The Expressing Relation

Andrea IACONA ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the evidence from ordinary language. My point is that if we assume about propositions only what is really intuitive, a certain kind of account of the expressing relation turns out to be precluded. As the classical picture of the expressing relation seems to presuppose that kind of account, this leads to think that there is something wrong with the classical picture of the expressing relation. In the second part of the paper I outline what I take to be a plausible but relatively modest account of the expressing relation. Some of the implications of the account outlined may appear undesirable. But I believe that the uneasiness depends on deep-rooted philosophical prejudices rather than on a solid intuitive basis. In the last section I deal with some objections that may be raised against the claims defended in the paper.

1. The Terms of The Relation It is said that sentences express propositions: the sentence Snow is white expresses the proposition that snow is white, the sentence Grass is green expresses the proposition that grass is green, and so on. Going by what they say, it may happen that different sentences express the same proposition or, conversely, that the same sentence expresses different propositions: both the Italian sentence La neve bianca and the English sentence Snow is white express the proposition that snow is white; on the other hand, the sentence It is raining expresses one proposition today and another proposition tomorrow. But how come the sentence Snow is white expresses just the proposition that snow is white, rather than the proposition that grass is green? In virtue of what different sentences express the same proposition, or one and the same sentence expresses different propositions in different circumstances? More generally, the question may be raised: What is it for a sentence s to express the proposition that p?.
Universit del Piemonte Orientale, Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, e-mail: andreai@ lett.unipmn.it

Dialectica Vol. 56, No 3 (2002), pp. 235-260

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To say that a certain sentence expresses a certain proposition is to say that a certain relation namely, the expressing relation obtains between the sentence and the proposition. Then, it seems quite natural to address our question as one of the form: What are the conditions for the relation R to obtain between a member of the class A and a member of the class B?. Take for example the question: What is it for a certain key to open a certain door?. We know that there are keys and that there are doors. Keys open doors in such a way that the same key may open more than one door, and the same door may be opened by more than one key. In order to get an answer to our question we need to know the conditions under which the opening relation obtains between keys and doors. Once we know that a key opens a door just in case the shape of the key matches the shape of the doors lock, we know what it is for a certain key to open a certain door. We might get an answer to the question What is it for a man to love a woman? in similar fashion. We know that there are men and that there are women. Men love women in such a way that one and the same man can love more than one woman, and one and the same woman can be loved by more than one man. In order to get the answer we need specify the conditions under which the love relation obtains between men and women. The cases of the opening and love relation and the case of the expressing relation might look alike at first sight. But there is an important disanalogy. The class of sentences and the class of propositions arent such that we can pick up a member of the first class and a member of the second class, and then see under what conditions the expressing relation obtains between them. The reason is that we seem to have no access to propositions independently of the sentences that we take to express them. In the first part of the paper I argue that this precludes a reductive or non-circular account of the expressing relation. In the second part of the paper I outline what I take to be a plausible but relatively modest account of the expressing relation. 2. What Can and What Can not be Taken for Granted About Propositions One rather widespread assumption about propositions is that the evidence for them comes from our ordinary way of speaking. We ordinarily speak of things said, meant, stated, thought, and so on, where the things in question are what we identify by means of clauses of the form that so-and-so. For example, in (1) Tom said that snow is white. the clause that snow is white seems to stand for what Tom said, namely, that snow is white. Propositions are usually assumed to be the things we say, mean, state, think, and so on, or what the clauses of the form that so-and-so stand for. In accordance with this assumption, from now on the word proposition

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will stand for the things we say, mean, state, think, and so on, i.e. the things were able to isolate as objects of our linguistic or mental acts. This definition may be regarded as intuitive, in that it doesnt require any sort of theorization but the intuitive distinction between saying, thinking, asserting that so-and-so, and the thing said, thought, asserted, that so-and-so. Certainly, in ordinary language we dont have a word for the class of all the things were able to isolate as objects of our different linguistic and mental acts. But we normally identify such things by means of clauses of the form that so-and-so in short, thatclauses. Accordingly, all we need to know about the word proposition is that it applies to the things we identify by means of that-clauses: we can say the proposition so-and-so whenever we can say that so-and-so. What exactly are propositions? Many philosophers seem to assume that propositions are language-independent and mind-independent entities, i.e. that their existence does not depend on that of speakers or thinkers. Another usual assumption about propositions is that they are made out of building blocks or constituents of some kind, in such a way that their structure matches to some extent the syntactic structure of the sentences which express them. Lastly, propositions are taken to be the kind of things that are true or false, and it is usually assumed that the sense in which they are true or false is different from that in which sentences can be said to be true or false. Sentences can be said to be true or false given the meaning they have and the way they are used on certain occasions by speakers of the language they belong to. On the contrary, propositions are taken to be true or false independently of linguistic facts concerning the sentences which express them. It seems to me that the widespread assumption that the evidence for propositions comes from ordinary language and the widespread assumption that propositions enjoy the properties just seen cant both be right. To begin with, nothing in the evidence provided by ordinary language leads us to think that propositions are language-independent entities. Suppose Tom tells us: (2) Snow is white. We certainly take what Tom says, that snow is white, to be other than his act of saying it. But we dont seem to take what Tom says to be something that would have existed even if English or any other language hadnt existed. Our intuitions are rather silent on this point. Prima facie, we seem to have no ground for thinking that propositions are language-independent entities, as we dont have language-independent access to them. There is an important difference between Tom and the proposition that snow is white. Our ways of identifying and describing Tom are to a large extent independent of its being the referent of the word Tom. That is, they cant be extracted from a simple analysis of our use of the name Tom or of any other expression. We can see

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Tom walking, or recognize him by his voice. On the contrary, there seems to be no way of identifying or describing the proposition that snow is white independently of its being the referent of the clause that snow is white. No significant distinction can be drawn between recognizing the proposition that snow is white as that very proposition and regarding it as the referent of the clause that snow is white. As there seems to be nothing to say about propositions besides what can be extracted from our use of that-clauses which refer to them, we have no grounds for taking propositions to be language-independent entities. This is not quite the same as saying that propositions are language-dependent entities because our criteria of identification for them are exclusively linguistic. An argument from the exclusively linguistic nature of our criteria of identification for propositions to their language-dependence wouldnt be very compelling. But it seems to follow from the fact that we only have linguistic criteria of identification for propositions that were not entitled to claim that they are language-independent entities, unless some argument is provided. Just as our ordinary way of talking doesnt presuppose the language-independence of propositions, it doesnt presuppose their mind-independence. Suppose we take what Tom said to be what Tom thought. Even if one grants that what Tom thought is other than Toms thinking it, it doesnt follow that what Tom thought would have existed even if thinkers like Tom hadnt existed. If all that we are entitled to say is that propositions can be thought by more than one person, they are no more mind-independent than sentences are. The proposition that snow is white isnt more mind-independent than the sentence (2) embedded in the that-clause which refers to the proposition. Similar considerations may be advanced as to the question whether propositions have structure. If saying that propositions are structured amounts to saying that they are made out of language-independent building blocks whose combination happens to match the combination of the words occurring in the sentences that express them, we are not entitled to say that propositions are structured. The proposition that snow is white doesnt have building blocks that we can identify or describe in a way that is to some extent independent of our analysis of (2). We dont identify the proposition that snow is white as that very proposition by identifying its constituents and the way they are combined. On the contrary, the only sense in which the proposition that snow is white can be said to have constituents is that in which its structure is entirely derived from the structure of (2). Lastly, propositions dont seem to be true or false in a sense that substantively differs from that in which sentences can be said to be true or false. It is usually assumed that sentences have a truth value relatively to the circum-

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stances in which they are uttered by the speakers of the language they belong to, while propositions have a truth value absolutely. For example, it is assumed that the sentence (3) It is raining. is true or false relatively to the place and time at which it is uttered by speakers of English, whereas the truth value of the proposition expressed by (3) on a given occasion does not itself change with time or space. However, we have no reason to think that propositions have their truth value absolutely. Our way of identifying propositions by means of that-clauses does not rule out the possibility of truth value changes. Suppose that Mary utters (3) at 2 p.m., and that half an hour later she utters (3) again. One may report Mary as saying the first time that it rains at 2 p.m., and the second time that it rains at 2.30 p.m. Otherwise, one may report Mary as saying on both occasions that it is raining. It is compatible with the first report to say that on the two occasions Mary stated different propositions, whereas it is compatible with the second report to say that she stated the same proposition. Our way of identifying propositions by means of that-clauses leaves indeterminate whether the proposition stated by Mary on the first occasion is the same as the proposition stated by Mary on the second occasion. Accordingly, it leaves indeterminate whether the proposition stated by Mary on the first occasion has a fixed truth value. If Mary stated two different propositions on the two occasions, the proposition she stated on the first occasion has a fixed truth value: if it rains at 2 p.m., it is always true that it rains at 2 p.m. Instead, if Mary stated the same proposition on both occasions, the proposition in question can change its truth value. For it may be the case that it rains at 2 p.m. but it is sunny half an hour later. We are not forced to conclude that propositions have their truth value absolutely. Moreover, the supposition that propositions can change their truth value seems compatible with our ordinary way of talking. Take the sentence The things he used to say about marriage could have been true some years ago, but they are certainly false now. This sentence seems to presuppose that the truth value of a proposition can change, as the expression the things he used to say refers to propositions. The same goes for expressions like It is no longer true that so-and-so, as that so-and-so refers to a proposition. More generally, in many cases in which we utter a sentence of the form Fa we seem to say something that may be true at a certain time and false at another time, for the object a may have the property of being F at a certain time and lack that property at another time. Presumably, the expressions that seem to presuppose truth value changes of propositions could be paraphrased in terms of expressions that do not presuppose such changes. For example, any sentence of the form At time t it was true that a

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is F, but now it is no longer true could be rephrased as It is true that a was F at time t, but it is false that a is still F. This is the kind of paraphrase that the advocates of propositions usually recommend. According to them, truth value changes are merely apparent, in that they concern the linguistic expression of propositions rather than those propositions themselves. For example, it is often maintained that the true proposition asserted by uttering a sentence of the form Fa at the time in which a is F is different from the false proposition that could be asserted at the time in which a is not F by uttering the same sentence, so, no truth value change can affect the first proposition. However, it seems that there may be a motivation for preferring expressions that dont presuppose truth value changes to expression that do presuppose such changes only if one starts from the assumption that propositions have their truth value absolutely. The simple fact that expressions of the second kind can be paraphrased in terms of expressions of the first kind shows nothing about the truth values of propositions. For there seems to be no reason for taking the expressions of the first kind to have some priority upon the expressions of the second kind, unless it is assumed what expressions of the second kind seem to question, i.e., that propositions have their truth value absolutely. Summarizing, the assumption that propositions enjoy properties such as that of being language-independent and mind-independent, that of being structured, or that of being true or false in a different sense from that in which sentences are true or false, finds no support in our ordinary way of speaking. Therefore, if the only evidence at our disposal comes from our ordinary way of speaking, we are not entitled to assume that there are entities with those properties. Conversely, in order to be entitled to assume that there are entities with those properties there must be arguments in support of them which do not rest simply on our ordinary way of speaking. One argument that may be taken to be perform this task is the classical argument that truths exist independently of our recognizing them. The proposition that so-and-so, it is sometimes said, is independent of its being expressed by the English sentence so-and-so or by some other sentence of a foreign language. For even before the human race made its appearance, it was already true that so-and-so. And even if speakers of English or any other language hadnt existed at all, it still would have been true that so-and-so. Frege used to say that the Pythagorean theorem is true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true: just as a planet was in interaction with other planets even before anyone saw it, the Pythagorean theorem was true even before it was discovered. But this argument is not a good argument. Whether considerations about propositions being true in the past or in possible states of affairs are relevant to the question about their existence in the past or in possible

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states of affairs depends on what it is for a truth bearer to be true in the past or in possible states of affairs. However, it seems that the most plausible sense in which a truth bearer can be said to be true in the past or in possible states of affairs fails to support any conclusion about its existence in the past or in possible states of affairs. Truth bearers are entities to which truth can be ascribed. The conditions under which truth bearers turn out to be true are called their truth conditions. For example, a truth bearer that is true just in case snow is white is a truth bearer that has snow being white as its truth condition. As snow happens to be white, such a truth bearer is true in the world as it is now, i.e. its truth condition is satisfied by the way things are. Truth bearers can also be evaluated with respect to states of affairs different from the actual and present one. Instead of wondering whether things as they are make a given truth bearer true, one may wonder whether the way things were in the past (will be in the future), or the way things could have been, is such as to make it true. That is, one may wonder whether those circumstances would have been such as to satisfy its truth condition. Just as for a truth bearer to be true in the present and actual state of affairs is for its truth condition to be satisfied in the present and actual state of affairs, for a truth bearer to be true in a state of affairs different from the present and actual one is for its truth condition to be satisfied in that state of affairs. This seems clear if we think of states of affairs different from the present and actual one as possible worlds as they are conceived in modal logic. For a formula Fa to be true in a possible world w is for its truth condition to be satisfied in w, namely, for the interpretation of a to exist in w and belong to the interpretation of F in w. The same goes for a truth bearer that has snow being white as its truth condition. For such a truth bearer to be true in an alternative state of affairs (where alternative means different from the actual and present one) is for snow to be white in that state of affairs. As snow was white two years ago, the truth bearer in question comes out true if evaluated with respect to the world as it was two years ago. On the contrary, the same truth bearer comes out false if evaluated with respect to a possible world where snow is green. As long as the satisfaction of the truth condition of a truth bearer doesnt require the existence of human beings or human activities, we can attribute truth to that truth bearer even with respect to the world as it was before the human race made its appearance, or with respect to possible worlds where no human being exists. The question about the truth of truth bearers in alternative states of affairs is to be distinguished from the question about the existence of truth bearers in such states of affairs. The latter question depends on what truth bearers are. If a truth bearer is an entity that exists in virtue of some linguistic conventions,

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it ontologically depends on those conventions. On the contrary, if a truth bearer is an entity that enjoys some kind of language-independent and mind-independent status, it can exist even if no linguistic convention exists. While the question whether a given truth bearer exists in alternative states of affairs depends on considerations about its ontological status, considerations about the satisfaction of its truth condition in those states of affairs are utterly irrelevant to that question. The existence in an alternative state of affairs of a truth bearer that has snow being white as its truth condition depends on what kind of entity the truth bearer is, independently of whether snow is or isnt white in that state of affairs. In short, the question about the truth of a truth bearer in alternative states of affairs depends on the satisfaction of its truth condition in those states of affairs, no matter what its ontological status is, whereas the question about its existence in those states of affairs depends on its ontological status, no matter whether its truth condition is satisfied in them. Once this is clear, it also becomes clear that from considerations about the truth of a truth bearer in alternative states of affairs we are not entitled to draw conclusions about its existence in those states of affairs. Let us assume that the Pythagorean theorem is eternally true, and take a time before it was formulated. The way things were at that time was such as to satisfy the truth condition of the theorem, namely, the condition that the sum of the squares of the catheti of a right-angle triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate to say that the theorem was true before we discovered it. It is also legitimate to add that the theorem was and indeed is true independently of our taking it to be true. This amounts to saying that its truth condition is satisfied independently of us. No doubt the truth condition itself depends on the theorem, and the theorem was formulated by us. But the fact that the condition is satisfied by no means depends on us. The important point is that the claim that the Pythagorean theorem was true before we formulated it and independently of our recognizing its truth does not entail that before we formulated it and independently of this formulation the world contained a certain entity that was the Pythagorean theorem. Something similar may be said with regard to possible states of affairs. Hadnt human beings ever existed, the truth condition of the Pythagorean theorem would still have been satisfied. Therefore, were entitled to say that the theorem would have been true even if speakers or thinkers hadnt existed. This does not entail that even if there were no speakers the world would still contain a certain entity, the Pythagorean theorem. I take the previous considerations to be relevant to the evaluation of other arguments that have been offered in support of the view that propositions are language-independent and mind-independent entities, notably by George E.

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Moore, Arthur N. Prior, George Bealer and Stephen Schiffer.1 For it seems that these other arguments rest on the same assumption that underlies the argument just considered, that is, the assumption that a truth bearer must exist in a certain possible world in order to be true in that possible world. As far as I know, no argument other than those relying on this dubious assumption is available in support of the claim that propositions are language-independent and mind-independent entities, and no argument that does not rely on equally dubious assumptions is able to show that propositions enjoy the other two properties considered above.2 But since a full defense of this claim would require at least another paper, here I can only say that nothing in what follows rests on the hypothesis that propositions enjoy the properties under consideration. Ill assume simply what can be extracted from our ordinary way of speaking of things said, meant, stated, thought, and so on. 3. Reference to Propositions We saw that the only material at our disposal for the identification of propositions is provided by that-clauses. That-clauses are in turn the result of the nominalization of the sentences they embed. One way in which our language enables us to introduce that-clauses is by application of the predicate true. From (2) Snow is white. we can infer (4) It is true that snow is white. The clause that snow is white, obtained by nominalization of (2), is all we need to refer to the proposition that snow is white. This is to say that in inferring (4) from (2) we derive a sentence involving explicit reference to a proposition from a sentence not involving such a reference. Another class of cases in which our language licenses the introduction of that-clauses is that of indirect speech reports. Suppose (2) is uttered by Tom. Then (5) Tom said: snow is white. is a direct report of Toms utterance. The indirect counterpart of (5) is (1) Tom said that snow is white. which involves explicit reference to the proposition that snow is white. A sentence of the form A said that p counts as indirect counterpart of a sentence
1 Moore 1962, p. 375; Prior 1971, pp. 5-6, 12; Bealer 1993, pp. 5-16; Schiffer 1996, p. 150; Schiffer 2000, p.7. In Iacona 2002 these arguments are examined in some detail. 2 In particular, arguments such as those offered in Evans 1985 and Richard 1981 to the effect that propositions have their truth value absolutely, rest on assumptions that seem to me neither intuitive (as they are tacitly taken to be) nor warranted on independent grounds.

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of the form A said: s (where s stands for a quoted sentence) just in case p is either the same sentence as s or it is a sentence obtained by paraphrasing s. In the latter case, one or more expressions occurring in s may be replaced with other expressions taken to be equivalent to them. The replacement is both a matter of interlinguistic or homophonic translation and a matter of context adjustment. If we use the term interpretation to include both translation and context adjustment, we can say that indirect speech reports differ from direct speech reports in that they may embed in that-clauses the interpretations of the sentences directly reported. Both in the case of the truth predicate and in the case of indirect speech reports, the step from sentences which do not involve explicit reference to propositions to sentences which do involve such reference is secured by the introduction of that-clauses embedding either sentences (occurring in sentences) of the first kind or sentences that interpret them. That is, explicit reference to the proposition that p is obtained by introduction of the clause that p in connection with a sentence s, where p is either the same sentence as s or it is an interpretation of s.3 As we have no way of identifying or describing propositions independently of that-clauses, we have no way of identifying or describing propositions independently of sentences in connection with whom that-clauses can be introduced. Note that given any thatclause, there is at least one such sentence, namely, the sentence embedded in the that-clause itself. Therefore, the only sense in which propositions can be said to be independent of sentences is that in which each proposition is independent of this or that sentence. The proposition that p can be said to be independent of the sentence s only insofar as the clause that p can be introduced on the basis of some interpretation relation between p and a sentence s'? different from s. For example, the proposition that snow is white can be said to be independent of (2) only insofar as the clause that snow is white can be introduced in connection with some other sentence, say, the Italian sentence (6) La neve bianca. The disanalogy with doors and women seems clear. Doors can be identified and described independently of their being related to keys. The independence of a door from its relation to a key is not simply a matter of there being other keys to which it is related. Similarly, women can be identified and described independently of their being related to men. The independence of a woman from her relation to a man is not simply a matter of there being other men to whom she is related.
3 The matter is slightly more complex with other languages. For example, in German the nominalization of sentences involves changes in the word order. When the German sentence Die Katze sitzt auf der Matte is embedded its word order must change, as in Es ist wahr, da die Katze auf der Matte sitzt, or Ich glaube, da die Katze auf der Matte sitzt.

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The preceding considerations suggest that the question What is it for a sentence s to express the proposition that p? cannot be handled by picking up members of the class of sentences and members of the class of propositions and then examining the conditions under which a certain relation obtains between them. In order to pick up a proposition we need some sentence, that is, some relation need be involved between a that-clause and a sentence. This is to say that we cannot deal with sentences and propositions in the same way in which we can deal with keys and doors or men and women. As we can identify and describe doors and women independently of keys and men, we are able to explain the opening and love relations in terms of some other relation obtaining between keys and doors or men and women. If the relation R obtains between a member a of the class A and a member b of the class B, and were able to give a description of b independently of its being R-related to a (or to any other member of A), then we may be able to account for a being R-related to b in terms of a being R-related to b. That is, we may be able to provide an account which contains the same objects a and b as its ingredients, although it does not contain R but some more basic relation R?4 The opening relation may be explained in terms of the relation between some features of the key and some features of the door. Similarly, supposing one wants a behaviorist account of love, one might say that for a man to love a woman is to behave in a certain way in presence of that woman. But we cant analyse s expresses the proposition that p in terms of s is related in such-and-such a way to the proposition that p. The only way of providing a s-independent description of the proposition that p is in terms of some sentence s', different from s, that we take to be related to the clause that p. But if the clause that p is related to s', it is related to s' in the same way in which it is related to s. That is, just as the clause that p can be introduced in connection with s, it can be introduced in connection with s'. Therefore, if s is taken to express the proposition that p, there seems to be no reason not to take s' to express the proposition that p as well. And it wouldnt make much sense to say that s expresses the proposition that p is to be analysed in terms of s is related in such-and-such a way to what is expressed by s'. It is a traditional picture that of sentences as perceptible garbs of propositions:

4 It may be the case that we have a R-independent description of the things in B but were not able to give a reductive account of R. Perhaps, the to-the-right-of relation could be an example. On the contrary, it seems that in order to have a reductive account of R we must be able to give a R-independent description of the things in B, for the account is reductive only to the extent to which the notion of R is not presupposed by its ingredients.

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The thought, in itself imperceptible by the senses, gets clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to grasp it. We say a sentence expresses a thought.5

We may make a dress for a person, or change a dress we made for a different one. But the person under the dress remains the same. Getting clothed is purely accidental to that person. According to this picture, sentences capture, or latch on to, entities that are in some important sense outside language, thereby giving them perceptible form. More generally, the view of the expressing relation as a relation between linguistic items and entities out there has been rather influential in philosophy. Roughly, the idea is that the sentence (2) picks up an external object more ore less in the same way in which the name Fido picks up a certain dog. In accordance with this idea, one might think that some reductive or non-circular account of the expressing relation could be provided, i.e., that the fact that a certain sentence expresses what it expresses can be explained in terms of that sentence being related in some way to an external or independent entity of some kind. For example, (2) would express what it expresses in that its semantic properties (as they result from the composition of the semantic properties of its constituent expressions) would relate it to a certain external or independent entity. Similarly, (2) and (6) would express the same thing in that their semantic properties (as they result from the composition of the semantic properties of their constituent expressions) would make them pick up the same external or independent entity. However, it seems to follow from the considerations advanced so far that the relation between sentences and propositions cannot be accounted in these terms. s expresses the proposition that p cannot be analysed in terms of s is related in such-and-such a way to the proposition that p. That is, we cannot give an explanation of the expressing relation obtaining between s and the proposition that p in terms of some more basic complex relation obtaining between the sentence (its constituent expressions) and the proposition (its building blocks). 4. A Modest Proposal Rather, the answer to our question What is it for a sentence s to express the proposition that p? should take the form: the sentence s expresses the proposition that p just in case ...s..., where ...s... does not contain the proposition that p. But how is the substitute for to express the proposition that p to be found? The answer is rather simple. If we look at our ordinary way of introducing sentences containing that p in connection with s, we get an
5

Frege 1977, p. 5.

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account of the relation between s and the proposition that p. Plausibly enough, the expressing relation amounts to this relation. There are two classes of cases in which we make a connection between s and a sentence containing that p. One is that in which p and s are the same sentence, the other is that in which p and s are different sentences. In the first case the sentence containing that p is obtained by means of simple linguistic transformations that entitle us to embed sentences in that-clauses. Consequently, for any closed sentence p, the relation between p and the proposition that p is warranted by these simple linguistic transformations. The inference from (2) Snow is white. to (4) It is true that snow is white. rests on nothing but the linguistic transformation that entitles us to derive from p its pleonastic equivalent It is true that p. Similarly, the inference from (5) Tom said: Snow is white. to (1) Tom said that snow is white. rests on nothing but the unproblematic step from sentences of the form A said: p to sentences of the form A said that p.6 As long as the nominalization of (2) is licensed, explicit reference to the proposition that snow is white is warranted, independently of the semantic properties of (2). Then, (7) The sentence Snow is white expresses the proposition that snow is white. is trivially true. Its out of place to ask why the expressing relation obtains between (2) and the proposition that snow is white. There is nothing to say about the sentence and the proposition being related, besides their being related in virtue of simple linguistic transformations of which we already have a perfect mastery. The point about the triviality of (7) may be made by paraphrasing (7) in terms of ordinary language. It seems that whenever we feel entitled to introduce the clause that p in connection with the sentence p, we also feel entitled to use expressions such as says that p or means that p with regard to p. That is, our ordinary use of sentences containing says that or means that seems to match our way of making connections between sentences and that-clauses. Since p expresses the proposition that p is to be accounted just in terms of the connection we make between p and the clause
6 Obviously, the inference above is unproblematic under the assumption that Tom is speaking English. For example, the string of words I VITELLI DEI ROMANI SONO BELLI has one meaning in Italian and another meaning in Latin.

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that p, p expresses the proposition that p may be paraphrased into p says that p or p means that p, where expresses is replaced by says or means, and the proposition that p is replaced by its ordinary equivalent that p. This is to say that the cash value of (7) is captured by (7*) Snow is white says that snow is white. or (7**)Snow is white means that snow is white. Since (7*) and (7**) are trivially true according to our ordinary use of the verbs to say or to mean, (7) turns out to be trivially true as well. The second case in which we make a connection between a sentence s and a clause that p is that in which p and s are different sentences. In this case p must be an interpretation of s. Accordingly, the relation between s and the proposition that p is warranted by that interpretation relation. For example, the relation between (6) La neve bianca. and the proposition that snow is white is warranted insofar as (2) whose relation to the proposition that snow is white is trivially warranted is an interpretation of (6). This is to say that (8) The sentence La neve bianca expresses the proposition that snow is white. is true because (2) is an interpretation of (6). The point about (7) and (8) may be generalized as an account of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition: (ME) The sentence s (as uttered in a certain context) expresses the proposition that p iff p is an interpretation of s (as uttered in that context).

(ME) makes (7) trivial because it is obviously (or vacuously) true that (2) is an interpretation of itself. (8) comes out less trivial because it is less obvious that (2) is an interpretation of (6). To put things another way, it is true in virtue of the grammar of our language that (2) expresses the proposition that snow is white. On the contrary, it is not true in virtue of the grammar of our language that (6) expresses the proposition that snow is white, as it is not true in virtue of the grammar of our language that (2) is an interpretation of (6).7 It follows from (ME) that sameness of proposition expressed may be accounted for in terms of inter-interpretability between sentences. Saying that two sentences s and s' express the same proposition amounts to saying that there is a certain proposition to which both s and s' are expressing-related. Given (ME),
7 We find some hint in the direction of (ME) in Haack 1970, pp. 56-57, Von Wright 1984, pp. 20-21, and Field 1992, pp. 325-326.

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s and s' are expressing-related to the same proposition that p just in case the sentence p is an interpretation of both s and s'. Since p need not differ from s or s', there is always at least one sentence that counts as an interpretation of one of them. It follows that whenever s and s' are interpretations of each other, there is a sentence p that counts as an interpretation of both. This is to say that sameness of proposition expressed may be phrased as (MS) The sentence s' expresses the same proposition as the sentence s (as uttered in a certain context) iff s' is an interpretation of s (as uttered in that context).

There is at least one point on which the contrast between (ME) and a reductive or non-circular account of the expressing relation seems clear. If the expressing relation is explainable in terms of some more basic relation obtaining between sentences and propositions, say, in virtue of semantic facts concerning the sentences themselves (presumably, facts about the words occurring in them and the way they are combined), then for any sentence which expresses a proposition there is a story to be told about why that sentence expresses that very proposition. Thus, it is quite natural to think that on a reductive or non-circular account of the expressing relation, (2) would bear that relation to the proposition that snow is white in virtue of semantic facts concerning (2) (presumably, facts about the words occurring in it and the way they are combined). As (7) would be true in virtue of those facts, there would be a substantive answer to the question why (7) holds. On the contrary, (ME) provides no substantive answer to that question. (7) turns out to be trivially true according to (ME), as it simply contains two occurrences of the same sentence. The case of (8) is different, in that some interpretation relation is taken to hold between two different sentences. But even in this case it doesnt seem correct to say that (ME) provides a substantive answer to the question why (8) holds. Certainly, the question whether some interpretation relation holds between two given sentences may be a rather substantive one, and this makes the truth of (8) non-trivial. However, if the answer to the question why (8) holds is substantive in that it involves a non-trivial answer to the question whether (2) is an interpretation of (6), then the substantive part of the answer is exactly the part of the answer that (ME) does not provide. Therefore, even if it may be right to say that (ME) allows for a substantive answer to the question why (8) holds, it doesnt seem correct to say that (ME) provides such an answer. More generally, (ME) doesnt seem to provide a substantive answer to the question why sentences express propositions, at least

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not in the sense in which a reductive or non-circular account of the expressing relation would provide one. Accordingly, (ME) may be regarded as a minimalist account of the expressing relation.8 However, saying that (ME) is a minimalist account in this sense does not amount to saying that (ME) is a minimalist account in the sense that it reduces all claims about sentences expressing proposition to a collection of trivial claims. Insofar as interpretation between sentences may be a non-trivial affair, the claims obtained by (ME) may be non-trivial. 5. Context-Dependence (ME) and (MS) provide a simple answer to the question How come the sentence Snow is white expresses the proposition that snow is white? and to the question How come the English sentence Snow is white and the Italian sentence La neve bianca express the same proposition?. The question How come one and the same sentence expresses different propositions in different circumstances? is a little more complicated. The answer in accordance with (ME) is that one and the same sentence can be interpreted by different sentences in different circumstances. This answer seems to square ill with some widespread assumptions about context-dependence. For example, it is usually assumed that the proposition expressed by (3) It is raining. changes with the place and time at which (3) is uttered, i.e. that a variation of context of utterance determines a variation of proposition expressed. But suppose (3) is uttered at 2 p.m., and that half an hour later (3) is uttered again. It may be the case that both It was raining at 2 p.m. and (3) are good interpretations of (3) as uttered on the first occasion, and that both It was raining at 2.30 p.m. and (3) are good interpretations of (3) as uttered on the second occasion. In this case (ME) does not allow us to say that on the two occasions (3) expressed two different propositions more than it allows us to say that it expressed the same proposition. The divergence between (ME) and the standard account depends on some tacit assumptions about propositions which underlie the standard account. It is normally taken for granted that the proposition expressed by (3) on a certain occasion is something that cannot be individuated by means of the sentence alone. We need, so to speak, more information than that contained in the sentence. For example, the proposition expressed by (3) as it is uttered in New York the 26th of October 2000 at 2 p.m. is something that cannot be individuated by means of (3) alone. One needs to
I take this to be the sense in which Hartry Field uses the expression minimalist view of the expressing relation (Field 1992, pp. 325-26).
8

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know that (3) is uttered in New York the 26th of October at 2 p.m. Thus, it is normally assumed that if there is a sentence by means of which the proposition in question can be individuated, it is the eternal sentence (9) It rains in New York the 26th of October 2000 at 2 p.m. This assumption goes well with the tacit assumption that propositions have their truth value absolutely. It is no accident that the usual consideration in support of the claim that the same sentence may express different propositions in different circumstances is that the same sentence may be used to say something true on a certain occasion and something false on a certain other occasion. It is commonly taken for granted that difference of truth value is a sufficient condition of difference of proposition expressed, i.e. that if the truth value of the proposition expressed by uttering a certain sentence on a certain occasion differs from the truth value of the proposition expressed by uttering that sentence on a different occasion, then two different propositions are expressed on the two occasions. This criterion in turn presupposes, and follows from, the assumption that propositions have their truth value absolutely. It would simply be inconsistent to maintain that a difference of truth value is ipso facto a difference of proposition expressed and to allow truth value changes for propositions. If propositions can change their truth value, it may happen that on two different occasions we make two utterances of the same sentence that differ in truth value yet express the same proposition. Conversely, if each proposition has its truth value absolutely, having that truth value is part of its being the proposition it is. Note that the assumption that propositions have their truth value absolutely presupposes, and follows from, the equally widespread claim that sameness of truth value is a necessary condition of sameness of proposition expressed, i.e. that if two sentences (as uttered in their respective contexts) express the same proposition, then they have the same truth value. For if truth value changes are allowed, we get cases in which the proposition expressed is the same but the truth values differ. Conversely, to deny that sameness of truth value is a necessary condition of identity between propositions is to allow truth value changes for propositions. In short, the claim that (3) must express different propositions on different occasions is equivalent to the assumption that the proposition expressed by (3) on a given occasion is something that has its truth value absolutely and, accordingly, that cannot be individuated by means of (3) alone. But since we have no reason to accept the assumption in question, we have no reason to accept that claim. Rather, it seems correct to say that (3) can express different propositions in different contexts. Similar considerations may be advanced with regard to other cases in which it is commonly maintained that the same sentence expresses different

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propositions in different contexts. This happens with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The sentence (10) He is tall. may be taken to say that John is tall in one context, and that Tom is tall in another context. It is normally assumed that if we take (10) and we add all the relevant information concerning the first context we get a proposition involving John, whereas if we add all the relevant information concerning the second context we get a proposition involving Tom. However, there may be circumstances in which it is correct to interpret (10) by means of (10) itself. And if we allow that propositions can be individuated by means of that-clauses embedding sentences containing indexicals just as by means of that-clauses embedding sentences not containing indexicals, this means that there may be circumstances in which it is correct to say that (10) expresses the proposition that he is tall. There certainly are cases in which it is incorrect not to get rid of the indexicals occurring in a certain sentence in order to identify the proposition expressed by that sentence. For example, it is incorrect for you to identify the proposition expressed by the sentence I like cheese as it is uttered by me by means of a that-clause embedding that very sentence. Note that this possibility is ruled out by the fact that it is incorrect for you to interpret the sentence I like cheese as uttered by me by resorting to the sentence itself. But in some cases there is nothing wrong with keeping the indexicals occurring in a certain sentence in order to identify the proposition expressed by that sentence. And in many cases in which the indexicals are to be replaced, they can be replaced with other indexicals. In all these cases it seems appropriate to say that the sentence in question can express indexical propositions. What has been said about indexicals applies to demonstratives. More generally, in identifying propositions expressed by sentences containing contextdependent expressions we may get rid of those expressions in favor of context-independent expressions, but we dont necessarily need to do so. Accordingly, sentences containing context-dependent expressions can be said to express propositions that inherit their context-dependence just as propositions that do not inherit it. This goes against a standard picture of contextdependence. The picture is that if we take a sentence (containing contextdependent expressions) and we add all the relevant information about the context of its utterance, we get one proposition which is the proposition expressed by that sentence in that context. On the contrary, the previous considerations suggest that given any sentence (containing context-dependent expressions) and given the context in which it is uttered, more than one proposition can equally be said to be expressed by that sentence in that context. This is to say that there is no univocal answer to the question What is the proposition

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expressed by such-and-such sentence in such-and-such context?. In fact, it is simply misleading to suppose that there is such a thing as the proposition expressed by a given sentence in a given context. As there is no fixed way of interpreting that sentence, there is no fixed way of determining what proposition it expresses. Another class of cases in which it is usually maintained that one and the same sentence expresses different propositions is that in which the sentence is ambiguous. For example, the sentence (11) Visiting relatives can be boring. contains the ambiguous expression visiting relatives. One reading of (11) is that it can be boring to visit relatives. The other is that relatives who are visiting can be boring. It is usually assumed that the proposition expressed by (11) as it is uttered by a given speaker in a given context corresponds to just one of these two readings. However, there may be cases in which an utterance of (11) can be reported both by means of a that-clause embedding a sentence corresponding to one of the two readings above, say It can be boring to visit relatives, and by means of a that-clause embedding (11) itself. In such cases it is correct both to say that (11) expresses the proposition that it can be boring to visit relatives and to say that (11) expresses the proposition that visiting relatives can be boring. The second proposition can be described as an ambiguous proposition. More generally, insofar as sentences infected by features like context-dependence or ambiguity can be interpreted by sentences infected by the same features (just as by sentences not infected by them), they can be said to express propositions infected by those features (just as propositions not infected by them). What has been said so far undermines a more general idea about propositions. It is usually assumed as a matter of definition that propositions are interpretations of sentences, and that as such they arent themselves things which can be interpreted. On the contrary, it seems correct both to say that propositions are interpretations of sentences (although not in the usual sense) and that propositions can be interpreted just like sentences. This is perfectly compatible with our ordinary way of speaking about the things we say, state, believe, and so on. For we normally seem to attribute to such things properties like that of being unclear or ambiguous, and we normally seem to assume that some information about the circumstances in which they have been said, stated, believed, and so on, is needed in order to fully understand them. 6. Some Objections and The Responses to Them Objection 1. You say at some point that theres no way of identifying or describing the proposition that snow is white independently of the clause that snow is white. But this is simply false, as you yourself acknowledge when you

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concede that the very same proposition is expressed by the Italian sentence La neve bianca and by other sentences of foreign languages (Diego Marconi, Stephen Schiffer). What I acknowledge is that the proposition that snow is white can be said to be independent of the sentence Snow is white insofar as it is expressed by some other sentence. More generally, the proposition that p can be said to be independent of the sentence s (which expresses it) insofar as it is expressed by some sentence s' different from s. But saying that the proposition that p is expressed by s' amounts to saying that sentences involving explicit reference to the proposition that p can be derived from sentences containing s', where sentences involving explicit reference to the proposition that p are nothing but sentences containing the clause that p. It is then essential to the proposition expressed by a certain sentence that we identify that proposition by means of a certain that-clause. No doubt one can talk of the proposition that snow is white as what is expressed by the Italian sentence La neve bianca. But if asked what is it that is expressed by the Italian sentence La neve bianca, all one can say is something like La neve bianca expresses the proposition that snow is white or La neve bianca says that snow is white. We seem to have no way of identifying the proposition that snow is white which is in some important sense independent of the clause that snow is white. In substance, the claim that we have no way of identifying or describing propositions independently of that-clauses is not incompatible with propositions being in some sense independent of the sentences that express them. Different sentences can express the same proposition, but the identification of that proposition essentially depends on some that-clause. Objection 2. But it is not in general true that our ordinary discourse about propositions can be accounted in terms of that-clauses. There are ways of talking of propositions which involve no use of that-clauses at all. Sometimes we refer to propositions indirectly, as in The Pythagorean Theorem is true. At other times we quantify over propositions, as in Everything Mary believes is questionable (Gabriele Usberti). The claim that that-clauses are essential to the identification of propositions by no means entails that there is no way of talking of propositions without using that-clauses. What the claim does entail is that if there is such a way of talking of propositions, it can be traced back to ways of talking of propositions which involve that-clauses. The basic way of talking of propositions hinges on the use of that-clauses, whereas the ways of talking of propositions which involve no use of that-clauses are secondary or derived with respect to it. This is not to say that each single speaker actually derives, or is able to derive, each

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single sentence involving reference to a proposition from a sentence containing a that-clause, and each sentence containing a that-clause from a sentence not containing it. Neither is it to say that all the propositions we talk about have actually been obtained in such a way. What is required is that the dependence holds in principle, and that our ways of talking of propositions which involve no use of that-clauses arent, so to speak, genuine ways of introducing propositions in our discourse. Take the sentence (12) The Pythagorean Theorem is true. (12) involves reference to a proposition yet contains no that-clauses. All that is needed in order to rightfully assert (12) is to know that a certain proposition called The Pythagorean Theorem is true (indeed, this may be the only thing one knows about the proposition in question). However, it seems that in using (12) we take for granted that there is a direct or explicit way of referring to the proposition called The Pythagorean Theorem. It is by resorting to such an explicit way that the proposition has been identified as that very proposition, and has been shown to be true. Accordingly, it is plausible to account for its introduction in our discourse as follows. If one knows that the sum of the squares of the catheti of a right-angle triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse, one allows (13) It is true that the sum of the squares of the catheti of a right-angle triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse. where the embedded sentence refers to the proposition that the sum of the squares of the catheti of a right-angle triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse. One may also know that (14) Pythagoras proved that the sum of the squares of the catheti of a rightangle triangle equals the square of the hypotenuse. where the embedded sentence obviously refers to the same proposition referred to in (13). If one knows in addition that the proposition proved by Pythagoras is called The Pythagorean Theorem, one can infer (12) from (13) and (14). In order to undermine the claim that propositions are essentially identified by means of that-clauses it has to be shown that, on the contrary, it is just by means of (12) that we introduce the proposition in question in our discourse, which seems quite implausible. The case of quantified sentences is slightly more complex. One might think that sentences such as (15) Everything Mary believes is questionable. show not only that (i) we can talk of propositions without using that-clauses, but that (ii) we normally assume that there are infinitely many propositions, no matter how or whether we identify them. The motivation for (ii) would be that a quantified sentence presupposes a domain of quantification, and there

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seem to be infinitely many things in the domain of quantification presupposed by (15). However, this motivation does not suffice for (ii). Nothing in (15) suggests that the domain of quantification which (15) presupposes is to be conceived of as a given infinity of objects enjoying some kind of independent existence. On the contrary, the sense in which (15) brings in infinitely many propositions is compatible with the claim that propositions are essentially things we identify by means of that-clauses. To think of infinitely many propositions is to think of infinitely many things we could identify by means of that-clauses. Actually, we can think of infinitely many such things, for we can embed infinitely many sentences in that-clauses. In the specific case of (15), we could assert infinitely many sentences of the form Mary believes that p. More generally, whenever we quantify over propositions we reason about the possibility of embedding sentences in that-clauses. The propositions in our domain of quantification are the things we would identify if we embedded certain sentences in certain that-clauses. We need not know or master all the sentences involved in our reasoning, for some of them may contain words we dont know or master. We dont even need to be in a position to know those sentences. For example, if one says The proposition expressed by the first utterance of the third millenium is false, one is reasoning about the falsity of a certain proposition which could be identified by means of a certain thatclause if one had a certain sentence. But the sentence in question cannot be known at the moment, and may contain words that dont belong to our present repertoire. In cases like this we refer to propositions not actually identified as to things we would identify if we had certain sentences at our disposal. More generally, our domain of quantification includes all the things were able to conceive of as identifiable in terms of that-clauses, no matter whether we actually are in a position to identify them. Quantification over propositions may be regarded as an extension of our way of talking of actually identified propositions. And since our way of talking of actually identified propositions hinges on our use of that-clauses embedding particular sentences we actually master, our understanding of quantified sentences rests on our use of thatclauses embedding particular sentences we actually master. The dependence of our use of sentences involving quantification over propositions on our use of sentences containing that-clauses seems clear if we consider the way in which quantified sentences are obtained. (15) says that for every x, if Mary believes x then x is questionable. We get to (15) in the same way in which we get to other quantified sentences of logical form x (FxGx), that is, by generalizing over sentences of logical form FaGa. It is then essential in order to get to (15) that we take the particular sentences that are to count as relevant for our generalization to have the logical form FaGa. Take the con-

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ditional whose antecedent is Mary believes that modern science has forgotten subjectivity, and whose consequent is that modern science has forgotten subjectivity is questionable. In order for this conditional to be relevant to our generalization, we must take the first sentence to say that a certain thing has a certain property F and the second sentence to say that the same thing has another property G. Therefore, we must treat the first sentence in such a way that the property of being believed by Mary turns out to be attributed to a certain thing, and the second sentence in such a way that the property of being questionable turns out to be attributed to the same thing. In order to get the thing to which the property of being believed by Mary is attributable, we must treat the first sentence as saying something of the form Mary believes a. For only in this case the sentence can be revolved by hinging on the a. But saying that the first sentence has the form Mary believes a amounts to saying that the expression that modern science has forgotten subjectivity occurring in it stands for something, namely, what Mary believes. Similarly, the property of being questionable turns out to be attributed to the same thing to which the property of being believed by Mary is attributed only if the expression that modern science has forgotten subjectivity occurring in the second sentence stands for something, namely, what is questionable. As (15) can be said to talk of propositions just in that it talks of the things believed by Mary, and in order to get to (15) the things believed by Mary must be identified by means of that-clauses, it is essential in order to get to (15) that propositions are identified by means of that-clauses. What holds for the generalization holds for the step from (15) to its instances. It seems necessary to the instantiation of (15) that we bring in sentences like those mentioned, and, accordingly, that we take propositions to be identified by means of that-clauses occurring in them. The case of existential quantification is analogous. Take the inference from Mary believes that modern science has forgotten subjectivity to there is something Mary believes. It is essential to this inference that the clause that modern science has forgotten subjectivity stands for something, namely, what is believed by Mary. The dependence of our use of quantified sentences like (15) on our use of sentences containing that-clauses shows the irrelevance of (i). As in the case of (12), in order to undermine the claim that propositions are essentially identified by means of that-clauses one has to maintain not only that (15) is a sentence involving reference to propositions yet not containing that-clauses which is obvious but that the way of talking of propositions involved in quantified sentences like (15) is independent of our way of identifying propositions in terms of that-clauses. Only the first irrelevant claim is true. For it seems that our way of identifying propositions in terms of

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that-clauses is necessary to our understanding and mastery of sentences like (15). The same doesnt hold for the opposite direction. In order to talk of propositions in terms of that-clauses one need not presuppose the way of talking of propositions involved in sentences like (15). We can easily imagine a speaker who has a perfect mastery of sentences containing that-clauses, yet lacks the quantificational apparatus required by (15). But it is hardly conceivable that a speaker has the quantificational apparatus required by (15) yet fails to master sentences containing that-clauses. Then, it seems correct to say that sentences like (15) presuppose some way of identifying propositions, they themselves dont provide one. In this sense, the talk of propositions involved in sentences like (15) isnt a way of introducing propositions in our discourse. Objection 3. Even if we can embed infinitely many sentences in that-clauses, the number of propositions still outstrips the number of that-clauses at our disposal. Take propositions about numbers: there are nondenumerably many such propositions. For example, to each of the nondenumerably many subsets of the set of natural numbers there corresponds a distinct truth of the theory of natural numbers, namely, the truth that, say, zero is (or is not) a member of that subset. Therefore, there are at least as many truths about natural numbers as there are subsets of the set of natural numbers, and so there are nondenumerably many such truths. But our language contains only denumerably many sentences, as each sentence is a finite string of words drawn from a finite vocabulary. This shows that there are propositions with no linguistic expression, and obviously such propositions arent identified by means of that-clauses (Josep Maci).9 The claim that nondenumerably many propositions exist independently of our linguistic resources presupposes that propositions are entities enjoying some kind of language-independent and mind-independent existence. As I do not assume this, Im not willing to accept the claim under consideration unless some independent argument is provided. To reject that claim is not quite the same thing as to say that it makes no sense at all to talk of nondenumerably many propositions about numbers. Rather, it means that the only sense in which such talk is acceptable is that in which every sentence about numbers we could assert would enable us to identify a corresponding proposition. Take the nondenumerably many subsets of the set of natural numbers. For each of these subsets we could have a sentence about it, and this would enable us to identify a corresponding proposition. Again, we can refer to propositions not actually identified as to things we would identify if we had certain sentences
9

A similar point is make in Sormes 1999, p. 19.

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at our disposal. In this particular case the trouble is that there is only a denumerable infinity of sentences available in our language, while the propositions about numbers we can think of are nondenumerably many. But this does not entail that there are propositions were not able to identify by means of thatclause. No proposition we can think of is, in principle, not identifiable in terms of some that-clause. On the contrary, the propositions we can think of are just the things we conceive of as identifiable in terms of that-clauses. The limitation is simply that given any language, only a denumerable infinity of propositions can be identified in that language. Therefore, we seem to have no reason for thinking that some propositions exist but have no linguistic expression, although it seems right to say that the number of propositions were able to conceive outstrips that of sentences available in our language. Objection 4. You take the following sentence to be trivially true: (7) The sentence Snow is white expresses the proposition that snow is white But (7) is trivially true only if the sentence Snow is white is identified in terms of what it means in English. If that is the way one identifies sentences, the claim that there is no substantive account of the expressing relation becomes itself trivial: for not only propositions cannot be identified except in terms of sentences, but the latter cannot be identified in terms of the former either. The point is that we do not need to identify sentences in terms of what they mean, and this is why there is still an interesting question of how we should define the expressing relation (Jrme Dokic). A sentence may be defined as a string of words formed according to the syntactic rules of this or that language. According to this definition, sentences are purely syntactic entities that have semantic properties contingently and depending on the linguistic practices of the speakers of the language they belong to. Otherwise, a sentence may be defined as a string of words that is formed according to the syntactic rules of a certain language and has certain semantic properties, namely, the semantic properties associated to it by the actual speakers of that language. According to the latter definition, sentences have their actual semantic properties necessarily or essentially. Both ways of individuating sentences are legitimate, although I think that in our case the second is preferable. The obvious way of making sense of claims involving our intuitive notions of saying that p or meaning that p and, accordingly, of expressing the proposition that p is that of taking them to be claims about properties possessed by strings of marks as they are understood by the speakers of the language they belong to, rather than claims about strings of marks simpliciter. For example, the obvious way of making sense of (7) is that of

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reading it as saying that the string of words Snow is white as we understand it expresses the proposition that snow is white. Therefore, it seems natural to presuppose the second of the two definitions considered above. Or, in case the first definition is adopted, it seems natural to add to (7) some restriction such as given the way we actually use the sentence or given our actual understanding of the sentence. But independently of the question whether the second definition is to be preferred, the point here is that the triviality of (7) does not depend on that definition, as it does not depend on the fact that Snow is white has the meaning it has. On the contrary, (7) is trivial just because it is true no matter what the meaning of Snow is white is. Given any sentence p, it is true that p expresses the proposition that p, whatever the meaning of p may be. Even if one doesnt know what a certain sentence p means, one can confidently say that it expresses a certain proposition, namely, the proposition that p. To put things another way, if the first definition is adopted and sentences are taken to have their semantic properties contingently, (7) is to be regarded as necessarily true, in that its truth is compatible with the different meanings that could be assigned to Snow is white by English speakers (provided the relevant linguistic transformations concerning that-clauses remain fixed). Note that (ME) preserves the necessity of (7), as the sentence Snow is white is an interpretation of itself for all its possible meanings.10
REFERENCES
BEALER, G. 1993. Universals, Journal of Philosophy, 90, pp. 5-32. EVANS, G. 1985. Does Tense Logic Rest upon a Mistake?, in Collected Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985. FIELD, H. 1992. Critical Notice: Paul Horwichs Truth, Philosophy of Science, 59, pp. 321-330. FREGE, G. 1977. Thoughts, in P.T. Geach and R.H. Stoothoff (eds), Logical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell. HAACK, R.J. and S. 1970. Token-Sentences, Translation and Truth-Value, Mind, 79, pp. 40-57. IACONA, A. 2002. Are there propositions? Erkenntnis (forthcoming) MOORE, G.E. 1962. Commonplace Book (1919-1953), ed. by C. Lewy, Bristol, Thoemmes Press, repr. 1993. PRIOR, A.N. 1971. Objects of Thought, Oxford, Clarendon Press. RICHARD, M. 1981. Temporalism and Eternalism, Philosophical Studies, 39, pp. 1-13. SCHIFFER, S. 1996. Language-Created Language-Independent Entities, Philosophical Topics, 24, pp. 149-167. SCHIFFER, S. 2000. Pleonastic Fregeanism, in A. Kanamori, (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 6, Analytical Philosophy and Logic, Bowling Green Documentation Center, pp. 1-15. SOAMES, S. 1999. Unterstanding Truth, Oxford, Oxford University Press. VON WRIGHT, G.H. 1984. Demystifying Propositions, in Truth, Knowledge, and Modality, Oxford, Blackwell.
10 This paper was given as a talk at the University of Heidelberg in October 2000. I thank the people who discussed it on that occasion, especially Andreas Kemmerling and Marco Santambrogio. Im also grateful to Harry Field, Diego Marconi and Stephen Schiffer for their comments on earlier versions of the paper.