PRIMARY LEGISLATION CENTRAL ISSUES Primary legislationin the form of Acts of the UK Parliamentis one of the main ways

s in which government policy is put on a legal footing, ena ling it to e implemente! y pu lic o!ies. Stu!ying t"e legislative process she s li!ht on the practical application of the "rinci"les of parliamentary supremacy# t"e rule of la$# an! t"e separation of po$ers. In formal terms, the le!islat#re is $the %#een in Parliament$. o Almost all %ills are !rafte! y government& government controls t"e legislative process an! government !eci!es $"en Acts are roug"t into force. o T"e role of Parliament is to scrutini&e an! occasionally to veto government proposals'

 The consultation process ena les t"e government to see( vie$s on its "ro"osals. o The code !o'ernin! cons#ltation is not# "o$ever# legally in!ing an researc" reveals a !egree of cynicism a(o#t what is achie'e (y cons#ltation. %ills are !rafte! y specialist government la$yers )"arliamentary co#nsel*. o Some +ills are critici,e for incl# in! unnecessary !etail& o ot"ers are critici&e! for eing merely frame$or(s to e fille! in later y ministers #sin! "owers to ma(e !elegate! legislation' Pre)legislative scrutiny, in which raft +ills are scr#tini,e (y Parliament, is $i!ely accepte! to e a goo! i!ea ut government $illingness to pu lis" %ills in !raft "as varie! in recent years.

 The legislative process in'ol'es the *ouse of +ommons an! *ouse of Lor!s# in turn# !e ating an! scrutini&ing a %ill' ,ou ts "ave een raise! over t"e effectiveness of t"e scrutiny of %ills ealin! with constit#tional iss#es. o +ommentators suggest t"at a more systematic approac" is nee!e!' ,evolution "as implications for t"e operation of t"e -. Parliament' o The Scottis" Parliament may /an! !oes0 give consent for t"e -. Parliament to legislate on matters t"at "ave een !evolve! to Scotlan!. o Some politicians are concerne! a out t"e 1Englis" 2uestion1, as(ing $"y MPs from constituencies in 3ales# Scotlan!# an! Nort"ern Irelan! s"oul! e a le to vote on %ills t"at $ill apply only to Englan!.

INTRO,-+TION Le!islati'e "rocess relate to PS, R-L, S-P This cha"ter e4amines primary legislation1, in the form of -. Acts of Parliament# an! "o$ t"ey are ma!e. Stu!ying legislation an the le!islati'e "rocess "ro'i es a goo! opportunity to t"in( furt"er a out three of the .ey constit#tional "rinci"les e/amine in Part I0 o parliamentary supremacy& o the rule of la$& an o the separation of po$ers' +y seein! how these "rinci"les o"erate in a "artic#lar conte/t, it sho#l (e "ossi(le to achie'e a ee"er #n erstan in! of them.

/a0 PARLIAMENTARY S-PREMA+Y As we saw, the -nite! .ing!om1s constitutional set)up gives politicians, rather than the 1# iciary, the final say on $"et"er an Act of Parliament is vali! an s"oul! e recogni&e! as in!ing la$' The 5ustification for this is !enerally sai to (e t$ofol!.

6st 5ustification2 3ishes of electorate 4"olitic iss#e (#t not le!al iss#e5 only can le!ally e/"resse thr# Parliament 6irst, the elections an the "olitical "rocess of ma(ing legislation are li(ely to lea! to legislation t"at accor!s $it" t"e $is"es of t"e electorate' ,icey0 4... A5ny e/"ressions which attri(#te to Parliamentary electors a le!al "art in the "rocess of law2ma.in! are 7#ite inconsistent with the 'iew ta.en (y the law of the "osition of the elector. The sole legal rig"t of t"e electors un!er t"e Englis" constitution is to elect mem ers of Parliament' Electors ha'e no le!al means of initiatin!, of sanctionin!, or of re"ealin! the le!islation of Parliament.

 No co#rt will consi er for a moment the ar!#ment that a law is in'ali as (ein! o""ose to the o"inion of the electorate& t"eir opinion can e legally e4presse! t"roug" Parliament# an! t"roug" Parliament alone. 4+#t 8icey !oes on, howe'er, to ma.e the followin! assertion.5 4... 35e may assert that the arran!ements of the constitution are no$ 4he was writin! in 9:;<5 s#ch as to ensure t"at t"e $ill of t"e electors s"all y regular an! constitutional means al$ays in t"e en! assert itself as the "re ominant infl#ence in the co#ntry.

 %ut t"is is a political# not a legal fact. o Electors "ave no legal means of initiating# of sanctioning# or of repealing the le!islation of Parliament. o No court $ill consi!er for a moment t"e argument t"at a la$ is invali! as eing oppose! to t"e opinion of t"e electorate& The electors can in the lon! r#n always enforce their will.

2 Politically 4since wishes of electorate only relate to "olitics5, Parliament s#(1ect to limitation, e4ternally (y the "eo"le resist to the law, internally (y moral conscience 8icey e/"lains that, as a matter of politics /alt"oug" not of la$0, mem ers of Parliament /MPs0 are su 5ect to an e4ternal1 limit on Parliament$s le!al "ower to le!islate that is, $the possi ility or certainty that 4...5 s#(1ects, or a large num er of t"em# $ill !iso ey or resist 7'''8 la$s. There is also, he ar!#e , an 1internal limit19 each MP is 1moul!e! y t"e circumstances un!er $"ic" "e lives# inclu!ing un!er t"at "ea! t"e moral feelings of t"e time an the society in which he (elon!s

=n 1#stification2 Le!islati'e "rocess is s#"erior to a 1# icati'e "rocess to etermine "#(lic interest iss#e A secon! 5ustification is that the legislative process is superior to t"e a!5u!icative processes of the courts for !eli erating on an !etermining 2uestions of pu lic interest )which #n er"in e'ery "iece of le!islation*.

Argument0 P#(lic 'iew may not f#lly consi ere (y Parliament alone, most of the time is the government control the le!islati'e "rocess In assessin! the e4tent to which there is an effective transmission mec"anism et$een pu lic vie$s an! $"at is enacte! on t"e statute oo(, it nee!s to e recogni&e! t"at government "as a !ominant role in t"e legislative process. Parliament may formally e t"e legislature for the whole Unite Kin! om, ut it is t"e government t"at: o initiates policy# o !rafts %ills, o steers %ills t"roug" t"e process, an o often !eci!es $"en /if at all0 legislation is roug"t into force. To say that 1Parliament legislates1 is# at est# a "alf)trut"0 formally, it is so(#t in reality# it is t"e

government t"at !etermines t"e content an! timing of legislation'

Argument9 No. of 'otes i not reflect in the "ro"ortion on the >o#se2 that mean not all "#(lic 'iew can (e f#lly reflecte in the ho#se 4only can i ate with ma1ority 'otes in "artic#lar area consi ere ?P5 A f#rther factor that nee s to (e reco!ni,e is that the electoral system use! for +ommons1 elections;t"at is# 1first past t"e post1 oes not res#lt in that *ouse "aving a composition proportionate to t"e num er of votes cast nationally for each of the "olitical "arties.

Argument0 >-L is not electe ?oreo'er, only one of t"e t$o *ouses of Parliament /t"e +ommons0 is electe!& t"e ot"er /t"e Lor!s0 is not' There may e goo! arguments in favour of first)past)t"e)post elections an! an unelecte! secon! c"am er, (#t ensuring t"at pu lic opinion is reflecte! in t"e legislation that is "asse is not one of t"em.

/ 0 R-LE O< LA3 Co#rt sho#l ha'e more "ower I!eas a out t"e rule of la$ are relevant to legislation an! t"e legislative process. As we saw, t"ere is a !e ate o'er the e/tent to which %ritis" 5u!ges sho#l "ave po$er to a!5u!icate on t"e vali!ity of Acts of Parliament. Since 9:@A, -. courts an! tri unals "ave "a! po$ers to 1!isapply1 provisions in legislation t"at are not in accor!ance $it" European +ommunity )now E#ro"ean Union* la$. Since the *uman Rig"ts Act 6==> came into force, the senior co#rts ha'e also ha "owers to ma.e 1!eclarations of incompati ility1 in relation to "ro'isions that are hel to (e contrary to Con'ention ri!hts.

 The 1legal constitutionalists1 $oul! li(e t"e courts to "ave greater po$ers to revie$ legislationinclu!ing po$er to 2uas" )rather than merely to 'declare incompatible'* sections contrary to Con'ention ri!hts an "owers to stri.e own le!islation that (reaches other f#n amental ri!hts or "rinci"les.

R-L relate to "ower of !o't conferre (y stat#te There is anot"er sense in which the rule of la$ comes into play an this relates to t"e $ay in $"ic" legislation confers po$er on government' Acts of Parliament often give ministers very roa! !iscretionary po$ers to carry o#t e/ec#ti'e action an to ma.e r#les in the form of ele!ate le!islation.

/c0 SEPARATION O< PO3ERS S-PB2 !o't control the le!islati'e "rocess an also ma.e ele!ate le!islation St# yin! le!islation an the le!islati'e "rocess also throws a searchli!ht on the "rinci"le of se"aration of "owers. It s"oul! e clear from "re'io#s cha"ters that the -nite! .ing!om !oes not a!"ere to any strict separation2of2"owers arran!ements )e/ce"t for the associate "rinci"le of in e"en ence of the 1# iciary*. In fact, few co#ntries o. St# yin! le!islation an the le!islati'e "rocess is a !oo way of seein! 1#st how m# y the waters arein other wor s, t"e government is a !ominant influence in t"e legislative process t"at lea!s to t"e enactment of an Act of Parliament& the government also

"as e4tensive po$er to ma(e 1!el?egate! legislation1. 8raftin! co#nsel sho#l (e wary in raftin!, if !rant too m#ch "ower too m#ch "ower to other (ranches, it will mo'e le!islati'e "ower to them as well The followin! e/tract is written from a US "ers"ecti'e, (#t ma.es "oints that are rele'ant to the Unite Kin! om. @ac( Star(9 Loo.in! from the "ers"ecti'e of "olitical "hiloso"hy, counsel 7t"e la$yers $"o !raft legislation8 $ill soon recogni&e t"e relevance to t"is pro lem of t"e concept of separation of po$ers, which has (een cite in the isc#ssion of always raftin! !enerally an which, of co#rse, is a (e roc. of mo ern re"resentati'e !o'ernment. If t"e t"ree ranc"es of government oug"t to e !istinctly separate, counsel s"oul! e $ary of !rafting 'ery !enerally an there(y allocating to t"e 5u!icial an! e4ecutive

ranc"es consi!era le po$er to interpret the law. In effect granting t"at po$er, if t"e grant is roa! enoug"# is in!istinguis"a le from allocating legislative aut"ority to t"e ot"er ranc"es of government' That chain of reasonin! lea s to the concl#sion that, e'ery other rele'ant consi eration (ein! set asi e, co#nsel sho#l ens#re that they are raftin! s"ecifically eno#!h. That is, they are well a 'ise to mo'e a little towar the s"ecific en of the s"ectr#m.

3*O OR 3*AT IS T*E LEGISLAT-RE A The process of ma(ing legislation is comple4, altho#!h it is easy eno#!h to state the (asic elements of the system. 3e loo. at this in the ne/t section. +efore oin! so, howe'er, $e s"oul! e4amine t"e main actors in t"e process'

Govt control o'er le!islati'e2 "olicy, raft (ill, intro #ce to Parliament, left to minister to (rin! Act into force The government ta.es a lea in many as"ects of the "rocess0 o ministers an! civil servants !evelop policy initiatives& o government la$yers !raft %ills& o ministers intro!uce %ills to Parliament an! steer t"em t"roug" t"e *ouse of Commons an the >o#se of Lor s, o suggesting amen!ments alon! the way& o often it is left to a Secretary of State to !eci!e $"en an Act of Parliament s"oul! come into force'

Bueen2 consent to "ro!ress thr# Parliament on ministersC a 'ice an !i'e royal assent The %#een has a formal in'ol'ement at two "oints. 6irst, some %ills re2uire 1Bueen1s consent1 even to progress t"roug" Parliament. o This sit#ation arises in cases in which a Crown "rero!ati'e is in'ol'e . o The Bueen acts on t"e a!vice of ministers. Secon!, %ills re2uire royal assent in or!er to ecome la$& this is a formality. o The re2uirement for royal assent ma.es the le!islat#re, strictly s"ea.in!, $the %#een in Parliament$ ut t"e political reality is t"at Parliament )or, when the Parliament Act 9:99 is in'o.e , the >o#se of Commons* is t"e effective legislative o!y'

%#een has no any s#(stanti'e role (#t only a formal sym(ol in enact the law Sir Ivor @ennings0 Tec"nically spea(ing# la$s are ma!e y t"e Bueen in Parliament# not y t"e Bueen, the *ouse of Lor!s an! t"e *ouse of +ommons. In other wor s, laws are ma e at the c#rio#s ceremony which res#lts when three no(le lor s, actin! #n er a Commission from the %#een, seat themsel'es self2conscio#sly on the woolsac. wearin! their three2 cornere hats. They sen the Dentleman Usher of the +lac. Ro to re7#est the atten ance of the Commons 4...5. The Commons, as it ha""ens, are isc#ssin! matters "ri'ately in their own Cham(er& an , since they claim the ri!ht to o so, when +lac. Ro is seen a""roachin! the oor is sh#t in his face with st# ie isco#rtesy& for neither the %#een nor the %#een$s messen!er is allowe in e/ce"t on the or er of the >o#se. +lac. Ro ha'in! ta""e on the oor three times, the Ser!eant2at2Arms o"ens

the wic.et an as.s, E3ho$s there BE >a'in! satisfie himself that it is not >er ?a1esty come with an arme !#ar to arrest the lea ers of the -""osition, the Ser!eant2at2Arms o"ens the oor an allows +lac. Ro to o his (ows an eli'er his mesFsa!e& where#"on ?r. S"ea.er lea s the Commons, or s#ch of them as ha'e not seen the show (efore, to atten the Lor s Commissioners at the +ar of the >o#se of Lor s. The lon! title of the +ill (ein! rea , the Cler. of the Parliaments anno#nces that ELe Reine le 'a#ltE, an the +ill (ecomes an Act of Parliament.

ParliamentCs role limite to scr#tini,e the (ills Parliament1s role is largely limite! to scrutini&ing t"e %ills introduced by ministers. MPs an! peers may e involve! in 1pre)legislative scrutiny1 if a raft +ill is "#(lishe , (#t in most cases, the first opportunity to e4amine a government %ill is at t"e point at $"ic" a minister formally intro!uces it to one of t"e *ouses of Parliament )its 'First Reading$*.

?P an "eer limite o""ort#nity to initiate le!islation Mem ers of Parliament an! peers also ha'e limite! opportunity to initiate legislation in the form of private mem er1s %ills.

Royal assent m#st (e !i'en after +ills "asse thr# = ho#se an sometime Gs.i"C the Lor s The normal re7#irement is that a %ill is passe! y ot" t"e *ouse of +ommons an! t"e *ouse of Lor!s efore it may receive royal assent. A han f#l of +ills ha'e, o'er the years, receive! royal assent un!er t"e terms of t"e Parliament Act 6=66 )as amended in 1949*, $"ic" permits royal assent to (e given even t"oug" t"e Lor!s !isagree $it" a %ill. These constitutional arrangements are reflecte! in t"e Pream le to each Act. The first applies to an Act "asse in the normal way. o +e it enacte (y the %#een$s most E/cellent ?a1esty, y an! $it" t"e a!vice an! consent of t"e Lor!s Spiritual an! Temporal# an! +ommons, in this "resent

Parliament assem(le , an (y the a#thority of the same, as follows0 A secon! type of Pream le is #se if royal assent is recei'e #n er the terms of the Parliament Acts. o +e it enacte (y The %#een$s most E/cellent ?a1esty, y an! $it" t"e a!vice an! consent of t"e +ommons in this "resent Parliament assem(le , in accor ance with the "ro'isions of the Parliament Acts 9:99 an 9:H:, an (y the a#thority of the same, as follows0

POLI+YMA.ING Le!islation !i'e le!al effect to !o't "olicies The main purpose of legislation is to give legal ac(ing to government policies. Political scientists ha'e s"ilt m#ch in. o'er the efinition an characteristics of $"olicy$. 6or the "#r"oses of this cha"ter, $e can say t"at government policy is an aut"oritative !etermination y ministers an! civil servants of $"at $ill e !one a out somet"ing. E/am"les of that $somethin!$ incl# e0 !lo(al warmin!& ens#rin! that +ritish man#fact#rin! in #stry s#r'i'es the economic ownt#rn& the challen!e of ens#rin! financial s#""ort for ol er "eo"le in the conte/t of an a!in! "o"#lation& ealin! with antisocial (eha'io#r (y yo#n! "eo"le& an so on.

Policy ifferent from mere "hiloso"hy, "olicy is the "hiloso"hy translate into "ractice S' @ames9 T"e policy ma(ing process 3hat is a "olicyB The wor.in! efinition 4... 5 is0 a co#rse of action which the !o'ernment has ta.en a eli(erate ecision to a o"t. This sho#l (e istin!#ishe from a !o'ernment$s "hiloso"hy. A !o'ernment comes into office with a certain set of i eas an 'al#esits "hiloso"hyan the government1s policies are t"e practical plans t"roug" $"ic" t"at p"ilosop"y is translate! into practice' So the La(o#r !o'ernment came to "ower in 9:@H with a "hiloso"hiFcal intent of !reat social e7#ality& increasin! state "ensions was one way of contri(#tin! to that aim. 4... 5 A "olicy may (e "ainsta.in!ly constr#cte o'er years, or co((le to!ether in ho#rs. An it is ma e in ifferent ways on ifferent s#(1ects0 the ecisi'e way in which the

!o'ernment e'ise an then scra""e #nit fines contrasts with the (#m(lin! "re'aricaFtion o'er the 9:IH race relations (ill. None the less, it is "ossi(le to chart a $"olicy "rocess$, the 'ario#s sta!es thro#!h which a "olicy will "ass as it e'elo"s.

Sta!es of Policy ma.in!2 concern on restraint (efore the le!islation sta!e James s#!!ests that there are si/ sta!es, as follows. o A s#(1ect ecomes an issue. o The iss#e gets onto t"e policy agen!a. )-ther a#thors may !ro#" these two sta!es to!ether as $"olicy initiation$.* o The government investigates an iss#e. o The government ta(es a !ecision. o There follow the sta!es of le!islation an le!itimi,ation. o The final sta!e is that of "olicy im"lementation an re'iew. 6or now, we are intereste in sta!es )a*2) *in other wor s, the t"ings t"at "appen efore a %ill is intro!uce! to Parliament (y the !o'ernment. -f "artic#lar interest for #s is $"at constitutional an! legal constraints an! incentives control t"ese processes.

Spee!y policy ma(ing an! implementation e4ample Policyma(ing ta(es place at many !ifferent spee!s' Sometimes, the !o'ernment feels the nee to formulate a policy an! see( to implement it very 2uic(ly. 6or e/am"le, on 6> @une =;;<, the A""ellate Committee of the *ouse of Lor!s )the forer#nner of the UK S#"reme Co#rt* hel that criminal courts !i! not "ave po$er to s"iel! t"e i!entity of (ey prosecution $itnesses from efen ants an their lawyers, (eca#se this was contrary to a common law ri!ht for efen ants to (e a(le to face their acc#sers. The government too( t"e vie$ t"at t"is $as unaccepta le, (eca#se t"ere $ere serious pro lems $it" $itness intimi!ation "artic#larly in gang)relate! crimes'

 A policy $as rapi!ly !eci!e!& a +ill was rafte to reflect the !o'ernment$s "olicy& it was intro!uce! to Parliament on H J#ly =;;< an it recei'e royal assent on =9 J#ly =;;<. o 3it"in $ee(s times

2 <ast trac( le! to +ommitteeCs in2uiry0 s#!!est ?inister sho#l e/"lain, s#nset cla#se, s#(1ect to "ose2le!is sc#rinty within "erio of time A s"ate of 1fast trac(e!1 %ills le! t"e *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee to con!uct an in2uiry into rapi!ly ma!e legislation. The Committee calle for a re2uirement that ministers intro #cin! +ills in these circ#mstances s"oul! ma(e a statement e4plaining $"y fast) trac(ing $as t"oug"t necessary, what cons#ltation there has (een with intereste "arties, an other matters. The Committee also recommen e that there sho#l (e a presumption in favour of %ills t"at are eing fast)trac(e! incl# in! a 1sunset clause1# which wo#l re2uire t"e Act of Parliament to e !e ate! an! rene$e! after 6> mont"s or some other s"ecifie "erio & o it $oul! continue in force only if t"at $as approve! y a positive vote.

 The Committee also recommen e that +ills that ha (een fast2trac.e thro#!h Parliament sho#l (e su 5ect to post)legislative scrutiny i!eally $it"in one year.

Normal +ills ta.e lon!er time Normally# t"e !evelopment of policy an! legislation ta(es muc" longer;sometimes years'

Policy ma.in! eri'e from many so#rces0 !o't eli(eration, me ia, "#(lic "ress#re %' @ones# ,' .avanag"# M' Moran# an! P' Norton9 Eac" government !ecision "as a long an! comple4 provenance , (#t all m#st start somewhere. It is tem"tin! to thin. that they ori!inate, e#re.a2li.e, in the min s of sin!le in i'i #als, (#t they are more often the "ro #ce of e(ate or a !eneral climate of o"inion in'ol'in! many min s.Policy initiati'es, moreo'er, can ori!inate in all "arts of the "olitical system. Settin! the "olitical a!en a is a c#rio#sly el#si'e "rocess. Items can e !eli erately intro!uce! y t"e government# an clearly it has many ro#tes a'aila(le to it, e.!. Tony Blair in the summer of 1999 announcing in an interview that fox hunting really would be banned. 4... 5

 The me!ia too "ave enormous po$er to set t"e agen!a0 Michael Buerk's reports from Ethiopia detailing the scale of the family that touched the nation and initiated assistance 4... 5 The pu lic1s role in "olicy ma.in! is #s#ally limited to )the emocratically 'ital f#nction of* voting for a particular policy "ac.a!e at !eneral elections. T"ey !o "ave ot"er occasional opportunities, howe'er, for e/am"le the referen!ums on t"e E+ an! Scottis" an! 3els" !evolution 4...5, an pressures can e uilt up t"roug" lo ying MPs. -ccasionally, events occur t"at create $i!esprea! pu lic concern, an! governments often ta(e action in t"e $a(e of t"em. 6or e/am"le, le!islation on o!s was enacte after a s"ate of attac.s (y o!s on chil ren one s#mmer in the 9:<;s, an after the 8#n(lane shootin!s of ?arch 9::I han !#ns were (anne . In many casesas in

the two 1#st cite s#ch "reci"itate action, in reaction to the s# en ro#sin! of "#(lic o"inion, "ro'es to (e "oorly frame an recei'es m#ch criticism.

+onsultation to ma(e policy +onsultation is a ma5or aspect of t"e policyma(ing process )altho#!h it is easy to point to examples of situations in which the government has rushed ahead without proper consultation before announcing its final policy*. o Suc" as its announcement to a olis" t"e Lor! +"ancellor an! create a -. Supreme +ourt

2 Dreen "a"er for tentati'e isc#ssion2 3hite "a"er for more firm ecisions then le!islation 6or many years, the !o'ernment has a o"te 'ario#s cons#ltation "ractices. Ty"ically, a Green Paper is pu lis"e!, outlining t"e government1s initial vie$s on a propose! "olicy, or setting out various policy options' A 3"ite Paper may follo$ some mont"s later, in which the !o'ernment lays o#t more firmly its "olicy "lans on a !i'en to"ic. Sometime later# a %ill $ill e intro!uce! to Parliament )altho#!h (ear in min that not all policies will necessarily require new legislation to "#t them into "ractice*.

+' San!for!9 Dreen Pa"ers were in'ente (y the La(o#r Do'ernment in 9:I@. 3hite Pa"ers are of m#ch earlier 'inta!e. It is !enerally hel that 13"ite Papers announce firm government policy for implementation. Green Papers announce tentative proposals for !iscussion'$ Sir >arol 3ilson wrote0 $A 3hite Pa"er is essentially a statement of !o'ernment "olicy in s#ch terms that with rawal or ma1or amen ment, followin! cons#ltation or "#(lic e(ate, ten s to (e re!ar e as a h#miliatin! with rawal. A Dreen Pa"er re"resents the (est that the !o'ernment can "ro"ose on the !i'en iss#e, (#t, remainin! #ncommitte , it is a(le witho#t loss of face to lea'e its final ecision o"en #ntil it has (een a(le to consi er the "#(lic reaction to it$.

2 Cons#ltation "a"er formally "#(lishe as +omman! paper 4(y ?inisters to Parliament in the comman of >er ?a1esty5 +onsultation papers may e pu lis"e! in a variety of $ays' Some are "#(lishe informally on the rele'ant e"artment$s we(site& others are more formally pu lis"e! as 1+omman! Papers1.

+a inet Office9 +omman! Papers are Parliamentary Papers presente! to t"e -nite! .ing!om Parliament nominally y comman! of t"e Sovereign# ut in practice y a Government Minister' The title eri'es from the form#la ori!inally carrie on "a"ers EPresente to Parliament (y Comman of >er )or >is* ?a1estyE. In recent years the a""roach has (een to #se the "hrase0 EPresente to Parliament (y the Secretary of State for )or other title as a""ro"riate* (y Comman of >er )or >is* ?a1estyE. Sometimes more than one ?inister will "resent the Pa"er in which case all ?inisters are liste , a""earin! in or er of Ca(inet "rece ence. In certain circ#mstances, e.!. re"orts "ro #ce (y Royal Commissions, the ori!inal form#la still a""lies. Comman Pa"ers are "a"ers of interest to Parliament where "resentation to Parliament is not re2uire! y statute.

 The su 5ects may e, e.!.0 o ma5or policy proposals an o consultation !ocuments )3hite an Dreen Pa"ers*, o !iplomatic !ocuments s#ch as treaties, o Do'ernment responses to Select +ommittee reports )tho#!h these may (e ealt with in corres"on ence with an s#(se7#ently "#(lishe (y the Committee*, o reports of ma5or committees of in2uiry or certain e"artmental re"orts or re'iews an 8raft +ills. There sho#l , howe'er, (e a presumption that any Paper $"ic" $ill cause a statement to e ma!e y a Minister or lea! to a !e ate in Parliament s"oul! e pu lis"e! as a +omman! Paper'

+o!e on +onsultation2set #" a""roach the !o't will ta.e when r#n a formal, written an "#(lic cons#ltation (#t witho#t any le!al enforcement In DEEE, the !o'ernment "#(lishe for the first time a co!e on consultation' >? Do'ernment Co e of Practice on Cons#ltation0 Intro #ction -n!oin! ialo!#e (etween Do'ernment an sta.ehol ers is an im"ortant "art of "olicyma.2in!. This ialo!#e will, at times, nee to (ecome more formal an more "#(lic. 3hen e'elFo"in! a new "olicy or consi erin! a chan!e to e/istin! "olicies, "rocesses or "ractices, it will often (e esira(le to carry o#t a formal, time2(o#n , "#(lic, written cons#ltation e/ercise. This .in of e/ercise sho#l (e o"en to anyone to res"on (#t sho#l (e esi!ne to see. 'iews from those who wo#l (e affecte (y, or those who ha'e a "artic#lar interest in, the new "olicy or chan!e in "olicy.

6ormal cons#ltation e/ercises can e/"ose to scr#tiny the Do'ernment$s "reliminary "olicy analysis an the "olicy or im"lementation o"tions #n er consi eration. Status of t"e co!e This Co e sets out t"e approac" the Government $ill ta(e $"en it "as !eci!e! to run a formal# $ritten# pu lic consultation e4ercise' It s#"erse es an re"laces "re'io#s 'ersions of the Co e. T"e +o!e !oes not "ave legal force an! cannot prevail over statutory or man!atory re2uirements' The Co e sets o#t the Do'ernment$s !eneral "olicy on formal, "#(lic, written cons#ltation e/ercises. A list of the UK e"artments an a!encies a o"tin! the Co e is a'ailFa(le on the +etter Re!#lation E/ec#ti'e$s we(site. -ther "#(lic sector or!anisations are free to ma.e #se of this Co e for their cons#ltation "#r"oses, (#t it oes not a""ly to

cons#ltation e/ercises r#n (y them #nless they e/"licitly a o"t it. Ministers retain t"eir e4isting !iscretion not to con!uct formal consultation e4ercises un!er t"e terms of t"e +o!e' At times# a formal# $ritten# pu lic consultation $ill not e t"e most effective or proportionate $ay of see(ing input from intereste! parties, e.!. when en!a!in! with sta.ehol ers 'ery early in "olicy e'elo"ment )"rece in! formal cons#ltation* or when the sco"e of an e/ercise is 'ery narrow an the le'el of interest hi!hly s"ecialise . In s#ch cases an e/ercise #n er this Co e wo#l not (e a""ro"riate. There is, moreo'er, a 'ariety of other ways a'aila(le to see. in"#t from intereste "arties other than formal cons#ltation. S#ch en!a!ement wor. is not the s#(1ect of this Co e. 3hen e"artments eci e only to carry o#t en!a!ement with intereste "arties in ways other than formal, written cons#ltaFtion, they are enco#ra!e to (e clear a(o#t the reasons why the metho s (ein! #se ha'e (een chosen.

 Criterion 9 3hen to cons#lt 6ormal cons#ltation sho#l ta.e "lace at a sta!e when there is sco"e to infl#ence the "olicy o#tcome. Criterion = 8#ration of cons#ltation e/ercises Cons#ltations sho#l normally last for at least 9= wee.s with consi eration !i'en to lon!er timescales where feasi(le an sensi(le. Criterion A Clarity of sco"e an im"act Cons#ltation oc#ments sho#l (e clear a(o#t the cons#ltation "rocess, what is (ein! "ro"ose , the sco"e to infl#ence an the e/"ecte costs an (enefits of the "ro"osals. Criterion H Accessi(ility of cons#ltation e/ercises Cons#ltation e/ercises sho#l (e esi!ne to (e accessi(le to, an clearly tar!ete at, those "eo"le the e/ercise is inten e to reach.

 Criterion K The (#r en of cons#ltation Kee"in! the (#r en of cons#ltation to a minim#m is essential if cons#ltations are to (e effec2ti'e an if cons#ltees$ (#y2in to the "rocess is to (e o(taine . Criterion I Res"onsi'eness of cons#ltation e/ercises Cons#ltation res"onses sho#l (e analyse caref#lly an clear fee (ac. sho#l (e "ro'i e to "artici"ants followin! the cons#ltation. Criterion @ Ca"acity to cons#lt -fficials r#nnin! cons#ltations sho#l see. !#i ance in how to r#n an effecti'e cons#ltation e/ercise an share what they ha'e learne from the e/"erience.

2 Co e is not le!ally enforcea(le 4altho#!h (in in!5, an it is not a !o'ernmental "romise as well (#t only prescri e t"e $ay of cons#ltation sho#l (e one when nee to ma.e "#(lic cons#ltation 4which o not im"ly that e'ery time nee e to (e refer when "olicy ma.in!5 Altho#!h the co e says that it $ oes not ha'e le!al force$, in a n#m(er of 1# icial re'iew cases, attempts "ave een ma!e to c"allenge t"e la$fulness of consultation e4ercises on t"e groun!s t"at t"e terms of t"e co!e "ave not een follo$e!' 6or e/am"le, in R /%"att Murp"y /a firm00 v T"e In!epen!ent Assessor, a firm of solicitors ar!#e that the co e ha create a $le!itimate e/"ectation that there wo#l (e cons#ltation (y the !o'ernment, accor in! to the co e, when it eci e that it wante to chan!e the way in which 'ictims of miscarria!es of 1#stice are com"ensate .H=

 The Co#rt of A""eal a!ree with the 1# !e at first instance )?ay LJ* an 7#ote his r#lin! with a""ro'al. R /%"att Murp"y /a firm00 v T"e In!epen!ent Assessor9 =A The Intro #ction states that the Co e an the criteria a""ly to all "#(lic cons#ltations (y !o'ernment e"artments an a!encies. ?r Swift 4co#nsel for the !o'ernment, which ha $inter'ene $ in the case5 s#(mits, correctly in my 'iew, that this means that t"e +o!e is to apply $"enever it is eci e as a matter of "olicy to "ave a pu lic consultation& not t"at pu lic consultation is a re2uire! prelu!e to every policy c"ange. The +o!e states t"at it !oes not "ave legal force (#t sho#l !enerally (e re!ar e as in!ing on -nite! .ing!om !epartments an! t"eir agencies unless Ministers conclu!e t"at e4ceptional

circumstances re2uire a !eparture from it. Ministers retain t"eir e4isting !iscretion not to con #ct a formal written cons#ltation e/ercise #n er the terms of the Co e, for e/am"le where the iss#e is 'ery s"ecialise an where there is a 'ery limite n#m(er of so2calle sta.ehol ers who ha'e (een irectly in'ol'e in the "olicy e'elo"ment "rocess. =H 6or the reasons !i'en (y ?r Swift, I !o not consi er that it is "ossi(le to rea t"is !ocument as any form of governmental promise or un!erta(ing t"at policy c"anges $ill never e ma!e $it"out consultation. It wo#l (e 'ery s#r"risin! if it co#l (e so rea , not least (eca#se a ecision in a "artic#lar case whether to cons#lt is itself a "olicy ecision. Rather the +o!e prescri es "o$ generally pu lic consultation s"oul! e con!ucte! if t"ere is to e pu lic consultation'

Argument0 Cons#ltation altho#!h sta.ehol er can (e .e"t informe , (#t merely a G"ro forma a""roachC2 res"onse from the !ro#" is e/"ecte In =;;<, the >ansar Society )an e #cational charity see.in! to stren!then "arliamentary emocracy an to enco#ra!e !reater "#(lic in'ol'ement in "olitics* "#(lishe the fin in!s of a st# y on the le!islati'e "rocess. Its concl#sions on the cons#ltation "hase are set o#t in the followin! e/tract. Ale4 %ra&ier et al0 Drowin! cynicism Altho#!h it can e/ert a noticea(le infl#ence on le!islation, we fo#n e'i ence of increasin! e'i ence of cynicism a(o#t the cons#ltation "rocess. Many e4ternal groups 2uestione! $"et"er consultations are an effective means (y which to infl#ence "olicy, re"ortin! that they 'ary consi era(ly an o not always seem $!en#ine$.

 3hile some e"artments ha'e (#ilt #" a re"#tation for re!#lar an ro(#st cons#ltation, others are consi ere less effecti'e or well2 is"ose towar !atherin! sta.ehol er in"#t (eyon $tr#ste circles$& some ma.e #se of all the reso#rces a'aila(le, while others $!o thro#!h the motions$. -ne inter'iewee from a small charity criticise! t"e pre!ominant 1pro forma approac"1# which she feels at times 1seems !esigne! $it" particular sta(e"ol!er groups in min! or to pro!uce a particular set of responses1. T"ese sentiments $ere ec"oe! y many ot"ers. E'en so, all of the sta(e"ol!ers t"at $e spo(e to maintaine! t"at# at t"e very least# consultations ena le! t"em to (eep informe! a out t"e government1s plans' o Sta(e"ol!er mean group affecte! y policy

F ,RA<TING %ILLS Parliamentary Co#nsel 4PC5 raft the (ills In the Unite Kin! om, t"ere is a centrali&e! system of !rafting %ills' They are written (y a team of 1#st over si4ty 1parliamentary counsel1 )government la$yers* wor.in! from No' GH 3"ite"all'

T"ey act on t"e asis of formal instructions sent y !epartments. 3or( is allocate! to pairs or small teams of counsel.

PC office2 technician in raftin! the (ill 4(#t not "olicy ma.er5, cannot (e one (y "ri'ate "ractitioner The first e/tract is from an article written (y a senior an! long) serving parliamentary counsel. Geoffrey %o$man9 Let me start with a homely insi!ht into the rafter$s min . Some time a!o a ta(le in my room at wor. was sent away for french2"olishin!. 3hen it came (ac. it ha a notice on it sayin! $Nothin! m#st (e "lace on this ta(le.$ I imme iately tho#!ht that there were at least two thin!s wron!. 6irst, if nothin! was to (e "lace on the ta(le how i the notice !et "#t onto itB An secon ly, for how lon! was nothin! to (e "#t onto itB It efeats the o(1ect of a ta(le if nothin! can e'er (e "#t onto it. So I mentally re rafte the notice so that it rea 0 $Nothin! )e/ce"t this notice* m#st (e "lace on this ta(le #ntil s#ch time as the french2"olisher allows it.$ +#t it oes not sto" there. 3hat ha""ens if the french2"olisher ies or (ecomes ill or insane or !oes o#t of (#siness (efore he a""ro'es of the ta(le$s #seB That may !i'e yo#

some i ea of the sli!htly ma worl that le!islati'e rafters inha(it. 4... 5 The process of legislative !rafting nee s someone $"o $ill stan! ac(& o who will rut"lessly analyse t"e i!eas& o who will 2uestion everyt"ing with a 'iew to "ro #cin! somethin! that stan s #" to scr#tiny in Parliament an in the co#rts& o who will rea( concepts !o$n to t"eir essential components: an o who will then e4press t"em in easily !igesti le provisions an in lan!#a!e that is #nam(i!#o#s, clear an sim"le. I thin. the Parliamentary Co#nsel -ffice achie'es this (y recr#itin! "eo"le with the ri!ht a"tit# e, an then (y !i'in! them a lon! an caref#l trainin!. That is why we ha'e a Parliamentary Co#nsel -ffice.

 As for $"et"er t"e 5o coul! e !one y la$yers in private practice, it is interestin! that there was an e/"eriment in 9::I when "art of the 6inance +ill was rafte (y "ri'ate "rac2titioners. It $as not a success, an! "as not een repeate!' As 8aintith an Pa!e say in their (oo. The E/ec#ti'e in the Constit#tion0 $As well as (ein! 'ery e/"ensi'e the contractors$ wor. was tho#!ht to (e o"a7#e an Eo'er2 rafte E.$ After researchin! the rele'ant fiel of law an analysin! what it is the e"artment seems to (e see.in! to achie'e, raftin! (e!ins. Co#nsel hol meetin!s with e"artment lawyers an officials as an when nee e . +ounsel see t"emselves as tec"nicians rat"er t"an policy) ma(ers' 7'''8

 E war C. Pa!e, $Their wor is law0 Parliamentary co#nsel an creati'e "olicy analysis$ 4=;;:5 P#(lic Law @:;,@:9 )footnotes omitte * Earlier wor. on the officials in the UK char!e with e'elo"in! "olicy into le!islation in (ill teams, containe stron! in ications that "arliamentary rafters of le!islation ha infl#ence the thin.in! of the "olicy officials res"onsi(le for its e'elo"ment. ?oreo'er, in the UK sys2tem of !o'ernment where few officials ha'e any le'el of s"ecialisation, the "arliamentary rafter is a rare e/am"le of a s"ecialista "erson with technical 7#alifications an e/"erience who ten s to ma.e a career within the same small e"artment. T"e !rafting stage is li(ely to e t"e first at $"ic" t"e policy as a $"ole is su 5ecte! to a form of rigorous scrutiny# an! a scrutiny $it" a "ig" !egree of legitimacy' If a !rafter says t"at a policy cannot $or( it is ta(en e4tremely seriously' >owe'er, at "resent we can only hy"othesise that the "rocess of raftin! sha"es "olicy,

an the central 7#estions this "a"er a resses are0 oes it, an in what wayB 3hat sorts of "olicy iss#es !et raise at this sta!e in the e'elo"ment of "olicy, how im"ortant are they an how are they resol'e B 4... 5

UK Act more etaile an "recise than E#ro"e -'er the years, a !rafting style "as emerge! in t"e -nite! .ing!om that is mar.e ly !ifferent from t"e continental1 approac" use! in Eirecti'es an in the le!islation of most other mem(er states. Denerally, legislation in civil la$ 5uris!ictions ten!s to e simple, short, an concerne with settin! own (roa statements of "rinci"les an r#les, $"ereas Acts of Parliament are incline! to e muc" more !etaile! an! precise.

+riticism2 incom"rehensi'e 4com"le/5 to "eo"le #e to com"le/ in "olicy itself, "recision nee e when in'ol'e "eo"le ri!ht, incremental chan!e to "olicy, to restrict iscretion in im"lementin! the "olicy 4"re'ent misinter"ret5 A criticism that has often (een ma e of Acts of Parliament is that they are #s#ally incompre"ensi le to non)la$yers, an sometimes even to la$yers, (eca#se of the comple4ity of t"eir language# grammar# an! structure' There may (e several reasons for this. <irst, the stat#te may see. to !i'e le!al effect to a policy t"at itself is in"erently "ig"ly comple4'

 Secon!, in some conte/ts, it may e important for people1s rig"ts an! o ligations to e spelt out $it" great precision so that they may "lan their affairs accor in!ly. o An as"ect of the rule of la$ is t"at la$ nee!s to e certain an sometimes certainty may go "an! in "an! $it" comple4ity. o This is particularly so $"ere a statute imposes a ta4 )the ri!ht of !o'ernment to re7#ire a transfer of wealth from a citi,en or (#siness* or penal sanctions. A thir reason for comple4ity is incremental c"ange to policy, which is often given legal effect several Acts amen!ing earlier ones o'er a "erio of time.

o -ntil suc" time as t"ese Acts are consoli!ate!# people an! t"eir legal a!visers may "ave to loo( at several !ifferent

statutes to un!erstan! $"at t"e la$ re2uires' <ourt", comple4ity may arise from a !esire to control an! restrict !iscretion in t"e implementation of policy. o A government !epartment may fear that 4#nless contin!encies are antici"ate an etails s"elt o#t5, ot"er people may misun!erstan! e4actly $"at t"e Act is inten!e! to ac"ieve0 there may(e misinterpretation1 y t"e agency res"onsi(le for !i'in! "ractical effect to a "olicy )s#ch as a local a#thority* or, if liti!ation sho#l arise, the co#rts.

o An illustration of this sort of raftin! can (e seen in the Local Do'ernment )?iscellaneo#s Pro'isions* Act 9:<=. o 3"en t"e *ome Office set up a system for t"e licensing of se4 s"ops (y local a#thorities, it was t"oug"t necessary to specify t"at, for the "#r"ose of the Act, 1premises1 inclu!e Iessels1, which means 1any s"ip# oat# raft or ot"er apparatus constructe! or a!apte! for floating on $ater' o A plet"ora of !etail suc" as t"is can stan! in t"e $ay of easy compre"ension.

/a0 +OMPLEJITY O< %ILLS Com"le/ity ma.e ?P cannot scr#tini,e "ro"erly Legislation t"at is !ifficult to un!erstan! may create "ro(lems not only for t"e people $"ose rig"ts an! interests are affecte! y it, ut also for Parliament' If MPs !uring t"e legislative process cannot un!erstan! what a +ill really means, t"ey $ill not e a le to pro e an! scrutini&e t"e government1s policy proposals effecti'ely.

E/"lanatory Note !i'en Since 9:::, all !o'ernment +ills ha'e (een accompanie! y e4planatory notes1, rafte (y lawyers in the e"artment s"onsorin! the +ill, which may go some $ay to a!!ressing t"is pro lem'

One si!e9 Act sho#l (e clear 4more etaile 5 when confer "ower to e/ec#ti'e, this is "rinci"le of R-L, +ritish has s#ch -n the one han , t"ere are calls for !etaile! legislation' As we ha'e seen, ,icey argue! t"at statutes oug"t to confer as little !iscretion as possi le on ministers an! ot"er pu lic o!ies, an one way of restrictin! iscretion is to s"ell o#t in stat#tes with consi era(le "artic#larity what "owers ministers an others ha'e, an how they o#!ht to set a(o#t ma.in! their ecisions. To ay, some commentators contin#e to ar!#e that the tra!itional %ritis" !rafting style "as t"e virtue of ot" prompting certainty an ena ling !emocratic control.

Anot"er si!e9 sho#l (e less etaile to re #ce "arliament wor. an im"ro'e efficiency On t"e ot"er "an!, there are also calls for shorter, less !etaile! legislation. An e itorial in The Times claime 0 1%ecause %ritis" la$s are five times longer t"an compara le continental meas#res, Parliament faces a legislative $or(loa! that has (ecome intolera le. There may (e a case, therefore, for a!opting some of t"e practices use! in continental la$ma(ing to improve efficiency'

/ 0 <RAME3OR. %ILLS 6ramewor. (ill which lea'e etails to (e fille (y ele!ate le!islation in !o'ernment e"artments Stat#tes often nowa ays set o#t only the roa! frame$or( for t"e government1s policy, leaving t"e !etail to e fille! in later y !elegate! legislation !rafte! in government !epartments'

Eg 6.2 PACA =;9; !i'e >S wi e "ower to ma.e ele!ate le!islation to retain 8NA sam"le 6or e/am"le, the Policing an! +rime Act DE6E# s' =H# amen!e! t"e Police an! +riminal Evi!ence Act 6=>F to give t"e *ome Secretary very $i!e po$ers to ma(e !elegate! legislation a(o#t the contro'ersial to"ic of retention (y the "olice of "eo"le$s 8NA sam"les.

2 Lor committee02 criticism2 7#estion relate to h#man ri!ht sho#l (e enacte (y "rimary le!islation, if ele!ate , no s#fficient scr#tini,e (y Parliament an "arliament e(ate may not ha""en The >o#se of Lor s committee scr#tini,in! the +ill that (ecame the =;9; Act were hi!hly critical. >o#se of Lor s Constit#tion Committee0 9K. Cla#se :I of the (ill see.s to amen the Police an Criminal E'i ence Act 9:<H (y insertin! new "owers for the Secretary of State, (y re!#lations, to Ema.e "ro'ision as to the retention, #se an estr#ction of materialE. It is in our vie$ $"olly unaccepta le t"at t"e important matter of retention of samples is to e !ealt $it" y !elegate! legislation.

 The Do'ernment$s "ro"osals as to how they inten to im"lement the ?ar"er 1# !ment 4of the European +ourt of *uman Rig"ts, hol in! that "re'io#s retention arran!ements (reache the EC>R5 raise important an! controversial 2uestions# which the >o#se will want to e(ate f#lly. +lause =H 7!elegate! legislation8# if agree! to# $ill not allo$ t"at !e ate to "appen' T"e principles governing samples s"oul! e set out on t"e face of primary legislation to ena le Parliament to scrutinise t"em an!# if nee!s e# to see( to amen! t"em' -namen!a le !elegate! legislation $ill not provi!e a suf) ficient opportunity for parliamentary oversig"t an control over t"e legal frame$or( for t"e Government1s policy.

 9I. 3e call on the Do'ernment to thin. a!ain an (rin! forwar "ro"osals in a se"arate (ill to re!#late the National 8NA 8ata(ase. Results9 The government !i! not "ee! t"at particular a!vice. Nor "as criticism of t"is sort !eterre! government from #sin! framewor. (ills.

Eg D) Committee critici,e a(o#t ele!ate le!islation is not s#ita(le for the roa! pu lic arrangement which creation of e/tensi'e "arliamentary e(ate The +oalition government forme in ?ay =;9; a!opte! a policy of cutting pu lic e4pen!iture y re!ucing !ramatically t"e num er of pu lic o!ies (y mer!in! or a(olishin! se'eral o,en of them. Rather than set o#t in etail what was to ha""en to each "#(lic (o y, the (ill that (ecame the Pu lic %o!ies Act DE66 conferre! roa! po$ers on ministers to implement t"e policy y !elegate! legislation.

 The >o#se of Lor s Constit#tion Committee re"ort on the (ill was ca#stic 0 9A. The Pu lic %o!ies %ill 7*L8 stri(es at t"e very "eart of our constitutional system# eing a type of 1frame$or(1 or 1ena ling1 legislation t"at !rains t"e life loo! of legislative amen!ment an! !e ate across a very roa! range of pu lic arrangements. In "artic#lar, it hits irectly at the role of the >o#se of Lor s as a re'isin! cham(er. 9H. The P#(lic +o ies +ill 4>L5 is concerne with the esi!n, "owers an f#nctions of a 'ast ran!e of pu lic o!ies# t"e creation of many of $"ic" $as t"e pro!uct of e4tensive parliamentary !e ate an! !eli eration. 3e fail to see why s#ch "arliamentary e(ate an eli(eration sho#l (e enie to

"ro"osals now to a(olish or to re esi!n s#ch (o ies.

8ele!ate le!islation altho#!h fle/i(le (#t too m#ch "ower at the same time As we will see later, !elegate! legislation is su 5ect to significantly less parliamentary scrutiny t"an %ills an! it cannot e amen!e!& it can only e approve! or re5ecte! y Parliament# as !rafte! y a government !epartment' So while s(eleton)style %ills may give ministers ma4imum fle4i ility to alter an! amen! policy to suit c"anging circumstances, an while suc" %ills may appear to e clearer# t"ere are fears t"at t"ey confer too muc" unsupervise! !iscretion on government'

Pro(lem0 too m#ch etaile 2 incom"rehensi'e, too fle/i(le2 too m#ch "ower on ministers There is a ris. that we are en in! #" with the worst of all worl s0 Acts t"at are over)ela orate an! so !etaile! as to prevent MPs an! t"e pu lic from un!erstan!ing them, an which also confer too muc" regulation)ma(ing po$er on ministers.

S#mmary0 8ifferent sit#ation sho#l (e c#re (y ifferent metho s, no one sol#tion for all scenario There is "ro(a(ly, howe'er, no general cure)all for t"e ills that are ia!nose . The search for clearer, more easily scr#tini,e le!islation nee s to ha'e re!ar to "artic#lar circ#mstances. Legislation li(ely to e rea! only y specialist practitioners )for e/am"le, acco#ntants an lawyers a 'isin! com"anies* may $ell nee! to e p"rase! an! structure! !ifferently from a statute !ealing $it" t"e asic rig"ts an! entitlements of or!inary citi&ens'

PRE)LEGISLATIIE S+R-TINY O< ,RA<T %ILLS A e'elo"ment in recent years is the "ractice of the government pu lis"ing a !raft of a %ill some mont"s )or even years* efore it is finali&e! an! rea!y to e formally intro!uce! to Parliament. ,raft %ills are pu lis"e! as +omman! Papers.

+enefits02 ?P ha'e in"#t to the le!islation, (enefit for !o't as lesser time nee e at later sta!es, s#(se7#ent amen ment wil l (e lesser *ouse of +ommons Mo!erni&ation +ommittee, The Le!islati'e Process, 6irst Re"ort0 There is almost #ni'ersal a!reement that pre)legislative scrutiny is rig"t in principle, s#(1ect to the circ#mstances an nat#re of the le!islation. It provi!es an opportunity for t"e *ouse as a whole, for in i'i #al (ac.(enchers, an for the -""osition to "ave a real input into t"e form of t"e actual legislation which s#(se7#ently emer!es, not least (eca#se ?inisters are li.ely to (e far more rece"ti'e to s#!!estions for chan!e (efore the +ill is act#ally "#(lishe . It o"ens Parliament #" to those o#tsi e affecte (y le!islation.

 At the same time s#ch pre) legislative scrutiny can e of real enefit to t"e Government. It co#l , an in ee sho#l , lea! to less time eing nee!e! at later stages of t"e legislative process& the #se of the Chair$s "owers of selection wo#l nat#rally reflect the e/tent an nat#re of "re'io#s scr#tiny an e(ate. A(o'e all, it s"oul! lea! to etter legislation an! less li(eli"oo! of su se2uent amen!ing legislation'

Limit Parliamentary e(ate time an also in'ol'e "olitical (ills which always in'ol'e etaile scr#tiny ma.e less "#(lishin! 3hile there is consens#s a(o#t the esira(ility of the !o'ernment "#(lishin! raft +ills, the reality is that t"ere "as een significant variation in "o$ many %ills are pu lis"e! in !raft eac" parliamentary year' Kennon0 No +ill that is hi!hly contro'ersial (etween the "olitical "arties has (een s#(1ect to "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny. 4... 5 Le!islation starts in 3hitehall. 3ithin any e"artment officials an ?inisters ha'e a list of s#(1ects on which they wo#l li.e to chan!e the law. ?inisters, with a weather eye on the 'ane a(o'e No.9; 8ownin! Street, will ha'e "olitical "riorities. -fficials are also conscio#s of matters that nee im"ro'in! (#t which o not en!a!e "olitical attention.

 The Government1s annual legislative programme nee!s to inclu!e "ig" profile political measures' Limits on parliamentary time mean that the legislative programme of a co#"le of o,en +ills has to (e split et$een t"e contentious an! t"e non) contentious. 6ew e"artments wo#l "res#me to claim more than one "lace in each cate!ory. 4... 5 It is against t"is ac(groun! t"at t"e) Government1s tentative promise t"at Kt"e presumption 7is8 t"at %ills $ill e pu lis"e! in !raft for pre)legislative scrutiny unless t"ere is goo! reason ot"er$iseE nee s to (e consi ere . It is unrealistic to e4pect t"at a Minister $"o stan!s a goo! c"ance of securing a place in t"e legislative programme for a "ig" profile %ill will want to elay its enactment y going t"roug" t"e

longer process of pre)legislative scrutiny' +y efinition, t"is sort of %ill "as a political impetus t"at may over$"elm !etaile! scrutiny. An e'i ence2ta.in! committee mi!ht (e carrie away (y the "olitical a'alanche (ehin the +ill an not ha'e time to loo. at the min#tiae. T"e un!erstan!a le com at et$een Government an! Opposition on a (ey issue mig"t leave t"e !etails une4amine!'

Statistic of "#(lishin! the raft2 low ratio #e to timeta(le an some +ill not s#ita(le to (e "#(lishe *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee# Pre)legislative Scrutiny9 Analysis of the tren s in "re2 le!islati'e scr#tiny I. Parliamentary s#""ort for "re2 le!islati'e scr#tiny, to which we referre in o#r "re'io#s re"ort, has remaine stron!. A n#m(er of the Commons e"artmental committees that con #cte "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny in =;;@2;< affirme its 'al#e. The Commons Liaison Committee state that ECommittees are .een to contri(#te their s"ecialist .nowle !e to the le!islati'e "rocess thro#!h (oth the scr#tiny of raft (ills an of other le!islation.E The Joint Committee on the raft Constit#tional Renewal +ill state that the ecision to "resent the raft +ill for "re2 le!islati'e scr#tiny Eis the ri!ht thin! to o for a (ill of this nat#re.E @. The Do'ernment, too, ha'e contin#e to e/"ress their commitment to "re2le!islati'e scr#2

tiny. The 8raft Le!islati'e Pro!ramme state that0 The Do'ernment f#lly en orses the 'al#e of "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny of raft (ills as a means of im"ro'in! the 7#ality of (ills s#(se7#ently intro #ce to Parliament 4...5 for many 4(ills5 it can (e e/tremely 'al#a(lewhere the s#(1ect matter is of "artic#Flar interest to Parliament an where Committees can im"ro'e te/ts on the (asis of e/"ert e'i ence.$ <. At Secon Rea in! of the ?arine an Coastal Access +ill in the Lor s, the ?inister, Lor >#nt of Kin!$s >eath, tol the >o#se Ehow hel"f#l the "rocess of "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny has (een in e'elo"in! this +ill 4...5 As a res#lt of this "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny "rocess, a !oo raft (ill has (een im"ro'e ma e stron!er an more trans"arent.E The Secretary of State for J#stice an Lor Chancellor, Jac. Straw ?P, tol #s that, in terms of the le!islati'e "roc2ess, Eon the whole it has certainly (een wor.in! (etter than (efore we ha "re2 le!islati'e scr#tiny.E >owe'er, he i a that Ethe main "ro(lem with "re2 le!islati'e scr#tiny is !ettin! "eo"le to !i'e the same scr#tiny to (ills in

raft as they o later on. There ha'e (een "lenty of e/am"les where there has (een somethin! in a (ill which is "otentially e/"losi'e (#t the o! oes not (ar. #ntil the last moment 4... 5 The lesson is that yo# ha'e to stir the o!.E 3hen as.e if he tho#!ht this was ha""enin! at the moment, he sai Eto a e!ree it is, (#t I thin. that sometimes it is not.E In last session$s re"ort, we "ro #ce a ta(le showin! the n#m(er of raft (ills that ha (een "#(lishe in each session, com"arin! it with the n#m(er of Do'ernment (ills intro2 #ce . This ta(le was (ase #"on statistics "ro'i e (y the Do'ernment in answer to a writ2ten 7#estion from the Committee Chairman. 3e ha'e re"ro #ce the ta(le (elow, a in! the fi!#res for =;;@2;<. In o#r "re'io#s re"ort, we note with concern that (oth the n#m(er an "ro"ortion of raft (ills ha fallen (etween the =;;A2;H session an the =;;I2;@ session, in s"ite of the Do'ernment$s =;;K commitment Eat least to maintain the "ro"ortion of (ills "#(lishe in

 raft.E In their res"onse, the Do'ernment state that they ha also E(een isa""ointe at the lower n#m(ers of raft (ills "#(lishe in recent sessions. +#t 4... 5 it will not (e "ossi(le to !i'e a !eneral #n erta.in! to "#(lish most (ills in raft or re!#larly to achie'e the fi!#res reache in =;;A2;H.

 The main practical o stacle remains the nee to ha'e the free om to (rin! forwar m#ch legislation on a timeta le which !oes not allo$ for pu lication of t"e propose! legislation in !raft form'K The 8raft Le!islati'e Pro!ramme state that whilst the Do'ernment were Ecommitte to "#(lishin! as many (ills as "ossi(le in raft ... "#(lication in !raft is not suita le for every ill'K

 3e therefore welcome the fact that in =;;@2;<, the n#m(er of raft (ills, an the ratio of raft (ills to Do'ernment (ills, were at their healthiest since the hi!h water mar. of =;;A2;H. 3e are also "lease to see that a f#rther se'en raft (ills are "lanne for the =;;<2;: sesFsion )altho#!h only one of them ha (een "#(lishe when we a!ree this re"ort*. It is im"eraFti'e that the "ro!ress ma e in the =;;@2;< session is maintaine . 3e reaffirm o#r stron! s#""ort for "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny an o#r esire to see it #se more ro#tinely. 3e welcome the increase in the n#m(er of raft (ills "#(lishe in =;;@F;< from the low le'els of "re'io#s sessions, an call on the Do'ernment to maintain this "ro!ress in =;;<2;:.

T*E PARLIAMENTARY YEAR Parliament organi&es its $or(loa! into annual sessions' Pre'io#sly, sessions #se to start in No'em(er or 8ecem(er an r#n for a little short of twel'e months )with a lon! s#mmer (rea.*. After the "assin! of the 6i/e Term Parliament Act =;99, it is e4pecte! t"at eac" five)year Parliament $ill "ave five 6D)mont" sessions, eginning an! en!ing in t"e spring. In recent years, the government "as a!opte! a practice of pu lis"ing a 1!raft legislative "ro!ramme$ in which it sets out in outline t"e main %ills that it e4pects to intro!uce to Parliament in t"e follo$ing session. The annual session starts $it" t"e State Opening of Parliament# one of t"e great ceremonial occasions'

 The monarc" atten!s t"e *ouse of Lor!s# to $"ic" MPs are summone!' 6rom the throne, the monarc" rea!s out a s"ort speec" /1t"e Bueen1s Speec"10 !rafte! y t"e government# $"ic" sets out t"e government1s proposals for %ills'

PARLIAMENTARY STAGES O< A %ILL Ty"e of le!islat#re2 Policy ma.in!, "olicy infl#ence 4UK5, no "olicy affect Political scientists# Sc"$ar& s#r'eyin! emocracies ha'e suggeste! t"at t"ere are t"ree (in!s of legislature. o <irst, there are those that can (e escri(e as $policyma(ing1 or 1transformative1 (eca#se t"ey "ave t"e capacity to !evelop policy of t"eir o$n. The -S +ongress is one of the few that falls into this cate!ory.

o Secon! )an this is the cate!ory into which the -. Parliament falls*, there are 1policy) influencing1# 1reactive1# 1arena1# or 1legitimi&ing1 le!islat#res. They o"erate to mo!ify or re5ect proposals from government, (#t t"ey !o not !evelop t"eir o$n policies' The emp"asis is on !e ate an! ratifying !ecisions ma!e else$"ere /t"at is# in government0' -ne "ractical reason for these le!islat#res not (ein! a(le to ta.e a lea in "olicyma.in! is sim"ly t"at t"ey lac( t"e resources to !o so. Parliamentarians !o not "ave a large o!y of a!visory civil servants or muc" time'

o T"ir!, t"ere are legislatures that ha'e little or no policy effect10 t"eir role is essentially to assent to $"atever policy is ma!e y government'

Policy infl#ence le!islat#re2 amen , re1ect, loo. for re"lacement (#t not ma.e "olicy #e to lac. of "olitical will, reso#rces an constit#tional "ower As yo# rea the ne/t two e/tracts, consi er into which cate!ory the a#thors wo#l fit the UK Parliament. P' Norton9 In terms of their im"act on "#(lic "olicy, three ty"es of le!islat#re can (e i entifie 0 "olicyFa.in!, "olicy2 infl#encin!, an those with little or no "olicy affect. Policy2ma.in! le!islat#res can in'ol'e themsel'es in the rawin! #"the ma.in!of "olicy. Policy2infl#encin! le!islat#res "ave t"e formal capacity to amen!# even to re5ect, meas#res of "olicy "lace (efore them, (#t they are essentially e"en ent on !o'ernment to "#t forwar those meas#res. Even if t"ey re5ect a measure# t"ey loo( to government to formulate an! ring for$ar! a replacement'

 T"e legislature itself !oes not see( to generate;or ma(e; policy. It lac(s t"e political $ill# t"e institutional resources or even# in some cases# t"e constitutional po$er to !o so' Le!islat#res with little or no "olicy effect e/ist mainly to !i'e assent to meas#res lai (efore them.

-. is policy influence legislature (ase on historical conte/t that "arliament loo. forwar ?onarch then !o't to (rin! forwar the +ill Norton )a "rofessor of !o'ernment at >#ll Uni'ersity who is also a Conser'ati'e "eer* conFcl# es that, for most of its history, the UK Parliament $has not (een a "olicy2 ma.in! (o y. >e e/"lains that the -. Parliament "as loo(e! to t"e e4ecutive;first t"e monarc"# t"en t"e (ing1s governmentto ring for$ar! %ills for it to consi!er. T"e -. Parliament is# "e argues#1a policy)influencing legislature1. It s"ares t"is c"aracteristic $it" most legislatures aroun! t"e $orl!'

Parliament not only res"on to the !o't initiationL"ro"osal (#t also contri(#te to the in"#t (y the e/ternal so#rces stan as re"resentati'e of the "#(lic R' %lac( urn et' al9 It is a central feature of Parliament, howe'er, that it mainly "erforms a responsive rat"er t"an an initiating function $it"in t"e constitution' The !o'ernmentat ifferent le'els initiates "olicy, form#lates its "olicy on le!islation an other "ro"osals, e/ercises "owers #n er the "rero!ati'e or !rante (y stat#te an , in all these as"ects, "erforms the !o'ernin! role in the State. %ot" *ouses of Parliament spen! most of t"eir time respon!ing# in a variety of $ays# to t"ese initiatives# proposals or e4ecutive actions.

 T"e government# "o$ever# is not t"e only source of input of usiness for Parliament. Muc" usiness is originate! y the o""osition front2(ench, an (y ac() enc"ers on eit"er si!e of t"e t$o *ouses' The inspiration for t"eir input is largely foun! in general pu lic opinion# outsi!e pressures or interest groups, news"a"ers, ra io an tele'ision, an in t"e min!s an! attitu!es of millions of citi&ens represente! in t"e +ommons y Mem ers' Parliament, therefore, fin s itself the reci"ient of a wi e ran!e of e/ternal "ress#res an "ro"osals, roa!ly !ivi!e! in origin et$een t"e government of t"e !ay on t"e one "an! an! t"e outsi!e $orl! t"e pu lic on t"e ot"er.

UK "arliament only in 'ery limite circ#mstances will initiate the "olicy s#ch as for the own >o#seCs interest R' %lac( urn et' al9 Only in a limite! conte4t oes either *ouse "ave a policy of its o$n or initiate KparliamentaryK proposals. 6or e/am"le, the *ouse of Lor!s "as a long stan!ing concern $it" its o$n composition an! po$ers' The Commons )an , to a lesser e/tent, the Lor s* ha'e 1ealo#sly esta(lishe , "reser'e an e/ercise Eall their ancient an #n o#(te ri!hts an "ri'ile!esE )to 7#ote the claim ma e to the so'erei!n on their (ehalf (y the S"ea.er at the (e!innin! of each Parliament*.

 An ot" *ouses a!opt a KparliamentaryK stance an! concern t"emselves $it" t"eir o$n interests $"en initiating or influencing policy on suc" matters as t"eir o$n proce!ures an! t"e pay# accommo!ation# facilities an! con!itions of service of Mem ers or peers. +#t for most matters the initiati'e comes from o#tsi e Parliament.

Sta!e of le!islati'e "rocess, almost half start at Common an another half start at Lor e/ce"t ?oney +ills always start in Common Let #s now mo'e on to consi er what ha""ens from the "oint at which a +ill is $intro #ce $ to Parliament (y the !o'ernment. The (asic r#le is that a %ill nee!s to progress t"roug" various stages in t"e *ouse of +ommons an! t"en t"e *ouse of Lor!sor 'ice 'ersa. A out "alf of the fifty or so !o'ernment +ills start in t"e +ommons an! a out "alf in t"e Lor!s' There is no real significance as to $"ic" *ouse is c"osen to start t"e %ill off, e4cept t"at 1Money %ills1 )+ills that eal only with ta/ation an !o'ernment e/"en it#re* al$ays egin in t"e +ommons'

)a* <IRST REA,ING2 announce and start the progress The <irst Rea!ing is a formality )in effect, announcing t"at t"e %ill $ill e pu lis"e! an! start its passage t"roug" t"e *ouse*. Since 9:::, +ills are accompanie! y 1e4planatory notes1, rafte (y !o'ernment lawyers, which see( to e4plain in some !etail, ut using non)tec"nical language an! avoi!ing 1a!vocacy1, what the +ill is esi!ne to achie'e an how it will o this. E4planatory notes are not en!orse! 7support8 y Parliament'

)(* SE+ON, REA,ING2 debate and recorded in !ansard The Secon Rea in! typically ta(es place t$o to four $ee(s after t"e <irst Rea!ing, an is an opportunity for MPs or peers to !e ate t"e general policy aims in t"e %ill. ,e ates are pu lis"e! in *ansar!, the official recor .

)c* +OMMITTEE STAGE2 (y >-C an >-L committee Seem not so efficient since ma1ority mem(er are from the !o't "arty an alter (y #sin! technical if con'ince co#l (e im"to'e The +ommittee Stage usually starts t$o $ee(s later, an is when etaile consi eration of the "olicy an raftin! of the +ill occ#rs. In the Commons, t"is is normally in a pu lic %ill committee of et$een fifteen an! t$enty MPs )in proportion# party)politically, to the composition of t"e *ouse as a $"ole*. 6or most +ills, the committee1s $or( egins $it" oral evi!ence sessions in which MPs "ear from e4perts# campaign groups# an! finally t"e minister in c"arge of t"e %ill.

 There is then cla#se2(y2cla#se e(ate, with Opposition MPs see(ing to argue t"at amen!ments s"oul! e ma!e& very fe$# if any, of these amen!ments are agree! to y t"e pu lic %ill committee )on $"ic" t"e governing party "as a ma5ority of mem ers*, (eca#se the government instructs t"e MPs of its party# $"o $ill form a ma5ority of t"e committee# to vote against t"em' It is normal also for t"e government to ma(e amen!ments9 often they will (e 1tec"nical1, to ti y #" raftin! "oints& sometimes# t"ey $ill alter t"e policy of t"e %ill slig"tly if t"e government "as een convince! t"at it coul! e improve!' In the *ouse of Lor!s, the +ommittee Stage normally ta(es place on t"e floor of t"e c"am er, giving all peers intereste! in t"e %ill an opportunity to ta le amen!ments see(ing /in t"eir vie$0 to improve it.

/!0 REPORT AN, T*IR, REA,ING After the Committee Sta!e in the rele'ant ho#se, t"ere follo$ t"e Report an! T"ir! Rea!ing stages. These sta!es often ta(e place on t"e same !ay. They are furt"er opportunities for MPs or peers /!epen!ing on in $"ic" *ouse t"e %ill is in at t"at time0 to press for acceptance of their amen ments an for the !o'ernment to ma.e its own amen ments.

/e0 PING)PONG Once t"e %ill "as een t"roug" ot" *ouses# a!reement nee s to (e reache on the final te/t that will (e "resente for royal assent. 3"ere t"ere is !isagreement, a 1ping)pong1 process $ill arise, with propose! amen!ments an! counter)amen!ments s"uttling ac( an forth, until ot" *ouses are $illing to consent to t"e %ill'

/f0 ROYAL ASSENT Royal assent is t"e final stage of the le!islati'e "rocess. The !rant of royal assent is a "rero!ati'e "ower of the %#een altho#!h# y constitutional convention# it is al$ays grante!. The constit#tional mechanics of royal assent are set o#t in the followin! stat#te.

Royal Assent Act 6=HL 9)9* An Act of Parliament is #ly enacte if >er ?a1esty$s assent thereto, (ein! si!nifie (y Letters Patent #n er the Dreat Seal, si!ne with >er ?a1esty$s own han , o is "rono#nce in the "resence of (oth >o#ses in the >o#se of Lor s in the form an manner c#stomary (efore the "assin! of this Act& or o is notifie! to eac" *ouse of Parliament# sitting separately# y t"e Spea(er of t"at *ouse or in t"e case of "is a sence y t"e person acting as suc" Spea(er' 9 )=* Nothin! in this section affects the "ower of >er ?a1esty to eclare the Royal Assent in "erson in Parliament, or the manner in which an Act of Parliament is re7#ire to (e en orse in her ?a1esty$s name.

 The last time that a monarc" signifie! royal assent in person $as in 6>MF# when %#een Mictoria atten e Parliament. The normal practice is t"at t"e monarc" "as no personal involvement in the "rocess. At the start of eac" annual parliamentary session, a small num er of 1Lor!s +ommissioner1 are appointe! at the start of the "arliamentary year to carry out t"is formality. A s"ort ceremony ta(es place in the >o#se of Lor s #rin! a con'enient (rea. in other (#siness, en!ing $it" a senior parliamentary official announcing 1La Reyne le veulf /Norman <renc" for 1T"e Bueen $ills it10' The grant of royal assent is t"en announce! y Spea(er in t"e *ouse of +ommons'

Printing an! pu lication After royal assent, the new Act of Parliament must e officially printe! an! pu lis"e! in t"ree forms0 o a 1Bueen1s Printer1s1 version on "a"er, which will (e fo#n in !oo law li(raries& o on t"e $$$'legislation'gov'u( $e site mana!e (y the National Archi'es*& o a(o#t si/ months later, one copy of t"e Act is printe! on vellum parc"ment# an is si!ne (y the Cler. of the Parliaments )the senior official in the >o#se of Lor s* an lo !e in the >o#se of Lor s Recor -ffice. Professor @ac(son e4plains that 1T"is is t"e copy to $"ic" t"e courts $oul! see( access# in case of any !ou t regar!ing t"e aut"enticity or te4t of a statute1'

 Acts are no longer put 1on t"e Parliamentary Roll1' %ILLS O< +ONSTIT-TIONAL IMPORTAN+E Possi(ility for !o'ernin! "arty to #n ermine li(erty an ri!ht As we note in Cha"ter =, one of the a""arent !o$nsi!es of a constitutional system (ase on parliamentary supremacy is that t"is gives an a$ful lot of po$er to t"e governing party (eca#se, as we ha'e 1#st seen, the reality is that the government controls Parliament rat"er t"an t"e ot"er $ay aroun!. The larger t"e governing party1s ma5ority in t"e *ouse of +ommons, the more control it e4erts' 3hat, then, is t"ere to prevent a government from intro #cin! an steerin! thro#!h a +ill that see.s to un!ermine asic li erties or to c"ange t"e constitutional set)up

in a way that a 'anta!es the !o'ernmentB Pre'io#sly, we e/amine 8icey$s answers to this con#n r#m.

+ills of $first2class constit#tional im"ortance$ (y con'ention is an e/ce"tion of all +ill sho#l !o to stan in! committee 4"#(lic (ill committee5 as stan in! committee (ase on "ro"ortion of the common which more li.ely to (e a!ree (y own "arty mem(er altho#!h more efficient the "#(lic committee wo#l ha'e one in term of etail "ro'isions. >ere, we loo. more "ractically at what ha""ens in Parliament where there is a ris. of this. In the ne/t e/tract, Professor Ro ert *a&ell ) irector of the UCL Constit#tion Unit* consi ers the constit#tional con'ention that %ills of 1first)class constitutional importance1 ha'e t"eir Secon! Rea!ing stage in t"e c"am er of t"e *ouse of +ommons )a 1+ommittee of t"e 3"ole *ouse1, or +3** rat"er t"an in a pu lic %ill committee' o ?ore ?P will (e in'ol'e while "#(lic (ill committee, (ill only consi ere in the room

 Ro ert *a&ell9 The ori!ins of this con'ention !o (ac. to 9:HK, an the Attlee !o'ernment$s s#(stantial "ost2war le!islati'e "ro!ramme. Anticipating t"at t"e tas( of post)$ar reconstruction $oul! re2uire a "eavy legislative programme, the wartime coalition !o'ernment$s ?achinery of Do'ernment Committee ha recommen e that in f#t#re all %ills s"oul! go to Stan!ing +ommittee upstairs' +#t they reco!nise that0 EAn e4ception $oul! "ave to e ma!e if any %ill of first class constitutional importance $ere intro!uce!# of t"e or!er# for instance# of t"e Parliament Act 6=66 or t"e Statute of 3estminster 6=G6E. This sentence was re"eate in the "ost2war La(o#r !o'ernment$s

memoran #m to the 9:HK2HI Proce #re Committee, which also reco!nise that in a ition to the E!reat meas#res of the SessionE, it ha (een the "ractice to retain on the floor of the >o#se short +ills which were #nli.ely to re7#ire a etaile committee sta!e, an #r!ent +ills which nee e to (e "asse in a few ays. The Proce #re Committee a""ro'e the "ro"osal to refer s#(stantially all +ills to Stan in! Committee, an a""ro'e the !o'ernment$s "ro"ose e/ce"tions of short +ills, #r!ent +ills an +ills of Efirst class constit#tional im"ortanceE. That is how the con'ention emer!e that +ills of first class constit#tional im"ortance sho#l ta.e their committee sta!e on the floor. After 9::@ the con'ention was challen!e (y the new La(o#r !o'ernment, which attem"te to s"lit the committee sta!e ) isc#sse f#rther (elow*. 6rom the o#tset it "ro'e iffic#lt to efine e/actly which +ills were of Efirst class constit#tional im"ortanceE, an which were not. The Lea er of the >o#se, >er(ert ?orrison, was "resse a(o#t the efinition when he !a'e e'i ence to the Proce #re Committee in 9:HK, an re"eate the

two e/am"les of the Parliament Act 9:99 an the Stat#te of 3estminster 9:A9. 4...5 4>a,ell says that the main a!vantage of t"e convention is t"at it ena les more M Ps to ta(e part in !eli erations t"an $oul! e t"e case if t"e %ill $ere to e consi!ere! in a committee room'5 Set a!ainst this are some si!nificant isa 'anta!es from ta.in! the committee sta!e on the floor. 6irst is the c#rtailment of time. +eca#se time on the floor is "rime "arliamen2tary time, this is ine'ita(ly in more scarce s#""ly than when the committee sta!e is ta.en #"stairs. 4...5. 6or constit#tional +ills ta.en in C3>, the committee sta!e laste on a'era!e 9K ho#rs. 6or +ills referre to Stan in! Committee, the a'era!e committee sta!e laste =K ho#rs. Lin.e to the limite time is the limite n#m(er of amen ments mo'e . 6or +ills ta.en in C3>, an a'era!e of 9; amen ments were e(ate #rin! the committee sta!e. In Stan in! Committee the n#m(er was fi'e times hi!her, with an a'era!e of K9 amen ments mo'e to

each +ill. This s#""orts the contention that e(ate in a C3> ten s to (e a contin#ation Secon Rea in! e(ate, stayin! with the !eneral "rinci"les of the +ill rather than en!a!in! in etaile scr#tiny. ?eas#re sim"ly (y n#m(er of amen ments, the intensity of etaile scr#tiny wo#l a""ear to (e a lot !reater when a +ill is referre to Stan in! Committee. It is "ar! to resist t"e conclusion t"at t"e +3* proce!ure "as ecome a !ignifie! part of t"e constitution, while the more efficient $or( of scrutiny is !one in Stan!ing +ommittee or in Select +ommittees of eac" *ouse'

Reform of a chec.list, ena(le the "olitician 4Parliament5 aware of constit#tional "rinci"le 4not only 1# !es sho#l aware5 -ne possi le reform t"at mig"t improve t"e scrutiny of constitutional an other +ills is the use of 1c"ec(lists1, as Professor ,a$n Oliver e/"lains0 Scr#tiny stan ar s may (e #se either within !o'ernment, at the sta!e when "olicy is #n er e'elo"ment an then the raftin! "rocess is #n erta.en, or in Parliament, when +ills an raft +ills are (ein! scr#tinise , for instance (y select committees, or (y in e"en ent (o ies with res"onsi(ility for o(1ecti'e scr#tiny, s#ch as the New Nealan Le!islation A 'isory Committee or the 6rench Conseil $Etat. Scr#tiny stan ar s may (e concerne with s#(stanti'e, "roceF #ral or informational matters. S#(stanti'e matters incl# e com"liance with h#man ri!hts re7#irements, EU law an constit#tional "rinci"les, EfitE with the e/istin! law, an com"liFance with E(etter le!islationE stan ar s s#ch as those set o#t in the >ansar Society$s

9::= re"ort on the le!islati'e "rocess. Proce #ral ones incl# e cons#ltation with rele'ant (o ies an com"liance with e"artmental an Ca(inet "rocesses. Informational re7#irements co#l incl# e the !o'ernment$s e/"lanations of the "olicy o(1ecti'es of the +ill, the !o'ernment$s 'iews as to com"ati(ility of a +ill with the EC>R an other international instr#ments, 'al#e for money, re!#latory an other im"act assessments, an the !o'ernment$s 1#stifications for any non2com"liance with normal s#(stanti'e, "roce #ral or informational re7#irements. 4...5 There a""ears, howe'er, to (e a worryin! lac. of a""reciation on the "art of ministers an some "arliamentarians of the e/istence an im"ortance of the le!al an constit#tional 'alF#es with which in e"en ent scr#tineers concern themsel'es in the emocracies referre to a(o'e. E/am"les are !i'en in the case st# ies in this article an s#(se7#ent isc#ssion. They incl# e res"ect for the r#le of law an for in i'i #al li(erties an ri!hts, ri!hts of access to the co#rts, matters s#ch as the (#r en of "roof in criminal "rocee in!s, the a'oi ance of certain retros"ecti'e

le!islation, certainty in relation to a ministrati'e "owers, non2 ele!ation of le!islati'e "ower #nless 1#stifie , an that there sho#l (e no ta/ation witho#t the e/"ress consent of Parliament. In most emocracies those 'al#es an "rinci"les wo#l (e ta.en into acco#nt e/"licitly an as matters of co#rse at 'ario#s sta!es in the le!islati'e "rocess0 not so in the Unite Kin! om. There is, in other wor s, a noticea le !ivergence in t"e -nite! .ing!om et$een two c#lt#res, that of the la$yer an! t"at of t"e politician' The case for scrutiny stan!ar!s that wo#l artic#late le!al an constit#tional 'al#es here is, therefore, particularly strong.

 In an era $"en t"e courts are ela orating e4plicit constitutional principles, it is surely important t"at Parliament# "arliamentarians an their select committees s"oul! not e left e"in!, or at least not witho#t realisin! that this is ha""enin! an ma.in! a "ositi'e ecision to "artici"ate in the artic#lation or e'elo"ment of constit#tional "rinci"les or not to o so. Scrutiny stan!ar!s or c"ec(lists coul! ring Parliament ac( into t"e constitutional arena. There are also !oo !eneral "#(lic "olicy reasons for a chec.list, !i'en the real concern a(o#t the amo#nt of (a ly tho#!ht o#t le!islation (ro#!ht forwar (y !o'ernment in recent years, m#ch of it amen in! earlier le!islation.

Parliamentary scr#tiny is a "art time 1o( for the "arliament mem(er2?P (#sy in constit#ency iss#e, >-L2 witho#t salary who has their own 1o(s, (oth with limite time an limite so#rces, ?P whi" all ma.e har ly any efficient scr#tini,e system Professor ,avi! <el!man, as well as (ein! an aca emic, ha "ractical e/"erience of the "arliamentary scr#tiny #rin! his time as le!al a 'iser to the Joint Committee on >#man Ri!hts0 The first an essential "oint to (ear in min is that parliamentary scrutiny of legislation is a part) time activity for parliamentarians' In the >o#se of Commons, M'P's "ave a large num er of ot"er functions' T"ey represent constituencies# an! rely on t"eir support in t"e constituency (oth in the local "arty an amon! the electorate at lar!eto ha'e a chance of retainin! the seat at the ne/t election.

 As constit#ency re"resentati'es, ?.P.s s"en a !reat eal of their time answerin! letters an tele"hone calls from constit#ents, hol in! Es#r!eriesE in the conFstit#ency, an followin! #" their !rie'ances on their (ehalf (y writin! to ministers an other "#(lic a#thorities, as.in! "arliamentary 7#estions, or )more rarely* inter'enin! on the floor of the >o#se. They also o"en fetes, 'isit hos"itals, an so on. ?#ch of their local re"#tation, an sometimes their "ros"ects for re2election, will e"en on how they eal with iss#es which are im"ortant to their constit#encies. 4... 5 Scrutinising legislation# y contrast# attracts little pu licity )unless it is concerned with controversial issues such as sexuality or abortion*. It re2uires a great !eal of concentrate! attention# an! must ta(e its place in t"e 2ueue of activities vying for a mem er1s time.

 Particularly if the mem(er has little e4pertise in t"e fiel! of policy an! la$ with which the le!islation is concerne , it is 7#ite un!erstan!a le t"at M'P's ten! to rely on t"e !irections on voting given y t"e party1s $"ips, rat"er t"an attempting to analyse all legislation in !ept". In the *ouse of Lor!s# most peers# not eing salarie! politicians, "ave many non)political activities $"ic" ta(e up muc" of t"eir time. T"ey "ave# per"aps# even less time t"an M'P's to !evote to scrutiny of legislation. There is a !reat eal of e/"ertise amon! "eers on which the >o#se can rely to inform their e(ates. T"ere is some support availa le to mem ers of ot" *ouses# ut less t"an one mig"t e4pect.

 Most M'P's "ave some researc" assistance from t"eir o$n# very limite! staff& a few "eers can call on similar reso#rces, (#t the system relies to a significant e4tent on peers using t"eir private resources to support t"eir parliamentary !uties' This a""lies as m#ch to h#man ri!hts as to any other s#(1ect. 4... 5 4...T5he "re'ailin! atmos"here in (oth >o#ses !i'es one the feelin! that "eo"le are oin! im"ortant thin!s at !reat s"ee , with remar.a(ly little s#""ort, an in "hysical con itions which are im"ro'in! !ra #ally as more s"ace is ma e a'aila(le, (#t which for most mem ers of ot" *ouses are still crampe!# uncomforta le# an! inconvenient. Since (oth >o#ses normally sit after l#nch, an contin#e late into the e'enin! an ni!ht, many important legislative provisions are !iscusse! at times $"en anyone $it" any sense $oul! eit"er e

asleep or slumpe! in front of a television set' +y the time usiness egins in earnest, many of the ?.P's $ill "ave spent a great !eal of the mornin! an early afternoon in meetin!s, or ealin! with constituency usiness, or tra'ellin! from their constit#encies& peers /most of $"om are unsalarie!0 $ill often "ave spent t"e early part of t"e !ay !oing t"eir proper 5o s' 3e "ave a legislature $"ic" is run on t"e c"eap, an e"en s on "eo"le oin! shift wor.#s#ally se'eral shifts a ay, an often in ifferent 1o(s. In s"ort# $e "ave part)time legislators'

Recommen ation 4re1ect s#"er ma1ority52 iss#e "ro(lem in lac. of time, ?inister sho#l e/"lain more etails an effect to the constit#tional, "re2le!islati'e scr#tiny re7#ire In =;99, as "art of a (roa er in7#iry into the "rocess of constit#tional chan!e, t"e *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee consi!ere! scrutiny of constitutionally important %ills. The +ommittee $as particularly critical of the way that some s#ch +ills !o not receive full scrutiny in Parliament !ue to pressure of time, especially at the end of an annual parliamentary session )the ill that become the !onstitutional Reform and "overnance #ct $%1% was cited as an example*. The +ommittee $as not in favour of creating ne$ proce!ures# suc" as super)ma5orities, for si!nificant constit#tional +ills.

 The +ommittee i , howe'er, recommen! t"at a minister intro!ucing suc" a %ill s"oul! ma(e a !etaile! statement e/"lainin!, amon! other thin!s0 the impact of t"e proposal upon e4isting constitutional arrangements& what "#(lic en!a!ement ha ta.en "lace& an "o$ t"e %ill "a! een scrutini&e! $it"in government' A re2uirement for pre)legislative scrutiny of a raft +ill $sho#l (e e"arte from only in e/ce"tional circ#mstances$.

%RINGING LEGISLATION INTO <OR+E After a %ill "as complete! its "assa!e thro#!h Parliament an! receive! royal assent, the ne/t ste" is for it to (e roug"t into force. Every Act contains a commencement provision towar s its en . Some are very straig"tfor$ar! an say sim"ly 1T"is Act comes into force on t"e !ay on $"ic" it is passe!1 )that is, the ay on which it recei'e royal assent* or may s"ecify a ate& most are more com"le/. Example" +"il!ren an! Young Persons Act DEE> Commencement Section L an! t"is Part come into force on t"e !ay on $"ic" t"is Act is passe!.

Common commencement ates2 ay new le!islation came into force Not (no$ing when new le!islation is to (e (ro#!ht into force can e a ma5or pro lem for usinesses an! citi&ens' Since =;;<, a more coor inate a""roach has (een ta.en, with the intro!uction of Ncommon commencement !ates1 t$ice a year'

?inisters i not entitle to ref#se to (rin! the Act into force (y the reason that the Act will s#(se7#ently (e amen e e'en tho#!h Act confer the "ower to eci e the "ro"er time2 it will #s#r" the intention of Parliament, an only Parliament can amen (#t not e/ec#ti'e A "ro(lem of a ifferent sort arises if the government !eci!es not to ring legislation into force. E4 parte <ire %riga!es -nion an! ors In 9::A, the *ome Secretary announce! t"at "e $oul! not e ringing into force sections in t"e +riminal @ustice Act 6=>> that set o#t in stat#tory form the metho s (y which the Criminal In1#ries Com"ensation +oar calc#lates its "ayments to 'ictims of crime. )The +oar ha , in fact, (een o"eratin! on a non2stat#tory (asis since 9:IH.*

 Instea , he sai , the !o'ernment wo#l instr#ct the +oar to ma.e f#t#re "ayments accor in! to a tariff system set (y the >ome -ffice )which was !oin! to re #ce the amo#nts of com"ensation "aya(le in many cases*. T"e La$ Lor!s# y a ma5ority# "el! t"at t"e *ome Secretary1s !ecision $as unla$ful0 alt"oug" "e $as entitle! to !eci!e when to (rin! a section into force, "e $as not a le to !eclare "e $oul! never !o t"is an ma.e r#les contrary to t"e $ill of Parliament e4presse! in t"e Act. The !o'ernment s#(se7#ently intro #ce its tariff scheme in a new Act.

POST)LEGISLATIIE S+R-TINY A final ste" in the "rocess is post) legislative scr#tiny, intro!uce! y t"e government in Marc" DEE>' This was prompte! y recommen!ations of t"e La$ +ommission of En!lan an 3ales, which, in =;;I, calle for a more systematic a""roach. T"e La$ +ommission9) to check whether ob#ective is achieved$ the efficiency 4... 38e un!erstan! post) legislative scrutiny to refer to a roa! form of revie$, the purpose of $"ic" is to a!!ress t"e effects of t"e legislation in terms of $"et"er t"e inten!e! policy o 5ectives "ave een met (y the le!islation an , if so, how effectively' >owe'er, this oes not "recl# e consi eration of narrow 7#estions of a "#rely le!al or technical nat#re.

 The government1s response $as positive' Office of t"e Lea!er of t"e *ouse of +ommons, Post2le!islati'e Scr#tiny0 The Do'ernments A""roach )=;;<, Cm @A=;* The +ommission1s propose! mo!el see(s to com ine in a complementary fas"ion internal !epartmental scrutiny $it" parliamentary scrutiny, with the central "ower of initiati'e for "arliamentary scr#tiny itself (alance (etween the Commons e"artmental committees an other elements within Parliament. The Do'ernment (roa ly en orses this a""roach (#t consi ers that !reater clarity is necessary in the way the "rime role of the Commons commit2tees sho#l (e reco!nise . ?#ch of the acti'ity of Commons committees, e'en if not o'ertly la(elle in that way, in "ractice in'ol'es e/amination of the effecti'eness of e/istin! "rimary le!islation. It wo#l (e #n esira(le for

that wor. to (e s#(1ect to #"lication or conflictin! wor. from other committees. 99. The Government consi!ers t"at its proposal $ill e a valua le an! proportionate approac" to$ar!s ac"ieving t"e o 5ective of etter post) legislative scrutiny' This a""roach is set o#t in more etail in the Do'ernment$s res"onse to the in i'i #al Law Commission recommen ations, as a""en e . In "ractice, !i'en the len!ths of time in'ol'e in the "assa!e of new le!islation an the lea times in'ol'e for the "re"aration of the ?emoran a en'isa!e in these "ro"osals, the o"eration of the "ro"ose system an its effecti'eness will ha'e to (e .e"t #n er contin#o#s re'iew. If the .in of ?emoran #m for "arliamentary scr#tiny which is "ro"ose in'ol'es a is"ro"ortionate wor.loa in their "ro #ction, or if they o not "ro'e to (e the .in of oc#ment which Parliament fin s hel"f#l, then it wo#l (e a""ro"riate to consi er alternati'e a""roaches.

LEGISLATIIE <-N+TIONS A<TER ,EIOL-TION 8e'ol#tion Parliament has the "ower to le!islate within the terms The Scottis" Parliament# t"e Nort"ern Irelan! Assem ly# an! t"e National Assem ly of 3ales "ave po$er to enact primary legislation $it"in t"e terms, res"ecti'ely, of the Scotlan Act 9::<, the Northern Irelan Act 9::<, an the Do'ernment of3ales Act =;;I. ,evolution "as implications for t"e -. Parliament an it is this to which we now t#rn.

)a* T*E SE3EL +ONIENTION2 %arliament will not legislate for devolved matter &'cottish( unless devolved parliament consent &in 'ewel Motion( although under )ct entitled to do so even without consent 8#rin! the "assa!e of the (ill that (ecame the Scotlan Act 9::<, it $as recogni&e! t"at t"e -. Parliament $oul! continue, in certain circ#mstances, to pass legislation on policy areas that were not reserve!1 to t"e -. Parliament )or, "#ttin! it the other way, areas that ha (een $ e'ol'e $*. T"e 6==> Act specifically preserves t"is po$er to legislate'

Se'eral le!islation ha'e to (e ma e to e'ol#tion "arliament as relate to #niformity of UK s#ch as electoral e/"ectation, EU law etc In =;;=, the >o#se of Lor s Constit#tion Committee e/amine this. *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee, 8e'ol#tion0 Inter2 instit#tional Relations in the Unite Kin! om, Secon Re"ort, Session =;;=2;A, >L =< Le!islatin! for Scotlan after 8e'ol#tion0 The Sewel Con'ention 9=I. 3e also hear m#ch e'i ence a(o#t the way 3estminster contin#es to le!islate for e'ol'e matters in Scotlan . As we ha'e note , the "rinci"les !o'ernin! this were first state (y Lor Sewel in the Lor s Secon Rea in! e(ate on the Scotlan +ill, an are now set o#t in the ?emoran #m of Un erstan in!. Agreement to 3estminster legislating for Scotlan! is given

7 y t"e Scottis" Parliament ''' 8# in Se$el motions' 9=@. Professor Pa!e$s e'i ence to #s em"hasise that 3estminster legislation on !evolve! matters $as e4pecte! to e rare# ut "as in fact turne! out to e common' To the en! of @une DEED# t"ere "a! een GF Se$el motions. Some (ills ha'e (een the s#(1ect of more than one Sewel motion, while other motions ha'e (een "asse for (ills which ha'e faile to com"lete their "assa!e at 3estminster. Professor Page1s e4planation for t"e fre2uency of legislation emp"asise! pulls to$ar! uniformity across t"e -. es"ite the e/istence of a Scottish Parliament.

 These arose from a 'ariety of factors, inclu!ing electoral e4pectations# t"e a!ministration of policies y -. o!ies# avoi!ing 1regulatory ar itrage1# applying E- or international la$, or simply seeing no goo! reason $"y t"e la$ s"oul! !iffer et$een Scotlan! an! ot"er parts of t"e -..

Le!islate for e'ol'e matter (enefit for (oth si es *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee9 Professor Pa!e also "ig"lig"te! reasons $"y suc" legislation may e attractive to t"e Scottis" E4ecutive, incl# in! the reliance on t"e - . Government to initiate reforms, avoi!ing !isruption to t"e E4ecutive1s legislative programme for the Scottish Parliament, an avoi!ing any ris( of legal uncertainty a(o#t the 'ali ity of Scottish le!islation. 9=<. 6rom the "oint of 'iew of the E/ec#ti'e, we note that the con'ention offers si!nificant (enefits in "artic#lar, ena ling legislation to apply to Scotlan! $it"out "aving to fin! legislative time for it'

Scottish Parliament lose the control o'er e'ol'e (ill at 3estminster com"are to (efore Scottish Parliament, so recommen e'ol'e sho#l s#(1ect to scr#tiny *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee9 9=:. A n#m(er of as"ects of the o"eration of the Sewel con'ention ca#se #s concern. -ne of these is the nat#re of the consent the Scottish Parliament !i'es when it assents to a Sewel motion "#t (efore it. It a""ears to #s that this is 'ery often in the nat#re of a (lan.et "ermission $(lan. che7#e$for the 3estminster le!islation. If t"e matter $ere t"e su 5ect of legislation efore t"e Scottis" Parliament t"e Parliament $oul! "ave several opportunities to consi!er t"e ill an! propose amen!ments' 3"en t"e matter is !ealt $it" at 3estminster, the Scottis" Parliament receives only t"e one

opportunity to consi!er t"e matter.

 It cannot propose amen!ments or# it appears# ma(e its consent con!itional on !esire! c"anges eing ma!e to t"e -. ill. It also !ets no opportunity to consi!er t"e -. ill again# even if t"at "as een t"e su 5ect of e4tensive amen!ments' )The only circ#mstances in which the bill will return to the &arliament is if further amendments are made extending to 'cotland provisions which did not apply there earlier, as with the A o"tion an Chil ren +ill.* 6rom the "oint of 'iew of the Scottis" Parliament t"ere appears to us to e a loss of control over legislation affecting !evolve! matters when that is ma e at 3estminster, com"are with the mechanisms that a""ly in the Scottish Parliament.

 The i!ea t"at amen!ments affecting !evolve! matters s"oul! e su 5ect to a 1scrutiny reserve1 in a $ay similar to Emeasures, an so re7#ire f#rther a""ro'al (y the Scottish Parliament was "#t to #s (y Professor Pa!e, an is one that interests #s.

Co2o"eration (tw UK "arliament an S. "arliament (ecome U. "arliament with S. e/ec#ti'e as nee e consent from S. e/ec#ti'e in le!islate e'ol'e matter, le!islation matter recommen e sho#l (e (tw le!islator *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee9 9A;. Secon , we fin it stran!e that an iss#e which is fun!amentally a out co)operation et$een legislatures "as turne! in practice into co)operation et$een e4ecutives. The convention itself states t"at it is for t"e -. Government to !etermine $"et"er an approac" s"oul! e ma!e to t"e Scottis" E4ecutive, an for t"e E4ecutive to signal $"et"er t"at consent "as een given.

 That appears to us to inappropriate'

9A9. 3hile the UK Do'ernment may ha'e a 'iew a(o#t whether a +ill affects e'ol'e matters or not, an what action sho#l (e ta.en as a res#lt, $e recommen! t"at suc" communication s"oul! e et$een t"e -. Parliament an! Scottis" Parliament# not me!iate! y t"e e4ecutives at eac" en!'

Recommen!9 UK Parliament ta.e a 'ice on etermination of e'ol'e matter, "roce #ral consent (tw = "arliament, S.Parliament a(le to e/"ress 'iew on amen ment to le!islati'e e'ol'e (ill *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee9 9A=. ?a.in! s#ch comm#nication a "arliamentary an not a !o'ernment matter wo#l in'ol'e consi era(le chan!es. 3hether those chan!es sho#l (e ma e an what they sho#l (e are of co#rse matters for the Scottish Parliament as well as the UK Parliament to etermine. The Committee consi er that these wo#l incl# e ensuring t"at t"e -. Parliament "a! access to a!vice so t"at it coul! !etermine $"et"er a ill affecte! !evolve! matters or not'

 They wo#l also inclu!e t"e esta lis"ment of a formal arrangement et$een t"e -. Parliament an! Scottis" Parliament to !eal $it" proce!ural issues arising from suc" consent, an ena ling t"e Scottis" Parliament more routinely to e4press its vie$s on amen!ments ma!e !uring a ill1s passage at 3estminster. S#ch chan!es wo#l of co#rse also re2uire t"e Scottis" Parliament to ma(e c"anges to its proce!ures as well, an improving proce!ures $ill re2uire a s"are! $ill for t"e t$o parliaments to ta.e control of this matter. >owe'er, in the interests of "romotin! a "ro"er se"aration (etween the e/ec#ti'e an the le!islati'e f#nctions, we thin. that sho#l (e #n erta.en.

Nort"ern Irelan! Assem ly0 witho#t Sewel con'ention, with only = 'ote on 3estminster, an no flow of information (tw = Parliament *ouse of Lor!s +onstitution +ommittee9 9AA. Thir , we note that the Se$el motion mec"anism !oes not appear to operate in t"e Nort"ern Irelan! Assem(ly. There are ha'e (een only t$o votes on 3estminster legislation affectin! e'ol'e matters. There is no formal e4c"ange of information a out 3estminster legislation with the Northern Irelan E/ec#ti'e, an a flo$ of information t"at rests on t"e fact t"at t"e Spea(er of t"e Assem ly is a mem er of t"is *ouse an recei'es >ansar as a matter of co#rse.

Nort"ern Irelan! Assem ly suggestion0 e/ten the Sewel con'ention 9AH. 3hile it is of co#rse a matter for the Northern Irelan Assem(ly an E/ec#ti'e to eal with themsel'es, $e consi!er it $oul! e a!vantageous to t"e -. Parliament as $ell as t"e Assem ly for t"ere to e a proper proce!ure to !eal $it" Se$el motions where a 3estminster (ill affects e'ol'e matters in Northern Irelan .

/ 0 T*E ENGLIS* B-ESTION1 ?P from e'ol'e constit#encies in'ol'e le!islate matter only for En!lan A !ifferent concern that has emer!e in the wa.e of !evolution of !evolve! legislative po$ers to Scotlan!# 3ales# an! Nort"ern Irelan! is the role of the UK Parliament as the legislature for %ills t"at apply only to Englan! The practical pro lem )accor in! to some* is that, since 9::<, MPs representing 3els"# Nort"ern Iris"# an! Scottis" constituencies in the UK Parliament "ave continue! to e a le to vote on legislation t"at applies only to Englan .

 It is sai that this is unfair in general an! in particular on t"ose occasions on $"ic" a ma5ority of MPs from Englan! oppose an initiative, ut it is nonet"eless passe! (eca#se of votes from MPs in ot"er parts of t"e -nite! .ing!om $"o are prepare! to support t"e government, even t"oug" t"eir constituents $ill not e affecte! (y what is "ro"ose . This is one as"ect of what has (een #((e $the En!lish %#estion )or $the 3est Lothian %#estion$, after the name of the Scottish constit#ency of the ?P who first raise this iss#e #rin! the e'ol#tion e(ates of the 9:@;s*.

S#!!estion of En!lish 'ote for En!lish law will face iffic#lty0 iffic#lty in etermine En!lishLNon En!lish law 4technicality iss#e5, Parliament will (ecome #nsta(le #e to i'ision of En!lish n Non2En!lish Parliament 4"olitically iss#e5 One possi le solution wo#l (e to create an En!lish Parliament, istinct from the UK Parliament. Another, s#""orte (y the Conser'ati'e Party, amon! others, is 1Englis" votes for Englis" la$s1# in which only ?Ps from constit#encies in En!lan wo#l 'ote on "ro'iFsions in +ills (efore the UK Parliament that a""ly only to En!lan . Critics ar!#e that s#ch a reform wo#l #n ermine the Unite Kin! om, in the Parliament of which all ?Ps sho#l (e free to 'ote e7#ally on any iss#e.

 *a&ell9 En!lish Motes on En!lish Laws0 3estminster as a Pro/y for an En!lish Parliament In contrast 4to the i ea of an En!lish Parliament5, En!lish 'otes on En!lish laws is a "ro"osiFtion that oes comman some elite s#""ort an consi era(le mass s#""ort. Pollin! ata consistently show that (etween K; an I; "ercent of "eo"le in En!lan a!ree that Scottish ?Ps sho#l no lon!er (e allowe to 'ote on En!lish laws now that Scotlan has its own "arliament. It seems only lo!ical an fair, since En!lish ?Ps can no lon!er 'ote on matters e'ol'e to Scotlan . E'en a ma1ority of Scots s#""ort restrictin! the 'otin! ri!hts of Scottish ?Ps in this way. %ut t"e !ifficulties of implementing suc" a policy seem insupera le, at ot" a tec"nical an! a political level'

 The tec"nical !ifficulty is i!entifying t"ose Englis" la$s on which only Englis" MPs $oul! e allo$e! to vote' Strictly s"ea.in! t"ere is no suc" t"ing as an Englis" la$# in t"e sense of a 3estminster statute t"at applies only to Englan!. The territorial e/tent cla#ses in 3estminster stat#tes ty"ically e/ten to the Unite Kin! om, Dreat +ritain, or En!lan an 3ales. ?any stat#tes 'ary in their territorial a""lication in ifferent "arts of the act. In theory the S"ea.er co#l i entify in a 'ance those cla#ses or amen ments that a""ly only to En!lan an r#le that only En!lish ?Ps co#l ta.e "art in those i'isions. +#t the com"le/ity an conf#sion res#ltin! from e/cl# in! non2En!lish ?Ps from some 'otes (#t not others in the same (ill wo#l (e immense. -nly with the intro #ction of electronic 'otin! at 3estminster wo#l it (ecome feasi(le, (eca#se that wo#l ena(le the 'otin! terminals of non2En!lish ?Ps to (e isa(le or isco#nte in i'isions in which they were eeme ineli!i(le to 'ote.

 If the technical iffic#lties are a#ntin!, the political !ifficulties are even greater' Pro"onents of En!lish 'otes on En!lish laws ten to #n erestimate 1#st what a h#!e chan!e wo#l (e in'ol'e . It $oul! create t$o classes of MP, en!ing t"e tra itional reci"rocity where(y all mem ers can vote on all matters. It $oul! effectively create a parliament $it"in a parliament. An after close2fo#!ht elections, t"e -'.' government mig"t not e a le to comman! a ma5ority for its Englis" usiness, lea!ing to great political insta ility. These "olitical iffic#lties cast serio#s o#(t on the li.elihoo of En!lish 'otes on En!lish laws e'er (ecomin! "olitical reality.

Ne$ +ommittee0 consi er le!islation only affect "art of UK In <e ruary DE6D, an e/"ert committee )$the Mc.ay +ommission* (e!an wor. $to consi er "o$ t"e *ouse of +ommons mig"t !eal $it" legislation $"ic" affects only part of t"e -nite! .ing!om# followin! the e'ol#tion of certain le!islati'e "owers to the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Irelan Assem(ly an the National Assem(ly for 3ales$.