Peter van Inwagen has discussed the special composition problem in various articles and texts over the

past several decades. It is in Material Beings that he gives his fullest answer to the question, in which he puts forward an interpretation of the special composition problem and posits his rather radical answer to it. Essentially, the composition problem is the question, When do two things compose something else ! "he gloss that is is often given, that is When is x a part of z! is a misleading formulation as it already supposes that there is a mereological sum, z, and it is merely a question of determining how x is related to it in order to form a part of the composite ob#ect. $ formulation of the question more appropriately would be, When do x and y compose something ! %an Inwagen also distinguishes the special composition problem from the general composition problem. "he special composition problem&s answers should tell us about the multigrade relation between ob#ects'it tells us when composition has occurred( answers to the general composition problem tell us what composition is. )rudely put *as van Inwagen does bring considerable formality to what would constitute an answer+, answers to the special composition problem should resemble the following, y the x&s compose y *an answer to the special composition problem+ and "he x&s are in contact *or however else the composition relationship is made'the x&s are glued together! or whatever else the answer is to be( "he x&s are in contact is then equivalent to y the x&s compose y if contact is the solution to the general composition problem+ "he range of possible answers to when composition occurs of course lies on a spectrum from always! to never.! -n the always end is most notably "heodore .ider, who in his boo/ FourDimensionalism argues for unrestricted mereological sums *as well as temporal parts( van Inwagen is a staunch three0dimensionalist and as such also denies that there are temporal parts, but these arguments rest not strictly on the special composition problem but instead more on theories of time and

truthma/ers for statements about the past( but given van Inwagen&s near nihilism about composite ob#ects, many of the questions that .ider raises about identity throughout time and change are simply non0starters for van Inwagen since he will deny the existence of the ob#ects that .ider is predicating 1past2 qualities of+. Peter 3nger has expressed the other extreme view, that of mereological nihilism, that is that x and y never compose anything because there are no composite ob#ects. It is certainly closer to 3nger&s view that we find van Inwagen( he explicitly denies that most of what we thin/ of as everyday composite ob#ects are in fact mereological sums. 4owever, the furniture of his universe differs considerably from that of 3nger&s as unli/e 3nger, whose picture of the universe is simply atoms or the fundamental physical particulars, van Inwagon&s also includes organisms. "o understand this seemingly odd ontology, first we must exam how van Inwagen comes to a position very much li/e that of the nihilist and flatly re#ects the universalism of thin/ers li/e .ider. "hen we must understand why organisms represent a special type of ob#ect. %an Inwagen begins with the supposition that there must be some way in principle to determine if x and y form a composite ob#ect. "his is in part because of his commitment to what he calls "he 5octrine of $rbitrary 3ndetached Parts. "hat is, if at the same time, some single ob#ect occupies a spacial region, then any subregion of that spacial region forms a part of that ob#ect. "his is a formal definition to prevent the existence of scattered ob#ects. It is noteworthy that other theorists li/e .ider follow van Inwagen&s reasoning below *on a mereological principle+ but then come to the opposite conclusion, re#ecting the 5octrine of $rbitrary 3ndeatched Parts and opting for unrestricted mereological sums rather than van Inwagen&s nihilism *so given that there is no principle of restricted mereology, yet there is mereological sums, mereology is not restricted to principled composition, and therefore any stipulated mereological sum is an actual mereological sum'hence there can be a 6ew 7or/ 8ets0)hicago pi99a0$ridam )ha/rabarti composite ob#ect, and in fact there is+. %an Inwagen begins by first considering ways in which pre0theoretically we thin/ of things as forming some composite ob#ect. )ontact is one such way. :or example, when I have stones scattered

across the beach I do not thin/ they compose something. 4owever, if I stac/ them up together then I might thin/ that they now compose a heap. 4owever, when I move the two boo/s on my des/ into such a position as their spines are touching, I do not ta/e it that I have formed a new composite ob#ect. Part of the reason might be because I need merely to bump one to brea/ the relationship of contact, and perhaps we intuitively thin/ that ob#ects are hardier! sorts of things. .o fastening is considered as a contender. If I assemble my nephew&s ;ego bloc/s, it seems that I can create tiny helicopters and cars in much the same way the automotive plants put together actual cars and helicopters. <ut van Inwagen demands a principled way'remember the formulation of the answer above. If I were to accidentally staple a paper to my hand it does not seem li/e I have suddenly brought a new ob#ect into existence, the =arrod0staple0paper composite ob#ect. <ut surely there is no doubt I have #ust fastened the paper to me with the staple. $gain, though, one might thin/ that fastening is still not hardy! enough. <ut cohesion is a better example where cohesion is ta/en to be a bonding relationship that entails brea/ing apart. .o when I soldering two copper pipes together, I form a single longer copper pipe. -ne can imagine, however, that some deranged person is in the habit of using super industrial bonding glue to glue together two or more rabbits. We would hardly assent to his claims he has created two headed and three headed rabbit0creatures. "hat is, cohesion also fails to provide a principled way of accounting for composition. "hen perhaps fusion is an answer in which there is no way in principle to determine where one part ends and another begins. <ut still we can thin/ of cases where we thin/ this fails. :or example, we can imagine that =anet and =ane, already identical twins, undergo radical surgery which severs one of their hands and attaches then at the wrist. <ecause of the perfection of the surgery, their identical 56$, et cetera, it is in principle impossible to tell where they were fused. .till, we *or van Inwagen+ wants to resist the idea that we now have a =anet0=ane fusion and that we have one person0 entity where before we had two. :urthermore, they continue to occupy the same distinct spatial locations except now lac/ing their hands'so while we cannot detect where they were fused, =anet and =ane do not suddenly overlap with each other. 4ence, they individually uphold the 5octrine of

$rbitrary 3ndetached Parts, and since there has been no change *one is not subsumed, we could say+, we are inclined to say that we still have the same two ob#ects as we did before'only now, they are fastened>cohered>fused. .o, given that there is no principled way of accounting for when composition occurs, there is no principle of composition. $nd because van Inwagen wants to resist the idea of arbitrary undetached parts, he rules out all of the physical bonding considerations above as provided a principled way of explaining restricted composition. $nd if there is no principle of composition, then there is no composition. <ut that is actually not the case, claims van Inwagon. "here might still be a principle of composition but one that also upholds the 5octrine of $rbitrary 3ndetached Parts. $nd this is where van Inwagon&s metaphysics truly become novel. %an Inwagon holds that there is a principle of composition. :irst, van Inwagon argues that the part0whole relation is, at least in part, causal *much of van Inwagon can be read as coming from $ristotelian notions+. "his is in part why all the simple bonding! principles of composition fail as they only consider relative positions and fixedness rather than any causal notions. $ full explication of van Inwagon&s thought on causality and composition is not needed, but it clearly is part of the motivation or defense of his one principle of composition, *y the x&s compose y) iff the activity of the x&s constitute a life, or there is only one x "he formulation then proposed that all there are then are simples *only one x+ and organisms *when x&s activity constitutes a life+. =ust what constitutes a life and an organism also need not be addressed here as van Inwagen&s definition and defense of that definition is quite lengthy. <ut there is another interesting entailment. .o while this this answer to the special composition problem gives us organisms that have x&s as their parts, those x&s are not parts of organisms in the form of organs or appendages( so while there are organisms with parts, their parts are not hands, arms, hearts, brains and livers and the li/e but instead only the fundamental particles that play a causal role in constituting a life *hence a splinter in my food is not part of me+. Why is this the case It is because, outside of the organism, hands, brains, hearts and livers do not satisfy the criterion

of the activity of the x&s constitute a life.! When a hand is severed, it immediately ceases to constitute the life of the organism to which it belonged. "herefore, a severed hand fails to be part of the organism and fails the test of the 5octrine of $rbitrary 3ndetached Parts. $nd given the 5octrine of $rbitrary 3ndetached Parts, we must deny that organisms have parts, which are hands. Instead, organisms constitute wholes with their parts as the simples *fundamental particles+ and are not constituted by other composite ob#ects li/e hearts and hands, things that themselves fail the principle of composition above.