You are on page 1of 11

Heirs of Cecilio Claudel vs.

CA & Heirs of Macario Claudel (Siblings of Cecilio) Facts: Cecilio Claudel acquired from the Bureau of Lands a parcel of land. Thirty-nine years after his death, two branches of Cecilios family contested the ownership over the land the Heirs of Cecilio and the Siblings of Cecilio. The Heirs of Cecilio partitioned the lot among themselves and obtained the corresponding TCTs. Siblings of Cecilio filed a complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reconveyance with Damages alleging that their parents had purchased from the late Cecilio several portions of the lot. They admitted that the transaction was verbal but they were able to present the subdivision plan. The CFI dismissed the complaint disregarding the evidence. The CA reversed the CFIs ruling ordering the cancellation of the TCTs issued in the name of the Heirs of Cecilio. As ruled by the CA, the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to consummated sales as in the case at bar where oral evidence may be admitted. Issue: WON a contract of sale of land may be proven orally. Held: Yes, a contract of sale of land may be proven orally subject to certain exceptions. This case falls within the exception. The rule of thumb is that a sale of land, once consummated, is valid regardless of the form it may have been entered into. For nowhere does law or jurisprudence prescribe that the contract of sale be put in writing before such contract can validly cede or transmit rights over a certain real property between the parties themselves. However, in the event that a third party, as in this case, disputes the ownership of the property, the person against whom that claim is brought cannot present any proof of such sale and hence has no means to enforce the contract. Thus the Statute of Frauds was precisely devised to protect the parties in a contract of sale of real property so that no such contract is enforceable unless certain requisites, for purposes of proof, are met. The provisions of the Statute of Frauds pertinent to the present controversy, state: Art. 1403 (Civil Code). The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: 2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents: e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein; The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced in Writing. Therefore, except under the conditions provided by the Statute of Frauds, the existence of the contract of sale made by Cecilio with his siblings cannot be proved.

CITY LITE v CA 10 February 2000 Bellosillo, ponente

petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals decision

SHORT VERSION: Only when the agent has written authority to sell realty can the sale be valid.

FACTS: FP Holdings and Realty Corp (respondent) was the registered owner of a 71754 sq m-parcel of land along E Rodriguez Ave, QC known as the Violago Property or the San Lorenzo Ruiz Commercial Center. o It was offered for sale to the general public through a sales brochure: A parcel of land including buildings and other improvements thereon located along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, with a total lot area of 71,754 square meters - 9,192 square meters in front, 23,332 square meters in the middle, and 39,230 square meters at the back. But the total area for sale excludes 5,000 square meters covering the existing chapel and adjoining areas which will be donated to the Archdiocese of Manila thus reducing the total saleable area to 66,754 square meters. Asking price was P6,250.00/square meter with terms of payment negotiable. Broker's commission was 2.0% of selling price, net of withholding taxes and other charges. As advertised, contact person was Meldin Al G. Roy, Metro Drug Inc., with address at 5/F Metro House, 345 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City. o The 9192 sq m- front portion was the subject of litigation. Meldin Roy (respondent) sent a sales brochure, location plane and copy of the TCT to Atty Gelacio Mamaril, a lawyer and licensed real estate broker. Mamaril passed on the documents to City-Lites Executive VP Antonio Teng and Legal Counsel Atty Victor Villanueva. o City-Lite conveyed its interest to purchase of the front portion in a letter send to Metro Drug (Attn: Meldin Roy). Roy also informed City-Lites representative that it would take time to subdivide the lot and FP Holdings wasnt receptive to a purchase. o Atty Mamaril sent a letter to Metro Drug expressing City-Lites desire to buy the entire front lot so long as the P6250/sq m asking price was reduced and that payment be made in installments. Roy made a counter offer in another letter: 1. The price shall beP6,250.00/square meter or a total of P57,450,000.00; 2. The above purchase price shall be paid to the owner as follows: (a) P15.0 Million downpayment; (b) balance payable within six (6) months from date of downpayment without interest. City-Lite and Mamaril met with Roy to consummate the transaction; Roy agreed to sell the property provided City-Lite submit its acceptance in writing to the terms and conditions in Roys letter. Later that afternoon Mamaril and Teng conveyed their formal acceptance of the terms. However, FP Holdings refused to execute the corresponding deed of sale and registered an adverse claim to the title of the property with the Register of Deeds of QC, annotated in the memorandum of encumbrance in the TCT. FP Holdings filed a petition for the cancellation of the adverse claim against City-Lite with the RTC QC; City-Lite caused the annotation of the first notice of lis pendens which was recorded in the title of the property. o RTC dismissed FP Holdings petition; FP Holdings caused a resurvey and segregation of the property, asking and was granted separate titles from the RD QC.

City-Lite instituted a complaint against FP Holdings for specific performance and damages and caused the annotation of the second notice of lis pendens. o The property was transferred to Viewmaster Construction Co (respondent) for which a TCT was issued; the lis pendens was carried over to the new title. o The RTC rendered a decision in favor of City-Lite ordering FP Holdings to execute a deed of sale of the property and ordering the RD QC to cancel Viewmasters TCT. o The CA reversed an set aside the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: was there a contract of sale perfected between City-Lite and FP Holdings through its agent Meldin Roy of Metro Drug?

REASONING: Art. 1874 of the Civil Code provided: "When the sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void."

Roy was FP Holdings authorized agent to sell the property, but the NCC required that the authority be in writing. The absence of authority to sell could be determined from the written memo issued by FP Holdings president requesting Metro Drugs assistance in finding buyers. The memo stated: o
We will appreciate Metro Drug's assistance in referring to us buyers for the property. Please proceed to hold preliminary negotiations with interested buyers and endorse formal offers to us for our final evaluation and appraisal.

o o

This meant that Roy and/or Metro Drug were only to assist FP Holdings, and FP Holdings were the only ones who could make the final evaluation, appraisal and acceptance of any transaction. Roy and/or Metro Drug were only a contact person with no authority to conclude a sale of the property. Consequently, the sale should be null and void, and not produce any legal effect to transfer the property from FP Holdings to any interested party.

RULING: appealed decision affirmed

Pichel v. Alonzo
Facts: Respondent Prudencio Alonzo was awarded by the Government that parcel of land in Basilan City in accordance with Republic Act No. 477. The award was cancelled by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 on the ground that, previous thereto, plaintiff was proved to have alienated the land to another, in violation of law. In 1972, plaintiff's rights to the land were reinstated. On August 14, 1968, plaintiff and his wife sold to defendant Luis Pichel all the fruits of the coconut trees which may be harvested in the land in question for

the period, September 15, 1968 to January 1, 1976, in consideration of P4,200.00. Even as of the date of sale, however, the land was still under lease to one, Ramon Sua, and it was the agreement that part of the consideration of the sale, in the sum of P3,650.00, was to be paid by defendant directly to Ramon Sua so as to release the land from the clutches of the latter. Pending said payment plaintiff refused to allow the defendant to make any harvest. In July 1972, defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land. Alonzo filed for the annulment of the contract on the ground that it violated the provisions of R.A. 477, which states that lands awarded under the said law shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation, otherwise the awardee shall no longer be entitled to apply for another piece of land. The lower court ruled that the contract, which it held as a contract of lease, is null and void. Issues: (1) Whether the respondent had the right or authority to execute the "Deed of Sale" in 1968, his award having been cancelled previously by the Board of Liquidators on January 27, 1965 (2) Whether the contract is one for lease of the land, or for sale of coconut fruits (3) Whether the contract is an encumbrance as contemplated by R.A. 477 Held: (1) Until and unless an appropriate proceeding for reversion is instituted by the State, and its reacquisition of the ownership and possession of the land decreed by a competent court, the grantee cannot be said to have been divested of whatever right that he may have over the same property. Herein respondent is not deemed to have lost any of his rights as grantee during the period material to the case at bar, i.e., from the cancellation of the award in 1965 to its reinstatement in 1972. Within said period, respondent could exercise all the rights pertaining to a grantee. (2) A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity in its provisions, nor is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. The terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. The document in question expresses a valid contract of sale. It has the essential elements of a

contract of sale. The subject matter of the contract of sale in question are the fruits of the coconut trees on the land during the years from September 15, 1968 up to January 1, 1976, which subject matter is a determinate thing. Under Article 1461 of the New Civil Code, things having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale. Pending crops which have potential existence may be the subject matter of sale. The essential difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things is that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased. The contract was clearly a "sale of the coconut fruits." The vendor sold, transferred and conveyed "by way of absolute sale, all the coconut fruits of his land," thereby divesting himself of all ownership or dominion over the fruits during the seven-year period. The possession and enjoyment of the coconut trees cannot be said to be the possession and enjoyment of the land itself because these rights are distinct and separate from each other, the first pertaining to the accessory or improvements (coconut trees) while the second, to the principal (the land). A transfer of the accessory or improvement is not a transfer of the principal. It is the other way around, the accessory follows the principal. Hence, the sale of the nuts cannot be interpreted nor construed to be a lease of the trees, much less extended further to include the lease of the land itself. The grantee of a parcel of land under R.A. No. 477 is not prohibited from alienating or disposing of the natural and/or industrial fruits of the land awarded to him. What the law expressly disallows is the encumbrance or alienation of the land itself or any of the permanent improvements thereon. Permanent improvements on a parcel of land are things incorporated or attached to the property in a fixed manner, naturally or artificially. They include whatever is built, planted or sown on the land which is characterized by fixity, immutability or immovability. Houses, buildings, machinery, animal houses, trees and plants would fall under the category of permanent improvements, the alienation or encumbrance of which is prohibited. The purpose of the law is not violated when a grantee sells the produce or fruits of his land. On the contrary, the aim of the law is thereby achieved, for the grantee is encouraged and induced to be more industrious and productive, thus making it possible for him and his family to be economically selfsufficient and to lead a respectable life. At the same time, the Government is assured of payment on the annual installments on the land. We agree with herein petitioner that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to prohibit the grantee from selling the natural and industrial fruits of his land,

for otherwise, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein the grantee would not be able to receive and enjoy the fruits of the property in the real and complete sense.
1. MELLIZA vs CITY OF ILOILO (23 SCRA 477) Facts: Juliana Melliza during her lifetime owned, among other properties, 3 parcels of residential land in Iloilo City (OCT 3462).Said parcels of land were known as Lots Nos. 2, 5 and 1214. The total area of Lot 1214 was 29,073 sq. m. On 27 November 1931she donated to the then Municipality of Iloilo, 9,000 sq. m. of Lot 1214, to serve as site for the municipal hall. The donation was however revoked by the parties for the reason that the area donated was found inadequate to meet the requirements of the development plan of the municipality, the so-called Arellano Plan. Subsequently, Lot 1214 was divided by Certeza Surveying Co., Inc. into Lots 1214-A and 1214B. And still later, Lot 1214-B was further divided into Lots 1214-B-1, Lot 1214-B-2 and Lot1214-B-3. As approved by the Bureau of Lands, Lot 1214-B-1, with 4,562 sq. m., became known as Lot 1214-B; Lot 1214-B-2,with 6,653 sq. m., was designated as Lot 1214-C; and Lot 1214-B-3, with 4,135 sq. m., became Lot 1214-D. On 15 November1932, Juliana Melliza executed an instrument without any caption providing for the absolute sale involving all of lot 5, 7669 sq.m. of Lot 2 (sublots 2-B and 2-C), and a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot 1214 (sublots 1214-B2 and 1214-B3) in favor of the Municipal Government of Iloilo for the sum of P6,422; these lots and portions being the ones needed by the municipal government for the construction of avenues, parks and City hall site according the Arellano plan. On 14 January 1938, Melliza sold her remaining interest in Lot 1214 to Remedios Sian Villanueva (thereafter TCT 18178). Remedios in turn on 4 November1946 transferred her rights to said portion of land to Pio Sian Melliza (thereafter TCT 2492). Annotated at the back of Pio Sian Mellizas title certificate was the following that a portion of 10,788 sq. m. of Lot 1214 now designated as Lots 1412-B-2 and1214-B-3 of the subdivision plan belongs to the Municipality of Iloilo as per instrument dated 15 November 1932. On 24 August 1949 the City of Iloilo, which succeeded to the Municipality of Iloilo, donated the city hall site together with the building thereon, to the University of the Philippines (Iloilo branch). The site donated consisted of Lots 1214-B, 1214-C and 1214-D, with a total area of 15,350 sq. m., more or less. Sometime in 1952, the University of the Philippines enclosed the site donated with a wire fence. Pio Sian Melliza thereupon made representations, thru his lawyer, with the city authorities for payment of the value of the lot (Lot 1214-B). No recovery was obtained, because as alleged by Pio Sian Melliza, the City did not have funds. The University of the Philippines, meanwhile,

obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7152 covering the three lots, Nos. 1214-B,1214-C and 1214-D.On 10 December 1955 Pio Sian Melizza filed an action in the CFI Iloilo against Iloilo City and the University of the Philippines for recovery of Lot 1214-B or of its value. After stipulation of facts and trial, the CFI rendered its decision on 15 August 1957, dismissing the complaint. Said court ruled that the instrument executed by Juliana Melliza in favor of Iloilo municipality included in the conveyance Lot 1214-B, and thus it held that Iloilo City had the right to donate Lot 1214-B to UP. Pio Sian Melliza appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 May 1965, the CA affirmed the interpretation of the CFI that the portion of Lot 1214 sold by Juliana Melliza was not limited to the 10,788 square meters specifically mentioned but included whatever was needed for the construction of avenues, parks and the city hall site. Nonetheless, it ordered the remand of the case for reception of evidence to determine the area actually taken by Iloilo City for the construction of avenues, parks and for city hall site. Hence, the appeal by Pio San Melliza to the Supreme Court. One of his causes of action was that the contract of sale executed between Melliza and the Mun. referred only to lots 1214-C and 1214-D and it is unwarranted to include lot 1214-B as being included under the description therein because that would mean that the object of the contract of sale would be indeterminate. One of the essential requirements for a contract of sale is that it should have for its object a determinate thing. HELD: The paramount intention of the parties was to provide Iloilo municipality with lots sufficient or adequate in area for the construction of the Iloilo City hall site, with its avenues and parks. For this matter, a previous donation for this purpose between the same parties was revoked by them, because of inadequacy of the area of the lot donated. Said instrument described 4parcels of land by their lot numbers and area; and then it goes on to further describe, not only those lots already mentioned, but the lots object of the sale, by stating that said lots were the ones needed for the construction of the city hall site, avenues and parks according to the Arellano plan. If the parties intended merely to cover the specified lots (Lots 2, 5, 1214-C and 1214-D), there would scarcely have been any need for the next paragraph, since these lots were already plainly and very clearly described by their respective lot number and areas. Said next paragraph does not really add to the clear description that was already given to them in the previous one. It is therefore the more reasonable interpretation to view it as describing those other portions of land contiguous to the lots that, by reference to the Arellano plan, will be found needed for the purpose at hand, the construction of the city hall site. The requirement of the law that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing, is fulfilled as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties (Art.

1273, old Civil Code; Art. 1460, New Civil Code). The specific mention of some of the lots plus the statement that the lots object of the sale are the ones needed for city hall site; avenues and parks, according to the Arellano plan, sufficiently provides a basis, as of the time of the execution of the contract, for rendering determinate said lots without the need of a new and further agreement of the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from insofar as it affirms that of the CFI, and dismissed the complaint; without costs

YU TEK vs GONZALES (29 Phil 384) FACTS: A written contract was executed between Basilio Gonzalez and Yu Tek and Co., where Gonzales was obligated to deliver600 piculs of sugar of the 1st and 2nd grade to Yu Tek, within the period of 3 months (1 January-31 March 1912) at any place within the municipality of Sta. Rosa, which Yu Tek & Co. or its representative may designate; and in case, Gonzales does not deliver, the contract will be rescinded and Gonzales shall be obligated to return the P3,000 received and also the sum of P1,200by way of indemnity for loss and damages. No sugar had been delivered to Yu Tek & Co. under this contract nor had it been able to recover the P3,000. Yu Tek & Co. filed a complaint against Gonzales, and prayed for judgment for the P3,000 and the additional P1,200. Judgment was rendered for P3,000 only, and from this judgment both parties appealed. Defendant alleges that the court erred in refusing to permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which the defendant raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop. The second contention of the defendant arises from the first. He assumes that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise upon his own plantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of the thing due. (Arts. 1452, 1096, and 1182, Civil Code.) ISSUES: 1) Whether compliance of the obligation to deliver depends upon the production in defendants plantation 2) Whether there is a perfected sale 3) Whether liquidated damages of P1,200 should be awarded to the plaintiff

HELD: 1) The case appears to be one to which the rule which excludes parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. It may be true that defendant owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. Our conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself. 2) Article 1450 defines a perfected sale as follows: The sale shall be perfected between vendor and vendee and shall be binding on both of them, if they have agreed upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price, even when neither has been delivered. Article 1452 provides that the injury to or the profit of the thing sold shall, after the contract has been perfected, be governed by the provisions of articles 1096 and 1182. There is a perfected sale with regard to the thing whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles In McCullough vs. Aenlle & Co. (3 Phil 285), a particular tobacco factory with its contents was held sold under a contract which did not provide for either delivery of the price or of the thing until a future time. In Barretto vs. Santa Marina (26 Phil 200),specified shares of stock in a tobacco factory were held sold by a contract which deferred delivery of both the price and the stock until the latter had been appraised by an inventory of the entire assets of the company. In Borromeo vs. Franco (5 Phil.Rep., 49) a sale of a specific house was held perfected between the vendor and vendee, although the delivery of the price was withheld until the necessary documents of ownership were prepared by the vendee. In Tan Leonco vs. Go Inqui (8 Phil. Rep.,531) the plaintiff had delivered a quantity of hemp into the warehouse of the defendant. The defendant drew a bill of exchange in the sum of P800, representing the price which had been agreed upon for the hemp thus delivered. Prior to the presentation of the bill for payment, in said case, the hemp was destroyed. Whereupon, the defendant suspended payment of the bill. It was held that the hemp having been already delivered, the title had passed and the loss was the vendees. It is our purpose to distinguish the case at bar from all these cases. The contract in the present case was merely an executory agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. As there was no perfected sale, it is clear that articles 1452, 1096, and 1182 are not applicable. The agreement upon the thing which was the object of the contract was not within

the meaning of article 1450. Sugar is one of the staple commodities of this country. For the purpose of sale its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being denominated a picul.' There was no delivery under the contract. If called upon to designate the article sold, it is clear that Gonzales could only say that it was sugar. He could only use this generic name for the thing sold. There was no appropriation of any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar. The contract in the present case is different from the contracts discussed in the cases referred to. In the McCullough case, for instance, the tobacco factory which the parties dealt with was specifically pointed out and distinguished from all other tobacco factories. So, in the Barretto case, the particular shares of stock which the parties desired to transfer were capable of designation. In the Tan Leonco case, where a quantity of hemp was the subject of the contract, it was shown that quantity had been deposited in a specific warehouse, and thus set apart and distinguished from all other hemp The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from with the modification allowing the recovery of P1,200 under paragraph 4 of the contract, without costs

TOYOTA SHAW, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-116650 May 23, 1995 Facts: Sometime in June of 1989, Luna L. Sosa wanted to purchase a Toyota Lite Ace. It was then a seller's market and Sosa had difficulty finding a dealer with an available unit for sale. But upon contacting Toyota Shaw, Inc., he was told that there was an available unit. So on 14 June 1989, Sosa and his son, Gilbert, went to the Toyota office at Shaw. There they met Popong Bernardo, a sales representative of Toyota. Sosa emphasized to Bernardo that he needed the Lite Ace not later than 17 June 1989 because he, his family, and a balikbayan guest would use it on 18 June 1989 to go to Marinduque, his home province, where he would celebrate his birthday on the 19th of June. He added that if he does not arrive in his hometown with the new car, he would become a "laughing stock." Bernardo assured Sosa that a unit would be ready for pick up at 10AM on 17 June 1989. Bernardo then signed the "Agreements Between Mr. Sosa & Popong Bernardo of Toyota Shaw, Inc." P100 thousand was the downpayment, but the purchase price was not mentioned in the contract. It was also agreed upon by the parties that the balance of the purchase price would be paid by credit financing through B.A. Finance. Toyota contends, however, that the Lite Ace was not delivered to Sosa because of the disapproval by B.A. Finance of the credit financing application of Sosa. It further alleged that a particular unit had already been reserved and earmarked for Sosa but could not be released due to the uncertainty of payment of the balance of the purchase price. Toyota then gave Sosa the

option to purchase the unit by paying the full purchase price in cash but Sosa refused. The financing corporation seemed to have not approved Sosas application. Issue: WON there was a perfected contract of sale? NO Held: Exhibit "A" or the Agreement is NOT a perfected contract of sale. Nothing was mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the installments were to be paid. A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. Definiteness as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal property. Exhibit "A" shows the absence of a meeting of minds between Toyota and Sosa. For one thing, Sosa did not even sign it. He was not dealing with Toyota but with Popong Bernardo. Bernardo was only a sales representative of Toyota and hence a mere agent of the latter. Exhibit "A" may be considered as part of the initial phase of the generation or negotiation stage of a contract of sale. Accordingly, in a sale on installment basis which is financed by a financing company, three parties are thus involved: the buyer who executes a note or notes for the unpaid balance of the price of the thing purchased on installment, the seller who assigns the notes or discounts them with a financing company, and the financing company which is subrogated in the place of the seller, as the creditor of the installment buyer. Since B.A. Finance did not approve Sosa's application, there was then no meeting of minds on the sale on installment basis. The Vehicle Sales Proposal was a mere proposal which was aborted in lieu of subsequent events. It follows that the VSP created no demandable right in favor of Sosa for the delivery of the vehicle to him, and its non-delivery did not cause any legally indemnifiable injury.

You might also like