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E. Me rit t v.

Gov ern men t of the Ph ilippin e I sl and s

Fact s: This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six
feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he
was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and
in his mental condition. The plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries, his
physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the
accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach
the highest parts of the building.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount
allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. Nothing was found in the record which would
justify increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor
were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the
hospital. In this the Court thinks there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months.
The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home,
would not prevent recovery for the whole time. The Court, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his
part, is P18,075.
The petitioner vis-à-vis Act No. 2457 effective February 3, 1915 was authorized to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General to appear in said suit.
Issue: WON the scope of the Act authorizes the Court to hold that the Government is legally liable for the said amount
Rul in g: No

Ratio nale: Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that
the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the
state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the
act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the
amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability,
but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in
this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in
express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence
of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must
presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested
in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where
the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
According to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage
case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable
to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of
civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of
the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of
Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)

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