ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SO PAULO DA FUNDAO GETULIO VARGAS

CENTRO DO COMRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadoras Vera Thorstensen Luciana Maria de Oliveira

RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO RGO DE APELAO: Efeitos na aplicao das regras do comrcio internacional

Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comrcio 1994 (GATT 1994)

Organizadora Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin Autores Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira Carina Costa de Oliveira Carolina Szsz Janete Cynthia Kramer Daniel Pezzutti Ribeiro Teixeira Fbio Morosini Fabio Weinberg Crocco Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini Felipe de Andrade Krausz Frederico Arana Meira Jacqueline Spolador Lopes Joo Henrique Ribeiro Roriz Jos Guilherme Moreno Caiado Jos Luiz Pimenta Jnior Lucas da Silva Tasquetto Lucas Queiroz Pires Lusa Niencheski Matheus Bassani Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin Milena da Fonseca Azevedo Nathalie Tiba Sato Vera Kanas Grytz 1

INTRODUO
Anlise do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comrcio de 1994 (GATT 1994) e da jurisprudncia consolidada pelo rgo de Soluo de Controvrsias (DSB) da OMC

ACORDO GERAL SOBRE TARIFAS E COMRCIO (GATT 1994)

Artigo 1

Vera Kanas Grytz Felipe de Andrade Krausz IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article I General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 1.1 With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not require the elimination of any preferences in respect of import duties or charges which do not exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article and which fall within the following descriptions: (a) Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth therein; Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories which on July 1, 1939, were connected by common sovereignty or relations of protection or suzerainty and which are listed in Annexes B, C and D, subject to the conditions set forth therein; Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba; Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries listed in Annexes E and F.

1.2

(b)

(c)

(d) 1.3

The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to preferences between the countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24, 1923, provided such preferences are approved under paragraph 5 (1), of Article XXV which shall be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph 1 of Article XXIX. The margin of preference on any product in respect of which a preference is permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a maximum margin of preference in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement shall not exceed: (a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates provided for therein; if no 2

1.4

preferential rate is provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this paragraph be taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947, and, if no most-favoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not exceed the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947; (b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the appropriate Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates existing on April 10, 1947.

In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date of April 10, 1947, referred to in subparagraph (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be replaced by the respective dates set forth in that Annex.
Footnote 1: The authentic text erroneously reads subparagraph 5(a).

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo I Tratamento Geral de Nao mais Favorecida

1.1

Qualquer vantagem, favor, imunidade ou privilgio concedido por uma parte contratante em relao a um produto originrio de ou destinado a qualquer outro pas, ser imediata e incondicionalmente estendido ao produtor similar, originrio do territrio de cada uma das outras partes contratantes ou ao mesmo destinado, ste dispositivo se refere aos direitos aduaneiros e encargos de tda a natureza que gravem a importao ou a exportao, ou a elas se relacionem, aos que recaiam sbre as transferncias internacionais de fundos para pagamento de importaes e exportaes, digam respeito ao mtodo de arrecadao dsses direitos e encargos ou ao conjunto de regulamentos ou formalidades estabelecidos em conexo com a importao e exportao bem como aos assuntos incluidos nos 1 e 2 do art. III. As disposies do pargrafo primeiro do presente artigo no importaro na eliminao de quaisquer preferncias com respeito a direitos aduaneiros ou encargos que no ultrapassem os limites fixados no 3 dste artigo e que se enquadrem nas seguintes descries: (a) preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais dos territrios enumerados no Anexo A, subordinadas s condies nele estipuladas; preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre dois ou mais territrios que, em 1 de julho de 1939, estavam sujeitos a uma soberania comum ou unidos por laos de proteo ou suzerania, os quais so enumerados nos Anexos B, C e D, dentro das condies nos mesmos estipulados; preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre os Estados Unidos da Amrica e a Repblica de Cuba; preferncias em vigor exclusivamente entre paises vizinhos mencionados nos Anexos E e F.

1.2

(b)

(c)

(d) 1.3

Quando no fr fixada especificamente a margem mxima de preferncia na correspondente lista anexada a ste Acrdo, a margem de preferncia sbre qualquer produto em relao ao qual seja permitida uma, preferncia, de conformidade com o 2 do presente artigo, no poder exceder: (a) relativamente aos direitos ou encargos sbre qualquer produto descrito nessa lista, a diferena entre a taxa de nao mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial, que figuram na mesma lista; se no houver estipulao da taxa preferencial, esta, para os fins de aplicao do presente pargrafo, passar a ser a que estava em vigor em 10 de abril de 1947; se nenhuma taxa de nao mais favorecida fr fixada, a margem no ultra-passar a diferena, existente em 10 de abril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicvel nao mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial; 3

(b)

no tocante aos direitos ou encargos sbre qualquer produto no descrito na lista correspondente diferena, existente em 10 de abril de 1947, entre a taxa aplicvel nao mais favorecida e a taxa preferencial.

No caso das partes contratantes mencionadas no Anexo G, a data de 10 de abril de 1947, citada nas alineas (a) e (b) do presente pargrafo, ser substituida pelas respectivas datas indicadas nesse anexo. (Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Na verso original do GATT em portugus, publicada pela Lei 313/1948, a traduo do pargrafo 3 est incorreta. Dessa forma, a traduo adequada do texto original deve compreender as disposies tal como so apresentadas, sugerindo-se a seguinte redao As disposies do pargrafo 1 no se aplicaro s preferncias entre os pases que anteriormente foram parte do Imprio Otomano e dele se separaram em 24 de julho de 1923, desde que tais preferncias sejam aprovadas nos termos do pargrafo 5, do Artigo XXV, que dever ser aplicado de acordo com o pargrafo 1 do Artigo XXIX. II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo I do GATT Artigo I

A interpretao do Artigo I do GATT pelos Painis e pelo rgo de Apelao foi construda com base nos seguintes elementos: (a) Objeto e finalidade (Object and purpose); (b) mbito de aplicao (Scope of application); (c) Ordem de exame (Order of examination); (d) Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilgio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer Pas Membro (any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member): (i) Geral (General); e (ii) Atribuio de quotas tarifrias (Allocation of tariff quotas). (e) Produtos similares (like products); (f) Qualquer produto originrio ou destinado para outro pas (any product originating in or destined for another country); e (g) Ser outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente (shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally). a) Objeto e finalidade Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, para. 84 Nesse caso o rgo de Apelao aponta que o objeto e a finalidade do Artigo I do GATT so plenamente identificveis como mandamento para aplicao do princpio da no discriminao no tratamento destinado aos produtos similares importados, ao mesmo tempo em que tambm pretende ser incentivo para que haja continuidade nas concesses tarifrias negociadas, e sua consequente generalizao entre todos os Membros. Para. 84. The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is to prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibition of discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other Members on an MFN basis. b) mbito de aplicao 4

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, para. 78 Nesse caso o rgo de Apelao estabeleceu que a cobertura da clusula da nao mais favorecida, tal como estipulada pelo Artigo I do GATT, no limitada apenas ao seu mbito normativo, como proibio que seria to somente destinada as medidas restritivas e discriminatrias assim identificadas unicamente atravs de suas disposies legais. Na verdade, inexiste qualquer limitao para proibio de medidas discriminatrias, sejam elas jurdicas ou na prtica contrrias ao Artigo I do GATT (de jure ou de facto, respectivamente). Para. 78. In approaching this question, we observe first that the words of Article I:1 do not restrict its scope only to cases in which the failure to accord an advantage to like products of all other Members appears on the face of the measure, or can be demonstrated on the basis of the words of the measure. Neither the words de jure nor de facto appear in Article I:1. Nevertheless, we observe that Article I:1 does not cover only in law, or de jure, discrimination. As several GATT panel reports confirmed, Article I:1 covers also in fact, or de facto, discrimination. (2) Like the Panel, we cannot accept Canada's argument that Article I:1 does not apply to measures which, on their face, are origin-neutral. (3) c) Ordem de exame Relatrio do Painel no litgio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia - Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.138 Neste Relatrio o Painel estrutura a ordem de exame das medidas potencialmente discriminatrias adotadas em face aos produtos similares importados, quando submetidas apreciao pelo DSB. Primeiramente, fica estabelecido que a anlise das medidas deve ser realizada sob a tica das vantagens previstas no prprio Artigo I do GATT. Se os benefcios tarifrios e aduaneiros restarem classificados como tais vantagens, caber ao Painel (ou ao rgo de Apelao) decidir se esses mesmos benefcios so oferecidos a todos os produtos importados similares e se sua concesso realizada de maneira incondicional. Para. 14.138. The Appellate Body, in Bananas III, confirmed that to establish a violation of Article I, there must be an advantage, of the type covered by Article I and which is not accorded unconditionally to all like products of all WTO Members. Following this analysis, we shall first examine whether the tax and customs duty benefits are advantages of the types covered by Article I. Second, we shall decide whether the advantages are offered (i) to all like products and (ii) unconditionally. Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS379/R, para. 14.166 Neste Relatrio o Painel retoma os posicionamentos estabelecido em Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry e EC - Bananas, quais sejam uma vantagem tal como definida pelas disposies do Artigo I do GATT e sua extenso, incondicional ou no, para os produtos similares dos outros Membros, consolidando os elementos a serem analisados durante o exame de conformidade de uma medida em relao as disposies presentes ao Artigo I do GATT. Para. 14.166. By its terms, three elements must be demonstrated to establish a violation of Article I:1: there must be an advantage, (of the type covered by that provision) which is not accorded to all like products of all WTO Members, unconditionally. (4) d) Qualquer vantagem, favor, privilgio ou imunidade concedida por qualquer Membro

(i) Geral Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada - Autos), Demandantes: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, para. 79 Nesse Relatrio o rgo de Apelao ressalta o carter abrangente da proibio contra medidas discriminatrias, destacando a incluso da totalidade das vantagens concedidas para quaisquer produtos dentro das disposies previstas no Artigo I do GATT. Nesse diapaso, cabe destacar que tais vantagens para os seus respectivos produtos devem ser estendidas para quaisquer outros produtos similares, originrios de todos os Membros, de forma imediata e incondicional. Nota-se, portanto, o carter eminentemente amplo e inclusivo das disposies do Artigo I do GATT. Para. 79. We note next that Article I:1 requires that any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. (emphasis added) The words of Article I:1 refer not to some advantages granted with respect to the subjects that fall within the defined scope of the Article, but to any advantage; not to some products, but to any product ; and not to like products from some other Members, but to like products originating in or destined for all other Members. (ii) Atribuio de quotas tarifrias Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 206 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao, em concordncia com a deciso anterior do Painel, aponta que quotas tarifrias que resultam em vantagens, mas que apresentem requisitos discriminatrios para sua extenso imediata s importaes de produtos similares de outros Membros, so proibidas pelo Artigo I:1 do GATT. Para. 206. On the first issue, the Panel found that the procedural and administrative requirements of the activity function rules for importing third-country and non-traditional ACP bananas differ from, and go significantly beyond, those required for importing traditional ACP bananas. This is a factual finding. Also, a broad definition has been given to the term advantage in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by the panel in United States - Non-Rubber Footwear. (5) It may well be that there are considerations of EC competition policy at the basis of the activity function rules. This, however, does not legitimize the activity function rules to the extent that these rules discriminate among like products originating from different Members. For these reasons, we agree with the Panel that the activity function rules are an advantage granted to bananas imported from traditional ACP States, and not to bananas imported from other Members, within the meaning of Article I:1. Therefore, we uphold the Panel's finding that the activity function rules are inconsistent with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do Painel em European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/MEX, para. 7.239 Nesse caso o Painel recorda que o Artigo I:1 do GATT no permite que os Membros concedam tratamentos diferenciados nos diversos procedimentos relativos importao de produtos, de modo que a discriminao entre origens pudesse ser equilibrada atravs de diferentes concesses mais ou menos favorveis a depender do procedimento e da origem do produto. Para. 7.239. The requirement to match EC import licences with BFA export certificates means that those BFA banana suppliers who are initial holders of export certificates enjoy a commercial advantage compared to banana suppliers from other third countries. (6) We note that it is not possible to ascertain how many of 6

the initial BFA export certificate holders are BFA banana producers or to what extent the tariff quota rent share that accrues to initial holders of BFA export certificates is passed on to the producers of BFA bananas in a way to create more favourable competitive opportunities for bananas of BFA origin. However, we also note that the possibility does exist to pass on tariff quota rent to BFA banana producers in such a way, whereas there is no such possibility in respect of non-BFA third-country banana producers. Thus, the EC's requirement affects the competitive relationship between bananas of non-BFA third-country origin and bananas of BFA origin. It is certainly true that Article I of GATT is concerned with the treatment of foreign products originating from different foreign sources rather than with the treatment of the suppliers of these products. In this respect, we note that the transfer of tariff quota rents which would normally accrue to initial holders of EC import licences to initial holders of BFA export certificates does occur when bananas originating in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua are, at some point, traded to the EC. Therefore, in our view, the requirement to match EC import licences with BFA export certificates and thus the commercial value of export certificates are linked to the product at issue as required under Article I. In practice, from the perspective of EC importers who are Category A or C operators, bananas of non-BFA third country origin appear to be more profitable than bananas of BFA origin. This is confirmed by the fact that EC import licences for non-BFA third-country bananas and Category B licences for BFA bananas are typically oversubscribed in the first round of licence allocations, while Category A and C licences for BFA bananas are usually exhausted only in the second round of the quarterly licence allocation procedure. The EC argues that the fact that licences allowing the importation of non-BFA bananas at in-quota tariff rates are usually exhausted in the first round amounts to an advantage for bananas of Complainants' origin. While we do not endorse the EC's view, even if this were to constitute an advantage, we note that Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against a less favourable treatment under others. (7) e) Produtos similares Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia - Autos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, para. 14.141 Nesse caso o rgo de Apelao, ao confrontar-se com a questo de similaridade entre produtos nacionais e importados, realiza uma anlise sobre as especificidades dos produtos em pauta, tendo como parmetros os argumentos sobre as suas caractersticas especficas tal como apresentados pelos Membros envolvidos em uma controvrsia. Para o rgo de Apelao resta patente que se os produtos nacionais no forem singulares, quando tanto eles quanto os produtos estrangeiros compartilham o mesmo segmento de mercado, sem diferenas relevantes no consumo, e sem evidencias que afastem a presuno de similaridade evidenciada durante os procedimentos de soluo da controvrsia, o produto importado ser considerado como similar ao produto nacional. Para. 14.141. We have found in our discussion of like products under Article III:2 that certain imported motor vehicles are like the National Car. (8) The same considerations justify a finding that such imported vehicles can be considered like National Cars imported from Korea for the purpose of Article I. We also consider that parts and components imported from the complainants are like imports from Korea. Indonesia concedes that some parts and components are exactly the same for all cars. As to the parts and components which arguably are specific to the National Car, Indonesia does not contest that they can be produced by the complainants companies. This fact confirms that the parts and components imported for use in the National Car are not unique. As before, we note in addition that the criteria for benefitting from reduced customs duties and taxes are not based on any factor which may affect per se the physical characteristics of those cars and parts and components, or their end uses. In this regard, we note that past panels interpreting Article I have found that a legislation itself may violate that provision if it could lead in principle to less favourable treatment of the same products. (9) Relatrio do Painel no litgio Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panam, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.356 7

Nesta deciso o Painel reconhece que medidas que possuem como critrio de incidncia para sua aplicao a origem dos produtos, so contrrias s disposies do Artigo I do GATT, ainda que tal distino entre os produtos similares somente pudesse ser realizada hipoteticamente. Observa-se que a clusula da nao mais favorecida compreende obrigaes para com Membros que ainda no produzem o produto similar sujeito s medidas, mas que caso comeassem a produzi-los, estes estariam sujeitos a distines discriminatrias unicamente por causa de sua origem. Para. 7.356. The Appellate Body has previously recognized the possibility of using hypothetical imports to determine whether a measure violates Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. (10) Under the advance import declaration and legalization requirements, the distinction between products is based on the circulation and points of departure of textile, apparel and footwear products prior to the products' arrival in Colombia. In particular, since Panama does not currently produce any of these products for export to Colombia, but in light of the fact that the Panel views it as proper to consider Panama's claim, hypothetical imports from Panama or the CFZ are appropriate for consideration. An advance import declaration, advance payment of customs duties and taxes, and special rules concerning legalization would be required simply because of the products' origin. In the Panel's view, the hypothetical origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama were to produce the subject goods and export those goods to Colombia is sufficient for the Panel to proceed in considering Panama's claim under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do Painel em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (US Poultry) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS392/R, paras. 7.423-7.429 Nesse caso o Painel discorre sobre a questo da comparao entre produtos nacionais e importados e sua consequente similaridade. A problemtica central se a comparao entre produtos vis--vis deveria ser hipottica, considerando apenas se a origem o fator discriminatrio na aplicao de medidas restritivas na importao. O Painel ressalta que esta anlise deve ser feita para cada caso individualmente, a fim de apurarem-se as suas especificidades particulares, determinantes na definio de similaridade entre produtos. Para. 7.423. The Panel notes that Article I:1 requires a comparison between like products originating from one country vis--vis products originating from a WTO Member. The products to be compared in this dispute are the products at issue poultry products as defined by the PPIA originating from China vis--vis poultry products originating in the territory of other WTO Members which have been deemed equivalent by the FSIS. China argues that the Panel should follow a hypothetical like product analysis as several panels have done when confronted with origin-based discrimination (11), while the United States argues that the Panel should rely on the approach of the panel in the EC - Asbestos dispute because it dealt with the issue of likeness in the context of products with different safety levels. (12) Para. 7.424. The concept of like product has been abundantly interpreted in the prior decisions of panels and the Appellate Body. Whatever the provision at issue, the Appellate Body has explained that a like product analysis must always be done on a case-by-case basis. (13) Para. 7.425. The traditional approach for determining likeness has, in the main, consisted of employing four general criteria: (14) (i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers' tastes and habits more comprehensively termed consumers' perceptions and behaviour in respect of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products. (15) Para. 7.426. A different approach used by panels and the Appellate Body to determine the likeness of the products has been to assume hypothetically that two like products exist in the market place when one of two situations arises: first cases concerning origin-based discrimination, and second, cases where it was not possible to make the like product comparison because of for example a ban on imports. (16) Para. 7.427. The panel in China Publications and Audiovisual Products (17) recalled the relevant WTO jurisprudence which supports a hypothetical like product analysis where a difference in treatment between domestic and imported products is based exclusively on the products' origin. In these cases, the complainant did not need to identify specific domestic and imported products and establish their likeness in terms of the 8

traditional criteria in order to make a prima facie case of likeness. Instead, when origin is the sole criterion distinguishing the products, it has been sufficient for a complainant to demonstrate that there can or will be domestic and imported products that are like. (18) For example, the panels in Argentina Hides and Leather and Canada Wheat Exports and Grain Imports found in the context of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, that where a Member draws an origin-based distinction in respect of internal taxes, a comparison of specific products is not required and, consequently, it is not necessary to examine the various likeness criteria. (19) We also note that panels have found that foreign origin cannot serve as a basis for a determination that imported products are unlike domestic ones. (20) Para. 7.428. The panel in Colombia Ports of Entry applied a hypothetical like product analysis in respect of products originating from Panama and other WTO Members in the context of Article I:1. The measure at issue affected products coming from Panama into Colombia, whether originating or not in Panama. Panama did not appear to produce goods for export to Colombia, but nevertheless the Panel considered Panama's claim. Based on the above jurisprudence under Article III of the GATT 1994 (21), the panel adopted a hypothetical likeness approach on the premise of an origin-based distinction that would arise if Panama were to produce the subject goods and export them to Colombia. (22) The panel considered that if Panama were to produce textiles, apparel and footwear, goods originating in Panama would be like products to those originating in other countries. (23) Para. 7.429. We note that the United States has argued that the differing safety levels of poultry from China vis--vis other WTO Members may have an impact on the like products analysis. (24) However, the United States did not provide specific evidence relating to different safety levels between poultry products from China and other WTO Members. Therefore, we see no reason not to proceed with the hypothetical like products analysis and base our determination on whether the products alleged to be like are distinguished solely because of their origin. f) Qualquer produto originrio ou destinado para outro pas Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190 Nessa disputa o rgo de Apelao ressalta a essncia do princpio da no discriminao, qual seja a origem dos produtos no poder ser caracterstica que os submeta a quaisquer medidas discriminatrias. Produtos similares devem ser tratados de forma igual, independentemente de sua origem. Dessa forma, at mesmo o tratamento domstico dispensado aos produtos similares, em determinados pases, no pode ser considerado, por outro Membro, como fundamento para tratamento discriminatrio na importao destes mesmos produtos, uma vez que a distino na concesso de vantagens seria um critrio preponderantemente baseado em origem de produtos. Para. 190. The issue here is not whether the European Communities is correct in stating that two separate import regimes exist for bananas, but whether the existence of two, or more, separate EC import regimes is of any relevance for the application of the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements. The essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like products should be treated equally, irrespective of their origin. As no participant disputes that all bananas are like products, the nondiscrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas, irrespective of whether and how a Member categorizes or subdivides these imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by that Member. g) Ser outorgada imediata e incondicionalmente 9

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia - Autos), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Japo, EUA e Japo, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R e WT/DS64/R, paras. 14.145-14.147 Nesse Relatrio o rgo de Apelao observa que as vantagens concedidas a um produto importado devem ser igualmente estendidas, ou seja, concedidas aos produtos similares de outras origens imediata e incondicionalmente. Dessa forma, no permitido suspender ou mesmo proibir a aplicao de vantagens aos produtos similares em face de qualquer condio, inclusive estabelecer objees originrias de relaes contratuais de mbito privado, o que tambm seria inconsistente com o escopo e as disposies do Artigo I do GATT. Para. 14.145. Indeed, it appears that the design and structure of the June 1996 car programme is such as to allow situations where another Members like product to a National Car imported by PT PTN from Korea will be subject to much higher duties and sales taxes than those imposed on such National Cars. For example, customs duties as high as 200% can be imposed on finished motor vehicles while an imported National Car benefits from a 0% customs duty. No taxes are imposed on a National Car while an imported like motor vehicle from another Member would be subject to a 35% sales tax. The distinction as to whether one product is subject to 0 % duty and the other one is subject to 200% duty or whether one product is subject to 0% sales tax and the other one is subject to a 35% sales tax, depends on whether or not PT TPN had made a deal with that exporting company to produce that National Car, and is covered by the authorization of June 1996 with specifications that correspond to those of the Kia car produced only in Korea. In the GATT/WTO, the right of Members cannot be made dependent upon, conditional on or even affected by, any private contractual obligations in place. (25) The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1 which provides that tax and customs duty benefits accorded to products of one Member (here on Korean products) be accorded to imported like products from other Members immediately and unconditionally. (26) Para. 14.146. We note also that under the February 1996 car programme the granting of customs duty benefits to parts and components is conditional to their being used in the assembly in Indonesia of a National Car. The granting of tax benefits is conditional and limited to the only Pioneer company producing National Cars. And there is also a third condition for these benefits: the meeting of certain local content targets. Indeed under all these car programmes, customs duty and tax benefits are conditional on achieving a certain local content value for the finished car. The existence of these conditions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1 which provides that tax and customs duty advantages accorded to products of one Member (here on Korean products) be accorded to imported like products from other Members immediately and unconditionally. Para. 14.147. For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 car programme which introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 car programme which also introduce discrimination between imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are inconsistent with the provisions of Article I of GATT. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada - Autos), Demandante: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, paras. 81-82 Nesse Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao destaca a influncia e a penetrao da clusula da nao mais favorecida para alm do Artigo I do GATT, com ocorrncia sistemtica em outras disposies do Quadro Normativo da OMC, notadamente com reflexos diretos nas demais disposies do GATT. Para. 81. Thus, from both the text of the measure and the Panel's conclusions about the practical operation of the measure, it is apparent to us that [w]ith respect to customs dutiesimposed on or in connection with importation, Canada has granted an advantage to some products from some Members that Canada has 10

not accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. (emphasis added) And this, we conclude, is not consistent with Canada's obligations under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Para 82. The context of Article I:1 within the GATT 1994 supports this conclusion. Apart from Article I:1, several MFN-type clauses dealing with varied matters are contained in the GATT 1994. (27) The very existence of these other clauses demonstrates the pervasive character of the MFN principle of nondiscrimination. Relatrio do Painel no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada Autos), Demandantes: Japo e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS139/R e WT/DS142/R, paras. 10.22 10.25 Nesse caso, o Painel discorre sobre certos elementos presentes no Artigo I do GATT. Para o Painel, no possvel identificar se uma vantagem foi estendida incondicionalmente sem um exame de possveis discriminaes entre produtos similares de Membros diferentes. Sobre essa faceta do Artigo I do GATT, necessrio destacar que a extenso incondicional de vantagens obrigao dos Membros da OMC, no sendo possvel sua relativizao em face da situao ou conduta de outros Membros. Contudo, o Painel tambm destaca que condies impostas, quando no relacionadas aos produtos em si e a sua origem, no so necessariamente contrrias ao Artigo I do GATT. Para. 10.22. As explained below, we believe that this interpretation of Japan does not accord with the ordinary meaning of the term unconditionally in Article I:1 in its context and in light of the object and purpose of Article I:1. In our view, whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is accorded unconditionally cannot be determined independently of an examination of whether it involves discrimination between like products of different countries. Para. 10.23. Article I:1 requires that, if a Member grants any advantage to any product originating in the territory of any other country, such advantage must be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territories of all other Members. We agree with Japan that the ordinary meaning of unconditionally is not subject to conditions. However, in our view Japan misinterprets the meaning of the word unconditionally in the context in which it appears in Article I:1. The word unconditionally in Article I:1 does not pertain to the granting of an advantage per se, but to the obligation to accord to the like products of all Members an advantage which has been granted to any product originating in any country. The purpose of Article I:1 is to ensure unconditional MFN treatment. In this context, we consider that the obligation to accord unconditionally to third countries which are WTO Members an advantage which has been granted to any other country means that the extension of that advantage may not be made subject to conditions with respect to the situation or conduct of those countries. This means that an advantage granted to the product of any country must be accorded to the like product of all WTO Members without discrimination as to origin. Para. 10.24. In this respect, it appears to us that there is an important distinction to be made between, on the one hand, the issue of whether an advantage within the meaning of Article I:1 is subject to conditions, and, on the other, whether an advantage, once it has been granted to the product of any country, is accorded unconditionally to the like product of all other Members. An advantage can be granted subject to conditions without necessarily implying that it is not accorded unconditionally to the like product of other Members. More specifically, the fact that conditions attached to such an advantage are not related to the imported product itself does not necessarily imply that such conditions are discriminatory with respect to the origin of imported products. We therefore do not believe that, as argued by Japan, the word unconditionally in Article I:1 must be interpreted to mean that making an advantage conditional on criteria not related to the imported product itself is per se inconsistent with Article I:1, irrespective of whether and how such criteria relate to the origin of the imported products.

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Para. 10.25. We thus find that Japan's argument is unsupported by the text of Article I:1. We also consider that there is no support for this argument in the GATT and WTO reports cited by Japan. A review of these reports shows that they were concerned with measures that were found to be inconsistent with Article I:1 not because they involved the application of conditions that were not related to the imported product but because they involved conditions that entailed different treatment of imported products depending upon their origin. Relatrio do Painel em Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia - Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panam, WT/DS366/R, para. 7.366 Nesse Relatrio, o Painel reitera o posicionamento estabelecido em Canada Auto quanto proibio de discriminao da concesso de vantagens em razo da origem dos produtos. Nesse escopo, a legislao aduaneira, mesmo que com objetivo de evitar ilcitos, fica proibida de aplicar normas distintas com base na origem dos produtos importados. Para. 7.366. With respect to Colombia's view that it may condition its customs procedures on the need to control and verify imported merchandise from Panama and to avoid circumvention of such laws and regulation through under-invoicing, fraud and smuggling, without violating Article I:1, the Panel reiterates the view expressed in Canada Autos (28) that conditions attached to an advantage granted in connection with the importation of a product will violate Article I:1 when such conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of products. As such, in the Panel's view, Article I:1 prohibits Members from addressing such concerns through the use of customs rules that are applied on the basis of origin. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Colombia - Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panam, WT/DS139/AB/R e WT/DS142/AB/R, paras. 83-84 Nessa deciso o rgo de Apelao aponta que, apesar do carter expansivo da clusula da nao mais favorecida, existem diversas excees s disposies do Artigo I previstas no prprio GATT, como os Artigos XX, XXI e XXIV. Para. 83. The drafters also wrote various exceptions to the MFN principle into the GATT 1947 which remain in the GATT 1994. (29) Canada invoked one such exception before the Panel, relating to customs unions and free trade areas under Article XXIV. This justification was rejected by the Panel, and the Panel's findings on Article XXIV were not appealed by Canada. Canada has invoked no other provision of the GATT 1994, or of any other covered agreement, that would justify the inconsistency of the import duty exemption with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. Para. 84. The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our interpretation. That object and purpose is to prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries. The prohibition of discrimination in Article I:1 also serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other Members on an MFN basis. Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Import measures on certain products from the European Communities (US - Certain EC Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS165/R, para. 6.54 Nesse caso, o Painel identifica diferenciao na regulamentao entre produtos domsticos e similares importados, e o exclusivo substrato para tal distino a origem destes produtos, e no as suas caractersticas prprias. Tal diferenciao discriminatria e, portanto, contrria ao Artigo I do GATT. Para. 6.54. We find that the 3 March additional bonding requirements violated the most-favoured-nation clause of Article I (30) of GATT, as it was applicable only to imports from the European Communities, although identical products from other WTO Members were not the subject of such an additional bonding requirements. The regulatory distinction (whether an additional bonding requirement is needed) was not

12

based on any characteristic of the product but depended exclusively on the origin of the product and targeted exclusively some imports from the European Communities. (31) Relatrio do Painel no litgio European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS246/R, paras. 7.59-7.60 Nesse Relatrio, o Painel reconhece que a incondicionalidade da extenso das vantagens acordadas para produtos similares podem relacionar-se a condies de compensaes comerciais. Entretanto, o Artigo I do GATT tem uma abrangncia superior questo de exigncia de compensaes, que justamente coaduna-se com o sentido usual de incondicionalmente, qual seja, sem limitao ou sujeio a quaisquer condies. Para. 7.59. In the Panel's view, moreover, the term unconditionally in Article I:1 has a broader meaning than simply that of not requiring compensation. While the Panel acknowledges the European Communities' argument that conditionality in the context of traditional MFN clauses in bilateral treaties may relate to conditions of trade compensation for receiving MFN treatment, the Panel does not consider this to be the full meaning of unconditionally under Article I:1. Rather, the Panel sees no reason not to give that term its ordinary meaning under Article I:1, that is, not limited by or subject to any conditions. (32) Para. 7.60. Because the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements are accorded only on the condition that the receiving countries are experiencing a certain gravity of drug problems, these tariff preferences are not accorded unconditionally to the like products originating in all other WTO Members, as required by Article I:1. The Panel therefore finds that the tariff advantages under the Drug Arrangements are not consistent with Article I:1 of GATT 1994. III. Comentrios

O Artigo I do GATT dispe sobre um dos pilares fundamentais para o sistema multilateral de comrcio, qual seja o princpio ou clusula da nao mais favorecida (most favoured nation). Estabelece o Artigo em referncia vedao discriminao quando da concesso de quaisquer vantagens e benefcios a determinados produtos de certa origem, importando na exigncia de imediata extenso destas vantagens para outros produtos similares originrios ou destinados a todos os demais Membros da OMC. Prestigia-se, assim, a equidade no trato das relaes comerciais internacionais, com a disseminao de condies congruentes de competio entre os diversos pases, caracterstica indissocivel da configurao do multilateralismo atual. Tais disposies positivam a obrigao jurdica de manuteno da concorrncia entre produtos similares, independentemente de sua origem ou destino, na medida em que ingerncias discriminatrias de poltica comercial, quando institudas pelos Membros, so proibidas. Exige-se, assim, que a cada Membro sejam concedidas vantagens como se fossem as mais benficas, simultaneamente expanso de benefcios negociados aos demais Membros da OMC. Estabelece-se uma implicao automtica e direta das concesses bilaterais, que se tornam coletivas, uma vez que todos os Membros, mesmo que no tenham participado diretamente das negociaes, adquiram as mesmas vantagens acordadas por aqueles que as negociaram. As disposies do Artigo I do GATT fazem referncia medida a qual constitua vantagem, favor, imunidade ou privilgio (advantage, favour, privilege or immunity), o que representa, de modo geral, as possibilidades de atuao dos Membros no mbito do comrcio internacional. Predendeu-se dimensionar a incidncia do princpio da no discriminao todas as vantagens acordadas, extrapolando qualquer condicionante relacionada concesso da medida em si. Mostra-se inequvoco o destaque objetiva limitao proibitiva de violaes clusula da nao mais favorecida consubstanciada neste Artigo. Nesse sentido, em Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, o rgo de Apelao posicionou-se decisivamente sobre a extenso do princpio da no discriminao sob a gide do Artigo I do GATT, que extrapola qualquer restrio originria de eventual distino de jure ou de facto, aplicveis a uma medida que seja contestada. Em verdade, tal distino no est presente no Artigo I do GATT, exatamente por almejar a uma efetiva proibio contra a discriminao para alm do mbito puramente normativo e a priori, propriamente abrangendo os efeitos provenientes da adoo de uma medida (i.e. muitas 13

vezes o tratamento discriminatrio somente pode ser verificado quando da anlise da aplicao efetiva da medida, uma vez que seus efeitos concretos no poderiam ser depreendidos unicamente pela apreciao de suas disposies legais em abstrato). Identifica o rgo de Apelao, que concedida medida que implique em qualquer vantagem para certos produtos, esta deve ser estendida, imediata e incondicionalmente, a todos os outros Membros, sob pena de consequente infrao ao Artigo I:1 do GATT. Portanto, a demonstrao da existncia desses trs elementos: (i) uma vantagem conferida ao produto oriundo de certa origem; (ii) no estendida a todos os produtos similares dos demais Membros da OMC; ou, (iii) com imposio de condies para tanto, caracteriza violao aos preceitos do Artigo I:1 do GATT, conforme destacado pelo rgo de Apelao em US - AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties (China). O rgo de Apelao reafirmou, em EC - Bananas, seu entendimento sobre a caracterizao de violao ao Artigo I do GATT, quando da anlise de caso concreto sujeito ao sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC. Assim sendo, para que se estabelea uma violao clusula de nao mais favorecida, dever existir uma vantagem, do tipo compreendido pelo Artigo I do GATT, e que no concedida incondicionalmente, de forma generalizada para todos os Membros da OMC. A apreciao pelos Painis e pelo rgo de Apelao em cada caso seguir essa avaliao segmentada em etapas. O rgo de Apelao esclarece, em Canada - Auto, sobre a finalidade intrnseca que subjaz clusula da nao mais favorecida, e que tambm seria consequncia de sua incidncia. Trata-se do estmulo que o Artigo I:1 do GATT providencia para a concesso de novos benefcios, por consubstanciarem vantagens a serem estendidas, indiscriminadamente, a todos os Membros, multilateralizando as negociaes automaticamente. As observaes do Painel em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, fundamentadas na anterior deciso de outro Painel, em India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, so essenciais para uma compreenso adequada dos termos dispostos no Artigo I do GATT, fundamentalmente para a abordagem apropriada de um caso concreto. Nesse sentido, Painel determinou que sero consideradas medidas relacionadas importao, tal como prescrito no Artigo I do GATT, aquelas inteiramente relacionadas ao processo de importao, assim como aquelas relacionadas aos demais aspectos relativos ou que impliquem em consequncias na importao. No caso EC - Bananas, o Painel fixou o sentido de vantagens com preciso, como sendo aquele ato que acarreta oportunidades competitivas mais favorveis ou que afeta a relao comercial de produtos de origens diferentes. Retiram-se restries na abordagem dos resultados de medidas adotadas pelos pases, para alm de distores pontuais no fluxo do comrcio, efetivamente se analisando as deformidades provocadas ao instituir-se uma medida contrria ao Artigo I do GATT. Tal viso coaduna-se, assim, com a posio adotada pelo rgo de Apelao desde Canada - Auto, ou seja, a valorizao da grande amplitude da incidncia da disposio legal qualquer vantagem (any advantage). Ressalta o Painel, em United States - Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, que o Artigo I:1 do GATT demanda que seja realizada uma comparao vis--vis entre produtos importados de certas origens em relao a produtos similares importados provenientes de outras origens, sendo estas todos os Membros da OMC. Nesse sentido, o Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entry utilizou-se de uma comparao hipottica entre produtos similares das demais origens, uma vez que a anlise dos produtos em concreto no foi possvel. Estabeleceu-se, consequentemente, a possibilidade de uma esfera de atuao para os Painis ou rgo de Apelao que extrapola a limitao aos dados apresentados pelos Membros, podendo ser a medida submetida a uma ponderao que considere danos futuros, em sincronia, portanto, com as disposies do Artigo I do GATT. A expanso imediata e incondicional das vantagens concedidas tambm necessitou de uma abordagem para ter seu contedo definido. Em Canada Auto, prevaleceu o entendimento de que uma vantagem, na acepo do Artigo I do GATT, somente poder ser considerada como incondicionalmente concedida atravs de um 14

levantamento sobre a ocorrncia, ou no, de discriminao entre produtos similares de diversas origens. Dessa forma, conforme tambm reforado em United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, a concesso de vantagem diz respeito no somente a ela em si, mas, de forma indiscriminada, a quaisquer condies proporcionadas aos produtos originados de qualquer Membro. A obrigao de no discriminao em relao s diferentes origens, encontra-se disposta no Artigo I:1. Este Artigo versa sobre o tratamento oferecido pela clusula de nao mais favorecida, em que toda vantagem concedida ao produto importado de qualquer pas deve ser extendida ao produto similar de todos os outros Membros da OMC, independentemente de sua situao ou conduta. De modo similar, em Colombia Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, confirmou-se que a concesso de uma vantagem a um produto importado em razo de sua origem proibida. Apesar da importncia sistmica, algumas excees so permitidas, quando da adoo de certas medidas pelos Membros, em razo do princpio da nao mais favorecida. Tais ressalvas garantem o afastamento legal e autorizado do Artigo I do GATT nos casos de direitos anti-dumping e compensatrios, trfego fronteirio e unies aduaneiras, waivers para tratamento tarifrio preferencial a PEDs e PMDRs, a enabling clause (clusula de habilitao) e mesmo as excees gerais contidas no Artigo XX do GATT. De tais excees, cabe tecer comentrios adicionais sobre a enabling clause. Para tanto, o rgo de Apelao determinou, confirmando deciso anterior do Painel em EC - Tariff Preferences, que a enabling clause uma exceo ao Artigo I. Isso porque a funo da enabling clause justamente permitir a adoo de medidas que proporcionem tratamento diferencial e mais favorvel a alguns Membros em desenvolvimento, sem uma extenso imediata e incondicional aos demais Membros da OMC, o que, fora do mbito especial da enabling clause, consistiria em patente desrespeito s disposies do Artigo I do GATT. Todavia, o rgo de Apelao tambm declarou que a regra consubstanciada no Artigo I:1 do GATT continua vigente e aplicvel nas hipteses de enabling clause. Dessa forma, o estudo da consistncia de uma medida deve passar primeiramente pelo crivo do Artigo I do GATT e, constatada infrao ao dispositivo em referncia, dever proceder-se com a anlise da enabling clause como justificativa legal para tanto, uma vez que incorpora uma regra mais especfica, a qual prevalece em caso de conflito. Sobre a no discriminao no tratamento preferencial, declarou tambm, que o pargrafo 2(d) no constitui exceo ao pargrafo 2(a) da enabling clause, uma vez que se reconhece a existncia da categoria de Pases de Menor Desenvolvimento Relativo (PMDRs), que podem receber, dada sua natureza especial, certas vantagens tarifrias, independentemente de sua extenso automtica aos demais Membros beneficiados. Ainda, dos pargrafos 3(a) e 3(c) se depreende que no h necessidade de que as preferncias tarifrias sejam proporcionadas igualmente, exatamente pelas necessidades objetivamente diferentes destes pases, ressalvando-se que existe a impossibilidade proibitiva de que tais condies resultem em gravame injustificado aos demais Membros da OMC. Finalmente, levantada a questo do nus de prova em relao aos fatos necessrios para indicar a incompatibilidade da medida com o Artigo I do GATT e com a enabling clause. Para o rgo de Apelao, devido importncia dessa relao probatria, o encargo ser majoritariamente do Membro demandado, cabendo, entretanto, ao demandante a indicao de quais disposies da enabling clause esto, teoricamente, sendo descumpridas. Depreende-se, que os Painis e, principalmente, o rgo de Apelao, foram responsveis pela instituio de precedentes especficos para a determinao do significado objetivo, e do processo de anlise, sobre medidas impostas pelos Membros em relao s disposies do Artigo I do GATT, o que propiciou uma uniformizao da abordagem deste tema no sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC. Ainda, possvel averiguar que em diversos casos em que foi levantada a questo de violao ao Artigo I do GATT, no houve uma abordagem substancial da questo, seja por sucesso na fase de consulta, falha de argumentao das Partes, ou pelo recurso economia judicial pelo Painel ou rgo de Apelao, consequncias representativas do carter universal do princpio da no discriminao e da clusula de nao mais favorecida, e da sua disseminao no multilateralismo atual como reflexo do disposto no Artigo I do GATT. 15

FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 2: We note, though, that the measures examined in those reports differed from the measure in this case. Two of those reports dealt with like product issues: panel report, Spain Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135, adopted 11 June 1981, BISD 28S/102; panel report, Canada/Japan Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber, L/6470, adopted 19 July 1989, BISD 36S/167. In this case, as we have noted, there is no dispute that the motor vehicles subject to the import duty exemption are like products. Furthermore, two other reports dealt with measures which, on their face, discriminated on a strict origin basis, so that, at any given time, either every product, or no product, of a particular origin was accorded an advantage. See panel report, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59; panel report, European Economic Community Imports of Beef from Canada, L/5099, adopted 10 March 1981, BISD 28S/92. In this case, motor vehicles imported into Canada are not disadvantaged in that same sense. Footnote 3: Panel Report, para. 10.40. Footnote 4: Panel Report on Indonesia Autos, para. 14.138, citing to Appellate Body Report on EC Bananas III. Footnote 5: Adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.9. Footnote 6: Whereas the framework agreement provides that the signatory countries are authorized to issue export licences for seventy percent of their allocations, which licences are to be presented in order to obtain import licences of Category A and C for import into the Community, in conditions which may improve the regularity and stability of commercial transactions and guarantee the absence of any discriminatory treatment among operators (emphasis added). Recital 8 of Regulation 478/95. Footnote 7: The Panel ... considered that Article I:1 does not permit balancing more favourable treatment under some procedure against a less favourable treatment under others. If such a balancing were accepted, it would entitle a contracting party to derogate from the most-favoured nation obligation in one case, in respect of one contracting party, on the ground that it accords more favourable treatment in some other case in respect of another contracting party. In the view of the Panel, such an interpretation of the most-favoured-nation obligation of Article I:1 would defeat the very purpose underlying the unconditionality of that obligation. Panel Report on United States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Nonrubber Footwear from Brazil, adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, 151, para. 6.10. Likewise, in the context of Article III a panel found that an element of more favourable treatment would only be relevant if it would always accompany and offset an element of differential treatment causing less favourable treatment. Panel Report on United States - Section 377 of the TariffAct of 1930, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, 388, para. 5.16. Footnote 8: We refer to our discussions in paragraphs 14.110 and 14.111 where we found that given that the Timor, Escort, 306, Optima and Corolla models are in the same market segments, there would not appear to be any relevant differences in respect of consumers' tastes and habits sufficient to render these products unlike. In our view, this evidence is also sufficient to establish a presumption of likeness between the Timor, Corolla, Escort, 306 and Optima for purposes of Article I of GATT. Since Indonesia has submitted no evidence or argument to rebut the presumption of likeness for purposes of Article I of GATT, we find that at least these imported motor vehicles are like the National Car for purposes of Article I of GATT. Footnote 9: See for instance the Panel Report on United States - Denial of Most-favoured-nation Treatment as to Non-rubber Footwear from Brazil, adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.12. Footnote 10: Appellate Body Report, Canada Periodicals, pp. 20-21; see also Panel Report, Indonesia Autos, para. 14.113. Footnote 11: China's first written submission, para. 89. Footnote 12: United States' first written submission, para. 98. Footnote 13: Appellate Body Report, EC Asbestos, para. 102. Footnote 14: Appellate Body Report, Japan Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 21, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 113 and, in particular, fn. 46; Panel Report, US Gasoline, para. 6.8 (where the approach set forth in the Border Tax Adjustment case was adopted in a dispute concerning Article III:4 of the GATT 1994). Footnote 15: The fourth criterion, tariff classification, was not mentioned by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, but was included by subsequent panels (e.g., GATT Panel Report, EEC Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; GATT Panel Report, Japan Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6; and Panel Report, US Gasoline, para. 6.8; Appellate Body Report, Japan Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 21-22, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 114. Footnote 16: Panel Report, Canada Periodicals, paras. 5.22-5.23 upheld by the Appellate Body Report, Canada Periodicals, p. 12. Footnote 17: Panel Report, China Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.1446. Footnote 18: Panel Report, Indonesia Autos, para. 14.113; Panel Report, Argentina Hides and Leather, paras. 11.168 -11.170; Panel Report, Canada Autos, para. 10.74; Panel Report, India Autos, paras. 7.174-7.176. Footnote 19: Panel Report, Canada Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, footnote 246 to para. 6.164. Footnote 20: Panel Report, US FSC (Article 21.5 EC II), para. 8.133. Footnote 21: The panel referred to the Appellate Body Report, Canada Periodicals, pp. 20-21; Panel Report, Indonesia Autos, para. 14.113. Panel Report, Colombia Ports of Entry, footnote 648 to para. 7.356. Footnote 22: Panel Report, Colombia Ports of Entry, para. 7.356. Footnote 23: Panel Report, Colombia Ports of Entry, para. 7.357. Footnote 24: United States' first written submission, para. 98. Footnote 25: For instance in the FIRA case, the Panel rejected Canadas argument that the situation under examination was the consequence of a private contract with an investor: 5.6 The Panel carefully examined the Canadian view that the purchase undertakings should be considered as private contractual obligations of particular foreign investors vis--vis the Canadian government. The Panel recognized that investors might have an economic advantage in assuming purchase undertakings, taking into account the other conditions under which the investment was permitted. The Panel felt, however, that even if this were so, private contractual obligations entered into by investors should not adversely affect the rights which contracting parties, including contracting

16

parties not involved in the dispute, possess under Article III:4 of the General Agreement and which they can exercise on behalf of their exporters. See FIRA, op. cit, para. 5.6. Footnote 26: See Working Party Report on the Accession of Hungary, BISD 20S/34 adopted on 30 July 1973. Footnote 27: These relate to such matters as internal mixing requirements (Article III:7); cinema films (Article IV(b)); transit of goods (Article V:2, 5, 6); marks of origin (Article IX:1); quantitative restrictions (Article XIII:1); measures to assist economic development (Article XVIII:20); and measures for goods in short supply (Article XX(j)). Footnote 28: Panel Report, Canada Autos, para. 10.23. Footnote 29: Such as in Articles XX (general exceptions), XXI (security exceptions) and XXIV (customs unions and free trade areas). Footnote 30: Article I:1 of GATT reads as follows: With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. Footnote 31: Panel Report on Indonesia Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (Indonesia Automobiles), adopted on 23 July 1998, WT/DS54,55,59, 64/R, para.14.147: For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996 car programme which introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February 1996 car programme which also introduced discrimination between imports in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various conditions and other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are inconsistent with the provisions of Article I of GATT. Footnote 32: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 3465.

17

Artigo II

Fabrizio Sardelli Panzini Frederico Arana Meira Jacqueline Spolador Lopes Jos Luiz Pimenta Jnior IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article II Schedules of Concessions 2.1 (a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. The products described in Part II of the Schedule relating to any contracting party which are the products of territories entitled under Article I to receive preferential treatment upon importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates shall, on their importation into such territory, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Part II of that Schedule. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly or mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from maintaining its requirements existing on the date of this Agreement as to the eligibility of goods for entry at preferential rates of duty.

(b)

(c)

2.2

Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any time on the importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product or in respect of an article from which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part; any anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of Article VI; fees or other charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered.

(b)

(c) 2.3

No contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement. If any contracting party establishes, maintains or authorizes, formally or in effect, a monopoly of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, such monopoly shall not, except as provided for in that Schedule or as otherwise agreed between the 18

2.4

parties which initially negotiated the concession, operate so as to afford protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule. The provisions of this paragraph shall not limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to domestic producers permitted by other provisions of this Agreement. 2.5 If any contracting party considers that a product is not receiving from another contracting party the treatment which the first contracting party believes to have been contemplated by a concession provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall bring the matter directly to the attention of the other contracting party. If the latter agrees that the treatment contemplated was that claimed by the first contracting party, but declares that such treatment cannot be accorded because a court or other proper authority has ruled to the effect that the product involved cannot be classified under the tariff laws of such contracting party so as to permit the treatment contemplated in this Agreement, the two contracting parties, together with any other contracting parties substantially interested, shall enter promptly into further negotiations with a view to a compensatory adjustment of the matter. (a) The specific duties and charges included in the Schedules relating to contracting parties members of the International Monetary Fund, and margins of preference in specific duties and charges maintained by such contracting parties, are expressed in the appropriate currency at the par value accepted or provisionally recognized by the Fund at the date of this Agreement. Accordingly, in case this par value is reduced consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund by more than twenty per centum, such specific duties and charges and margins of preference may be adjusted to take account of such reduction; provided that the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e., the contracting parties acting jointly as provided for in Article XXV) concur that such adjustments will not impair the value of the concessions provided for in the appropriate Schedule or elsewhere in this Agreement, due account being taken of all factors which may influence the need for, or urgency of, such adjustments. Similar provisions shall apply to any contracting party not a member of the Fund, as from the date on which such contracting party becomes a member of the Fund or enters into a special exchange agreement in pursuance of Article XV.

2.6

(b)

2.7

The Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo II Listas de Concesses

IB.

2.1

(a)

Cada Parte Contratante conceder s outras Partes Contratantes, em matria comercial, tratamento no menos favorvel do que o previsto na parte apropriada da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo. Os produtos das Partes Contratantes, ao entrarem no territrio de outra Parte Contratante, ficaro isentos dos direitos aduaneiros ordinrios que ultrapassarem os direitos fixados na Parte I da lista das concesses feitas por esta Parte Contratante, observados os termos, condies ou requisitos constantes da mesma lista. Esses produtos tambm ficaro isentos dos direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza, exigidos por ocasio da importao ou que com a mesma se relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do presente Acordo ou os que, como consequncia direta e obrigatria da legislao vigente no pas importador, na referida data, tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente. Os produtos enumerados na Parte II da lista relativa a qualquer das Partes Contratantes, originrios de territrio que, em virtude do Artigo I, goze do direito de tratamento 19

(b)

(c)

preferencial no tocante importao, ao serem importados, estaro isentos no territrio correspondente a essa lista, da parte que exceder dos direitos aduaneiros ordinrios fixados na Parte II dessa Lista. observados os termos, as condies ou requisitos constantes da mesma. Esses produtos tambm ficaro isentos dos direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza, exigidos por ocasio da importao ou que com a mesma se relacionem, e que ultrapassem os direitos ou encargos em vigor na data do presente Acordo ou os que, como consequncia direta e obrigatria da legislao vigente na referida data, no pas importador, tenham de ser aplicados ulteriormente. Nenhuma disposio do presente Artigo impedir que qualquer Parte Contratante mantenha exigncias existentes na data do presente Acordo, quanto s condies de entrada dos produtos sujeitos s taxas dos direitos preferenciais. 2.2 Nenhuma disposio do presente Artigo impedir que, uma Parte Contratante, a qualquer tempo, aplique no tocante importao de qualquer produto: (a) encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido, de conformidade como o disposto no pargrafo 2 do Artigo III, sobre um produto nacional similar ou uma mercadoria com a qual o produto importado tenha sido fabricado ou produzido no todo ou em parte; direitos destinados a contrabalanar ou a compensar o dumping quando, aplicados de conformidade com o disposto no Artigo VI (33); taxas ou outros encargos que guardem proporo com os custos dos servios prestados.

(b)

(c) 2.3

Nenhuma Parte Contratante modificar seu mtodo de avaliao, para fins aduaneiros, ou de converso de moedas, de maneira a diminuir o valor das concesses constantes da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo. Se uma das partes estabelecer, mantiver ou autorizar, de direito ou de fato, um monoplio da importao de qualquer produto descrito na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, tal monoplio, ressalvadas as disposies em contrrio constantes dessa lista ou que, de outro modo, tenham sido acordadas entre as partes que inicialmente negociaram a concesso, no dever ter por efeito assegurar proteo mdia superior quela que prevista nessa lista. As disposies do presente pargrafo no limitaro o recurso das Partes Contratantes a qualquer forma de auxlio aos produtores nacionais, permitida em outros dispositivos do presente Acordo. Quando uma Parte Contratante considerar que um produto no est recebendo de uma outra Parte Contratante tratamento que a primeira acredita ter sido atribudo por uma concesso constante da lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, poder levar a questo diretamente considerao da outra Parte Contratante. Se esta ltima concordar em que o tratamento reclamado o que estava previsto, mas declarar que tal tratamento no pode ser concedido por haver um tribunal ou outra autoridade competente decidido que ao produto em questo no pode ser classificado, consoante a legislao alfandegria respectiva, de modo a permitir o tratamento previsto no presente Acordo, as duas partes constantes, juntamente com outras interessadas de modo substancial, iniciaro, o mais depressa possvel, novas negociaes com o fim de alcanar um ajuste compensatrio. (a) Os direitos especficos e encargos includos nas listas relativas s Partes Contratantes que sejam membros do Fundo Monetrio Internacional e as margens de preferncia nos direitos especficos e encargos mantidos por essas Partes Contratantes so representados, nas moedas respectivas, dentro da paridade aceita ou reconhecida provisoriamente pelo Fundo na data do presente Acordo. Consequentemente, no caso de ser esse valor for reduzido, de conformidade com as clusulas estatutrias do Fundo Monetrio Internacional em mais de vinte por cento, tais direitos especficos e encargos e as margens de preferncia podem ser ajustados de forma a levar em considerao essa reduo; desde que as Partes Contratantes (isto , as Partes Contratantes quando em ao conjunta, nos termos do Artigo XXV) convenham em que esses ajustamentos no importem em diminuir o valor das concesses 20

2.4

2.5

2.6

constantes da lista respectiva ou de qualquer outra parte desse Acordo, levados em conta todos os fatores que possam influir quanto necessidade ou urgncia de tais ajustamentos. (b) A qualquer Parte Contratante que no seja membro do Fundo, sero aplicveis disposies anlogas a partir da data em que a mesma passe a ser membro do Fundo ou conclua um acordo especial de cmbio, na conformidade do que dispe o Artigo XV.

2.7

As listas anexas ao presente Acordo passam a constituir parte integrante da Parte I do mesmo.

Footnote 33: A verso original da Lei 313 de 30/07/1948 estabelece erroneamente ... no Artigo IV.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar. II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo II Artigo II Geral

O DSB identificou a importncia das concesses tarifrias seguirem os objetivos e propsitos do Acordo da OMC e do GATT 94, no que se refere segurana e previsibilidade. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chiken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/R, paras. 7.328 e 7.427 Para. 7.328. In the Panel's view, the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-term preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule runs counter to one of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, namely that the security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements must be preserved. Therefore, the Panel concludes that an interpretation of the term salted in that concession to include the criterion of long-term preservation could undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which lie at the heart of both the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994. Para. 7.427. () the Panel recalls that a fundamental object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 is that the security and predictability of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements must be preserved. In the Panel's view, a Member's unilateral intention regarding the meaning to be ascribed to a concession that Member has made in the context of WTO multilateral trade negotiations cannot prevail over the common intentions of all WTO Members as determined through an analysis undertaken pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC - Chicken Cuts), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS269/AB/R e WT/DS286/AB/R, paras. 239 e 249 Para. 239. Having said this, we caution against interpreting WTO law in the light of the purported object and purpose of specific provisions, paragraphs or subparagraphs of the WTO agreements, or tariff headings in Schedules, in isolation from the object and purpose of the treaty on the whole. Even if, arguendo, one could rely on the specific object and purpose of heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule in isolation, we would share the Panel's view that one Member's unilateral object and purpose for the conclusion of a tariff commitment cannot form the basis for an interpretation of that commitment, because interpretation in the light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention must focus on ascertaining the common intentions of the parties.

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Para. 249. In the light of these considerations, we see no reason to disturb the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.328 of the Panel Reports, that the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of longterm preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC Schedule ... could undermine the object and purpose of security and predictability, which [underlie] both the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities and its Member States - Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products (EC - IT Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R e WT/DS377/R, para. 7.1327 Para. 7.1327. On this basis, we consider that tariff concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted in such a way to further the objectives of preserving and upholding the security and predictability of the reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers to trade. This includes consideration of the general objective of the expansion of trade and the substantial reduction of tariffs. However, a panel should take care not to disturb the balance of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions negotiated by parties. 2. Artigo II.1(a) a) Geral O rgo de Apelao estabeleceu que as concesses devem ser consideradas no contexto do resultado de um entendimento recproco, conforme estabelecido na Conveno de Viena e em contraposio viso unilateral das expectativas de apenas uma das Partes. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R e WT/DS68/R, paras. 8.23-8.24, 8.26-8.27 e 8.45 Para. 8.23. The meaning of a particular expression in a tariff schedule cannot be determined in isolation from its context. It has to be interpreted in the context of Article II of GATT 1994 - a provision that gives the rationale for the specification of products and duty rates in tariff schedules in the first place: i.e., they constitute a binding commitment arising out of a negotiation. It should be noted in this regard that the protection of legitimate expectations in respect of tariff treatment of a bound item is one of the most important functions of Article II. () Para. 8.24. () Although Article II:5 is a provision for the special bilateral procedure regarding tariff classification, not directly at issue in this case, the existence of this provision confirms that legitimate expectations are a vital element in the interpretation of Article II and tariff schedules. Para. 8.26. In our view, it may, as a matter of fact, be the case that in nearly all instances, the ordinary meaning of the terms of the actual description in a tariff schedule accurately reflects and exhausts the content of the legitimate expectations. It is clearly the case that most descriptions are to be treated with the utmost care to maintain their integrity precisely because, on their face, they normally constitute the most concrete, tangible and reliable evidence of commitments made. In our view, however, this cannot be the case a priori for all tariff commitments. It must remain possible, at least in principle, that parties have legitimately formed expectations based on other particular supplementary factors. Para. 8.27. To deny this a priori would be to reduce the nature and meaning of commitments under Article II to a purely formal and mechanical task of noting descriptions in schedules. This would be to rob such commitments of the reality of the context in which they clearly occur in Article II. Para. 8.45. We now turn to the examination of whether the actual tariff treatment of LAN equipment entitles the United States to legitimate expectations in this regard sufficient to establish its claim of a 22

violation of Article II of GATT 1994 by the European Communities. In our view, an exporting Member's legitimate expectations regarding tariff commitments are normally based, at a minimum, on the assumption that the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product at the time of the negotiation will be continued unless such treatment is manifestly anomalous or there is information readily available to the exporting Member that clearly indicates the contrary. The existence of such expectations in tariff negotiations can be seen in the fact that negotiators normally use actual trade data to calculate the effect of requests and offers, and to evaluate the resulting tariff reductions in terms of trade-weighted average. In other words, they work on the general assumption that the actual tariff treatment accorded to a particular product as traded is the relevant item for the purposes of negotiations. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R e WT/DS68/AB/R, paras. 81 e 84 Para. 81. Second, we reject the Panel's view that Article II:5 of the GATT 1994 confirms that legitimate expectations are a vital element in the interpretation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 and of Members' Schedules. It is clear from the wording of Article II:5 that it does not support the Panel's view. This paragraph recognizes the possibility that the treatment contemplated in a concession, provided for in a Member's Schedule, on a particular product, may differ from the treatment accorded to that product and provides for a compensatory mechanism to rebalance the concessions between the two Members concerned in such a situation. However, nothing in Article II:5 suggests that the expectations of only the exporting Member can be the basis for interpreting a concession in a Member's Schedule for the purposes of determining whether that Member has acted consistently with its obligations under Article II:1. In discussing Article II:5, the Panel overlooked the second sentence of that provision, which clarifies that the contemplated treatment referred to in that provision is the treatment contemplated by both Members. Para. 84. The purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the parties. These common intentions cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective and unilaterally determined expectations of one of the parties to a treaty. Tariff concessions provided for in a Member's Schedule - the interpretation of which is at issue here - are reciprocal and result from a mutually-advantageous negotiation between importing and exporting Members. A Schedule is made an integral part of the GATT 1994 by Article II:7 of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the concessions provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention. b) Tratamento No Menos Favorvel (treatment no less favourable) O rgo de Apelao definiu que a variao no tipo das tarifas aplicada e consolidada, consideradas as modalidades ad valorem e especfica, no justifica a violao do Artigo II, mas depende da anlise da equivalncia entre essas. Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Appares and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.31-6.32 e 6.65 Para. 6.31. We note that the past GATT practice is clear: a situation whereby a contracting party applies one type of duties while its Schedule refers to bindings of another type of duties constitutes a violation of Article II of GATT, without any obligation for the complaining party to submit further evidence that such variance leads to an effective breach of bindings. The fact that Argentina claims that it is simply following its past practice of using specific duties would not seem to be relevant, since it made ad valorem tariff concessions on the products in question and thus created an obligation for itself to impose such type of duties. As a guarantee for predictability and to ensure the full respect of the negotiations under Article II, GATT practice has generally required that once a Member has indicated the type(s) of duties in specifying its bound rate, it must apply such type(s) of duties. Accordingly, faced with such a variance in the type duties 23

applied by Argentina from that reflected in its Schedule, we consider that we do not have to examine the effects of that variance on possible future imports. Indeed, such a variance undermines the stability and predictability of Members' Schedules. Para. 6.32. We, therefore, find that Argentina, in using a system of specific minimum tariffs although it has bound its tariffs at ad valorem rates only, is violating the provisions of Article II of GATT and that the United States does not have to provide further evidence that the resultant duties exceed the bound tariff rate. Such a variance between Argentinas Schedule and its applied tariffs constitutes a less favourable treatment to the commerce of the other Members than that provided for in Argentinas Schedule, contrary to the provisions of Article II of GATT. Para. 6.65. In the light of the foregoing, we find that the United States has provided sufficient evidence that Argentina has effectively imposed duties on imports of textiles and apparel above 35 per cent ad valorem, that indeed the total amount of duties collected annually on these items leads to the conclusion that duties above 35 per cent ad valorem on the average transaction value have been imposed on the same items, and that in any case, as we found in paragraph 6.47 above, the very nature of the minimum specific duty system imposed in Argentina on the items at issue will inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the imposition of duties above 35 per cent ad valorem. In addition, the fact that Argentina is using minimum specific duties while they bound their tariffs according to an ad valorem type of duties, is inconsistent with its Schedule and with the requirements of Article II of GATT. Therefore, we consider that minimum specific duties imposed by Argentina on textile and apparel imports constitute a treatment of those imports that is less favourable than that provided for in Argentinas Schedule and contrary to Article II of GATT. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Appares and other Items (Argentina - Textile and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 56 e 62-63 Para. 56. We modify the Panel's findings in paragraphs 6.31 and 6.32 of the Panel Report accordingly. Para. 62. As noted above, the Panel stated that ... the very nature of the minimum specific duty system imposed in Argentina on the items at issue will inevitably lead, in certain instances, to the imposition of duties above 35 per cent ad valorem. (emphasis added) This reference to in certain instances indicates that the Panel did not conclude that there was infringement in all cases. We recall our finding that the DIEM regime, by its structure and design, results in the application of specific duties with ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per cent for all textile and apparel products imported at prices below the relevant break-even prices in the relevant tariff categories. At the same time, products imported at prices above such breakeven prices will be subject to a duty equivalent to 35 per cent or less ad valorem. This proposition holds for all relevant tariff categories relating to textile and apparel products to which the DIEM are applied. It is the result of Argentina requiring its customs officials to collect the higher of two values: the applicable ad valorem duty or the DIEM. It follows that, under such a system, the rate of duty applicable to any import transaction depends on the position of the imported product within the prevailing price range in any relevant tariff category. Thus, some transactions will fall within a price range where the application of the DIEM results in ad valorem equivalents exceeding 35 per cent. Other transactions, on the other hand, will fall within a price range where the application of the DIEM results in ad valorem equivalents less than, or equal to, 35 per cent. We agree with Argentina, therefore, that the application of the DIEM does not result in a breach of Article II for each and every import transaction in a given tariff category. At the same time, however, we agree with the Panel that there are sufficient reasons to conclude that the structure and design of the DIEM will result, with respect to a certain range of import prices within a relevant tariff category, in an infringement of Argentina's obligations under Article II:1 for all tariff categories in Chapters 51 to 63 of the N.C.M. Para. 63. For these reasons, we find no legal basis on which to reverse the Panel's findings in paragraph 6.65 of the Panel Report.

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3.

Artigo II.1(b) a) Ao entrarem no territrio de outra Parte Contratante (on their importation into the territory)

O DSB identificou na expresso ao entrarem no territrio um elemento temporal que faz com que a obrigao de pagar direitos aduaneiros ordinrios se constitua no momento em que a mercadoria ingressa no territrio do outro Membro. Relatrio do Painel no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.184-7.185 Para. 7.184. We therefore conclude that the ordinary meaning of on their importation in Article II:1(b), first sentence, of the GATT 1994, considered in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, contains a strict and precise temporal element which cannot be ignored. This means that the obligation to pay ordinary customs duties is linked to the product at the moment it enters the territory of another Member. If the right to impose ordinary customs duties and the importer's obligation to pay it accrues because of the importation of the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another Member, ordinary customs duties should necessarily be related to the status of the product at that single moment. It is at this moment, and this moment only, that the obligation to pay such charge accrues. Para. 7.185. In contrast to ordinary customs duties, the obligation to pay internal charges does not accrue because of the importation of the product at the very moment it enters the territory of another Member but because of the internal factors (e.g., because the product was re-sold internally or because the product was used internally), which occurs once the product has been imported into the territory of another member. The status of the imported good, which does not necessarily correspond to its status at the moment of importation, seems to be the relevant basis to assess this internal charge. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 153 e 158 Para. 153. The other terms contained in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) shed some light on the scope and meaning of ordinary customs duties and indicate, for example, that an ordinary customs duty is a charge imposed on products, on their importation. The Panel recognized both of these elements as immediate context for the term ordinary customs duties in the first sentence of Article II:1(b), and attached particular significance to the second of these elements. Thus, the Panel emphasized the temporal limits of the first sentence of Article II:1(b), and underlined that a key criterion for a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty under Article II:1(b) is that it accrue at the moment of importation. Para. 158. () The right of a WTO Member to impose a customs duty, and the obligation of an importer to pay such a duty, accrue at the very moment the product enters the customs territory of that Member and by virtue of the event of importation. In contrast, the classification rules according to which customs authorities determine under which tariff heading the product concerned falls, depending on its status or condition, are not relevant to the nature of the duty itself because they do not determine the moment at which the obligation to pay accrues, but only the amount of that duty. Similarly, as all of the participants agree, the moment at which a charge is collected or paid is not determinative of whether it is an ordinary customs duty or an internal charge. Ordinary customs duties may be collected after the moment of importation, and internal charges may be collected at the moment of importation. For a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty, however, the obligation to pay it must accrue at the moment and by virtue of or, in the words of Article II:1(b), on, importation. b) Direitos aduaneiros ordinrios (ordinary customs duties)

25

Segundo o DSB, os direitos aduaneiros ordinrios consistem nos direitos que recaem sobre bens exclusivamente no momento de sua entrada no territrio de outro Membro. Relatrio do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, para. 7.104 Para. 7.104. We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure other than an ordinary customs duty, which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We have also found that ordinary customs duties must have the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not constituting ordinary customs duties, their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of that provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, para. 147 Para. 147. The Panel's reasoning and findings under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 may be summarized as follows. The Panel began by finding that the first sentence of Article II:1(b) is not applicable to the Chilean price band duties, because the Panel had already found that they are not ordinary customs duties. Relatrio do Painel no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R e WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.192, 7.204 e 7.210 Para. 7.192. In sum, based on its ordinary meaning and its context, we conclude that ordinary customs duties within the meaning of the first sentence of Article II:1(b) refer to duties imposed on goods at the moment of their importation into the customs territory of an importing Member and must be interpreted more narrowly than other charges and duties under the second sentence of Article II:1(b), which are imposed on goods on or in connection with importation. Para. 7.204. (...) if the obligation to pay a charge does not accrue based on the product at the moment of its importation, it cannot be an 'ordinary customs duty' within the meaning of Article II:1(b), first sentence of the GATT 1994: it is, instead, an 'internal charge' under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, which obligation to pay accrues based on internal factors. Para. 7.210. In sum, based on the above elements considered as a whole, in particular the fact that the charge under the measures relates to the internal assembly of auto parts into motor vehicles, we conclude that the charge is an internal charge within the meaning of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts), Demandante: CE, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R e WT/DS342/AB/R, paras. 141, 166 e 171-172 Para. 141. It seems to us that an examination of whether a particular charge is an internal charge or a border measure involves consideration of all three types of charges, that is: ordinary customs duties under the first sentence of Article II:1(b); other duties and charges under the second sentence of Article II:1(b); and internal charges and taxes under Article III:2. This should assist a panel in understanding the relationship among these fundamental GATT provisions. Para. 166. () The Harmonized System does not provide context that is relevant to the threshold question or to the assessment of the respective scope of application of ordinary customs duties in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) and internal charges in Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 that must be undertaken in answering that question. It follows that the Panel did not err in interpreting the term ordinary customs

26

duties in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 without relying on the rules of the Harmonized System, in general, or GIR 2(a), in particular. Para. 171. We consider that a panel's determination of whether a specific charge falls under Article II:1(b) or Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 must be made in the light of the characteristics of the measure and the circumstances of the case. In many cases this will be a straightforward exercise. In others, the picture will be more mixed, and the challenge faced by a panel more complex. A panel must thoroughly scrutinize the measure before it, both in its design and in its operation, and identify its principal characteristics. Having done so, the panel must then seek to identify the leading or core features of the measure at issue, those that define its centre of gravity for purposes of characterizing the charge that it imposes as an ordinary customs duty or an internal charge. It is not surprising, and indeed to be expected, that the same measure may exhibit some characteristics that suggest it is a measure falling within the scope of Article II:1(b), and others suggesting it is a measure falling within the scope of Article III:2. In making its objective assessment of the applicability of specific provisions of the covered agreements to a measure properly before it, a panel must identify all relevant characteristics of the measure, and recognize which features are the most central to that measure itself, and which are to be accorded the most significance for purposes of characterizing the relevant charge and, thereby, properly determining the discipline(s) to which it is subject under the covered agreements. Para. 172. We understand the Panel to have adopted just such an approach to the measures at issue in this case. The Panel identified the following characteristics of the charge as having particular significance for legal characterization purposes: (i) the obligation to pay the charge accrues internally after auto parts have entered the customs territory of China and have been assembled/produced into motor vehicles; (ii) the charge is imposed on automobile manufacturers rather than on importers in general; (iii) the charge is imposed based on how the imported auto parts are used, that is, not based on the auto parts as they enter, but instead based on what other parts from other countries and/or other importers and/or domestic parts are subsequently used, together with those imported parts, in assembling a vehicle model; and (iv) the fact that identical auto parts imported at the same time in the same container or vessel can be subject to different charge rates depending on which vehicle model they are assembled into. Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, para. 7.246 e 7.249 Para. 7.246. The AD, as its statutory name makes clear, is a duty. It applies to goods (articles) which are imported into India (in our case, alcoholic liquor). It does not apply to domestic goods. The AD is assessed at the time and point of importation by India's Customs authorities. The good which is imported and subject to the AD is cleared through customs for entry into India's customs territory once the AD has been paid. The AD is payable by the importers of the subject goods or their agents. Furthermore, as imposed through CN 32/2003, the AD on alcoholic liquor took the form of either an ad valorem duty or a specific duty. Para. 7.249. Judging exclusively by the above characteristics of the AD on alcoholic liquor as in force on the date of establishment of this Panel, we would agree with the United States that the AD on alcoholic liquor could, in principle, have qualified as an ordinary customs duty, or an other duty or charge, within the meaning of Article II:1(b). However, these same characteristics are also consistent with India's view that the AD on alcoholic liquor qualified as a charge imposed on the importation of a product and equivalent to an internal tax imposed in respect of the like domestic product within the meaning of Article II:2(a). In this regard, to mention only a few elements, the AD being a duty imposed on a product, it can be considered a charge imposed on a product as that term is used in Article II:2(a). Also, as we have explained, the AD is a duty imposed on the importation of a product. And finally, as is already clear from its name, the AD is imposed in addition to India's basic customs duty (BCD) which the United States does not dispute is an ordinary customs duty within the meaning of Article II:1(b). Article II:2 implies that Article II:2(a) charges may be imposed on a product subject to a tariff binding in addition to the ordinary customs duty levied on that product.

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Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 156-157 e 164 Para. 156. The Panel acknowledged that the phrase 'other duties and charges of any kind' could conceivably support the interpretation argued for by the United States, but considered that customary rules of treaty interpretation require that the terms of the treaty also be read in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. As immediate context, the Panel noted a parallelism between the two sentences of Article II:1(b) and concluded that this parallelism strongly suggests that ... the charges intended to be covered by the two provisions are charges of the same kind . In addition, the Panel reasoned that OCDs inherently discriminate against, or disadvantage, imports, and that there is a readily apparent rationale that is, avoiding the circumvention of tariff concessions for subjecting ODCs that are of the same kind as OCDs to the same disciplines. Finally, the Panel considered that the charges referred to in Article II:2 differ from OCDs and ODCs because they do not inherently discriminate against, or disadvantage, imports, and inferred from this that charges falling under Article II:2 are therefore outside the scope of Article II:1(b). Para. 157. We do not agree with the Panel that Article II:1(b) strongly suggests that OCDs and ODCs are of the same kind. As the Panel itself observed, the two sets of charges are described and disciplined in separate sentences of Article II:1(b), and may, by their terms, not pertain to the same event of importation. While both sentences of Article II:1(b) relate to duties or charges applied on the importation of certain products, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) also uniquely covers charges imposed in connection with the importation of such products. Moreover, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) refers to duties or charges of any kind, which suggests that, while in some instances ODCs may be of a similar kind to OCDs, in other instances they may be of a different kind. Accordingly, we do not find the language of Article II:1(b) read in its context to be conclusive as to whether OCDs and ODCs are necessarily of a similar or dissimilar kind. Para. 164. For these reasons, we find that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article II:1(b) as covering only duties or charges that inherently discriminate against imports, and of Article II:2(a) as covering only charges that do not inherently discriminate against imports. c) Observados os termos, condies ou requisitos constantes (subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth) Segundo o rgo de Apelao, o Artigo II do GATT permite que os Membros incorporem concesses em seus cronogramas, mas no possvel reduzir os compromissos assumidos. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, paras. 5.2-5.7 Para. 5.2. The Panel first examined the issue in the light of the wording of Article II. It noted that in Article II:1(b), the words subject to the ... qualifications set forth in that Schedule are used in conjunction with the words shall ... be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth in [the Schedule]. This suggests that Article II:1(b) permits contracting parties to qualify the obligation to exempt products from customs duties in excess of the levels specified in the Schedule, not however to qualify their obligations under other Articles of the General Agreement. The Panel further noted that the title of Article II is Schedules of Concessions and that the ordinary meaning of the word to concede is to grant or yield. This also suggests in the view of the Panel that Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement.

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Para. 5.3. The Panel then examined the issue in the light of the purpose of the General Agreement. It noted that one of the basic functions of the General Agreement is, according to its Preamble, to provide a legal framework enabling contracting parties to enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. Where the General Agreement mentions specific types of negotiations, it refers to negotiations aimed at the reduction of barriers to trade (Articles IV(d), XVII:3 and XXVIII bis). This supports in the view of the Panel the assumption that Article II gives contracting parties the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement commitments additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement. Para. 5.4. The Panel then examined the issue in the context of the provisions of the General Agreement related to Article II. It noted that negotiations on obstacles to trade created by the operation of state-trading enterprises may be conducted under Article XVII:3 and that a note to that provision provides that such negotiations may be directed towards the reduction of duties and other charges on imports and exports or towards the conclusion of any other mutually satisfactory arrangement consistent with the provisions of this Agreement (See paragraph 4 of Article II and the note to that paragraph). (emphasis added). () Para. 5.5. () it does support, in the view of the Panel, the conclusion that the CONTRACTING PARTIES did not envisage that qualifications in Schedules established in accordance with Article II:1(b) could justify measures inconsistent with the other Articles of the General Agreement. Para. 5.6. The Panel finally examined the issue in the light of the drafting history. It noted that the reference to terms and qualifications was included in a draft of the present Article II:1(b) during the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. The original draft had referred only to conditions. This amendment was proposed and adopted in order to provide more generally for the sort of qualifications actually provided in the form of notes in the specimen Schedule. A number of these notes are, in effect, additional concessions rather than conditions governing the tariff bindings to which they relate (E/PC/T/153 and E/PC/T/W/295). Schedule provisions qualifying obligations under the General Agreement were not included in the specimen Schedule nor was the possibility of such Schedule provisions mentioned by the drafters. () Para. 5.7. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel found that Article II:1(b) does not permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement (). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/GTM e WT/DS27/R/HND, para. 154 Para. 154. The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh Protocol, the Schedules are Schedules to the GATT 1994, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement . With respect to concessions contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar (United States - Sugar Headnote) found that:
(...) Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement. This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions and commitments for agricultural products contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The ordinary meaning of the term concessions suggests that a Member may yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations. We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure other than an ordinary customs duty, which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We have also found that ordinary customs duties must have the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT

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1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not constituting ordinary customs duties, their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of that provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties. (emphasis added)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 416-418 e 432 Para. 416. While it is unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member's Schedule would be limited in time, such limitation does not appear to be precluded by the wording of Article II:1(b), which refers to terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in a Member's Schedule. The parties agree in principle that Article II:1(b) allows WTO Members to subject tariff concessions to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in [their] Schedule. () Para. 417. In GATT and WTO jurisprudence, it has been recognized that there are limits to the terms, conditions, or qualifications that may be incorporated in a Member's Schedule of Concessions. In EC Bananas III, the Appellate Body stated that the ordinary meaning of the term 'concession' suggests that a Member may yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations under the WTO covered agreements through an entry in its Schedule. The GATT panel in US Sugar found that:
Article II gives Members the possibility to incorporate into the legal framework of the General Agreement commitments additional to those already contained in the General Agreement and to qualify such additional commitments, not however to reduce their commitments under other provisions of that Agreement.

Para. 418. Insofar as a temporal limitation does not diminish obligations or reduce commitments under other provisions of the covered agreements, scheduling a temporal limitation to a tariff concession does not seem incompatible with the findings of the Appellate Body in EC Bananas III and the GATT panel in US Sugar. Para. 432. The Panel relied on the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994, as reflected in the preambles of these two Agreements. It noted that concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of expanding trade in goods and services and reducing barriers to trade, through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements. At the same time, the Panel considered that this general object and purpose is consistent with the more specific object and purpose of Article II:1(a) and (b). It referred, in particular, to the objective of promoting security and predictability in international trade, through the exchange of concessions , which is subject to conditions and qualifications in Members' Schedules. According to the Panel, its finding that the tariff quota concession had expired was consistent with the specific objective of promoting security and predictability in international trade through the exchange of concessions, because it gave effect to the terms and conditions incorporated into the European Communities' Schedule, including the temporal limitation provided for in the Bananas Framework Agreement. The Panel considered that the general object and purpose of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 of expanding trade and reducing barriers to trade through the negotiation of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements had to be reconciled with the specific objective of respecting scheduled concessions including the terms and conditions inscribed in Schedules. () Relatrio do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, paras. 7.496 e 7.501 Para. 7.496. () The Panel has already noted that it would follow the approach indicated by the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina Textiles and Apparel, and begin its analysis with consideration of the first sentence of Article II:1 (b) of the GATT 1994.

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Para. 7.501. The Panel recalls the words of the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina Textiles and Apparel:
It is evident to us that the application of customs duties in excess of those provided for in a Member's Schedule, inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b), constitutes 'less favourable' treatment under the provisions of Article II:1(a)

d) Direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza (other duties or charges of any kind) O DSB concluiu que o termo direitos ou encargos de qualquer natureza compreende qualquer taxa ou encargo relacionado importao, mas que no corresponde a um direito aduaneiro ordinrio, imposto ou direito listado no Artigo II:2. Relatrio do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, paras. 7.105-7.108 Para. 7.105. The next question is whether the Chilean PBS duties could be considered as other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation, under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). We have already indicated that all other duties or charges of any kind should in our view be assessed under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). Pursuant to the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b), such other duties or charges had to be recorded in a newly created column other duties and charges in the Members' Schedules. Paragraph 1 of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 (the Understanding) reads:
() [i]n order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature and level of any 'other duties or charges' levied on bound tariff items, as referred in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules and concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the tariff item to which they apply. It is understood that such recording does not change the legal character of 'other duties or charges'.

Para. 7.106. According to the second paragraph of the Understanding:

() [t]he date as of which other duties or charges are bound, for the purposes of Article II, shall be 15 April 1994. 'Other duties or charges' shall therefore be recorded in the Schedules at the levels applying on this date.

Para. 7.107. Other duties or charges must not exceed the binding in this other duties and charges column of the Schedule. If other duties or charges were not recorded but are nevertheless levied, they are inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b), in light of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). We note that Chile did not record its PBS in the other duties and charges column of its Schedule. Para. 7.108. We therefore find that the Chilean PBS duties are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System) Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/AB/R, paras. 153, 165, 168 e 177 Para. 153. The question before us in this appeal is whether the claim that Argentina actually made before the Panel was limited to the first sentence of Article II:1(b), or whether that claim also included the second sentence of that provision. Para. 165. For all these reasons, we conclude that, although Argentina's request for the establishment of a panel was phrased broadly enough to include a claim under both sentences of Article II:1(b) of the GATT

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1994, a close examination of Argentina's submissions reveals that the only claim made by Argentina was under the first sentence of Article II:1(b). Para. 168. Contrary to what Argentina argues, given our finding that Argentina has not made a claim under the second sentence of Article II:1(b), the Panel in this case had neither a right nor a duty to develop its own legal reasoning to support a claim under the second sentence. The Panel was not entitled to make a claim for Argentina, or to develop its own legal reasoning on a provision that was not at issue. Para. 177. For these reasons, we find that, by making a finding in paragraph 7.108 of the Panel Report that the duties resulting from Chile's price band system are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the second sentence of that provision, which was not part of the matter before the Panel, and also by thereby denying Chile the due process of a fair right of response, the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we reverse that finding. Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and International Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.113-7.115 Para. 7.113. Although there is no definition of what constitutes an other duty or charge in the GATT 1994 and in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, the ordinary meanings of Article II:1(b) and Article II:2 make it clear that any fee or charge that is in connection with importation and that is not an ordinary customs duty, nor a tax or duty as listed under Article II:2 (internal tax, anti-dumping duty, countervailing duty, fees or charges commensurate with the cost of services rendered) would qualify for a measure as an other duties or charges under Article II:1(b). Para. 7.114. The travaux prparatoires concerning the Understanding confirm such interpretation. The Secretariat note on Article II:1(b): OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT stated:
4 The definition of ODCs falling under the purview of Article II:1(b) can only be done by exclusion -i.e. by reference to those categories of ODC not covered by it. It would be impossible, and logically fallacious, to draw up an exhaustive list of ODCs which do fall under the purview of Article II:1(b), since it is always possible for governments to invent new charges. Indeed, an attempt to provide an exhaustive list would create the false impression that charges omitted from it, or newly invented, were exempt from the II:1(b) obligation.

Para. 7.115. The foreign exchange fee is imposed on imported products only and it is not an ordinary customs duty. It is computed on the value of imports, not on the cost of the services rendered by the customs authorities. Consequently, it is not a fee or charge that falls under Article VIII of the GATT. It is obviously not an anti-dumping or countervailing duty. Therefore, it is a border measure in the nature of an ODC within the meaning of Article II:1(b). 4. Artigo II.2(a) a) Encargo equivalente a um imposto interno exigido (charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed) O rgo de Apelao avaliou que o termo equivalente s pode ser determinado por meio de comparao qualitativa e quantitativa, incluindo elementos de efeito e valor. Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra - Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 7.194, 7.198, 7.273 e 7.283

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Para. 7.194. (...) As we will explain further below, if a border charge is determined to be equivalent to an internal tax, it is caught by the provisions of Article III:2, first sentence. Article III:2, first sentence, sets out a strict national treatment obligation. Indeed, as the United States itself has reminded us, under Article III:2, first sentence, even a de minimis tax burden differential disfavouring the product being imported would put the importing Member in breach of Article III:2. Thus, we do not believe the interpretation which we consider should be given to the term equivalent in Article II:2(a) diminishes the value of tariff concessions. Para. 7.198. The foregoing considerations lead us to the view that, in an Article II:2(a) inquiry, it is only if a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax that it can (ever) be concluded that to use terms similar to those appearing in the chapeau of Article II:2 nothing in Article II would prevent the imposition of such a charge. Or to put it another way, for the purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry, equivalence is a necessary condition for a charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1. It is important to recall, however, that equivalence is a necessary condition for the purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry only. To explain, even if a border charge is not equivalent to an internal tax and thus does not fall within the scope of Article II:2(a), it may still fall within the scope of, e.g., Article II:2(b). If it meets the conditions of Article II:2(b), it falls outside the scope of Article II:1. Hence, in cases where a border charge is not equivalent to an internal tax, it may or may not fall outside the scope of Article II:1. Para. 7.273. In our view, even if, as appears possible, the form (ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and structure of the rates of AD for alcoholic liquor were different from the form and structure of the rates of State excise duties on alcoholic liquor, this would not demonstrate that the AD on alcoholic liquor was not equivalent to State excise duties on domestic alcoholic liquor. The concept of equivalence as it appears in Article II:2(a) does not imply that a border charge and an internal tax need to have the same form (ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and/or rate structure. Rather, it implies that they need to have the same function of imposing a charge on a product qua product. We do not see why a border charge and an internal tax having a different form (ad valorem vs. specific duties, etc.) and/or rate structure could not nonetheless fulfil the same relative function within the customs duty and tax system of the Member concerned. Para. 7.283. Nevertheless, the design of the AD on alcoholic liquor could not, in any event, be determinative, on its own, of whether it was equivalent to State excise duties. As we have pointed out, the outcome of an equivalence inquiry under Article II:2(a) is context-dependent. Depending on the context, one and the same border charge may be equivalent, or not equivalent, to an internal tax. As a result, we also need to examine the AD on alcoholic liquor in its relevant context. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 167, 170-172 e 175 Para. 167. The Panel considered several dictionary definitions of the term equivalent and concluded that whether a border charge and internal tax are equivalent is determined by whether they have the same function. The United States argues that the Panel erred by incorrectly focus[ing] on a single attribute to determine whether the charge and the internal tax are 'equivalent'. We agree that all relevant attributes or definitions need to be considered in ascribing to a treaty's terms the ordinary meaning given to those terms in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, we note that the Panel considered various definitions in interpreting the meaning of the term equivalent in Article II:2(a), and we do not find the fact that the Panel settled on one attribute of that term to be in error per se. Para. 170. In our view, these two concepts equivalence and consistency with Article III:2 cannot be interpreted in isolation from each other; they impart meaning to each other and need to be interpreted harmoniously. By contrast, the Panel's interpretation was predicated on its understanding that, because the term equivalent refers to the border charge, and the phrase imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III refers to the internal tax, Article II:2(a) draws a distinction between the two concepts. We are not persuaded that the phrase imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III relates exclusively to the words internal tax. Determining whether a charge is imposed 33

consistently with Article III:2 necessarily involves a comparison of a border charge with an internal tax in order to determine whether one is in excess of the other. Yet, the Panel's statement that the term 'imposed' in Article II:2(a) relates to the internal tax and not the border charge leaves nothing with which the internal tax can be compared. Para. 171. Moreover, we disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the term equivalent does not require any quantitative comparison of the charge and internal tax. This would mean that a border charge that is significantly greater in amount than an internal tax could still be deemed equivalent under Article II:2(a), provided that the two were functionally equivalent. We find that such a result would be incompatible with a proper interpretation of Article II:2(a). Para. 172. To give meaning and effect to the phrase imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III, we consider it necessary, in the light of the structure and context of Article II:2, to read this phrase in a manner that imparts meaning to the assessment of whether the charge and internal tax are equivalent. We disagree with the Panel that understanding the term equivalent as requiring a quantitative comparison would make redundant the reference to consistency with Article III:2. Indeed, as we see it, the reference in Article II:2(a) to consistency with Article III:2 suggests that the concept of equivalence includes elements of effect and amount that necessarily imply a quantitative comparison. Para. 175. We thus consider that the term equivalent calls for a comparative assessment that is both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Such an assessment is not limited to the relative function of a charge and an internal tax, but must also include quantitative considerations relating to their effect and amount. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Panel erred in attributing an overly narrow meaning to the term equivalent. b) De conformidade como o disposto no pargrafo 2 do Artigo III (consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III) O rgo de Apelao considera que o ponto central do termo estabelecer um elo com as provises do Artigo III:2, no sendo necessrio a meno explcita deste Artigo, pelo demandante, para que o Painel verifique sua consistncia. Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/R, paras. 2.212-2.215 Para. 2.212. We do not think it is possible to draw particular inferences from the reference to consistency with Article III:2 regarding the GATT 1947 negotiators' intentions in respect of those cases, discussed above, where a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax, but the tax is imposed inconsistently with Article III:2. Indeed, as we have suggested, Article II:2(a) in our view refers to an internal tax imposed consistently with Article III:2 because this is what the GATT 1947 prescribed (and the GATT 1994 still prescribes today). Where a border charge is equivalent to an internal tax, it is subject to Article III:2, and so the internal tax to which the border charge is equivalent must be imposed consistently with Article III:2. If a reference to other requirements to be complied with specifically, those contained in Article III:2 was to be included in Article II:2(a), it stands to reason that the text of Article II:2(a) would do so in a manner that reflects, and is consistent with, what the GATT 1947 prescribed and, hence, would contemplate an internal tax imposed consistently with Article III:2. In the light of this, the fact that the text of Article II:2(a) contemplates an internal tax imposed consistently with Article III:2 in our view does not support the conclusion that the GATT 1947 negotiators considered that if a contracting party subsequently imposed an internal tax inconsistently with Article III:2, the border charge equivalent to that internal tax would be subject to the provisions of Article II:1. Para. 2.213. Additionally, we note that the relevant context of Article II:2(a) includes Article II:2(b) which makes clear that Article II does not prevent the imposition, on the importation of a product, of an antidumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of Article VI. In our view, 34

similarly to what we have said in respect of the concept of consistency with Article III:2 in Article II:2(a), the concept of consistency with Article VI in Article II:2(b) is not to be regarded as a necessary condition, for the purposes of an Article II:2(b) inquiry, for an anti-dumping or countervailing duty imposed on the importation of a product to fall outside the scope of Article II:1. Accordingly, we consider that our interpretation of the phrase an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in Article II:2(a) is consistent with the provisions of Article II:2(b). Para. 2.214. As to whether our interpretation of the phrase an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III is consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT 1994, we recall our view that a border charge equivalent to an internal tax which is imposed inconsistently with the provisions of Article III:2 would fall outside the scope of Article II:1. However, we have also indicated that such a border charge would be caught by the strict obligations contained in Article III:2. In the light of this, we do not consider that our interpretation of the aforementioned phrase could be said to undermine the value of tariff concessions negotiated by exporting Members. As our interpretation does not threaten to undermine the value of tariff concessions, we do not consider that it runs counter to the object and purpose, expressed in the preamble to the GATT 1994, of substantially reducing tariffs. Para. 2.215. A final point should be made. In keeping with our view that the reference in Article II:2(a) to consistency with Article III:2 is not intended to stipulate an additional requirement to be met for a border charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1, we would not proceed, in an inquiry under Article II:2(a), to examine the consistency of an internal tax with Article III:2 after having determined that a particular border charge is equivalent to that internal tax. It is important to keep in mind, in this connection, that if the complaining party wishes a panel to examine the internal tax and an equivalent border charge in the light of the requirements of Article III:2, it is open to the complaining party to include in its panel request an independent claim of violation of Article III:2, and to develop such a claim in its submissions to a panel. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United States (India - Additional Import Duties), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS360/AB/R, paras. 179181 Para. 179. We note, however, the Panel's statement that for the purposes of an inquiry under Article II:2(a) ... consistency of the internal tax with the provisions of Article III:2 is not a necessary condition. The Panel added that the reference in Article II:2(a) to consistency with Article III:2 is not intended to stipulate an additional requirement to be met for a border charge to fall outside the scope of Article II:1. Given these unequivocal statements, we do not consider that the Panel preserved a role for evaluating consistency with Article III:2 in the context of Article II:2(a). Para. 180. We consider that Article II:2(a) should not be interpreted in a manner that reads out the significance, for purposes of an Article II:2(a) inquiry, of the element of consistency with Article III:2 or, at most, ascribes to it the purpose of acknowledg[ing], and call[ing] attention to, the existence of relevant requirements stipulated elsewhere in the GATT 1994. Rather, as we have indicated, we believe that the requirement of consistency with Article III:2 must be read together with, and imparts meaning to, the requirement that a charge and internal tax be equivalent. We recall that Article II:2(a) refers to a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III in respect of the like domestic product. We also recall that the first sentence of Article III:2 prohibits the imposition on imported products of internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. We therefore consider that whether a charge is imposed in excess of a corresponding internal tax is an integral part of the analysis in determining whether the charge is justified under Article II:2(a). Contrary to what the Panel suggests, a complaining party is not required to file an independent claim of violation of Article III:2 if it wishes to challenge the consistency of a border charge with Article III:2. Para. 181. We thus find that the element imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III forms an integral part of the assessment under Article II:2(a) of whether a charge and an internal

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tax are equivalent. Accordingly, we believe the Panel erred in its interpretation that the element of consistency with Article III:2 is not a necessary condition in the application of Article II:2(a). 5. Relao com outros Dispositivos a) Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura As qualificaes dos compromissos tarifrios no podem reduzir as obrigaes contidas no GATT. Ademais, as regras do GATT aplicam-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercados para produtos agrcolas, exceto quando o Acordo sobre Agricultura dispuser de modo contrrio. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/ABR, paras. 153-155 Para. 153. The European Communities raises the question whether the market access concessions for agricultural products made by the European Communities pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture prevail over Article XIII of the GATT 1994. () Para. 154. The market access concessions for agricultural products that were made in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations are set out in Members' Schedules annexed to the Marrakesh Protocol, and are an integral part of the GATT 1994. By the terms of the Marrakesh Protocol, the Schedules are Schedules to the GATT 1994, and Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 provides that Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement . With respect to concessions contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1947, the panel in United States - Restrictions on Importation of Sugar (United States - Sugar Headnote) found that:
(...) Article II permits contracting parties to incorporate into their Schedules acts yielding rights under the General Agreement but not acts diminishing obligations under that Agreement. This principle is equally valid for the market access concessions and commitments for agricultural products contained in the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994. The ordinary meaning of the term concessions suggests that a Member may yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations. This interpretation is confirmed by paragraph 3 of the Marrakesh Protocol, which provides: The implementation of the concessions and commitments contained in the schedules annexed to this Protocol shall, upon request, be subject to multilateral examination by the Members. This would be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members under Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. (emphasis added)

Para. 155. The question remains whether the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture allow market access concessions on agricultural products to deviate from Article XIII of the GATT 1994. The preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture states that it establishes a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture and that this reform process should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines. The relationship between the provisions of the GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Agriculture is set out in Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture:
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), WT/DS27/R, paras. 7.113-7.114

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Para. 7.113. The panel in the Sugar Headnote case found that qualifications on tariff bindings do not override other GATT provisions after an analysis of the wording of Article II, its object, purpose and context, and the drafting history of the provision. Although it made no mention of the Vienna Convention, it seems to have followed closely Articles 31 and 32 thereof. () Para. 7.114. We agree with the analysis of the Sugar Headnote panel report and note that Article II was not changed in any relevant way as a result of the Uruguay Round. Thus, based on the Sugar Headnote case, we conclude that the ECs inclusion of allocations inconsistent with the requirements of Article XIII in its Schedule does not prevent them from being challenged by other Members. We note in this regard that the Uruguay Round tariff schedules were prepared with full knowledge of the Sugar Headnote panel report, which was adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES in the middle of the Round (June 1989). () b) Artigo XXVIII do GATT Um Membro da OMC permanece vinculado lista de concesses prevista no Artigo II do GATT at o trmino do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT. Relatrio do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.454 Para. 7.454. The examination of a claim relating to a possible breach of GATT Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 would be outside the terms of reference of this Panel. Nevertheless, in light of the specific matter before this Panel and because of the numerous references made to Article XXVIII in the Doha Waiver, the Panel cannot totally disregard this provision. The combined reading of Articles II and XXVIII of the GATT 1994 implies that, until negotiations under the latter provision are formally concluded, a Member continues to be bound by the concessions contained in its Schedule. () Relatrio do rgo de Apelao do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso European Communities Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, paras. 378, 382-385 e 395 Para. 378. We begin by noting three different methods that Members may use to interpret or modify WTO law provided for in the WTO Agreement: (i) waivers (Article IX:3); (ii) multilateral interpretations (Article IX:2); and (iii) amendments (Article X). () Para. 382. In our view, the function of a waiver is to relieve a Member, for a specified period of time, from a particular obligation provided for in the covered agreements, subject to the terms, conditions, justifying exceptional circumstances or policy objectives described in the waiver decision. Its purpose is not to modify existing provisions in the agreements, let alone create new law or add to or amend the obligations under a covered agreement or Schedule. Therefore, waivers are exceptional in nature, subject to strict disciplines and should be interpreted with great care. Para. 383. Multilateral interpretations of provisions of WTO law are the next method identified above. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement sets out specific requirements for decisions that may be taken by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council to adopt interpretations of provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Such multilateral interpretations are meant to clarify the meaning of existing obligations, not to modify their content. Article IX:2 emphasizes that such interpretations shall not be used in a manner that would undermine the amendment provisions in Article X. A multilateral interpretation should also be distinguished from a waiver, which allows a Member to depart from an existing WTO obligation for a limited period of time. We consider that a multilateral interpretation pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement can be likened to a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions pursuant to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, as far as the interpretation of the WTO agreements is concerned. 37

Para. 384. The third method mentioned above is amendments to the WTO agreements. Article X of the WTO Agreement sets out rules and procedures to amend the provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Article X specifies the process and quorum required to amend particular provisions or covered agreements. Amendments, unlike waivers, are not limited in time and create new or modify existing rights and obligations for WTO Members. Special rules on acceptance and entry into force apply, depending on the provisions that are being amended and on whether the amendment would alter the rights and obligations of the Members. Amendments to the WTO Agreement and to a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1 enter into force following a formal acceptance process pursuant to Article X:7. Para. 385. The modification of Schedules of Concessions, which are an integral part of the GATT 1994, does not require a formal amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, but is enacted through a special procedure set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 or through multilateral rounds of tariff negotiations. Pursuant to Article XXVIII, a Member may modify or withdraw a concession annexed to the GATT 1994 by negotiation and agreement with other Members that are primarily concerned, and in consultation with Members that have a substantial interest in the concession. Article XXVIII:2 provides that, in an agreement on the renegotiation of a concession, which may include compensatory adjustment, WTO Members shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations . If an agreement cannot be reached, the modifying Member is free to modify or withdraw the concession, while other Members that are primarily concerned or have a substantial interest in the concession are free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the modifying Member. Para. 395. Moreover, while it is true that pursuant to Article II:7 of the GATT 1994 Members' Schedules of Concessions are integral parts of the covered agreements, Schedules are usually not modified by means of an amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement: special rules and procedures that Members are required to follow when they wish to modify their Schedules unless they enter into tariff commitments by means of the conclusion of multilateral rounds of trade negotiations are provided in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. In our view, if the duration of the tariff quota concession in the European Communities' Schedule had to be modified or extended, negotiations under Article XXVIII would be the proper procedure to follow. III. Comentrios

1. Artigo II Geral Os dispositivos que regulam os compromissos assumidos pelas Partes quanto liberalizao de seus mercados esto expressos no Artigo II do GATT 1947 e GATT 1994. O Artigo mencionado visa, sobretudo, a prover segurana e previsibilidade ao processo de consolidao de tarifas de importao dos Membros no mbito do Sistema Multilateral de Comrcio. Segundo a prpria instituio, o processo de consolidao tarifria foi intensificado, principalmente, a partir da Rodada Uruguai (1986-1994), na qual se pode observar um elevado crescimento do percentual de tarifas consolidadas tanto dos pases desenvolvidos (PD) quanto daqueles em desenvolvimento (PED). (34) Em linhas gerais, o propsito de garantir segurana e previsibilidade aos Membros da OMC encontrou respaldo nas decises do Painel, no DS269 e DS375/376/377, e do rgo de Apelao, no DS269. No caso EC - Chicken Cuts (DS269), a Comisso Europeia, por meio do Regulamento EC 1233/2002 e da Deciso EC 2003/97, alterou a classificao tarifria dos cortes de frango salgados congelados, o que, na prtica, significou uma elevao tarifria de 15,4% ad valorem (CN 02.10.90.20) para aproximadamente 70% ad valorem (tributo especfico de 1,024 euros por tonelada CN 02.07.41.10). Esse fato fez com que o Brasil alegasse que a medida fosse incompatvel com os Artigos II: 1(a) e II:1 (b) do GATT 94, uma vez que conferia tratamento menos favorvel do que aquele conferido na Lista de Compromissos das Comunidades Europeias. (35)

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A Unio Europeia argumentou que o frango salgado exportado pelo Brasil no poderia ser classificado como salgado, de acordo com a linha tarifria 02.010.90.20, uma vez que esse processo no havia sido implementado com o intuito de preservar o produto no longo prazo (long term preservation). Dessa forma, toda a anlise do Painel girou em torno da relao entre o termo salgado (presente na CN 02.10.90.20) e a noo de preservao no longo prazo que o processo de salga deveria conferir ao produto. Ao entender que a lista de concesses tarifrias das CE (e consequentemente o CN 02.10.90.20) era linguagem jurdica proveniente de um tratado, o Painel utilizou-se dos procedimentos previstos nos Artigos 31 e 32 da Conveno de Viena dos Direitos Tratados (CVDT) para interpretar a linguagem da linha tarifria em questo. Apesar da anlise do termo salgado ter sido realizada com base nos diversos elementos referentes aos Artigos 31 e 32 da CVDT (sentido ordinrio, contexto, entre outros), merece destaque a interpretao do termo em relao ao objeto e propsito do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC e do GATT 1094. Nesse sentido, o Painel constatou que as CE no apresentaram nenhuma ideia clara do conceito de preservao no longo prazo, no que se refere ao termo salgado, e a falta de certeza na utilizao desse critrio na linha tarifria 02.10.90.20 vai de encontro a um dos objetos e propsitos da OMC e do GATT 1994, que o de preservar a segurana e previsibilidade nas concesses mutuamente acordadas entre os Membros. O rgo de Apelao concordou com a interpretao do Painel e ainda atentou para o fato de potenciais problemas surgirem ao se interpretar, isoladamente, disposies especficas do tratado, sem levar em considerao os objetivos e propsitos gerais deste. No caso EC IT Products (DS375/376/377), o tratamento tarifrio dado pelas CE a determinados produtos de Tecnologia da Informao gerou questionamentos de Taiwan, Japo e EUA, que alegaram que o Bloco havia violado, entre outros, os Artigos II:1 (a) e II:1(b) do GATT. De acordo com os demandantes, por conta de as CE serem signatrias do Acordo de Tecnologia de Informao (ITA), firmado em 1996 por alguns Membros da OMC, o bloco deveria garantir que no seriam cobrados impostos sobre tais produtos (duty free treatment). O ponto central da disputa estava novamente na anlise dos termos que caracterizariam tais produtos. A partir da interpretao de tais termos, poder-se-ia dizer se estes estariam ou no cobertos pelo ITA e, consequentemente, se poderiam gozar de tratamento tarifrio diferenciado (duty free). Um dos termos que, por conta de ter sido alvo de interpretao do Painel, merece destaque Input or output units, contido na linha tarifria 847160, que constava no ITA, gozava de tratamento tarifrio diferenciado e, segundo os demandantes, teria sido objeto de violao por parte das CE. A anlise do Painel, que ocorreu nos termos dos Artigos 31 e 32 da CVDT (36), procurou avaliar o sentido ordinrio da linha tarifria em questo, com base em seu contexto e sob a luz dos seus objetivos e propsitos. Inicialmente, o Painel exps que o objeto e propsito relevante para a sua interpretao o Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, do qual faz parte o GATT 94 e a Lista de Concesses das CE. Em seguida, alertou para o fato de que a concesso tarifria dos Membros da OMC devia ser interpretada de modo a fomentar a segurana e previsibilidade das vantagens mutuamente acordadas entre eles, as quais visam a reduzir barreiras ao comrcio. Por fim, ao interpretar o texto da linha tarifria 847160 da lista de Concesses das CE, sob a luz do objeto e propsito dos preceitos supracitados, o Painel indicou que no havia nada que impedisse o tratamento tarifrio diferenciado concesso. A relao entre o objeto e propsito gerais do GATT 1994 e a concesso tarifria de um Membro tambm foi analisada pelo rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina Textiles and Apparel (DS56). Segundo a interpretao do rgo, qualquer reduo de uma concesso, por meio da imposio de tarifas em excesso daquilo que foi consolidado entre os Membros, promoveria um distrbio no equilbrio das concesses entre estes. (37) Em suma, tendo como referncia os casos em questo, pode-se perceber que as anlises do Painel e do rgo de Apelao referentes relao entre as concesses negociadas pelos Membros e o objeto e propsito do Acordo da OMC mostram uma recorrente tendncia em se interpretar o(s) termo(s) controverso(s) sob a luz de preceitos fundamentais para o Sistema Multilateral de Comrcio, como segurana jurdica e previsibilidade, a partir do cumprimento daquilo que foi acordado entre os Membros. 39

2. Artigo II.1(A) O Painel decidiu que a proteo das expectativas legtimas relacionadas s concesses tarifrias corresponde a uma das funes mais importantes do Artigo II. (Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Computer Equipment, para. 8.23, DS62, 67 e 68). Este posicionamento pode ser corroborado, de acordo com o Painel, pelo disposto no Artigo II.5 (Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Computer Equipment, para. 8.24, DS62, 67 e 68). Para o Painel, embora na maioria das vezes a descrio contida na lista de concesses reflita as expectativas legtimas, h casos em que tais expectativas podem ser formadas tambm por outros fatores. (Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Computer Equipment, para. 8.26, DS62, 67 e 68). O rgo de Apelao reverteu o entendimento do Painel mencionado acima, e entendeu que o Artigo II.5 no preconiza que a expectativa somente do Membro exportador pode ser a base para a interpretao da lista de concesses com o escopo de analisar se o Membro agiu em consonncia com as suas obrigaes descritas no Artigo II.1 (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC - Computer Equipment, para. 81, DS62, 67 e 68). Tal deciso do rgo de Apelao utilizou a regra de interpretao contida no Artigo 31 da Conveno de Viena e, por isso, buscou a inteno comum das Partes. O rgo de Apelao asseverou que a inteno comum no se depreende de uma expectativa unilateral, j que concesses tarifrias so recprocas e resultam de mtuas negociaes. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC Computer Equipment, para. 84, DS62, 67 e 68). Por fim, deve-se mencionar que no entendimento do Painel as expectativas legtimas do Membro exportador so pautadas, no mnimo, na continuao do tratamento tarifrio existente no momento da negociao, exceto quando h evidncias no sentido oposto (Relatrio do Painel no caso EC Computer Equipment, para. 8.45, DS62, 67 e 68). Tratamento No Menos Favorvel Por considerar que as prticas do GATT no forneciam princpios claros para julgar alteraes feitas pelos Membros no tipo do direito cobrado na importao de mercadorias, o DSB elaborou nova interpretao sobre em quais circunstncias a modificao do tipo de direito cobrado viola o Artigo II do GATT. No julgamento do caso 56 (Argentina Textiles and Apparel), o Painel considerou que a simples variao do tipo do direito cobrado pela Argentina utilizao do direito especfico mnimo ao invs de ad valorem, conforme prev a lista de concesses do pas j constitui, por si s, tratamento no menos favorvel e, portanto, automtica violao ao Artigo II:1(a) (Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina Textiles and Apparel que afetam importaes de txtil e vesturio, paras. 6.316.32, WT/DS56/R). O Painel havia se baseado em interpretaes anteriores, especificamente o DS158 (EC - Bananas). O rgo de Apelao, no entanto, considerou que a deciso do Painel no se baseou na leitura do Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b), mas sim em frgeis decises anteriores do GATT que no serviam como referncia para o Caso 56, o que motivou a busca por uma interpretao nova. Com a leitura do Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b), o rgo de Apelao notou que o principal objetivo da norma fazer com que os pases preservem o valor das tarifas negociadas na lista de concesses (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao em Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, paras. 45-47, WT/DS56/R). Portanto, o principal princpio a ser respeitado para que o Artigo II:1(a) e 1(b) no seja violado que a mudana na forma de cobrar o direito no gere valor que exceda aquele consolidado pelo Membro na lista de concesses. Ao definir a nova interpretao, o rgo de Apelao apresentou como premissa que a violao da obrigao contida no Artigo II:1(b) tambm desrespeita o Artigo II:1(a). Desta forma, o rgo de Apelao preferiu utilizar para o julgamento o Artigo II:1(b), por ser mais especfico e trazer provises mais relevantes do que o Artigo II:1(a). Como concluso, o rgo de Apelao definiu que a aplicao de um tipo de direito diferente daquele acordado na lista de concesses (neste caso, mudana de ad valorem para direito especfico mnimo) viola a obrigao contida no Artigo II:1(b), e portanto tambm 1(a), somente na medida que esta

40

alterao implique em que a tarifa cobrada exceda o valor consolidado (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no Caso Argentina Textiles and Apparel, paras. 5556, WT/DS56/R). 3. Artigo II.1(b) A evoluo interpretativa do Artigo II:1(b) do GATT 1994 e do Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo II:1(b) foi relevante para adicionar preciso na definio de trs tipos de direitos e encargos: os direitos aduaneiros ordinrios (ordinary customs duties primeira sentena do Artigo II:1(b)); os outros direitos e encargos (other duties and charges segunda sentena do Artigo II:1(b)); e os encargos e tributos internos (internal charges and taxes Artigo III:2). No que se refere diferenciao entre os direitos aduaneiros ordinrios previstos no Artigo II:1(b) e os tributos internos do Artigo III:2, o rgo de Apelao definiu a importncia de se observar se o fato gerador decorre do momento da importao. O aspecto temporal foi enfatizado para a identificao do direito aduaneiro ordinrio, no sentido de que a obrigao do importador recolher o direito decorre do momento em que o produto entra no territrio aduaneiro de um Membro e em funo da importao. No obstante, um direito aduaneiro ordinrio pode ser recolhido aps a importao e um tributo interno pode ser recolhido no momento da importao. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China Auto Parts, paras. 153 e 158, DS339/340/342). Ademais, o rgo de Apelao reconheceu que um direito pode apresentar, de forma simultnea, caractersticas de um direito aduaneiro ordinrio e de um tributo interno. Nesses casos, deve-se levar em considerao os elementos centrais mais relevantes que caracterizam a aplicao do direito. Alm da determinao do momento do fato gerador, podem ser observados os responsveis pelo recolhimento do tributo (importador versus agente domstico) e a comparao ao tratamento dado a outros produtos no que se refere diferenciao entre os semelhantes importados no mesmo momento. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Auto Parts, paras. 171-172, DS339/340/342). Direitos aduaneiros ordinrios e os outros direitos e encargos (respectivamente, primeira e segunda sentena do Artigo II:1(b)), o Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo II:1(b) estabelecido na Rodada Uruguai previu a separao destes em uma nova coluna na lista de concesses dos Membros. No obstante, o rgo de Apelao definiu que os direitos aduaneiros ordinrios e os outros direitos e encargos no possuem a mesma natureza, sendo que o segundo no apresenta relao com o momento da importao, mas est conectado com a importao. Ademais, os outros direitos aduaneiros podem ser de qualquer tipo e, portanto, so mais abrangentes que os direitos aduaneiros ordinrios. Nesse sentido, a definio de outros direitos aduaneiros somente pode ser realizada por excluso. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India Addictional Import Duties, paras. 156-157, DS360 e Relatrio do Panel no caso Dominican Republic Import and Sale of Cigarettes, paras. 7113-7114, DS302). 4. Artigo II.2(a) Encargos equivalentes a um imposto interno exigido. A deliberao do DSB sobre o Artigo II:2(a) adicionou entendimentos importantes para definir o que se deve compreender sobre os conceitos equivalente a um imposto interno e em conformidade com o disposto no pargrafo 2 do Artigo III. Alm disso, houve deliberao sobre a quem recai o nus da prova em casos envolvendo o Artigo. O conceito de equivalente a um imposto interno gerou interpretaes distintas entre o Painel e o rgo de Apelao, e na concluso final o rgo de Apelao rejeitou a interpretao do Painel de que o termo equivalente deveria ser entendido exclusivamente como ter a mesma funo ou ter funo correspondente. Segundo o rgo de Apelao, esta definio no pode ser aceita, pois seria o mesmo que dizer que as tarifas aduaneiras e internas podem ser equivalentes ainda que exista um diferencial de carga tributria em detrimento do produto importado. Em outras palavras, o termo equivalente no pode ter o seu significado entendido de maneira estreita e demanda tambm uma comparao quantitativa entre as tarifas de importao e os impostos internos.

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No caso de referncia, DS360 (India - Addictional Import Duties), o rgo afirmou que, quando uma tarifa imposta em excesso aos correspondentes tributos internos, parte integral da anlise determinar o quanto esta carga justificada de acordo com o Artigo II:2(a) (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R). Outra deliberao importante do rgo de Apelao, de que o conceito dos termos equivalente e consistncia com o pargrafo 2 do Artigo III no podem ser interpretados isoladamente um do outro, pois eles se comunicam entre si, o que requer uma leitura conjunta (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, WT/DS360/AB/R). Alm disso, no necessrio que o demandante entre com uma representao de violao do Artigo II:2(a) em conjunto com a do Artigo III:2 para que este ltimo seja levado em considerao, pois ao acionar o primeiro, automaticamente o ltimo deve ser analisado (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 181, WT/DS360/AB/R). Em resumo, a imposio do tributo de forma consistente com o Artigo III:2 parcela integrante da determinao em relao ao Artigo II:2(a), a fim de determinar o quanto uma tarifa e os impostos internos so equivalentes. O rgo de Apelao deliberou tambm sobre qual Membro deve ser responsvel por providenciar prova em casos de suspeita de violao do Artigo II:2(a). A deciso do rgo de Apelao foi de que a atribuio do nus da prova deve ser julgada caso a caso, proviso por proviso e medida por medida (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 186, WT/DS360/AB/R). De conformidade com o disposto no pargrafo 2 do Artigo III O Painel decidiu que o elemento de consistncia com o Artigo III.2 no uma condio necessria para a aplicao do Artigo II:2(a) (Relatrio do Painel no caso India Addictional Import Duties, para. 2.212, DS360). Todavia, tal entendimento foi modificado pelo rgo de Apelao, que exigiu a observncia do Artigo III.2 do GATT na verificao de equivalncia entre encargos aduaneiros e impostos internos. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 181, DS360). Ademais, o Painel entendia ser necessrio um questionamento especfico para o Artigo III.2 do GATT, caso o demandante desejasse a anlise da equivalncia entre impostos internos e encargos aduaneiros, prevista no Artigo II:2(a) do GATT, luz do Artigo III.2 do GATT (Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 2.215, DS360). Entretanto, o rgo de Apelao reverteu esse entendimento, pois considera que a anlise do Artigo III.2 do GATT inerente verificao do Artigo II.2(a) neste aspecto (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Addictional Import Duties, para. 180, DS360). 5. Relao com outros Artigos Artigo XIII do GATT e Acordo sobre Agricultura Observa-se que o Artigo II do GATT no foi alterado durante a Rodada Uruguai. Assim, o rgo de Apelao, ao analisar a relao entre o GATT (Artigos II e XIII) e o Acordo sobre Agricultura no caso EC Bananas III, seguiu a jurisprudncia do antigo GATT, especificamente contida no caso US Restries na Importao de Acar. Tal deciso determinou que um Membro pode estabelecer seus direitos relacionados a compromissos tarifrios, desde que no diminua as obrigaes assumidas no mbito do GATT (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC Bananas III, para. 154, DS27). Desse modo, o rgo de Apelao corroborou tambm a deciso do Painel no caso EC Bananas III, que havia registrado a violao das Comunidades Europeias com fundamentao semelhante (Relatrio do Painel no caso EC Bananas III, paras. 7.113-7.114, DS27). Cabe pontuar que tal deciso vai ao encontro do pargrafo 3 do Protocolo de Marraqueche. J no tocante a aspectos relacionados a produtos agrcolas, o relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC Bananas III estatui a aplicao dos compromissos assumidos pelos Membros relacionados a acesso a mercados, respeitando os dispositivos especficos do Acordo sobre Agricultura. (Relatrio do rgo de

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Apelao no caso EC Bananas III, para. 155, DS27). Ressalte-se que o Acordo sobre Agricultura, por ser mais especfico que o GATT, deve prevalecer sobre este nos casos de conflito aparente entre tais normas. Artigo XXVIII do GATT No caso EC Bananas III o Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 se manifestou sobre a relao do Artigo II com o Artigo XXVIII do GATT, ressaltando que tal anlise no era objeto do seu termo de referncia. No obstante, concluiu que um Membro continua vinculado a sua lista de concesses at a concluso do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT. (Relatrio do Painel do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso EC - Bananas III, para. 7.454, DS27). J o rgo de Apelao do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do caso em questo destacou que a modificao da lista de concesses no exige uma emenda formal nos termos do Artigo X do Acordo da OMC. Essa alterao efetuada por meio do procedimento estabelecido no Artigo XXVIII do GATT ou por meio de rodadas multilaterais de negociaes. Assim, decidiu que eventual modificao ou prorrogao das quotas concedidas pela lista de concesses das Comunidades Europeias deve ser feita por meio do procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII do GATT. Portanto, o rgo de Apelao corroborou o entendimento do Painel. (Relatrio do rgo de Apelao do Segundo Recurso ao Artigo 21.5 no caso EC - Bananas III, paras. 385 e 395, DS27).

FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 34: Segundo a OMC, o percentual de tarifas consolidadas dos PD aumentou 21 pontos percentuais (p.p.), saindo de 78% para 99% ao final dessa Rodada. No que se refere aos pases em desenvolvimento, o percentual de tarifas consolidadas, que antes de 1994 era de 21%, passou a ser de 73% aps esse perodo, o que representou um crescimento de 52 p.p. Fonte: Organizao Mundial do Comrcio (OMC). Disponvel em: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm Acesso em: 18/10/2011>. Footnote 35: GARBELINI JNIOR, A. O contencioso entre as Comunidades Europeias e o Brasil em Soluo de Controvrsias: O Brasil e o contencioso na OMC. PDUA LIMA, Maria Lcia; ROSENBERG, Brbara (Coords.). Tomo 1 (Srie GV Law). So Paulo: Saraiva, 2009. pp. 384-385. Footnote 36: Relatrio do Painel, WT/DS375/R WT/DS376/R WT/DS377/R, para 7.1246. Footnote 37: Relatrio do rgo de Apelao: Argentina Textiles and Apparel, para. 47; Panel Report on EC - Chicken Cuts, para. 7.319.

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Artigo III

Nathalie Tiba Sato IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article III National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation 3.1 The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. With respect to any existing internal tax which is inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 2, but which is specifically authorized under a trade agreement, in force on April 10, 1947, in which the import duty on the taxed product is bound against increase, the contracting party imposing the tax shall be free to postpone the application of the provisions of paragraph 2 to such tax until such time as it can obtain release from the obligations of such trade agreement in order to permit the increase of such duty to the extent necessary to compensate for the elimination of the protective element of the tax. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal quantitative regulations in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1. The provisions of paragraph 5 shall not apply to any internal quantitative regulation in forcein the territory of any contracting party on July 1, 1939, April 10, 1947, or March 24, 1948, at the option of that contracting party; Provided that any such regulation which is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 5 shall not be modified to the detriment of imports and shall be treated as a customs duty for the purpose of negotiation. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply. (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. 44

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

(b)

The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

3.9

The contracting parties recognize that internal maximum price control measures, even though conforming to the other provisions of this Article, can have effects prejudicial to the interests of contracting parties supplying imported products. Accordingly, contracting parties applying such measures shall take account of the interests of exporting contracting parties with a view to avoiding to the fullest practicable extent such prejudicial effects. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any contracting party from establishing or maintaining internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films and meeting the requirements of Article IV Notes and Supplementary Provisions Ad Article III

3.10

Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III. Paragraph 1 The application of paragraph 1 to internal taxes imposed by local governments and authorities with the territory of a contracting party is subject to the provisions of the final paragraph of Article XXIV. The term reasonable measures in the last-mentioned paragraph would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national legislation authorizing local governments to impose internal taxes which, although technically inconsistent with the letter of Article III, are not in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such repeal would result in a serious financial hardship for the local governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation by local governments or authorities which is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Article III, the term reasonable measures would permit a contracting party to eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a transition period, if abrupt action would create serious administrative and financial difficulties. Paragraph 2 A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly taxed. Paragraph 5 Regulations consistent with the provisions of the first sentence of paragraph 5 shall not be considered to be contrary to the provisions of the second sentence in any case in which all of the products subject to the regulations are produced domestically in substantial quantities. A regulation cannot be justified as being consistent with the provisions of the second sentence on the ground that the proportion or amount allocated to each of the products which are the subject of the regulation constitutes an equitable relationship between imported and domestic products.

45

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo III Tratamento Nacional no tocante Tributao e Regulamentao Internas

3.1

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os impostos e outros tributos internos, assim como leis, regulamentos e exigncias relacionadas com a venda, oferta para venda, compra, transporte, distribuio ou utilizao de produtos no mercado interno e as regulamentaes sobre medidas quantitativas internas que exijam a mistura, a transformao ou utilizao de produtos, em quantidade e propores especificadas, no devem ser aplicados a produtos importados ou nacionais, de modo a proteger a produo nacional. Os produtos do territrio de qualquer Parte Contratante, importados por outra Parte Contratante, no esto sujeitos, direta ou indiretamente, a impostos ou outros tributos internos de qualquer espcie superiores aos que incidem, direta ou indiretamente, sobre produtos nacionais. Alm disso nenhuma Parte Contratante aplicar de outro modo, impostos ou outros encargos internos a produtos nacionais ou importados, contrariamente aos princpios estabelecidos no pargrafo 1. Relativamente a qualquer imposto interno existente, incompatvel com o que dispe o pargrafo 2, mas expressamente autorizado por um acordo comercial, em vigor a 10 de abril de 1947, no qual se estabelece o congelamento do direito de importao que recai sobre um produto Parte Contratante que aplica o imposto ser lcito protelar a aplicao dos dispositivos do pargrafo 2 a tal imposto, at que possa obter dispensadas obrigaes desse acordo comercial, de modo a lhe ser permitido aumentar tal direito na medida necessria compensar a supresso da proteo assegurada pelo imposto. Os produtos de territrio de uma Parte Contratante que entrem no territrio de outra Parte Contratante no usufruiro tratamento menos favorvel que o concedido a produtos similares de origem nacional, no que diz respeito s leis, regulamento e exigncias relacionadas com a venda, oferta para venda, compra, transporte, distribuio e utilizao no mercado interno. Os dispositivos deste pargrafo no impediro a aplicao de tarifas de transporte internas diferenciais, desde que se baseiem exclusivamente na operao econmica dos meios de transporte e no na nacionalidade do produto. Nenhuma Parte Contratante estabelecer ou manter qualquer regulamentao quantitativa interna que se relacione com a mistura, transformao ou utilizao de produtos em quantidades ou propores determinadas e que exija, direta ou indiretamente o fornecimento pelas fontes produtoras nacionais, de quantidade ou proporo determinada de um produto enquadrado na regulamentao. Alm disso, nenhuma Parte Contratante aplicar de outro modo, regulamentaes quantitativas internas, de forma a contrariar os princpios estabelecidos no pargrafo 1. Os dispositivos do pargrafo 5 no se aplicaro a qualquer regulamentao quantitativa interna em vigor, no territrio de qualquer Parte Contratante, a 1 de julho de 1939, a 10 de abril de 1947, ou a 24 de maro de 1948, escolha da Parte Contratante, contanto que qualquer regulamentao dessa natureza, contrria ao que dispe o pargrafo 5, no seja modificada em detrimento de importaes e seja tratada como se fosse um direito aduaneiro, para efeito de negociao. Nenhuma regulamentao quantitativa interna que se relacione com a mistura, transformao ou utilizao de produtos em quantidades ou propores determinadas ser aplicada, de modo a repartir qualquer quantidade, ou proporo dessa natureza entre fontes estrangeiras de suprimento. (a) As disposies desse Artigo no se aplicaro s leis, regulamentos ou exigncias que se refiram a aquisies, por rgo governamentais de produtos comprados para atender s necessidades dos poderes pblicos e no se destinam revenda, no comrcio, ou produo de bens para venda no comrcio.

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

46

(b)

As disposies deste Artigo no impediro o pagamento de subsdios exclusivamente a produtores nacionais compreendidos os pagamentos a produtores nacionais com recursos provenientes da arrecadao dos impostos ou tributos internos aplicados de conformidade com os dispositivos deste Artigo e de subsdios concedidos sob a forma de compra de produtos nacionais pelos poderes pblicos.

3.9

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as medidas internas para controle de preos mximos embora guardem conformidade com outros dispositivos deste Artigo, podem ocasionar prejuzos aos interesses das Partes Contratantes que fornecem os produtos importados. As Partes Contratantes que tomarem tais medidas levaro em conta os interesses das Partes Contratantes exportadoras, com o fim de evitar o mais possvel, esses efeitos perniciosos. Os dispositivos deste Artigo no impediro qualquer Parte Contratante de estabelecer ou manter regulamentaes quantitativas internas relativas exibio de filmes cinematogrficos e de atender s exigncias do Artigo IV. Notas e Disposies Adicionais Ao Artigo III

3.10

Qualquer imposto ou outros tributos internos, bem como qualquer lei, regulamento ou prescrio mencionados no Pargrafo 1 que se apliquem no s ao produto importado como tambm ao produto nacional similar e que sejam cobrados ou exigidos no caso do produto importado no momento e no local da importao, sero no obstante considerados como taxa interna ou um outro tributo interno ou como uma lei, regulamentao ou exigncias regidas no Pargrafo 1 e esto consequentemente sujeitas s disposies do Artigo III. Pargrafo primeiro A aplicao do pargrafo primeiro s taxas internas cobradas pelas autoridades governamentais ou administrativas locais do territrio de uma Parte Contratante regida pelas disposies constantes do ltimo pargrafo do Artigo XXIV. A expresso medidas razoveis que estejam a seu alcance que figura nesse pargrafo no deve ser interpretada como obrigando, por exemplo uma Parte Contratante a revogar uma legislao nacional que d s autoridades mencionadas acima, o poder de aplicar taxas internas que sejam contrrias na forma, letra do Artigo III, sem contratarem, de fato, o esprito deste Artigo se essa extino trouxer graves dificuldades financeiras para as autoridades locais interessadas. No que concerne s taxas cobradas por essas autoridades locais e que sejam contrrias letra e ao esprito do Artigo III, a expresso medidas razoveis que estejam a seu alcance permite a uma Parte Contratante elimina progressivamente essas taxas no curso de um perodo de transio, se a sua supresso imediata ameace provocar graves dificuldades administrativas e financeiras. Pargrafo 2 Uma taxa que satisfaa s prescries da primeira frase do pargrafo 2 somente deve ser considerada como incompatvel com as prescries da Segunda frase nos casos em que haja concorrncia entre de um lado, o produto taxado e de outro, um produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser substituto direto e que no seja taxado igualmente. Pargrafo 5 As medidas de regulamentao compatveis com as disposies da primeira frase do pargrafo 5 no sero consideradas como contrrias s disposies da segunda frase se o pas que aplica a regulamentao produz em quantidade substancial todos os produtos a ela submetidos. No se poder invocar o fato de que na atribuio de uma determinada proporo ou quantidade de cada um dos produtos submetidos regulamentao guardou-se uma relao quantitativa entre os produtos nacionais e os importados para sustentar que uma regulamentao est conforme com as disposies da Segunda frase. 47

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo III:2

1. Artigo III.2, primeira frase significado de produtos similares aos nacionais (like domestic products) a) Definio de produtos similares (like products) Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canad e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 112-114 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao afirma que no h uma definio absoluta para produtos similares, apropriada para todos os casos. O significado de produtos similares deve ser definido caso a caso, ou seja, conforme os pormenores de cada caso em particular. Para. 112. Because the second sentence of Article III:2 provides for a separate and distinctive consideration of the protective aspect of a measure in examining its application to a broader category of products that are not like products as contemplated by the first sentence, we agree with the Panel that the first sentence of Article III:2 must be construed narrowly so as not to condemn measures that its strict terms are not meant to condemn. Para. 113. How narrowly is a matter that should be determined separately for each tax measure in each case. We agree with the practice under the GATT 1947 of determining whether imported and domestic products are like on a case-by-case basis. Para. 114. No one approach to exercising judgement will be appropriate for all cases. The criteria in Border Tax Adjustments should be examined, but there can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is like. The concept of likeness is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The accordion of likeness stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The width of the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by the particular provision in which the term like is encountered as well as by the context and the circumstances that prevail in any given case to which that provision may apply. b) Critrios Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canad e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 113-115 O rgo de Apelao faz referncia ao Relatrio do Grupo de Trabalho intitulado Border Tax Adjustments, que sugere uma abordagem para a interpretao da expresso produtos similares definindo critrios para sua determinao, caso a caso. Os critrios do Border Tax Adjustments, quais sejam, (i) a finalidade do produto em um determinado mercado; (ii) preferncias e hbitos dos consumidores; (iii) propriedades, natureza e qualidade do produto e (iv) a classificao tarifria,foram utilizados em diversas decises subsequentes. No caso em questo, o rgo de Apelao afirma que linhas tarifrias que incluam uma grande variaedade de produtos no um critrio confivel para determinao da similaridade do produto. Por fim, o Painel entende que, alm da aplicao dos critrios do Border Tax Ajustment, e de outros que possam ser relevantes, a definio de produtos similares envolver inevitavelmente elementos de julgamento individual e discricionrio.

48

Para. 113. () In applying the criteria cited in Border Tax Adjustments to the facts of any particular case, and in considering other criteria that may also be relevant in certain cases, panels can only apply their best judgement in determining whether in fact products are like. This will always involve an unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgement (). Para. 114. () it is a discretionary decision that must be made in considering the various characteristics of products in individual cases.
Uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures based on the Harmonized System (the HS) was recognized in GATT 1947 practice as providing a useful basis for confirming likeness in products. However, there is a major difference between tariff classification nomenclature and tariff bindings or concessions made by Members of the WTO under Article of the GATT 1994.

Para. 115. () tariff bindings that include a wide range of products are not a reliable criterion for determining or confirming product likeness under Article III:2. 2. Artigo III.2, primeira frase significado de superiores aos que incidem (in excess of)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canad e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 112 e 115 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao determina que, se os produtos tributados forem considerados produtos similares ao nacional, e se os tributos forem aplicados em valores superiores aos que incidem sobre os produtos nacionais, ento a medida inconsistente com o Artigo III:2. Neste sentido, no necessrio um teste de efeitos sobre o comrcio, nem h um padro de minimis, bastando apenas que o tributo seja aplicado em valor superior ao valor que incide sobre os produtos nacionais para que haja a violao. Para. 112. () Read in their context and in the light of the overall object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the words of the first sentence require an examination of the conformity of an internal tax measure with Article III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported and domestic products are like and, second, whether the taxes applied to the imported products are in excess of those applied to the like domestic products. If the imported and domestic products are like products, and if the taxes applied to the imported products are in excess of those applied to the like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2, first sentence. Para. 115. () Even the smallest amount of excess is too much. The prohibition of discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional on a trade effects test nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard. 3. Artigo III.2, segunda frase - significado de produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser substituto direto (like and directly competitive or substitutable products)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canad e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, para. 117 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao afirmou que a definio dos produtos que se encaixam na expresso produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser substituto direto, deve se dar caso a caso. O rgo de Apelao afirmou ainda, que apropriado analisar a elasticidade de substituio do produto, para o exame do mercado relevante dos produtos. Para. 117. () As with like products under the first sentence, the determination of the appropriate range of directly competitive or substitutable products under the second sentence must be made on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only at such matters as physical characteristics, common end-uses, and tariff classifications, but also at the market-place. This seems appropriate. () It 49

does not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant markets as one among a number of means of identifying the broader category of products that might be described as directly competitive or substitutable. Nor does it seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as one means of examining those relevant markets. Relatrio do Painel no caso Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea - Alcoholic Beverages), Demandante: EUA e Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS75/AB/R, paras. 114-115, 118, 120, 124, 127, 134, 137 e 142-143 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, neste caso, a expresso que possa ser substituto direto indica uma relao entre produtos que podem no ser, em um dado momento, considerados pelos consumidores como substitutos, mas que podem, de qualquer forma, substituir um ao outro. Esta noo particularmente importante em mercados em que existem barreiras regulatrias ao comrcio ou competio e, portanto, pode haver uma demanda latente. O rgo de Apelao afirma ainda que produtos perfeitamente substituveis so abrangidos pela primeira sentena do pargrafo III:2, que utiliza a expresso produtos similares, os produtos imperfeitamente substituveis so abrangidos pela segunda sentena das notas adicionais, a qual adota a expresso produto diretamente competidor ou que possa ser substituto direto. O rgo de Apelao analisou ainda, a possibilidade de agrupamento de produtos importados, e afirmou que a possibilidade de agrupamento deve ser decidida caso a caso, no sendo dispensada a anlise da competitividade e a possibilidade de substituio com o produto domstico. Para. 114. The term directly competitive or substitutable describes a particular type of relationship between two products, one imported and the other domestic. It is evident from the wording of the term that the essence of that relationship is that the products are in competition. This much is clear both from the word competitive which means characterized by competition, and from the word substitutable which means able to be substituted. The context of the competitive relationship is necessarily the marketplace since this is the forum where consumers choose between different products. Competition in the market-place is a dynamic, evolving process. Accordingly, the wording of the term directly competitive or substitutable implies that the competitive relationship between products is not to be analyzed exclusively by reference to current consumer preferences. In our view, the word substitutable indicates that the requisite relationship may exist between products that are not, at a given moment, considered by consumers to be substitutes but which are, nonetheless, capable of being substituted for one another. Para. 115. Thus, according to the ordinary meaning of the term, products are competitive or substitutable when they are interchangeable or if they offer, as the Panel noted, alternative ways of satisfying a particular need or taste. Particularly in a market where there are regulatory barriers to trade or to competition, there may well be latent demand. Para. 118. () Like products are a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like products are, by definition, directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all directly competitive or substitutable products are like. The notion of like products must be construed narrowly but the category of directly competitive or substitutable products is broader. While perfectly substitutable products fall within Article III:2, first sentence, imperfectly substitutable products can be assessed under Article III:2, second sentence. Para. 120. In view of the objectives of avoiding protectionism, requiring equality of competitive conditions and protecting expectations of equal competitive relationships, we decline to take a static view of the term directly competitive or substitutable. The object and purpose of Article III confirms that the scope of the term directly competitive or substitutable cannot be limited to situations where consumers already regard products as alternatives. If reliance could be placed only on current instances of substitution, the object and purpose of Article III:2 could be defeated by the protective taxation that the provision aims to prohibit. Para. 124. () the term directly competitive or substitutable does not prevent a panel from taking account of evidence of latent consumer demand as one of a range of factors to be considered when assessing the 50

competitive relationship between imported and domestic products under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994. Para. 127. () the object and purpose of Article III is the maintenance of equality of competitive conditions for imported and domestic products. It is, therefore, not only legitimate, but even necessary, to take account of this purpose in interpreting the term directly competitive or substitutable product. Para. 134. In taking issue with the use of the term nature of competition, Korea, in effect, objects to the Panels sceptical attitude to quantification of the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products. For the reasons set above, we share the Panels reluctance to rely unduly on quantitative analyses of the competitive relationship. In our view, an approach that focused solely on the quantitative overlap of competition would, in essence, make cross-price elasticity the decisive criterion in determining whether products are directly competitive or substitutable. Para. 137. It is, of course, true that the directly competitive or substitutable relationship must be present in the market at issue. () It is also true that consumer responsiveness to products may vary from country to country. This does not, however, preclude consideration of consumer behaviour in a country other than the one at issue. It seems to us that evidence from other markets may be pertinent to the examination of the market at issue, particularly when demand on that market has been influenced by regulatory barriers to trade or to competition. Clearly, not every other market will be relevant to the market at issue. But if another market displays characteristics similar to the market at issue, then evidence of consumer demand in that other market may have some relevance to the market at issue. This, however, can only be determined on a case-bycase basis, taking account of all relevant facts. Para. 142. () Some grouping is almost always necessary in cases arising under Article III:2, second sentence, since generic categories commonly include products with some variation in composition, quality, function and price, and thus commonly give rise to sub-categories. From a slightly different perspective, we note that grouping of products involves at least a preliminary characterization by the treaty interpreter that certain products are sufficiently similar as to, for instance, composition, quality, function and price, to warrant treating them as a group for convenience in analysis. But, the use of such analytical tools does not relieve a panel of its duty to make an objective assessment of whether the components of a group of imported products are directly competitive or substitutable with the domestic products. Para. 143. Whether, and to what extent, products can be grouped is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 4. Artigo III.2, segunda frase significado de no seja taxado igualmente (not similarly taxed)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, Canad e EUA, WT/DS8/AB/R, paras. 118-119 O rgo de Apelao entendeu, neste caso, que h uma diferena entre produtos importados tributados em valores superiores aos que incidem sobre o produto nacional, expresso utilizada na primeira sentena do Artigo III.2, e produtos que no sejam taxados igualmente aos produtos diretamente competidores ou que possam ser substitutos diretos, nos termos das notas adicionais ao Artigo III.2. Segundo o rgo de Apelao, pode haver um excesso de tributao que resulte em maior nus aos produtos domsticos do que aos produtos diretamente competidores, ou que possam ser substitutos diretos domsticos, mas que no justifique a concluso de que os produtos no so taxados igualmente. Assim, um produto no taxado igualmente quando a carga tributria sobre os produtos importados mais elevada do que a aplicada sobre os produtos diretamente competidores ou que possam ser substitutos diretos, e o valor tributado deve ser mais elevado que a taxa de minimis em qualquer caso. Para. 118. To interpret in excess of and not similarly taxed identically would deny any distinction between the first and second sentences of Article III:2. Thus, in any given case, there may be some amount of 51

taxation on imported products that may well be in excess of the tax on domestic like products but may not be so much as to compel a conclusion that directly competitive or substitutable imported and domestic products are not similarly taxed for the purposes of the Ad Article to Article III:2, second sentence. In other words, there may be an amount of excess taxation that may well be more of a burden on imported products than on domestic directly competitive or substitutable products but may nevertheless not be enough to justify a conclusion that such products are not similarly taxed for the purposes of Article III:2, second sentence. Para. 119. () We agree with the Panel that this amount of differential taxation must be more than de minimis to be deemed not similarly taxed in any given case. And, like the Panel, we believe that whether any particular differential amount of taxation is de minimis or is not de minimis must, here too, be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, to be not similarly taxed, the tax burden on imported products must be heavier than on directly competitive or substitutable domestic products, and that burden must be more than de minimis in any given case. Relatrio do Painel no caso Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Chile - Alcoholic Beverages), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS87/AB/R, paras. 49 e 52-53 O rgo de Apelao entendeu, neste caso, que h uma diferena entre produtos importados tributados em valores superiores aos que incidem sobre o produto nacional, expresso utilizada na primeira sentena do Artigo III.2, e produtos que no sejam taxados igualmente aos produtos diretamente competidores ou que possam ser substitutos diretos, nos termos das notas adicionais ao Artigo III.2. Segundo o rgo de Apelao, pode haver um excesso de tributao que resulte em maior nus aos produtos domsticos do que aos produtos diretamente competidores ou que possam ser substitutos diretos domsticos, mas que no justifique a concluso de que os produtos no so taxados igualmente. Assim, um produto no taxado igualmente quando a carga tributria sobre os produtos importados mais elevada do que a aplicada sobre os produtos diretamente competidores ou que possam ser substitutos diretos, e o valor tributado deve ser mais elevado que a taxa de minimis em qualquer caso. Para. 49. () We must, therefore, assess the relative tax burden imposed on directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products. Para. 52. () The examination under the second issue must, therefore, take into account the fact that the group of directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products at issue in this case is not limited solely to beverages of a specific alcohol content, falling within a particular fiscal category, but covers all the distilled alcoholic beverages in each and every fiscal category under the New Chilean System. Para. 53. A comprehensive examination of this nature, which looks at all of the directly competitive or substitutable domestic and imported products, shows that the tax burden on imported products, most of which will be subject to a tax rate of 47 per cent, will be heavier than the tax burden on domestic products, most of which will be subject to a tax rate of 27 per cent. III. Comentrios

No tocante ao Artigo III.2, possvel constatar que sua interpretao pelo rgo de Apelao inicia-se no caso Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II. De acordo com essa deciso, para o Artigo III no importa a inteno, ou seja, no importa se o Membro desenhou sua regulao interna no sentido de favorecer empresas nacionais, mas apenas se a regulao interna objetivamente concede essa proteo. De fato, o Artigo III estabelece alguns parmetros para a investigao da proteo interna: ele distingue entre os produtos nacionais que podem ser qualificados como similares de produtos importados (primeira frase do segundo pargrafo) e os produtos internos que so diretamente competidores e substitutos dos importados (segunda frase do segundo pargrafo).

52

Esses dois tipos de produtos esto sujeitos a conceitos jurdicos distintos: se, de um lado, o conceito de produtos similares parece ambguo, de outro o conceito que se aplica a produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos e a distino entre essas duas categorias est muito mais clara. No caso Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, o rgo de Apelao foi claro ao afirmar que even the smallest amount of excess is too much The prohibition under Article III.2, first sentence, is not conditional on a trade effects test nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard. Esta afirmao nos faz indagar como so aferidos os produtos similares, e, em particular, como os produtos similares podem ser diferenciados dos produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos. Como esclarecido nas vrias decises do rgo de Apelao acima mencionadas, os produtos similares so espcie do gnero produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos. Produtos similares importados ou nacionais devem supostamente possuir mais caractersticas fsicas em comum e devem, ordinariamente, estar sujeitos aos mesmos impostos. No tocante aos produtos competidores e substitutos, o critrio jurdico no to claro. Em primeiro lugar, a diferena no tratamento de produtos estrangeiros e nacionais est sujeita a um critrio minimalista. Ou seja, para que seja proibido, ser necessrio demonstrar que o tratamento de produtos nacionais e importados no similar. Em segundo lugar, como a segunda frase do Artigo III.2 faz referncia expressa ao primeiro pargrafo do mesmo dispositivo, entende-se que, para que seja proibido, imprescindvel demonstrar tambm que a diferena de tratamento de produtos nacionais e estrangeiros o que efetivamente confere proteo quele. As diferenas entre produtos similares e produtos competidores diretos e substitutos e seus critrios restritivos parecem estar associadas presuno de que se dois produtos so bastante semelhantes, qualquer diferena de tratamento entre eles traduzir em uma proteo significativa para o produto que se beneficiar de condies mais favorveis. Neste caso, presume-se que o efeito de proteo existe e significativo. De outro lado, se os produtos so mais diferenciados, o sentido do efeito de proteo tem que ser demonstrado. Esta presuno, todavia, parece no estar correta. Se o grau de proteo se eleva na proporo do aumento da possibilidade de substituio de um produto pelo outro, isto no condio suficiente para gerar uma proteo necessariamente significativa. Da porque, deve-se questionar o sentido prtico de distinguir entre os critrios jurdicos aplicados a produtos similares e produtos competidores diretos e substitutos. Em primeiro lugar, a distino entre os dois tipos de produtos no , na prtica, nada fcil. De acordo com as decises do rgo de Apelao acima mencionadas, essa distino deve ser feita caso a caso e no existe um critrio nico que possa ser usado em todos os casos. Como j dito, existe um aparente consenso de que produtos similares devem compartilhar mesmas caractersticas fsicas e produtos competidores diretos e substitutos devem ser aferidos de acordo com regras de mercado, levando-se em conta a similaridade no uso final do produto. No entanto, mais do que isto, quase nenhuma outra informao sistemtica pode ser extrada das decises do rgo de Apelao. Em segundo lugar, a distino entre critrios jurdicos aplicveis a dois tipos de produtos imaterial. O caso do Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II emblemtico: ficou decidido pelo painel que for it to conclude that dissimilar taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for it to find that the dissimilarity is not de minimis. Em outras palavras, se a diferena de tratamento muito grande, o efeito protetivo pode ser presumido (no caso de produtos similares). Da porque, a nica diferena entre o critrio aplicado a produtos similares e diretamente competidores e substitutos estaria relacionada importncia do tratamento da desigualdade. No entanto, o rgo de Apelao discordou desse entendimento e afirmou que a questo de aferir se a proteo foi concedida deve ser entendida separadamente da questo de aferir se o tratamento foi desigual.

53

Infelizmente, contudo, o rgo de Apelao somente discorreu vagamente sobre o tema de como aferir a proteo, referindo que, acima da importncia do tratamento desigual, existem other factors to be considered. No se encontra esclarecido quais devem ser esses other factors. Conclui-se, portanto, que nenhuma avaliao dos efeitos da proteo necessria para produtos similares, diferentemente do que ocorre com os produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos. certo que os Painis da OMC evitam padres quantitativos. Mesmo assim, para verificar se um produto substitui outro obviamente uma questo de gradao, j que no existe padro para decidir quando a substituio pequena o suficiente para considerar que os produtos no so competidores diretos. Pelo mesmo motivo, os painis da OMC no tm considerado nenhum padro para avaliar a desigualdade entre produtos. Esses Painis tm tentado identificar produtos similares e produtos diretamente competidores e substitutos separadamente de sua avaliao da importncia das barreiras que so criadas para as empresas estrangeiras (a importncia da desigualdade no tratamento). Mesmo assim, pode-se reconhecer que a proteo , verdadeiramente, uma questo de gradao e no uma questo de princpios. Ademais, o quanto as empresas nacionais protegem-se por barreiras no-tarifrias ser determinado (entre outros fatores) pelo grau de substituio entre produtos nacionais e estrangeiros e a importncia da barreira imposta. Em outras palavras, se o Artigo III expressa um padro quanto ao grau de proteo, no se pode escapar de estabelecer tambm algum nvel de padro para o que considerado um grau de proteo admissvel. Desta feita, a avaliao da proteo atual em face do padro deveria considerar conjuntamente a importncia da barreira e o grau de substituio entre os produtos nacionais e estrangeiros.

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 IA.

Artigo IV Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article IV Special Provisions relating to Cinematograph Films

If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative regulations relating to exposed cinematograph films, such regulations shall take the form of screen quotas which shall conform to the following requirements: (a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematograph films of national origin during a specified minimum proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a specified period of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of whatever origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per theatre per year or the equivalent thereof; With the exception of screen time reserved for films of national origin under a screen quota, screen time including that released by administrative action from screen time reserved for films of national origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect among sources of supply; Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Article, any contracting party may maintain screen quotas conforming to the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this Article which reserve a minimum proportion of screen time for films of a specified origin other than that of the contracting party imposing such screen quotas; Provided that no such minimum proportion of screen time shall be increased above the level in effect on April 10, 1947; Screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation, liberalization or elimination.

(b)

(c)

(d) IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo 4 Disposies Especiais relativas a Filmes Cinematogrficos Se uma Parte Contratante estabelecer ou mantiver regulamentaes quantitativas internas relativas aos filmes cinematogrficos expostos, tais regulamentaes devero ser impostas sob a forma de cotas de projeo, que obedecero s condies e prescries seguintes: (a) As cotas de projeo podero tornar obrigatria a exibio de filmes cinematogrficos de origem nacional durante uma proporo mnima determinada do tempo total de projeo, realmente utilizado num perodo no inferior a um ano na exibio comercial de todos os filmes de qualquer origem; e sero computados na base do tempo de projeo anual por sala ou de seu equivalente. com exceo do tempo de projeo reservado aos filmes de origem nacional numa cota de projeo, nenhum tempo de projeo, inclusive o liberado por medida administrativa do mnimo reservado aos filmes de origem nacional, ser formal ou efetivamente dividido entre as fontes de produo. No obstante as disposies da alnea (b), acima, qualquer das Partes Contratantes poder manter as cotas de projeo que estejam em conformidade com as condies da alnea (a), s quais reservem uma proporo mnima do tempo de projeo para filmes de origem estrangeira determinada, com a condio de que tal proporo mnima do tempo de projeo no venha a ser elevada acima do nvel em vigor em 10 de abril de 1947.

(b)

(c)

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(d)

As cotas de projeo ficaro sujeitas a negociaes visando sua limitao, liberalizao ou eliminao.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nenhum comentrio. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo IV

Nenhum comentrio, uma vez que este Artigo no foi objeto de nenhum caso no DSB. III. Comentrios

Nenhum comentrio.

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Artigo V

Felipe de Andrade Krausz Vera Kanas Grytz IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article V Freedom of Transit 5.1 Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of transport, shall be deemed to be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or without transshipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. Traffic of this nature is termed in this article traffic in transit. There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport. Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at the proper custom house, but, except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations, such traffic coming from or going to the territory of other contracting parties shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be exempt from customs duties and from all transit duties or other charges imposed in respect of transit, except charges for transportation or those commensurate with administrative expenses entailed by transit or with the cost of services rendered. All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic. With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit, each contracting party shall accord to traffic in transit to or from the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to traffic in transit to or from any third country. Each contracting party shall accord to products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable than that which would have been accorded to such products had they been transported from their place of origin to their destination without going through the territory of such other contracting party. Any contracting party shall, however, be free to maintain its requirements of direct consignment existing on the date of this Agreement, in respect of any goods in regard to which such direct consignment is a requisite condition of eligibility for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty or has relation to the contracting partys prescribed method of valuation for duty purposes. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the operation of aircraft in transit, but shall apply to air transit of goods (including baggage). Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo V Liberdade de Trnsito

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

IB.

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5.1

As mercadorias (compreendidas as bagagens) assim como os navios e outros meios de transporte sero considerados em trnsito atravs do territrio de uma Parte Contratante, quando a passagem atravs dsse territrio, quer se efetue ou no com baldeao, armazenagem, ruptura de carga ou mudana na forma de transporte, no constitua seno uma frao de uma viagem completa, iniciada e terminada fora das fronteiras da Parte Contratante em cujo territrio se efetua. No presente artigo, um trfego dessa natureza denominado trfego em trnsito. Haver liberdade de trnsito atravs do territrio das Partes Contratantes para o trfego em trnsito com destino a ou de procedncia de territrios de outras Partes Contratantes pelas rotas mais cmodas para o trnsito internacional. Nenhuma distino ser baseada no pavilho dos navios ou barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de entrada, de sada ou destino ou sbre consideraes relativas propriedade das mercadorias, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de transporte. Qualquer Parte Contratante poder exigir que o trfego em trnsito pelo seu territrio seja objeto de uma declarao na Alfndega interessada; todavia, salvo quando houver falta de observao das leis e regulamentos alegrios aplicveis, os transportes dessa natureza procedentes de outras Partes Contratantes ou a les destinados no sero submetidos a prazos ou restries inteis e ficaro insentos de direitos de trnsito e de qualquer outro encargo relativo ao trnsito, excetuadas as despesas de transporte ou pagamentos correspondentes s despesas administrativas ocasionadas pelo trnsito ou ao custo, dos servios prestados. Todos os direitos e regulamentos aplicados pelas Partes Contratantes ao trfego em trnsito proveniente de outras Partes Contratantes ou a les destinado devero ser eqitativos, tendo em vista as condies do trfego. No que diz respeito aos direitos, regulamentos e formalidades relativos ao trnsito, cada Parte Contratante conceder, ao trfego em trnsito procedente de outra Parte Contratante ou a ela destinado, um tratamento no menos favorvel do que o concedido ao trfego em trnsito proveniente de qualquer outro pas ou a le destinado. Cada Parte Contratante conceder aos produtos que tenham transitado pelo territrio de qualquer outra Parte Contratante tratamento no menos favorvel do que aqule que lhe seria concedido se tivessem sido transportados do seu lugar de origem ao de destino sem passar pelo referido territrio. Ser, todavia, facultado a qualquer Parte Contratante manter as condies de expedio direta vigentes na data dste Acrdo, em relao a tdas as mercadorias para as quais a expedio direta constitua uma condio de admisso ao gzo de direitos preferenciais ou se relacione forma de avaliao prescrita pela Parte Contratante para a fixao dos direitos alfandegrios. As disposies do presente artigo no sero aplicveis s aeronaves em trnsito, mas sero aplicveis ao trnsito areo de mercadorias, compreendidas as bagagens.

5.2

5.3

5.4

5.5

5.6

5.7

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo V

A interpretao do Artigo V do GATT pelo Painel encontra-se limitada ao Relatrio do Painel em Colombia Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, nica vez em que o presente artigo sofreu escrutnio durante o processo de soluo de controvrsias na OMC. A sua interpretao foi construda com base nos seguintes elementos:

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(a) O mbito de aplicao do conceito de trfego em trnsito no Artigo V:2 (the scope of the concept of traffic in transit in Article V:2) (b) As obrigaes substantivas na primeira e na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 (the substantive obligations in Article V:2, first and second sentences) (i) Primeira frase do Artigo V:2 (Article V:2, first sentence) (ii) Segunda frase do Artigo V:2 (Article V:2, second sentence) (c) O mbito de aplicao da obrigao da Nao Mais Favorecida no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994 (the scope of application of the MFN obligation in Article V:6 of the GATT 1994) (d) As obrigaes substantivas no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994 (the substantive obligations in Article V:6 of the GATT 1994)

Relatrio do Painel no litgio Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia Ports of Entry), WT/DS366/R, paras. 7.392, 7.396-7.397, 7.400-7.402, 7.453-7.459, 7.464-7468 e 7.4757.478 a) O mbito de aplicao do conceito de trfego em trnsito no Artigo V:2 Nesses trechos, o Painel identifica o elemento central para a construo da interpretao das disposies do Artigo V do GATT. Trata-se da expresso trfego em trnsito e sua definio, tal como estabelecida no Artigo V:1 do GATT, a qual o Painel ressalta ser clara e suficiente em si. Dessa forma, quando em conjunto com a interpretao do Artigo V:2 do GATT, o Painel destaca que para todos os produtos em trfego em trnsito dever ser concedida respectiva liberdade de trnsito no transporte dentro do territrio do Membro em que estes produtos estiverem em trnsito. O Painel tambm indica que, apesar da ausncia de referncia explcita expresso trfego em trnsito, na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 do GATT, resta claro que a extenso da obrigao da nao mais favorecida destina-se promoo da liberdade de trnsito para produtos em trfego em trnsito. Assim, a segunda frase do Artigo V:2 do GATT complementa e estende a liberdade de trnsito para produtos em trfego em trnsito, independente de critrios injustamente discriminatrios assim listados e determinados no prprio texto do Artigo V do GATT. Para. 7.392. The Panel recalls that both parties have referred to Article V:1 to inform the scope of the obligations under Article V:2. In particular, Article V:1 defines goods as traffic in transit when their passage across the territory of a Member with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic passes. (38) Para. 7.396. In the Panel's view, the definition of traffic in transit provided in Article V:1 seems sufficiently clear on its face. When applied to Article V:2, freedom of transit must thus be extended to all traffic in transit when the goods' passage across the territory of a Member is a only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic passes. Freedom of transit must additionally be guaranteed with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport. Para. 7.397. The Panel notes that the term traffic in transit does not appear in Article V:2, second sentence. This provision reads: No distinction shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport. In spite of the absence of an explicit reference to traffic in transit in this second sentence of Article V:2, the Panel believes that it is sufficiently clear from its text that the MFN obligation in the second sentence is closely related to the obligation to extend freedom of transit, in the first sentence. In the Panel's view, the second sentence complements and expands upon the obligation to extend freedom of transit, stating additionally that distinctions must not be made based on the nationality, or place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination of the vessel transporting goods. Moreover, both obligations form part of the same textual provision. b) As obrigaes substantivas na primeira e na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 (i) Primeira frase do Artigo V:2 59

Nas disposies a seguir, o Painel nota que a promoo da liberdade de trnsito pelos Membros no mbito do seu territrio necessita ser realizada indiscriminadamente, a partir de um mnimo que se completa por meio das rotas mais convenientes para o trnsito internacional. Isto implica no delineamento de uma condio limitante sobre a obrigao de promoo da liberdade de trnsito, a qual no precisa ser estendida a todas as rotas possveis, mas deve ser necessariamente garantida nas rotas mais convenientes para o trnsito, da entrada sada do territrio do Membro. Assim, a obrigao de estender a liberdade de trnsito mercadorias em trfego em trnsito exige acesso irrestrito, mas apenas s rotas mais convenientes para o transporte de mercadorias, no havendo, portanto, obrigao do Membro de garantir a liberdade de trnsito todas as rotas possveis dentro de seu territrio. Para. 7.400. In addition to the definition of freedom, the Panel notes the significance of the rest of the text in Article V:2. The opening text in Article V:2, first sentence (There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting party ...) introduces the obligation the provision of freedom of transit by Members within their territory. The intermediate clause in Article V:2, first sentence (... via the routes most convenient for international transit ...) imposes a limiting condition on the obligation that freedom of transit should be provided on the most convenient routes. The remainder of Article V:2, first sentence (... for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties ) explains that freedom of transit must be provided for 'traffic in transit entering and then subsequently departing from the Member's territory. The Panel notes that the term of art traffic in transit has been defined in the preceding section to include goods when those goods' passage across the territory of a Member with or without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the traffic passes. Para. 7.401. In light of the ordinary meaning of freedom and the text of Article V:2, the Panel concludes that the provision of freedom of transit pursuant to Article V:2, first sentence requires extending unrestricted access via the most convenient routes for the passage of goods in international transit whether or not the goods have been trans-shipped, warehoused, break-bulked, or have changed modes of transport. Accordingly, goods in international transit from any Member must be allowed entry whenever destined for the territory of a third country. Reasonably, in the Panel's view, a Member is not required to guarantee transport on necessarily any or all routes in its territory, but only on the ones most convenient for transport through its territory. (ii) Segunda frase do Artigo V:2 No trecho a seguir, o Painel indica que as disposies presentes na segunda frase do Artigo V:2 do GATT so suficientemente claras. Dessa forma, possvel identificar a obrigao estabelecida de assegurar-se, a todos os produtos de todos os Membros da OMC, um nvel idntico de acesso e igualdade de condies durante o seu transporte em trnsito internacional. Probe-se, assim, discriminaes com base no pavilho dos navios ou barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de entrada, de sada ou destino, na propriedade dos produtos, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de transporte, como objetivamente expresso no Artigo V:2 do GATT. Para. 7.402. The Panel shall now turn to examine the scope of the obligation in Article V:2, second sentence. In this regard, the Panel considers that the obligation in Article V:2, second sentence is clear on its face: Members shall not make distinctions between goods which are traffic in transit based on the flag of vessels; the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination of the vessel; or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport. As noted, the first sentence in Article V:2 addresses freedom of transit for goods in international transit. As a complement to this protection, the Panel considers that Article V:2, second sentence further prohibits Members from making distinctions in the treatment of goods, based on their origin or trajectory prior to arriving in their territory, based on their ownership, or based on the transport or vessel of the goods. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that Article V:2, second sentence requires that goods from all Members must be ensured an identical level of access and equal conditions when proceeding in international transit.

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c) O mbito de aplicao da obrigao da nao mais favorecida no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994 Nos trechos em destaque, o Painel entende que as obrigaes presentes nas disposies do Artigo V:6 do GATT destinam-se aos Membros cujo territrio o destino final dos produtos em trnsito internacional, uma vez que os requisitos para a remessa ou entrega direta so indicados como critrios para a elegibilidade de entrada de produtos, sujeitos preferncias tarifrias ou como elementos que mantm relao com os mtodos de valorao dos produtos para fins de tributao. Tais referncias, presentes nas disposies do Artigo V:6 do GATT, apenas justificam-se se dirigidas aos Membros cujo territrio o destino final dos produtos em trnsito internacional, conforme destaca o Painel. Dessa forma, as disposies do Artigo V:6 do GATT estabelecem a proteo da clusula da nao mais favorecida para produtos que estiveram sujeitos ao trnsito em trfego quando da sua chegada ao destino final, no territrio de determinado Membro, consubstanciando proteo contra discriminao baseada no curso geogrfico do trnsito destes produtos. Para. 7.453. The Panel notes that Article V:6, first sentence includes the phrase products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party (emphasis added) when discussing the applicable goods regulated by the provision. The Panel notes that the phrase incorporates the present perfect tense of the verb to be. No other provisions in Article V employ the present perfect verb tense, instead relying on the term of art traffic in transit, which is defined in Article V:1, when discussing the applicable goods regulated by the provision. (39) In particular, Article V:5 addresses MFN protection requiring parties to accord treatment no less favourable to traffic in transit through the territory of any other contracting party [w]ith respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit. The text of Article V:6 does not provide that each contracting party shall accord treatment no less favourable to traffic in transit through the territory of any other contracting party. Moreover, Members are not obliged to accord MFN protection to products which are in transit, or to products which were in transit. Instead, Article V:6 requires Members to extend MFN protection to products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party. Para. 7.454. The Panel thus considers it necessary to examine the meaning of the phrase products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party in order to determine the scope of Article V:6, i.e. what goods are regulated by the provision. The Panel recalls that the Appellate Body in Chile Price Band System observed generally that requirements expressed in the present perfect tense impose obligations that came into being in the past, but may continue to apply at present. (40) Implicitly, the present perfect verb tense refers to an action that happened at an unspecified time in the past before the present moment. In addition, the perfect aspect refers to a past happening that is considered in relation to a later event or time, although it is unclear whether the event referred to is understood to continue at present, or has recently concluded. (41) As such, the ordinary meaning of products which have been in transit remains unclear. On the one hand, the goods may have begun transit in the past, but are still continuing in transit until an unspecified time in the future. On the other hand, the goods may have recently been in transit, but are no longer in transit. Due to these opposing possibilities for interpretation, the Panel considers it is not possible to clearly determine the meaning of the phrase to products which have been in transit simply by reference to the text. Accordingly, the Panel will consider Article V:6 in light of context provided elsewhere in Article V. Para. 7.455. As discussed above and in relation to Panama's Article V:2 claim, Article V is generally entitled Freedom of Transit. Moreover, the Panel notes that a definition of the term traffic in transit appears in Article V:1. Colombia argues that the scope of Article V is informed by its title (Freedom of Transit) and the definition of traffic in transit provided in Article V:1 that goods are deemed to be in transit across the territory of a contracting party when the passage across such territory ... is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. (42) Colombia argues that this definition of traffic in transit informs the definition of transit for the entire Article, including Article V:6. (43) Thus, Colombia argues that the scope of Article V is limited to goods destined for sale outside of the country through which it is passing. (44) Para. 7.456. While Colombia considers that freedom of transit is one and the same for all provisions, the Panel does not agree. The Panel notes that neither freedom nor transit are defined anywhere in Article V or the WTO Agreement. The Panel recalls that the dictionary definition of freedom as referred to in relation 61

to Panama's Article V:2 claim is the unrestricted use of something. (45) Moreover, the Panel notes that the dictionary definition of transit is the action of passing across or through; passage or journey from one place or point to another (46), or [t]he passage or carriage of people or goods from one place to another. (47) Taken in combination, consideration of the dictionary or ordinary meaning of these terms does not shed light on the issue of whether Article V:6 only concerns goods which are in passage through a territory with a destination outside/beyond that territory, whether it concerns goods which have arrived at their final destination, or both. (48) Thus, the title and the ordinary meaning of the term transit do not inform the scope of all the provisions of Article V. Para. 7.457. Additionally, the Panel rejects the view that the definition of traffic in transit provided in Article V:1 necessarily informs the definition of transit for the entire article, in particular, the reference to products which have been in transit in Article V:6. As the Panel has noted, while the term of art traffic in transit appears in paragraphs 1-5 of Article V, the term is not used in paragraph 6. Contrary to Colombia's argument, Article V:1 clearly indicates that [t]raffic of this nature is termed in this Article 'traffic in transit' (emphasis added) when referring to goods in which passage across such territory ... is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. Moreover, Article V:1 does not expressly state that the concept of traffic in transit is applicable to all provisions in Article V. Therefore, the Panel declines to conclude based either on the definition of traffic in transit appearing in Article V:1 that the scope of Article V:6 only concerns goods which pass through a territory of a Member as a portion of a larger trajectory that begins and ends in beyond the frontier of the Member across whose territory the goods pass. Para. 7.458. In the Panel's view, the immediate context provided by Article V:6, second sentence helps to inform the intended scope and application of Article V:6. The Panel recalls that the second sentence in Article V:6 provides as follows:
Any contracting party shall, however be free to maintain its requirements of direct consignment existing on the date of this Agreement, in respect of any goods in regard to which such direct consignment is a requisite condition of eligibility for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty or has relation to the contracting party's prescribed method of valuation for duty purposes.

Para. 7.459. The Panel notes the inclusion of the terms direct consignment as a requisite condition of eligibility for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty and method of valuation for duty purposes. As argued by Panama, these terms are irrelevant for countries that are intermediary destinations for goods in transit, since eligibility for entry, valuation and duty collection are not undertaken for goods in transit through a Member's territory that will not be subject to importation and customs valuation requirements. In light of the focus on activities in the second sentence commonly associated with importation of goods, Panama argues that the requirements of the second sentence of Article V:6 would be unnecessary if the first sentence of Article V:6 were limited in application to goods that are in transit through a Member's territory. Panama submits that such an interpretation is impermissible as it cannot be reconciled with the principle that interpreters may not reduce whole clauses to inutility. (49) Para. 7.464. In terms of substance, the Panel notes that the second sentence permits a Member to maintain any direct consignment requirements that existed in 1947, whenever those direct consignment requirements were a mandatory condition for entry of the goods at preferential rates of duty or related to the Member's prescribed method of customs duty valuation. Requirements related to the direct consignment of goods have previously been discussed in a 1981 Note by the WTO Secretariat. (50) In that Note, the Secretariat indicated that direct consignment rules for goods require that a product must be transported directly from the place of production to its preferential destination in order to be eligible for origin treatment. Moreover, the Note explains (as relevant at that point in time) that a good under direct consignment could only be transported through territory other than that of its origin or final destination, if justified for geographical reasons, and if the goods in question have remained under customs surveillance and have not entered into the commerce of the transit country.

62

Para. 7.465. Though not binding on Members' rights and obligations, the Panel considers the Secretariat's commentary consistent with the view that the second sentence of Article V:6 is intended to clarify that, in complying with requirements of the first sentence of Article V:6, a Member is nevertheless permitted to maintain any direct consignment requirements that existed in 1947 (when commitments among Members were negotiated) without violating the obligation in the first sentence. In other words, Article V:6, first sentence requires Members to extend MFN treatment to all goods that have been in international transit, except with respect to specific, pre-existing direct consignment commitments. Para. 7.466. In light of the fact that direct consignment requirements are discussed in the context of being a prerequisite for the eligibility for entry of goods at preferential rates of duty or that relate to that Member's method of valuation for duty purposes, the Panel thus considers that both the first and second sentences of Article V:6 apply to a Member's territory which serve as the final destination of the goods. (51) Para. 7.467. In reaching its conclusion, the Panel considers that its interpretation conforms with the principles of treaty interpretation set forth by the Appellate Body in US Gasoline to avoid interpretations that reduce certain other provisions to inutility. The Panel recalls its findings above, that Article V:2, second sentence imposes an MFN obligation by prohibiting Members from making distinction based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin, departure, entry, exit or destination, or on any circumstances relating to the ownership of goods, of vessels or of other means of transport of traffic in transit. The definition of traffic in transit from Article V:1 include those goods when the passage across such territory, ... is only a portion of a complete journey beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting party across whose territory the traffic passes. Thus, Article V:2 extends MFN protection to goods in transit through Member countries, while Article V:6 extends MFN protection from discrimination based on the geographic course of goods in transit upon reaching their final destination. Para. 7.468. The Panel additionally notes that Article V:5 extends MFN protection to traffic in transit [w]ith respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit (emphasis added). In accordance with the Ad Note to this provision, MFN protection extends to like products being transported on the same route under like conditions in relation to transportation charges. Setting aside transportation charges, the protection under Article V:5 broadly extends to all regulations and formalities for all traffic in transit. As Article V:6 extends MFN protection broadly to treatment (i.e. Each contracting party shall accord to products which have been in transit through the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable...), an interpretation that Article V:6 governs treatment extended to traffic in transit would overlap with the broad protection already ensured by Article V:5. Para. 7.475. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Panel concludes that the obligations in Article V:6, first and second sentences apply to Members whose territory is the final destination for goods in international transit. d) As obrigaes substantivas no Artigo V:6 do GATT 1994 Nos trechos abaixo, o Painel destaca que as disposies sobre as obrigaes materiais presentes no Artigo V:6 do GATT so plenamente compatveis a partir da interpretao literal de seu texto legal. Com efeito, estabeleceu-se que o tratamento reservado aos produtos transportados diretamente do seu local de origem at o seu destino, ou seja, sem passar pelo territrio de outro Membro, deve ser igualmente destinado aos produtos que tenham sido transportados do seu local de origem ao local do destino final, percorrendo os territrios de Membros na condio de trfego em trnsito. Como a comparao entre o tratamento dispensado aos produtos, os quais estiveram em trfego em trnsito, e aos produtos que seriam importados de forma direta realizada hipoteticamente, uma vez que a importao direta efetivamente no ocorreu no h anlise de similaridade entre os produtos. Para. 7.476. In light of its determination that Article V:6 extends obligations with respect to goods that have been in transit, but have reached their final destination, the Panel will consider the obligation to provide treatment no less favourable to those goods in comparison to the same goods had they been transported 63

from their place of origin to their destination without going through the territory of such other contracting party. Para. 7.477. The Panel considers the obligation in Article V:6 first sentence is straightforward: all treatment extended to goods that were transported from their place of origin to their destination without going through the territory of other contracting party, must be extended to goods that have been transported from their place of origin, and passed through the territories of such other contracting countries as traffic in transit prior to reaching their final destination. Such treatment must strictly be no less favourable. As the comparison is made based on a hypothetical, identical set of goods, i.e. the passage a good that was shipped from its origin via its actual route through one or more Member countries prior to arrival at its final destination is compared to the hypothetical passage of that good directly from its place of origin to its final destination, no like product analysis is required. (52) Para. 7.478. Thus, products that are transported from their place of origin which pass through any other Member country on the route to their final destination must be treated no less favourably than had those same products been transported from their place of origin to their final destination without ever passing through that other Member's territory. III. Comentrios

A interpretao do Artigo V do GATT ainda carece de maior escrutnio, por futuros Painis e, eventualmente, pelo rgo de Apelao, para que seja possvel afirmar a criao de uma jurisprudncia slida sobre suas disposies. Atualmente, apenas em Colombia - Ports of Entry pode-se identificar no Relatrio do Painel interpretao especfica sobre o Artigo V do GATT. A atuao do Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entry foi eminentemente conservadora, em razo da falta de guias interpretativos originrios de Relatrios anteriores. Esse fato por diversas vezes foi incorporado no texto do Relatrio, com vistas a resguardar a posio dos panelistas na interpretao indita das disposies do Artigo V do GATT. Nesse sentido, ainda que no seja possvel determinar linhas interpretativas que sero utilizadas como precedentes em futuros casos, o Relatrio do Painel Colombia - Ports of Entry esclarece importantes disposies do Artigo V do GATT, notadamente os conceitos de trfego em trnsito e liberdade de trnsito, e as obrigaes materiais impostas aos Membros da OMC. Importa destacar que na definio de trfego em trnsito e liberdade de trnsito, o Painel utilizou-se do texto do prprio Artigo V do GATT, na medida em que restringiu sua interpretao aos limites propostos pela interpretao textual. Ressaltou-se, frequentemente, que devido clareza textual das disposies do Artigo V do GATT, estaria o significado das expresses trfego em trnsito e liberdade de trnsito patentes evidenciadas em sua leitura, no cabendo maiores consideraes por parte do Painel. No Relatrio, o Painel dispe que o trfego em trnsito elemento basilar na interpretao do Artigo V do GATT, uma vez estabelecida a esfera de abrangncia da incidncia de suas obrigaes. Dessa maneira, por estarem as mercadorias em trfego em trnsito, incidem as obrigaes dispostas no Artigo V do GATT, notadamente a liberdade de trnsito. Outro ponto importante cinge questes discriminatrias, em paralelo com a promoo da liberdade de trnsito dos produtos em trfego em trnsito no territrio de um Membro. O Artigo V:2 do GATT bastante expressivo, ao repudiar tratamento discriminatrio para produtos com base em elementos que no sejam caracterizadores destes produtos em si, mas que, no obstante, ensejam tratamentos discriminatrios que seriam repelidos por outras disposies do GATT. Assim, o pavilho dos navios ou barcos, no lugar de origem, no ponto partida, de entrada, de sada ou destino ou sobre consideraes relativas propriedade das mercadorias, dos navios, barcos ou outros meios de transporte no podem ser invocados, mesmo que indiretamente ou utilizados como elementos para a aplicao de tratamento diferenciado que acabe por discriminar os produtos em trnsito no territrio de um Membro. Foi crucial para a completa interpretao do Artigo V do GATT a delimitao da abrangncia de seus pargrafos, de modo a identificar a extenso adequada das obrigaes de no discriminao para produtos, com base no seu trajeto at alcanar o destino final, inclusive em relao s disposies especficas constantes no Artigo V:6 do GATT. Resta identificado que, - apesar da excepcionalidade da manuteno de 64

requisitos relacionados entrega ou remessa direta (direct consignment), para a elegibilidade da entrada de produtos sujeitos a preferncias tarifrias ou relacionados aos mtodos dos Membros de valorao dos produtos para fins de tributao, - os Membros permancem obrigados s demais disposies do Artigo V do GATT, ainda que seja o destino final dos produtos que estiveram sujeitos ao trfego em trnsito. Identificase, portanto, que a linha interpretativa estabelecida pelo Painel em Colombia - Ports of Entry de valorao da interpretao textual das disposies do Artigo V do GATT, destacando-se a obrigao de liberdade de trnsito para produtos durante o transporte, e abolindo o tratamento discriminatrio, com base em aspectos relativos natureza do produto e de seu transporte, notadamente a sua origem e a reafirmao da clusula da nao mais favorecida.

FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 38: Taken as a whole and read objectively, Article V:1 appears plainly definitional in purpose. In its entirety, this provision defines when goods qualify as being in transit across the territory of a contracting party. Footnote 39: The Panel notes that Article V:1 defines the term traffic in transit. Subsequently, paragraphs 2-5 employ this term. Paragraph 2 reads in part: There shall be freedom of transit ... for traffic in transit ... (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 reads in part: Any contracting party may require that traffic in transit through its territory be entered at the proper custom house ... (emphasis added). Paragraph 4 reads in part: All charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on traffic in transit ... (emphasis added). Paragraph 5 reads: With respect to all charges, regulations and formalities in connection with transit, each contracting party shall accord to traffic in transit to or from the territory of any other contracting party treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to traffic in transit to or from any third country (emphasis added). Paragraph 6 does not refer to traffic in transit in its text. Footnote 40: Appellate Body Report, Chile Price Band System, para. 206, citing G. Leech and J. Svartvik, A Communicative Grammar of English, (Longman, 1979), paras. 112-119. R. Quirk and S. Greenbaum, A University Grammar of English, (Longman, 1979), paras. 328-330. Footnote 41: G. Leech and J. Svartvik, A Communicative Grammar of English, (Longman, 3rd edition, 2002), paras. 122 and 125. The authors comment that the present perfect tense has four related possible uses: (i) a past event with results in the present time; (ii) an indefinite event in a period leading up to the present time; (iii) a habit in a period leading up to the present time; and (iv) a state leading up to the present time. In uses (i), (iii), and (iv) the authors note that events may be understood to continue at the present time. However in use (ii), the authors note that the present perfect tense often refers to the recent indefinite past, i.e. the event has recently concluded. Footnote 42: Colombia's comment on Panama's response to Panel question No. 116. Footnote 43: Colombia's comment on Panama's response to Panel question No. 116. Footnote 44: Colombia's first written submission, para. 279. Footnote 45: See Panama's first written submission, para. 171, citing The New Oxford Dictionary of English, (Clarendon Press, 2nd Ed. 2001), p. 730. Footnote 46: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 4th Ed. 1993), p. 3327. Footnote 47: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 4th Ed. 1993), p. 3327. Footnote 48: For instance, in the Panel's view, these terms may be construed to mean the unrestricted passage or journey of goods through a territory, but also the unrestricted passage or journey from one location to another location. Footnote 49: Question n 8 from Panama to Colombia. Footnote 50: See Rules of Origin, Note by the Secretariat, Consultative Group of Eighteen, Fourteenth Meeting, 25-27 March 1981, CG.18/W.48, 6 March 1981, Special Distribution, p. 5. Footnote 51: In resorting to the second sentence of Article V:6 as context to interpret the first sentence of the same provision, the Panel does not reach any finding in regard to the provisions in the second sentence. The Panel recognizes that the second sentence provides a limited and time-bound exception to the requirements set forth in the first sentence. Furthermore, the Panel is not aware of the existence of any direct consignment rules that comply with the second sentence. Footnote 52: In this respect, the Panel would like to address Colombia's argument that adherence to Panama's interpretation of MFN obligations in Article V:6 would essentially undo the explicit limitation of MFN protections set forth in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. As explained above, Article V:6 requires a Member to treat a good shipped from its origin via its actual route through one or more Member countries prior to arrival at its final destination, identically had that same good hypothetically passed from its place of origin to its final destination without traversing a particular territory in question. In contrast, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 broadly ensures that any advantage extended to a product of a particular origin must be extended immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. Thus, Article I:1 ensures MFN treatment to like products of all origins, whereas Article V:6 ensures MFN treatment based on its transit trajectory regardless of the existence of a like product of a different origin. In the Panel's view, the obligations in these two provisions are not the same and should not be treated as redundant.

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Artigo VI

Lucas Queiroz Pires Milena da Fonseca Azevedo Nathalie Tiba Sato IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article VI Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties 6.1 The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purposes of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another (a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either (i) (ii) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.

(b)

Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms of sale, for differences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability. 6.2 In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an antidumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this Article, the margin of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term countervailing duty shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material 66

6.3

6.4

6.5

6.6

injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry. (b) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy an anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product for the purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall waive the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to permit the levying of a countervailing duty, in cases in which they find that a subsidy is causing or threatening material injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party. In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a countervailing duty for the purpose referred to in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph without the prior approval of the CONTRACTING PARTIES; Provided that such action shall be reported immediately to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly if the CONTRACTING PARTIES disapprove.

(c)

6.7

A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the movements of export prices, which results at times in the sale of the commodity for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed not to result in material injury within the meaning of paragraph 6 if it is determined by consultation among the contracting parties substantially interested in the commodity concerned that: (a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the comm odity for export at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and the system is so operated, either because of the effective regulation of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other contracting parties.

(b)

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo VI Direitos Anti-Dumping e de Compensao

6.1

No ser cobrado, sbre um produto originrio de uma Parte Contratante e importado no territrio de outra Parte Contratante, nenhum direito ou taxa anti-dumping de importncia superior margem de dumping com a qual sse produto esteja sendo importado. No sentido do presente artigo, entende-se por margem de dumping : a) a diferena entre o preo de um determinado produto exportado de um pais para outro e o preo comparvel pedido nas condies normais do comrcio por um produto similar destinado ao consumo no pas exportador ou, na ausncia de tal preo no mercado interno dsse ltimo pais, a diferena entre o preo supramencionado e: (i) (ii) o preo comparvel mais eleva do para a exportao de um produto similar para um terceiro pais nas condies normais do comrcio, ou o custo de produo dsse produto no pas de origem, mais uma elevao razovel para as despesas de venda e o lucro. 67

b)

Sero devidamente consideradas, em cada caso, as diferenas nas condies e modalidades de venda, as diferenas de taxa e outras que afetem os elementos de comparao dos preos. 6.2 No ser cobrado sbre um produto originrio de uma Parte Contratante e importado no territrio de outra Parte Contratante, nenhum direito de compensao que ultrapasse a importncia do prmio ou da subveno que se sabe ter sido concedida, direta ou indiretamente, fabricao, produo ou exportao do referido produto no pas de origem ou de exportao, inclusive qualquer subveno especial concedida para o transporte de um produto determinado. A expresso direito de compensao deve ser interpretada como significando um direito especial cobrado com o fim de neutralizar qualquer prmio ou subveno concedidos, direta ou indiretamente, fabricao, produo ou exportao de um produto. Nenhum produto originrio de uma Parte Contratante e importado no territrio de outra Parte Contratante ser submetido a direitos anti-dumping ou de compensao, por gozar de iseno ou do reemblso dos direitos ou impostos que recaiam sbre o produto similar quando destinado ao consumo do pas de origem ou no pas de exportao. Nenhum produto originrio de uma Parte Contratante e importado no territrio de outra Parte Contratante ficar sujeito, ao mesmo tempo, a direitos ani-dumping e a direitos de compensao, com o fim de fazer face a uma mesma situao resultante do dumping ou da subveno das exportaes. Nenhuma Parte Contratante cobrar direitos anti-dumping ou de compensao na importao de um produto procedente de outra Parte Contratante, a menos que verifique que o efeito do dumping ou da subveno, segundo o caso, seja tal que cause ou ameace causar um prejuizo substancial a uma produo nacional estabelecida ou constitua obstculo criao de uma produo nacional ou a retarde sensvelmente. As Partes Contratantes podero derrogar as prescries do presente pargrafo, de maneira a permitir uma Parte Contratante cobrar um direito anti-dumping ou um direito de compensao na importao de um produto qualquer, tendo em vista compensar um dumping ou uma subveno que cause ou ameace causar prejuzo substancial a uma produo estabelecida no territrio de outra Parte Contratante que exporte o produto em questo para o territrio da Parte Contratante importadora. Um sistema de estabilizao do preo nacional ou dos lucros brutos dos produtores de um produto essencial, independente das flutuaes dos preos de exportao, e que permita, em certas ocasies, a venda do produto para a exportao a um preo inferior ao cobrado por produto similar no mercado interno, no ser considerado como materialmente prejudicial no sentido indicado pelo pargrafo 5 dste artigo, se ficar decidido, mediante consulta entre as partes contratantes que tenham intersse essencial no produto: a) que o sistema tenha igualmente, resultado na exportao do produto em questo a um preo superior ao preo correspondente cobrado por um produto similar no mercado interno: que o funcionamento do sistema, quer como conseqncia da regulamentao efetiva da produo, quer por qualquer outra razo, no estimula indevidamente as exportaes, nem prejudica gravemente os intersses das demais Partes Contratantes.

6.3

6.4

6.5

6.6

b)

6.7

Nenhuma Parte Contratante poder recorrer, para neutralizar os efeitos do dumping ou da concesso de um subsdio, no que concerne a um produto do territrio de outra Parte Contratante a outras medidas que no sejam os direitos anti-dumping ou os de compensao.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)

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IC.

Comentrios sobre a Traduo

De modo geral, a verso em portugus do Artigo VI do GATT diverge em forma e em contedo da verso original em ingls do referido dispositivo normativo. Destacam-se a supresso de trechos importantes dos pargrafos 1 e 6 e a consequente alterao da numerao. O pargrafo 1, na verso em ingls, subdividido em caput, alneas e itens. O caput, que apresenta conceitos importantes como a prpria definio de dumping foi substitudo pelo contedo do pargrafo 2. As alneas e itens, no entanto, foram mantidos. Desta forma, na traduo, o pargrafo 2 traz o contedo do pargrafo 3 da verso em ingls, e assim sucessivamente por todo o artigo, resultando na alterao da numerao de todos os pargrafos. Alm disso, o contedo do pargrafo 6 da verso em ingls foi reproduzido no pargrafo 5 da verso em portugus com a excluso da terceira alnea. Por fim, o pargrafo 7 da verso em portugus no tem equivalente na verso em ingls. A excluso de alguns trechos e a alterao da numerao podem resultar em problemas de interpretao e referenciao. Sugesto de traduo dos pargrafos 1, 2 e 6: 6.1 As partes contratantes reconhecem que o dumping, pelo qual os produtos de um pas so introduzidos no mercado de outro pas a um preo menor do que o valor normal dos produtos deve ser condenado se causar ou ameaar causar um dano material a uma indstria estabelecida no territrio de uma Parte Contratante ou materialmente retardar o estabelecimento de uma indstria nacional. Para efeitos do presente artigo, um produto deve ser considerado como sendo introduzido no mercado de um pas importador a um preo menor do que o seu valor normal, se o preo do produto exportado de um pas para outro (a) inferior ao preo comparvel, nas operaes comerciais regulares, de um produto similar destinado ao consumo no pas exportador, ou, (b) na ausncia de preo interno, menor que (i) o maior preo comparvel de um produto similar para exportao a terceiros pases em operaes comerciais regulares, ou (ii) o custo de produo do produto no pas de origem, acrescida de uma adio razovel para custos de venda e lucro. Sero devidamente consideradas, em cada caso, as diferenas nas condies e modalidades de venda, as diferenas de tributao e outras que afetem os elementos de comparao dos preos. 6.2. A fim de compensar ou evitar dumping, uma Parte Contratante poder cobrar sobre qualquer produto objeto de dumping um direito antidumping de importncia no superior margem de dumping com a qual esse produto esteja sendo importado. Para efeitos do presente artigo, a margem de dumping a diferena de preos determinada de acordo com as disposies do pargrafo 1. 6.6. (a) Nenhuma Parte Contratante cobrar direitos anti-dumping ou de compensao na importao de um produto procedente de outra Parte Contratante, a menos que verifique que o efeito do dumping ou da subveno, segundo o caso, seja tal que cause ou ameace causar um prejuizo substancial a uma produo nacional estabelecida ou constitua obstculo criao de uma produo nacional ou a retarde sensvelmente. (b) As Partes Contratantes podero derrogar as prescries do presente pargrafo, de maneira a permitir uma Parte Contratante cobrar um direito anti-dumping ou um direito de compensao na importao de um produto qualquer, tendo em vista compensar um dumping ou uma subveno que cause ou ameace causar prejuzo substancial a uma produo estabelecida no territrio de outra Parte Contratante que exporte o produto em questo para o territrio da Parte Contratante importadora. (c) Em circunstncias excepcionais, no entanto, em que um atraso pode causar danos que seriam de difcil reparao, uma Parte Contratante poder cobrar um direito de compensao para os fins da alnea (b) deste pargrafo, sem a aprovao prvia das partes contratantes, desde que tal ao seja imeditamente comunicada s partes contratantes e que o direito de compensao seja retirado imediatamente se as partes contratantes desaprovarem.

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II. 1.

Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo VI Parte Geral

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.114 Grande parte deste caso se dedica a estabelecer a funo do Artigo VI e a sua aplicao. Este Artigo, porm no independente e vem sempre seguido do Acordo Anti-dumping, que esmia os termos do Artigo do GATT em previses mais detalhadas. Resumidamente, o o Artigo define o que dumping e a forma como deve ser combatido (direitos anti-dumping). No trecho abaixo, mostra-se uma das anlises feitas pelo Painel nesse sentido. Esta anlise ocorre em todo o caso. Para 6.114. Moreover, we recall that dumping is to be condemned if it causes or threatens to cause certain effects listed in Article VI:1. Even though Article VI:1 does not read dumping is to be condemned only if it causes those effects, we consider that it should be interpreted as limiting the use of anti-dumping measures to the situations expressly foreseen in Article VI. (53) In other words, whenever a Member addresses a practice that meets the definition of Article VI:1, it has to abide by the WTO rules governing anti-dumping. (54) If, as the United States seems to argue, a Member could decide to apply other tests or other sanctions to counteract dumping practices within the meaning of Article VI, this would be contrary to the terms of Article VI. Also, alleging that the disciplines of Article VI are only applicable to the extent a Member wants to address situations of material injury, threat thereof or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry would undermine the whole purpose of Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement. From the terms of Article VI, we deduce that the purpose of that provision is to define the conditions under which counteracting dumping as such is allowed. This purpose is confirmed by Article 1, first sentence, of the Anti- Dumping Agreement, (...) 2. Artigo VI:1 a) dumping Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio United States Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber V), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS264/AB/R, paras. 92-93 e 99 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao aponta que, pela interpretao dos Artigos VI:1 e 2:1 do Acordo AntiDumping, o dumping definido em relao ao produto como um todo, para fins de, inter alia, determinao do volume das importaes, determinao do dano, nexo causal entre as importaes objeto de dumping e dano indstria nacional e clculo da margem de dumping. Para. 92. Specifically, Article VI:1 defines dumping as occurring where products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products. This definition is reiterated in Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (). Para. 93. It is clear from the texts of these provisions that dumping is defined in relation to a product as a whole as defined by the investigating authority. () Para. 99. Our view that dumping and margins of dumping can only be established for the product under investigation as a whole is in consonance with the need for consistent treatment of a product in an antidumping investigation. Thus, having defined the product under investigation, the investigating authority must treat that product as a whole for, inter alia, the following purposes determination of the volume of dumped imports, injury determination, causal link between dumped imports and injury to domestic industry, and calculation of the margin of dumping. 70

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS136/R, paras. 6.103-6.104 O Painel decidiu que no caso de determinar se o Act of 1916 viola ou no o Artigo VI do GATT, este deve interpretar este Artigo, porm, tendo em vista a lei que est sendo questionada. O objeto de regulao do Artigo VI a atividade de anti-dumping do Membro, ou seja, o que pode ser feito para combater o dumping (descrito no para. 6.103 abaixo). O Aartigo VI determina as noes de dumping no pargrafo 1 e detm dois critrios, conforme descrito a seguir: (i) produtos importados que passaram pelo processo de alfndega; e (ii) produtos importados abaixo do valor normal (para. 6.104 a seguir). Para. 6.103. Considering the terms of Article VI in their ordinary meaning, we note that Article VI does not regulate the practice of dumping itself, but the anti-dumping activities of Members. In other words, Article VI concentrates on what Members may do in order to counteract dumping. However, Article VI is based on a definition of dumping, found at the beginning of Article VI:1: dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products. (55) The normal value is either the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, in the absence of such domestic price, the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. Para. 6.104. Therefore, the conditions for dumping to exist are the following: (i) there must be products imported and cleared through customs (introduction into the commerce); and (ii) those imported products must be priced at a price lower than their normal value, i.e. their price in a foreign country, be it the country of production or another country of export, or a constructed value based on a calculation of cost and profits. In other words, there must be a price difference between like products sold in two markets, one of which is not within the jurisdiction of the same Member, their price in the country of exportation being lower that their price in the country of production or in a third country to which they are exported. (56) b) the price of the product exported from one country to another Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US Zeroing) (Japan), Demandante: Japo, WT/DS322/R, para. 7.106 No caso em questo o painel analisa de que maneira os Artigos 2:1 do Acordo Anti-dumping e VI do GATT se aplicam ao zeroing levantando pelo Japo. Neste trecho, o Painel declara no haver relao entre os Artigos e o zeroing. Com isso, o painel faz uma analogia com o dumping e a diferena de preo, interpretando a expresso the price of the product exported from one country to another pode ser um operao de exportao particular que pode ser usada como base para calcular o anti-dumping. Para. 7.106. The Panel has also not been presented with compelling arguments as to why the context in which the words product and products are used in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994 supports the interpretation proffered by Japan. The fact that dumping is defined in the GATT 1994 and in the AD Agreement as occurring when a product is introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, i.e. when the price of a product is less than its normal value in our view undermines the argument that it is not permissible to interpret the concept of dumping as being applicable to individual sales transactions. We fail to see why the notion that a product is introduced into the commerce of another country cannot apply to a particular export sale and would necessarily require an examination of different export sales at an aggregate level. Similarly, the notion of a margin of dumping as the price difference that exists when one price is less than another price (or constructed value) can easily be applied to individual transactions and does not require an examination of export transactions at na aggregate level. (57) The terms export price of a product exported from one country to another in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and the price of the product exported from one country to another in Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 can reasonably be interpreted to mean the price of the product in a particular export transaction. 71

2.

Artigo VI: 2 a) Interpretao geral do Artigo

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.189 e 6.190 O caso em questo discute a possibilidade de aplicao de medidas em casos de dumping por parte do exportador. Esta medida est prevista no Act of 1916 dos EUA. Para isso, o Painel se propes a analisar a natureza das medidas que podem ser aplicadas contra o dumping, por meio da interpretao do Artigo VI:2 do GATT. O Artigo VI:2 interpretado pelo Painel pelo significado dos termos utilizados. O Painel utiliza o significado do temo may, assim como mostrado no dicionrio, para levantar a natureza optativa de um Membro aplicar uma medida sobre outro. Com isso, v-se que o nico meio de punir o dumping por meio de uma medida anti-dumping. Para. 6.189. In Article VI:2, the only term the meaning of which is actually debated by the parties is the verb may. The ordinary meanings of the verb may as an auxiliary verb include have ability or power to, can. (58) Taken on its own, this verb could mean that Members have the possibility only to impose duties or that they have a choice between duties and other types of measures. If the Word may was used in the first meaning, it could be argued that the term only should have been added right after it so as to limit its meaning. However, such an argument disregards the immediate context of the word may. The terms in order to offset or prevent dumping set up the framework in which the term may must be understood. By specifying that the purpose of anti-dumping measures is to offset dumping, not to impose punitive measures, Article VI:2, first sentence, limits the meaning of the word may to giving Members the choice between a duty equal to the dumping margin and a lower duty, not between anti-dumping duties and other measures. Para 6.190. In other words, the thrust of Article VI:2, first sentence, is to make the imposition of duties facultative and to limit in any event that amount to the dumping margin. If, as suggested by the United States, the sentence had been meant to allow other measures than anti-dumping duties, it is reasonable to expect that it would have been specified. As mentioned in paragraph 6.103 above, Article VI was meant to regulate the use of anti-dumping by WTO Members. It would have been logical to list the other possible sanctions, especially if those sanctions could be more severe than the imposition of offsetting duties. (59) We therefore conclude that the ordinary meaning of the terms of the first sentence of Article VI:2 support the view that anti-dumping duties are the only type of remedies allowed under Article VI. b) Valor normal Relatrio do Painel no litgio European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon) (Norway), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.705 O caso trata da imposio pela Unio Europeia de direito anti-dumping sobre a criao de salmo da Noruega. Neste trecho especfico a discusso se refere sobre o valor mnimo de importao e qual deve ser a base de clculo do direito anti-dumping. O Painel decide que o direito anti-dumping s pode se colocado quando o preo estiver abaixo do vlor normal. Este direito nunca pode ser imposto no caso do preo estar acima do valor normal. Por essa razo o valor normal a referncia para determinar os direitos anti-dumping e se estes devem impostos ou no. Para. 7.705. Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 reveals that the purpose of imposing and collecting antidumpingduties is to offset or prevent dumping. This principle is reflected in Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement, which provides that an anti-dumping duty may only be imposed when allrequirements for the imposition have been fulfilled. It follows that the appropriate amount of antidumpingduty must be an amount that results in offsetting or preventing dumping, when all otherrequirements for the imposition of anti-dumping duties have been fulfilled. Dumping is defined inboth Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and 72

Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement, in essentially the sameterms, as the introduction of a product into the commerce of another country at a price which is lessthan its normal value. Thus, to the extent that an antidumping duty may be imposed to offset orprevent dumping, it follows that it may only be collected when the price of the imported product isless than its normal value. No anti-dumping duty may be imposed (and therefore collected) when theprice of an imported product is above its normal value. To this extent, normal value constitutes apoint of reference for determining when anti-dumping duties may or may not be imposed andcollected. c) Dumping com relao a um produto Relatrio do Orgo de Apelao no litgio United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US - Zeroing) (Japan), Demandante: Japo, WT/DS322/AB, para. 110 O Relatrio do rgo de Apelao reverteu o entendimento feito pelo painel de que o dumping no determinado com relao a um produto. Abaixo, segue a concluso do Orgo de Apelao: Para. 110. Article VI:2 defines margin of dumping as the difference between the normal value and the export price and establishes the link between dumping and margin of dumping. (60) The margin of dumping reflects the magnitude of dumping. It is also one of the factors to be taken into account to determine whether dumping causes or threatens material injury. (61) Article VI:2 lays down that [i]n order to offset or prevent dumping, a Member may levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product. Thus, the margin of dumping also is defined in relation to a product. d) Prevenes ao dumping Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act), Demandantes: Canad e Mxico, WT/DS234/AB/R, para 231 Os demandantes alegam a inconsistncia da lei americana Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 - CDSOA, tambm conhecida como the Byrd Amendment, com as obrigaes internacionais assumidas pelos EUA. Neste caso, a medida adotada pelos EUA feita com base no GATT, no Acordo Antidumping e no ASMC. O Painel julga, e o rgo de Apelao reafirma, que a medida adotada pelos EUA no se enquadram nas possveis prevenes ao dumping, como consta especificamente no Artigo VI:2 e, por este motivo, viola legislao internacional. Para. 231. The Panel noted that, in our Report in US 1916 Act, we found that Article VI of the GATT 1994, in particular Article VI:2, read in conjunction with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, limits the permissible responses to dumping to definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional measures and price undertakings. (62) The Panel took the view that a similar approach should apply in respect of the permissible responses to subsidization. (63) The Panel observed that Part V of the SCM Agreement foresees definitive countervailing duties, provisional measures and undertakings, whereas Part III foresees countermeasures. According to the Panel, these are the permissible responses to dumping under Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the AntiDumping Agreement, or within the range of the permissible responses to subsidization under the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement, the Panel concluded that the CDSOA constitutes a non-permissible specific action against dumping, contrary to Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and a non-permissible specific action against a subsidy, contrary to Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. 3. Artigo VI:3

Relatrio do Orgo de Apelao no litgio United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Australia, Brasil, Chile, Unio Europeia, ndia, Indonsia, Japo, Coria, Tailndia, Canad e Mxico, WT/DS217/AB e WT/DS234/AB, para. 269 73

Este caso traz muito dos entendimentos j tirados do caso US 1916 Act. Na parte que se refere s medidas a serem tomadas na presena de subsdio, o Orgo de Apelao faz referncia aos achados no caso acima mencionado. O rgo de Apelao discorda da distino, alegada pelos EUA, entre as medidas reguladas pelo Artigo VI:2 (possveis medidas de preveno) e as reguladas pelo Artigo VI:3 (medidas compensatrias). Enquanto no caso US - 1916 Act, o Orgo de Apelao entendeu que as medidas contra o anti-dumping devem ser direitos anti-dumping, medidas preventivas e preos predatrios sob a anlise do Artigo VI: 1 e 2, na anlise do Artigo VI:3 o Orgo de Apelao interpreta que as medidas contra o subsdio sero: direitos compensatrios, medidas provisrias, preos predatrios e medidas compensatrias multilateralmente sancionadas pelo Sistema de Soluo de Controvrsias. A OMC julga a consistncia de um subsdio com o Artigo VI do GATT, e com os seus respectivos acordos internacionais, como um todo e de forma literal, sem buscar definies especficas em cada Artigo. Para. 269. Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement identify three responses todumping, namely, definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional measures and price undertakings. Noother response is envisaged in the text of Article VI of the GATT 1994, or the text of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Therefore, to be in accordance with Article VI of the GATT 1994, asinterpreted by the AntiDumping Agreement, a response to dumping must be in one of these threeforms. We confirmed this in US 1916 Act. We fail to see why similar reasoning should not applyto subsidization. The GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement provide four responses to acountervailable subsidy: (i) definitive countervailing duties; (ii) provisional measures; (iii) priceundertakings; and (iv) multilaterally-sanctioned countermeasures under the dispute settlementsystem. No other response to subsidization is envisaged in the text of the GATT 1994, or in the textof the SCM Agreement. Therefore, to be in accordance with the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the SCM Agreement, a response to subsidization must be in one of those four forms. a) Medida compensatria Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities (US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS212/AB/R, para. 113 A discusso gira em torno da aplicabilidade de uma medida compensatria, de acordo com o Artigo VI:3, e com os termos do ASMC. Este caso especfico por se tratar de uma empresa americana recm-privatizada que, apesar desta privatizao, continua gozando dos benefcios de uma empresa pblica. A questo discutida, referente aos termos do Artigo VI:3 o receptor do benefcio em especial, se este benefcio atinge os scios ou a prpria sociedade. O rgo de Apelao faz esta importante distino, esclarecendo que esta questo deve ser analisada caso a caso, uma vez que tal benefcio pode, ou no, indiretamente favorecer a sociedade em questo. Para. 113. In addition, we observe that a transfer of funds could be provided directly from the government to the legal person that is the producer of the subsidized product, or it could be provided indirectly, say, through an income tax concession to the natural persons that own the firm (inasmuch as they invest in the legal person's productive activities). In both cases, the cost of raising capital for the legal person that is the producer would be reduced. Hence, contrary to the contention of theUnited States, it is possible to confer a benefit on a firm by providing a financial contribution to its owners, whether natural or legal persons, possibly holding property by means of shares. Moreover, we note that Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 (64) and footnote 36 of Article 10 of the SCM Agreement (65) contemplate this possibility by providing that a subsidy may be bestowed indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of merchandise. (emphasis added) Para. 115. () the approach advocated by theUnited States could potentially undermine the SCM Agreement by opening wide a door enabling subsidizing governments to circumvent that Agreement's provisions by bestowing benefits directly on the firm's owners rather than on the firms themselves. In sum, the legal distinction between firms and their owners that may be recognized in a domestic legal context is not necessarily relevant, and certainly not conclusive, for the purpose of determining whether a benefit exists 74

under the SCM Agreement, because a financial contribution bestowed on those investing in a firm may confer a benefit upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994. (66) b) determined to have been granted Relatrio do Painel no litgio Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea (Japan - DRAMs) (Korea), Demandante: Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS336/AB/R, para. 7.353 O Artigo V:3 do GATT utilizado como justificativa do Japo pela imposio de uma medida compensatria com base em um subsdio que possa ter sido imposto (determined to have been granted), ou seja, que esta medida pode ser imposta anteriormente ao possvel subsdio. O Painel rejeita esta justificativa, atestando quem uma medida que pode ter sido um subsdio no passado, no necessariamente consiste um benefcio no presente. O Orgo de Apelao mantm o julgamento do Painel. Para. 7.353. Japan asserts that a finding of subsidization in respect of a past period of investigationsuffices for the imposition of countervailing duties. Japan refers in this regard to Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994, which refers to the subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of [the imported] product (emphasis supplied). Japan also refers to a statement by the panel in US Lead and Bismuth II that a countervailing duty may only be imposed on an imported product if it is demonstrated that a (countervailable) subsidy was bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production or export of that merchandise (emphasis supplied). While Japan relies on these sources because of their use of the past tense, we do not consider that the use of the past tense is necessarily at odds with a finding that countervailing duties are imposed to offset the injurious effects of present subsidization. This is because the fact that a nonrecurring subsidy was formally bestowed in the past does not necessarily mean that that subsidy does not continue to confer a benefit in the present. (67) 3. Artigo VI:6

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act) (Japan), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS162/R, para. 6.253 O Painel destaca que o Artigo VI:6(a), na sua essncia, no dispe sobre obrigaes adicionais com relao existncia do dano material ou ameaa de dano. Contudo, o objetivo do pargrafo explicitar a necessidade de uma determinao pelas autoridades sobre o dano ou ameaa de dano antes de se aplicar a medida. Para. 6.253. For these reasons, we find that the 1916 Act, to the extent that it provides for the identification of an intent on the part of the defendant rather than for the actual injury requirements of Article VI, is not compatible with Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994. We note that Article VI:6(a) does not, in substance, contain additional obligations with respect to the existence of material injury, threat of injury or material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. However, from the terms of Article VI:6(a), it seems to us that the objective of that paragraph is to require a determination by the authorities of the importing Member that dumping is such as to cause material injury, threat thereof or material retardation. Having regard to the evidence before us, we do not consider that Japan has established a prima facie case of violation of Article VI:6(a) based on the fact that the 1916 Act would not provide for a determination by the US authorities. Relatrio do Painel no litgio Mexico - Definitive Countervailing Measures on Olive Oil from the European Communities (Mexico - Olive Oil), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS341/R, para. 7.190 Dado o entendimento de que o significado do Artigo VI do GATT no pode ser stabelecido sem referncia s disposies do ASMC, o termo indstria domstica, trazido no Artigo 16.1 do referido Acordo, tambm remete ao termo indstria domstica utilizado no Artigo VI:

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Para. 7.190. By its own terms, Article 16.1 provides a definition of the term domestic industry for the purposes of this Agreement, i.e., the definition applies to the entire SCM Agreement. 1 As such, this termmust be given a consistent meaning throughout the SCM Agreement including for the purposes of the term domestic industry as used in Article 11.4. 2 With respect to Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body and prior panels have found that the SCM Agreement provides context for the interpretation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, 3 Indeed, the panel in Brazil Desiccated Coconut emphasized that the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 cannot be established without reference to the provisions of the SCM Agreement. 4 The definition in Article 16.1, therefore also informs the meaning of the term domestic industry as used in Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994,and an enterprise or group of enterprises that qualifies as a domestic industry within the meaning of Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement will also constitute the domestic industry for the purposes of Article VI:6(a) of the GATT 1994. 4. Relao com outros artigos do GATT a) Artigos I e II Relatrio do Painel no litgio Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil - Desiccated Coconut), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS22/R, 1996, para. 281 O Painel decidiu neste caso que, como o Artigo VI do GATT no constituia lei aplicvel para os fins da disputa, as alegaes sob os Artigos I e II do GATT, que derivavam da alegada inconsistncia com o Artigo VI no poderiam proceder. A interpretao foi mantida pelo rgo de Apelao. Para. 281. In light of the provisions of the WTO Agreement, interpreted in their context and in light of their object and purpose, as discussed above, this Panel concludes that Article VI of GATT 1994 does not constitute applicable law for the purposes of this dispute. As a result, the Philippines' claims under Articles I and II, which derive from their claims of inconsistency with Article VI of GATT 1994, cannot succeed. b) Artigo III Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.77 Neste caso, o Artigo III e artigo VI do GATT so analisados conjuntamente. A Unio Europeia alega que o 1916 Act uma lei anti-dumping e que por isso viola o Artigo VI do GATT. Caso o Painel no entenda assim, o 1916 Act ainda viola os Acordos da OMC, pois vai contra o tratamento nacional j que a lei se dirige somente a bens exportados e no a bens nacionais. O Painel busca ento uma metodologia para anlise da questo e as questes que envolvem a anlise de cada Artigo, conforme o pargrafo abaixo Para. 6.77. As mentioned above, our understanding is that Article III:4 and Article VI are based on two different premises. The applicability of Article III:4 seems to depend primarily on whether the measure applied pursuant to the law at issue is an internal measure or not. (68) In contrast, the applicability of Article VI seems to be based on the nature of the trade practice which is addressed. Under Article VI, the type of sanction eventually applied does not seem to be relevant for a measure to be considered as an anti-dumping measure, or not. We note in this respect that, for the EC, the fact that the 1916 Act imposes other sanctions than duties is insufficient to make that law fall outside the scope of Article VI and, for the United States, under Article VI, dumping does not have to be counteracted exclusively with duties. Consequently, it seems to us that the fact that a law imposes measures that can be qualified as internal measures, such as fines, damages or imprisonment, does not appear to be sufficient to conclude that Article VI is not applicable to that law.

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5.

Relao com outros acordos a) Acordo Anti-dumping

Relatrio do Painel no litgio United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.97 O Artigo VI tem uma relao direta com o Acordo Anti-dumping. Essa questo foi levantada no caso aqui citado e em outros que tratam do mesmo Artigo. Para. 6.97. Since the EC made claims of violation of Article VI and, separately, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, we would like to clarify how we see the relationship between these provisions. Just as the panel in the India - Quantitative Restrictions (69) case did not analyse Article XVIII:B in isolation from the Understanding on Balance-of-payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, this Panel has no intention to address Article VI in isolation from the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In our opinion, Article VI and the Anti-Dumping Agreement are part of the same treaty or, as the panel and the Appellate Body put it in Argentina Safeguard Measures on Import of Footwear with respect to Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, an inseparable package of rights and disciplines. (70) In application of the customary rules of interpretation of international law, we are bound to interpret Article VI of the GATT 1994 as part of the WTO Agreement and the Anti-Dumping Agreement is part of the context of Article VI. (71) This implies that Article VI should not be interpreted in a way that would deprive it or the Anti-Dumping Agreement of meaning. Rather, we should give meaning and legal effect to all the relevant provisions. (72) However, the requirement does not prevent us from making findings in relation to Article VI only, or in relation to specific provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as required by our terms of reference. Relatrio do Painel no litgio Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (Korea - Certain Paper), Demandante: Indonsia, WT/DS312/R, para. 556 O caso atribui destaque ao procedimento a ser adotado por um Membro, na investigao e denncia da prtica de dumping por um pas, se enquadrando nas definies constantes no Artigo VI (em especial, os Artigos VI:1 e VI:6), mas com foco em procedimento para chegar a esta definio, que deve estar de acordo com o Acordo Anti-dumping. O Painel analisa a metodologia de investigao da Coreia, incluindo: fonte de informaes; avaliao e identificao da existncia de dumping; disclosure das informaes utilizadas na investigao. Apenas a definio de dumping deve se enquadrar no Artigo VI do GATT, mas o procedimento para chegar a esta definio deve estar de acordo com os termos do Acordo Anti-dumping. Para. 556. The European Communities agrees with Korea that Article 5.8 refers to termination of aninvestigation on a country-wide basis. Article 2 of the Agreement defines dumping. Article 2.1 of the Agreement refers to the word country 3 times and specifically to the product exported from one country to another. The word country is used a further 5 times in Article 2.2 and footnote 2 of the Agreement. These provisions reflect the language of Article VI of the GATT, which also repeatedly refers to imports from one country to another. They indicate that the concept of dumping involves a strong connotation of a country-wide assessment, which may be reflected in the scope of the investigation. Thus, absent particular provisions requiring a company specific approach, a countrywide approach will generally be permissible. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio United States - Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties (US - Customs Bond Directive). Demandante: ndia, WT/DS345/AB/R, paras. 83 e 206 Mais uma anlise das possveis medidas de preveno ao dumping, reguladas pelo Artigo VI:2 e 3 do GATT, em face do Acordo Anti-dumping e o ASMC. Aqui, a discusso gira em torno do termo as interpreted by this agreement, o qual consta em ambos os Acordos, em seus Artigos 18:1 e 32:1 respectivamente. Para o demandante, tal frase permite aos Membros a possibilidade de interpretar as medidas estabelecidas nestes 77

acordos, sem se restringir s definies do GATT. O Painel discorda desta interpretao, alegando que os demais Acordos nunca podem ser interpretados para fins de permitir uma medida que no foi expressamente autorizada pelo Artigo VI do GATT. O rgo de Apelao mantm a deciso do Painel. Para. 83. India argues that the Panel erred in its interpretation of the phrase as interpreted by this Agreement in Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and in Article 32:1 of the SCMAgreement. India submits that any interpretation of the Ad Note that would authorize the United States to impose the EBR independently of the three permissible specific actions against dumping under the Anti-Dumping Agreement or of the four permissible specific actions under the SCM Agreement would render this phrase redundant and inutile. According to India, had the intent of the drafters of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement been to consider as permissible the specific actions identified in Article VI:2 or 3 of the GATT 1994, but not specified in the Anti-Dumping Agreement or the SCM Agreement, they would not have included the phrase as interpreted by this Agreement in the text of Article 18:1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 32:1 of theSCM Agreement. Para. 206. The Panel examined the relationship between the Ad Note and the Anti-Dumping Agreement,and addressed the question of whether the Ad Note authorizes the imposition of security requirements that are not expressly envisaged by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Panel considered that the Appellate Body Report in Brazil Desiccated Coconut makes it clear that Article VI of the GATT 1994 (including the Ad Note) was not superseded by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (73) The Panel reasoned that, whereas Article VI may not be interpreted so as to justify action that is prohibited by the Anti-Dumping Agreement, Article VI can be an appropriate legal basis for authorizing a conduct that is not prohibited by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. According to the Panel, [a]ny other approach would deprive the Ad Note of meaning and legal effect, and would effectively mean that it has been superseded by the Anti-Dumping Agreement. (74) The Panel also discussed the statements made by the Appellate Body in US - 1916 Act and US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) that Article VI and, in particular, Article VI:2, read in conjunction with the Anti-Dumping Agreement, limit the permissible responses to dumping to 'definitive anti-dumping duties, provisional measures and price undertakings. (75) For the Panel, these statements did not undermine its reasoning because in neither report did the Appellate Body refer to the Ad Note. (76) The Panel therefore concluded that the relationship between the Ad Note and the Anti-Dumping Agreement is not such as to preclude the Ad Note authorizing certain types of security that are not expressly envisaged by the Anti-DumpingAgreement. (77) b) Acordo sobre Subsdios e Medidas Compensatrias Relatrio do Painel no litgio Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil - Desiccated Coconut), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS22/R, 1996, para. 227 O Painel esclareceu, neste caso, que o ASMC no substitui o Artigo VI do GATT como base da disciplina da OMC para as medidas compensatrias. Para. 227. () It is evident that both Article VI of GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement have force, effect, and purpose within the WTO Agreement. That GATT 1994 has not been superseded by other Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (MTN Agreements) is demonstrated by a general interpretive note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. (78) The fact that certain important provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 are neither replicated nor elaborated in the SCM Agreement further demonstrates this point. (79) Thus, the question for consideration is not whether theSCM Agreement supersedes Article VI of GATT 1994. () Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (Brazil Desiccated Coconut), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS22/AB/R, 1997:I, 167, at 181 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao determinou que as medidas compensatrias somente podem ser impostas conforme as disposies do ASMC e do Artigo VI do GATT 1994, conjuntamente. Quando houver um

78

conflito entre as disposies do ASMC e o Artigo VI do GATT as disposies do ASMC devem prevalecer conforme dispe a nota interpretativa do Anexo 1A. From reading Article 10, it is clear that countervailing duties may only be imposed in accordance with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. A countervailing duty being a specific action against a subsidy of another WTO Member, pursuant to Article 32.1, it can only be imposed in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. The ordinary meaning of these provisions taken in their context leads us to the conclusion that the negotiators of the SCM Agreement clearly intended that, under the integrated WTO Agreement, countervailing duties may only be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Part V of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, taken together. If there is a conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and ArticleVI of the GATT 1994, furthermore, the provisions of the SCM Agreement would prevail as a result of the general interpretative note to Annex 1A. III. Comentrios

O Artigo VI do GATT trata de anti-dumping e medidas compensatrias. Essas matrias possuem Acordos prprios desenvolvidos na Rodada Uruguai. Por essa razo, o Artigo VI invocado nas disputas como violao para complementar o termo de referncias, mas em grande parte, at mesmo por uma questo de economia processual, a disposio analisada aquela dos acordos especficos, quais sejam, o Acordo Antidumping e o ASMC. Apesar deste ponto, h dois casos considerados importantes para a anlise do Artigo VI na questo antidumping: (i) primeiro, o US 1916 Act (DS136 e DS162), em que analisou-se a natureza da lei questionada, e por isso contou com uma anlise detalhada do Artigo VI do GATT; (ii) o caso US Softwood Lumber V (DS264) que, ao analisar o pargrafo I do Artigo VI do GATT determinou que, em uma investigao, o dumping deve ser definido em relao ao produto como um todo para os diversos clculos e etapas subsequentes. J em relao parte do Artigo VI que trata de medidas compensatrias, o caso paradigmtico o Brazil Desiccated Coconut (DS22), que avalia queo ASMC no substitui as disciplinas do Artigo VI. Assim, o Artigo e o ASMC devem ser analisados conjuntamente apesar de, em caso de conflito, prevalecerem as disposies do ltimo. Essa anlise conjunta vale inclusive para termos utilizados tanto no GATT como no ASCM, como exemplicou o Painel com o termo indstria domstica definido no Artigo 16.4 do Acordo, ao analisar o Artigo VI:6 (a) do GATT. Com isso, grande parte dos entendimentos a respeito de anti-dumping e medidas compensatrias feita pelo DSB nos acordos especficos. Ainda que estes sejam feitos, o GATT ainda interpretado de uma forma tradicional, de modo a restringir a interpretao dos termos dos demais Acordos. Como exemplo, o USCustoms Bond Directive em que a interpretao dos EUA referente ao termo as intepreted by this ubsidiz presente no Acordo Anti-dumping e ASMC, foi rejeitado pelo painel com a justificativa de que no pode haver interpretao dos acordos de uma forma que se sobreponha ao GATT. Esse entendimento aparece de forma muito clara na deciso do Sitema de Soluo de Controvrsias. FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 53: Such a limitation was clearly envisaged by the drafters of Article VI. The Report of the Sub-Committee at the Havana Conference which considered the provision which was to replace the original Article VI in the GATT 1947 noted that The Article as agreed to by the Sub-Committee condemns injurious price dumping as defined therein and does not relate to other types of dumping. (emphasis added) (Havana Reports, p. 74, para. 23, as reported in GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Updated 6th Edition (1995), p. 222). Footnote 54: This is without prejudice to a Member choosing to address the effects of dumping, e.g. increased imports, or its causes (e.g., subsidization) through other legitimate means under the WTO Agreement, such ascountervailing or safeguard measures. However, it cannot choose to address dumping as such with instruments or in ways that are different from those allowed in the WTO Agreement for that purpose. This is, in our view, the meaning of footnote 24 to Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides that This is not intended to preclude actions under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as appropriate. Footnote 55: We note that this definition is close to the definition of dumping given by Jacob Viner in Dumping, A Problem in International Trade, Op. Cit., p. 3, i.e. price-discrimination between national markets. The court in Zenith III, Op. cit., p. 1213,

79

refers to the 1966 edition which includes, at p. 4, a slightly revised definition: price discrimination between purchasers in different national markets. Footnote 56: The existence of a price difference between two markets located in two different Members, together with a lower price in the importing country than in the country of production are essential features to differentiate dumping from other forms of price discrimination and pricing practices. In this respect, see also Viner, Op . Cit., pp. 2-3 Footnote 57: Japan argues that the fact that prices can be established in the marketplace on a transaction-specificbasis does not mean that the words product, dumping and margin of dumping in the GATT 1994 and in theAD Agreement have a transactionspecific meaning. Japan asserts that investigating authorities routinelyaggregate prices for transactions into prices for a product and concludes from this that the fact that prices can betransaction-specific does not necessarily mean that margins of dumping are determined for individualtransactions. Second Written Submission of Japan, para. 45. The question before the Panel, however, is whetherthe term price difference indicates that dumping and margins of dumping may be found to exist with respect toparticular transactions. While it may be true that it is possible to aggregate prices for some particular purposes,the words price and price difference clearly do not require an examination of export transactions at na aggregate level. Footnote 58: See The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993), p. 1721. It is evident that while we review the ordinary meaning, our reading of the dictionary is already made selective by the broad context of the term. For instance, we left aside the definition of may as have the possibility, opportunity or suitable conditions to or the definition of may which, in the interpretation of some statutes means shall, must. Footnote 59: We note in that respect that Article 7.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provides for the types of provisional measures that may be imposed, lists the measures that may be taken, i.e. provisional duty or, preferably, a security. Footnote 60: See Appellate Body Report, US Zeroing (EC), para. 125. Footnote 61: Article 3.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Footnote 62: Ibid., para. 7.7. Footnote 63: Ibid. Footnote 64: Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 provides: No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The termcountervailing duty shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise. (emphasis added, footnote omitted) Footnote 65: Footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement provides: The term countervailing duty shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly orindirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994. (emphasis added) Footnote 66: Footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement. Footnote 67: We note that the term countervailing duty is similarly defined using the past tense, in the sensethat note 36 to the SCM Agreement refers to a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise. Again, though, the fact that the formal bestowal of a subsidy occurred in the past does not necessarily preclude the possibility that imports continue to benefit from this subsidy in the present. Footnote 68: See Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (not adopted), DS21/R, 3 September 1991, para 5.12:Another panel had found that the words treatment no less favourable in Article III:4 call for effective equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of the application of laws, regulations or requirements affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products[]. It was apparent to the Panel that the comparison implied was necessarily one between the measures applied to imported products and the measures applied to like domestic products. Footnote 69: Op. Cit., footnote 305 above. Footnote 70: Adopted on 12 January 2000, WT/DS/121/AB/R, para. 81. Footnote 71:See, in this respect, our reasoning in para. 6.195 below. Footnote 72: See, e.g., the reports of the Appellate Body on Argentina Safeguard Measures on Import of Footwear, Op. cit., para. 81, Korea Definitive Safeguard Measures on Import of Certain Dairy Products, adopted on 12 January 2000, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 81 and United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 23. Footnote 73: Panel Report, US Shrimp (Thailand), para. 7.92; Panel Report, US Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.72. Footnote 74: Panel Report, US Shrimp (Thailand), para. 7.94; Panel Report, US Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.73. Footnote 75: Appellate Body Report, US 1916 Act, para. 137; Appellate Body Report, US Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 265. Footnote 76: Panel Report, US Shrimp (Thailand), para. 7.97; Panel Report, US Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.76. Footnote 77: Panel Report, US Shrimp (Thailand), para. 7.98; Panel Report, US Customs Bond Directive, para. 7.77. Footnote 78: The general interpretive note to Annex 1A provides that, [i]n the event of a conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ... the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict . Such an interpretive note would be unnecessary if the MTN agreements superseded GATT 1994. Footnote 79: For example, the SCM Agreement does not replicate or elaborate on Article VI:5 of GATT 1994, which proscribes the imposition of both an anti-dumping and a countervailing duty to compensate for the same situation of dumping and export subsidization, nor does it address the issue of countervailing action on behalf of a third country as provided for in Article VI:6(b) and (c) of GATT 1994. If the SCM Agreement were considered to supersede Article VI of GATT 1994 altogether with respect to countervailing measures, these provisions would lose all force and effect. Such a result could not have been intended.

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Artigo VII Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article VII Valuation for Customs Purposes

IA.

7.1

The contracting parties recognize the validity of the general principles of valuation set forth in the following paragraphs of this Article, and they undertake to give effect to such principles, in respect of all products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions on importation and exportation based upon or regulated in any manner by value. Moreover, they shall, upon a request by another contracting party review the operation of any of their laws or regulations relating to value for customs purposes in the light of these principles. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may request from contracting parties reports on steps taken by them in pursuance of the provisions of this Article. (a) The value for customs purposes of imported merchandise should be based on the actual value of the imported merchandise on which duty is assessed, or of like merchandise, and should not be based on the value of merchandise of national origin or on arbitrary or fictitious values. Actual value should be the price at which, at a time and place determined by the legislation of the country of importation, such or like merchandise is sold or offered for sale in the ordinary course of trade under fully competitive conditions. To the extent to which the price of such or like merchandise is governed by the quantity in a particular transaction, the price to be considered should uniformly be related to either (i) comparable quantities, or (ii) quantities not less favourable to importers than those in which the greater volume of the merchandise is sold in the trade between the countries of exportation and importation. When the actual value is not ascertainable in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the value for customs purposes should be based on the nearest ascertainable equivalent of such value.

7.2

(b)

(c)

7.3

The value for customs purposes of any imported product should not include the amount of any internal tax, applicable within the country of origin or export, from which the imported product has been exempted or has been or will be relieved by means of refund. (a) Except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph, where it is necessary for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article for a contracting party to convert into its own currency a price expressed in the currency of another country, the conversion rate of exchange to be used shall be based, for each currency involved, on the par value as established pursuant to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or on the rate of exchange recognized by the Fund, or on the par value established in accordance with a special exchange agreement entered into pursuant to Article XV of this Agreement. Where no such established par value and no such recognized rate of exchange exist, the conversion rate shall reflect effectively the current value of such currency in commercial transactions. The CONTRACTING PARTIES, in agreement with the International Monetary Fund, shall formulate rules governing the conversion by contracting parties of any foreign currency in respect of which multiple rates of exchange are maintained consistently with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Any contracting party may apply such rules in respect of such foreign currencies for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article as an alternative to the use of par values. Until such rules are adopted by the Contracting Parties, any contracting party may employ, in respect of any such foreign currency, rules of 81

7.4

(b)

(c)

conversion for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article which are designed to reflect effectively the value of such foreign currency in commercial transactions. (d) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to require any contracting party to alter the method of converting currencies for customs purposes which is applicable in its territory on the date of this Agreement, if such alteration would have the effect of increasing generally the amounts of duty payable.

7.5

The bases and methods for determining the value of products subject to duties or other charges or restrictions based upon or regulated in any manner by value should be stable and should be given sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the value for customs purposes. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo VII Valor para Fins Alfandegrios

IB.

7.1

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, ao que diz respeito determinao do valor para fins alfandegrios. a validade dos princpios gerais que figuram nos seguintes pargrafos do presente artigo e se comprometem a aplic-los em relao a todos os produtos submetidos a direitos alfandegrios ou a outras taxas ou restries de importao e exportao, baseadas no valor ou pelo mesmo reguladas dentro de qualquer modalidade. Alm disso, cada vez que uma Parte Contratante o solicitar, as Partes Contratantes examinaro a aplicao de qualquer lei ou qualquer regulamento relativo ao valor para fins alfandegrios, na base dos referidos princpios. Qualquer Parte Contratante poder pedir s demais que lhe forneam relatrios sobre as medidas que tenham tomado de acordo com as disposies do presente artigo. (a) O valor para fins alfandegrios das mercadorias importadas dever ser estabelecido sobre o valor real da mercadoria importada qual se aplica o direito ou de uma mercadoria similar, e no sobre o valor do produto de origem nacional ou sobre valores arbitrrios ou fictcios. O valor real dever ser o preo ao qual, em tempo e lugar determinados pela legislao do pas importador, as mercadorias importadas ou as mercadorias similares so vendidas ou oferecidas venda por ocasio das operaes comerciais normais efetuadas nas condies de plena concorrncia. Essas mercadorias ou mercadorias similares so vendidas ou oferecidas venda em condies de plena concorrncia e atravs de operaes comerciais normais, Na medida em que o preo dessas mercadorias ou de mercadorias similares dependa da quantidade sobre a qual recai uma transao determinada, o preo considerado dever guardar relao na conformidade da escolha efetuada em definitivo pelo pas importador, quer com quantidades comparveis, quer com quantidades fixadas de forma no menos favorvel ao importador do que se fosse tomado o maior volume dessas mercadorias que efetivamente tenha dado ensejo a transaes comerciais entre o pas exportador e o pas importador. No caso em que for impossvel determinar o valor real em conformidade com os termos da alnea (b), do presente pargrafo, o valor para fins alfandegrios dever ser baseado na equivalncia comprovvel, mais prxima desse valor.

7.2

(b)

(c)

7.3

O valor para fins alfandegrios de qualquer mercadoria importada no dever compreender nenhuma taxa interna exigvel no pas de origem ou de provenincia, da qual a mercadoria importada tenha sido exonerada ou cuja importncia tenha sido ou seja destinada a um reembolso.. (a) Salvo disposies contrrias do presente pargrafo, quando uma Parte Contratante se encontrar na necessidade, para fins de aplicao do pargrafo 2 do presente artigo, de converter em sua prpria moeda um preo expresso em moeda de um outro pas, a taxa de converso a ser adotada dever se basear, para cada moeda, sobre a paridade estabelecida 82

7.4

conforme os estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional, sobre a taxa de cmbio reconhecida pelo Fundo ou sobre a paridade estabelecida conforme acordo especial de cmbio concludo em virtude do artigo XV do presente Acordo. (b) Na ausncia de uma tal paridade e de uma tal taxa de cmbio reconhecida, a taxa de converso dever corresponder efetivamente ao valor corrente desta moeda nas transaes comerciais. As Partes Contratantes, de acordo com o Fundo Monetrio Internacional, formularo regras regulando a converso, pelas Partes Contratantes, de qualquer moeda estrangeira em relao qual taxas mltiplas de cmbio tenham sido mantidas em conformidade com o Acordo constitutivo do Fundo Monetrio Internacional. Cada Parte Contratante poder aplicar tais regras a essas moedas estrangeiras para os fins de aplicao do pargrafo 2 do presente artigo em vez de se basear nas paridades. At que se adotem as regras em apreo, cada Parte Contratante poder, para os fins de aplicao do pargrafo 2 do presente artigo, aplicar a qualquer moeda estrangeira, enquadrada nas condies definidas no presente pargrafo, regras de converso destinadas a exprimir efetivamente a valor dessa moeda estrangeira nas transaes comerciais. Nenhuma disposio do presente pargrafo poder ser interpretada como obrigando uma Parte Contratante a introduzir modificaes na forma de converso do valor que, para fins alfandegrios, estiver em vigor no seu territrio na data da assinatura do presente Acordo, se tais modificaes tiverem por efeito elevar de um modo geral a soma dos direitos aduaneiros exigidos.

(c)

(d)

7.5

Os critrios e os mtodos que servirem para determinar o valor dos produtos submetidos a direitos alfandegrios ou a outras taxas ou restries baseadas no valor ou pelo mesmo reguladas, dentro de qualquer modalidade, devero ser constante e suficientemente divulgados para habilitar os comerciantes a determinar o valor para fins alfandegrios com uma aproximao satisfatria.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a comentar. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo VII

O Artigo em anlise no foi objeto de nenhum litgio no DSB da OMC. III. Comentrios

Nada a comentar.

83

Artigo VIII

Fabio Weinberg Crocco IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article VIII Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation* 8.1 (a) All fees and charges of whatever character (other than import and export duties and other than taxes within the purview of Article III) imposed by contracting parties on or in connection with importation or exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered and shall not represent an indirect protection to domestic products or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal purposes. The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a). The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirements.*

(b)

(c)

8.2

A contracting party shall, upon request by another contracting party or by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, review the operation of its laws and regulations in the light of the provisions of this Article. No contracting party shall impose substantial penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements. In particular, no penalty in respect of any omission or mistake in customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than necessary to serve merely as a warning. The provisions of this Article shall extend to fees, charges, formalities and requirements imposed by governmental authorities in connection with importation and exportation, including those relating to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) consular transactions, such as consular invoices and certificates; quantitative restrictions; licensing; exchange control; statistical services; documents, documentation and certification; analysis and inspection; and quarantine, sanitation and fumigation.

8.3

8.4

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo VIII Formalidades Relativas importao e exportao

8.1

(a)

Todos os emolumentos e encargos de qualquer natureza que sejam exceto os direitos de importao e de exportao e as taxas mencionadas no artigo III, percebidas pelas Partes Contratantes na importao ou na exportao ou por ocasio da importao ou da exportao sero limitadas ao custo aproximado dos servios prestados e no devero constituir uma proteo indireta dos produtos nacionais ou das taxas de carter fiscal sobre a importao ou sobre a exportao.

84

(b)

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem a necessidade de restringir o nmero e a diversidade dos emolumentos e encargos a que se refere alnea (a). As Partes Contratantes reconhecem igualmente a necessidade de reduzir a um mnimo os efeitos e a complexidade das formalidades de importao e de exportao e de reduzir a simplificar as exigncias em matria de documentos requeridos para a importao e a exportao.

(c)

8.2

Uma Parte Contratante a pedido de uma outra Parte Contratante ou das Partes Contratantes, examinar a aplicao de suas leis e regulamentos, tendo em vista as disposies do presente artigo. Nenhuma Parte Contratante impor penalidades severas por ligeiras infraes regulamentao ou ao processo aduaneiro. Em particular, as penalidades pecunirias impostas em virtude de omisses ou erros nos documentos apresentados Alfndega no excedero, nos casos em que forem facilmente reparveis e manifestamente isentos de qualquer inteno fraudulenta, que no correspondam a negligncia grave, importncia que represente uma simples advertncia. As disposies do presente artigo se estendero aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e exigncias impostas pelas autoridades governamentais em conexo com a importao e exportao, inclusive no que disser respeito: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) s formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares: s restries quantitativas; s licenas; ao controle de cmbios; aos servios de estatstica; aos documentos a exibir, documentao e emisso de certificados ; s anlises e s verificaes; quarentena, inspeo sanitria e desinfeco.

8.3

8.4

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

De modo geral, a traduo do Artigo VIII do GATT no observa integralmente a forma e o teor da verso em ingls do referido dispositivo normativo. Em relao forma, destaca-se que o texto do Artigo traduzido no foi estruturado da mesma maneira que o original em ingls. Ademais, cumpre notar que na traduo suprimiu-se a referncia expressa ao Artigo III do GATT. Quanto ao contedo, verifica-se que certas palavras foram suprimidas da verso em portugus. Abaixo est proposta de traduo do Artigo:
Artigo VIII Taxas e Formalidades Relativas importao e exportao 1) (a) Todas as taxas e cobranas de qualquer natureza (exceto direitos de importao e exportao e tributos abrangidos no escopo do Artigo III) impostos pelas autoridades governamentais importao ou exportao ou relativos importao ou exportao, deveriam limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos servios prestados e no constituir uma proteo indireta aos produtos nacionais ou tributao sobre a importao ou a exportao. (b) The contracting parties recognize the need for reducing the number and diversity of fees and charges referred to in subparagraph (a). (c) The contracting parties also recognize the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export documentation requirements.* (b) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem a necessidade de limitar o nmero e a diversidade desses direitos e taxas referidos no subitem (a), acima. (d) As Partes Contratantes reconhecem, igualmente, a necessidade de reduzir ao mnimo os efeitos e a complexidade das formalidades de importao e de exportao e de reduzir e simplificar as formalidades relativas aos documentos a fornecer em matria de importao e de exportao.

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2. Uma Parte Contratante, mediante requerimento de outra parte contratante ou das PARTES CONTRATANTES, dever rever a aplicao de suas leis e regulamentao luz do disposto neste Artigo. 3. Nenhuma Parte Contratante impor penalidades severas por infraes leves regulamentao ou aos procedimentos aduaneiros. Em particular, as penalidades impostas em decorrncia de omisses ou erros referentes documentao alfandegria, que forem de fcil retificao, desde que ocasionados sem propsito fraudulento ou por negligncia grave, no devero ser impostas alm do necessrio para representar uma simples advertncia. 4. As disposies do presente Artigo se estendero aos emolumentos, taxas, formalidades e exigncias impostas pelas autoridades governamentais em conexo com a importao e exportao, inclusive no que disser respeito: a) s formalidades consulares, tais como faturas e certificados consulares: b) s restries quantitativas; c) s licenas; d) ao controle de cmbios; e) aos servios de estatstica; f) aos documentos a exibir, documentao e certificao; g) s anlises e s inspees; e h) quarentena, inspeo sanitria e desinfeo.

II. 1.

Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo VIII Definio dos termos limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos servios prestados

Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para. 6.75 Ao interpretar a expresso limitar-se ao custo aproximado dos servios prestados, o Painel em Argentina Textil and Apparel reproduziu trechos constantes de relatrio do caso US - Customs User Fee (35S/245). Reiterou-se que a expresso impe um requisito duplo. Primeiro, as taxas e cobranas devem envolver a prestao de determinado servio. Segundo, o valor cobrado no deve exceder o custo dos servios prestados. Para. 6.75. The meaning of Article VIII was examined in detail in the Panel Report on. The panel found that Article VIIIs requirement that the charge be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered is actually a dual requirement, because the charge in question must first involve a service rendered, and then the level of the charge must not exceed the approximate cost of that service. According to the panel report, the term services rendered means services rendered to the individual importer in question. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatrio do Painel no caso US - Certain EC Products, demandante: EUA, WT/DS165/R, para. 6.69. 2. Imposio de Taxas ad valorem ilimitadas

Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para. 6.75 O DSB entendeu que a imposio de taxas ad valorem ilimitadas est em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo VIII do GATT. Justificou que a imposio de taxas sob a referida modalidade no refletiria o custos dos servios prestados, ou seja, no se limitaria ao custo aproximado dos servios prestados. Para. 6.75. An ad valorem duty with no fixed maximum fee, by its very nature, is not limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered. For example, high -price items necessarily will bear a much greater tax burden than low-price goods, yet the service accorded to both is essentially the same. An unlimited ad valorem charge on imported goods violates the provisions of Article VIII because such a charge cannot be related to the cost of the service rendered. 3. Taxas alfandegrias com propsitos fiscais

86

Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, paras. 6.77-6.78 O DSB esclareceu que o Artigo VIII do GATT veda a imposio de taxas alfandegrias com propsitos fiscais (arrecadatrios). Para. 6.77. () While the gathering of statistical information concerning imports may benefit traders in general, Article VIII bars the levying of any tax or charge on importers to support the r elated costs for the individual entry in question since it will also benefit exports and exporters. Para. 6.78. As to Argentinas argument that it was collecting this tax for fiscal purposes in the context of its undertakings with the IMF, we note that not only does Article VIII of GATT expressly prohibit such measures for fiscal purposes but that clearly a measure for fiscal purposes will normally lead to a situation where the tax results in charges being levied in excess of the approximate costs of the statistical services rendered. 4. Relao com outros Acordos

Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/R, para 6.79 Com base em circunstncias fticas, o Painel em Argentina - Textiles and Apparel concluiu que no haveria nos Acordos da OMC excees ao disposto no Artigo VIII do GATT. Chegou-se mesma concluso em relao ao acordo firmado entre OMC e FMI, Declarao sobre a relao entre a OMC e o FMI, e Declarao sobre a Contribuio da OMC para alcanar maior coerncia na poltica econmica global. Para. 6.79. () Argentina argues that the tax should be found to comply with Article VIII, if necessary through a less strict application of the requirements of Article VIII of GATT than was adopted in the Customs Users Fee. We find no exception in the WTO Agreement that would excuse Argentina's compliance with the requirements of Article VIII of GATT. Moreover, we see nothing in the Agreement between the IMF and the WTO, the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the International Monetary Fund and the Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking that suggests that we should interpret Article VIII as argued by Argentina. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/AB/R, para. 74. 5. Definio dos termos taxas e cobranas

Relatrio do Painel China - Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China - Raw Materials), Demandantes: Unio Europeia, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS394/DS395/DS398/R, para. 7.844 O DSB interpretou de forma ampla os termos taxas (i.e. fees) e cobranas (i.e. charges) constantes do Artigo VIII do GATT. De acordo com a definio adotada pelo Painel em China - Raw Materials, taxas e cobranas, previstas no Artigo VIII do GATT, devem: (a) ser impostas de forma relacionada importaes ou exportaes; e (b) ser cobradas em contrapartida prestao de servios. Para. 7.844. The Panel concluded above that the meaning of fees or charges that fall within the scope of Article VIII is broad. Notwithstanding this view, the Panel concluded further that only fees imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation and collected in exchange for a service rendered may be considered as falling within the scope of Article VIII:1(a). The Panel noted that typically such fees or charges would include payments provided for customs-related documentary, certification and inspection, and statistical activities. 87

III.

Comentrios

Poucos foram os precedentes em que o DSB analisou detidamente o contedo do Artigo VIII do GATT. Nos relatrios em que o dispositivo em questo foi apreciado, focou-se em expresses constantes do primeiro pargrafo do Artigo, tais como: taxas, cobranas e servios prestados. A partir da anlise de precedentes, resta claro que taxas e cobranas impostas por autoridades governamentais, nos termos do Artigo VIII do GATT devem: (a) ter como contrapartida a prestao de servios; (b) ser impostas de forma relacionada a importaes ou exportaes; e (c) estar limitadas ao custo dos servios efetivamente prestados. Referidas taxas e cobranas no poderiam, portanto, ser impostas de forma ilimitada, bem como com propsitos arrecadatrios. No obstante, pelo fato de o Artigo VIII do GATT ser dotado de linguagem ampla, possvel identificar diversas lacunas interpretativas. O disposto no pargrafo 3 do Artigo VIII exemplo disso, visto que at o momento no houve posicionamentos em relao ao significado dos termos penalidades substanciais por infraes leves.

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Artigo IX

Jos Guilherme Moreno Caiado IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article IX Marks of Origin 9.1 Each contracting party shall accord to the products of the territories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to marking requirements no less favourable than the treatment accorded to like products of any third country. The contracting parties recognize that, in adopting and enforcing laws and regulations relating to marks of origin, the difficulties and inconveniences which such measures may cause to the commerce and industry of exporting countries should be reduced to a minimum, due regard being had to the necessity of protecting consumers against fraudulent or misleading indications. Whenever it is administratively practicable to do so, contracting parties should permit required marks of origin to be affixed at the time of importation. The laws and regulations of contracting parties relating to the marking of imported products shall be such as to permit compliance without seriously damaging the products, or materially reducing their value, or unreasonably increasing their cost. As a general rule, no special duty or penalty should be imposed by any contracting party for failure to comply with marking requirements prior to importation unless corrective marking is unreasonably delayed or deceptive marks have been affixed or the required marking has been intentionally omitted. The contracting parties shall co-operate with each other with a view to preventing the use of trade names in such manner as to misrepresent the true origin of a product, to the detriment of such distinctive regional or geographical names of products of the territory of a contracting party as are protected by its legislation. Each contracting party shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such requests or representations as may be made by any other contracting party regarding the application of the undertaking set forth in the preceding sentence to names of products which have been communicated to it by the other contracting party. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo IX Marcas de Origem 9.1 No que diz respeito s condies relativas s marcas, cada Parte Contratante conceder aos produtos do territrio das outras Partes Contratantes um tratamento no menos favorvel que o concedido aos produtos similares de qualquer terceiro pas. As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que, no estabelecimento e aplicao das leis e regulamentos relativos s marcas de origem, conviria reduzir a um mnimo as dificuldades e os inconvenientes que tais medidas possam acarretar para o comrcio e a produo dos pases exportadores, levando devidamente em conta a necessidade de proteger os consumidores as indicaes fraudulentas ou de natureza a induzir em erro. Sempre que possvel do ponto de vista administrativo, as Partes Contratantes devero permitir a oposio, por ocasio da importao, das marcas de origem.

9.2

9.3

9.4

9.5

9.6

IB.

9.2

9.3

89

9.4

No que diz respeito marcao de produtos importados, as leis e regulamentos das Partes Contratantes sero de natureza a permitir a sua aplicao sem ocasionar danos srios aos produtos nem reduzir substancialmente o seu valor ou elevar inutilmente o seu preo de custo. Em regra geral, nenhuma parte Contratante dever impor multa ou direito especial por falta de observao dos regulamentos relativos marcao antes da importao, a menos que a retificao da marcao seja indevidamente retardada ou que marcas de natureza a induzir em erro tenham sido opostas ou que a marcao tenha sido intencionalmente omitida. As Partes Contratantes colaboraro entre si para o fim de evitar que as marcas comerciais sejam utilizadas de forma a induzir em erro quanto verdadeira origem do produto em detrimento das denominaes de origem regional ou geogrfica dos produtos do territrio de uma Parte Contratante que sejam protegidos pela legislao dessa Parte Contratante. Cada Parte Contratante dar inteira e amistosa considerao aos pedidos ou representaes que possa lhe dirigir uma outra Parte Contratante sobre abusos tais como os mencionados acima no presente pargrafo, que lhe tenham sido assinalados por essa outra Parte Contratante em relao denominao dos produtos que a mesma houver comunicado primeira Parte Contratante.

9.5

9.6

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

A traduo para o portugus foi feita de forma quase literal. No item 3, entretanto, o texto em portugus traduziu o termo affixed por oposio. Essa escolha, no entanto, pode levar a interpretaes incorretas. O termo oposio usado na sub-rea do direito de propriedade intelectual, com o significado de contestao de uma determinada marca, sentido que parece no representar aquele do termo affixed, o qual mais se aproxima de afixao, no caso, de smbolo que represente a marca de origem em determinado produto. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo IX

Relatrio do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS161/R e WT/DS169/R, paras. 7.502, 7.505 e 7.510 De acordo com o entendimento do Painel, a medida em questo no esta restrita marca de origem e, portanto, no se aplica o Artigo IX do GATT. Para. 7.502. The United States does not consider that this is a general country of origin requirement as described in Article IX of GATT 1994 but rather is a special rule triggered by the fact that a third country product is characterized as a GI and is intended to encumber the third country GI itself. There is nothing in Article IX that exempts such a requirement from the obligation to provide no less favourable treatment to imported products. Para. 7.505. The European Communities argues that Article III:4 is not applicable. Marks of origin are dealt with in Article IX of GATT 1994, which contains an MFN obligation but not a national treatment obligation. This omission implies that Members are free to impose country of origin marking requirements only with respect to imported products and not domestic products. Para. 7.510. As for the European Communities' argument that this labelling requirement cannot be subject to the national treatment obligation in Article III:4 of GATT 1994 due to the terms of Article IX of GATT 1994 on marks of origin, it suffices to note that the labelling requirement is part of the Regulation, which is a law or regulation affecting the internal sale and offering for sale of products within the meaning of Article III:4 of GATT 1994. In any event, it has not been shown that this is, in fact, a requirement to display a mark of origin. 90

A discusso versa sobre a existncia de obrigao de tratamento nacional no Artigo IX. A Unio Europeia argumenta que, de acordo com o texto legal, somente haveria uma obrigao do tipo nao mais favorecida. O Painel, contudo, entendeu que a medida no se refere ao Artigo IX e, portanto, no integrante do mrito da questo. III. Comentrio

O Artigo IX trata do uso de marcas de origem. Sergundo a sua redao, os Membros da OMC mantm a sua discricionariedade para legislar sobre o assunto. As legislaes domsticas, entretanto, no devem conceder tratamento menos favorvel aos produtos similares de outros pases, e devem ser elaboradas de forma que reduzam as dificuldades e inconvenientes para a indstria dos pases exportadores. No entanto, em seu pargrafo segundo, o Artigo IX ressalta o direito dos Membros de adotar as normas domsticas para proteger consumidores de marcas de origens fraudulentas ou que possam induzir a erro. O Artigo, entretanto, no traz uma definio clara do termo marca de origem e o assunto j foi alvo de disputas, como em Korea - Beef acima. Ainda que a deciso do Painel do caso no esclarea definifitamente o conceito, d a entender que o significado de marca de origem seja diverso do de regra de origem, e tambm de indicao geogrfica. De acordo com ZIEGLER e GRATTON (2011) (80), um exemplo comum de marca de origem a marca Made in ... afixada em diversos produtos. Ainda assim, uma clara diferenciao entre esses conceitos no consta no GATT e na jurisprudncia atual do Artigo IX. Outros conceitos presentes nos pargrafos do Artigo IX como, por exemplo, reduzir a um mnimo e danos srios... reduzir substancialmente o seu valor ou elevar inutilmente o seu preo de custo apresentam certo grau de impreciso e carecem de interpretao. Por fim, chama ainda ateno a ausncia de uma clusula de tratamento nacional, e, dada a importncia desta para os acordos da OMC, deve-se indagar se o Artigo IX no precisa ser lido em conjunto com o Artigo III do GATT. Por fim, aos interessados no assunto, pode ser conveniente recorrer ao texto do Acordo sobre Regras de Origem, bem como doutrina sobre esse assunto.

FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 80: Ziegler and Gratoon, in Wolfrum & Stoll & Hestermeyer (eds), Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, Vol. 5, Art. IX, para. 15.

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 IA.

Artigo X Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article X Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations

10.1

Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy which are in force between the government or a governmental agency of any contracting party and the government or governmental agency of any other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private. No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice, or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure has been officially published. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article. Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement and their decisions shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies unless an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior jurisdiction within the time prescribed for appeals to be lodged by importers; Provided that the central administration of such agency may take steps to obtain a review of the matter in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the actual facts. The provisions of subparagraph (b) of this paragraph shall not require the elimination or substitution of procedures in force in the territory of a contracting party on the date of this Agreement which in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of administrative action even though such procedures are not fully or formally independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement. Any contracting party employing such procedures shall, upon request, furnish the CONTRACTING PARTIES with full information thereon in order that they may determine whether such procedures conform to the requirements of this subparagraph.

10.2

10.3

(b)

(c)

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo X Publicao e Apurao dos Regulamentos Relativos Ao Comrcio

10.1

As leis, regulamentos, decises judicirias e administrativas de aplicao geral, adotados por qualquer Parte Contratante e que visem classificao ou avaliao dos produtos para fins aduaneiros, s tarifas de Alfndegas, taxas e outras despesas, ou s prescries, restries ou interdies de 92

importao ou de exportao, ou a transferncia de pagamentos que lhes digam respeito, ou que se refiram sua venda, sua distribuio, seu transporte ou seu seguro, ou sua estadia em entreposto, sua inspeo, sua exposio, sua transformao, sua mistura ou outras utilizaes, sero prontamente publicados de maneira a permitir aos Governos ou aos comerciantes deles tomar conhecimento. Os acordos em vigor entre o Governo ou um rgo governamental de qualquer Parte Contratante e o Governo ou um rgo governamental de uma outra Parte Contratante que afetem a poltica econmica internacional sero igualmente publicados. O presente pargrafo no obrigar uma Parte Contratante a revelar informaes de ordem confidencial que constituam obstculo aplicao das leis ou que, por outro lado, sejam contrrios ao interesse pblico ou tragam prejuzo aos interesses comerciais legtimos de empresas pblicas ou particulares. 10.2 Nenhuma medida de ordem geral, que possa tomar uma Parte Contratante e que tenha por consequncia uma elevao do nvel de um direito alfandegrio ou de outra taxa imposta importao em virtude de usos estabelecidos e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrio, uma restrio ou uma interdio novas ou agravadas em matria de importao ou de transferncia de fundos relativos a uma importao dever ser posta em vigor antes de ter sido publicada oficialmente. (a) Cada Parte Contratante manter ou aplicar de maneira uniforme, imparcial e equitativa todos os regulamentos, leis, decises judicirias e administrativas da categoria visada no pargrafo 1 de presente Artigo. Cada Parte Contratante manter ou instituir, logo que possvel, tribunais judicirios, administrativos ou de arbitragem, ou instncias que tenham por fim especialmente reexaminar e retificar prontamente as medidas administrativas relacionadas com as questes aduaneiras. Esses tribunais ou instncias sero independentes dos organismos encarregados de aplicao das medidas administrativas e suas decises sero executadas por esses organismos, cuja prtica administrativa dirigiro igualmente, a menos que seja interposta apelao junto a uma jurisdio superior nos prazos previstos para as apelaes interpostas pelos importadores, ressalvada a possibilidade da administrao central de tal organismo tomar medidas com o fim de obter uma reviso da questo em uma outra ao, se houver base para supor que a deciso incompatvel com os princpios fixados pela lei ou com a realidade dos fatos. Disposio alguma da alnea (b) do presente pargrafo exigir a eliminao ou substituio dos processos em vigor no territrio de uma Parte Contratante no dia da assinatura do presente Acordo, que prevejam uma reviso imparcial das decises administrativas, ainda mesmo que esses procedimentos no sejam plena ou oficialmente independentes dos organismos encarregados da aplicao das medidas administrativas. Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar tais processos dever, quando solicitada, comunicar s Partes Contratantes todas as informaes pertinentes que as habilitem a decidir se esses processos esto de acordo com a prescrio da presente alnea.

10.3

(b)

(c)

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar. II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo X Objeto do Artigo

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 115

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Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao determinou que o Artigo X se refere publicao e administrao de leis, regulamentos, decises judiciais e decises administrativas de aplicao geral , e no ao contedo substantivo de tais medidas. Para. 115. Article X relates to the publication and administration of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, rather than to the substantive content of such measures. Thus, to the extent that Brazils appeal relates to the substantive content of the EC rules themselves, and not to their publication or administration, that appeal falls outside the scope of Article X of the GATT 1994. 2. Artigo X:1: primeira frase - significado do termo de aplicao geral (of general application)

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 111 e 113 O rgo de Apelao entendeu, neste caso, que o Artigo X no trata de transaes especficas ao utilizar a expresso de aplicao geral, apesar de ser necessria a aplicao especfica de medidas de aplicao geral. Neste sentido, o rgo de Apelao afirma que uma medida que afete um nmero no identificvel de operadores econmicos, incluindo produtores domsticos e estrangeiros se qualificaria como uma medida geral, o que no seria o caso de uma medida dirigida a uma empresa especfica ou a um produto especfico. Para. 111. Article X:1 of the GATT 1994 makes it clear that Article X does not deal with specific transactions, but rather with rules of general application. It is clear to us that the EC rules pertaining to import licensing set out in Regulation 1431/94 are rules of general application. () Para. 113. Although it is true, as Brazil contends, that any measure of general application will always have to be applied in specific cases, nevertheless, the particular treatment accorded to each individual shipment cannot be considered a measure of general application within the meaning of Article X. The Panel cited the following passage from the panel report in United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear:
The mere fact that the restraint at issue was an administrative order does not prevent us from concluding that the restraint was a measure of general application. Nor does the fact that it was a country-specific measure exclude the possibility of it being a measure of general application. If, for instance, the restraint was addressed to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment, it would not have qualified as a measure of general application. However, to the extent that the restraint affects an unidentified number of economic operators, including domestic and foreign producers, we find it to be a measure of general application. We agree with the Panel that conversely, licences issued to a specific company or applied to a specific shipment cannot be considered to be a measure of general application within the meaning of Article X.

3.

Artigo X:2

Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear (US - Underwear), Demandante: Costa Rica, WT/DS24/AB/R, pginas 20-21 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, neste caso, o Artigo X:2 representa o princpio da transparncia, que se relaciona com o princpio do devido processo. Sua implicao essencial a de que Membros e outras pessoas afetadas por medidas governamentais que impem restries, requisitos ou outros nus devem ter a oportunidade de acesso s informaes sobre tais medidas para proteger-se ou buscar alter-las. Neste sentido, o rgo de Apelao observou que o Artigo X no trata da possibilidade de conferir efeito retroativo a uma medida de restrio de salvaguarda, ou seja, se no h autoridade que possibilite seu efeito retroativo, tal deficincia no sanada apenas pela publicao prvia de tal medida.

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Pg. 20. Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of transparency and has obviously due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures. Pg. 21. [W]e are bound to observe that Article X:2 of the General Agreement, does not speak to, and hence does not resolve, the issue of permissibility of giving retroactive effect to a safeguard restraint measure. The presumption of prospective effect only does, of course, relate to the basic principles of transparency and due process, being grounded on, among other things, these principles. But prior publication is required for all measures falling within the scope of Article X:2, not just ATC safeguard restraint measures sought to be applied retrospectively. Prior publication may be an autonomous condition for giving effect at all to a restraint measure. Where no authority exists to give retroactive effect to a restrictive governmental measure, that deficiency is not cured by publishing the measure sometime before its actual application. The necessary authorization is not supplied by Article X:2 of the General Agreement. 4. Artigo X:3 a) Geral Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Paquisto, Tailndia e Malsia, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 182-183 Ao analisar o caso concreto, o rgo de Apelao entendeu que existem padres mnimos de transparncia e justia processual na administrao de normas de comrcio, assegurados pelo Artigo X:3, que no foram atendidos. Neste sentido, o rgo de Apelao enumera alguns fatos do caso concreto que caracterizam o descumprimento do Artigo X:3: (i) a ausncia de transparncia e de possibilidade de contraditrio no processo de certificao sob a Seo 609, (ii) a ausncia de uma notificao formal e de motivao de recusa de pedido e (iii) a ausncia de um procedimento legal de reviso ou de apelao de uma negativa de pedido de certificao. Para. 182. [T]he provision of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 bear upon this matter. In our view, Section 609 falls within the laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application described in Article X:1. Inasmuch there are due process requirements generally for measures that are otherwise imposed in compliance with WTO obligations, it is only reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements of due process should be required in the application and administration of a measure which purports to be an exception to the treaty obligations of the member imposing the measure and which effectively results in a suspension pro hac vice of the treaty rights of other members. Para. 183. It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations which, in our view, are not met here. The non-transparent and ex parte nature of the internal governmental procedures applied by the competent officials in the Office of Marine Conservation, the Department of State, and the United States National Marine Fisheries Service throughout the certification processes under Section 609, as well as the fact that countries whose applications are denied do not receive formal notice of such denial, nor of the reasons for the denial, and the fact, too, that there is no formal legal procedure for review of, or appeal from, a denial of an application, are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. b) Objeto do Artigo Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 200 95

Segundo o entendimento do rgo de Apelao, neste caso, a exigncia de uniformidade, imparcialidade e razoabilidade presente no Artigo X:3 (a) se refere administrao de leis, regulamentos, decises judiciais e administrativas, e no a tais medidas em si. Se as leis, regulamentos, decises judiciais e administrativas so discriminatrias, deve haver a anlise de sua inconsistncia com as outras disposies relevantes do GATT 1994. Para. 200. The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indicates that the requirements of uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness do not apply to the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves, but rather to the administration of those laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. The context of Article X:3(a) within Article X, which is entitled Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations, and a reading of the other paragraphs of Article X, make it clear that Article X applies to the administration of laws, regulations, decisions and rulings. To the extent that the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves are discriminatory, they can be examined for their consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994. III. Comentrios

O objetivo primordial do Artigo X promover a transparncia na publicao e apurao dos regulamentos relacionados ao comrcio internacional. Ou seja, dar publicidade imediata e adequada s alteraes em leis e regulamentos concernentes ao comrcio internacional. No caso EC - Poultry, o rgo de Apelao rejeitou a reivindicao do Brasil de aplicao retroativa de medidas de salvaguardas transitrias no Acordo sobre Txteis e Vesturio. O Artigo X:1 prev que cada Membro deve prontamente publicar suas leis, regulamentos, decises judiciais e regras administrativas que afetem o comrcio exterior. Acordos que afetem regras do comrcio internacional tambm devem ser publicados. A publicao deve ocorrer de maneira a permitir aos governos ou respectivos comerciantes tomar conhecimento. Para lidar com os possveis efeitos colaterais negativos decorrentes da obrigatoriedade de comunicao, o Artigo X:1 estabelece que no obrigar uma Parte Contratante a revelar informaes de ordem confidencial que constituam obstculo aplicao das leis ou que, por outro lado, sejam contrrios ao interesse pblico ou tragam prejuzo aos interesses comerciais legtimos de empresas pblicas ou particulares. No caso EC - Poultry, o rgo de Apelao reformou a deciso do Painel de que certas licenas de importao das Comunidades Europeias a respeito de determinados produtos de frango violavam o Artigo X, porque a informao solicitada pelo Brasil dizia respeito a um carregamento especfico, fora do objeto do Artigo X (the information which Brazil claims the EC should have made available concerns a specific shipment, which is outside the scope of Article X of GATT ). O Artigo X:2 estabelece que nenhum Membro pode fazer valer determinadas medidas antes da respectiva publicao oficial. As medidas cobertas por essa obrigao incluem a elevao do nvel de um direito alfandegrio ou de outra taxa imposta importao em virtude de usos estabelecidos e uniformes, ou da qual resume uma prescrio, uma restrio ou uma interdio nova ou agravada em matria de importao ou de transferncia de fundos relativos a uma importao. O Painel US - Underwear foi estabelecido para decidir se um Membro est autorizado, quando utilizar medidas de salvaguardas provisrias do Artigo 6 do ATC, a retroagir a aplicao de tais medidas para a data de publicao do pedido de consulta. O Painel entendeu que o Artigo 6.10 era omisso sobre a questo, a qual, por sua vez, deveria ser resolvida com base no Artigo X do GATT. O Painel concluiu que if the importing country publishes the proposed restraint period and restraint level after the request for consultations, it can later set the initial date of the restraint period as the date of the publication of the proposed restraint . No entanto, o rgo de Apelao divergiu da concluso do Painel quanto omisso e entendeu que o Artigo 6.10 probe a retroatividade. Com relao ao entendimento do Painel a respeito do Artigo X do GATT, o rgo de Apelao decidiu que a publicao prvia da medida, nos termos do referido dispositivo, no pode, por si, justificar o efeito retroativo de medida governamental restritiva.

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O Artigo X:3 determina a aplicao, pelos Membros, de todas as leis, regulamentos, decises judicirias e administrativas listadas no pargrafo 1, de maneira uniforme, imparcial e equitativa, devendo manter ou instituir, logo que possvel tribunais judicirios, administrativos ou de arbitragem, ou instncias que tenham por fim especialmente reexaminar e retificar prontamente as medidas administrativas relacionadas com as questes aduaneiras, gozando esses tribunais de certas garantias de independncia em relao aos rgos aos quais pertencem. Excetuam-se, os procedimentos que preveem uma reviso imparcial das decises administrativas, ainda que esses procedimentos no sejam plena ou oficialmente independentes dos organismos encarregados da aplicao das medidas administrativas, se j estiverem em vigor no dia da assinatura do presente Acordo. No entanto, em caso de utilizao deste procedimento por qualquer uma das Partes Contratantes, esta dever comunicar s demais Partes Contratantes, quando solicitada. Vale ressaltar que, a facilitao comercial (trade facilitation) um dos principais temas da Rodada de Doha de negociaes multilaterais da OMC, foro negociador de um Acordo de Facilitao Comercial que tenha por objeto a simplificao, harmonizao, padronizao e modernizao dos procedimentos do comrcio internacional. No tocante transparncia normativa, o primeiro aspecto do Acordo de Facilitao Comercial refere-se obrigatoriedade da publicao e disponibilizao de informaes relacionadas ao comrcio exterior, por meio da internet ou do estabelecimento de servios de informao, ou seja, por meio de notificao ao pblico interessado. A obrigatoriedade de que cada Membro publique prontamente, de forma no discriminatria e adequada, diversos tipos de informaes. A obrigatoriedade positiva, pois objetiva assegurar o acesso e, logo, previsibilidade no planejamento das operaes de comrcio exterior. Outro ponto de destaque a obrigatoriedade de pr-publicao e discusso prvia de normas que impliquem alterao de procedimentos. Trata-se de medida para aumentar a participao dos operadores na elaborao das normas. O Acordo obrigaria o estabelecimento de prazos razoveis entre a publicao e a entrada em vigor da nova legislao. Ainda no contexto da transparncia, deve-se mencionar as tratativas para a instituio de um mecanismo de consulta prvia (decises antecipadas) relativa interpretao da legislao. Caso aprovado, o Brasil dever ampliar o alcance da consulta tradicional, instituda por meio da Lei n 9.430/96. O objetivo precisamente o mesmo, ou seja, garantir a certeza na interpretao da legislao. H a obrigatoriedade a cada Membro de estabelecer uma central de servios de informao. Um outro destaque, a obrigatoriedade do direito de recurso aos operadores, a partir da criao e manuteno de tribunais administrativos ou judiciais imparciais voltados ao julgamento de causas no comrcio exterior. O Brasil j trabalha com tal mecanismo no Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (CARF). Ainda, outra demanda atendida no Acordo a obrigatoriedade de utilizao da anlise de riscos para promover a liberao de mercadorias de baixo risco, assim como a utilizao de auditoria a posteriori por parte das Aduanas, para agilizar a liberao das mercadorias na zona primria.

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Artigo XI

Alice Borges Fernandes Pereira Lucas Queiroz Pires IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XI General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 11.1 No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend to the following: (a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party; Import and export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade; Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted; or to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the current market level; or to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product the production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.

11.2

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(iii)

Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned. IB. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XI Eliminao Geral das Restries Quantitativas 11.1 Nenhuma Parte Contratante instituir ou manter, para a importao de um produto originrio do territrio de outra Parte Contratante, ou para a exportao ou venda para exportao de um produto destinado ao territrio de outra Parte Contratante, proibies ou restries a no ser direitos 98

alfandegrios, impostos ou outras taxas, quer a sua aplicao seja feita por meio de contingentes, de licenas de importao ou exportao, quer por outro qualquer processo. 11.2 As disposies do pargrafo primeiro do presente Artigo no se estendero aos casos seguintes: (a) proibies ou restries aplicadas temporariamente exportao para prevenir ou remediar uma situao crtica, devido a uma penria de produtos alimentares ou de outros produtos essenciais para a Parte Contratante exportadora; proibies ou restries importao e exportao necessrias aplicao de normas ou regulamentaes referentes classificao, controle da qualidade ou venda de produtos destinados ao comrcio internacional; restries importao de qualquer produto agrcola ou de pescaria, seja qual for a forma de importao desses produtos, quando forem necessrias aplicao de medidas governamentais que tenham por efeito: (i) restringir a quantidade do produto nacional similar a ser posta venda ou produzida, ou na falta de produo nacional importante do produto similar, a quantidade de um produto nacional que o produto importado possa substituir diretamente; reabsorver um excedente temporrio do produto nacional similar ou, na falta de produo nacional importante do produto similar, de um produto nacional que o produto importado possa substituir diretamente colocando esse excedente disposio de certos grupos de consumidores do pas gratuitamente ou a preos inferiores aos correntes no mercado; ou restringir a quantidade a ser produzida de qualquer produto de origem animal cuja produo depende diretamente, na totalidade ou na maior parte, do produto importado, se a produo nacional deste ltimo for relativamente desprezvel.

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(iii)

Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplicar restries importao de um produto de acordo com as disposies da presente alnea (c) do presente pargrafo, tornar pblico o total do volume ou do valor do produto cuja importao for autorizada para um perodo ulterior determinado assim como qualquer modificao sobrevinda nesse volume ou nesse valor. Alm disso, as restries aplicadas conforme o item (i) supra no devero ser tais que reduzam o total das importaes em relao ao da produo nacional, em comparao com a proporo que se poderia razoavelmente antecipar entre ambas na ausncia das ditas restries. Para determinar essa proporo, a Parte Contratante levar devidamente em conta a que existia no correr de um perodo de referncia anterior e todos os fatores especiais. (Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios Traduo

Na verso em portugus do GATT constante no Decreto promulgador foram encontrados erros de portugus de importncia menor e algumas passagens que do azo a interpretaes, seno contraditrias, diversas daquelas possivelmente almejadas pelos negociadores do ato internacional. Em especfico, apontamos: a) no Artigo 2, imported in any form refere-se a agricultural or fisheries product. Na verso em portugus, tornou-se seja qual for a forma de importao desses produtos. H margem para interpretao que altera o campo de incidncia do Artigo. Enquanto que a redao original referia-se s mltiplas formas dos produtos agrcolas e da pesca per se, a em portugus parece aludir aos variados meios e modos de importao desse produtos. Sugere-se, portanto, uma traduo mais literal, qual seja, importados sob qualquer forma. b) no Artigo 2.c.1, permitted to be marketed or produced tornou-se a ser posta venda ou produzida. Novamente, uma alterao semntica, no ltimo caso. Sugere-se a ser vendido ou produzido. 99

II. 1.

Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XI A relao do Artigo XI com outros dispositivos de outros Acordos

Relatrio do Painel no caso Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Australia - Salmon), WT/DS18/R, para. 8.185 O Painel entendeu que no seria necessrio examinar se as medidas objeto de anlise eram incompatveis com o Artigo XI, aps ter constatado que as mesmas eram incompatveis com o SPS Agreement. Para. 8.185. Al haber constatado ya que la medida objeto de la diferencia es incompatible con las prescripciones del Acuerdo MSF, no consideramos necesario seguir examinando si es adems incompatible con el artculo XI del GATT de 1994. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), WT/DS27/R, paras. 5.4, 5.7, 7, 188-189, 191-192 e 208 Negociaes previstas no Artigo XVIII:3 (referente s empresas de trading estatais) no resultam em mecanismos inconsistentes com o GATT, em especial em restries quantitativas no justificadas pelas excees do Artigo XI:1. Produtos na agenda de concesso no justificam a manuteno de restrio quantitativas nos termos do Artigo XI:1. Por vezes, resultados das negociaes de agricultura no so compatveis com outros acordos, como, por exemplo, o Artigo 4.2 do Acordo sobre Agricultura probe o uso de medidas que podem ser autorizadas nas excees do Artigo XI do GATT. Por ser mais especfico, contudo, podem prevalecer os dispositivos do Acordo sobre Agricultura. As palavras introdutrias do GATT contribuem para a ideia do termo restrio abranger uma interpretao expansiva. O Painel tambm achou importante julgar que as disposies do Artigo XXIV (Territorial Application - Frontier Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas) no podem fazer com que se esquive das disposies do Artigo XI, concluindo que mesmo na formao de unies aduaneiras, no se pode aplicar restries quantitativas que venham a violar o Artigo XI. Para. 5.4. () The negotiations foreseen in Article XVII:3 are thus not to result in arrangements inconsistent with the General Agreement, in particular not quantitative restrictions made effective through state-trading that are not justified by an exception to Article XI:1. The Panel saw no reason why a different principle should apply to quantitative restrictions made effective by other means. Para. 5.7. For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel found that Article II:1(b) does not permit contracting parties to qualify their obligations under other provisions of the General Agreement and that the provisions in the United States GATT Schedule of Concessions can consequently not justify the maintenance of quantitative restrictions on the importation of certain sugars inconsistent with the application of Article XI:1. Para. 7. In some cases, the results of the agricultural negotiations were not consistent with the rules found in other WTO agreements. For example, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits the use of certain measures that might otherwise be authorized by Article XI:2 of GATT; Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture permits the use of certain measures that might otherwise be questioned under Articles II and XIX of GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards. In order to establish priority for rules of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 21.1 of that Agreement specifies:
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement [i.e., the Agreement on Agriculture].

In our view, Article 4.1 is not a substantive provision, but is a statement of where market access commitments can be found. The definition of market access concessions (Article 1(g) of the Agreement on 100

Agriculture) makes it clear that the Schedules annexed to Article II of GATT also contain the import quota commitments undertaken pursuant to Annex 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture (as well as an identification of the tariff lines which are eligible for the special safeguard provisions of Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture). If the Agreement on Agriculture would have allowed for country-specific allocations of tariff quotas there would have been a specific provision to this effect in deviation from Article XIII:2(d) as with the special treatment provisions of Annex 5. In contrast, Article 4.2 is a substantive provision in that it prohibits the use of certain non-tariff barriers, subject to certain qualifications. As a substantive provision, it prevails over such GATT provisions as Article XI:2(c). Moreover, the use of the term restriction in Article 3.2 is not a reason to give a narrow reading to the scope of the Licensing Agreement. Past GATT panel reports support giving the term restriction an expansive interpretation. The introductory words of Article XI of GATT provide as follows:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures ... . Thus, tariffs and tariff quotas are restrictions as that term is used in Article XI, although duties, taxes or other charges are excepted from Article XI's requirements. A similar reading is appropriate in the case of the Licensing Agreement. Article 3.2 of the Licensing Agreement refers to restrictions and Article 3.3 of the Licensing Agreement applies to licensing requirements for purposes other than the implementation of quantitative restrictions. Accordingly, we find that licensing procedures used for the implementation of measures other than quantitative restrictions, including tariff quotas, are subject to the disciplines of the Licensing Agreement. We also note that our argument that tariff quotas are restrictions does not imply that they are not, in principle, legitimate trade measures under the agreements covered by the WTO in the same sense that tariffs are. In considering these arguments, we first examine the relationship of the TRIMs Agreement to the provisions of GATT. We note that with the exception of its transition provisions the TRIMs Agreement essentially interprets and clarifies the provisions of Article III (and also Article XI) where trade-related investment measures are concerned. Thus the TRIMs Agreement does not add to or subtract from those GATT obligations, although it clarifies that Article III:4 may cover investment-related matters.

Para. 188. With regard to the specific relationship between, in the case before us, Article XXIV and Articles XI and XIII (and Article 2.4 of the ATC), we consider that the wording of Article XXIV does not authorize a departure from the obligations contained in Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. We base our findings on the nature of the conditional right established in Article XXIV as opposed to the clear and unambiguous obligation in Article XI prohibiting the use of quantitative restrictions, notwithstanding the specific contrary practice which has in the past existed in the sector of textiles and clothing but which the ATC represents a collective commitment to terminate. As further discussed above, we consider that it is possible, and even necessary in order to avoid a conclusion that would lead to politically and economically absurd results, to interpret the provisions of Article XXIV in such a way as to avoid conflicts with the prescriptions of Articles XI and XIII of GATT, and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Para. 189. As we have noted, paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV provide parameters for the establishment and assessment of a customs union, but in doing so allow flexibility in the choice of measures to be put in place on the formation of a customs union. In this context we recall the use of the terms substantially all the trade and substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce. While the meaning of these terms is not precisely clear in relation to what and how much constitute substantially, they do confirm clearly that in both cases the standard is not all. These provisions do not, however, address any specific measures that may or may not be adopted on the formation of a customs union and importantly they do not authorize violations of Articles XI and XIII, and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Moreover, we note that paragraph 6 of Article XXIV provides for a specific procedure for the renegotiation of tariffs which are increased above their bindings upon formation of a customs union; no such provision exists for quantitative restrictions. To the Panel, if the introduction of WTO inconsistent quantitative restrictions were intended to be negotiable on the formation of a customs union, it would seem odd to us that an explicit procedure would exist for changes in GATT's preferred form of trade barrier (i.e. tariffs), while no procedure would be provided for negotiation 101

of compensation connected with imposition of otherwise GATT inconsistent measures. We draw the conclusion that even on the occasion of the formation of a customs union, Members cannot impose otherwise incompatible quantitative restrictions. Para. 191. Finally, we recall that the prohibitions against quantitative restrictions in the sector of textiles and clothing constitute a fundamental feature of the WTO Agreement which argues strongly against the introduction of any new such restrictions in that sector. Moreover, considering the flexibility offered by the possibility of interim agreements under Article XXIV 375 and the inherently transitional nature of quantitative import restrictions in the sector of textiles and clothing, we find that Turkey was in a position to avoid the violations of Articles XI and XIII 376 of GATT, and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Para. 192. Consequently, we reject Turkey's defense that Article XXIV allows it to introduce, upon the formation of its customs union with the European Communities, quantitative restrictions on 19 categories of textile and clothing products, in violation of Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC. Para. 208. We then proceeded to examine Turkey's defense based on Article XXIV of GATT. In this context, we decided that we had jurisdiction to examine any specific measure adopted by a WTO Member in the context of a customs union but that, in this case, we did not need, and indeed we were asked by the parties not to assess the overall WTO compatibility of the Turkey-EC customs union. We have found that, as a general principle, Turkey was bound, at all times, by all WTO obligations, unless there was a conflict between any provisions. Since the wording of Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC is clear in prohibiting the introduction of quantitative restrictions such as those at issue, we examined the terms of Article XXIV to decide whether Turkey could be exempted from the application of these prohibitions. We found that the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV did not authorize any violation of the WTO obligations, other than the MFN obligation. Indeed, these paragraphs do not provide any indication as to the type of measure to be used in the formation of a customs union but rather provide guidelines for the overall assessment of regional trade agreements. We have therefore concluded that Article XXIV did not authorize the violation of Articles XI and XIII of GATT or Article 2.4 of the ATC. While reaching this conclusion on the basis of the wording of the provisions at issue, we have endeavoured to ensure that our interpretation did not render Turkey's right to form a customs union with the European Communities a nullity, since pursuant to Article XXIV:8(a)(ii), constituent members to a customs union are required to adopt substantially the same regulations of commerce. We found that this standard leaves flexibility to the constituent members. In any event, in the present case, taking into account, inter alia, the share of trade affected by the type of measures at issue (quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing), we found that there were WTO compatible alternatives available to Turkey if it wanted to conclude a customs union with the European Communities. Finally we found that even if the presumption of nullification of Article 3.8 of the DSU were rebuttable, Turkey had not submitted evidence that the benefits accruing to India under the ATC and GATT had not been reduced or nullified by the introduction of WTO incompatible quantitative restrictions. 2. Medida Interna lidando com o Tratamento dos Produtos Importados (Internal measure dealing with the treatment of imported products)

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.98-8.100 O Painel entendeu que houve violao ao Artigo III:4, o qual aplicvel ao caso em que uma medida interna disponha sobre o tratamento de produtos importados. O Artigo XI:1 aplicvel s transaes comerciais de exportao, mas no se aplica ao caso no contexto das atividades dessas exportaes. A posio do Canad de excluir o Artigo XI:1 do caso foi negada. O Canad pediu pela aplicao cumulativa dos Artigos XI:1 e III:4 na parte relativa ao decreto de proibio importao, mas o Painel no considerou que essa a referncia seguida pelo DSB. Para. 8.98. As regards Canada's reference to paragraph 4.26 of the aforementioned report, we consider that it does not substantiate Canada's position in this case either. In this paragraph, the Panel refrains from ruling 102

on a violation of Article III:4. It appears to do so, however, for reasons of legal economy because it simultaneously recognizes that Article III:4 could apply to state-trading transactions. Contrary to Canada's assertion, this paragraph does not confirm the non-applicability of Article III:4 to the part of an internal measure dealing with the treatment of imported products. At the most, it could confirm the application of both provisions. Nevertheless, as explained in the preceding paragraph, the Panel found that Article XI:1 applied, referring to the Note Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. This Note only applies to statetrading transactions. In the present case, however, there is no question of a measure applied in the context of state-trading activities. Para. 8.99. For the foregoing reasons, we consider that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 applies to the ban on importing asbestos and asbestos-containing products imposed by the Decree. On the basis of the grounds for this conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine further Canada's arguments on the exclusive application of Article XI:1. Para. 8.100. Looking at Canada's arguments, it is difficult to see whether Canada is claiming that, even if the import ban falls under Article III:4, it is also covered by Article XI:1. If Canada does in fact make such a claim for the cumulative application of Article III:4 and Article XI:1 to the part of the Decree banning imports, we do not consider that this forms part of the terms of reference given to the Panel by the DSB and, even if that were the case, Canada's arguments do not make a prima facie case in the sense given to this concept by the Appellate Body. Consequently, we do not consider it necessary to examine this point any further. 3. A Noo de Restrio Importao (the notion of restriction on importation)

Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos), WT/DS146/R e WT/DS175/R, para. 7.265 Em considerao proibio expressa no Artigo XI:1, a concluso do Painel a de que qualquer forma de limitao importao constitui uma restrio. Para. 7.265. This Panel endorses the ordinary meaning of the term restriction as identified by the India Quantitative Restrictions panel and its view as to the generally broad scope of the prohibition expressed in Article XI:1. As a result, it can be concluded that any form of limitation imposed on, or in relation to importation constitutes a restriction on importation within the meaning of Article XI:1. 4. Anlise das Condies de Equilbrio de Comrcio (Analysis of the trade balancing condition)

Relatrio do Painel no caso India - Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India - Autos), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS146/R; EUA, WT/DS175/R, para. 7.278 O Painel afirma que a nota n 60 do Memorandum de Entendimento que limita a quantidade de importao a um compromisso de exportao uma restrio prevista no Artigo XI:1. Para. 7.278. The Panel therefore finds that the trade balancing condition contained in Public Notice n 60 and in the Memorandum of Understanding MOUs signed thereunder, by limiting the amount of imports through linking them to an export commitment, acts as a restriction on importation, contrary to the terms of Article XI:1. With respect to the European Communities' argument that the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signatories that have yet to achieve the 70% indigenization requirement would continue to incur export obligations after 1 April 2001, the Panel notes that no evidence was presented to show that any such new export obligations have in fact accrued. 5. Alimento de Grama ou de Gro, Condicionantes Limitadores e Restries Importao (Grassfed/grain-fed condition constitutes a limit and an import restriction)

103

Relatrio do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS161/R; Austrlia, WT/DS169/R, paras. 777-778 O Painel entende que o uso de limitaes condicionadas ao alimento do gado corresponde s restries importao previstas no Artigo XI. Para. 777. In the light of the evidence before it, the Panel considers that the LPMO (NR: G/STR/N/4/KOR, 10 December 1998 - LPMO is a notified state-trading agency for beef and imports its share of the annual quota through a tendering system) practices to call for tenders on the basis of the distinction between grassfed and grain-fed beef, constitute an import restriction in violation of Article XI of GATT, through the Ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII. Para. 778. The Panel considers that pursuant to Article II, any other terms, conditions or qualifications that add to import concessions must be set forth in Korea's Schedule. The Panel recalls that Korea has made no condition concerning grass-fed/grain-fed beef in its Schedule. In administering its import beef quota on the basis of grain-fed and grass-fed beef distinctions, Korea is imposing a condition in the form of individual limits applied to grass and grain-fed beef, within Korea's total import quota. The Panel recalls its conclusion above, that such grass-fed/grain-fed condition constitutes a limit, an import restriction, inconsistent with Article XI of GATT. 6. Discriminao dos Preos Transnacionais (Transnational price discrimination)

Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Japo, WT/DS162/R, para. 6.277 Com respeito necessidade de deliberar sobre o Artigo XI, o Painel entendeu que o Artigo VI aplica-se mais diretamente ao 1916 Act do que o Artigo XI:1, no que se refere discriminao dos preos internacionais. O Artigo VI aplicvel sempre que uma medida objetivar uma situao de discriminao de preos transnacionais, conforme definido no no Artigo VI:1. Para. 6.277. With respect to the necessity to make findings under Article XI of GATT 1994, we are of the view that the same reasoning as with Article III:4 applies. In our opinion, Article VI addresses the basic feature of the 1916 Act (i.e. transnational price discrimination) more directly than Article XI:1. In our findings, we concluded that Article VI applies to a measure whenever that measure objectively targets a situation of transnational price discrimination, as defined in Article VI:1. Thus, we found that the 1916 Act was fully subject to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement and could not escape the disciplines of Article VI by the mere fact that it had anti-trust objectives, did not address injurious dumping as such, included additional requirements of an anti-trust nature or led to the imposition of measures other than anti-dumping duties. 7. A Deciso de um Painelista (Findings: One Panelists view)

Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Import Measures Certain Products from the European Communities (US - Certain EC Products), WT/DS165/R, para. 6.60 Um painelista tem a opinio de que os requisitos de vnculo podem legitimamente ser aplicados para reforar os direitos e obrigaes da OMC (como medidas para garantir o cumprimento das leis e regulaes). Contudo, caso os requisitos no so utilizados para esse objetivo, seria uma restrio contrrio ao Artigo XI do GATT. Para. 6.60. One Panelist is of the view that bonding requirements can legitimately be in place to enforce WTO compatible rights and obligations. Such bonding requirements could benefit from the application of Article XX(d), as measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 104

inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, assuming they support WTO compatible rights/obligations and they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the chapeau of Article XX). If bonding requirements are used to secure the respect of WTO compatible rights/obligations, they would not appear to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. However, if not, they could be viewed as effectively imposing a form of 'restriction' contrary to Article XI of GATT. 8. Restrio Importao de Cigarros (Restriction on the Importation of Cigarettes)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.257-7.258 O entendimento abaixo mostr que o Artigo XI:1 no se aplica para qualquer restrio, mas somente aquelas que so relacionadas importao de produtos. Por esse motivo, no caso, o Painel no est convencido de que os requisitos so uma restrio importao de cigarros. Para. 7.257. The Panel notes that, in the case of imported cigarettes, the bond is not enforced either at the time or at the point of importation. Indeed, under Article 14 of the Decree 79-03, the bond is posted both by importers and local manufacturers with the Directorate General of Internal Taxes, and not with customs authorities. The Dominican Republic has informed that, after the bond is posted with the Directorate General of Internal Taxes, it is then sent to the National Treasury (Tesorera Nacional) for safekeeping. The Dominican Republic has added that it is not the customs authorities, but the internal tax authorities, who would verify that the bond has been posted. Para. 7.258. Most importantly, the Panel is not persuaded that the bond requirement is a restriction on the importation of cigarettes. Article XI:1 of the GATT does not cover any restriction, but only those restrictions that are instituted or maintained by any Member on the importation (or exportation) of products. In the expression on the importation read in the context of an Article that is entitled General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions , the ordinary meaning of the word on suggests that it is a preposition denoting a relation. In that sense, the expression on the importation would be akin to with respect to the importation. Indeed, the panel on India Autos, considering the ordinary meaning of the phrase restriction on importation, reached a similar conclusion. An ordinary meaning of the term 'on', relevant to a description of the relationship which should exist between the measure and the importation of the product, includes 'with respect to', 'in connection, association or activity with or with regard to'. In the context of Article XI:1, the expression 'restriction on importation' may thus be appropriately read as meaning a restriction 'with regard to' or 'in connection with' the importation of the product. Even if, arguendo, the bond requirement could be considered to be a limiting condition, the Panel still does not find evidence that it is a condition specifically related to the importation of cigarettes, nor that it is instituted or maintained with regard to or in connection with the importation of cigarettes. 9. Portaria SECEX 14/2004

Relatrio do Painel no caso Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil - Retreaded Tyres), Demandante: European Communities, WT/DS332/R, para. 7.34 O Painel entende que a proibio em conceder a licena de importao prevista na Portaria SECEX 14/2004 e a proibio em importar pneus recauchutados prevista pela Resoluo CONAMA 23/96 so proibies importao inconsistentes com os requisitos do Artigo XI:1. Para. 7.34. For the reasons provided above, the Panel finds that the prohibition on granting of import licenses under Portaria SECEX 14/2004 is an import prohibition inconsistent with the requirements under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. We also find that Portaria DECEX 8/1991, to the extent that it prohibits the importation of retreaded tyres, is also an import prohibition inconsistent with Article XI:1. We do not find, however, that Resolution CONAMA 23/1996 is inconsistent with Article XI:1 in respect of the importation of 105

retreaded tyres. As for the other four measures listed in the European Communities' panel request, the Panel considers that the European Communities has not established a prima facie case regarding these claims. 10. Condio de Compra Domstica (Domestic Purchase Requirement)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Turkey - Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice (Turkey - Rice), WT/DS334/R, paras. 7.194-7.196 Os EUA consideram que, em relao aos requisitos de compras domsticas (medida de fronteira aplicada sobre produtos agrcolas), trazida pelo Artigo III:4, os Artigos XI:1 do GATT e 4.2 do Acordo sobre Agricultura devem ser considerados equivalentes. Contudo, o Painel comear analisando as demandas de acordo com o Artigo 4.2 do Acordo sobre Agricultura, por ser mais especfico. Se houvr inconsistncias relativas a todos esses dispositivos, tambm dever ser realizada uma anlise de acordo com o TRIMS. Para. 7.194. Only after the Panel considers the consistency of the domestic purchase requirement with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, will it turn to the issue of whether the same measure should also, or alternatively, be viewed as a border measure and thus properly analysed under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 or Article 4.2 of the Agreement on A product, while Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is limited to measures imposed on products that fall within the scope of the Agreement of Agriculture. Para. 7.195. In this particular case, and with regard to the domestic purchase requirement, the United States' claims under both Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture may be considered to be equivalent. Following the same approach used before, if the Panel decides that it should also, or alternatively, consider the domestic purchase requirement as a border measure, it will start by examining the claims presented by the United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement may be considered more specific in respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products. Para. 7.196. In conclusion, the Panel will begin its analysis of the claims advanced by the United States regarding the domestic purchase requirement, by considering first the claim brought under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. After the domestic purchase requirement has been considered under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel will then consider whether the same measure should also, or alternatively, be viewed as a border measure and thus analysed under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 or Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, or both. In this part of its analysis, should it be necessary, the Panel would start by examining the claims presented by the United States under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, since this Agreement may be considered more specific in respect of border measures imposed on agricultural products. If the Panel were to make findings under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, it would then consider whether it should also make findings under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. Finally, if the Panel were to determine that the domestic purchase requirement was inconsistent with any or all of the above-cited GATT provisions, it would then consider whether it is also necessary to issue findings under the TRIMs Agreement. 11. A Inconsistncia do 1916 Act com as Obrigaes dos EUA - Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994 (1916 Acts inconsistency with United States' obligations under Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS162/AB/R, paras. 153-154 O Japo e as Comunidades Europeias pleitearam ao rgo de Apelao a deliberao sobre a inconsistncia do 1916 Act com os Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994, e do Artigo XVI:4 do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, em atendimento aos Artigos III:4 e XI do GATT 1994. Para tanto, o rgo de Apelao deveria modificar o posicionamento do Painel em relao ao 1916 Act, com base no Artigo VI do GATT e do Acordo AntiDumping. As condies para o pleito, no entanto, no foram satisfeitas, no tendo sido acolhidos os argumentos oferecidos pelas Comunidades Europeias e pelo Japo. 106

Para. 153. In their joint other appellant's submission, the European Communities and Japan ask us to rule that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with United States' obligations under Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. With respect to Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994, their requests are conditioned on our reversal of the Panel's findings that the 1916 Act falls within the scope of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement. With respect to Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, their requests are conditioned on our reversal of the Panel's findings with respect to jurisdiction and the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation. Since, however, the conditions on which these requests are predicated have not been fulfilled, there is no need for us to examine the conditional appeals of the European Communities and Japan. Para. 154. For these reasons, we decline to rule on the conditional appeals of the European Communities and Japan relating to Articles III:4 and XI of the GATT 1994 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. 12. Avaliao (Evaluation)

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EU - Biotech Products), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R e WT/DS293/R, paras. 7.3428-7.3429 As medidas de salvaguardas so inconsistentes com o Artigo XI:1, bem como com os Artigos 5.1 e 2.2 do Acordo de Medidas Sanitrias e Fitossanitrias. Para. 7.3428. The Panel notes that the United States' claim under Article XI:1 concerns one of the nine safeguard measures challenged by it, namely, Greece Topas oilseed rape. Canada's claim under Article XI:1 is in respect of the same Greek safeguard measure. Para. 7.3429. We recall that we have already reached the conclusion that the aforementioned safeguard measures being challenged by the United States and Canada, respectively, are inconsistent with Article 5.1 and, by implication, the second and third requirements in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. In these circumstances, we see no need to examine, and offer additional findings on, whether the relevant safeguard measures are also inconsistent with Article XI:1. Accordingly, as did previous panels in similar situations, we exercise judicial economy with regard to the United States' and Canada's claims under Article XI:1. III. Comentrios

Em junho de 1992, o primeiro Painel aberto sob a gide do GATT 1994 contra os regimes nacionais europeus de importao de bananas baseou-se na desconformidade da prtica com os Artigos I e XI:1 do GATT. Para confirmar a existncia de restries quantitativas proibidas importao de bananas, o Painel seguiu os precedentes dos casos Canad - restries importao de sorvete e iogurte (BISD 36S/68), CEE Restries s importaes de mas - Denncia pelo Chile (BISD 36S/93), CEE - Restries importao de mas - Denncia pelos EUA (BISD 36S/135) e Japo - Restries s importaes de determinados produtos agrcolas (BISD 35S/163), e submeteu o regime europeu e as polticas nacionais dos principais importadores ao crivo do Artigo XI.2(c), que apresenta exceo regra geral desde que contempladas, cumulativamente, as seguintes hipteses: (i) a medida deve constituir uma restrio importao; (ii) a restrio importao deve recair sobre um produto agrcola ou de pesca; (iii) deve haver uma medida governamental para limitar as quantidades de um produto permitido a ser comercializado ou produzido; (iv) a restrio importao deve ser necessria execuo de uma restrio na oferta interna; (v) a restrio importao no deve reduzir o total de importaes em relao ao total da produo interna, quando comparada com a proporo que se poderia razoavelmente esperar entre os dois, na ausncia de restries; (vi) a restrio importao e a restrio do abastecimento domstico devem, em princpio, ser aplicveis a produtos similares; 107

(vii) deve ser tornados pblicos a quantidade total permitida ou o valor da cota para cada produto. A cumulatividade, com efeito, refere-se, to-somente, aos critrios inscritos na letra (c), no havendo, em sede dessa jurisprudncia, interpretao no sentido da inseparabilidade daqueles nsitos nos Artigo XI.2 (a), (b) e (c): De acordo com o Painel, por ter demonstrado em anlise anterior que duas ou mais condies do Artigo XI:2 (c) no haviam sido cumpridas em relao s medidas adotadas pela Frana, Portugal e Espanha, no seria necessrio examinar essas medidas luz das demais condies previstas neste Artigo. O Painel conclui, assim, em seu Relatrio de junho de 1993, pela condenao dos regimes nacionais anteriores ao regime comum europeu, por serem ilegais e discriminatrios. Novo Painel foi aberto para questionar o prprio regime comum de bananas: o DS38/R, ou caso Bananas II. O Relatrio, finalizado em janeiro de 1994, tambm condenou o novo regime. As argumentaes contidas no Relatrio de Bananas II forneceram a base para as concluses do DS27, o caso Bananas III, j sob a gide da OMC. Os demandantes do caso DS38/R alegaram que o regime comum europeu, com o seu sistema de quotas tarifrias, tarifas extra-cotas e licenas no automticas importao de bananas, - em tese, permitidas - impunha restries quantitativas de fato, ao contra-argumento da CEE de que o regime europeu para importao de bananas era apresentado no mbito do Artigo II do GATT (Agenda de Concesses, ou Compromissos), e, portanto, fora dos parmetros do Artigo XI. O Painel concluiu que a aplicao de quotas tarifrias per se, sob o Artigo II, no violou o Artigo XI, pois nenhum Membro Contratante havia alegado incompatibilidade nesse tocante. Assim, tambm seriam as tarifas extra-quotas (aquelas especificamente aplicadas quando a quantidade importada extrapolar a quota inicialmente pactuada), ainda que seus efeitos sobre o mercado tornassem as exportaes desvantajosas. Para o Painel, o Artigo XI:1 faz distino apenas entre proibies e restries por um lado, e taxas, impostos ou outros encargos, em nada se referindo aos efeitos comerciais da utilizao destes instrumentos. O Relatrio do Painel menciona, sem individualizar, casos anteriores nos quais teria assinalado que, para determinar se uma medida constitui ou no restrio quantitativa, seria irrelevante averiguar o real impacto da medida sobre os fluxos de comrcio. Finalmente, no que tange s licenas no automticas, o Painel concluiu que qualquer que fosse o regime de licenciamento, este no alteraria a natureza do contingente pautal e, como tal, seria consistente com o Artigo XI:1. Embora, no com base no Artigo XI.1, mas, sim, nos Artigos I, II e III, o Painel concluiu que o regime comum de bananas era discriminatrio por trs motivos: (a) impunha tratamento preferencial em tarifas; (b) impunha tratamento preferencial em quotas; e, (c) atribua sistemas discriminatrios de concesso de licenas. Para aquele colegiado, a nica forma legal, em relao ao sistema multilateral de comrcio, que as Comunidades Europeias teriam de oferecer tais privilgios s exportaes de bananas dos membros da ACP seria pela conceo de um waiver. Esse relatrio, tampouco foi adotado em razo da vigncia da clusula de consenso positivo existente no sistema multilateral de comrcio anterior OMC. Em 1995, dois anos aps a entrada em vigor do regulamento europeu que criou o mercado comum de bananas, e um ano aps o fim do Painel no caso Bananas II, sob a gide da recm criada OMC, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA abriram pedido de consultas junto ao DSB para perquirir as Comunidades Europeias acerca da adequao dos supramencionados acordos s regras da OMC. O DS16, porm, parou na fase de consultas, pois, com a entrada do Equador, o maior exportador de bananas do mundo, na Organizao, os postulantes do DS16 decidiram reingressar, juntamente com aquele pas, com pedido de abertura de Painel junto ao DSB da OMC. Deu-se origem ao DS27, ou Bananas III. Os demandantes do caso DS27 solicitaram que um Painel fosse aberto para examinar a poltica europeia luz do GATT, do Acordo sobre Procedimentos para o Licenciamento de Importaes, do Acordo sobre Agricultura, do GATS e do TRIMS. Para os fins deste trabalho, interessa-nos as teses defendidas em torno do Artigo X do GATT, argumentaes e contraargumentaes, assim como as concluses do Painel e do rgo de Apelao. A tese dos demandantes, no que se refere inadequao da restrio quantitativa contida no Regulamento s normas multilaterais de comrcio, assentou-se sobre trs pilares: (i) a de que os direitos do av no se aplicam s prticas discriminatrias; (ii) ainda que se aplicassem, as vantagens e o acesso oferecidos pelo mercado comum de 108

bananas excedia queles mantidos pelos regimes europeus que lhe antecederam; e, finalmente, (iii) alguns dispositivos do regime de distribuio de quotas gerava efeitos distorcivos ao mercado europeu. O rgo de Apelao conclui, em 1997, que o regime de importao de bananas da Unio Europeia era inconsistente com as regras da OMC, pois: (1) a alocao das cotas tarifrias, sobretudo para os pases da ACP, era contrria regra de no-discriminao (Artigo 13 do GATT); (2) os procedimentos para a emisso de licenas, os quais envolviam a compra de bananas dos pases da ACP para se ter o direito de importar bananas de alguns pases latino-americanos (ou outros pases), eram contrrios ao princpio da nao mais favorecida e ao princpio do tratamento nacional (Artigos 1 e 3 do GATT, respectivamente); e (3) os procedimentos de licenciamento eram tambm contrrios ao princpio da nao mais favorecida e ao princpio do tratamento nacional (Artigos 2 e 17 do GATS). No houve, portanto, reconhecimento de que o regime comum de bananas feria o Artigo XI. Aps o caso Bananas III, outros quatro casos foram postulados na OMC sobre o mesmo objeto, tendo sido, todos eles, considerados prejudicados pelo andamento do DS27, DS105 (entendido como prejudicado pela DS27), DS158 (aberto aps o perodo de 15 meses estabelecidos pelo DSB para o incio da entrada em vigor das medidas necessrias para atender s concluses do relatrio do rgo de Apelao), DS361 e DS364 (sobre o novo regime comum de bananas, em vigor desde 2006). O Painel considerou que a aluso ao Artigo XI, entre outros, como base legal para questionar a moratria europeia era desnecessria em razo de o Artigo 2.3 do Acordo de Medidas Sanitrias e Fitossanitrias, igualmente evocado, ser suficiente para enquadrar o tema. O mencionado Artigo estabelece que tais medidas no devem gerar discriminao arbitrria ou injustificada entre os Membros, e que elas no devem ser usadas de modo a que se constituam restries disfaradas ao comrcio. Em outras palavras, o Painel eximiu-se, portanto, de examinar o DS291, DS292 e DS293, em relao aos quais expediu o mesmo Relatrio, luz do Artigo XI. As Comunidades Europeias solicitaram consultas Repblica Popular da China sobre a imposio de medidas que afetavam negativamente as exportaes de peas de automveis das Comunidades para aquele pas. Entre outras irregularidades, a China teria agido de forma inconsistente com os Artigos 2.1 e 2.2 do TRIMs, em conjunto com o pargrafo 1(a) da lista exemplificativa anexa ao TRIMs pela aplicao de medidas de investimento relacionadas ao comrcio de bens, e com as disposies dos Artigos III e XI do GATT. As medidas comerciais chinesas, em questo, impunham tarifa de 25% sobre as importaes de peas automotivas as quais representavam mais de 60% do valor do veculo. A tarifa aplicada a peas que no se encaixavam nessa categoria era de 10%. Essas polticas resultavam em discriminao de peas estrangeiras e gerava subsdio produo domstica. A imposio da tarifa tambm coloca por terra o compromisso da China de no tratar peas como carros inteiros, assumido por ocasio da acesso OMC. A China alegava que a medida era necessria, a fim de prevenir a ocorrncia de evaso fiscal por parte de empresas que importam carros inteiros desmontados, com o objetivo de evitar as tarifas mais elevadas aplicadas a automveis montados. O Relatrio do Painel evocou o caso US - Sugar para explicar que o Artigo II confere s Partes contratantes a possibilidade de incorporar e de qualificar, no quadro legal dos compromissos decorrentes do GATT, compromissos adicionais, mas no a oportunidade de reduzir seus compromissos em outras disposies desse Acordo. O Artigo II:1(b) no permitiria, portanto, a manuteno de restries quantitativas, incompatveis que so com o Artigo XI:1. Tanto o Relatrio do Painel quanto o do rgo de Apelao tenderam a considerar que o objetivo preponderante das normativas chinesas, quanto importao de autopeas, era a imposio de parmetros de contedo nacional. As restries quantitativas e a remisso ao Artigo XI ficaram, assim, em segundo plano. O Relatrio do rgo de Apelao sequer as mencionou. A ndia, entre outros dispositivos, alegou, na fase de consultas, que a medida norte-americana enfrenta o Artigo XI do GATT, uma vez que a exigncia de depsitos maiores do que os regulares pode ser caracterizada como uma medida outra que no encargos e obrigaes. Com essa argumentao, a ndia abriu 109

o escopo semntico do Artigo XI do GATT para sustentar que esses depsitos serviriam como uma forma de restrio quantitativa, pois no se tratavam de direitos, tributos ou outros encargos, ao passo que efetivamente impunham uma restrio ao comrcio. O Painel isentou-se de se pronunciar sobre a denncia da ndia, no que se refere ao Artigo XI, julgando suficientes as ponderaes feitas acerca dos outros Artigos levantados. Justificou-se nos precedentes do rgo e fundamentou-se na necessidade de economia processual (pargrafo 7.167 do Relatrio). Nada obstante, no Anexo A do Relatrio do Painel, sobre os sumrios executivos das primeiras peties escritas, encontra-se a afirmao de que a diretiva no limitava a quantidade de camaro que poderia ser importada para os EUA e, portanto, no constitua uma restrio quantitativa, na acepo do Artigo XIII do GATT. A ndia no teria oferecido suporte para a sua afirmao de que os EUA teriam violado o Artigo XIII, alm do argumento de que a diretiva restringe severamente as importaes. Essa afirmao seria insuficiente para concluir que a diretiva era uma restrio quantitativa. Em sede de apelao, no foi evocado o Artigo XI, motivo por que o relatrio do rgo de Apelao tampouco o menciona. A controvrsia sobre restries quantitativas, no entanto, versou apenas sobre a limitao dos portos de entrada. O Panam pretendeu forjar a tese de que o termo restrio, contido no Artigo XI do GATT, referia-se a toda e qualquer condio limitante sobre a importao de produtos no classificveis como obrigaes, tributos e outros encargos. Evocou, em apoio sua tese, a jurisprudncia dos casos India Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Product e India - Autos. De sua feita, a Colmbia defendeu que o entendimento nesse vis seria demasiado amplo, porquanto, no limite, a proibio alcanaria toda e qualquer medida condicionante importao - por definio, limitante. O Painel acompanhou a Colmbia e no reconheceu o mrito da alegao de que a medida infringiria o Artigo XI:1. No foi utilizada a via recursal. Em julho de 1997, os EUA abriram consulta junto ndia por considerar que as restries quantitativas mantidas por ela, incluindo-se, mas no limitando-se, as mais de 2.700 linhas de produtos agrcolas e industriais notificados OMC no Anexo I, Parte B do WT/BOP/N/21 (Notificao prevista no pargrafo 9 do Entendimento das Disposies sobre Balana de Pagamentos do GATT), datado 22 de maio de 1997, parecem ser incompatveis com as obrigaes da ndia sob diversos Artigos, dentre os quais o XI:1. As restries quantitativas englobariam todas as proibies de importao, restries, licenas de importao, licenas especiais de importao e a proibio de no-comerciais (amostra) quantidades, bem como os procedimentos para implementar e administrar essas medidas. O Artigo XVIII do GATT, sob o ttulo Ajuda Governamental ao Desenvolvimento Econmico, Seo B, permite aos pases nos primeiros estgios de desenvolvimento, com dificuldades de manter condies mnimas de vida para seus sditos e em processo de rpida expanso de seu mercado interno, restringirem quantitativamente as importaes ao enfrentarem dificuldades na Balana de Pagamentos, garantindo-lhes nveis de reservas adequadas ao seu programa de desenvolvimento econmico. As medidas, contudo, somente podem ser institudas, mantidas ou intensificadas perante srio risco de declnio das reservas monetrias e at que atinja nveis razoveis dessa reserva. No processo, poder priorizar a importao de produtos essenciais luz de sua poltica econmica de desenvolvimento, desde que, inter alia, sejam aplicadas de modo a evitar danos desnecessrios aos interesses econmicos e a no obstacularizar os canais regulares de comrcio. A ndia afirmou que ao Painel no caberia vergar-se sobre o Artigo XI:1, uma vez que o Artigo apenas enuncia a proibio geral a restries quantitativas, mas no a forma como as restries autorizadas sob as excees o seriam administradas. Os EUA apontaram que o GATT, em muitas ocasies, reconheceu, em interpretao expansiva, que o licenciamento discricionrio e no automtico de importao constitui uma restrio quantitativa sobre o comrcio, nos termos do Artigo XI:1. Evocou, em auxlio tese, o Relatrio do Painel EC - Bananas, o caso CE - Programa de Preos Mnimos de Importao, Licenas e Depsitos de Seguro para Certas Frutas Processadas e Vegetais e o Painel em Japo - Comrcio de Semi-condutores.

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As importaes dos bens constantes no ttulo Itens restritos, Anexo II da Notificao sob a referncia WT/BOP/N/24, necessitam de licena emitida pelo Diretor-Geral do Comrcio Exterior (DGFT) da ndia. De acordo com os EUA, o licenciamento seria discricionrio e no transparente. A ndia contra-argumentou, afirmando que o sistema era transparente e baseado em regras, e registrou, em particular, que o Ato sobre Comrcio Exterior, de 1992, apresenta os critrios para a concesso de licenas e o dever de que a recusa de concesso de uma licena seja motivada por escrito e as decises sobre a concesso de licenas, incluindo recusas, passveis de recurso. O Painel secundou as alegaes norte-americanas (pargrafo 5.128 do Relatrio) e confirmou que o Artigo X:1 tem escopo largo e se aplica a quaisquer medidas restritivas que no possam ser enquadradas em direitos, tributos e outros encargos, tal qual decidido o mbito do Painel Japo - Comrcio de Semi-condutores. Em particular, a jurisprudncia do GATT, no Painel sobre Restries Quantitativas Importao de Certos Produtos de Hong Kong, por interpretao extensiva, fez equivaler certas medidas de licena a restries quantitativas. Para o Painel seria pacfico o entendimento de que sistemas de licenciamento discricionrios ou noautomticos, por sua prpria natureza, funcionam como limitaes na ao, j que certas importaes no podem ser permitidas. Com isso, houve certa modificao jurisprudencial quanto ao escopo do Artigo X:1 tal qual proclamado em EC - Bananas III. Conforme visto, a despeito das alegaes norte-americanas, licenas no-automticas no eram per se consideradas restries quantitativas. Aliadas, contudo, a critrios sinuosos de qualificao para a concesso de licenas de importao, elas se constituiriam, luz do caso em apreo, no apenas restries no tarifrias gerais e ilegtimas ao comrcio, mas restries quantitativas em si. O rgo de Apelao sustentou os argumentos do Painel quanto ao Artigo XI:1. Em India - Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector , o Painel considerou que a ndia agiu de forma inconsistente com suas obrigaes, nos termos do Artigo XI do GATT de 1994, impondo aos fabricantes de automveis, com base no Edital n 60 e respectivos memorandos de entendimento assinados, a obrigao de equilibrar a importao de kits e componentes com determinadas exportaes de valor equivalente. A ndia chegou a levar o caso ao rgo de Apelao, mas retirou o pedido recursal. tambm interessante notar a relao de alguns Acordos e dispositivos com Artigo XI. H um esforo do Painel em demonstrar que algumas medidas pautadas em certos dispositivos no estariam inconsistentes com o Artigo XI do GATT (Ex: negociaes previstas no Artigo XVIII:3), como tambm por demonstrar que outras medidas pautadas em outros dispositivos no podem se esquivar das obrigaes previstas no Artigo XI (Ex: formao da unio aduaneira, prevista no Artigo XXIV). A evoluo das interpretaes do DSB em relao aos Artigos XI e XI:1 do GATT foi bastante significativa e as concluses do DSB variam em nvel de complexidade. Esse nvel se intensifica desde a definio do termo restrio, no caso India - Autos, at anlises mais complexas. Nota-se uma evoluo da complexidade das decises relativas aos Artigos XI e XI:1 em alguns dos casos, como por exemplo: India - Autos, que analisou as condies da balana comercial das partes; Korea - Beef, no qual o Painel determinou que havia restrio importao, uma vez que o governo coreano diferenciava o tratamento comercial em funo da dieta do gado, cuja carne era importada de pases que os alimentavam ou com gros ou com grama. Nesse caso, o Painel concluiu que tal diferena de tratamento por tipos de alimento dado ao gado significava uma restrio ao comrcio. A partir dos casos visualizados, chega-se concluso de que as demandas dos Membros com o pleito de eliminao de restries quantitativas tm propiciado a evoluo das interpretaes. A ideia bsica de que as limitaes s importaes constituem uma restrio nos termos do Artigo XI, contudo, mantm-se. As decises do DSB relativas aos Artigos XI e XI:1 dependem, cada vez mais, de esforos de definio de parmetros que impeam que outras medidas protetivas ao livre comrcio sejam estabelecidas; possibilitando, assim, que as regras determinadas nos Acordos da OMC sejam obedecidas por todos os Membros.

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Artigo XII

Felipe Herzog IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XII Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments 12.1 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any contracting party, in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments, may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported, subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article. (a) Import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a contracting party under this Article shall not exceed those necessary: (i) (ii) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.

12.2

Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting the reserves of such contracting party or its need for reserves, including, where special external credits or other resources are available to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources. (b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall progressively relax them as such conditions improve, maintaining them only to the extent that the conditions specified in that sub-paragraph still justify their application. They shall eliminate the restrictions when conditions would no longer justify their institution or maintenance under that sub-paragraph. Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic policies, to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring equilibrium in their balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability of avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive resources. They recognize that, in order to achieve these ends, it is desirable so far as possible to adopt measures which expand rather than contract international trade. Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article may determine the incidence of the restrictions on imports of different products or classes of products in such a way as to give priority to the importation of those products which are more essential. Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article undertake: (i) (ii) to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic interests of any other contracting party; not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the importation of any description of goods in minimum commercial quantities the exclusion of which would impair regular channels of trade; and not to apply restrictions which would prevent the importations of commercial samples or prevent compliance with patent, trade mark, copyright, or similar procedures.

12.3

(a)

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(d)

The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic policies directed towards the achievement and maintenance of full and productive employment or towards the development of economic resources, a contracting party may experience a high level of demand for 112

imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves of the sort referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of this Article. Accordingly, a contracting party otherwise complying with the provisions of this Article shall not be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in those policies would render unnecessary restrictions which it is applying under this Article. 12.4 (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising the general level of its existing restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Article shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with the Contracting Parties as to the nature of its balance of payments difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other contracting parties. On a date to be determined by them, the Contracting Parties shall review all restrictions still applied under this Article on that date. Beginning one year after that date, contracting parties applying import restrictions under this Article shall enter into consultations of the type provided for in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph with the Contracting Parties annually. (i) If, in the course of consultations with a contracting party under sub-paragraph (a) or (b) above, the Contracting Parties find that the restrictions are not consistent with provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may advise that the restrictions be suitably modified. If, however, as a result of the consultations, the Contracting Parties determine that the restrictions are being applied in a manner involving an inconsistency of a serious nature with the provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade of any contracting party is caused or threatened thereby, they shall so inform the contracting party applying the restrictions and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing conformity with such provisions within the specified period of time. If such contracting party does not comply with these recommendations within the specified period, the Contracting Parties may release any contracting party the trade of which is adversely affected by the restrictions from such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they deter mine to be appropriate in the circumstances.

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(d)

The Contracting Parties shall invite any contracting party which is applying restrictions under this Article to enter into consultations with them at the request of any contracting party which can establish a prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the provisions of this Article or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected thereby. However, no such invitation shall be issued unless the Contracting Parties have ascertained that direct discussions between the contracting parties concerned have not been successful. If, as a result of the consultations with the Contracting Parties, no agreement is reached and they determine that the restrictions are being applied inconsistently with such provisions, and that damage to the trade of the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or modification of the restrictions. If the restrictions are not withdrawn or modified within such time as the Contracting Parties may prescribe, they may release the contracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. In proceeding under this paragraph, the Contracting Parties shall have due regard to any special external factors adversely affecting the export trade of the contracting party applying the restrictions.

(e)

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(f)

Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expeditiously and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the consultations.

12.5

If there is a persistent and widespread application of import restrictions under this Article, indicating the existence of a general disequilibrium which is restricting international trade, the Contracting Parties shall initiate discussions to consider whether other measures might be taken, either by those contracting parties the balance of payments of which are under pressure or by those the balance of payments of which are tending to be exceptionally favourable, or by any appropriate intergovernmental organization, to remove the underlying causes of the disequilibrium. On the invitation of the Contracting Parties, contracting parties shall participate in such discussions. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XII Restries Destinadas a Proteger o Equilbrio da Balana de Pagamentos

IB.

12.1

No obstante as disposies do pargrafo primeiro do artigo XI, toda Parte Contratante, a fim de salvaguardar sua posio financeira exterior e o equilbrio de sua balana de pagamentos, pode restringir o volume ou o valor das mercadorias cuja importao ela autoriza, sob reserva das disposies dos pargrafos seguintes do presente artigo. (a) As restries importao institudas, mantidas ou reforadas por uma Parte Contratante em virtude do presente artigo, no ultrapassaro o que for necessrio: (i) (ii) Para opor-se ameaa iminente de uma baixa importante de suas reservas monetrias ou para por fim a esta baixa; Ou para aumentar suas reservas monetrias segundo uma taxa de crescimento razovel, no caso em que elas sejam muito baixas.

12.2

Sero devidamente levados em conta, nestes dois casos todos os fatores especiais que afetem as reservas monetrias da Parte Contratante ou suas necessidades de reservas monetrias especialmente se ela dispe de crditos exteriores especiais ou de outros recursos a necessidade de prever o emprego apropriado destes crditos ou destes recursos. (b) As Partes Contratantes que aplicam restries em virtude da alnea (a) do presente pargrafo as atenuaro progressivamente medida que a situao prevista na dita alnea melhorar; elas no os mantero seno na medida em que esta situao ainda justificar a sua aplicao. Elas as eliminaro assim que a situao no justificar mais a sua instituio ou manuteno em virtude da dita alnea. Na execuo da sua poltica nacional, as Partes Contratantes se comprometem a levar devidamente em conta a necessidade de manter ou de restabelecer o equilbrio de suas balanas de pagamentos sobre uma base s e durvel e a oportunidade de evitar que os seus recursos produtivos sejam utilizados de uma maneira anti-econmica. Elas reconhecem que para alcanar estes objetivos conveniente a adoo na medida do possvel de medidas que visem mais ao desenvolvimento que contratao das trocas internacionais. As Partes Contratantes que aplicam restries de conformidade com o presente artigo podero determinar a incidncia destas restries sobre as importaes de diferentes produtos ou de diferentes categorias de produtos de maneira a dar prioridade importao de produtos que so necessrios. As Partes Contratantes que apliquem restries de conformidade com o presente artigo se comprometem:

12.3

(a)

(b)

(c)

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(i) (ii)

(iii)

a evitar lesar inutilmente os interesses comerciais ou econmicos de qualquer outra Parte Contratante; a se abster da aplicao de restries que faam indevidamente obstculos importao em quantidades comerciais mnimas de mercadorias, de qualquer natureza que sejam, cuja excluso entrave as correntes normais de trocas; e a se abster da aplicao de restries que faam obstculo importao de amostras comerciais ou observao de procedimentos relativos s patentes, marcas de fbrica, direitos autorais ou de reproduo ou outros procedimentos anlogos.

(d)

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que a poltica seguida no plano nacional por uma Parte Contratante destinada a realizar e manter o pleno emprego produtivo ou assegurar o desenvolvimento dos recursos econmicos pode provocar nesta Parte Contratante uma forte procura de importaes que comporte, para suas reservas monetrias, uma ameaa do gnero daquelas previstas na alnea (a) do pargrafo 2 do presente artigo. Em conseqncia, uma Parte Contratante que se conforme, sob qualquer outro aspecto, s disposies do presente artigo no ser obrigada a suprimir ou modificar as restries sob fundamento de que, se uma modificao for introduzida nesta poltica, as restries que ela aplique em virtude do presente artigo cessaro de ser necessrias. Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique novas restries ou que eleve o nvel geral das restries existentes reforando de maneira substancial as medidas aplicadas em virtude do presente artigo dever, imediatamente aps haver institudo ou reforado estas restries (ou, no caso em que consultas prvias sejam possveis na prtica, antes de as haver feito), entrar em consulta com as Partes Contratantes sobre a natureza das dificuldades atinentes s suas balanas de pagamentos, sobre os diversos corretivos que ela tem sua escolha, assim como sobre a repercusso possvel destas restries sobre a economia de outras Partes Contratantes. Numa data a ser fixada, as Partes Contratantes passaro em revista todas as restries que, nesta data, ainda se apliquem em virtude do presente artigo. Aps expirar o perodo de um ano a contar da data acima prevista, as Partes Contratantes que apliquem restries importao em virtude do presente artigo entraro anualmente com as Partes Contratantes em consultas do tipo previsto na alnea (a) do presente pargrafo. (i) Se, no curso das consultas realizadas com uma Parte Contratante conforme a alnea (a) ou a alnea (b) acima, as Partes Contratantes consideram que as restries no so compatveis com as disposies do presente artigo ou as do artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposies do artigo XIV), elas indicaro os pontos de divergncia e podero aconselhar que sejam adotadas modificaes apropriadas s restries. Contudo se em decorrncia dessas consultas as Partes Contratantes determinam que as restries so aplicadas de uma maneira que comporte uma sria incompatibilidade com as disposies do presente artigo ou as do artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposies do artigo XIV) e que delas resulte um prejuzo ou uma ameaa de prejuzo para o comrcio de uma Parte Contratante, elas comunicaro a respeito Parte Contratante que aplica as restries e faro recomendaes apropriadas a fim de assegurar a observao dentro de um prazo determinado, das disposies em pauta. Se a Parte Contratante no se conforma com as recomendaes no prazo fixado, as Partes Contratantes podero dispensar qualquer contratante cujo comrcio tiver sido atingido pelas restries de toda obrigao resultante do presente acordo, onde lhes parecer apropriado dispensar, levando, em conta as circunstncias, com relao Parte Contratante que aplica as restries.

12.4

(a)

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(d)

As Partes Contratantes convidaro qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique restries em virtude do presente artigo a entrar em consultas com elas a pedido de qualquer Parte Contratante que possa estabelecer prima facie que as restries so incompatveis com as disposies do presente artigo ou as do artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposies do artigo 115

XIV) e que seu comrcio foi atingido. Contudo, este convite no ser feito a no ser que as Partes Contratantes tenham constatado que as conversaes efetuadas diretamente entre as Partes Contratantes interessadas no chegaram a bom termo. Se nenhum acordo for obtido em conseqncia das consultas com as Partes Contratantes e se as Partes Contratantes determinam que as restries so aplicadas de uma incompatvel com as disposies acima mencionadas e das quais resulte um prejuzo ou uma ameaa de prejuzo para o comrcio da Parte Contratante que solicitou a consulta, elas recomendaro a retirada ou a modificao das restries. Se as restries no forem retiradas ou modificadas no prazo que for fixado pelas Partes Contratantes, estas podero dispensar a Parte Contratante que solicitou a consulta de toda a obrigao resultante do presente acordo onde lhes parecer apropriado dispensar, tendo em conta as circunstncias, com relao Parte Contratante que aplica as restries. (e) Em todo o procedimento efetuado de conformidade com o presente pargrafo, as Partes Contratantes levaro devidamente em conta todo o fator externo especial que atinge o comrcio de exportao da Parte Contratante que aplica restries. As determinaes previstas no presente pargrafo devero ser fornecidas prontamente e, se possvel, no prazo de sessenta dias a contar daquele em que as consultas tiverem sido iniciadas.

(f)

12.5

No caso em que a aplicao de restries importao em virtude do presente artigo tomar um carter durvel e extenso, o que seria ndice de um desequilbrio geral no sentido de reduzir o volume das trocas internacionais, as Partes Contratantes iniciaro conversaes para examinar se outras medidas podero ser tomadas, seja pelas Partes Contratantes cujo balano de pagamentos tende a ser excepcionalmente favorvel, seja ainda por qualquer organizao intergovernamental competente, a fim de fazer desaparecer as causas fundamentais deste desequilbrio. A convite das Partes Contratantes, as Partes Contratantes tomaro a parte nas conversaes acima prevista.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XII

Este Artigo no foi objeto de anlise pelo DSB da OMC. III. Comentrios

Nada a observar, uma vez que este Artigo no foi objeto de anlise pelo DSB da OMC.

116

Artigo XIII

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins Fabio Weinberg Crocco IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XIII Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions 13.1 No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted. In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the following provisions: (a) Wherever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of permitted imports (whether allocated among supplying countries or not) shall be fixed, and notice given of their amount in accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of this Article; In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may be applied by means of import licences or permits without a quota; Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas allocated in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, require that import licences or permits be utilized for the importation of the product concerned from a particular country or source; In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the contracting party applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any contracting party from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which the quota may relate. In cases in which import licences are issued in connection with import restrictions, the contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide, upon the request of any contracting party having an interest in the trade in the product concerned, all relevant information concerning the administration of the restrictions, the import licences granted over a recent period and the distribution of such licences among supplying countries; Provided that there shall be no obligation to supply information as to the names of importing or supplying enterprises. In the case of import restrictions involving the fixing of quotas, the contracting party applying the restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any 117

13.2

(b)

(c)

(d)

13.3

(a)

(b)

change in such quantity or value. Any supplies of the product in question which were en route at the time at which public notice was given shall not be excluded from entry; Provided that they may be counted so far as practicable, against the quantity permitted to be imported in the period in question, and also, where necessary, against the quantities permitted to be imported in the next following period or periods; and Provided further that if any contracting party customarily exempts from such restrictions products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during a period of thirty days after the day of such public notice, such practice shall be considered full compliance with this subparagraph. (c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries, the contracting party applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other contracting parties having an interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof.

13.4

With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the contracting party applying the restriction; Provided that such contracting party shall, upon the request of any other contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the other contracting party or the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles of this Article shall also extend to export restrictions.

13.5

() ANNEX I NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS () Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms import restrictions or export restrictions include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations. () Ad Article XIII Paragraph 2 (d) No mention was made of commercial considerations as a rule for the allocation of quotas because it was considered that its application by governmental authorities might not always be practicable. Moreover, in cases where it is practicable, a contracting party could apply these considerations in the process of seeking agreement, consistently with the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2. Paragraph 4 See note relating to special factors in connection with the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 of Article XI. 118

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XIII Aplicao No Discriminatria das Restries Quantitativas

13.1

Nenhuma proibio ou restrio ser aplicada por uma Parte Contratante importao de um produto originrio do territrio de outra Parte Contratante ou exportao de um produto destinado ao territrio de outra Parte Contratante a menos que proibies ou restries semelhantes sejam aplicadas importao do produto similar originrio de todos os outros pases ou exportao do produto similar destinado a todos os outros pases. Na aplicao das restries importao de um produto qualquer, as Partes Contratantes esforar-seo por chegar a uma repartio do comrcio desse produto que se aproxime tanto quanto possvel da que, na ausncia dessas medidas, as diferentes Partes Contratantes teriam o direito de esperar, observando para esse fim as disposies seguintes: (a) Sempre que for possvel, contingentes que representem a soma global das importaes autorizadas (sejam eles ou no repartidos entre os pases fornecedores) sero fixados e sua importncia ser publicada de acordo com a alnea 3 (b) do presente Artigo; Quando no for possvel fixar contingentes globais, as restries podero ser aplicadas por meio de licenas ou permisses de importao sem contingente global; A menos que se trate de tornar efetivas as cotas concedidas segundo a alnea (d) do presente pargrafo, as Partes Contratantes no prescrevero que as licenas ou permisses de exportao sejam utilizadas para a importao do produto visado de provenincia de uma fonte abastecedora ou de um pas determinado; Nos casos de ser um contingente repartido entre os pases fornecedores, a Parte Contratante que aplica as restries poder entender-se com todas as Partes Contratantes que tm um interesse substancial no fornecimento do produto visado para a repartio do contingente. Nos casos em que no for razoavelmente possvel aplicar este mtodo, a Parte Contratante em questo atribuir s Partes Contratantes que tm um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais contribuio trazida pelas Partes Contratantes ao volume total ou valor total das importaes do produto em questo no decorrer de um perodo anterior de referncia, devidamente levados em conta todos os elementos especiais que tenham podido ou que possam afetar o comrcio desse produto. No ser imposta nenhuma condio ou formalidade de natureza a impedir uma Parte Contratante de utilizar ao mximo a parcela do volume total ou do valor total que lhe for atribuda, com a condio de ser a importao feita dentro dos limites do perodo fixado para a utilizao desse contingente. Nos casos de serem as licenas de importao atribudas dentro do quadro de restries importao, a Parte Contratante que aplicar a restrio fornecer, a pedido de qualquer Parte Contratante interessada no comrcio do produto visado, todas as informaes pertinentes relativas aplicao dessa restrio, as licenas de importao concedidas no decorrer de um perodo recente e repartio dessas licenas entre os pases fornecedores, ficando entendido que no ser obrigada a fornecer informaes a respeito do nome dos estabelecimentos importadores e fornecedores. Nos casos de restries importao que comportem a fixao de contingentes, a Parte Contratante que as aplicar tornar pblico o volume total ou o valor total do ou dos produtos cuja importao for autorizada no decorrer de um perodo ulterior determinado bem como toda modificao sobrevinda neste volume ou nesse valor. Se qualquer desses produtos em questo estiver em viagem no momento em que o aviso for publicado, a entrada no ser proibida. Todavia, ser facultado computar esse produto, na medida do possvel, na quantidade cuja importao estiver autorizada no decorrer do perodo em questo, e 119

13.2

(b)

(c)

(d)

13.3

(a)

(b)

igualmente, se for o caso, na quantidade cuja importao for autorizada no decorrer do perodo ou dos perodos seguintes. Alm disso, se de modo habitual, uma Parte Contratante dispensar dessas restries os produtos que forem, dentro de trinta dias a contar da data dessa publicao, declarados com destino ao consumo ou que forem retirados de entrepostos com fins de consumo, essa prtica ser considerada plenamente satisfatria s prescries da presente alnea. (c) Nos casos de contingentes repartidos entre os pases fornecedores, a Parte Contratante que aplicar as restries informar sem demora todas as outras Partes Contratantes interessadas no fornecimento do produto em questo da parcela do contingente expressa em volume ou em valor, comumente atribuda aos diversos pases fornecedores e publicar todas as informaes teis a esse respeito.

13.4

No que se refere s restries aplicadas de acordo com a alnea 2 (d) do presente Artigo ou a alnea 2 (c) do Artigo XI a escolha, para qualquer produto, de um perodo de referncia e a apreciao dos elementos especiais que afetam seu comrcio sero feitos, a princpio, pela Parte Contratante que instituir a restrio. A dita Parte Contratante, a pedido de qualquer outra Parte Contratante que tenha um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, ou a pedido das Partes Contratantes, consultar sem demora a outra Parte Contratante ou s Partes Contratantes a respeito da necessidade de ajustar a repartio ou o perodo de referncia ou de apreciar de novo os elementos especiais em jogo ou de suprimir as condies, formalidades ou outras disposies prescritas de modo unilateral a respeito da atribuio de um contingente apropriado ou de sua utilizao sem restrio. As disposies do presente Artigo aplicar-se-o a qualquer contingente alfandegrio institudo ou mantido por uma Parte Contratante; alm disso, tanto quanto possvel, os princpios do presente Artigo aplicar-se-o igualmente s restries exportao. ANEXO I NOTAS E DISPOSIES ADICIONAIS

13.5

(...) Aos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII Nos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII as expresses restries importao ou restries exportao visam igualmente s restries aplicadas por meio de transaes efetuadas em decorrncia do comrcio do Estado. Ao Artigo XIII Pargrafo 2(d) Nenhuma meno foi feita s consideraes de ordem comercial, como critrio para a distribuio de cotas, porque foi considerado que sua aplicao pelas autoridades governamentais nem sempre pode ser praticvel. Alm disso, nos casos em que essa aplicao seja possvel, uma parte contratante poderia aplicar esse critrio como instrumento para chegar a um acordo, conforme a regra geral consignada na primeira sentena do 2. Pargrafo 4 Vide a nota relativa aos fatores especiais em conexo com a ltima alnea do 2 do Artigo XI. (Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994)

120

IC.

Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Houve erro de traduo no tocante ao pargrafo 2(c). A expresso import licences or permits foi traduzida como as licenas ou permisses de exportao, quando o correto seria as licenas ou permisses de importaes. Quando da internalizao do GATT 1947, a traduo nacional baseou-se na verso francesa. Todavia, quando se incorporou o GATT 1994 ao ordenamento ptrio, a traduo lastreou-se no texto oficial em ingls. Isto importante para se compreender a observao a seguir. Verifica-se que a passagem a Parte Contratante em questo atribuir s Partes Contratantes que tm um interesse substancial no fornecimento desse produto, partes proporcionais, inserida no pargrafo 2(d), na forma como traduzida, apresenta-se truncada, pois seria melhor que a vrgula constante do texto fosse suprimida ou que fosse acrescida outra vrgula imediatamente em seguida ao verbo atribuir. Nesta quadra, observa-se que a verso oficial em ingls no apresenta qualquer vrgula no trecho em apreo ( the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions). J a verso francesa dispe o seguinte: la partie contractante en question attribuera, aux parties contractantes ayant un intrt substantiel la fourniture de ce produit, des parts proportionnelles. Tendo a verso nacional sido efetuada com arrimo na sua congnere francesa, deveria ter seguido a metodologia desta e empregado uma vrgula logo aps o verbo atribuir, o que tornaria o texto mais suave. Por fim, nota-se, na parte final do pargrafo 3(a), o uso da expresso do nome. A verso inglesa refere-se a the names (plural), enquanto que a francesa utilizava le nom (singular). II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XIII Artigo XIII, caput a) Regimes administrativos de alocao de quotas tarifrias diferenciados Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.79 Em CE - Bananas III o DSB concluiu que as regras de no-discriminao dispostas no Artigo XIII do GATT aplicam-se a um determinado produto, independentemente da forma pela qual os Membros implementam seus regimes de alocao de quotas tarifrias. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190. Para. 7.79. We note that Article XIII:1 provides that no restriction shall be applied by any Member on the importation of any product of another Member unless the importation of the like product of all third countries ... is similarly ... restricted. Article XIII:2 requires Members when allocating tariff quota shares to aim at a distribution of trade (...) approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions. By their terms, these two provisions of Article XIII do not provide a basis for analysing quota allocation regimes separately because they have different legal bases or because different tariff rates are applicable. Article XIII applies to allocations of shares in an import market for a particular product which is restricted by a quota or tariff quota. In our view, its non-discrimination requirements apply to that market for that product, irrespective of whether or how a Member subdivides it for administrative or other reasons. Indeed, to accept that a Member could establish quota regimes by different legal instruments and argue that they are not as a consequence subject to Article XIII would be, as argued by the Complainants, to eviscerate the non-discrimination provisions of Article XIII. 121

Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.54 O Painel em US - Line Pipe entendeu que, na aplicao do Artigo XIII, caput, devem ser levados em considerao os padres tradicionais de comrcio entre as Partes. Para. 7.54. (...) imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (...) Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have ocurred in the absence of that measure. 2. Artigo XIII:1

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA, para. 343 A idia de no-discriminao prevista no Artigo I:1 diferente daquela contida no Artigo XIII. Para. 343. If a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Proultry Products), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/AB/R, para. 108 Contigentes alfandegrios devem ser calculados com base na totalidade das importaes, incluindo Membros e no-Membros da OMC. Para. 108. Therefore, we uphold the finding of the Panel in paragraph 233 of the Panel Report that the European Communities has not acted inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 by calculating Brazils tariff-rate quota based on the total quantity of imports, including those from non-Members. Relatrio de Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, para. 6.46 No caso vertente, apontou-se como uma distoro, entre outras, o fato de que o perodo anterior de referncia, constante do Artigo XIII:2(d), no pode estar acobertado por distores de mercado. Para. 6.46. (...) the world market excluding the European Communities is of limited value for purposes of calculating country shares based on a previous representative period because different banana-exporting countries have quite different market shares in different regions of the world. For example, Ecuadors world market share has increased from 26 to 36 per cent during the last decade and thus is significantly higher than its country allocation under the EC revised regime (...) Because different banana-exporting countries have quite different market shares in different regions of the world, it would also be difficult, if not impossible, to use a regional or specific country market as a basis for allocating tariff quota shares. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 190

122

A utilizao de dois regimes jurdicos distintos, por parte um Membro da OMC, no tem relevncia na aplicao do princpio da No-Discriminao previsto no Artigo XIII. Para. 190. If, by choosing a different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A agreements, if these provisions apply only within regulatory regimes established by that Member. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.49 O Painel em US - Line Pipe consignou que, caso os negociadores da Rodada Uruguai tivessem pretendido expressamente omitir o Artigo XIII do contexto das medidas de salvaguarda, eles poderiam ter dito isso no Acordo de Salvaguardas, mas no o fizeram. Para. 7.49. (...) we would suggest that it is the paucity of disciplines governing the application of tariff quota safeguard measure in Article 5 of the Safeguards Agreement that supports our interpretation of Article XIII. If Article XIII did not apply to tariff quota safeguard measures, such safeguard measures would escape the majority of the disciplines set forth in Article 5. This is an important consideration, given the quantitative aspect of a tariff quota. For example, if Article XIII did not apply, quantitative criteria regarding the availability of lower tariff rates could be introduced in a discriminatory manner, without any consideration to prior quantitative performance. In our view, the potential for such discrimination is contrary to the object and purpose of both the Safeguards Agreement, and the WTO Agreement. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.54 O Painel em US - Line Pipe entendeu que, na aplicao do Artigo XIII, caput, devem ser levados em considerao os padres tradicionais de comrcio entre as Partes. Para. 7.54. (...) imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (...) Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have ocurred in the absence of that measure. b) Interpretao do termo restrio Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas(EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, para. 7.332 O Painel em EC - Bananas III interpretou a palavra restrio de modo amplo, como qualquer benefcio concedido a um determinado Membro que seja capaz de afetar competitividade de outros Membros. Para. 7.332. Given that broad interpretation of the term restriction, the Panel sees the European Communities' preferential ACP tariff quota as a restriction for Ecuador within the meaning of Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. As the European Communities recognizes, its banana import regime confers a benefit, although a quantitatively limited one, to ACP countries, and Ecuador, like other MFN banana suppliers, cannot have access to that quantitatively limited benefit. Any benefit accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members presumably affects the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other Members,

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including from Ecuador, to the European Communities market. By its very nature, such a benefit reserved for some Members generally represents a disadvantage for other Members. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 7.679. Mudana de posicionamento: Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, fase de implementao, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, paras. 337 e 346 Entretanto, o rgo de Apelao divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel, reduzindo a interpretao do termo restrio. De acordo com o rgo de Apelao o referido termo deveria ser lido como uma referncia a quotas tarifrias, e no como benefcio. Para. 337. [] Applying Article XIII:1 to a tariff quota requires that the word restriction be read as a reference to a tariff quota. Article XIII:1 is then rendered thus: no tariff quota shall be applied by a Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries is similarly made subject to the tariff quota. The application of the tariff quota is thus on a product-wide basis. The principle of non-discriminatory application captured by Article XIII:1 requires that, if a tariff quota is applied to one Member, it must be applied to all; and, consequently, the term similarly restricted means, in the case of tariff quotas, that imports of like products of all third countries must have access to, and be given an opportunity of, participation. If a Member is excluded from access to, and participation in, the tariff quota, then imports of like products from all third countries are not similarly restricted. Para. 346. Having said that, we note our disagreement with the Panel's overly broad interpretation of the term restriction in Article XIII:1 as [a]ny benefit accorded to fresh bananas of only some Members presumably affect[ing] the competitive opportunities of like bananas imported from other Members considering that [b]y its very nature, ... a benefit reserved for some Members generally represents a disadvantage for other Members. Such a broad reading of the term restriction in Article XIII would mean that even a simple tariff preference without a limitation would lead to dissimilar restrictions within the meaning of Article XIII, thus confounding the function and coverage of Article I and Article XIII. Such an interpretation would also ignore the fact that Article XIII is concerned with the non-discriminatory administration of tariff quotas, and does not prohibit them as such. 3. Artigo XIII:2 a) Objetivo e propsito De acordo com a intepretao adotada pelo DSB, o Artigo XIII:2 objetivaria minimizar os impactos causados aos fluxos internacionais de comrcio em decorrncia da imposio de quotas tarifrias. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.68 Para. 7.68. [] In light of the terms of Article XIII, it can be said that the object and purpose of Article XIII:2 is to minimize the impact of a quota or tariff quota regime on trade flows by attempting to approximate under such measures the trade shares that would have occurred in the absence of the regime. In interpreting the terms of Article XIII, it is important to keep their context in mind. Article XIII is basically a provision

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relating to the administration of restrictions authorized as exceptions to one of the most basic GATT provisions-the general ban on quotas and other non-tariff restrictions contained in Article XI. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento no Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso EC - Bananas III, para. 7.706. 4. Artigo XIII:2(a) a) Aplicao da tarifa mnima O Painel no caso US - Pipe Line concluiu que o Artigo XIII:2(a) do GATT impe o dever de, sempre que possvel, fixar o montante total de importaes permitidas com base na tarifa mais baixa existente. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Pipe Line), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.58 Para. 7.58. Irrespective of whether or not tariff quotas constitute quotas within the meaning of Article XIII:2(a), tariff quotas are necessarily subject to the disciplines contained in Article XIII:2(a) as a result of the express language of Article XIII:5. Thus, Article XIII:2(a) must have meaning in the context of tariff quotas. We believe that, in respect of tariff quotas, Article XIII:2(a) requires Members to fix, wherever practicable, the total amount of imports permitted at the lower tariff rate. 5. Artigo XIII:2(d) a) Aplicao do princpio de no discriminao alocao de quotas tarifrias O rgo de Apelao concluiu em EC - Bananas III que os Membros esto impedidos de fazer discriminaes ao alocar quotas tarifrias entre Membros que no tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 161 Para. 161. (...) [A]llocation to Members not having a substantial interest must be subject to the basic principle of nondiscrimination. When this principle of non-discrimination is applied to the allocation of tariff quota shares to Members not having a substantial interest, it is clear that a Member cannot, whether by agreement or by assignment, allocate tariff quota shares to some Members not having a substantial interest while not allocating shares to other Members who likewise do not have a substantial interest. To do so is clearly inconsistent with the requirement in Article XIII:1 that a Member cannot restrict the importation of any product from another Member unless the importation of the like product from all third countries is similarly restricted. O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes Relatrios: (i) Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.73; e (ii) Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 7.715. b) Presuno relativa em relao aos critrios previstos no Artigo XIII:2, caput

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De acordo com o Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, na fase de implementao do caso EC - Bananas III, o Artigo XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presuno relativa em relao observncia dos critrios estabelecidos no Artigo XIII:2, caput. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, fase de implementao, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 338 Para. 338. () Article XIII:2(d) allows for the case where a quota is allocated among supplying countries, either by way of agreement or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by allotment to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and in accordance with the proportions supplied by those Members during a previous representative period, taking due account of special factors. In other words, Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive safe harbour; compliance with the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) is presumed to lead to a distribution of trade as foreseen in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, as far as substantial suppliers are concerned. c) Relao subsidiria entre primeira e segundas frases do Artigo XIII:2 De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, a relao entre as duas frases constantes do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT de natureza subsidiria. Ademais, no seria permissvel firmar acordos com apenas determinados Membros que tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.72 Para. 7.72. The terms of Article XIII:2(d) make clear that the combined use of agreements and unilateral allocations to Members with substantial interests is not permitted. The text of Article XIII:2(d) provides that where the first method, i.e., agreement, is not reasonably practicable, then an allocation must be made. Thus, in the absence of agreements with all Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product, the Member applying the restriction must allocate shares in accordance with the rules of Article XIII:2(d), second sentence. In the absence of this rule, the Member allocating shares could reach agreements with some Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product that discriminated against other Members having a substantial interest supplying the product, even if those other Members objected to the shares they were to be allocated. d) Discriminao entre estados que no tenham interesse no fornecimento de determinado produto Em EC - Bananas III, o Painel concluiu que se, por ventura, um Membro optar por alocar quotas tarifrias a Membros que no tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto, tais quotas devem ser estendidas a todos os Membros enquadrados nessa categoria. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.73 Para. 7.73. The question then is whether country-specific shares can also be allocated to Members that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the product and, if so, what the method of allocation would have to be. As to the first point, we note that the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) refers to allocation of a quota among supplying countries. This could be read to imply that an allocation may also be made to Members that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the product. If this interpretation is accepted, any such allocation must, however, meet the requirements of Article XIII:1 and the general rule in the chapeau to 126

Article XIII:2(d). Therefore, if a Member wishes to allocate shares of a tariff quota to some suppliers without a substantial interest, then such shares must be allocated to all such suppliers. Otherwise, imports from Members would not be similarly restricted as required by Article XIII:1. As to the second point, in such a case it would be required to use the same method as was used to allocate the country-specific shares to the Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product, because otherwise the requirements of Article XIII:1 would also not be met. e) Estados No-Membros O Painel do caso EC - Poultry posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT permite alocaes de quotas tarifrias a Membros que no sejam Membros da OMC e no seriam vedadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products (EC - Poultry), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS69/R, paras. 230-232 Para. 230. We note that Article XIII carefully distinguishes between Members (contracting parties in the original text of GATT 1947) and supplying countries or source. There is nothing in Article XIII that obligates Members to calculate tariff quota shares on the basis of imports from Members only. If the purpose of using past trade performance is to approximate the shares in the absence of the restrictions as required under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, exclusion of a non-Member, particularly if it is an efficient supplier, would not serve that purpose. Para. 231. This interpretation is also confirmed by the use in Article XIII:2(d) of the term of the total quantity or value of imports of the product without limiting the total quantity to imports from Members. Para. 232. The conclusion above is not affected by the fact that the TRQ in question was opened as compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII because Article XIII is a general provision regarding the non-discriminatory administration of import restrictions applicable to any TRQs regardless of their origin. O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC - Poultry, WT/DS69/AB/R, paras. 106 e 108. f) Relao entre o disposto em XIII:1 e XIII:2(d) do GATT Nos termos do Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Poultry, o disposto no Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT deve ser tido como lex especialis em relao ao Artigo XIII:1, e no como uma exceo. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.75 Para. 7.75. The consequence of the foregoing analysis is that Members may be effectively required to use a general others category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product. The fact that in this situation tariff quota shares are allocated to some Members, notably those having a substantial interest in supplying the product, but not to others that do not have a substantial interest in supplying the product, would not necessarily be in conflict with Article XIII:1. While the requirement of Article XIII:2(d) is not expressed as an exception to the requirements of Article XIII:1, it may be regarded, to the extent that its practical application is inconsistent with it, as lex specialis in respect of Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned.

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6.

Artigo XIII:5 a) Aplicao do Artigo XIII a regimes com uma nica quota tarifria

O Painel, na fase de implementao do caso EC - Bananas, concluiu, por meio de interpretao literal do Artigo XIII:5 do GATT, que o Artigo XIII do GATT aplicvel tanto aos regimes de impostao de quotas tarifrias mltiplas, quanto queles regimes que preveem apenas uma quota tarifria. Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU, para. 7.290 Para. 7.290. First, the Panel looks at the language of Article XIII:5 of the GATT 199 4. The words any (both before the terms tariff quota and contracting party) and shall in Article XIII:5 underscore the absolute and categorical nature of the application of the provisions of (...) Article [XIII] to tariff quotas. The Panel notes also that Article XIII:5 uses the term any tariff quota instituted or maintained by any [Member] in the singular. The Panel reads this to mean that Article XIII of the GATT 1994 is also applicable to one single tariff quota, and that this is so irrespective of whether that single tariff quota is prt of an import regime with more tariff quotas or is part of an import regime that comprises only one tariff quota. Ademais, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII do GATT aplicvel a quotas tarifrias. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.68 Para. 7.68. However, Article XIII:5 makes it clear, and the parties agree, that Article XIII applies to the administration of tariff quotas. O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 160. 7. Relao com outros Artigos do GATT a) Artigo I do GATT Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandante: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.107 De acordo com o entendimento do DSB, o Artigo I do GATT prev regra geral de no discriminao. O Artigo XIII:1, por sua vez, tambm prev a mesma regra, mas especificamente em relao administrao de quotas tarifarias. Trata-se, portanto, de norma mais especfica. Para. 7.107. Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I and XIII:1, both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in respect of rules and formalities in connection with importation, a phrase that has been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be imposed. To describe the relationship somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring non-discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation. Article XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the 128

administration of quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with that of Article I. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, fase de implementao, no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (CE - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 343 No obstante, de acordo com o entendimento do rgo de Apelao constante do relatrio de EC - Bananas III, a despeito de os Artigos I e XIII do GATT imporem deveres de no-discriminao, a dispensa do cumprimento do disposto no primeiro dispositivo no implica dispensa do cumprimento no segundo. Para. 343. We consider that the notion of non-discrimination in the application of tariffs under Article I:1 and the notion of non-discriminatory application of a prohibition or restriction under Article XIII are distinct, and that Article XIII ensures that a Member applying a restriction or prohibition does not discriminate among all other Members. Article I:1, which applies to tariffs, and Article XIII:1, which applies to quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas, may apply to different elements of a measure or import regime. Article XIII adapts the MFN-treatment principle to specific types of measures, that is, quantitative restrictions, and, by virtue of Article XIII:5, tariff quotas. Tariff quotas must comply with the requirements of both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the GATT 1994. This, in our view, does not make Article XIII redundant in respect of tariff quotas: if a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares. 8. Relao com outros acordos a) Acordo de Agricultura O DSB concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura no prev expressamente a alocao de quotas tarifrias especficas para cada pas em relao a produtos agrcolas. De acordo com o posicionamento do DSB, se essa fosse a inteno dos negociadores, haveria previso especfica a esse respeito no Acordo de Agricultura. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.124 Para. 7.124. () If the Agreement on Agriculture would have allowed for country-specific allocations of tariff quotas there would have been a specific provision to this effect in deviation from Article XIII:2(d) as with the special treatment provisions of Annex 5. In contrast, Article 4.2 is a substantive provision in that it prohibits the use of certain non-tariff barriers, subject to certain qualifications. As a substantive provision, it prevails over such GATT provisions as Article XI:2(c). O DSB reafirmou esse entendimento nos seguintes Relatrios: (i) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso EC - Bananas III, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 157; e (ii) Relatrio do Painel, fase de implementao, no caso EC Bananas III, WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 7.642. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, para. 7.126

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O DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercado, relacionados a produtos agrcolas, exceto se previsto expressamente em sentido contrrio no Acordo sobre Agricultura. Para. 7.126. Finally, we note that, pursuant to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, GATT rules apply subject to the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, a wording that clearly suggests priority for the latter. But giving priority to Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which simply relates market access concessions to Members' goods schedules as attached to GATT by the Marrakesh Protocol, does not necessitate, or even suggest, a limitation on the application of Article XIII. The provisions are complementary, and do not clash. Thus, Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture is not relevant in this case. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 155 Para. 155. () Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994, including Article XIII, apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter. b) Acordo de Salvaguardas Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, paras. 7.40, 7.44 e 7.49 O DSB concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT deve ser observado para fins de imposio de medidas de salvaguarda. Alegou-se, portanto, que no h disposio expressa no Acordo de Salvaguardas que autorize os Membros a agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII. Para. 7.40. In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's finding in EC- Bananas III (AB) that [i]f the negotiators had intended to permit Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT 1994 [by virtue of the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture], they would have said so explicitly. We see nothing in the Safeguards Agreement that expressly authorises a Member to act inconsistently with Article XIII. The fact that the Safeguards Agreement does not contain any express reference to Article XIII certainly does not amount to an express authorisation to depart from the provisions of that Article. Para. 7.44. () Just because some provisions of Article XIII are replicated in the Safeguards Agreement, that alone does not mean that the remaining provisions cease to be binding on Members. We therefore decline to draw any conclusions from the fact that certain Article XIII provisions are not replicated in the Safeguards Agreement. Like the Appellate Body, we consider that if the Uruguay Round negotiators had intended to expressly omit Article XIII from the safeguards context, they would and could have said so in the Agreement on Safeguards. They did not. Para. 7.49. () We are of the view that non-application of Article XIII in the context of safeguards would result in tariff quota safeguard measures partially escaping the control of multilateral disciplines. This result would be contrary to the objectives set out in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line Pipe), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS202/R, para. 7.54

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Tambm em US - Line Pipe, o Painel concluiu que a imposio de medidas de salvaguarda em dissonncia com padres histricos de fluxos internacionais de comrcio estaria em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:2, caput, do GATT. Para. 7.54. In our view, Korea is correct to argue that a Member would violate the general rule set forth in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 if it imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (at least in the absence of any evidence indicating that the shares a Member might be expected to obtain in the future differ, as a result of changed circumstances, from its historical share). Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure. 9. Lom Waiver

Em EC - Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que o Lom Waiver se estenderia no apenas ao disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas tambm ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX e WT/DS27/R/USA, paras. 7.106 e 7.107 Para. 7.106. () If the Lom waiver is interpreted to waive only compliance with the obligations of Article I:1, the waiver would effectively limit preferential treatment to tariff preferences. () In other words, in order to give real effect to the Lom waiver, it needs to cover Article XIII to the extent necessary to allow the EC to allocate country-specific tariff quota shares to the ACP countries in the amount of their pre-1991 bestever banana exports to the EC. Otherwise, the EC could not practically fulfil its basic obligation under the Lom Convention in respect of bananas, as we have found that it was not unreasonable for the EC to conclude that the Lom Convention may be interpreted to require country-specific tariff quota shares at levels not compatible with Article XIII. Since it was the objective of the Lom waiver to permit the EC to fulfil that basic obligation, logically we have no choice therefore but to interpret the waiver so that it accomplishes that objective (). Para. 7.107. Such an interpretation is also supported by the close relationship between Articles I and XIII:1, both of which prohibit discriminatory treatment. Article I requires MFN treatment in respect of rules and formalities in connection with importation, a phrase that has been interpreted broadly in past GATT practice, such that it can appropriately be held to cover rules related to tariff quota allocations. Such rules are clearly rules applied in connection with importation. Indeed, they are critical to the determination of the amount of duty to be imposed. To describe the relationship somewhat differently, Article I establishes a general principle requiring non-discriminatory treatment in respect of, inter alia, rules and formalities in connection with importation. Article XIII:1 is an application of that principle in a specific situation, i.e., the administration of quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas. In that sense, the scope of Article XIII:1 is identical with that of Article I. Mudana de posicionamento Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC - Bananas III), Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 183 O rgo de Apelao, no entanto, o divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel. De acordo com o seu entendimento, o Lom Waiver no implica dispensa do cumprimento de obrigaes previstas no Artigo XIII do GATT. Para. 183. We disagree with the Panel's conclusion. The wording of the Lom Waiver is clear and unambiguous. By its precise terms, it waives only the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement ... to the extent necessary to do what is required by the relevant provisions of the Lom 131

Convention. The Lom Waiver does not refer to, or mention in any way, any other provision of the GATT 1994 or of any other covered agreement. Neither the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the Lom Waiver, nor the need to interpret it so as to permit it to achieve its objectives, allow us to disregard the clear and plain wording of the Lom Waiver by extending its scope to include a waiver from the obligations under Article XIII. Moreover, although Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994 are both non-discrimination provisions, their relationship is not such that a waiver from the obligations under Article I implies a waiver from the obligations under Article XIII. O referido entendimento foi reafirmado pelo DSB no Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, fase de implementao, no caso EC - Bananas III (Demandantes: Equador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mxico e EUA), WT/DS27/RW2/ECU e WT/DS27/RW/USA, para. 350. III. Comentrios

A eliminao geral das restries quantitativas uma das ideias basilares do sistema GATT/OMC, figurando no Artigo XI do GATT 1994. Entretanto, este mesmo Artigo prev algumas excees a essa regra. Acontece que, para que essas excees sejam utilizadas, devem obedecer s disposies do Artigo XIII, o qual versa sobre a administrao no-discriminatria das restries quantitativas. O Artigo XIII tem um histrico de jurisprudncia relativamente escasso. Poucos foram os litgios solucionados pelo sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC, o que contribui para que boa parte das disposies do mencionado Artigo XIII ainda permanea sem uma interpretao segura. Fator que corrobora para a rara incidncia do Artigo, ora em foco, a utilizao do princpio da economia processual pelo rgo julgador (seja Painel ou o rgo Permanente de Apelao). O uso desse princpio tem um vis poltico. difcil saber at que ponto os julgadores querem evitar a criao de jurisprudncia. O Artigo XIII tem uma redao extensa, que, em algumas passagens, reflete a dificuldade tpica de tratados multilaterais com muitos participantes - de se chegar a termos precisos. Em Artigo divulgado em 2010, Busch e Pelc assinalam que
(...) in 41 percent of all cases, panels exercise judicial economy, a practice by which they rule not to rule on certain of the litigants legal arguments, deeming these unnecessary to solving the dispute at hand. This practice is important not only for the litigants, who frequently appeal its use, but for the membership as a whole, since judicial economy limits the scope of the case law that results. We argue in this article that panels invoke judicial economy to narrow the precedent they create, and do so largely at the insistence of the wider membership. (81)

Entre as expresses do Artigo XIII, que ainda necessitam ter seus significados delineados, destacam-se: todos os elementos especiais e perodo anterior de referncia, ambas constantes do pargrafo 2(d) e que tm grande importncia para a aplicao do Artigo em apreo. Embora j tenha um Painel do caso EC Bananas, estabelecido com base em recurso ao Artigo 21.5 do DSU, consignando que o perodo anterior de referncia no deve estar abarcado por distores de mercado, ainda se est longe de ser definido um marco temporal preciso. Por fim, til frisar que, s vezes, a o demandado usa a estratgia de invocar uma outra disposio ou instituto da legislao da OMC para tentar afastar a incidncia do Artigo XIII, como, por exemplo, o Artigo XIX, que cuida das medidas de salvaguarda, ou o waiver, que uma derrogao temporria das obrigaes assumidas. O rgo de Apelao tem rejeitado essa tese de defesa. Percebe-se que o argumento empregado o de que o Princpio da No-Discriminao (inserido no Artigo XIII) no pode ser afastado por normas de exceo que permitem um afrouxamento dos compromissos assumidos no sistema GATT/OMC. A anlise de precedentes envolvendo a interpretao do Artigo XIII do GATT demonstra que questes relacionadas administrao de regimes de quotas tarifrias foram objeto de diversas disputas no mbito da OMC. Trata-se, portanto, de tema significativamente controvertido. Certamente, a natureza aberta e at mesmo indefinida de diversos conceitos constantes do Artigo XIII do GATT contribuiu para tanto. Ademais, pde-se verificar que diversas disputas tiveram como cerne a relao dos pargrafos do referido Artigo, bem como a relao do Artigo com outros dispositivos constantes de outros Acordos da OMC. 132

Em EC - Bananas III, por exemplo, analisou-se se a criao de regimes diferenciados de alocao de quotas tarifrias para importaes de um mesmo produto estaria em conformidade com os Acordos da OMC. Com fundamento no Artigo XIII do GATT, concluiu-se que a subdiviso de regimes administrativos de importao no pode ser utilizada como mecanismo destinado a circunvir obrigaes de no-discriminao. Firmou-se, portanto, o entendimento de que as regras de no-discriminao dispostas no Artigo XIII do GATT aplicamse a um determinado produto, independentemente da forma pela qual os Membros implementam seus regimes de alocao de quotas tarifrias. Assim, a criao de regimes administrativos diferenciados de alocao de quotas tarifrias no vedada per se, sendo permissvel desde que observadas as obrigaes de nodiscriminao entre os Membros. Conforme mencionado, o DSB tambm foi questionado sobre o significado de termos constantes do Artigo XIII. Por exemplo, na fase de implementao de EC - Bananas III, o Painel considerou de modo amplo o termo restrio, constante do Artigo XIII:1 do GATT. De acordo com a abordagem adotada pelo Painel, a palavra restrio deveria ser interpretada como qualquer benefcio concedido a um determinado Membro que fosse capaz de afetar a competitividade de outros Membros. Contudo, o rgo de Apelao divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel, restringindo a interpretao do termo restrio. De acordo com o rgo de Apelao, o referido termo deveria ser lido como uma referncia ao termo quotas tarifrias, e no como benefcio. Segundo a definio mais precisa adotada pelo rgo de Apelao, o Artigo XIII:1 do GATT impe aos Membros o dever de no aplicarem quotas tarifrias a outros Membros, a menos que quotas tarifrias semelhantes sejam impostas importao do produto similar originrio de todos os outros Membros exportadores. Tambm foi objeto de apreciao do DSB, a interpretao de princpios gerais constantes do Artigo XIII do GATT. Em EC - Bananas III, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que a alocao de quotas tarifrias deve ser feita em observncia ao princpio de no-discriminao, previsto no Artigo XIII:1 do GATT. Com efeito, entendeu-se que Membros esto impedidos de fazer discriminaes na alocao de quotas tarifrias entre Membros que no tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto. Tambm, pde-se identificar intepretaes finalsticas do Artigo em comento. Exemplo disso a anlise sobre o objeto e propsito do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT, feita pelo Painel no caso EC - Bananas III. De acordo com a intepretao dada pelo Painel, o referido dispositivo objetivaria reduzir o impacto que a imposio de quotas tarifrias causa aos fluxos internacionais de comrcio. Conforme mencionado, o DSB tambm analisou a relao entre os diversos pargrafos e alneas do Artigo XIII. Nesse sentido, de acordo com o Relatrio do rgo de Apelao na fase de implementao do caso EC - Bananas III, o Artigo XIII:2(d) estabelece uma presuno relativa em relao observncia dos critrios estabelecidos no Artigo XIII:2, caput. O Relatrio do Painel no caso EC - Bananas III contm outro exemplo de anlise da relao entre os pargrafos do Artigo XIII. Nos termos do Relatrio em questo, o Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT deve ser tido como lex especialis em relao ao Artigo XIII:1. Ou seja, o Painel rejeitou o argumento de que o Artigo XIII:2(d) representaria uma exceo ao disposto no Artigo XIII:1. Concluiu-se, nesse sentido, que por serem autorizadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT, prticas de alocao de quotas tarifrias apenas a Membros com interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto no esto, necessariamente, em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:1. Ademais, analisou-se a relao de frases constantes de um mesmo dispositivo. De acordo com o entendimento firmado no Relatrio do Painel em EC - Bananas III, a relao entre as duas frases constantes do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT de natureza subsidiria. Segundo esse posicionamento, inicialmente o Membro importador deve tentar buscar firmar acordos com todos os Membros que tiverem interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto. Caso conclua-se que chegar a um acordo no praticvel, o Membro importador dever alocar quotas tarifrias em observncia ao disposto na segunda frase do Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT. Ademais, concluiu-se que no permissvel firmar acordos com apenas determinados Membros que tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de um determinado produto.

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A relao do Artigo XIII com outros Artigos do GATT tambm foi objeto de anlise. Por exemplo, o DSB firmou o entendimento de que o Artigo I do GATT prev regra geral de no-discriminao. O Artigo XIII:1, por sua vez, tambm reflete o mesmo princpio, porm com abrangncia restrita administrao de quotas tarifrias. Ou seja, trata-se de norma de natureza mais especfica. Outra questo controversa analisada foi o tratamento concedido a Membros que no tm interesse no fornecimento de determinados produtos. Em EC - Bananas III, o Painel concluiu que se, por ventura, um Membro optar por alocar quotas tarifrias a Membros que no tenham interesse substancial no fornecimento de determinado produto, tais quotas devem ser estendidas a todos os Membros enquadrados nessa categoria. Tambm discutiu-se se a alocao de quotas tarifrias a Estados que no sejam Membros da OMC seria vedada, por fora do Artigo XIII:2 do GATT. A esse respeito, o Painel em EC - Poultry posicionou-se no sentido de que o Artigo XIII:2 do GATT no obriga Membros a calcularem quotas tarifrias exclusivamente, com base em importaes oriundas de outros Membros. Concluiu-se que alocaes de quotas tarifrias a Membros que no sejam Membros da OMC no seriam vedadas pelo Artigo XIII:2(d) do GATT. Tambm foi objeto de anlise a relao do Artigo XIII com dispositivos constantes de outros Acordos da OMC. Como exemplo, em US - Pipe Line, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo XIII do GATT deve ser observado para fins da imposio de medidas de salvaguarda. Para tanto, constatou-se que no h disposio expressa no Acordo sobre Salvaguardas que autorize expressamente os Membros a agirem em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII. No mesmo precedente, o Painel considerou as consequncias polticas e jurdicas da eventual inaplicabilidade do Artigo XIII do GATT ao contexto da imposio das medidas de salvaguarda. Tambm em US - Pipe Line, o Painel concluiu que a imposio de medidas de salvaguarda em dissonncia com padres histricos de fluxos internacionais de comrcio estaria em desconformidade com o disposto no Artigo XIII:2, caput, do GATT. Por consequncia, concluiu-se que o referido dispositivo deve ser observado por Membros que aplicam medidas de salvaguarda. O DSB tambm analisou a relao entre o Artigo XIII do GATT e as normas constantes do Acordo sobre Agricultura. A esse respeito, destacam-se dois entendimentos firmados em EC - Bananas III. Primeiro, o DSB concluiu que o Acordo sobre Agricultura no prev expressamente a alocao de quotas tarifrias especficas para cada pas em relao a produtos agrcolas. De acordo com o posicionamento do DSB, se essa fosse a inteno dos negociadores, haveria previso especfica a esse respeito no Acordo sobre Agricultura. Em segundo lugar, o DSB posicionou-se no sentido de que o disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT aplica-se aos compromissos de acesso a mercado relacionado a produtos agrcolas, exceto se previsto expressamente em sentido contrrio no Acordo sobre Agricultura. Por fim, cumpre destacar a mudana de entendimento em relao extenso do Lom Waiver ao disposto no Artigo XIII. Inicialmente, em EC - Bananas III, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que o Lom Waiver se estenderia no apenas ao disposto no Artigo I:1 do GATT, mas tambm ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT. Todavia, o rgo de Apelao divergiu da abordagem adotada pelo Painel. De acordo com o entendimento do rgo de Apelao, o Lom Waiver no implica dispensa do cumprimento de obrigaes previstas no Artigo XIII do GATT. Ao reverter o entendimento adotado pelo Painel, o rgo de Apelao consignou que o referido waiver no contm nenhuma referncia ao GATT 1994. O entendimento do rgo de Apelao tambm pautou-se nas circunstncias envolvidas na negociao do Lom Waiver. Levando-se em considerao os objetivos dos negociadores do referido waiver, concluiu-se que no haveria fundamentos slidos que permitissem estender o escopo do Lom Waiver ao disposto no Artigo XIII do GATT. FOOTNOTE:
Footnote 81: BUSCH, Marc L.; PELC, Krzysztof J. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization. International Organization 64, Spring 2010, pp. 257-58. Disponvel em: <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/Busch%20&%20Pelc%20Judicial%20Economy%20IO.pdf>. Acesso em: 13 de dezembro de 2011.

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Artigo XIV Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XIV Exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination

14.1

A contracting party which applies restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of Article XVIII may, in the application of such restrictions, deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in a manner having equivalent effect to restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions which that contracting party may at that time apply under Article VIII or XIV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or under analogous provisions of a special exchange agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XV. A contracting party which is applying import restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of Article XVIII may, with the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, temporarily deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in respect of a small part of its external trade where the benefits to the contracting party or contracting parties concerned substantially outweigh any injury which may result to the trade of other contracting parties. The provisions of Article XIII shall not preclude a group of territories having a common quota in the International Monetary Fund from applying against imports from other countries, but not among themselves, restrictions in accordance with the provisions of Article XII or of Section B of Article XVIII on condition that such restrictions are in all other respects consistent with the provisions of Article XIII. A contracting party applying import restrictions under Article XII or under Section B of Article XVIII shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV or Section B of Article XVIII of this Agreement from applying measures to direct its exports in such a manner as to increase its earnings of currencies which it can use without deviation from the provisions of Article XIII. A contracting party shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV, inclusive, or by Section B of Article XVIII, of this Agreement from applying quantitative restrictions: (a) having equivalent effect to exchange restrictions authorized under Section 3 (b) of Article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or under the preferential arrangements provided for in Annex A of this Agreement, pending the outcome of the negotiations referred to therein.

14.2

14.3

14.4

14.5

(b)

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo 14 Excees Regra de No-Discriminao

14.1

Uma Parte Contratante que aplique as restries em virtude do artigo XII ou da seo B do artigo XVIII poder, na aplicao destas restries dispensar-se das disposies do artigo XIII na medida em que estas dispensas tiverem efeito equivalente ao das restries aos pagamentos e transferncias relativas s transaes internacionais correntes que esta Parte Contratante estiver autorizada a aplicar no mesmo momento em virtude do artigo VIII ou do artigo XIV dos estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional, ou em virtude de disposies anlogas de um acordo especial de cmbio concludo conforme pargrafo 6 do artigo XV. Uma Parte Contratante que aplique restries importao em virtude do artigo XII ou da seo B do artigo XVIII poder, com o consentimento das Partes Contratantes, dispensar-se temporariamente das disposies do artigo XIII por uma parte pouco importante de seu comrcio exterior, se as vantagens 135

14.2

que a Parte Contratante ou as Partes Contratantes em causa retirem desta derrogao compensam de maneira substancial qualquer prejuzo que possa resultar para o comrcio de outras Partes Contratantes. 14.3 As disposies do artigo XIII no impediro a um grupo de territrios que tenham no Fundo Monetrio Internacional uma quota parte comum, de aplicar s importaes originrias de outros pases, mas no s suas trocas mtuas, restries compatveis com as disposies do artigo XII ou da seo B do artigo XVIII, sob condio de que estas restries sejam sob todos os outros aspectos, compatveis com as disposies do artigo XIII. As disposies dos artigos XI a XV ou da seo B do artigo XVIII do presente acordo no impediro uma Parte Contratante que aplique restries importao compatveis com as disposies do artigo XII ou da seo B do artigo XVIII de aplicar medidas destinadas a orientar suas exportaes de maneira a lhe assegurar um suplemento de divisas que ela possa utilizar sem dispensar-se das disposies do artigo XIII. As disposies dos artigos XI a XV ou da seo B do artigo XVIII do presente Acordo no impediro uma Parte Contratante de aplicar: (a) restries quantitativas que tenham um efeito equivalente ao das restries de cmbio autorizadas em virtude da alnea (b) da seo 3 do artigo VII dos Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional. ou restries quantitativas institudas conforme os acordos preferenciais previstos no anexo A do presente Acordo, pendente o resultado das negociaes mencionadas neste anexo.

14.4

14.5

(b)

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nenhum comentrio. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XIV

O Artigo em anlise no foi objeto de nenhum litgio no DSB da OMC. III. Comentrio

Nada a comentar.

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Artigo XV Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XV Exchange Arrangements

15.1

The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with the International Monetary Fund to the end that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy with regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of quantitative restrictions and other trade measures within the jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with the terms of a special exchange agreement between that contracting party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES in reaching their final decision in cases involving the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or in paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination of the Fund as to what constitutes a serious decline in the contracting partys monetary reserves, a very low level of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary reserves, and as to the financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such cases. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek agreement with the Fund regarding procedures for consultation under paragraph 2 of this Article. Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate* the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider, at any time, that exchange restrictions on payments and transfers in connection with imports are being applied by a contracting party in a manner inconsistent with the exceptions provided for in this Agreement for quantitative restrictions, they shall report thereon to the Fund. Any contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall, within a time to be determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES after consultation with the Fund, become a member of the Fund, or, failing that, enter into a special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES. A contracting party which ceases to be a member of the Fund shall forthwith enter into a special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Any special exchange agreement entered into by a contracting party under this paragraph shall thereupon become part of its obligations under this Agreement. (a) A special exchange agreement between a contracting party and the CONTRACTINg PARTIES under paragraph 6 of this Article shall provide to the satisfaction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES that the objectives of this Agreement will not be frustrated as a result of action in exchange matters by the contracting party in question. The terms of any such agreement shall not impose obligations on the contracting party in exchange matters generally more restrictive than those imposed by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund on members of the Fund.

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(b)

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15.8

A contracting party which is not a member of the Fund shall furnish such information within the general scope of section 5 of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may require in order to carry out their functions under this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude: (a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or with that contracting partys special exchange agreement with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, or the use by a contracting party of restrictions or controls in imports or exports, the sole effect of which, additional to the effects permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII and XIV, is to make effective such exchange controls or exchange restrictions.

15.9

(b)

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XV Acordos em Matria de Cmbio

15.1

As Partes Contratantes se esforaro por colaborar com o Fundo Monetrio Internacional, a fim de promover uma poltica coordenada no que se refere s questes de cmbio, dentro da competncia do Fundo e as questes de restries quantitativas ou outras medidas comerciais, dentro da competncia das Partes Contratantes, Em todos os casos em que as Partes Contratantes forem chamadas a examinar ou a resolver problemas relativos s reservas monetrias, balana de pagamentos ou aos sistemas e acordos de cmbio, entraro em ligao estreita com o Fundo Monetrio Internacional. No decorrer dessas consultas, as Partes Contratantes aceitaro todas as constataes de fato, de ordem estatstica ou de outra que lhes forem comunicadas pelo Fundo Monetrio Internacional em matria de cmbio, de reservas monetrias e de balana de pagamento; e todas as concluses do Fundo sobre a conformidade das medidas tomadas por uma Parte Contratante em matria de cmbio, com os Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional ou com as disposies de um acordo especial de cmbio concludo entre essa Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes. Quando tiver que tomar sua deciso final nos casos em que entrem em linha de conta os critrios estabelecidos no 2 (a) do Artigo XII ou no pargrafo 9 do Artigo XVIII, as Partes Contratantes aceitaro as concluses do Fundo Monetrio Internacional sobre a questo de saber se as reservas monetrias da Parte Contratante sofreram uma baixa importante, se se acham em nvel muito baixo ou se se elevaram segundo um quociente de crescimento razovel, assim como sobre os aspectos financeiros dos outros problemas aos quais se estendam as consultas em semelhante caso. As Partes Contratantes procuraro um acordo com o Fundo Monetrio Internacional a respeito do processo de consulta prevista no 2 da presente Artigo. As Partes Contratantes abster-se-o de qualquer medida cambial que possa frustrar os objetivos considerados no presente Acordo e de qualquer medida comercial que possa frustrar os objetivos visados pelos Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional. Se a qualquer momento as Partes Contratantes considerarem que uma das partes aplica restries cambiais que incidem sobre os pagamentos e as transferncias relativas s importaes de modo incompatvel com as excees previstas no presente Acordo no que se refere s restries quantitativas, encaminharo ao Fundo Monetrio Internacional um relatrio a esse respeito. Toda Parte Contratante que no for membro do Fundo Monetrio Internacional dever, dentro de um prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes Contratantes. aps consulta ao Fundo Monetrio Internacional, tornarse membro do Fundo, ou seno, concluir com as Partes Contratantes um acordo especial sobre 138

15.2

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cmbio. A Parte Contratante que deixar de ser membro do Fundo Monetrio Internacional concluir imediatamente com as Partes Contratantes um Acordo especial de cmbio. Qualquer acordo especial sobre cmbio concludo por uma Parte Contratante em virtude do presente pargrafo, far, logo aps sua concluso, parte dos compromissos assumidos por essa Parte Contratante nos termos do presente acordo. 15.7 (a) Qualquer acordo especial de cmbio, concludo entre uma Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes em virtude do 6 do presente Artigo, conter as disposies que as Partes Contratantes acharem necessrias para que as medidas tomadas em matria de cmbio pela Parte Contratante em questo no contrariem o presente acordo. Os termos de tal acordo no imporo Parte Contratante, em matria de cmbio, obrigaes mais restritivas no seu conjunto que as impostas pelos Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional a seus prprios membros.

(b)

15.8

A Parte Contratante que no for membro do Fundo Monetrio Internacional fornecer s Partes Contratantes as informaes que elas possam pedir dentro do quadro geral da Seo 5 do Artigo VIII dos Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional, com o fim de desempenhar as funes que lhes atribui o presente acordo. Nada neste Acordo impedir: (a) O recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, aos controles ou a restries cambiais, de acordo com os Estatutos do Fundo Monetrio Internacional ou com o acordo especial sobre cmbio concludo entre aquela Parte Contratante e as Partes Contratantes; nem o recurso, por uma Parte Contratante, a restries ou a medidas de controle incidindo sobre importaes ou exportaes cujo nico efeito sem prejuzo dos fins autorizados pelos Artigos XI, XII, XIII e XIV, seja dar eficcia s medidas de controle ou restries cambiais dessa natureza.

15.9

(b)

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Pargrafo 1 Devero se esforar seria melhor do que se esforaro para shall seek. Pargrafo 2 Ao invs de entraro em ligao estreitaseria melhor sempre devero consultar, no caso de shall fully consult. Devero aceitar, ao invs de aceitaro. Melhor sugesto de pontuao para o trecho grifado, a seguir: de reservas monetrias, de balana de pagamentos e todas as concluses do Fundo . A expresso em que entrem em linha de conta no usual, recomenda-se que envolvam somente. Novamente, sugere-se devero aceitar. Ao invs de baixa importante, sugere-se queda significativa. Por fim, o trecho final do pargrafo est com uma redao estranha, sugerindo a seguinte redao: se encontram num nvel muito baixo ou se possuem uma taxa razovel de crescimento, bem como sobre os aspectos financeiros de outras questes relacionadas s consultas em casos similares. Pargrafo 3 Devero procurar seria melhor do que procuraro, no caso de shall seek. Prevista est errado, deveria ser previsto, j que se refere ao processo. Pargrafo 4 Sugere-se nova redao a esse importante dispositivo do GATT: As partes contratantes no devero, por meio de aes relacionadas ao cmbio [exchange action], frustrar o propsito dos dispositivos do GATT nem, por ao de comrcio, o propsito dos dispositivos dos Artigos do Acordo do FMI. Pargrafo 5 Ao invs de encaminharo, sugere-se devero encaminhar, para a expresso shall report.

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Pargrafo 6 Ao invs de concluir, sugere-se dever concluir. Pargrafo 7 (a) 6 ao invs de 6. Dever conter ao invs de conter. Sugere-se aes relacionadas ao cmbio ao invs de medidas tomadas em matria de cmbio; (b) no devero impor ao invs de no imporo. Tambm sugere-se aes relacionadas ao cmbio ao invs de em matria de cmbio. Por fim, sugere-se em seu conjunto do que ao invs de no seu conjunto que. Pargrafo 8 Ao invs de fornecero, recomenda-se devero fornecer, para shall furnish. Pargrafo 9 Sugere-se para o trecho grifado: efeito, alm dos fins autorizados pelos (...). II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XV Taxa de Cmbio como Extrapolao dos Compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um Membro

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.106 O Painel delimita que para uma taxa de cmbio configurar uma violao necessrio analisar: (i) se a taxa de cmbio um outro dever ou cobrana, conforme registrado na Agenda; (ii) se a taxa de cmbio inconsistente com o Artigo II:1 (b); (iii) se a taxa de cmbio uma restrio ao cmbio, de acordo com o Artigo XV:9 (a); (iv) se a taxa foi imposta de acordo com o texto introdutrio do FMI; e (v) se a medida justificvel com base no Artigo XV:9 (a) do GATT. Para. 7.106. Honduras claims that the foreign exchange fee as an other duty or charge is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic contends that the fee is an exchange restriction justified under Article XV:9(a). It states that should the Panel find to the contrary, it is nevertheless consistent with Article II:1(b) since it was recorded in the Schedule. Given its terms of reference and in light of the parties' claims and arguments during the proceedings, the Panel considers it necessary to examine the matter by analysing the following legal issues: (i) whether the foreign exchange fee is an ODC as recorded in the Schedule; (ii) whether the foreign exchange fee is inconsistent with Article II:1(b); (iii) whether the foreign exchange fee is an exchange restriction under Article XV:9(a); (iv) whether the fee is imposed in accordance with Articles of Agreement of the IMF; and (v) whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT. Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.116-7.122 Ao analisar a taxa de cmbio de estrangeiro (foreign exchange fee), o Painel analisou a natureza da medida, de forma que se a sua natureza for de tarifa interna, no se pode enquadrar como ODC ( other duties or charge). Assim, por tambm ser aplicado aos produtos internos, no houve registro legal de alguma ODC na Agenda da Repblica Dominicana. Com efeito, constatou-se uma violao do Artigo II:1(b), por ultrapassar o limite estabelecido na Agenda. Para. 7.116. On the issue of whether the foreign exchange fee as an ODC has been recorded in the Schedules of Concessions of the Dominican Republic, the Panel notes that the parties made essentially the same arguments as they did on the issue of whether the surcharge measure has been recorded in the Schedule. The Panel therefore considers that the same analysis the Panel made with respect to the recording of the surcharge measure in paragraphs 7.37 to 7.40 also applies to the recording of the foreign exchange although the Panel notes that the foreign exchange fee did exist at the level of 1.5 per cent as of 15 April 1994.

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Para. 7.117. Therefore, the Panel's overall factual assessment with respect to the recording of the foreign exchange fee measure is that the foreign exchange fee was applied at 1.5 per cent in 1994, but it was not recorded in the Schedule. What the Dominican Republic notified in document G/SP/3 was basically the products list and the ad valorem Selective Consumption Tax rates as applied to these imported products under Law 11-92 in force in 1994. It is clear that in fact these products were only subject to the Selective Consumption Tax, not to an equal amount of additional other duties and charges back in 1994. Para. 7.118. The Panel has found in paragraph 7.40 that the Dominican Republic has actually recorded in its Schedule the Selective Consumption Tax as it applied to imported products as of 15 April 1994. The fact that the Selective Consumption Tax applied both to imported and domestic products makes it clear that it is in the nature of an internal tax. Article II:2(a) and Article II:1(b) make a distinction between an internal tax that is subject to Article III and an ODC that is subject to a bound requirement with the consequence that the two are mutually exclusive. If a measure is in the nature of an internal tax, it is not an ODC. If a measure is in the nature of an ODC, it is not an internal tax. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the Dominican Republic has not established that the nature of the measure recorded in the Schedule of the Dominican Republic is an ODC measure within the meaning of Article II:1(b) that could be invoked to justify the current ODC measure, the foreign exchange fee. Para. 7.119. The Panel also considers that Hondurass challenge to the nature of the recorded measure is not prohibited by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Understanding or by the fact of absence of invocation of the Understanding in its Panel request based on the same analysis as developed by the Panel in paragraphs 7.67, 7.71 and 7.78. Para. 7.120. The Panel recalls that the foreign exchange fee is applied to all imported products, well beyond the selective products list in the G/SP/3 notification. As the Panel found in paragraph 7.103, the foreign exchange fee as applied to products outside the scope of the products listed in the G/SP/3 notification, is within the Panel's terms of reference. Para. 7.121. The Panel concludes for the reasons set out above, that there was no legally valid recording of any ODC measure as required by the Understanding in the Schedule of the Dominican Republic. For all legal and practical purposes, what was notified by the Dominican Republic in document G/SP/3 is equivalent to zero in the Schedule. The Panel finds that the foreign exchange fee is therefore applied in excess of the level of zero pursuant to the Schedule of the Dominican Republic and therefore is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Para. 7.122. The Panel also considers that the application of foreign exchange fee to products other than those products listed in the G/SP/3 notification is in excess of the level of zero or none pursuant to the Schedule of the Dominican Republic, since nothing was recorded for these products, either as an ODC or otherwise. 2. Relao do Artigo XV:2 com as Regras do FMI

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items (Argentina - Textiles and Apparel), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS56/AB/R e WT/DS56/AB/R/Corr.1, paras. 84-85 O Artigo XV:2 tido como o nico dispositivo que requer consulta com o FMI, ao tratar de assuntos relativos s reservas monetrias, balana de pagamentos e esquemas de cmbio estrangeiro. Tambm explica de modo pormenorizado como seria a atuao do FMI numa disputa da OMC, atentando inclusive para dispositivos do DSU. Para. 84. The only provision of the WTO Agreement that requires consultations with the IMF is Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994. This provision requires the WTO to consult with the IMF when dealing with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements . 141

Para. 85. As in the WTO Agreement, there are no provisions in the Agreement Between the IMF and the WTO that require a panel to consult with the IMF in a case such as this. Under paragraph 8 of this latter Agreement, in a case involving exchange measures within the Funds jurisdiction, the IMF shall inform in writing the relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) () whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. This case does not, however, involve exchange measures within the Funds jurisdiction. Paragraph 8 also provides that the IMF may communicate its views in writing on matters of mutual interest to the [WTO] or any of its organs or bodies (excluding the WTOs dispute settlement panels) () (emphasis added). Evidently, the IMF has not been authorized to provide its views to a WTO dispute settlement panel on matters not relating to exchange measures within its jurisdiction, unless it is requested to do so by a panel under Article 13 of the DSU. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 149 e 151-152 Observa-se que, os casos da OMC que contam com a atuao do FMI, no delegam a funo judicial do Painel. As concluses do FMI so utilizadas como evidncias pelo Painel, o qual tambm considera outros fatores para alcanar suas concluses, de forma objetiva. Para. 149. On the basis of these provisions, the Panel submitted to the IMF a number of questions regarding Indias balance-of-payments situation. The Panel gave considerable weight to the views expressed by the IMF in its reply to these questions. However, nothing in the Panel Report supports Indias argument that the Panel delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the Panel Report makes clear that the Panel did not simply accept the views of the IMF. The Panel critically assessed these views and also considered other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions. Para. 151. We conclude that the Panel made an objective assessment of the matter before it. Therefore, we do not agree with India that the Panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU. Para. 152. The question whether Article XV:2 of the GATT 1994 requires panels to consult with the IMF and to consider as dispositive specific determinations of the IMF was debated at length by the parties before the Panel. However, the Panel did not consider it necessary, for the purposes of this dispute, to decide this issue. As this finding of the Panel is not appealed, we abstain from taking any position on it. 3. Relao do Artigo XV:9 (a) com as Regras do FMI

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 1.8 Aqui se exemplifica uma das formas de atuao do FMI nos casos da OMC, sobre como determinada medida tem sido implementada. Para. 1.8. Pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization, the Panel, on 17 May 2004, requested the IMF to provide information on how the Comisin Cambiaria a las Importaciones (previously called Comisin de Cambio and originally introduced by the Monetary Board of the Dominican Republic's Central Bank on 24 January 1991) is being implemented by the Dominican Republic. The Panel also requested the IMF to provide its views on whether the Comisin Cambiaria a las Importaciones, as applied by the Dominican Republic, is considered to be an exchange control or exchange restriction under the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. On 25 June 2004 the IMF sent its response to the Panel. The letter from the IMF was circulated to Parties and the Panel invited Parties to make comments. Honduras made some comments and the Dominican Republic did not submit any comments.

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Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, para. 7.123 Para. 7.123. The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is an exchange measure justified by Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994. The Dominican Republic considers that Article XV:9(a) is an exception to other provisions of the GATT, including Article II. In its view, Members are entitled to use exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.138-7.146 O Painel recorreu a uma consulta do FMI para determinar se certa medida justificvel sob o Artigo XV:9(a) do GATT, e se constitui uma restrio cambial. Para tanto, analisa a forma de aplicao da medida, aplicada sobre o valor CIF da mercadoria, e no sobre a taxa de cmbio. Entendeu que no se tratava de uma medida de controle cambial, nos termos Artigo XV:9 (a). Paras. 7.138. The Panel takes note of the argument made by the Dominican Republic that the foreign exchange fee is approved by the IMF as a part of the stand-by arrangement between the IMF and therefore it is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. The Panel notes that paragraph 2 of Article XV provides that:
In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary Fund. In such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with the terms of a special exchange arrangement between that contracting party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.... (emphasis added)

Paras. 7.139. The Panel considered during the proceedings that it needed to seek more information on the precise legal nature and status of the foreign exchange fee measure in the stand-by arrangement between the IMF and the Dominican Republic. Secondly, since the Dominican Republic argues that the fee is an exchange restriction and it is imposed in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel considered that it needed to consult with the IMF based on paragraph 2 of Article XV to verify such an argument for a determination by the Panel on whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT. The core issue in this regard is whether the foreign exchange measure constitutes an exchange restriction in the package of the stand-by arrangement. If the answer is positive, the next issue then is whether the foreign exchange fee is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and hence justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994. Paras. 7.140. The Panel is also aware of the provision in paragraph 8 of the 1996 Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization that The Fund shall inform in writing the relevant WTO body (including dispute settlement panels) considering exchange measures within the Fund's jurisdiction whether such measures are consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. Paras. 7.141. The Panel also recalls a similar situation in Argentina - Textiles, where an ad valorem statistical tax was imposed allegedly for fiscal performance purposes so as to obtain IMF financing to deal with a financial crisis. That panel in that instance did not consult with the IMF. The Appellate Body considered that that panel had good reason for not consulting the IMF because the statistical tax was not one of the problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements . 143

However, it nevertheless stated that it might perhaps have been useful for the Panel to have consulted with the IMF on the legal character of the relationship or arrangement between Argentina and the IMF in this case. Paras. 7.142. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Panel requested information on 17 May 2004 from the IMF on the following two issues: (i) how the foreign exchange fee is being implemented by the Dominican Republic; (ii) whether the foreign exchange fee as currently applied by the Dominican Republic is an exchange control or exchange restriction under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Paras. 7.143. On the first issue, the IMF General Counsel replied that:
(a) The 'exchange commission' is levied under the legal authority of the Banco Central de la Repblica Dominicana (BCRD). Since its introduction in January 1991, the commission has undergone a number of changes in the way that it is levied. Initially, the commission was payable on sales of foreign exchange and was calculated as a percentage of the selling rate. (b) Since August 2002, however, pursuant to the Agreement between the BCRD and the Directorate General for Customs (DGC) of August 22, 2002, the commission has been collected in its entirety by the DGC. Moreover, although the commission is still referred to as an exchange commission (because it is levied on the basis of the legal authority vested in the BCRD to charge a commission on sales of foreign exchange), the commission is no longer payable on sales of foreign exchange. Rather, it is payable as a condition for the importation of goods, and the amount of the commission is now calculated exclusively on the CIF valuation of the imported goods as determined by the DGC (Article 1 of the Agreement between the BCRD and the DGC). By Notice of Resolution n 1 of the Monetary Board of October 22, 2003, the rate of the commission was increased to ten per cent in October 2003.

Paras. 7.144. On the second issue that the Panel requested information on, the reply states:
As applied since August 2002, the exchange commission is no longer a measure subject to Fund approval. As noted above, the commission is no longer payable on sales of foreign exchange. It is payable as a condition for the importation of goods and the amount to be paid is based on the CIF value of the imported goods (rather than the amount of foreign exchange sold to an importer for the payment of goods). As such, it does not constitute a multiple currency practice or an exchange restriction notwithstanding its label or the fact that the commission is charged on the basis of the legal authority vested in the BCRD to charge an exchange commission on sales of foreign exchange. For the same reasons, it is not an exchange control measure. (emphasis added)

Paras. 7.145. The Panel fully agrees with the opinion of the IMF. For the reasons set out above by the Panel and considering the opinion expressed by the IMF, the Panel finds that the foreign exchange fee measure as it is currently applied by the Dominican Republic does not constitute an exchange restriction within the meaning of Article XV: 9(a) of the GATT 1994. Paras. 7.146. Whether the fee is imposed in accordance with Articles of Agreement of the IMF:
(a) Arguments of the parties The Dominican Republic argues that the foreign exchange fee is applied in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the Fund as provided in Article XV:9(a). On 29 August 2003, The Dominican Republic concluded a stand-by arrangement with the Fund by which the Dominican Republic enforced, inter alia, a non-unified exchange rate system. The stand-by arrangement incorporated performance criteria calling for full unification of the dual exchange system by the end of 2003. The Fund approved the non-unified exchange rate system. However, due to its economic performance, the Dominican Republic was unable to fulfil its commitments made in the stand-by arrangement with the Fund and requested a waiver from the Fund in January 2004 for non-observance of the performance criteria, inter alia, on the unification of the foreign exchange market and for the continuous performance criteria regarding exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practices. The Dominican Republic submits that the Executive Board of the Fund completed its first review and the Dominican Republic

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understands that the Fund approved the exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practices. The foreign exchange fee as an exchange rate restriction, or multiple currency practice, is applied by the Dominican Republic in accordance with the Fund Articles of Agreement. Therefore, in the opinion of the Dominican Republic, it is permitted under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT.

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.150-7.155 O Painel entende que a taxa de cmbio estrangeiro independente de um sistema dual de taxa de cmbio, uma vez que pode ser imposta com ou sem esse sistema. Para. 7.150. In fact, the reply of the IMF General Counsel concludes that since the foreign exchange commission does not constitute an exchange restriction, the issue of its consistency or inconsistency with the Funds Articles for purpose of paragraph 8 of the Co-operation Agreement does not arise. The Panel fully agrees with this statement. Para. 7.151. The Panel considers that even if the foreign exchange fee does constitute an exchange restriction, Article XV:9(a) requires that it has to be applied in accordance with Articles of Agreement of the IMF. In light of the parties' arguments in this regard, the Panel will analyse whether the Dominican Republic has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the foreign exchange fee is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Para. 7.152. The Dominican Republic refers only to an IMF news release. The Panel has not been presented with a copy of the formal Decision made by IMF. The Dominican Republic referred to this decision as a waiver. It is not clear which provision of the IMF Articles of Agreement is the legal basis of the waiver and what is the legal basis to establish that the waiver was made in accordance with the Articles of Agreement. The Dominican Republic confirmed in its replies to questions that the waiver will be valid for three months. (5) As a result, the legal status of the waiver after the three-month period is not clear to the Panel. Para. 7.153. On the substance of the IMF news release, the meaning of the language that the IMF approved the Dominican Republic's request to waive the non-observance of (...) continuous performance criteria concerning (...) exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency practice is not self-evident. Does it mean that the IMF waived the obligation for the Dominican Republic to completely unify the dual exchange markets and to form one unified exchange rate? Is the foreign exchange fee one component of the exchange rate restrictions? The Panel considers that the foreign exchange fee measure is independent of the dual exchange rates system. Even before the dual exchange rates are unified, the foreign exchange fee can be eliminated without changing the dual exchange rate system. It is also true that, even after the dual exchange rates are unified, the foreign exchange fee can still be imposed without changing the unified exchange rate market. Para. 7.154. For these reasons, the Panel finds that the IMF waiver decision does not constitute a legal basis for the application of the foreign exchange fee measure and the Dominican Republic has not demonstrated that the foreign exchange fee is applied in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Whether the measure is justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994 Para. 7.155. The Panel considers that Article XV:9(a) as an exception provision has to be invoked and proved by the Dominican Republic to justify the inconsistency of the foreign exchange fee measure with the second sentence of Article II:1(b). As the Panel has already found that the measure does not constitute an exchange restriction within the meaning of Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994 and that the Dominican Republic has not demonstrated that it is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the Panel concludes that the foreign exchange fee is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) and can not be justified under Article XV:9(a) of the GATT 1994. 145

4.

Conceito de Exchange restriction de acordo com o Artigo XV:9(a)

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.132 O Painel considera que o Artigo XV:9 do GATT isenta as restries cambiais aplicadas de acordo com as disposies do FMI das obrigaes de outros Artigos do GATT, o princpio norteador que o FMI utilizou como critrio para as determinaes do que constituiu uma restrio cambial deve ser respeitado pelo Painel. Paras. 7.132. The Panel is also aware of the argument of the Dominican Republic that the criterion for determining whether a measure is an exchange restriction is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such, as set out by a Decision of the Executive Directors of the Fund in 1960 and the fact that Honduras does not disagree with this criterion. The Panel considers that, since Article XV:9 of the GATT exempts exchange restrictions measures that are applied in accordance with the Fund Articles, from obligations under other Articles of the GATT, the guiding principle that the IMF prescribed as the criterion for the determination of what constitutes an exchange restriction should be respected by this Panel. Therefore, the Panel should apply this criterion in its evaluation of the measure before it. Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.134-7.137 Delimita-se que a medida analisada pelo Painel a que aplicou a taxa do cmbio estrangeiro, atualmente. O conceito de restrio deve ser expandido, no pode se restringir a uma limitao unicamente nas importaes. Paras. 7.134. The Panel considers it necessary to examine the specific aspects of the current foreign exchange measure to determine whether it is in fact imposed solely on import-related exchange transactions. In this regard, the Panel notes that the 1991 Resolution provides differently from that of the later Resolution. Paras. 7.135. A reading of the 1991 Resolution reveals the nature of foreign exchange fee as it was applied in 1991. Paragraph 12 provides: the Central Bank shall charge users of official foreign exchange transactions and commercial banks, for the delegation of foreign exchange operations, the equivalent in Dominican Pesos (RD$) of two and a half per cent (2-1/2%) of the selling exchange rate applied to each transaction. This means that the fee was originally imposed on foreign exchange transactions conducted in both official and private foreign exchange markets through either the Central Bank or commercial banks. This Resolution actually required that the foreign exchange fee be paid for all kinds of foreign currency transactions, including both selling and purchasing transactions. This measure actually increased the cost for the use of foreign currency, for all kinds of transactions regardless of whether the transaction was related to importation. The Panel considers that the foreign exchange fee as it was applied in 1991 could be characterized as an exchange measure, as it is possible that the IMF would deem the increase of cost for the availability of foreign exchange as a means of restriction on the availability of the foreign currency. However, it is not necessary for the Panel to decide on the measure as it was applied in 1991. The measure to be examined by the Panel for the resolution of the dispute is the currently applied foreign exchange fee measure. Paras. 7.136. With regard to the currently applied foreign exchange fee measure, the Panel notes that the relevant provisions in the 1991 Resolution of the Monetary Board have been amended by later resolutions. On the issue of whether the fee is imposed on all types of transactions or solely on import-related transactions, the applicable rules are those under the Resolution of 20 August 2002. Paragraph 2 of this Resolution provides exchange commissions shall henceforth no longer be applied to external debt service payments, capital repatriation, remittances of profits, technology transfers, sales for travel expenses and medical services, credit cards and other services. The Dominican Republic confirms in its replies to a Panel question that [t]he foreign exchange fee applies only to importation of goods. It does not apply to foreign

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exchange payments of non-import related services, nor to foreign currency payments made by Dominican Republic residents, nor to remittance of dividends from companies located in the Dominican Republic. Paras. 7.137. The Panel considers that the ordinary meaning of the direct limitation on availability or use of exchange (...) as such means a limitation directly on the use of exchange itself, which means the use of exchange for all purposes. It cannot be interpreted in a way so as to permit the restriction on the use of exchanges that only affects importation. To conclude otherwise would logically lead to the situation whereby any WTO Member could easily circumvent obligations under Article II:1(b) by imposing a foreign currency fee or charge on imports at the customs and then conveniently characterize it as an exchange restriction. Such types of measures would seriously discriminate against imports while not necessarily being effective in achieving the legitimate goals under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Therefore, the Panel finds that because the fee as currently applied is imposed only on foreign exchange transactions that relate to the importation of goods, and not on other types of transactions, it is not a direct limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such. 5. nus de invocar o Artigo XV como Exceo ou Defesa Afirmativa

Relatrio do Painel no caso Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, paras. 7.107 e 7.131 O Painel, neste caso, concorda que o Artigo XV do GATT uma exceo ou defesa afirmativa. Assim, quele que o invocou cabe o nus da prova de estabelecer: (i) que a taxa de cmbio estrangeiro uma restrio cambial, de acordo com o Artigo XV:9(a); e, (ii) que a medida est de acordo com os Artigos introdutrios do FMI. Para. 7.107. As to the order of analysis of the claim made by Honduras and the defence made by the Dominican Republic, the Panel considers it necessary to first examine the claim of inconsistency of the fee with Article II:1(b). Both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT is an exception or an affirmative defence. The Panel agrees with this characterization of Article XV. That means that it serves as a justification for inconsistency with other provisions of the GATT. If there is no inconsistency with other GATT provisions in the first place, there is no need to have recourse to any affirmative defence for justification. Therefore, the Panel should begin its analysis with the claim under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Para. 7.131. The Panel takes note that both parties agree that Article XV of the GATT 1994 is an exception or an affirmative defence. Although the two concepts are not identical, an exception can often be invoked as an affirmative defence. It is well established that under an exception provision, the burden is on the defending party to justify the consistency of its measure under the exception provision it invoked. Therefore, in this case, the Dominican Republic bears the burden to establish: (i) that the foreign exchange fee measure is an exchange control or exchange restriction within the meaning of Article XV:9(a); and (ii) that the measure is in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as required by Article XV:9(a). III. Comentrios

O Artigo XV do GATT, apesar de abordar o tema do cmbio, sensvel e de extrema relevncia, no foi interpretado pelo DSB em muitas disputas no mbito da OMC. De acordo com a base de dados da OMC, o referido dispositivo foi invocado como violado em apenas duas disputas, havendo interpretaes do DSB relevantes com relao sua aplicao em no mais que trs disputas. No obstante isso, as interpretaes realizadas detm sua relevncia e foram aqui divididas por temas, quais sejam: (i) taxa de cmbio como extrapolao dos compromissos assumidos na Agenda de um Membro; (ii) relao do Artigo XV:2 com as regras do FMI; (iii) relao do Artigo XV:9 com as regras do FMI; (iv) conceito de exchange restriction de acordo com o Artigo XV:9 (a); e (v) o nus de invocar o Artigo XV como exceo ou defesa afirmativa.

147

Quanto ao primeiro tema, o Painel no caso DS302 contribui para chamar a ateno para a importncia de se observar os compromissos assumidos na agenda do Membro, observando-se se a taxa de cmbio representa uma violao ao GATT ou uma exceo ao Artigo XV:9(a). Conforme a metodologia adotada pelo Painel para analisar a referida violao (vide pargrafo 7.106 do Relatrio), o primeiro passo verificar se a medida em questo, no caso a taxa de cmbio, constitui uma extrapolao dos compromissos firmados na Agenda. Na disputa, o Painel entendeu que a taxa de cmbio implementada pela Repblica Dominicana foi aplicada em excesso, sendo inconsistente com o Artigo II:1(b) do GATT. A relao do dispositivo com as regras do FMI objeto do segundo e terceiro tema sugerido de anlise, mais especificamente com relao ao pargrafo XV:2 e XV:9(a), respectivamente. No que diz respeito ao primeiro pargrafo, denota-se que o rgo de Apelao entendeu que este era o nico dispositivo da OMC que ilustra uma situao na qual uma consulta com o FMI se faz necessria, quando se considera questes como reservas monetrias, balana de pagamentos ou acordos cambiais. O entendimento do rgo de Apelao tambm demonstra que cabe aos Painis decidir se na disputa se faz necessrio recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para questes especficas, como ocorrido em diversos casos, dentre os quais DS90 e DS302. No caso DS90, por exemplo, o Painel ponderou seriamente o entendimento do FMI, mas no o considerou como determinante para fundar as suas concluses. J a relao do Artigo XV:9(a) com as regras do FMI foi mais discutida no mbito do DSB. Como explanado anteriormente, o dispositivo delimita a possibilidade dos Membros recorrerem a medidas cambiais de acordo com as regras do FMI. Em suma, o entendimento dos Painis nos referidos casos demonstra: (a) o recurso ao entendimento do FMI por parte do DSB, para embasar as suas decises relacionadas a assuntos cambiais; e, (b) a necessidade de verificar a compatibilidade com as regras do FMI para que uma medida seja entendida como uma restrio cambial e, em caso afirmativo, considerada como uma exceo legtima, nos termos do Artigo XV:9(a). Por essas razes, observa-se a importncia do conhecimento sobre a medida cambial aplicada pelo Membro, inclusive sob a gide das regras do FMI, para que o DSB possa deliberar sobre a sua compatibilidade com o GATT. Interessante notar que os casos demonstram que, de fato, se a medida for tida como compatvel com as regras do FMI, tambm sero compatveis com a OMC, e vice-versa, conforme prev o Artigo XV:9(a). A ttulo de curiosidade, cabe apontar que o Artigo XV(4) ( as partes contratantes no devero, por meio de aes relacionadas ao cmbio [exchange action], frustrar o propsito dos dispositivos do GATT nem, por ao de comrcio, o propsito dos dispositivos dos Artigos do Acordo do FMI), tambm indica uma atuao da OMC de forma a atentar para as regras do FMI. O quarto tema foca no conceito de restrio cambial nas interpretaes promovidas pelo DSB. O Painel no caso DS302 refora a necessidade de compreenso da medida aplicada para se concluir se tal pode ser considerada uma efetiva restrio cambial luz da definio trazida pelo FMI. Por ela, entende-se uma medida como tal quando envolve uma limitao governamental direta na disponibilidade e utilizao do cmbio como tal. Mais uma vez, reforada a necessidade de recorrer ao entendimento do FMI para que DSB analise tais temas. O quinto e ltimo tema, demonstra ser relevante o entendimento do Painel, tambm no caso DS302, quanto ao carter excepcional ou de defesa afirmativa do Artigo XV, uma vez que serve como justificativa para que uma medida seja inconsistente com outro dispositivo do GATT. Caso no haja inconsistncia com outro dispositivo do GATT, no haver, portanto, necessidade de se recorrer exceo do Artigo XV. Logicamente, por seu carter excepcional, cabe ao Membro demandado justificar a consistncia da medida, de acordo com o dispositivo de exceo invocado, e provar a sua compatibilidade com as regras do FMI, tal como exige o j mencionado Artigo XV:9(a). Por fim, diante do atual cenrio de intensa discusso sobre a interferncia do cmbio no comrcio internacional, ousa-se dizer que os dispositivos da OMC que tratam da questo cambial, tal como o Artigo XV do GATT, assumem um papel ainda mais relevante na conjuntura da regulao do comrcio exterior. 148

 IA.

Artigo XVI Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XVI Subsidies Section A Subsidies in General

16.1

If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization. Section B Additional Provisions on Export Subsidies

16.2

The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties, both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product. Further, as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the extension of existing, subsidies. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provisions of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of contracting parties. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo 16 Subvenes Seo A Subvenes em Geral

16.3

16.4

16.5

IB.

149

16.1

Se uma Parte Contratante concede ou mantm uma subveno qualquer, inclusive qualquer forma de proteo das rendas ou sustentao dos preos que tenha diretamente ou indiretamente por efeito elevar as exportaes de um produto qualquer do territrio da referida Parte Contratante ou de reduzir as importaes do mesmo no seu territrio, dar conhecimento, por escrito, s Partes Contratantes, no somente da importncia e da natureza dessa subveno, como dos resultados que possam ser esperados sobre as quantidades do ou dos produtos em questo por ele importados ou exportados e as circunstncias que tornam a subveno necessria. Em todos os casos em que fique estabelecido que uma tal subveno causa ou ameaa causar um prejuzo srio aos interesses de outra Parte Contratante, a Parte Contratante que a concedeu examinar, quando solicitada, com a ou com as Partes Contratantes interessadas ou com as Partes Contratantes, a possibilidade de limitar a subveno. Seo B Disposies Adicionais Relativas s Subvenes e Exportao

16.2

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que a outorga, por uma Parte Contratante, de uma subveno exportao de um produto pode ter conseqncias prejudiciais para outras Partes Contratantes, quer se trate de pases importadores ou de pases exportadores; que pode provocar perturbaes injustificadas nos seus interesses comerciais normais e opor obstculo realizao dos objetivos do presente Acordo. Em conseqncia, as Partes Contratantes deveriam se esforar no sentido de enviar a concesso de subvenes exportao de produtos base. Contudo, se uma Parte Contratante consegue diretamente ou indiretamente, sob uma forma qualquer, uma subveno que tenha por efeito aumentar a exportao de um produto de base originria de seu territrio, esta subveno no ser concedida de tal maneira que a mencionada Parte Contratante detenha ento uma parte mais do que razovel do comrcio mundial de exportao do mesmo produto, tendo em vista a participao das Partes Contratantes no comrcio deste produto durante um perodo de referncia anterior, assim como todos os fatores especiais que possam ter afetado ou que possam afetar o comrcio em questo. Alm disso, a partir de 1 de janeiro de 1958, ou o mais cedo possvel depois desta data, as Partes Contratantes cessaro de conceder direta ou indiretamente qualquer subveno, de qualquer natureza que ela seja, exportao de todo produto que no seja produto de base, que tenha por resultado de reduzir o preo de venda na exportao deste produto abaixo do preo comparvel cobrado aos consumidores do mercado interno para o produto similar. At 31 de dezembro de 1957, nenhuma Parte Contratante estender o campo de aplicao de tais subvenes alm do nvel existente em 1 de janeiro de 1955, instituindo novas subvenes ou estendendo as subvenes existentes. As Partes Contratantes procedero periodicamente a um exame de conjunto da aplicao das disposies do presente artigo a fim de determinar luz da experincia, se elas contribuem eficazmente para a realizao dos objetivos do presente acordo e se elas permitem efetivamente que as subvenes causem um prejuzo srio ao comrcio ou aos interesses das Partes Contratantes.

16.3

16.4

16.5

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nenhum comentrio. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XIV

O Artigo em anlise no foi objeto de nenhum litgio no DSB da OMC. III. Comentrio

Nada a comentar. 150

Artigo XVII

Nathalie Tiba Sato IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XVII State Trading Enterprises 17.1 (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports and exports by private traders. The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales. No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether or not an enterprise described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance with the principles of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

(b)

(c)

17.2

The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale. With respect to such imports, each contracting party shall accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment. The contracting parties recognize that their enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of this article might be operated so as to create serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles are of importance to the expansion of international trade. (a) Contracting parties shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the products which are imported into or exported from their territories by enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a) of this article. A contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing an import monopoly of a product, which is not the subject of a concession under Article II, shall, on the request of another contracting party having a substantial trade in the product concerned, inform the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the import mark-up on the product during a recent representative period, or when it is not possible to do so, of the price charged on the resale of the product. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party which has reason to believe that its interest under this Agreement are being adversely affected by the operations of an enterprise of the kind described in paragraph 1 (a), request the contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing such enterprise to supply information about its operations related to the carrying out of the provisions of this Agreement.

17.3

17.4

(b)

(c)

151

(d)

The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises. Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo XVII em Ingls

Members, Noting that Article XVII provides for obligations on Members in respect of the activities of the state trading enterprises referred to in paragraph 1 of Article XVII, which are required to be consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in GATT 1994 for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders; Noting further that Members are subject to their GATT 1994 obligations in respect of those governmental measures affecting state trading enterprises; Recognizing that this Understanding is without prejudice to the substantive disciplines prescribed in Article XVII; Hereby agree as follows: 1. In order to ensure the transparency of the activities of state trading enterprises, Members shall notify such enterprises to the Council for Trade in Goods, for review by the working party to be set up under paragraph 5, in accordance with the following working definition:

Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports. This notification requirement does not apply to imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use or in use by an enterprise as specified above and not otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale. 2. Each Member shall conduct a review of its policy with regard to the submission of notifications on state trading enterprises to the Council for Trade in Goods, taking account of the provisions of this Understanding. In carrying out such a review, each Member should have regard to the need to ensure the maximum transparency possible in its notifications so as to permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and the effect of their operations on international trade. Notifications shall be made in accordance with the questionnaire on state trading adopted on 24 May 1960 (BISD 9S/184-185), it being understood that Members shall notify the enterprises referred to in paragraph 1 whether or not imports or exports have in fact taken place. Any Member which has reason to believe that another Member has not adequately met its notification obligation may raise the matter with the Member concerned. If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved it may make a counter-notification to the Council for Trade in Goods, for consideration by the working party set up under paragraph 5, simultaneously informing the Member concerned. A working party shall be set up, on behalf of the Council for Trade in Goods, to review notifications and counter-notifications. In the light of this review and without prejudice to paragraph 4(c) of Article XVII, the Council for Trade in Goods may make recommendations with regard to the adequacy of notifications and the need for further information. The working party shall also review, in the light of the notifications received, the adequacy of the above-mentioned questionnaire on state trading and the coverage of state trading enterprises notified under paragraph 1. It shall also develop an illustrative list 152

3.

4.

5.

showing the kinds of relationships between governments and enterprises, and the kinds of activities, engaged in by these enterprises, which may be relevant for the purposes of Article XVII. It is understood that the Secretariat will provide a general background paper for the working party on the operations of state trading enterprises as they relate to international trade. Membership of the working party shall be open to all Members indicating their wish to serve on it. It shall meet within a year of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement and thereafter at least once a year. It shall report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods. (82)
Footnote 82: The activities of this working party shall be coordinated with those of the working group provided for in Section III of the Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures adopted on 15 April 1994.

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XVII Empreendimentos Comerciais do Estado

17.1

(a)

Cada Parte Contratante que funde ou mantenha uma empresa de Estado, seja onde for, ou que conceda de direito ou de fato, a qualquer empresa privilgios exclusivos ou especiais compromete-se a que essa empresa, em suas compras ou vendas que tenham por origem ou por conseqncia importaes ou exportaes, se conforme ao princpio geral de no discriminao adotado pelo presente Acordo para as medidas de natureza legislativa ou administrativa relativas s importaes ou exportaes efetuadas pelos comerciantes particulares. As disposies da alnea (a) do presente pargrafo devero ser interpretadas como impondo a essas empresas a obrigao, levadas devidamente em conta as outras disposies do presente Acordo, de proceder s compras e vendas dessa natureza inspirando-se unicamente em consideraes de ordem comercial, inclusive no que diz respeito ao preo, qualidade, s quantidades disponveis, s possibilidades de venda, aos transportes e outras indicaes de compra ou venda, e como impondo a obrigao de oferecer s empresas de outras Partes Contratantes todas as facilidades de livre concorrncia nas vendas ou compras dessa natureza, de acordo com as prticas comerciais usuais, Nenhuma Parte Contratante impedir qualquer empresa quer se trate ou no de uma empresa mencionada na alnea (a) do presente pargrafo sujeita sua jurisdio, de agir de acordo com os princpios enunciados nas alneas (a) e (b) do presente pargrafo.

(b)

(c)

17.2

As disposies do pargrafo primeiro do presente Artigo no se aplicaro s importaes de produtos destinados a serem imediata ou finalmente consumidos pelos poderes pblicos ou por sua conta e no a serem revendidos ou a servirem produo de mercadorias destinadas venda. No que diz respeito a tais importaes, cada Parte Contratante conceder ao comrcio das outras Partes Contratantes um tratamento leal e equitativo. As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que os empreendimentos do gnero daqueles que so definidos na alnea (a) do pargrafo primeiro do presente Artigo podero ser utilizados de maneira que deles resultem srios entraves ao comrcio; nestas condies, importante, para assegurar o desenvolvimento do comrcio internacional, entabular negociaes sobre uma base de reciprocidade e de vantagens mtuas, a fim de limitar ou de reduzir esses entraves. a) 17.4(a) As Partes Contratantes notificaro s Partes Contratantes os produtos que so importados em seus territrios ou que deles so exportados por empreendimentos do gnero daqueles que so definidos na alnea (a) do pargrafo primeiro do presente Artigo. Qualquer Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantm ou autoriza um monoplio de importao de um produto sobre o qual no foi outorgada concesso nos termos do Artigo 2, dever, a pedido de uma outra Parte Contratante que tenha um comrcio substancial deste produto, 153

17.3

b)

levar ao conhecimento das Partes Contratantes a majorao do preo de importao do dito produto durante um perodo de referncia recente ou, quando isto no for possvel o preo cobrado, na revenda deste produto. c) As Partes Contratantes podero, a pedido de uma Parte Contratante que tenha razes para crer que seus interesses no quadro do presente acordo esto sendo atingidos pelas operaes de um empreendimento do gnero daqueles que so definidos na alnea (a) do pargrafo primeiro, convidar a Parte Contratante que estabelece, mantm ou autoriza um tal empreendimento a fornecer sobre as operaes do mencionado empreendimento as informaes referentes execuo do presente acordo. As disposies do presente pargrafo no obrigaro uma Parte Contratante a revelar informaes confidenciais cuja divulgao oponha obstculo aplicao das leis seja contrria ao interesse pblico ou prejudique os interesses comerciais legtimos de um empreendimento. Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo XVII em Portugus Os Membros, Tendo em conta que o artigo XVII cria obrigaes para os Membros com respeito s atividades de empresas estatais que realizam comrcio, referidas no pargrafo 1 do artigo XVII, das quais se requer compatibilidade das medidas governamentais que afetem a importao e exportao por comerciantes privados com os princpios gerais de no -discriminao previstos no GATT 1994; Tendo em conta que os Membros esto sujeitos s obrigaes do GATT 1994 com respeito quelas medidas governamentais que afeiem empresas estatais que realizam comrcio; Reconhecendo que o presente Entendimento no prejudica as disciplinas substantivas previstas no artigo XVII; Acordam o seguinte: 1. A fim de assegurar a transparncia das atividades das empresas estatais que realizam comrcio, os Membros notificaro tais empresas ao Conselho para o Comercio de Bens para exame pelo Grupo de Trabalho a ser estabelecido ao amparo do pargrafo 5 de acordo com a seguinte definio.

d)

As empresas governamentais e nogovernamentais, inclusive marketing boards, a que tenham sido outorgados direitos e privilgios especiais, inclusive poderes constitucionais ou legais, no exerccio dos quais influenciam por melo de suas compras e vendas o nvel ou a direo das importaes e exportaes. A referida exigncia de notificao no se aplica a importaes de produtos que sero consumidos em utilizao governamental imediata ou final ou em utilizao por empresa como especificada acima, desde que no seja para revenda nem para utilizao na produo de bens destinados a venda. 2. Cada Membro proceder reviso de suas polticas com respeito submisso de notificao de empresas estatais que realizam comrcio ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens levando em conta as disposies do presente Entendimento. Ao realizar tal reviso cada Membro deve ter em vista a necessidade de assegurar o mximo de transparncia possvel em suas notificaes a fim de permitir uma apreciao clara das operaes das empresas notificadas e do efeito de suas operaes sobre o comrcio internacional. As notificaes sero feitas de acordo com o questionrio sobre comrcio estatal adotado em 24 de maio de 1960 (BISD 98/184-185) ficando entendido que os Membros notificaro as empresas mencionadas no pargrafo 1, quer as importaes ou exportaes tenham ocorrido ou no. 154

3.

4.

Qualquer Membro que tiver razo para crer que um outro Membro no cumpriu adequadamente com sua obrigao de notificao poder trazer o assunto quele outro Membro. Se o assunto no for resolvido adequadamente o Membro poder fazer uma contra-notificao ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens para considerao pelo Grupo de Trabalho estabelecido ao amparo do pargrafo 5 informando simultaneamente aquele Membro interessado. Um grupo de trabalho ser estabelecido para, em nome do Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens, examinar as notificaes e contra-notificaes. luz desse exame e sem prejuzo para o pargrafo 4(c) do artigo XVII o Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens poder fazer recomendaes com respeito adequao das notificaes e necessidade de maior informao. O grupo de trabalho tambm examinar, luz das notificaes recebidas, a adequao do acima referido questionrio sobre comrcio estatal e o alcance, em termos de empresas estatais que realizam comrcio notificadas ao amparo do pargrafo 1. Dever igualmente elaborar uma lista Ilustrativa que mostre os tipos de relaes entre governos e empresas e os tipos de atividades que tais empresas exeram que possam ser relevantes para os propsitos do artigo XVII. Fica entendido que o Secretariado da OMC suprir o grupo de trabalho com um documento de base geral sobre as operaes das empresas estatais que realizam comrcio que digam respeito ao comrcio internacional. A participao no grupo de trabalho ser aberta a todos os Membros que indicarem seu desejo nesse sentido. O grupo de trabalho se reunir dentro de um ano a contar da data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC e subseqentemente uma vez por ano. O grupo de trabalho apresentar anualmente relatrio ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens5.

5.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nada a observar. II. 1. Evoluo da Interpretao do Painel/rgo de Apelao Princpios de Tratamento No Discriminatrio

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 85 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, neste caso, a disposio presente no subpargrafo (a) do Artigo XVII:1 pode ser entendida como uma disposio anti-circunveno. Isto porque o subpargrafo estabelece que um Membro no pode, por meio da concesso de privilgios exclusivos ou especiais a uma empresa privada ou pela criao ou manuteno de uma empresa estatal, envolver-se ou facilitar condutas que seriam consideradas discriminatrias se o Membro as fizesse diretamente. Para. 85. Subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 contains a number of different elements, including both an acknowledgement and an obligation. It recognizes that Members may establish or maintain State enterprises or grant exclusive or special privileges to private enterprises, but requires that, if they do so, such enterprises must, when they are involved in certain types of transactions (purchases or sales involving either imports or exports), comply with a specific requirement. That requirement is to act consistently with certain principles contained in the GATT 1994 (general principles of non-discriminatory treatment for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders). Subparagraph (a) seeks to ensure that a Member cannot, through the creation or maintenance of a State enterprise or the grant of exclusive or special privileges to any enterprise, engage in or facilitate conduct that would be condemned as discriminatory under

As atividades desse grupo de trabalho sero coordenadas com as do grupo de trabalho previsto na seo III da Deciso Ministerial sobre Procedimentos de Notificao adotada em 15 de abril de 1994.

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the GATT 1994 if such conduct were undertaken directly by the Member itself. In other words, subparagraph (a) is an anti-circumvention provision. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 87 O rgo de Apelao analisou o significado da proibio de conduta discriminatria por meio de empreendimentos estatais presente no subpargrafo (a). Segundo o rgo de Apelao, o termo discriminao pode significar fazer distino entre duas situaes similares, per se, ou fazer distines sobre uma base imprpria. Assim, o rgo de Apelao entendeu que apenas uma devida interpretao de uma disposio contendo a proibio de uma discriminao poder revelar qual tipo de tratamento diferenciado proibido. Para. 87. This requirement, which lies at the core of subparagraph (a), is a requirement that STEs not engage in certain types of discriminatory conduct. When viewed in the abstract, the concept of discrimination may encompass both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well as treating dissimilar situations in a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has previously dealt with the concept of discrimination and the meaning of the term non-discriminatory, and acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of distinctions between similar situations is concerned, the ordinary meaning of discrimination can accommodate both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of differential treatment is prohibited. In all cases, a claimant alleging discrimination will need to establish that differential treatment has occurred in order to succeed in its claim. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 98 e nota de rodap 104 O rgo de Apelao afirmou que mesmo se o Artigo XVII:1 no existisse isto no significaria que os empreendimentos comerciais estatais (STE, sigla em ingls) no estariam sujeitos s disciplinas do GATT 1994. O rgo de Apelao enumera algumas das disposies que constrangem a atuao dos STEs como o Artigo II:4 do GATT e as Notas Adicionais aos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII. Outras disposies do GATT 1994, notadamente o Artigo VI tambm se aplicam s atividades dos STEs. Para. 98 e Nota de Rodap 104. As we have seen, through its reference to the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders, Article XVII:1 imposes an obligation on Members not to use STEs in order to discriminate in ways that would be prohibited if undertaken directly by Members. Yet even if Article XVII:1 itself did not exist, this would not imply that STEs would be subject to no disciplines under the GATT 1994. For example, the express provisions of Article II:4 of the GATT 1994 and the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII constrain the behaviour of STEs. Other provisions of the GATT 1994, notably Article VI, also apply to the activities of STEs Footnote 104: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft104>). We need not identify, for purposes of this appeal, all of the provisions of the GATT 1994 that may apply to STEs, nor consider how these disciplines interact with and reinforce each other. We do, however, believe that these other provisions reveal that, even in 1947, the negotiators of the GATT created a number of complementary requirements to address the different ways in which STEs could be used by a contracting party to seek to circumvent its obligations under the GATT. The existence of these other provisions of the GATT 1994 also supports the view that Article XVII was never intended to be the sole source of the disciplines imposed on STEs under that Agreement. This is also consistent with the view that Article XVII:1 was intended to impose disciplines on one particular type of STE behaviour, namely discriminatory behaviour, rather than to constitute a comprehensive code of conduct for STEs. Moreover, as the Panel observed, since the conclusion of the 156

Uruguay Round, a number of additional obligations, under different covered agreements, operate to further constrain the behaviour of STEs. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 145 O rgo de Apelao esclareceu que as disposies do Artigo XVII:1 tem como objetivo prevenir certos tipos de atuao discriminatrio e no possvel interpretar que isso resulte na imposio de obrigaes abrangentes tpicas de lei concorrencial, como alegou os EUA no caso em tela. Para. 145. () The disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain types of discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting that provision as imposing comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs, as the United States would have us do. 2. Preos Diferenciados por Razes Comerciais (Note Ad, XVII do GATT 1994)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 94 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, a nota adicional ao Artigo XVII:1 confirma que ao menos um tipo de tratamento diferenciado a diferenciao de preo - consistente com o a Artigo XVII:1, desde que as razes para tal diferenciao de preo sejam de natureza comercial, por exemplo, para cumprir as condies de oferta e demanda dos mercados de exportao. Assim, a nota adicional tambm contempla que a determinao de uma consistncia ou inconsistncia da conduta de um empreendimento comercial estatal com o Artigo XVII:1 envolver a examinao do tratamento diferenciado e de consideraes comerciais. Para. 94. () This ad Note is attached to Article XVII:1 as a whole, rather than to either subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) alone. This sentence of the ad Note confirms that at least one type of differential treatment - price differentiation - is consistent with Article XVII:1 provided that the reasons for such differential prices are commercial in nature, and gives an example of such commercial reasons ( to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets). Thus, this Note also contemplates that determining the consistency or inconsistency of an STEs conduct with Article XVII:1 will involve an examination of both differential treatment and of commercial considerations. 3. Relao entre os Subpargrafos (a) e (b)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 89 O rgo de Apelao interpretou que a relao entre os subpargrafos (a) e (b) do Artigo XVII:1 pode ser extrada da frase incial do subpargrafo (b), que deixa claro que o resto de tal subpargrafo dependente do contedo do subpargrafo (a) e tem como fim clarificar o escopo do requisito de no discriminao do subpargrafo (a). Para. 89. () the question we are asked to consider is how subparagraph (a) relates to subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1. In our view, the answer to that inquiry is not found in the text of subparagraph (a). Rather, the words that bear most directly on the relationship between the first two paragraphs of Article XVII:1 are found in the opening phrase of subparagraph (b), which states that the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall (). (emphasis added) This phrase makes it abundantly clear that the remainder of subparagraph (b) is dependent upon the content of subparagraph (a), and operates to clarify the scope of the requirement not to discriminate in subparagraph (a). () Thus, the opening phrase in subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 supports Canadas view that the 157

principal source of the relevant obligation(s) in Article XVII:1(a) and (b) is, indeed, found in [t]he provisions of subparagraph (a). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 91 Sobre a relao entre os subpargrafos (a) e (b), o rgo de Apelao afirma que o subpargrafo (b) dependente, e no separado e independente do subpargrafo (a). Para. 91. Having examined the text of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1, it is our view that subparagraph (b), by defining and clarifying the requirement in subparagraph (a), is dependent upon, rather than separate and independent from, subparagraph (a). (). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 99-100 Sobre a relao entre os subpargrafos (a) e (b), o rgo de Apelao afirma que o subpargrafo (b) no estabelece requisitos independentes do subpargrafo (a), mas dependente deste ao apenas clarificar seu escopo. Para. 99. () subparagraphs (a) and (b) are necessarily related to each other. Subparagraph (a) is the general and principal provision, and subparagraph (b) explains it by identifying types of differential treatment in commercial transactions. It appears to us that these types of differential treatment would be the most likely to occur in practice and, therefore, that most if not all cases under Article XVII:1 will involve an analysis of both subparagraphs (a) and (b). Para. 100. For all these reasons, we are of the view that subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994 sets out an obligation of non-discrimination, and that subparagraph (b) clarifies the scope of that obligation. We therefore disagree with the United States that subparagraph (b) establishes separate requirements that are independent of subparagraph (a). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 106 e nota de rodap 115 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, neste caso, a constatao de uma violao do Artigo XVII:1 deve passar pela interpretao e aplicao de ambos os subpargrafos (a) e (b), pois ambos definem o escopo da obrigao de no-discriminao. Para. 106 e Nota de Rodap 115. Our conclusions regarding the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) imply that a panel confronted with a claim that an STE has acted inconsistently with Article XVII:1 will need to begin its analysis of that claim under subparagraph (a), because it is that provision which contains the principal obligation of Article XVII:1, namely the requirement not to act in a manner contrary to the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in [the GATT 1994] for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. At the same time, because both subparagraphs (a) and (b) define the scope of that non-discrimination obligation, we would expect that panels, in most if not all cases, would not be in a position to make any finding of violation of Article XVII:1 until they have properly interpreted and applied both provisions. Footnote 115: <http.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/repertory_e/s7a_e.htm#ft115>. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 110-111 158

O rgo de Apelao esclareceu que, como o subpargrafo (b) e sua aplicao aos fatos do caso so dependentes das obrigas definidas no subpargrafo (a), os paineis devem identificar o tratamento diferenciado supostamente discriminatrio sob o subpargrafo (a) para assegurar que estejam conduzindo uma investigao adequada sob o subpargrafo (b). Para. 110. () a panel faced with a claim of inconsistency with Article XVII:1(a) and (b) will, in most if not all cases, need to analyze and apply both provisions in order to assess the consistency of the measure at issue. Subparagraph (b) sets forth two specific conditions with which an STE must comply if allegedly discriminatory conduct falling, prima facie, within the scope of subparagraph (a) is to be found consistent with Article XVII:1. Yet, in order to know whether the conditions in (b) are satisfied, a panel must know what constitutes the conduct alleged to be inconsistent with the principles of non-discriminatory treatment in the GATT 1994. A panel will need to identify at least the differential treatment at issue. The outcome of an assessment under subparagraph (b) of whether the differential treatment is consistent with commercial considerations may depend, in part, upon whether the alleged discrimination relates to pricing, quality, or conditions of sale, and whether it is discrimination between export markets or some other form of discrimination. Para. 111. It follows that, logically, a panel cannot assess whether particular practices of an allegedly discriminatory nature accord with commercial considerations without first identifying the key elements of the alleged discrimination. We emphasize that we are not suggesting that panels are always obliged to make specific factual and legal findings with respect to each element of a claim of discrimination under subparagraph (a) before undertaking any analysis under subparagraph (b). Rather, because a panels analysis and application of subparagraph (b) to the facts of the case is, like subparagraph (b) itself, dependent on the obligation set forth in subparagraph (a), panels must identify the differential treatment alleged to be discriminatory under subparagraph (a) in order to ensure that they are undertaking a proper inquiry under subparagraph (b). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 124-125 O rgo de Apelao decidiu que o Painel no errou ao no considerar a relao apropriada dos subpargrafos (a) e (b) do Artigo XVII:1 ou em proceder com o exame de consistncia da medida em questo como subpargrafo (b) sem antes analisar o descumprimento do subpargrafo (a). Para. 124. () although the Panel refrained from explicitly defining the relationship between the first two subparagraphs of Article XVII:1, its approach was consistent with our interpretation of that relationship. Para. 125. In sum, we find that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Panel did not err in not considering the proper relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994, or in proceeding to examine the consistency of the CWB Export Regime with Article XVII:1(b) without first having found a breach of Article XVII:1(a). () 4. Consideraes Comerciais (Artigo XVII:1(b) GATT 1994)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 140-141 O rgo de Apelao faz referncia ao relatrio do Painel no mesmo caso que interpretou o termo consideraes comerciais como abrangendo uma variedade de diferentes consideraes que so definidas conforme o caso pelo tipo de negcio envolvido (compra ou venda) e pelas consideraes econmicas que motivam os atores a atuar nos mercados relevantes. No caso em questo, o Painel afirmou que o requisito de que os empreendimentos comerciais estatais (STEs) atuem inspirando-se unicamente em consideraes de ordem comercial do subpargrafo (b) tem como fim impedir que STEs atuem como atores polticos.

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Para. 140. () The Panel began its analysis by considering the meaning of the term commercial considerations in subparagraph (b) and found that this term should be understood as meaning considerations pertaining to commerce and trade, or considerations which involve regarding purchases or sales as mere matters of business. The Panel also determined that the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with such considerations must imply that they should seek to purchase or sell on terms which are economically advantageous for themselves and/or their owners, members, beneficiaries, etc. Thus, the Panel interpreted the term commercial considerations as encompassing a range of different considerations that are defined in any given case by the type of business involved (purchases or sales), and by the economic considerations that motivate actors engaged in business in the relevant market(s). Para. 141. The Panel then turned to address several arguments advanced by the United States with respect to the interpretation of the first clause of subparagraph (b). It was in responding to the United States assertion that the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with commercial considerations is equivalent to a requirement that STEs act like commercial actors that the Panel made the statement that the requirement in question is simply intended to prevent STEs from behaving l ike political actors. Yet in so doing the Panel expressly stated that it was not, as the United States now suggests that it did, equating non-commercial actors with political actors. () Relatrio do Orgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 144-145 O rgo de Apelao afirmou que a interpretao do termo consideraes comerciais implica que a determinao de consistncia entre a conduta de um empreendimento comercial (STE) estatal e os requisitos da primeira clusula do subpargrafo (b) deve ser realizada caso a caso e deve envolver uma anlise detalhada do mercado relevante. Segundo a interpretao da relao entre os subpargrafos (a) e (b) a investigao de se um STE est atuando inspirando-se unicamente em consideraes de ordem comercial deve ser conduzida a respeito do mercado no qual a STE est supostamente atuando. Ou seja, o subpargrafo (b) no d ao painel um mandato para conduzir uma investigao ampla, em abstrato, se a STE est atuando comercialmente. Para. 144. () it is important to observe that the Panels interpretation of the term commercial considerations necessarily implies that the determination of whether or not a particular STEs conduct is consistent with the requirements of the first clause of subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, and must involve a careful analysis of the relevant market(s). We see no error in the Panels approach; only such an analysis will reveal the type and range of considerations properly considered commercial as regards purchases and sales made in those markets, as well as how those considerations influence the actions of participants in the market(s). Para. 145. At the same time, our interpretation of the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 necessarily implies that () a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted solely in accordance with commercial considerations must undertake this inquiry with respect to the market(s) in which the STE is alleged to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b) does not give panels a mandate to engage in a broader inquiry into whether, in the abstract, STEs are acting commercially. () Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, (WT/DS276/AB/R), para. 149 O rgo de Apelao afirmou que, como os empreendimentos comerciais estatais (STEs), assim como empresas privadas, tm o direito de explorar as vantagens de seus benefcios econmicos, no possvel interpretar que o subpargrafo (b) introduziria uma regra geral que impediria as STEs de desfrutar dos privilgios e vantagens a que tm direito porque tal uso poderia deixar empresas privadas em desvantagem. Para. 149. () the Panels approach emphasizes that whether an STE is in compliance with the disci plines in Article XVII:1 must be assessed by means of a market-based analysis, rather than simply by determining 160

whether an STE has used the privileges that it has been granted. In arguing that Article XVII:1(b) must be interpreted as prohibiting STEs from using their exclusive or special privileges to the disadvantage of commercial actors, the United States appears to construe Article XVII:1(b) as requiring STEs to act not only as commercial actors in the marketplace, but as virtuouscommercial actors, by tying their own hands. We do not see how such an interpretation can be reconciled with an analysis of commercial considerations based on market forces. In other words, we cannot accept that the first clause of subparagraph (b) would, as a general rule, require STEs to refrain from using the privileges and advantages that they enjoy because such use might disadvantage private enterprises. STEs, like private enterprises, are entitled to exploit the advantages they may enjoy to their economic benefit. Article XVII:1(b) merely prohibits STEs from making purchases or sales on the basis of non-commercial considerations. 5. Oferecer s Empresas de outras Partes Contratantes todas as Facilidades de Livre Concorrncia nas Vendas ou Compras dessa Natureza

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 156-157 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, em transaes envolvendo duas partes, sendo que o vendedor um empreendimento comercial estatal, o termo empresas na segunda clusula do subpargrafo (b) do Artigo XVII:1 s pode se referir a compradores. Para. 156. In the abstract, competition to participate in purchases and sales could include competition to participate as a buyer, as a seller, or both. However, the clause under examination does not refer, in the abstract, to any purchases and sales. Rather, it refers to such purchases or sales, repeating the phrase found in the first clause of subparagraph (b). As discussed in our analysis above, this phrase in subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 refers back to the activities identified in subparagraph (a), namely the purchases and sales of an STE involving imports or exports. Para. 157. In other words, the second clause of subparagraph (b) refers to purchases and sales transactions where: (i) one of the parties involved in the transaction is an STE; and (ii) the transaction involves imports to or exports from the Member maintaining the STE. Thus, the requirement to afford an adequate opportunity to compete for participation (i.e., taking part with others) in such purchases and sales (import or export transactions involving an STE) must refer to the opportunity to become the STEs counterpart in the transaction, not to an opportunity to replace the STE as a participant in the transaction. If it were otherwise, the transaction would no longer be the type of transaction described by the phrase such purchases or sales in the second clause of Article XVII:1(b), because it would not involve an STE as a party. Thus, in transactions involving two parties, one of whom is an STE seller, the word enterprises in the second clause of Article XVII:1(b) can refer only to buyers. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada -Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 160 O rgo de Apelao, assim como o Painel, no determinou os limites da expresso oferecer s empresas de outras partes contratantes todas as facilidades de livre nas compras e vendas relevantes, mas reconhece que, em outras circunstncias, empresas podem atuar tanto como compradoras e vendedoras. Para. 160. () The Panel did not determine the full ambit of the requirement to afford adequate opportunity () to compete for participation in relevant purchases and sales. Nor do we. The Panel expressly recognized the possibility that, in other circumstances, particular enterprises could act both as a buyer and as a seller. The Panel also explicitly stated that it was not asked to, and was not, ruling on the scope of the obligation in this clause with respect to STEs that act as purchasers, rather than as sellers.

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Artigo XVII:3

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Canada - Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 97 O rgo de Apelao esclarece que o Artigo XVII:3 explicitamente reconhece que as disposies do Artigo XVII:1 no podem ser a nica base pra a eliminao dos potenciais obstculos ao comrcio relacionados a empreendimentos comerciais estatais, e medidas adicionais para reduzir ou limitar tais obstculos devem ser buscadas por meio de negociaes. Para. 97. To us, [Article XVII:3] explicitly recognizes that, notwithstanding the existence of certain disciplines on STEs in Article XVII:1, these alone may not suffice to prevent the various ways in which STEs might create obstacles to trade, and that additional measures to limit or reduce such obstacles should therefore be pursued through negotiation. Thus, this provision constitutes acknowledgement by the GATT contracting parties of the limitations inherent in Article XVII:1, and recognizes that Article XVII:1 cannot serve as the sole legal basis for eliminating all potential obstacles to trade relating to STEs. () III. Comentrios

O Artigo XVII do GATT 1994 o principal texto que trata dos empreendimentos comerciais do Estado (STEs, sigle em ingls) e suas operaes. Em resumo, tal artigo determina que as STEs, em suas compras ou vendas, envolvendo importao ou exportao, devem atuar conforme os princpios gerais de nodiscriminao e suas decises sobre importao ou exportao devem inspirar-se unicamente em consideraes comerciais. Alm disso, o artigo estabelece que os Membros devem notificar anualmente suas STEs OMC. A definio de empreendimentos comerciais do estado pode ser encontrada no Entendimento da OMC sobre a Interpretao do Artigo XVII, em seu pargrafo 1, como segue: As empresas governamentais e no governamentais, inclusive marketing boards, a que tenham sido outorgados direitos e privilgios especiais, inclusive poderes constitucionais ou legais, no exerccio dos quais influenciam por melo de suas compras e vendas o nvel ou a direo das importaes e exportaes. importante notar que o Artigo XVII no se aplica s compras governamentais, que so reguladas pelo Acordo sobre Compras Governamentais da OMC para os Membros que deste fazem parte. O caso Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports o nico precedente do DSB que analisa o Artigo XVII minuciosamente, ao concentrar-se na interpretao das expresses no discriminao, inspirar-se unicamente em consideraes comerciais e na relao entre os subpargrafos (a) e (b). O rgo de Apelao interpretou que o subpargrafo (a) introduz a disposio principal e o subpargrafo (b) a explica, ao identificar os tipos de tratamento diferenciado em transaes comerciais que poderiam ocorrer na prtica. Assim, todas as alegaes sob o Artigo XVII:1 deveriam requerer uma anlise sequencial de ambos os subpargrafos. No entanto, o rgo de Apelao absteu-se de definir explicitamente a relao entre os subpargrafos ao no considerar um erro legal o fato de o Panel ter procedido com a suposio que apenas a violao do subpargrafo (b) suficiente para estabelecer a violao do Artigo XVII:1. Por fim, outras disposies alm do Artigo XVII se aplicam a empreendimentos comerciais do Estado (STEs), como o Artigo II:4 do GATT e as Notas Adicionais aos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV e XVIII. Segundo a Nota 104 ao Relatrio do rgo de Apelao do caso Canada - Wheat Exports and Grain Imports a existncia de outras disposies que se aplicam aos STEs no GATT revelam que, mesmo em 1947, os negociadores criaram diversas outras obrigaes complementares para tratar das diversas formas pelas quais os STEs poderiam ser usados por uma parte para buscar escapar de suas obrigaes sob o GATT. Assim, o objetivo do Artigo XVII:1 no tem como objetivo ser um cdigo de conduta dos STEs, mas apenas impor disciplinas a respeito de um comportamento em particular dos STEs, notadamente, a atuao discriminatria.

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Artigo XVIII

Nathalie Tiba Sato IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XVIII Governmental Assistance to Economic Development 18.1 The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of their economies, particularly of those contracting parties the economies of which can only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of development. The contracting parties recognize further that it may be necessary for those contracting parties, in order to implement programmes and policies of economic development designed to raise the general standard of living of their people, to take protective or other measures affecting imports, and that such measures are justified in so far as they facilitate the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement. They agree, therefore, that those contracting parties should enjoy additional facilities to enable them (a) to maintain sufficient flexibility in their tariff structure to be able to grant the tariff protection required for the establishment of a particular industry and (b) to apply quantitative restrictions for balance of payments purposes in a manner which takes full account of the continued high level of demand for imports likely to be generated by their programmes of economic development. The contracting parties recognize finally that, with those additional facilities which are provided for in Sections A and B of this Article, the provisions of this Agreement would normally be sufficient to enable contracting parties to meet the requirements of their economic development. They agree, however, that there may be circumstances where no measure consistent with those provisions is practicable to permit a contracting party in the process of economic development to grant the governmental assistance required to promote the establishment of particular industries with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people. Special procedures are laid down in Sections C and D of this Article to deal with those cases. (a) Consequently, a contracting party, the economy of which can only support low standards of living and is in the early stages of development, shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement, as provided in Sections A, B and C of this Article. A contracting party, the economy of which is in the process of development, but which does not come within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, may submit applications to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Section D of this Article.

18.2

18.3

18.4

(b)

18.5

The contracting parties recognize that the export earnings of contracting parties, the economies of which are of the type described in paragraph 4 (a) and (b) above and which depend on exports of a small number of primary commodities, may be seriously reduced by a decline in the sale of such commodities. Accordingly, when the exports of primary commodities by such a contracting party are seriously affected by measures taken by another contracting party, it may have resort to the consultation provisions of Article XXII of this Agreement. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review annually all measures applied pursuant to the provisions of Sections C and D of this Article. Section A

18.6

18.7

(a)

If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article considerit desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising 163

the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect and enter into negotiations with any contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agreement is reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be free to modify or withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give effect to such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved. (b) If agreement is not reached within sixty days after the notification provided for in subparagraph (a) above, the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession may refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which shall promptly examine it. If they find that the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession has made every effort to reach an agreement and that the compensatory adjustment offered by it is adequate, that contracting party shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession if, at the same time, it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not find that the compensation offered by a contracting party proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is adequate, but find that it has made every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation, that contracting party shall be free to proceed with such modification or withdrawal. If such action is taken, any other contracting party referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be free to modify or withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party which has taken the action. Section B 18.8 The contracting parties recognize that contracting parties coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article tend, when they are in rapid process of development, to experience balance of payments difficulties arising mainly from efforts to expand their internal markets as well as from the instability in their terms of trade. In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided that the import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed those necessary: (a) (b) to forestall the threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves, or in the case of a contracting party with inadequate monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves.

18.9

Due regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting the reserves of the contracting party or its need for reserves, including, where special external credits or other resources are available to it, the need to provide for the appropriate use of such credits or resources. 18.10 In applying these restrictions, the contracting party may determine their incidence on imports of different products or classes of products in such a way as to give priority to the importation of those products which are more essential in the light of its policy of economic development; Provided that the restrictions are so applied as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial or economic interests of any other contracting party and not to prevent unreasonably the importation of any description of goods in minimum commercial quantities the exclusion of which would impair regular channels of trade; and Provided further that the restrictions are not so applied as to prevent the

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importation of commercial samples or to prevent compliance with patent, trade mark, copyright or similar procedures. 18.11 In carrying out its domestic policies, the contracting party concerned shall pay due regard to the need for restoring equilibrium in its balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability of assuring an economic employment of productive resources. It shall progressively relax any restrictions applied under this Section as conditions improve, maintaining them only to the extent necessary under the terms of paragraph 9 of this Article and shall eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such maintenance; Provided that no contracting party shall be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground that a change in its development policy would render unnecessary the restrictions which it is applying under this Section. 18.12 (a) Any contracting party applying new restrictions or raising the general level of its existing restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Section, shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with the CONTRACTING PARTIES as to the nature of its balance of payments difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other contracting parties. On a date to be determined by them the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review all restrictions still applied under this Section on that date. Beginning two years after that date, contracting parties applying restrictions under this Section shall enter into consultations of the type provided for in subparagraph (a) above with the CONTRACTING PARTIES at intervals of approximately, but not less than, two years according to a programme to be drawn up each year by the CONTRACTING PARTIES; Provided that no consultation under this subparagraph shall take place within two years after the conclusion of a consultation of a general nature under any other provision of this paragraph. (i) If, in the course of consultations with a contracting party under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that the restrictions are not consistent with the provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV), they shall indicate the nature of the inconsistency and may advise that the restrictions be suitably modified. If, however, as a result of the consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES determine that the restrictions are being applied in a manner involving an inconsistency of a serious nature with the provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that damage to the trade of any contracting party is caused or threatened thereby, they shall so inform the contracting party applying the restrictions and shall make appropriate recommendations for securing conformity with such provisions within a specified period. If such contracting party does not comply with these recommendations within the specified period, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may release any contracting party the trade of which is adversely affected by the restrictions from such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances.

(b)

(c)

(ii)

(d)

The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall invite any contracting party which is applying restrictions under this Section to enter into consultations with them at the request of any contracting party which can establish a prima facie case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the provisions of this Section or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that its trade is adversely affected thereby. However, no such invitation shall be issued unless the CONTRACTING PARTIES have ascertained that direct discussions between the contracting parties concerned have not been successful. If, as a result 165

of the consultations with the CONTRACTING PARTIES no agreement is reached and they determine that the restrictions are being applied inconsistently with such provisions, and that damage to the trade of the contracting party initiating the procedure is caused or threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or modification of the restrictions. If the restrictions are not withdrawn or modified within such time as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may prescribe, they may release the contracting party initiating the procedure from such obligations under this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. (e) If a contracting party against which action has been taken in accordance with the last sentence of subparagraph (c) (ii) or (d) of this paragraph, finds that the release of obligations authorized by the CONTRACTING PARTIES adversely affects the operation of its programme and policy of economic development, it shall be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary (83) to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect on the sixtieth day following the day on which the notice is received by him.

Footnote 83: By the Decision of 23 March 1965, the CONTRACTING PARTIES changed the title of the head of the GATT secretariat from Executive Secretary to Director-General.

(f)

In proceeding under this paragraph, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall have due regard to the factors referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. Determinations under this paragraph shall be rendered expeditiously and, if possible, within sixty days of the initiation of the consultations. Section C

18.13 If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article finds that governmental assistance is required to promote the establishment of a particular industry with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people, but that no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement is practicable to achieve that objective, it may have recourse to the provisions and procedures set out in this Section. 18.14 The contracting party concerned shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the special difficulties which it meets in the achievement of the objective outlined in paragraph 13 of this Article and shall indicate the specific measure affecting imports which it proposes to introduce in order to remedy these difficulties. It shall not introduce that measure before the expiration of the time-limit laid down in paragraph 15 or 17, as the case may be, or if the measure affects imports of a product which is the subject of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, unless it has secured the concurrence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in accordance with provisions of paragraph 18; Provided that, if the industry receiving assistance has already started production, the contracting party may, after informing the CONTRACTING PARTIES, take such measures as may be necessary to prevent, during that period, imports of the product or products concerned from increasing substantially above a normal level. 18.15 If, within thirty days of the notification of the measure, the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not request the contracting party concerned to consult with them, that contracting party shall be free to deviate from the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to apply the proposed measure. 18.16 If it is requested by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to do so, the contracting party concerned shall consult with them as to the purpose of the proposed measure, as to alternative measures which may be available under this Agreement, and as to the possible effect of the measure proposed on the commercial and economic interests of other contracting parties. If, as a result of such consultation, the CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is no measure consistent with the other provisions of 166

this Agreement which is practicable in order to achieve the objective outlined in paragraph 13 of this Article, and concur in the proposed measure, the contracting party concerned shall be released from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to apply that measure. 18.17 If, within ninety days after the date of the notification of the proposed measure under paragraph 14 of this Article, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have not concurred in such measure, the contracting party concerned may introduce the measure proposed after informing the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 18.18 If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, the contracting party concerned shall enter into consultations with any other contracting party with which the concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall concur in the measure if they agree that there is no measure consistent with the other provisions of this Agreement which is practicable in order to achieve the objective set forth in paragraph 13 of this Article, and if they are satisfied: (a) that agreement has been reached with such other contracting parties as a result of the consultations referred to above, or if no such agreement has been reached within sixty days after the notification provided for in paragraph 14 has been received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, that the contracting party having recourse to this Section has made all reasonable efforts to reach an agreement and that the interests of other contracting parties are adequately safeguarded.

(b)

The contracting party having recourse to this Section shall thereupon be released from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to apply the measure. 18.19 If a proposed measure of the type described in paragraph 13 of this Article concerns an industry the establishment of which has in the initial period been facilitated by incidental protection afforded by restrictions imposed by the contracting party concerned for balance of payments purposes under the relevant provisions of this Agreement, that contracting party may resort to the provisions and procedures of this Section; Provided that it shall not apply the proposed measure without the concurrence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 18.20 Nothing in the preceding paragraphs of this Section shall authorize any deviation from the provisions of Articles I, II and XIII of this Agreement. The provisos to paragraph 10 of this Article shall also be applicable to any restriction under this Section. 18.21 At any time while a measure is being applied under paragraph 17 of this Article any contracting party substantially affected by it may suspend the application to the trade of the contracting party having recourse to this Section of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove; Provided that sixty days notice of such suspension is given to the CONTRACTING PARTIES not later than six months after the measure has been introduced or changed substantially to the detriment of the contracting party affected. Any such contracting party shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation in accordance with the provisions of Article XXII of this Agreement. Section D 18.22 A contracting party coming within the scope of subparagraph 4 (b) of this Article desiring, in the interest of the development of its economy, to introduce a measure of the type described in paragraph 13 of this Article in respect of the establishment of a particular industry may apply to the 167

CONTRACTING PARTIES for approval of such measure. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly consult with such contracting party and shall, in making their decision, be guided by the considerations set out in paragraph 16. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES concur in the proposed measure the contracting party concerned shall be released from its obligations under the relevant provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement to the extent necessary to permit it to apply the measure. If the proposed measure affects a product which is the subject of a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, the provisions of paragraph 18 shall apply. 18.23 Any measure applied under this Section shall comply with the provisions of paragraph 20 of this Article. Notas e Disposies Adicionais ao Artigo XVIII em Ingls The CONTRACTING PARTIES and the contracting parties concerned shall preserve the utmost secrecy in respect of matters arising under this Article. Paragraphs 1 and 4 1. When they consider whether the economy of a contracting party can only support low standards of living, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall take into consideration the normal position of that economy and shall not base their determination on exceptional circumstances such as those which may result from the temporary existence of exceptionally favourable conditions for the staple export product or products of such contracting party. The phrase in the early stages of development is not meant to apply only to contracting parties which have just started their economic development, but also to contracting parties the economies of which are undergoing a process of industrialization to correct an excessive dependence on primary production.

2.

Paragraphs 2, 3, 7, 13 and 22 The reference to the establishment of particular industries shall apply not only to the establishment of a new industry, but also to the establishment of a new branch of production in an existing industry and to the substantial transformation of an existing industry, and to the substantial expansion of an existing industry supplying a relatively small proportion of the domestic demand. It shall also cover the reconstruction of an industry destroyed or substantially damaged as a result of hostilities or natural disasters. Paragraph 7 (b) A modification or withdrawal, pursuant to paragraph 7 (b), by a contracting party, other than the applicant contracting party, referred to in paragraph 7 (a), shall be made within six months of the day on which the action is taken by the applicant contracting party, and shall become effective on the thirtieth day following the day on which such modification or withdrawal has been notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Paragraph 11 The second sentence in paragraph 11 shall not be interpreted to mean that a contracting party is required to relax or remove restrictions if such relaxation or removal would thereupon produce conditions justifying the intensification or institution, respectively, of restrictions under paragraph 9 of Article XVIII. Paragraph 12 (b) The date referred to in paragraph 12 (b) shall be the date determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 (b) of Article XII of this Agreement.

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Paragraphs 13 and 14 It is recognized that, before deciding on the introduction of a measure and notifying the CONTRACTING PARTIES in accordance with paragraph 14, a contracting party may need a reasonable period of time to assess the competitive position of the industry concerned. Paragraphs 15 and 16 It is understood that the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall invite a contracting party proposing to apply a measure under Section C to consult with them pursuant to paragraph 16 if they are requested to do so by a contracting party the trade of which would be appreciably affected by the measure in question. Paragraphs 16, 18, 19 and 22 1. It is understood that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may concur in a proposed measure subject to specific conditions or limitations. If the measure as applied does not conform to the terms of the concurrence it will to that extent be deemed a measure in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES have not concurred. In cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES have concurred in a measure for a specified period, the contracting party concerned, if it finds that the maintenance of the measure for a further period of time is required to achieve the objective for which the measure was originally taken, may apply to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for an extension of that period in accordance with the provisions and procedures of Section C or D, as the case may be. It is expected that the CONTRACTING PARTIES will, as a rule, refrain from concurring in a measure which is likely to cause serious prejudice to exports of a commodity on which the economy of a contracting party is largely dependent.

2.

Paragraphs 18 and 22 The phrase that the interests of other contracting parties are adequately safeguarded is meant to provide latitude sufficient to permit consideration in each case of the most appropriate method of safeguarding those interests. The appropriate method may, for instance, take the form of an additional concession to be applied by the contracting party having recourse to Section C or D during such time as the deviation from the other Articles of the Agreement would remain in force or of the temporary suspension by any other contracting party referred to in paragraph 18 of a concession substantially equivalent to the impairment due to the introduction of the measure in question. Such contracting party would have the right to safeguard its interests through such a temporary suspension of a concession; Provided that this right will not be exercised when, in the case of a measure imposed by a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES have determined that the extent of the compensatory concession proposed was adequate. Paragraph 19 The provisions of paragraph 19 are intended to cover the cases where an industry has been in existence beyond the reasonable period of time referred to in the note to paragraphs 13 and 14, and should not be so construed as to deprive a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of Article XVIII, of its right to resort to the other provisions of Section C, including paragraph 17, with regard to a newly established industry even though it has benefited from incidental protection afforded by balance of payments import restrictions. Paragraph 21 Any measure taken pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 21 shall be withdrawn forthwith if the action taken in accordance with paragraph 17 is withdrawn or if the CONTRACTING PARTIES concur in the measure proposed after the expiration of the ninety-day time limit specified in paragraph 17. 169

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XVIII Ajuda do Estado em Favor de Desenvolvimento Econmico

18.1

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que a realizao dos objetivos do presente Acordo ser facilitada pelo desenvolvimento progressivo de suas economias, em particular nos casos das Partes Contratantes cuja economia no asseguram populao seno um baixo nvel de vida e que est nos primeiros estgios de seu desenvolvimento. As Partes Contratantes reconhecem alm disso que pode ser necessrio para as Partes Contratantes previstas no pargrafo primeiro, com o objetivo de executar seus programas e suas polticas de desenvolvimento econmico orientados para a elevao do nvel geral de vida de suas populaes, tomar medidas de proteo ou outras medidas que afetem as importaes e que tais medidas so justificadas na medida em que elas facilitem a obteno dos objetivos deste Acordo. Elas estimam, em consequncia, que estas Partes Contratantes deveriam usufruir facilidades adicionais que as possibilitem: (a) conservar na estrutura de suas tarifas aduaneiras suficiente flexibilidade para que elas possam fornecer a proteo tarifria necessria criao de um ramo de produo determinado, e (b) instituir restries quantitativas destinadas a proteger o equilbrio de suas balanas de pagamento de uma maneira que leve plenamente em conta o nvel elevado e permanente da procura de importao suscetvel de ser criada pela realizao de seus programas de desenvolvimento econmico. As Partes Contratantes reconhecem finalmente que, com as facilidades adicionais previstas nas sees A e B do presente Artigo, as disposies do presente Acordo deveriam normalmente permitir s Partes Contratantes enfrentar s necessidades de seu desenvolvimento econmico. Elas reconhecem, todavia, que pode haver casos em que no seja possvel, na prtica, instituir a medida compatvel com aquelas disposies, que permitem a uma Parte Contratante em via de desenvolvimento econmico, conceder o auxlio necessrio do Estado para favorecer a criao de ramos de produo determinada com o fim de elevar o nvel de vida geral de sua populao. Normas especiais previstas para tais casos nas sees C e D do presente Artigo. (a) Em consequncia, qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia no pode assegurar populao seno um baixo nvel de vida e que se encontra nos primeiros estgios de seu desenvolvimento, ter a faculdade de dispensar-se, temporariamente, das disposies dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, na forma prevista nas sees A, B e C do presente Artigo. Qualquer Parte Contratante cuja economia est em via de desenvolvimento, mas que no se enquadra no plano da alnea (a) acima, pode encaminhar pedidos s Partes Contratantes, na forma prevista na seo D do presente Artigo.

18.2

18.3

18.4

(b)

18.5

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as receitas de exportao das Partes Contratantes cuja economia do tipo descrito nas alneas (a) e (b) do pargrafo 4 acima, e que dependem da exportao de um pequeno nmero de produtos de base, podem sofrer uma sria baixa em face do enfraquecimento da venda desses produtos. Em conseqncia quando as exportaes dos produtos de base de uma Parte Contratante que se encontra nesta situao so afetadas seriamente por medidas adotadas por uma outra Parte Contratante, a referida Parte Contratante poder recorrer s disposies do Artigo XXII do presente Acordo, relativas s consultas. As Partes Contratantes procedero cada ano a um exame de todas as medidas aplicadas em virtude das disposies das sees C e D do presente Artigo. Seo A

18.6

18.7

(a)

Se uma Parte Contratante que se enquadra na alnea (a) do pargrafo 4 do presente Artigo, considera conveniente, para a criao de determinado ramo da produo que tenha em vista a 170

elevao geral do nvel de vida de sua populao, a modificao ou a retirada de uma concesso tarifria includa na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo, ela notificar s Partes Contratantes, para esse fim, e entrar em negociaes com a Parte Contratante com a qual aquela concesso tenha sido negociada primitivamente e com qualquer outra Parte Contratante cujo interesse substancial nesta concesso tenha sido reconhecido pelas Partes Contratantes. Se houver um acordo entre as Partes Contratantes em apreo, a elas ser permitido modificar ou retirar as concesses includas nas listas correspondentes, anexas ao presente Acordo, a fim de dar cumprimento ao aludido Acordo, inclusive as compensaes que ele comportar. (b) Se, decorrido o prazo de sessenta dias, contado a partir da data da notificao mencionada na alnea (a) acima, no se verificar um acordo, a Parte Contratante que se prope a modificar ou a retirar a concesso poder submeter a questo apreciao das Partes Contratantes que devero examin-la prontamente. Se lhes parecer que a Parte Contratante que se prope a modificar ou a retirar a concesso fez tudo que lhe era possvel fazer para chegar um acordo, e que a compensao oferecida suficiente, a referida Parte Contratante ter a faculdade de modificar ou de retirar a concesso sob a condio de aplicar ao mesmo tempo a compensao. Se parecer s Partes Contratantes que a compensao oferecida por uma Parte Contratante que se prope a modificar ou a retirar a concesso no suficiente mas que esta Parte Contratante fez tudo que lhe seria razoavelmente possvel fazer para oferecer uma compensao suficiente, a Parte Contratante ter a faculdade de por em aplicao a modificao ou a retirada. Se tal medida for adotada, qualquer outra Parte Contratante mencionada na alnea (a) acima ter a faculdade de modificar ou de retirar concesses substancialmente equivalentes, negociadas primitivamente com a Parte Contratante que adotou a medida em questo. Seo B 18.8 As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que as Partes Contratantes enquadradas no plano da alnea (a) do pargrafo 4 do presente Artigo podem, quando se encontram em rpido processo de desenvolvimento experimentar, para equilibrar sua balana de pagamentos, dificuldades provenientes, sobretudo, dos esforos que desenvolvem, no sentido de dar expanso aos seus mercados internos, bem como instabilidade nos termos de seu intercmbio. Tendo em vista salvaguardar a sua situao financeira exterior e assegurar o nvel de reservas suficiente para a execuo de seu programa de desenvolvimento econmico, uma Parte Contratante que se enquadra no plano da alnea (a) do pargrafo 4 do presente Artigo pode, sob reserva das disposies dos pargrafos 10 a 12, regulamentar o nvel geral de suas importaes, limitando o volume ou o valor das mercadorias cuja importao ela autoriza, com a condio de que as restries importao institudas ou mantidas intensificadas no devam ultrapassar do que necessrio: (a) para se opor ameaa de uma baixa importante de suas reservas monetrias ou para por fim a esta baixa; (b) ou para aumentar suas reservas monetrias, segundo uma taxa de crescimento razovel, caso elas sejam insuficientes. Nesses dois casos, sero devidamente considerados todos os fatores especiais que possam afetar as reservas monetrias da Parte Contratante, ou as suas necessidades de reservas monetrias, e, notadamente, assim que, disponham de crditos externos especiais ou de outros recursos, a necessidade de prever o emprego adequado dos seus crditos ou dos seus recursos.

18.9

18.10 Na aplicao destas restries a Parte Contratante em apreo pode determinar sua incidncia sobre as importaes dos diferentes produtos ou das vrias categorias de produtos, de maneira a dar prioridade importao dos produtos mais necessrios, levando em conta sua poltica de desenvolvimento econmico; todavia, as restries devero ser aplicadas de modo a evitar um prejuzo intil dos interesses comerciais ou econmicos de qualquer outra Parte Contratante e no causar indevidamente obstculos importao de mercadorias em quantidades comerciais mnimas de qualquer natureza que sejam cuja excluso embaraaria as correntes normais de intercmbio; alm disso, as referidas restries no devero ser aplicadas de modo a criar dificuldades importao de amostras 171

comerciais ou observao dos processos relativos patentes, marcas de fbrica, direitos autorais e de reproduo ou de outros processos anlogos. 18.11 Na execuo de sua poltica nacional a Parte Contratante em causa levar devidamente em conta a necessidade de restabelecer o equilbrio de sua balana de pagamentos numa base sadia e durvel, e a oportunidade de assegurar a utilizao de seus recursos produtivos sobre uma base econmica. Ela atenuar progressivamente, na medida que a situao melhorar, qualquer restrio adotada por fora da presente seo, e no a manter seno na medida necessria, considerando as disposies do pargrafo 9 do presente Artigo; to logo a situao no mais justificar sua manuteno ela a eliminar, contudo, nenhuma Parte Contratante ser obrigada a suprimir ou modificar as restries, salvo se ocorrer uma mudana em sua poltica de desenvolvimento, caso em que as restries que aplica por fora da presente seo deixaro de ser necessrias. 18.12 (a) Qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique novas restries ou que estabelea o nvel geral das restries existentes, reforando de maneira substancial as medidas aplicadas em virtude da presente seo, dever, imediatamente aps haver institudo ou reforado essas restries (ou, no caso em que consultas prvias sejam possveis na prtica, antes de as haver feito), consultar as Partes Contratantes sobre a natureza das dificuldades referentes sua balana de pagamentos, os diversos corretivos entre os quais ela tem preferncia, bem como as repercusses possveis daquelas restries sobre a economia de outras Partes Contratantes. Numa data a ser fixada, as Partes Contratantes passaro em revista todas as restries que naquela data forem ainda aplicadas por fora da presente seo. No fim do perodo de dois anos, a contar da data acima mencionada, as Partes Contratantes que aplicarem restries em virtude da presente seo, iniciaro, com as Partes Contratantes, em intervalos que sero aproximadamente de dois anos, sem serem inferiores a esta durao consultas do tipo previsto na alnea (a) acima, segundo um programa que ser estabelecido anualmente pelas Partes Contratantes; contudo, nenhuma consulta, em virtude da presente alnea, se efetuar menos, de dois anos aps o trmino de uma consulta de carter geral que seria iniciada em virtude de uma outra disposio do presente pargrafo. (i) Se, no decorrer dos entendimentos havidos com uma Parte Contratante, conforme a alnea (a) ou alnea (b) do presente pargrafo, parecer s Partes Contratantes que as restries no so compatveis com as disposies da presente seo ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposies do Artigo XIV), elas indicaro os pontos de divergncia e podero aconselhar no sentido de que modificaes apropriadas sejam introduzidas nas restries. (ii) Contudo, se no decorrer daquelas consultas as Partes Contratantes determinem que as restries sejam aplicadas de maneira que comporte uma sria incompatibilidade com as disposies da presente seo ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva das disposies do Artigo XIV) e que resulte num prejuzo ou numa ameaa de prejuzo para o comrcio de uma Parte Contratante, elas avisaro a Parte Contratante que aplica as restries e faro recomendaes apropriadas, tendo em vista assegurar a observao num prazo determinado das disposies em apreo. Se a Parte Contratante no se conforma com aquelas recomendaes no prazo fixado, as Partes Contratantes podero dispensar qualquer Parte Contratante cujo comrcio for prejudicado pelas restries, de quaisquer obrigaes resultantes do presente Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado dispensar levando em conta as circunstncias com relao Parte Contratante que aplica as restries. As Partes Contratantes convidaro qualquer Parte Contratante que aplique restries por fora da presente seo, a entrar em consulta com elas, a pedido de qualquer Parte Contratante, e que possa estabelecer prima facie que as restries so incompatveis com as disposies da presente seo ou aquelas do Artigo XIII (sob reserva de disposies do Artigo XIV), e que seu comrcio foi atingido. Todavia, este convite s ser encaminhado se as Partes Contratantes constatarem que as conversaes mantidas diretamente entre as Partes Contratantes interessadas no chegaram a bom termo. Se nenhum acordo for realizado em 172

(b)

(c)

(d)

decorrncia das consultas com as Partes Contratantes, e se as Partes Contratantes determinam que as restries so aplicadas de modo incompatvel com as disposies supramencionadas, resultando num prejuzo ou numa ameaa de prejuzo para o comrcio da Parte Contratante que iniciou o procedimento elas recomendaro a supresso ou a modificao das restries. Se as restries no so suprimidas ou modificadas no prazo a ser fixado pelas Partes Contratantes, estas podero dispensar a Parte Contratante que iniciou o procedimento de qualquer compromisso resultante do presente Acordo, no que lhes parecer apropriado dispensar levando em conta as circunstncias, com a relao Parte Contratante que aplica as restries. (e) Se uma Parte Contratante, contra a qual uma medida foi tomada, de conformidade com a ltima frase da alnea (c) (ii) ou da alnea (d) do presente pargrafo, verificar que a dispensa concedida pelas Partes Contratantes prejudica a execuo de seu programa e de sua poltica de desenvolvimento econmico, lhe ser permitido, num prazo de 30 dias, a contar da aplicao desta medida, notificar por escrito ao Secretrio Executivo6 das Partes Contratantes, sua inteno de denunciar o presente Acordo. Esta denncia entrar em vigor ao expirar um prazo de sessenta dias contado a partir em que o Secretrio executivo das Partes Contratantes tiver recebido a referida notificao. Em qualquer procedimento iniciado, de conformidade com o presente pargrafo, as Partes Contratantes levaro devidamente em conta os fatores mencionados no pargrafo 2 do presente Artigo. As determinaes previstas no presente pargrafo devero ser apresentadas prontamente e, se possvel, num prazo de 60 dias, a contar da data em que as consultas tiverem sido iniciadas. Seo C 18.13 Se uma Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alnea (a) do pargrafo 4 do presente Artigo verifica que um auxlio do Estado necessrio para facilitar a criao de um determinado ramo de produo com o fim de elevar o nvel de vida geral da populao, sem que seja possvel na prtica adotar medidas compatveis com as outras disposies do presente Acordo para realizar este objetivo, lhe ser permitido recorrer s disposies e aos processos da presente seo. 18.14 A Parte Contratante em apreo notificar as Partes Contratantes sobre as dificuldades especiais que ela encontra na realizao do objetivo definido no pargrafo 13 do presente Artigo; ela indicar a medida precisa que afeta as importaes que se prope a promover para remediar tais dificuldades. Ela no adotar esta medida antes do trmino do prazo fixado no pargrafo 15 ou no pargrafo 17, conforme o caso, ou se a medida afeta as importaes de um produto que se tornou objeto de uma concesso contida na lista correspondente anexa ao presente Acordo, a no ser que tenha obtido a aprovao das Partes Contratantes, de conformidade com as disposies do pargrafo 18; todavia, se o ramo de produo que recebe uma ajuda do Estado j entrou em atividade, a Parte Contratante poder, aps ter informado as Partes Contratantes, tomar as medidas necessrias para evitar que, durante aquele perodo, as importaes do produto ou dos produtos em questo no ultrapassem substancialmente um nvel normal. 18.15 Se, num prazo de trinta dias contado a partir da notificao da referida medida as Partes Contratantes no convidarem a Parte de Contratante em apreo a entrar em consultas com elas, a 3 Corresponde hoje ao cargo de Diretor Geral Parte Contratante ter a faculdade de dispensar-se das disposies dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, aplicveis em espcie, na medida necessria aplicao da medida projetada. 18.16 Se ela convidada pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte Contratante em causa entrar em consulta com elas sobre o objeto da medida projetada, as diversas medidas entre as quais ela tem a escolha no plano
6

(f)

Corresponde hoje ao cargo de Diretor Geral.

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do presente Acordo, bem como as repercusses que a medida projetada poderia ter sobre os interesses comerciais ou econmicos de outras Partes Contratantes. Se, no decorrer dessas consultas as Partes Contratantes reconhecem que no possvel na prtica adotar a medida compatvel com as outras disposies do presente Acordo para realizar o objetivo definido no pargrafo 13 do presente Artigo, e, se elas do sua aprovao medida projetada, a Parte Contratante em causa ser desobrigada dos compromissos que lhe cabem nos termos das disposies dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo aplicveis em espcie, desde que aquela seja necessria aplicao da medida. 18.17 Se, num prazo de 90 dias a contar daquele da notificao da medida projetada, conforme o pargrafo 14 do presente Artigo, as Partes Contratantes no aprovarem a medida em questo, a Parte Contratante em causa poder adotar a referida medida aps ter informado as Partes Contratantes. 18.18 Se a medida projetada afeta um produto que foi o objeto de uma concesso contida na lista correspondente, anexa ao presente Acordo a Parte Contratante em apreo consultar qualquer outra Parte Contratante com a qual a concesso tiver sido negociada primitivamente bem como com toda outra Parte Contratante cujo interesse substancial na concesso tiver sido reconhecido pelas Partes Contratantes. Estas daro sua aprovao medida projetada se reconhecerem a impossibilidade, na prtica, de adotar a medida compatvel com as outras disposies do presente Acordo para realizar o objetivo definido no pargrafo 13 do presente Artigo e se elas tiverem a segurana. (a) que um Acordo foi realizado com as outras Partes Contratantes em questo, em decorrncia das consultas, acima indicadas. (b) ou que, se nenhum Acordo foi realizado no prazo de 60 dias a partir da data em que a notificao prevista no pargrafo 14, tenha sido recebida pelas Partes Contratantes, a Parte Contratante que recorreu s disposies da presente seo fez tudo que lhe era razoavelmente possvel fazer para chegar a um tal acordo, e que os interesses das outras Partes Contratantes seriam suficientemente salvaguardados. A Parte Contratante que recorreu s disposies da presente seo ser isentada das obrigaes que lhe tocam nos termos das disposies dos demais Artigos do presente Acordo aplicveis na espcie, desde que isto seja necessrio para lhe permitir a aplicao da medida. 18.19 Se uma medida projetada do tipo definido no pargrafo 13 do presente Artigo se refere a um ramo da produo, cuja criao foi facilitada, no decorrer do perodo inicial, pela proteo acessria resultante das restries que impem a Parte Contratante a fim de proteger o equilbrio de sua balana de pagamentos a ttulos das disposies do presente Acordo, aplicveis na espcie, a Parte Contratante poder recorrer s disposies e aos processos da presente seo, com a condio de que ela no aplique a medida projetada sem a aprovao das Partes Contratantes. 18.20 Nenhuma disposio dos pargrafos procedentes da presente seo autorizar a derrogao das disposies dos Artigos primeiro, II e XIII do presente Acordo. As reservas do pargrafo 10 do presente Artigo sero aplicveis a qualquer restrio dependente da presente seo. 18.21 A qualquer momento durante a aplicao de uma medida, em virtude das disposies do pargrafo 1, do presente Artigo, qualquer das Partes Contratantes afetada de modo substancial por aquela medida poder suspender a aplicao no comrcio da Parte Contratante que recorreu s disposies da presente seo de concesses ou de outras obrigaes substancialmente equivalentes que resultem do presente Acordo, e cujas Partes Contratantes no desaprovarem a suspenso, com a condio de que um aviso prvio de 60 dias seja dado s Partes Contratantes, ou no mximo, seis meses depois que a medida tenha sido adotada ou modificada de modo substancial em detrimento da Parte Contratante afetada. Esta Parte Contratante dever se prestar s consultas, de conformidade com as disposies do Artigo XXII do presente Acordo. Seo D 18.22 Ser permitido a qualquer Parte Contratante enquadrada no plano da alnea (b) do pargrafo 4 do presente Artigo e que para favorecer o desenvolvimento de sua economia, deseja instituir uma medida do tipo definido no pargrafo 13 do presente Artigo, no que se refere criao de um 174

determinado ramo de produo determinando encaminhar s Partes Contratantes um pedido de aprovao de uma tal medida. As Partes Contratantes entraro prontamente em consultas com aquela Parte Contratante, e, formulando sua deciso se inspiraro nas consideraes expostas no pargrafo 16. Se as Partes Contratantes aprovarem a medida projetada, elas isentaro a Parte Contratante em causa das obrigaes que lhe cabem nos termos das disposies dos outros Artigos do presente Acordo, aplicveis em espcie, desde que isto seja necessrio para lhe permitir a aplicao da medida; Se a medida projetada afeta um produto que foi objeto da concesso contida na lista correspondente anexa ao presente Acordo as disposies do pargrafo 18 sero aplicveis. 18.23 Qualquer uma das medidas aplicadas em virtude da presente seo, dever ser compatvel com as disposies ao pargrafo 20 do presente Artigo. Notas e Disposies Adicionaisao Artigo XVIII em Portugus As Partes Contratantes e as Partes Contratantes em causa observaro o mais estrito segredo sobre todas as questes que se apresentaro no ttulo deste artigo Pargrafo primeiro e 4 1. Quando as Partes Contratantes examinarem a questo de saber se a economia de uma Parte Contratante no pode assegurar populao seno um fraco nvel de vida, elas tomaro em considerao a situao normal desta economia e no estabelecero sua determinao sobre as circunstncias excepcionais tais como aquelas que possam resultar da existncia temporria de condies excepcionalmente favorveis para o comrcio de exportao do produto ou dos produtos principais da Parte Contratante. A expresso nos primeiros estgios de seu desenvolvimento no se aplica somente s Partes Contratantes cujo desenvolvimento econmico est comeando mas tambm, quelas cujas economias esto em vias de industrializao a fim de reduzir um estado de dependncia excessiva com relao produo dos produtos de base.

2.

Pargrafos 2, 3, 7, 13 e 22 A meno da criao de ramos de produo determinados, no visa somente a criao de um novo ramo de produo, mas tambm, a criao de uma nova atividade no quadro de um ramo de produo existente, a transformao substancial de um ramo de produo existente e o desenvolvimento substancial de um ramo de produo existente que no satisfaz a demanda interna a no ser em uma proporo relativamente fraca. Ela visa igualmente a reconstruo de um ramo de produo destrudo ou substancialmente danificado como conseqncias de hostilidades ou de catstrofes devidas s causas naturais. Pargrafo 7 (b) Toda modificao ou retirada efetuadas, em virtude da alnea (b) do pargrafo 7, por uma Parte Contratante, diversa da Parte Contratante requerente prevista na alnea (a) do pargrafo 7, dever intervir em um prazo de seis meses a contar do dia em que a medida havia sido instituda pela Parte Contratante requerente; esta modificao ou esta retirada entraro em vigor ao expirar um prazo de trinta dias a contar daquele em que eles tiverem sido notificados s Partes Contratantes. Pargrafo 11 A segunda frase do pargrafo 11 no ser interpretada como obrigando uma Parte Contratante a atenuar ou suprimir as restries se esta atenuao ou esta supresso devessem criar imediatamente uma situao que justificaria o reforamento ou o estabelecimento, segundo o caso, de restries de conformidade com o pargrafo 9 do artigo XVIII.

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Pargrafo 12 (b) A data prevista na alnea (b) do pargrafo 12 ser aquela que as Partes Contratantes fixaro de conformidade com as disposies da alnea (b) do pargrafo 4 do artigo XII do presente Acordo. Pargrafos 13 e 14 Reconhece-se que antes de decidir instituir uma medida e de a notificar as Partes Contratantes, de conformidade com os dispositivos do pargrafo 14, uma Parte Contratante pode ter necessidade de um prazo razovel para determinar a situao do ponto de vista da concorrncia, do ramo de produo em causa. Pargrafos 15 e 16 Entende-se que as Partes Contratantes devero convidar uma Parte Contratante que se prope a aplicar uma medida em virtude da seo C a entrar em consultas com elas, de conformidade com os dispositivos do Pargrafo 16, se a solicitao lhes tiver sido feita por uma Parte Contratante cujo comrcio ser afetado de maneira aprecivel pela medida em questo. Pargrafos 16, 18, 19 e 22 1. Entende-se que as Partes Contratantes podero dar sua aprovao e uma medida projetada sob reserva das condies ou das limitaes que elas indicam. Se a medida tal qual aplicada, no estiver conforme com as condies desta aprovao, ela ser reputada, para as necessidades em causa como no tendo sido objeto de aprovao das Partes Contratantes. Se, quando as Partes Contratantes derem sua aprovao a uma medida para um perodo determinado, a Parte Contratante em causa, constatar que a manuteno desta medida durante um novo perodo for necessria para realizar o objetivo em vista do qual a medida tiver sido instituda inicialmente, ela poder solicitar s Partes Contratantes uma prorrogao do dito perodo, de conformidade com os dispositivos e os processos da Seo C ou D, segundo o caso. Espera-se que as Partes Contratantes se abstero, em regra geral, de dar sua aprovao a uma medida que ser suscetvel de causar um prejuzo srio s exportaes de um produto de que a economia de uma Parte Contratante dependa substancialmente.

2.

Pargrafos 18 e 22 A insero dos nomes ... e que os interesses das outras Partes Contratantes sejam suficientemente salvaguardados tem por finalidade dar uma latitude suficiente para examinar qual , em cada caso o mtodo mais apropriado para salvaguardar esses interesses. Este mtodo pode, por exemplo, tomar a forma seja da outorga de uma concesso adicional pela Parte Contratante que recorreu aos dispositivos da Seo C ou da seo D enquanto o perodo ou a derrogao dos dispositivos dos outros artigos do Acordo permanecer em vigor, seja da suspenso temporria, por qualquer outra Parte Contratante prevista no pargrafo 18, de uma concesso substancialmente equivalente ao prejuzo causado pela instituio da medida em questo. Esta Parte Contratante ter o direito de salvaguardar seus interesses pela suspenso temporria de uma concesso; entretanto, este direito no ser exercido quando, no caso de uma medida aplicada por uma Parte Contratante que entre no quadro da alnea (a) do pargrafo 4, as Partes Contratantes, tiverem determinado que a compensao oferecida suficiente. Pargrafo 19 As disposies do pargrafo 19 se aplicam aos casos nos quais um ramo de produo continuou a existir alm do prazo razovel mencionado na nota relativa aos pargrafos 13 e 14; estas disposies no devem ser interpretadas como privando uma Parte Contratante que entre no quadro da alnea (a) do pargrafo 4 do artigo XVIII, do direito de recorrer s outras disposies de seo C, compreendidas aquelas do pargrafo 17, no que concerne um ramo de produo recentemente criado mesmo se este tiver sido beneficiado por uma 176

proteo acessria originria das restries importao destinadas a proteger o equilbrio da balana de pagamentos. Pargrafo 21 Toda medida tomada em virtude das disposies do pargrafo 21 ser relatada imediatamente se a medida tomada de conformidade com as disposies o pargrafo 17, ela mesma relatada, ou se as Partes Contratantes do sua aprovao medida projetada aps expirar o prazo de noventa dias previsto no pargrafo 17. (Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) II. 1. Evoluo da Interpretao do Painel/rgo de Apelao Artigo XVIII:11

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 126 e 128 O Artigo XVIII:11 estabelece que nenhuma Parte Contratante ser obrigada a retirar ou modificar suas restries sobre o fundamento de que uma mudana na sua poltica de desenvolvimento tornaria desnecessrias as restries que se aplicam nos termos daquele Artigo. Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao afirmou que a exigncia feita pelo Painel de eliminao das barreiras quantitativas e o recurso somente a instrumentos de poltica macroeconmica eram suficientes para a soluo do desequilbrio na balana de pagamentos, e que tal exigncia no resultou na imposio de uma mudana na poltica de desenvolvimento da ndia. Segundo o rgo de Apelao, o uso de instrumento de poltica macroeconmica no tem relao com nenhuma poltica de desenvolvimento particular, diferentemente de medidas econmicas estruturais. Para. 126. () we are of the opinion that the use of macroeconomic policy instruments is not related to any particular development policy, but is resorted to by all Members regardless of the type of development policy they pursue. () Para. 128. We believe structural measures are different from macroeconomic instruments with respect to their relationship to development policy. If India were asked to implement agricultural reform or to scale back reservations on certain products for small-scale units as indispensable policy changes in order to overcome its balance-of-payments difficulties, such a requirement would probably have involved a change in Indias development policy. 2. Artigo XVIII:11, Note Ad

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 114 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao interpretou que a expresso presente na nota adicional ao Artigo XVIII:11 would thereupon produce, ou devessem criar imediatamente, na verso em p ortugus, exige um nexo de causalidade direto entre a remoo das restries balana de pagamentos e a recorrncia de uma das trs condies a que se refere o Artigo XVIII:9. Para. 114. We agree with the Panel that the Ad Note, and, in particular, the words would thereupon produce, require a causal link of a certain directness between the removal of the balance-of-payments restrictions and the recurrence of one of the three conditions referred to in Article XVIII:9 ().

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3.

Prima facie

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, para. 136 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, se o demandante estabeleceu com sucesso um caso prima facie de inconsistncia com o Artigo XVIII:1, a Parte demandada poderia, em sua defesa, refutar as provas aduzidas em apoio inconsistncia ou invocar a ressalva do Artigo XVIIII. Neste ltimo caso, a Parte deve demonstrar que o demandante violou sua obrigao de no exigir que o demandado altere sua poltica de desenvolvimento. O nus da prova de tal alegao recairia sobre o demandado. Para. 136. () Assuming that the complaining party has successfully established a prima facie c ase of inconsistency with Article XVIII:11 and the Ad Note, the responding party may, in its defence, either rebut the evidence adduced in support of the inconsistency or invoke the proviso. In the latter case, it would have to demonstrate that the complaining party violated its obligation not to require the responding party to change its development policy. This is an assertion with respect to which the responding party must bear the burden of proof (). 4. Artigo XVIII:12

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 102-103 Neste caso, o rgo de Apelao reconhece a competncia do Comit sobre Balana de Pagamentos e os procedimentos do Artigo XVIII:12 mas interpreta que os Painis devem considerar as deliberaes e concluses de tal Comit, no havendo conflito entre suas competncias. Para. 102. () Recourse to the dispute settlement procedures does not call into question either the availability or the utility of the procedures under Article XVIII:12 and the BOP Understanding. On the contrary, if panels refrained from reviewing the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, they would diminish the explicit procedural rights of Members under Article XXIII and footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, as well as their substantive rights under Article XVIII:11. Para. 103. We are cognisant of the competence of the BOP Committee and the General Council with respect to balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII:12 of the GATT 1994 and the BOP Understanding. However, we see no conflict between that competence and the competence of panels. Moreover, we are convinced that, in considering the justification of balance-of-payments restrictions, panels should take into account the deliberations and conclusions of the BOP Committee, as did the panel in Korea Beef. 5. Artigo XVIII, B

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS90/AB/R, paras. 84-86 Segundo o rgo de Apelao, os Artigos 1.1 e 1.2 do DSU da OMC deixam claro que os procedimentos de soluo de controvrsias do Artigo XXIII, conforme elaborao e aplicao do DSU, esto disposio para questes relacionadas s restries na balana de pagamentos, tal como o descumprimento por uma Parte das obrigaes estabelecidas no Artigo XVIII:B. Para. 84. This dispute was brought pursuant to, inter alia, Article XXIII of the GATT 1994. According to Article XXIII, any Member which considers that a benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under the 178

GATT 1994 is being nullified or impaired as a result of the failure of another Member to carry out its obligations, may resort to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII. The United States considers that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT 1994 was nullified or impaired as a result of Indias alleged failure to carry out its obligations regarding balance-of-payments restrictions under Article XVIII: B of the GATT 1994. Therefore, the United States was entitled to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of Article XXIII with regard to this dispute. Para. 85. Article XXIII is elaborated and applied by the DSU. The first sentence of Article 1.1 of the DSU provides:
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the covered agreements). We note that Appendix 1 to the DSU lists Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, to which the GATT 1994 belongs, among the agreements covered by the DSU. A dispute concerning Article XVIII:B is, therefore, covered by the DSU.

Para. 86. Article 1.2 of the DSU provides in relevant part:

The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding. Appendix 2 does not identify any special or additional dispute settlement rules or procedures relating to balance-of-payments restrictions. It does not mention Article XVIII:B of the GATT 1994, or any of its paragraphs. The DSU is, therefore, fully applicable to the current dispute.

III.

Comentrios

As disposies do Artigo XVIII, includas no GATT em 1955, demonstram o reconhecimento de que, para que os PMDRs fossem capazes de implementar programas e polticas para o seu desenvolvimento econmico, era necesrio incorporar certas flexibilidades ao GATT. O segundo pargrafo do Artigo identifica o objetivo de suas disposies, quais sejam, a elevao do nvel geral de vida de suas populaes e para tomar medidas de proteo ou outras medidas que afetem as importaes. Os pargrafos 9 e 11 trazem as principais disposies do Artigo XVIII, sendo que o ltimo foi analisado em detalhes no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions. Segundo o Artigo XVIII:11, um Membro que adote restries deve considerar a necessidade de restaurao do equilbrio na balana de pagamentos e assegurar que as polticas utilizem efetivamente os recursos produtivos no pas. A ltima sentena do pargrafo, no entanto, traz uma ressalva, dispondo que nenhuma Parte Contratante ser obrigada a retirar ou modificar suas restries sobre o fundamento de que uma mudana na sua poltica de desenvolvimento tornaria desnecessrias as restries que se aplicam nos termos daquele Artigo. Nesse sentido, o caso India - Quantitative Restrictions centrou-se na anlise do desenvolvimento econmico preceituado pelo Artigo. Os EUA alegaram que a manuteno por parte da ndia de procedimentos e prticas a respeito de produtos agrcolas e industriais que limitavam quantitativamente sua importao era contrria s suas obrigaes sob o Artigo XVIII do GATT. A ndia, por sua vez, alegou que as restries no eram somente necessrias, mas, que no era possvel retir-las, j que isso implicaria na modificao de sua poltica de desenvolvimento econmico. Para analisar com maior propriedade a situao financeira da ndia e seu programa de desenvolvimento, o Painel buscou a opinio do FMI, que entendeu que as restries quantitativas impostas pela ndia no eram necessrias, no sentido do pargrafo 9 do Artigo XVIII. Por fim, o Painel e o rgo de Apelao entenderam que, as restries quantitativas no poderiam ser consideradas poltica domstica, e sua remoo no resultaria na mudana da poltica de desenvolvimento domstico indiana.

179

Artigo XIX

Cynthia Kramer IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 19.1 (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.

(b)

19.2

Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove. Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.

19.3

(b)

180

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XIX Medidas de emergncia para os casos de importao de produtos especiais

19.1

(a)

Se, em conseqncia da evoluo imprevista das circunstncias e por efeito dos compromissos que uma Parte Contratante tenha contrado em virtude do presente Acordo, compreendidas as concesses tarifrias, um produto for importado no territrio da referida Parte Contratante em quantidade por tal forma acrescida e em tais condies que traga ou ameace trazer um prejuzo srio aos produtores nacionais de produtos similares ou diretamente concorrentes, ser facultado a essa Parte Contratante, na medida e durante o tempo que forem necessrios para prevenir ou reparar esse prejuzo, suspender, no todo ou em parte, o compromisso assumido em relao a esse produto, ou retirar ou modificar a concesso. Se uma Parte Contratante tiver feito uma concesso sobre uma preferncia e que o produto ao qual esta se aplica venha a ser importado no territrio dessa Parte Contratante nas circunstncias enunciadas na alnea (a) do presente pargrafo, de tal forma que essa importao determine ou ameace determinar um prejuzo srio aos produtores do produto similar ou de produtos diretamente concorrentes, estabelecidos no territrio da Parte Contratante que se beneficia ou se beneficiava da referida preferncia, esta poder apresentar um requerimento Parte Contratante importadora que ficar ento livre para suspender, no todo ou em parte, o compromisso tomado ou retirar ou modificar a concesso, na medida e pelo tempo necessrio para prevenir ou remediar tal prejuzo.

(b)

19.2

Antes que uma Parte Contratante tome as medidas previstas para a aplicao das disposies do 1 do presente artigo, avisar por escrito s Partes Contratantes com a maior antecedncia possvel. Proporcionar s Partes Contratantes, assim como a todas as outras Partes Contratantes que tenham interesse substancial como exportadoras do produto em questo, oportunidade de consultar, com ela, as medidas que se prope tomar. Quando esse aviso prvio for dado a propsito de uma concesso relativa a uma preferncia ser mencionada a Parte Contratante que tiver requerido essa medida. Em circunstncias crticas, em que qualquer prazo acarrete um prejuzo difcil de reparar, as medidas previstas no 1 do presente artigo podero ser tomadas a ttulo provisrio, sem consulta prvia, com a condio de que essa consulta tenha lugar imediatamente aps a sua aplicao. (a) Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas no chegarem a um Acordo sobre essas medidas, nada impedir uma Parte Contratante, se o desejar, de adotar as medidas em questo ou de continuar a sua aplicao.

19.3

Nesse caso ser facultado s Partes Contratantes lesadas por essas medidas, se num prazo de 90 dias, a contar de sua aplicao, suspender, aps prvio aviso de trinta dias dirigido s Partes Contratantes, a aplicao, ao comrcio da Parte Contratante que tomou essas medidas ou, no caso considerado no 1 (b) do presente artigo, do comrcio da Parte Contratante que solicitou a sua adoo, de concesses ou outras obrigaes sensivelmente equivalentes, resultantes do presente acordo, cuja suspenso no d lugar a nenhuma objeo das Partes Contratantes. (b) Sem prejuzo das disposies da alnea (a) do presente pargrafo, quando essas medidas forem tomadas sem consulta prvia, de Acordo com o 2 do presente artigo e determinem ou ameacem determinar grave prejuzo aos produtores nacionais de produtos por elas afetados sobre o territrio de uma Parte Contratante, ser facultado a essa Parte Contratante, quando qualquer prazo a esse respeito determinar um prejuzo dificilmente reparvel, suspender, a partir da aplicao dessas medidas e durante o perodo dessa consulta, as concesses ou outras obrigaes que julgar necessrias para prevenir ou reparar o prejuzo.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) 181

IC.

Comentrios sobre a Traduo

No pargrafo 1(b), deveria constar livre para suspender, e no livre de suspender, no sentido de que facultada s partes a suspenso, de acordo com o Artigo em ingls, qual seja, free (...) to suspend. No pargrafo 2, a palavra consult deveria ter sido traduzida como consultar, e no examinar. II. 1. Interpretao e aplicao do Artigo XIX Geral a) Aplicao do Artigo XIX Em Argentina - Footwear e Korea - Dairy, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que qualquer medida de salvaguarda imposta aps a entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC deve respeitar as disposies do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas e do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 76 Para. 76. () any safeguard measure imposed after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement must comply with the provisions of both the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 86 Para. 86. As part of the context of paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX, we note that the title of Article XIX is: Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products. The words emergency action also appear in Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. We note once again, that Article XIX:1(a) requires that a product be imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers. (emphasis added) Clearly, this is not the language of ordinary events in routine commerce. In our view, the text of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, read in its ordinary meaning and in its context, demonstrates that safeguard measures were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, emergency actions. And, such emergency actions are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, a Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not foreseen or expected when it incurred that obligation. The remedy that Article XIX:1(a) allows in this situation is temporarily to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. Thus, Article XIX is clearly, and in every way, an extraordinary remedy. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R para. 93 Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao observou que o remdio previsto no Artigo XIX de carter emergencial e deve ser invocado apenas em situaes em que, como resultado das obrigaes assumidas no mbito do GATT de 1994, um Membro encontra-se confrontado com desenvolvimento no previsto ou esperado no momento que assumiu determinada obrigao. Para. 93. Our reading is supported by the context of these provisions. As part of the context of paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX, we note that the title of Article XIX is: Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products. The words emergency action also appear in Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. We note once again, that Article XIX:1(a) requires that a product be imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers . (emphasis added) Clearly, this is not the language of ordinary events in routine commerce. In our view, the text of Article 182

XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, read in its ordinary meaning and in its context, demonstrates that safeguard measures were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, emergency actions. And, such emergency actions are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, a Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not foreseen or expected when it incurred that obligation. The remedy that Article XIX:1(a) allows in this situation is temporarily to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. Thus, Article XIX is clearly, and in every way, an extraordinary remedy. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 94; e Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 87 Em Argentina - Footwear e Korea - Dairy, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que o objeto e a finalidade do Artigo XIX tambm confirmam a sua interpretao. Para. 94. This reading of these phrases is also confirmed by the object and purpose of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. The object and purpose of Article XIX is, quite simply, to allow a Member to readjust temporarily the balance in the level of concessions between that Member and other exporting Members when it is faced with unexpected and, thus, unforeseen circumstances which lead to the product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products. In perceiving and applying this object and purpose to the interpretation of this provision of the WTO Agreement, it is essential to keep in mind that a safeguard action is a fair trade remedy. The application of a safeguard measure does not depend upon unfair trade actions, as is the case with anti-dumping or countervailing measures. Thus, the import restrictions that are imposed on products of exporting Members when a safeguard action is taken must be seen, as we have said, as extraordinary. And, when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their extraordinary nature must be taken into account. Para. 87. This reading of these phrases is also confirmed by the object and purpose of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. The object and purpose of Article XIX is, quite simply, to allow a Member to re-adjust temporarily the balance in the level of concessions between that Member and other exporting Members when it is faced with unexpected and, thus, unforeseen circumstances which lead to the product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products. In perceiving and applying this object and purpose to the interpretation of this provision of the WTO Agreement, it is essential to keep in mind that a safeguard action is a fair trade remedy. The application of a safeguard measure does not depend upon unfair trade actions, as is the case with anti-dumping or countervailing measures. Thus, the import restrictions that are imposed on products of exporting Members when a safeguard action is taken must be seen, as we have said, as extraordinary. And, when construing the prerequisites for taking such actions, their extraordinary nature must be taken into account. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea (US - Line), Demandante: Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS202/AB/R, paras. 82-83 Em US - Line Pipe, o rgo de Apelao enfatizou que o equilbrio alcanado pelos Membros da OMC em conciliar a tenso natural relativa s medidas de salvaguarda encontrado nas disposies do Acordo sobre Salvaguarda. Para. 82. [P]art of the raison dtre of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards is, unquestionably, that of giving a WTO Member the possibility, as trade is liberalized, of resorting to an

183

effective remedy in an extraordinary emergency situation that, in the judgement of that Member, makes it necessary to protect a domestic industry temporarily. Para. 83. There is, therefore, a natural tension between, on the one hand, defining the appropriate and legitimate scope of the right to apply safeguard measures and, on the other hand, ensuring that safeguard measures are not applied against fair trade beyond what is necessary to provide extraordinary and temporary relief. A WTO Member seeking to apply a safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that the right to apply such measures must be respected in order to maintain the domestic momentum and motivation for ongoing trade liberalization. In turn, a WTO Member whose trade is affected by a safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that the application of such measures must be limited in order to maintain the multilateral integrity of ongoing trade concessions. The balance struck by the WTO Members in reconciling this natural tension relating to safeguard measures is found in the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards. b) Standard of review Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel Safeguards), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, para. 10.38 Em US - Steel, o Painel, em deciso mantida pelo rgo de Apelao, concluiu que o padro de reviso para as alegaes de violao de acontecimentos imprevistos do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994 foi previsto no Artigo 11 do DSU. Para. 10.38. [T]he role of this Panel in the present dispute is not to conduct a de novo review of the USITCs determination. Rather, the Panel must examine whether the United States respected the provisions of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards, including Article 3.1. As further developed below, the Panel must examine whether the United States demonstrated in its published report, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that unforeseen developments and the effects of tariff concessions resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the relevant domestic producers. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 276 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao rejeitou o argumento dos EUA que o Artigo 11 do DSU no era aplicvel em alegao de violao do Artigo XIX do GATT. Para. 276. We explained in US - Lamb, in the context of a claim under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, that the competent authorities must provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination. More recently, in US - Line Pipe, in the context of a claim under Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, we said that the competent authorities must, similarly, provide a reasoned and adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than increased imports is not attributed to increased imports. Our findings in those cases did not purport to address solely the standard of review that is appropriate for claims arising under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. We see no reason not to apply the same standard generally to the obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards as well as to the obligations in Article XIX of the GATT 1994. 2. Artigo XIX:1 a) Artigo XIX:1(a): como resultado de acontecimentos imprevistos 184

(i) Conceito de acontecimentos imprevistos Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 91 e Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, paras. 91 e 84 Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao se pronunciou a respeito da frase como resultado de acontecimentos imprevistos que, embora no esteja prevista no Acordo sobre Salvaguardas, est no Artigo XIX:1(a). Para. 91. To determine the meaning of the clause as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions in sub-paragraph (a) of Article XIX:1, we must examine these words in their ordinary meaning, in their context and in light of the object and purpose of Article XIX.79 We look first to the ordinary meaning of these words. As to the meaning of unforeseen developments, we note that the dictionary definition of unforeseen, particularly as it relates to the word developments, is synonymous with unexpected. 80 Unforeseeable, on the other hand, is defined in the dictionaries as meaning unpredictable or incapable of being foreseen, foretold or anticipated. 81 Thus, it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the phrase as a result of unforeseen developments requires that the developments which led to a product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been unexpected. With respect to the phrase of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions , we believe that this phrase simply means that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the importing Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994, including tariff concessions. Here, we note that the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 are made an integral part of Part I of that Agreement, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article II of the GATT 1994. Therefore, any concession or commitment in a Member's Schedule is subject to the obligations contained in Article II of the GATT 1994. Para. 84. To determine the meaning of the clause - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions - in subparagraph (a) of Article XIX:1, we must examine these words in their ordinary meaning, in their context and in light of the object and purpose of Article XIX. We look first to the ordinary meaning of these words. As to the meaning of unforeseen developments, we note that the dictionary definition of unforeseen, particularly as it relates to the word developments, is synonymous with unexpected. Unforeseeable, on the other hand, is defined in the dictionaries as meaning unpredictable or incapable of being foreseen, foretold or anticipated. Thus, it seems to us that the ordinary meaning of the phrase as a result of unforeseen developments requires that the developments which led to a product being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers must have been unexpected. (ii) Requisitos para configurao de acontecimentos imprevistos Em US - Lamb e Chile - Price Band System, o rgo de Apelao e Painel, respectivamente, concluram que a existncia de circunstncias imprevistas uma questo pertinente de fato e de direito ao abrigo do Artigo 3.1 do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas, e o relatrio publicado pelas autoridades competentes, nos termos deste Artigo, deve conter uma concluso fundamentada sobre os acontecimentos imprevistos. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand (US - Lamb), Demandantes: Nova Zelndia e Austrlia, WT/DS177/AB/R e WT/DS178/AB/R, para. 76; e Relatrio do Painel no caso Chile - Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Chile - Price Band System), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS207/R, paras. 76, 7.134 e 7.139

185

Para. 76. [W]e observe that Article 3.1 requires competent authorities to set forth findings and reasoned conclusions on all pertinent issues of fact and law in their published report. As Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 requires that unforeseen developments must be demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure to be applied the existence of unforeseen developments is, in our view, a pertinent issue of fact and law, under Article 3.1, for the application of a safeguard measure, and it follows that the published report of the competent authorities, under that Article, must contain a finding or reasoned conclusion on unforeseen developments. Para. 7.134. We recall that the Appellate Body in US - Lamb stated that unforeseen developments is a circumstance whose existence must be demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure to be applied consistently with Article XIX. According to the Appellate Body, the demonstration of the existence of this circumstance must feature in the published report of the investigating authorities. If the published report does not discuss or offers any explanation as to why certain factors mentioned in it can be regarded as unforeseen developments, that report does not demonstrate that the safeguard measure concerned has been applied as a result of unforeseen developments. Para. 7.139. According to Chile, the statement by the CDC regarding declining international prices reflects the fact that a fall in international prices to such low levels and for such a long period is unusual and unpredictable, especially with respect to products whose prices tend to undergo strong fluctuations. We wish to point out that, although this ex post facto explanation provided by Chile cannot, in any event, cure the CDC's failure to make findings and reasoned conclusions in its report, this explanation would not meet the requirement to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments either. First, Chile in its explanation and the CDC in its determination seem to refer to different events. Whereas the CDC spoke of sizeable and rapid decreases in international prices, Chile now argues that it was the sustained fall in international prices which could not have been foreseen. Second, it should be recalled that the safeguard measures do not impose any duty which was not already being applied under the Chilean PBS. The duty applied pursuant to the safeguard measures is merely a different label for the portion of the Chilean PBS duties exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate. The Chilean PBS has the stated objective of providing additional protection to offset declining international prices. The very fact that Chile established its PBS with such an objective constitutes, in our view, evidence that declining international prices cannot have been unforeseen. If the safeguard measures are not adding any protection to what already resulted from the Chilean PBS, in force since 1983, it is difficult to see how those safeguard measures could then have been adopted as a result of developments which could not have been foreseen at the end of the Uruguay Round. Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches (Argentina - Preserved Peaches), Demandante: Chile, WT/DS238/R, para. 7.33 Em Argentina - Preserved Peaches, a autoridade investigadora tinha se referido a acontecimentos imprevistos apenas em sua concluso final, o Painel considerou que isso era insuficiente. Para. 7.33. A mere phrase in a conclusion, without supporting analysis of the existence of unforeseen developments, is not a substitute for a demonstration of fact. The failure of the competent authorities to demonstrate that certain alleged developments were unforeseen in the foregoing section of their report is not cured by the concluding phrase. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.52-10.53 Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que acontecimentos imprevistos devem ser demonstrados em um Relatrio antes de a medida ser aplicada.

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Para. 10.52. Given that the demonstration of unforeseen developments is a prerequisite for the application of a safeguard measure, it cannot take place after the date as of which the safeguard measure is applied. This has been confirmed by the Appellate Body, which noted, in US - Lamb, that although Article XIX provides no express guidance on where and when the demonstration of unforeseen developments is to be made, it is nonetheless a prerequisite, and it follows that this demonstration must be made before the safeguard measure is applied. Otherwise, the legal basis for the measure is flawed. Any demonstration made after the start of the application of a safeguard measure would have to be disregarded automatically as it cannot afford legal justification for that measure. Para. 10.53. (..) such a reasoned and adequate explanation of how unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports causing serious injury must form part of the overall reported explanation by the competent authority that it has satisfied all the WTO prerequisites for the imposition of a safeguard measure. Since the demonstration of unforeseen developments must be included in the published report of the competent authorities it is necessary to look for the demonstration of unforeseen developments in the report of the competent authority, completed and published prior to the application of the safeguard measures. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 279 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que a autoridade competente deve fornecer uma explicao fundamentada e adequada de como os fatos apoiam sua determinao, incluindo acontecimentos imprevistos nos termos do Artigo XIX:1(a) do GATT 1994. Para. 279. We do not see how a panel could examine objectively the consistency of a determination with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 if the competent authority had not set out an explanation supporting its conclusions on unforeseen developments. Indeed, to enable a panel to determine whether there was compliance with the prerequisites that must be demonstrated before the application of a safeguard measure, the competent authority must provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support its determination for those prerequisites, including unforeseen developments under Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 316 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao confirmou a deciso do Painel de que cada medida questionada deve ter sido objeto de uma demonstrao especifica de acontecimentos imprevistos e tambm que a demonstrao factual de acontecimentos imprevistos deve se relacionar com o produto especfico abrangido pela medida especfica em questo. Para. 316. To trigger the right to apply a safeguard measure, the development must be such as to result in increased imports of the product (such product) that is subject to the safeguard measure. Moreover, any product, as Article XIX:1(a) provides, may, potentially, be subject to that safeguard measure, provided that the alleged unforeseen developments result in increased imports of that specific product (such product). We, therefore, agree with the Panel that, with respect to the specific products subject to the respective determinations, the competent authorities are required by Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 to demonstrate that the unforeseen developments identified have resulted in increased imports [of the specific products subject to] each safeguard measure at issue.

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Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 319 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao concordou com o Painel no sentido de que com relao a produtos especficos sujeitos s determinaes respectivas, as autoridades competentes so obrigadas pelo Artigo XIX: 1(a) do GATT 1994, a demonstrar que os acontecimentos imprevistos resultaram em aumento das importaes dos produtos especficos sujeitos medida de salvaguarda em questo. Para. 319. [W]hen an importing Member wishes to apply safeguard measures on imports of several products, it is not sufficient merely to demonstrate that unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports of a broad category of products that included the specific products subject to the respective determinations by the competent authority. If that could be done, a Member could make a determination and apply a safeguard measure to a broad category of products even if imports of one or more of those products did not increase and did not result from the unforeseen developments at issue. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that such an approach does not meet the requirements of Article XIX:1(a), and that the demonstration of unforeseen developments must be performed for each product subject to a safeguard measure. (Emphasis original) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 326 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que era para as autoridades competentes, e no para os Painis, fornecerem uma concluso fundamentada sobre acontecimentos imprevistos. Para. 326. A reasoned conclusion is not one where the conclusion does not even refer to the facts that may support that conclusion. As the United States itself acknowledges, Article 3.1 thus assigns the competent authorities - not the panel - the obligation to publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law. A competent authority has an obligation under Article 3.1 to provide reasoned conclusions; it is not for panels to find support for such conclusions by cobbling together disjointed references scattered throughout a competent authoritys report. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 92 Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que a exigncia de imprevistos no estabeleceu uma condio separada para a imposio de medidas de salvaguarda, mas descreveu um certo conjunto de circunstncias. Para. 92. When we examine this clause - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions - in its immediate context in Article XIX:1(a), we see that it relates directly to the second clause in that paragraph - If, , any product is being imported into the territory of that Member in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products . The latter, or second, clause in Article XIX:1(a) contains the three conditions for the application of safeguard measures. These conditions, which are reiterated in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, are that: (1) a product is being imported in such quantities and under such conditions; (2) as to cause; (3) serious injury or the threat of serious injury to domestic producers. The first clause in Article XIX:1(a) - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the obligations incurred by a Member under the 188

Agreement, including tariff concessions - is a dependent clause which, in our view, is linked grammatically to the verb phrase is being imported in the second clause of that paragraph. Although we do not view the first clause in Article XIX:1(a) as establishing independent conditions for the application of a safeguard measure, additional to the conditions set forth in the second clause of that paragraph, we do believe that the first clause describes certain circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a safeguard measure to be applied consistently with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. In this sense, we believe that there is a logical connection between the circumstances described in the first clause - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions - and the conditions set forth in the second clause of Article XIX:1(a) for the imposition of a safeguard measure. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.39, 10.41 e 10.43 Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que a norma legal utilizada para determinar o que constitui um acontecimento imprevisto pode ser tanto subjetiva quanto objetiva. Para. 10.39. The legal standard that is used to determine what constitutes an unforeseen development is, as agreed by the parties, at least in part, subjective. This is supported by the Appellate Body, who stated in Korea - Dairy that safeguard measures are to be invoked only in situations when an importing Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not foreseen or expected when it incurred [its] obligation [under GATT 1994]. Para. 10.41. What was unforeseen when the contracting parties negotiated their first tariff concessions in all likelihood differs from what can be considered to be unforeseen today. The Panel notes that after 50 years of GATT, tariffs have, for many products, disappeared or reached very low levels. Further, what constitutes unforeseen developments for an importing Member will vary depending on the context and the circumstances. Nevertheless, the subjectivity of the standard does not take away from the fact that the unexpectedness of a development for an importing Member is something that must be demonstrated through a reasoned and adequate explanation. Para. 10.43. In addition, the standard for unforeseen developments may also be said to have an objective element. The appropriate focus is on what should or could have been foreseen in light of the circumstances. The standard is not what the specific negotiators had in mind but rather what they could (reasonably) have had in mind. This was recognized early in GATT by the US - Fur Felt Hats decision, which characterized unforeseen developments as developments [] which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.97-10.100 Em US - Steel, o Painel concluiu que a confluncia de vrios eventos pode se unir para formar a base de um acontecimento imprevisto. Para. 10.97. The United States argues that the robustness of the US dollar was a development which combined with the other developments, namely, the currency crises in Asia and the former USSR and the continued growth in steel demand in the United States market as other markets declined, lead to i ncreased imports.

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Para. 10.98. The Panel has already accepted that the Russian and the Southeast Asian financial crises, at least conceptually, could be considered unforeseen developments that did not exist at the end of the Uruguay Round. We have also found that the USITC did not consider the strength of the United States economy and the appreciation of the US dollar as unforeseen developments per se; it had referred to these factors in relation to other unforeseen developments, which together had resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to cause injury. Para. 10.99. Article XIX does not preclude consideration of the confluence of a number of developments as unforeseen developments. Accordingly, the Panel believes that confluence of developments can form the basis of unforeseen developments for the purposes of Article XIX of GATT 1994. The Panel is of the view, therefore, that it is for each Member to demonstrate that a confluence of circumstances that it considers were unforeseen at the time it concluded its tariff negotiations resulted in increased imports causing serious injury. Para. 10.100. To the complainants argument that the changes in steel markets were much more pronounced in 1991 following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union than later on and could not, therefore, be unforeseen after 1994, the Panel notes that the fact that the dissolution of the USSR and its overall effects may have constituted an unforeseen development in 1991 does not mean that a subsequent financial crisis also resulting somehow from the dissolution of the USSR, cannot, with other developments, be considered part of a confluence of unforeseen developments in 1997 for the purpose of Article XIX of GATT 1994. (iii) Relao entre acontecimentos imprevistos e condio para imposio da salvaguarda Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, paras. 10.104 e 10.110 Em US - Steel, o Painel considerou que a frase como resultado de implica uma conexo lgica entre acontecimentos imprevistos e os efeitos de tarifas concesses e obrigaes e a condio para imposio de uma medida de salvaguarda. Para. 10.104. The Appellate Body has interpreted the phrase as a result of in Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 as a logical connection that exists between the first two clauses of that Article. In other words, a logical connection must be demonstrated to have existed between the elements of the first clause of Article XIX:1(a) - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions - and the conditions set forth in the second clause of that Article increased imports causing serious injury - for the imposition of a safeguard measure. Para. 10.110. The Panel agrees with New Zealand that it would be improper to reduce to a nullity the obligation to explain how unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury. In some cases, the explanation may be as simple as bringing two sets of facts together. However, in other situations, it may require much more detailed analysis in order to make clear the relationship that exists between the unforeseen developments and the increased imports that are causing or threatening to cause serious injury. The nature of the facts, including their complexity, will dictate the extent to which the relationship between the unforeseen developments and increased imports causing injury needs to be explained. The timing of the explanation, its extent and its quality are all factors that can affect whether a explanation is reasoned and adequate. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 315 190

Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao confirmou que acontecimentos imprevistos devem resultar em aumento das importaes do produto que est sujeito a uma medida de salvaguarda. Para. 315. Turning to the term as a result of that is also found in Article XIX:1(a), we note that the ordinary meaning of result is, as defined in the dictionary, an effect, issue, or outcome from some action, process or design. The increased imports to which this provision refers must therefore be an effect, or outcome of the unforeseen developments. Put differently, the unforeseen developments must result in increased imports of the product (such product) that is subject to a safeguard measure. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/AB/R; Japo, WT/DS249/AB/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/AB/R; China, WT/DS252/AB/R; Sua, WT/DS253/AB/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/AB/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/AB/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/AB/R, para. 350 Em US - Steel, o rgo de Apelao esclareceu a relao entre acontecimentos imprevistos e aumento das importaes e concluiu que em situaes de acontecimentos imprevistos, o aumento das importaes tambm deve ser imprevisto. Para. 350. In a similar vein, we said in Argentina - Footwear (EC) that the increased quantities of imports should have been unforeseen or unexpected.In doing so, we were referring to the fact that the increased imports must, under Article XIX:1(a), result from unforeseen developments in order to justify the application of a safeguard measure. Because the increased imports must be as a result of an event that was unforeseen or unexpected, it follows that the increased imports must also be unforeseen or unexpected. Thus, the extraordinary nature of the domestic response to increased imports does not depend on the absolute or relative quantities of the product being imported. Rather, it depends on the fact that the increased imports were unforeseen or unexpected. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 96 Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao observou um relatrio do Painel do GATT (Hatters Fur), que confirmou que o desenvolvimento deve ter sido previsto data da negociao de tarifas. Para. 96. In addition, we note that our reading of the clause - as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions - in Article XIX:1(a) is also consistent with the one GATT 1947 case that involved Article XIX, the so-called Hatters Fur case. Members of the Working Party in that case, in 1951, stated: () unforeseen developments should be interpreted to mean developments occurring
after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated.

Em Korea - Dairy, o rgo de Apelao decidiu que os acontecimentos imprevistos so acontecimentos no previstos ou esperados quando os Membros estabeleceram essa obrigao. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products (Korea - Dairy), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 86 Para. 86. [S]uch emergency actions [safeguard measures] are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, an importing Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not foreseen or expected when it incurred that obligation.

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Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches (Argentina - Preserved Peaches), Demandante: Chile, WT/DS238/R, paras. 7.25 e 7.28 Em Argentina - Preserved Peaches, o Painel concordou com a abordagem de ambas as partes de que os acontecimentos deveriam ter sido imprevistos pelos negociadores no momento em que estes concederam as concesses relevantes. Para. 7.25. There is the issue of the point in time at which Article XIX:1(a) requires that developments should have been unforeseen. Chile stated that the developments should have been unforeseen by a Member at the time it incurred the relevant obligation. In response to questions posed by the Panel, both parties submitted basically that developments should have been unforeseen by the negotiators at the time at which they granted the relevant concession. Para. 7.28. We will apply this interpretation and determine whether the competent authorities assessed whether the developments which they identified were unforeseen as at the time the relevant obligation was negotiated. We emphasize that we are not now discussing the time at which the competent authorities must demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments in order to adopt a safeguard measure. (iv) como resultado - do efeito das obrigaes acordadas por um Membro Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que os compromissos assumidos por um Membro em seus schedules of concessions integram suas obrigaes no mbito do Artigo II do GATT e, portanto, tambm devem ser considerados quando estivermos analisando a compatibilidade de uma salvaguarda com as regras da OMC, incluindo concesses tarifrias. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, paras. 91-92 Para. 91. [W]e believe that this phrase simply means that it must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the importing Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994, including tariff concessions. Here, we note that the Schedules annexed to the GATT 1994 are made an integral part of Part I of that Agreement, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article II of the GATT 1994. Therefore, any concession or commitment in a Members Schedule is subject to the obligations contained in Article II of the GATT 1994. Para. 92. as a result of the effect of the obligations incurred by a Member as setting forth certain circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter of fact in order for a safeguard measure to be applied consistently with the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (US - Steel), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS248/R; Japo, WT/DS249/R; Repblica da Coreia, WT/DS251/R; China, WT/DS252/R; Sua, WT/DS253/R; Noruega, WT/DS254/R; Nova Zelndia, WT/DS258/R; Brasil, WT/DS259/R, para. 10.140 Em US - Steel, o Painel considerou que fica evidenciada a relao entre concesso tarifria e aumento nas importaes se a salvaguarda foi imposta para um produto para o qual o Membro apresentou concesses tarifrias. Para. 10.140. () the logical connection between tariff concessions and increased imports causing serious injury is proven once there is evidence that the importing Member has tariff concessions for the relevant product. 3. Artigo XIX:2

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a) avisar por escrito s Partes Contratantes com a maior antecedncia possvel e oportunidade para consultar Apesar de no haver precedentes a respeito, devem ser interpretados conforme o Artigo 12 do Acordo de Salvaguardas. 4. Relao com outros Acordos da OMC a) Acordo sobre Salvaguardas Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS121/AB/R, para. 89 Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao rejeitou a concluso do Painel de que medidas de salvaguarda que atendam aos requisitos do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas automaticamente tambm satisfazem os requisitos do Artigo XIX. O rgo de Apelao considerou esta concluso do Painel incompatvel com os princpios de interpretao de tratado e com o sentido comum dos Artigos 1 e 11.1(a) do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas. Para. 89. [I]t is clear from Articles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards that the Uruguay Round negotiators did not intend that the Agreement on Safeguards would entirely replace Article XIX. Instead, the ordinary meaning of Articles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards confirms that the intention of the negotiators was that the provisions of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards would apply cumulatively, except to the extent of a conflict between specific provisions We do not see this as an issue involving a conflict between specific provisions of two Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods. Thus, we are obliged to apply the provisions of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 cumulatively, in order to give meaning, by giving legal effect, to all the applicable provisions relating to safeguard measures. Relatrio do Painel e do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Safeguard Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand (US - Lamb), Demandante: Nova Zelndia e Austrlia, WT/DS177/R, WT/DS178/R) paras. 7.11; WT/DS177/AB/R e WT/DS178/AB/R, para. 70 Em US - Lamb, o Painel referindo-se s concluses do rgo de Apelao em Argentina - Footwear e Korea - Dairy, sobre a relao entre o Acordo sobre Salvaguardas e o Artigo XIX do GATT 1994, observou que os normativos devem ser interpretados conjuntamente. Para. 7.11. Thus the Appellate Body explicitly rejected the idea that those requirements of GATT Article XIX which are not reflected in the Safeguards Agreement could have been superseded by the requirements of the latter and stressed that all of the relevant provisions of the Safeguards Agreement and GATT Article XIX must be given meaning and effect. Para. 70. [A]rticles 1 and 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards express the full and continuing applicability of Article XIX of the GATT 1994, which no longer stands in isolation, but has been clarified and reinforced by the Agreement on Safeguards. III. Comentrios

Nos termos dos Relatrios aprovados pelo DSB da OMC, o remdio previsto no Artigo XIX (imposio de uma salvaguarda) de carter emergencial e deve ser invocado apenas em situaes em que, como resultado das obrigaes assumidas no mbito do GATT de 1994, um Membro se encontrar confrontado com acontecimento no previsto ou esperado no momento que assumiu determinada obrigao.

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Acontecimentos no previstos devem ser demonstrados em um Relatrio antes de a medida ser aplicada e a autoridade competente deve fornecer uma explicao fundamentada e adequada de como os fatos apoiam sua determinao. Cada medida questionada deve ter sido objeto de uma demonstrao especifica de acontecimentos imprevistos e tambm deve haver uma demonstrao factual de que os acontecimentos imprevistos se relacionam com o produto especfico abrangido pela medida especfica em questo. O padro de reviso para alegaes de violao de acontecimentos imprevistos do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994 foi previsto no Artigo 11 do DSU. A exigncia de imprevistos no estabeleceu uma condio separada para a imposio de medidas de salvaguarda, mas descreveu um conjunto de circunstncias. O rgo de Apelao concluiu que qualquer medida de salvaguarda imposta aps a entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC deve respeitar as disposies do Acordo sobre Salvaguardas e, cumulativamente, do Artigo XIX do GATT 1994. Em Argentina - Footwear, o rgo de Apelao rejeitou a concluso do Painel de que medidas de salvaguarda que atendam aos requisitos do Acordo de Salvaguardas automaticamente tambm satisfazem os requisitos do Artigo XIX do GATT. O rgo de Apelao considerou esta concluso do Painel incompatvel com os princpios de interpretao de tratado e com o sentido comum dos Artigos 1 e 11.1(a) do Acordo de Salvaguardas.

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Artigo XX

Fbio Morosini Carina Costa de Oliveira Lusa Niencheski Matheus Bassani IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XX General Exceptions Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importations or exportations of gold or silver; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices; (e) relating to the products of prison labour; (f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; (h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved; (i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabilization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to increase the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement relating to non-discrimination; (j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of the Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.

195

IB.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XX Excees Gerais

Desde que essas medidas no sejam aplicadas de forma a constituir quer um meio de discriminao arbitrria, ou injustificada, entre os pases onde existem as mesmas condies, quer uma restrio disfarada ao comrcio internacional, disposio alguma do presente captulo ser interpretada como impedindo a adoo ou aplicao, por qualquer Parte Contratante, das medidas: I. a) b) necessrias proteo da moralidade pblica; necessrias proteo da sade e da vida das pessoas e dos animais e preservao dos vegetais; que se relacionem exportao e a importao do ouro e da prata; necessrias a assegurar a aplicao das leis e regulamentos que no sejam incompatveis com as disposies do presente acordo, tais como, por exemplo, as leis e regulamentos que dizem respeito aplicao de medidas alfandegrias, manuteno em vigor dos monoplios administrados na conformidade do 4 do art. II e do art. XVII proteo das patentes, marcas de fbrica e direitos de autoria e de reproduo, e a medidas prprias a impedir as prticas de natureza a induzir em rro; relativas aos artigos fabricados nas prises: impostas para a proteo de tesouros nacionais de valor artstico, histrico ou arqueolgico; relativas conservao dos recursos naturais esgotveis, se tais medidas forem aplicadas conjuntamente com restries produo ou ao consumo nacionais; tomadas em aplicao de compromissos contrados em virtude de acrdos intergovernamentais sbre produtos bsicos, concludos dentro dos princpios aprovados pelo Conselho Econmico e Social das Naes Unidas, na sua resoluo de 28 de maro de 1947, que instituiu uma Comisso Provisria de Coordenao para os acrdos Internacionais relativos aos produtos bsicos; que impliquem em restries exportao de matrias primas produzidas no interior do pas e necessrias para assegurar a uma indstria nacional de transformao as quantidades essenciais das referidas matrias-primas durante os perodos nos quais o preo nacional seja mantido abaixo do preo mundial, em execuo de um plano governamental de estabilizao; sob reserva de que essas restries no tenham por efeito reforar a exportao ou a proteo concedida referida indstria nacional e no sejam contrrias s disposies do presente acrdo relativas no discriminao. essenciais aquisio e repartio de produtos dos quais se faz sentir uma penria geral ou local; todavia, as referidas medidas devero ser compatveis com todos os acrdos multilaterais destinados a assegurar uma repartio internacional eqitativa dsses produtos ou, na ausncia de tais acrdos, com o princpio segundo o qual tdas as Partes Contratantes tm direito a uma parte equitativa do aprovisionamento internacional dos referidos produtos; essenciais ao funcionamento do contrle de preos estabelecido por uma Parte Contratante que, em conseqncia da guerra, sofra de penria de produtos; essenciais liquidao metdica dos excedentes temporrios de estoques pertencentes a qualquer Parte Contratante ou por ela controlados ou de indstrias que se tenham 196

c) d)

e) f) g)

h)

i)

II.

a)

b)

c)

desenvolvido no territrio de uma Parte Contratante por motivo das exigncias da guerra e cuja manuteno em tempo normal seja contrria s economia, ficando entendido que nenhuma Parte Contratante poder instituir medidas dessa natureza, a no ser depois de haver consultado as outras Partes Contratantes interessadas com o fim de ser adotada uma ao internacional apropriada. As medidas institudas ou mantidas nos trmos da Parte Segunda do presente artigo, incompatveis com as outras disposies do presente Acrdo, sero suprimidas, logo que as circunstncias que as motivaram cessarem de existir e, em qualquer caso, a 1 de janeiro de 1951 o mais tardar, ficando entendido que, com o consentimento das Partes Contratantes, o perodo considerado poder ser prorrogado no que se refere a aplicao, por qualquer Parte Contratante, de uma medida relativa a um produto determinado, para novos perodos que as Partes Contratantes fixarem. (Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios Traduo

O texto original, em ingls, do Artigo XX do GATT apresenta um caput e dez pargrafos, cada um constando diferentes fundamentos para configurao de exceo (pargrafos a a j). A traduo do Artigo XX para o portugus, prevista na Lei n 313, de 30 de julho de 1948, divide os pargrafos deste Artigo em duas partes. A parte I engloba a traduo dos pargrafos a a i, sem alterar o teor do texto original. J a parte II reproduz o teor original do pargrafo j, mas inclui dois dispositivos (Parte II, letras b e c) no previstos no texto original em ingls. II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XX Artigo XX, Caput a) Objetivo do Artigo XX (Purpose) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 20 O propsito do caput do Artigo XX , segundo essa deciso do rgo de Apelao, estipular limites e condies que impeam a utilizao abusiva pelas partes frente s excees trazidas nas alneas do referido Artigo. Page 20. The chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied. It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses of Article XX is generally the prevention of abuse of the exceptions of [what was later to become] Article [XX]. This insight drawn from the drafting history of Article XX is a valuable one. The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties concerned. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, paras. 846, 158 e 155

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O rgo de Apelao, aprofundando-se na explicao do Artigo XX, consignou que deve haver um equilbrio entre o direito da parte contratante em invocar as excees do Artigo e o seu dever de observar os direitos da parte contrria e disposies em outros Acordos. Estabeleceu, tambm, uma conexo entre esse equilbrio e o princpio da boa-f. Ainda, explicou a relevncia do Prembulo do Acordo da OMC, que se refere expressamente ao uso sustentvel dos recursos naturais, para uma interpretao mais alargada do caput do Artigo e, especificamente, da alnea g. Para. 846. In our view, the language of the chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive obligations contained in the other provisions of the GATT 1994, that is to say, the ultimate availability of the exception is subject to the compliance by the invoking Member with the requirements of the chapeau. This interpretation of the chapeau is confirmed by its negotiating history. The language initially proposed by the United States in 1946 for the chapeau of what would later become Article XX was unqualified and unconditional. Several proposals were made during the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 1946 suggesting modifications. In November 1946, the United Kingdom proposed that in order to prevent abuse of the exceptions of Article 32 [which would subsequently become Article XX], the chapeau of this provision should be qualified. This proposal was generally accepted, subject to later review of its precise wording. Thus, the negotiating history of Article XX confirms that the paragraphs of Article XX set forth limited and conditional exceptions from the obligations of the substantive provisions of the GATT. Any measure, to qualify finally for exception, must also satisfy the requirements of the chapeau. This is a fundamental part of the balance of rights and obligations struck by the original framers of the GATT 1947. Para. 158. The chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably. Para. 155. We must fulfill our responsibility in this specific case, which is to interpret the existing language of the chapeau of Article XX by examining its ordinary meaning, in light of its context and object and purpose in order to determine whether the United States measure at issue qualifies for justification under Article XX. It is proper for us to take into account, as part of the context of the chapeau, the specific language of the preamble to the WTO Agreement, which, we have said, gives colour, texture and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 1994, in particular. b) Discriminao arbitrria ou injustificada entre pases em que prevalecem as mesmas condies (arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail) (i) Elementos constitutivos (Constitutive elements) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, para. 150 O rgo de Apelao declarou que so trs os aspectos que devem ser observados para que uma medida se enquadre no conceito de discriminao arbitrria ou injustificvel. Primeiramente, a medida comercial imposta por uma das Partes deve ser discriminatria. Em segundo lugar, o rgo de Apelao afirmou que tal medida deve ser arbitrria e indefensvel. Por ltimo, deve ocorrer entre pases que gozem das mesmas condies comerciais. Para. 150. In order for a measure to be applied in a manner which would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, three elements must exist. 198

First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. As we stated in United States - Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is different from the discrimination in the treatment of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, III or XI. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. We will examine this element of arbitrariness or unjustifiability in detail below. Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail. In United States - Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal that such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the chapeau are not only different from the requirements of Article XX(g); they are also different from the standard used in determining that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. (ii) Forma de discriminao includa no caput (Type of discrimination covered by the chapeau) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 22 Novamente, por meio do relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso US - Gasoline foi esclarecido outro ponto da interpretao do caput do Artigo XX. Desta vez, a controvrsia versava sobre se as medidas discriminatrias abrangiam tanto as condies dos pases importadores e exportadores ou somente dos pases exportadores. Averbou-se que a discriminao refere-se aos pases importadores e exportadores. Page 22. The assumption on which all the participants proceeded is buttressed by the fact that the chapeau says that nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ... The exceptions listed in Article XX thus relate to all of the obligations under the General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the most-favoured-nation obligation, of course, but others as well. Effect is more easily given to the words nothing in this Agreement, and Article XX as a whole including its chapeau more easily integrated into the remainder of the General Agreement, if the chapeau is taken to mean that the standards it sets forth are applicable to all of the situations in which an allegation of a violation of a substantive obligation has been made and one of the exceptions contained in Article XX has in turn been claimed. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, para. 150 O rgo de Apelao tambm na deciso do caso US - Shrimp reconheceu que medidas discriminatrias podem ocorrer no s entre os diferentes Membros exportadores, mas tambm entre exportadores e importadores. Para. 150. In United States Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal that such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the chapeau are not only different from the requirements of Article XX(g); they are also different from the standard used in determining that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. (iii) Padro de Discriminao (Standard of discrimination) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 de abril de 1996, page 21 Nessa deciso, restou consignado que o padro de discriminao estipulado no Artigo XX deve ser diferente do padro estipulado no Artigo III:4, haja vista que se fosse o mesmo, as excees das alneas a e j do Artigo XX restariam sem significado. 199

Page 21. The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofitable one if it involved no more than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline establishment rules were inconsistent with Article III:4. That would also be true if the finding were one of inconsistency with some other substantive rule of the General Agreement. The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed down that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that inconsistency was nevertheless justified. One of the corollaries of the general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility. (iv) Exemplos de discriminao arbitrria e injustificvel (Examples of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products (US - Shrimp), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 de outubro de 1998, paras. 161 e 177 O rgo de Apelao exemplificou a situao em que foi adotada medida discriminatria arbitrria e injustificvel, justamente quando os EUA pretenderam coercitivamente aplicar a mesma poltica em outros governos. Isto , os EUA utilizaram um padro uniforme sem atender as particularidades de cada regio do seu territrio. Ainda, o rgo criticou a exigncia nica, rgida e no flexvel imposta pelos EUA aos pases pretendentes certificao. Para. 161. Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure's application relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments, Members of the WTO. Section 609, in its application, is, in effect, an economic embargo which requires all other exporting Members, if they wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy (together with an approved enforcement program) as that applied to, and enforced on, United States domestic shrimp trawlers. As enacted by the Congress of the United States, the statutory provisions of Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) do not, in themselves, require that other WTO Members adopt essentially the same policies and enforcement practices as the United States. Para. 177. Section 609 has been applied in a manner constituting arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail. We have already observed that Section 609, in its application, imposes a single, rigid and unbending requirement that countries applying for certification under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is essentially the same as the United States' program, without inquiring into the appropriateness of that program for the conditions prevailing in the exporting countries. Furthermore, there is little or no flexibility in how officials make the determination for certification pursuant to these provisions. In our view, this rigidity and inflexibility also constitute arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the granting of tariff preferences to developing countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS246/R, 1 de dezembro de 2003, paras. 7.233-7.234 O Painel analisou se os Acordos de Drogas da Unio Europeia estavam em consonncia com o Artigo XX (b) e, para tanto, analisou se tais medidas enquadravam-se nas hipteses do caput do Artigo XX. Especificamente, o Painel analisou a incluso do Paquisto, a partir de 2002, como um beneficirio do regime de preferncias de Drogas e da excluso do Ir, descobrindo que nenhum critrio objetivo poderia ser discernido no processo de seleo. Consequentemente, o Painel no se convenceu de que as condies nos 12 pases beneficirios de tais Acordos de Drogas foram os mesmos. 200

Para. 7.233. The Panel notes that the European Communities has not provided any evidence on the existence of procedures or criteria, whether published or other, relating to the periodic selection of beneficiaries under the Drug Arrangements. While the European Communities provided a description of its selection process during this litigation, stating that it is based on the overall assessment of the gravity of the drug problem in each developing country in accordance with objective criteria, and also referred to UN statistics on drug production and seizures, the Panel has no evidence before it to identify whether or not the European Communities actually conducted a selection process as described by the European Communities and whether such selection process, if it occurred, was actually based upon these UN statistics. Para. 7.234. The Panel finds no evidence to conclude that the conditions in respect of drug problems prevailing in the 12 beneficiary countries are the same or similar, while the conditions prevailing in other drug-affected developing countries not covered by any other preferential tariff schemes are not the same as, or sufficiently similar to, the prevailing conditions in the 12 beneficiary countries. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Brazil - Measures affecting imports of retreaded tyres (Brazil Retreated Tyres), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS332/AB/R, paras. 227, 230 e 246 Neste emblemtico caso, a partir da deciso emitida pelo Painel, a qual considerou que a restrio importao de pneus usados pelo Mercosul no era improcedente, o rgo de Apelao observou que para determinar se uma medida arbitrria, deve basear sua anlise nas causas de tal discriminao e no apenas nas consequncias advindas dela. Tambm ressaltou que a discriminao deve guardar pertinncia com o seu objetivo legtimo e no somente depender da avaliao de seu impacto quantitativo. Assim, considerou que houve discriminao entre os pases do Mercosul com relao a outros Membros da OMC, em decorrncia da imposio do banimento importao introduzida por uma deciso do Tribunal do Mercosul. Ademais, o rgo concluiu que uma medida considerada discriminatria quando no tem relao com o objetivo de uma medida justificada provisoriamente. Para. 227. We have to assess whether this explanation provided by Brazil is acceptable as a justification for discrimination between MERCOSUR countries and non-MERCOSUR countries in relation to retreaded tyres. In doing so, we are mindful of the function of the chapeau of Article XX, which is to prevent abuse of the exceptions specified in the paragraphs of that provision. In our view, there is such an abuse, and, therefore, there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when a measure provisionally justified under a paragraph of Article XX is applied in a discriminatory manner between countries where the same conditions prevail, and when the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go against that objective. The assessment of whether discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable should be made in the light of the objective of the measure. We note, for example, that one of the bases on which the Appellate Body relied in US - Shrimp for concluding that the operation of the measure at issue resulted in unjustifiable discrimination was that one particular aspect of the application of the measure (the measure implied that, in certain circumstances, shrimp caught abroad using methods identical to those employed in the United States would be excluded from the United States market) was difficult to reconcile with the declared objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles. Accordingly, we have difficulty understanding how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of Article XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pursuit of or would go against the objective that was provisionally found to justify a measure under a paragraph of Article XX. Para. 230. Having said that, we recognize that in certain cases the effects of the discrimination may be a relevant factor, among others, for determining whether the cause or rationale of the discrimination is acceptable or defensible and, ultimately, whether the discrimination is justifiable. The effects of discrimination might be relevant, depending on the circumstances of the case, because, as we indicated above, the chapeau of Article XX deals with the manner of application of the measure at issue. Taking into account as a relevant factor, among others, the effects of the discrimination for determining whether the rationale of the discrimination is acceptable is, however, fundamentally different from the Panel's approach, which

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focused exclusively on the relationship between the effects of the discrimination and its justifiable or unjustifiable character. Para. 246. As we explained above, the analysis of whether the application of a measure results in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination should focus on the cause or rationale given for the discrimination. For Brazil, the fact that Brazilian retreaders are able to use imported casings is the result of the decisions of the Brazilian administrative authorities to comply with court injunctions. We observe that this explanation bears no relationship to the objective of the Import Ban - reducing exposure to the risks arising from the accumulation of waste tyres to the maximum extent possible. The imports of used tyres through court injunctions even go against the objective pursued by the Import Ban. As we indicated above, there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX, when a Member seeks to justify the discrimination resulting from the application of its measure by a rationale that bears no relationship to the accomplishment of the objective that falls within the purview of one of the paragraphs of Article XX, or goes against this objective. Accordingly, we find that the imports of used tyres through court injunctions have resulted in the Import Ban being applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. c) Restrio disfarada ao Comrcio Internacional (disguised restriction on international trade) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS2/AB/R, page 22 A expresso discriminao arbitrria e injustificvel foi considerada, nessa deciso, pelo rgo de Apelao, similar e complementar expresso restrio disfarada ao comrcio internacional. Page 22. Arbitrary discrimination, unjustifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to us that disguised restriction includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of disguised restriction. We consider that disguised restriction, whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a disguised restriction on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Brazil - Measures affecting imports of retreaded tyres (Brazil Retreated Tyres), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 248 Nesse Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao fundamenta-se na contrariedade da deciso do Painel, a qual condicionou a constatao de uma restrio disfarada ao comrcio internacional, na existncia de importaes de pneus usados em quantidades prejudiciais consecuo do objetivo da restrio de importao. Para. 248. The Panel found that, since imports of used tyres take place in significant amounts under court injunctions to the benefit of the domestic retreading industry, the [Import Ban] is being applied in a manner that constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade. The Panel reasoned that the restriction on international trade inherent in the Import Ban has operated to the benefit of domestic retreaders, because [t]he granting of court injunctions for the importation of used tyres has ... in effect meant that ... domestic retreaders have been able to continue to benefit from the importation of used tyres as material for their own activity in significant amounts, while their competitors from non-MERCOSUR countries have been kept out of the Brazilian market. 202

2.

Artigo XX(a) a) Geral: moralidade pblica (public moral)

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China - Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 879 O Painel em China - Publications and Audiovisual Products adotou a interpretao de moralidade pblica elaborada pelo Painel, no caso US - Gambling, no qual o termo moralidade pblica prev determinadas condutas, certas ou erradas, a serem respeitadas conforme a cultura de uma comunidade ou nao. O contedo dessas condutas pode variar no tempo e no espao, dependendo de uma gama de fatores sociais, culturais, ticos e valores religiosos. Os Membros da OMC, ao aplicarem esses critrios, devem conceder uma margem para definir e aplicar a eles mesmos os conceitos de moralidade pblica no seu respectivo territrio, conforme seus prprios sistemas e valores. Para. 879. The Panel in China - Publications and Audiovisual Products adopted the interpretation of public morals developed by the panel in US - Gambling, namely that:
[T]he term public morals denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values Members, in applying this and other similar societal concepts, should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of public morals in their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of values.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 880 O Painel China - Publications and Audiovisual Products lembrou que o contedo e o escopo do conceito de moralidade pblica tendem a variar de Membro para Membro, em razo dos distintos valores sociais, culturais, ticos e religiosos e prosseguiu com a sua anlise sobre o pressuposto de que cada um dos tipos proibidos de contedo listados nas medidas Chinesas tal que, se fosse trazido para a China como parte de um produto fsico, poderia ter um impacto negativo sobre a moralidade pblica na China, no sentido do Artigo XX, do GATT 1994. Para. 880. The Panel recalled that the content and scope of the concept of public morals can vary from Member to Member, as they are influenced by each Members prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values and it proceeded with its analysis on the assumption that each of the prohibited types of content listed in Chinas measures is such that, if it were brought into China as part of a physical product, it could have a negative impact on public morals in China within the meaning of Article XX (a). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 881 O Painel ressaltou ser necessrio Parte demandada justificar a medida inconsistente com a OMC em sua contestao, e, frisou que, no presente caso, as medidas, as necessidades que a China deve estabelecer so os dispositivos que restringem o direito de importar contrrio ao Acordo de Acesso da China. No esto em questo, portanto, os dispositivos que preveem que a autoridade competente chinesa e/ou instituies de importao devem revisar o contedo dos produtos audiovisuais acabados e materiais de leitura, e que tais produtos no possam ser importados se contiverem contedo proibido.

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Para. 881. The Panel further recalled that it is the WTO-inconsistent measure that a responding party seeks to justify which must be necessary and found that in the case at hand, the measures, the necessity of which China must establish, are the provisions that restrict the right to import contrary to Chinas t rading rights commitments under the Accession Protocol. The separate provisions prescribing that the competent Chinese authorities and/or import entities review the content of imported finished audiovisual products and reading materials, and that such products may not be imported if they carry prohibited content, are not at issue. b) Necessria (necessary) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 882 Numa interpretao mais extensiva chancelada pelo rgo de Apelao, o Painel China - Publications and Audiovisual Products avaliou o termo necessidade, sob o Artigo XX (a), a partir de vrias disposies consideradas incompatveis com os compromissos de direitos comerciais da China. O Painel elaborou um processo passo-a-passo. Inicialmente, considerou a relao entre as disposies e objetivo declarado pela China (para proteger a moralidade pblica, evitando-se a disseminao de bens com contedo proibido na China). O Painel considerou que cada um dos tipos de contedo proibido pelas medidas da China poderia, se fosse trazido para a China, causar um impacto negativo sobre a moralidade pblica na Chi na, a partir do disposto no Artigo XX(a) do GATT 1994. Em seguida, o Painel identificou a importncia do objetivo perseguido (a proteo da moralidade pblica entre os valores ou interesses mais importantes perseguidos pelos Membros como uma questo de poltica pblica), e o nvel de proteo pretendido pela China (um elevado nvel de proteo da moralidade pblica). Para. 882. The Panel in China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, in a finding largely upheld by the Appellate Body, assessed the necessity under Article XX (a) of various provisions that it had found to be inconsistent with Chinas trading rights commitments. The Panel did so in a multi -step process. First, the Panel considered the relationship between the provisions and Chinas stated objective (to protect public morals by avoiding the dissemination of goods containing prohibited content within China). The Panel assumed that each of the types of prohibited content in Chinas measures could, if it were brought into China, have a negative impact on public morals in China within the meaning of Article XX (a) of the GATT 1994. Next, the Panel identified the importance of the objective pursued ( the protection of public morals ranks among the most important values or interests pursued by Members as a matter of public policy) and the level of protection sought by China (a high level of protection of public morals). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no litgio China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 883 No estgio seguinte da anlise, o Painel abordou separadamente cada uma das questes consideradas incompatveis com os compromissos de direitos comerciais da China. Para cada uma, o Painel: (i) identificou a contribuio para a realizao do objetivo perseguido; (ii) identificou o impacto restritivo sobre o comrcio e sobre aqueles que desejam importar; e (iii) sopesou trs fatores, a saber: a extenso da contribuio; o impacto restritivo; e, o fato de a proteo da moralidade pblica ser um interesse muito importante do governo e de a China ter adotado um nvel elevado de proteo da moralidade pblica no seu territrio. Para. 883. In the next stage of its analysis, the Panel addressed separately each provision that it had found to be inconsistent with Chinas trading rights commitments. For each, the Panel: (i) identified the contribution made to the realization of the objective pursued; (ii) identified the restrictive impact on trade and on those wishing to import; and (iii) weighed and balanced three factors, namely, the extent of the contribution, the restrictive impact, and the fact that the protection of public morals is a highly important governmental interest and that China has adopted a high level of protection of public morals within its territory.

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Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 884 Tendo ponderado e equilibrado esses fatores para cada questo, o Painel chegou a uma concluso sobre se a medida era necessria na ausncia de alternativas razoavelmente disponveis. O Painel ento analisou medidas alternativas propostas pelos EUA, e descobriu que, por causa da existncia de alternativas menos restritivas, as medidas em causa no eram necessrias para proteger a moralidade pblica. Para. 884. Having weighed and balanced these factors for each provision, the Panel reached a conclusion as to whether a provision was necessary in the absence of reasonably available alternatives. The Panel then analysed alternative measures proposed by the United States, and found that because less-restrictive alternatives were available, the measures in question were not necessary to protect public morals. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 885 Pelo fato do Painel China - Publications and Audiovisual Products ter decidido que o Artigo XX estava disponvel como meio de defesa de medidas inconsistentes com os compromissos de direitos comerciais da China, o Painel, num entendimento confirmado pelo rgo de Apelao, tambm decidiu que deve -se sopesar no apenas a impacto restritivo das medidas em causa tm sobre as importaes de produtos relevantes, mas tambm o efeito restritivo que eles tm sobre aqueles que desejam se engajar na importao, em especial sobre o seu direito ao comrcio. Em nossa opinio, se o Artigo XX compreendido como uma defesa direta de medidas em violao de compromissos dos direitos comerciais, faz sentido considerar o quanto essas medidas restringem o direito de importar. Para 885. Because the Panel in China - Publications and Audiovisual Products decided that Article XX was available as a defence for measures inconsistent with Chinas trading rights commitments, the Panel, in a finding upheld by the Appellate Body, also decided that it should weigh not only the restrictive impact the measures at issue have on imports of relevant products, but also the restrictive effect they have on those wishing to engage in importing, in particular on their right to trade. In our view, if Article XX is assumed to be a direct defence for measures in breach of trading rights commitments, it makes sense to consider how much these measures restrict the right to import. c) Ponderao e equilbrio (weighing and balancing) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 886 Em China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, o Painel, como parte de sua anlise, sopesou e equilibrou o efeito restritivo das medidas sobre o comrcio internacional, incluindo tanto o efeito restritivo sobre as importaes quanto o efeito restritivo sobre aqueles que desejam se engajar na importao. O rgo de Apelao, abordando este aspecto, descobriu que, embora, em princpio, um Painel deva avaliar o efeito restritivo de uma medida sobre o comrcio internacional, este teste deve ser aplicado luz da obrigao especfica dos Acordos abrangidos que a respectiva medida est violando. Com efeito, a avaliao do efeito restritivo a ser considerada em uma disputa particular pode, em certos casos, ser estendida alm de uma avaliao do efeito restritivo sobre produtos importados, j que esta avaliao deve ser realizada em funo da medida em questo, da especfica obrigao dos Acordos abrangidos que a medida viola, e da defesa invocada. Para. 886. In China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Panel, as part of its analysis, weighed and balanced the restrictive effect of the measures on international trade, including both the restrictive effect on imports and the restrictive effect on those wishing to engage in importing. The Appellate Body, addressing this finding, found that 205

1. while in principle a panel must assess the restrictive effect of a measure on international commerce, this test must be applied in the light of the specific obligation of the covered agreements that the respective measure infringes. The assessment of the restrictive effect to be taken into account in a particular dispute may, in appropriate cases, extend beyond an assessment of the restrictive effect on imported products, as this assessment must be undertaken in the light of the measure at issue, the specific obligation of the covered agreements that the measure infringes, and the defence being invoked.

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, (China Publications and Audiovisual Products), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 887 Com relao medida que se procurou justificar como necessria para proteger a moralidade pblica, o rgo de Apelao considerou no caso China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, que quanto menos restritivos os efeitos da medida, mais provvel que seja caracterizada como necessria. Consequentemente, se um Membro optar por adotar uma medida muito restritiva, ele ter que garantir que a medida cuidadosamente projetada de modo que os outros elementos a serem levados em conta na ponderao e equilbrio dos fatores relevantes para uma avaliao da necessidade da medida seja compensar o efeito to restritivo. Para. 887. With regard to the measure sought to be justified as necessary to protect public morals, the Appellate Body found in China - Publications and Audiovisual Products:
2. The less restrictive the effects of the measure, the more likely it is to be characterized as necessary. Consequently, if a Member chooses to adopt a v ery restrictive measure, it will have to ensure that the measure is carefully designed so that the other elements to be taken into account in weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment of the necessity of the measure will outweigh such restrictive effect.

3.

Artigo XX(b) a) nus da prova

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 22 Nesse caso, foi determinado que o nus da prova para demonstrar que a medida utilizada justificada com base em uma das excees do Artigo XX, da parte que alega a exceo. Para. 22. The burden of demonstrating that a measure provisionally justified as being within one of the exceptions set out in the individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the exception. That is, of necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing that an exception, (...) encompasses the measure at issue. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.177-8.178, circulao do Relatrio do Painel (setembro de 2000), circulao do Relatrio do rgo de Apelao (maro 2001) Nesse caso, seguindo interpretaes do caso EC - Hormones, o Painel entendeu que h a obrigao tanto para o demandante como para o demandado de provarem suas alegaes. Para. 8.177. With regard to the burden of proof, we refer, first of all, to our previous remarks concerning those cases in which a party invokes a defence. We consider that the reasoning of the Appellate Body in United States - Shirts and Blouses from India is applicable to Article XX, inasmuch as the invocation of that Article constitutes a defence in the sense in which that word is used in the above-mentioned report. It is 206

therefore for the European Communities to submit in respect of this defence a prima facie case showing that the measure is justified. Of course, as the Appellate Body pointed out in United States Gasoline, the burden on the European Communities could vary according to what has to be proved. It will then be for Canada to rebut that prima facie case, if established. Para. 8.178. If we mention this working rule at this stage, it is because it could play a part in our assessment of the evidence submitted by the parties. Thus, the fact that a party invokes Article XX does not mean that it does not need to supply the evidence necessary to support its allegation. Similarly, it does not release the complaining party from having to supply sufficient arguments and evidence in response to the claims of the defending party. Moreover, we are of the opinion that it is not for the party invoking Article XX to prove that the arguments put forward in rebuttal by the complaining party are incorrect until the latter has backed them up with sufficient evidence (See Report of the Appellate Body in European Communities - Hormones, para. 104). b) Ordem de anlise Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 119, 120 e 149 Nesse caso foi determinado que a anlise do Artigo XX deveria ser feita primeiramente com base no caput, para depois serem analisadas as excees dispostas nas alneas. Para. 119. The sequence of steps indicated above [reference to the US - Gasoline case, see above] in the analysis of a claim of justification under Article XX reflects, not inadvertence or random choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of Article XX. The Panel appears to suggest, albeit indirectly, that following the indicated sequence of steps, or the inverse thereof, does not make any difference. To the Panel, reversing the sequence set out in the United States - Gasoline 'seems equally appropriate'. We do not agree. Para. 120. The task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if indeed it remains possible at all, where the interpreter (like the Panel in this case) has not first identified and examined the specific exception threatened with abuse. The standards established in the chapeau are, moreover, necessarily broad in scope and reach (...). When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and contents of these standards will vary as the kind of measure under examination varies. Para. 149. () It does not follow from the fact that a measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g) that that measure also will necessarily comply with the requirements of the chapeau. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, para. 22 Nesse caso, foi determinado que a anlise do Artigo XX deveria ser feita primeiramente com base nas excees dispostas nas alneas, para depois ser aplicado o caput do Artigo. Para. 22. In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) to (j) - listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of characterization of the measure under one of the exceptions; second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.167 207

Para. 8.167. In accordance with the approach noted by the Panel in United States - Gasoline and the Appellate Body in United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, we will first examine whether the measure falls within the scope of paragraph (b) of Article XX, the provision expressly invoked by the European Communities. If we decide that it does, we will consider whether, in its application, the Decree satisfies the conditions of the introductory clause of Article XX. c) Ordem de anlise Artigo XX (b) Especificamente com relao alnea b do Artigo XX, observa-se que o caso US - Gasoline foi o leading case, no que concerne considerao inicial da exceo da alnea b, para depois analisar a subsuno aos critrios do caput. Os casos posteriores seguiram essa interpretao. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/R, para. 6.20 Para. 6.20. () The Panel observed that the United States therefore had to establish the following elements:
(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked fell within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (2) that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfil the policy objective; and (3) that the measures were applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX (4) In order to justify the application of Article XX(b), all the above elements had to be satisfied.

Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS246/R, paras. 7.216 e 7.218. Circulao do Relatrio do Painel (dezembro 2003), circulao do Relatrio do rgo de Apelao (abril 2004) Para. 7.216. Assuming a beneficiary country under the Drug Arrangements was not ensuring sufficient customs controls on export of drugs, or was infringing the objectives of an international fisheries conservation convention, the European Communities could then suspend the tariff preferences under the Drug Arrangements to this country, for reasons unrelated to protecting human life or health. Given that this beneficiary would be a seriously drug-affected country, the suspension of the tariff preferences would arrest the European Communities' support to alternative development in that beneficiary and therefore also stop efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs into the European Communities. The whole design of the EC Regulation does not support the European Communities' contention that it is necessary to the protection of human life and health in the European Communities, because such design of the measure does not contribute sufficiently to the achievement of the health objective. Para. 7.218. Recalling that the European Communities confirms that it is required to continue its suspension of tariff preferences for Myanmar through the expiration of the EC Regulation on 31 December 2004, the Panel notes that any of the 12 beneficiaries is also potentially subject to similar suspension under the same Regulation, regardless of the seriousness of the drug problems in that country. With one or more of the main drug-producing or trafficking countries outside the scheme, it is difficult to see how the Drug Arrangements are in fact contributing sufficiently to the reduction of drug supply into the European Communities' market to qualify as a measure necessary to achieving the European Communities' health objective. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.199

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Para. 7.199. Following this jurisprudence, the Panel considers that, in order to determine whether the Drug Arrangements are justified under Article XX(b), the Panel needs to examine: (i) whether the policy reflected in the measure falls within the range of policies designed to achieve the objective of or, put differently, or whether the policy objective is for the purpose of, protect[ing] human life or health. In other words, whether the measure is one designed to achieve that health policy objective; (ii) whether the measure is necessary to achieve said objective; and (iii) whether the measure is applied in a manner consistent with the chapeau of Article XX. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.184 Para. 8.184. We must first establish whether the policy in respect of the measure for which the provisions of Article XX(b) were invoked falls within the range of policies designed to protect human life or health. Relatrio do Painel no caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 5.26-5.27 Para. 5.26. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has established that the analysis of justification protection of Article XX is two-tiered, that is, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions under paragraphs (a) to (j) listed under Article XX, it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau required that the measure should not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade. Para. 5.27. Such sequence of analysis should be followed in this dispute because exceptions under Article XX are invoked. Moreover, in the examination of the measures at issue in this case, China thinks it is proper for the Panel to take into consideration the ever-growing attention given to environmental protection among the international community and in WTO itself. The preamble of Marrakech Agreement declares that one objective of WTO is to pursue the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development and seeking both to protect and preserve the environment. Under the guidance of these statements, the Appellate Body, in several disputes, accepted the identification of certain disputed measures with environmental concern as under paragraph (b) of Article XX (For example, in the cases of USGasoline, and US - Shrimp). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil Retreated Tyres), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS332/ABR, para. 139 Para. 139. We begin by recalling that the analysis of a measure under Article XX of the GATT 1994 is twotiered (Appellate Body Report, US - Gasoline, p. 22, DSR 1996; see also Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 64). First, a panel must examine whether the measure falls under at least one of the ten exceptions listed under Article XX (In other words, the policy objective of the measure at issue must fall under the range of policies covered by the paragraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994. See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, para. 149). Secondly, the question of whether the measure at issue satisfies the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX must be considered. d) Poltica de proteo humana, animal, vegetal ou da sade Alguns casos interpretaram o que seria a proteo humana, animal, vegetal ou da sade, a exemplo de US Gasoline, Thailand - Cigarette e EC - Asbestos. Os casos referiram-se, sucessivamente, a polticas especficas para: a reduo da poluio do ar causada pelo consumo da gasolina; a diminuio do consumo de cigarros como medida de proteo sade humana; e, a limitao da utilizao de amianto em funo dos riscos vida humana e sade. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/R, para. 6.21 209

Para. 6.21. () the policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline was a policy within the range of those concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or health mentioned in Article XX(b). Relatrio do Painel no caso Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand - Cigarettes), GATT DS10/R - 37S/200, para. 73 Para. 73. () smoking constituted a serious risk to human health and that consequently measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes fell within the scope of Article XX(b). The Panel noted that this provision clearly allowed contracting parties to give priority to human health over trade liberalization. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 162 Para. 162. () the Panel remained well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that chrysotile -cement products pose a risk to human life or health. e) Treatment of scientific data and risk assessment O Tratamento das informaes e das provas cientficas pelos Painis e pelo rgo de Apelao relevante para a interpretao das alneas b e g, pois a opinio da maioria dos cientistas pode ou no ser considerada necessria para comprovar uma poltica adotada por um Membro, no contexto dessas alneas. A jurisprudncia tem se direcionado no sentido de entender que a poltica adotada no precisa basea-se na posio majoritria dos cientistas. Ela pode ter por base a opinio de cientistas renomados que comprovem que aquela medida tem amparo cientfico. Os Membros possuem uma discricionariedade em suas polticas, ponderada pela boa-f nas escolhas destas. Os casos que tratam do tema tangenciam outros Acordos como o SPS e o TBT. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (EC - Hormones), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS26/AB/R e WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 194 Para. 194. We do not believe that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclusion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS measure. The risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view representing the mainstream of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists taking a divergent view. Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty. Sometimes the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible and representative governments tend to base their legislative and administrative measures on mainstream scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially where the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety. Determination of the presence or absence of that relationship can only be done on a case-to-case basis, after account is taken of all considerations rationally bearing upon the issue of potential adverse health effects. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 161 Para. 161. The Panel enjoyed a margin of discretion in assessing the value of the evidence, and the weight to be ascribed to that evidence. The Panel was entitled, in the exercise of its discretion, to determine that 210

certain elements of evidence should be accorded more weight than other elements - that is the essence of the task of appreciating the evidence. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 167 Para. 167. As for Canadas second argument, relating to quantification of the risk, we consider that, as with the SPS Agreement, there is no requirement under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to quantify, as such, the risk to human life or health. A risk may be evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms. In this case, contrary to what is suggested by Canada, the Panel assessed the nature and the character of the risk posed by chrysotile-cement products. The Panel found, on the basis of the scientific evidence, that no minimum threshold of level of exposure or duration of exposure has been identified with regard to the risk of pathologies associated with chrysotile, except for asbestosis. The pathologies which the Panel identified as being associated with chrysotile are of a very serious nature, namely lung cancer and mesothelioma, which is also a form of cancer. Therefore, we do not agree with Canada that the Panel merely relied on the French authorities hypotheses of the risk. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 178 Para. 178. In addition, in the context of the SPS Agreement, we have said previously, in European Communities - Hormones, that responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources. In justifying a measure under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a Member may also rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion. A Member is not obliged, in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a majority scientific opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the preponderant weight of the evidence. f) Alternativas razoavelmente disponveis (Reasonably available alternatives) As medidas alternativas existentes adoo de uma poltica especfica so observadas caso-a-caso, de acordo com a razoabilidade da deciso de adotar uma poltica em detrimento de outras que poderiam ser menos discriminatrias. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS161/AB/R, paras. 8.2138.214 (Circulao do Relatrio do Painel - julho de 2000) e (Circulao do Relatrio do rgo de Apelao - dezembro 2000) Paras. 8.213-8.214. In our view, France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks to halt. Such an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of health protection. On the basis of the scientific evidence before it, the Panel found that, in ge neral, the efficacy of controlled use remains to be demonstrated. Moreover, even in cases where controlled use practices are applied with greater certainty, the scientific evidence suggests that the level of exposure can, in some circumstances, still be high enough for there to be a significant residual risk of developing asbestos -related diseases. The Panel found too that the efficacy of controlled use is particularly doubtful for the building industry and for DIY enthusiasts, which are the most important users of cement-based products containing chrysotile asbestos. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 174

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Para. 174. Given these factual findings by the Panel, we believe that controlled use would not allow France to achieve its chosen level of health protection by halting the spread of asbestos-related health risks. Controlled use would, thus, not be an alternative measure that would achieve the end sought by France. 4. Artigo XX (d) a) Excees Gerais (General Exceptions) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandantes: Austrlia e EUA, WT/DS161/AB/R e WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 de dezembro de 2000, para. 15 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao examinou o argumento da Coreia de que a proibio sobre as vendas no mercado interno e sobre a importao de carnes (o sistema dual de comrcio) tinha o propsito de assegurar o cumprimento de uma de lei de defesa do consumidor e, apesar de violar o Artigo III:4, estava amparada na exceo do Artigo XX (d). Referindo-se ao Relatrio do caso US - Gasoline, o rgo de Apelao estabeleceu a necessidade de dois requisitos para fins de pargrafo d: que as medidas a assegurar a aplicao das leis e regulamentos no sejam inconsistentes com outras disposies do GATT 1994; e que sejam necessrias para assegurar tal aplicao. Para. 157. For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragraph (d) of Article XX, two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be necessary to secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) as a justification has the burden of demonstrating that these two requirements are met. b) Necessrias (Necessary) Relatrio do Painel no caso Canada - Certain Measures Concerning (Canada - Periodicals), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 de junho de 1997, para. 3.13 O Painel concluiu que as medidas de restrio importao de peridicos por parte do Canad estavam em contradio com o Artigo XI:1 e no seriam justificadas pelo Artigo XX (d), visto que no havia fornecido argumentos suficientes para demonstrar que a medida restritiva venda e distribuio de jornais e revistas estrangeiros seria a menos restritiva ao comrcio, bem como que seria relevante para o estmulo da indstria canadense de peridicos. Para. 3.13. Canada's claim that the import ban does not seek formal compliance with Section 19 of the Income Tax Act, but rather real or substantial compliance, which Canada admits has nothing to do with whether deductions are properly claimed, is simply another way of stating that the import ban helps advance the same overall (protectionist) aim as Section 19. However, the import ban does not secure compliance with Section 19, and thus does not fall within the purview of Article XX(d). If accepted, Canada's view of Article XX(d) would allow WTO Members to adopt all manner of GATT-inconsistent measures on the ground that they further the same objectives as other protectionist legislation. As the EEC - Parts and Components panel makes clear, the phrase secure compliance does not reach measures that merely help ensure that domestic policy goals are realized. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Korea - Measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef (Korea - Various Measures on Beef), Demandantes: Austrlia, WT/DS161/AB/R; EUA, WT/DS169/AB/R, paras. 161-162 e164 O rgo de Apelao enquadrou o significado do termo necessria no contexto do Artigo XX (d), como sendo uma medida de absoluta necessidade, indispensvel e a dar contribuio para. Alm disso, o rgo de Apelao declarou que, ao avaliar se uma medida necessria para assegurar a aplicao de uma 212

lei compatvel com o regime da OMC pode, em certos casos, levar em considerao a importncia relativa dos interesses em comum e valores que a lei ou o regulamento a ser cumprido se destine a proteger. Cumpre destacar que o Painel, neste mesmo caso, definiu a ordem de anlise, comeando pela verificao da alnea impugnada e, aps, o caput. Ainda, o rgo de Apelao afirmou que a determinao de se uma medida realmente necessria e se est conforme ao Artigo XX (d) - as hipteses de tais medidas serem dispensveis para alcanar a conformidade com a lei ou regulamento em causa envolvem o processo de sopesamento e balanceamento de diferentes fatores. Para. 161. We believe that, as used in the context of Article XX(d), the reach of the word necessary is not limited to that which is indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable. Measures which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance certainly fulfil the requirements of Article XX(d). But other measures, too, may fall within the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX(d), the term necessary refers, in our view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies necessary understood as indispensable; at the other end, is necessary taken to mean as making a contribution to. We consider that a necessary measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole of indispensable than to the opposite pole of simply making a contribution to. Para. 162. In appraising the necessity of a measure in these terms, it is useful to bear in mind the context in which necessary is found in Article XX(d). The measure at stake has to be necessary to ensure compliance with laws and regulations , including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of [lawful] monopolies , the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices. (emphasis added) Clearly, Article XX(d) is susceptible of application in respect of a wide variety of laws and regulations to be enforced. It seems to us that a treaty interpreter assessing a measure claimed to be necessary to secure compliance of a WTO consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases, take into account the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or important those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as necessary a measure designed as an enforcement instrument. Para. 164. In sum, determination of whether a measure, which is not indispensable, may nevertheless be necessary within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Conditions for the granting of tariff preferences to developing countries (EC - Tariff Preferences), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.196 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao, valendo-se das disposies estabelecidas no caso Korea - Beef sobre a interpretao do termo necessria, estabeleceu uma continuidade entre indispensvel e dar contribuio para. Para. 7.196. Although the Panel notes that the Appellate Body ruling in Korea - Various Measures on Beef was made in the context of the invocation of Article XX(d), not Article XX(b), the Panel is of the view that the same considerations apply to both these subparagraphs of Article XX because the structure of Articles XX(b) and XX(d) is very similar. The Panel considers that the approach of analysis followed by the Appellate Body in Korea - Various Measures on Beef is also appropriate for the analysis of a measure under Article XX(b). Relatrio do Painel no caso Argentina - Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import of finished leather (Argentina - Hides and Leather), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS155/R, para. 11.304 Nesse caso, o Painel, apesar de se recusar a resolver a disputa interpretativa acerca do significado de medidas necessrias, tendo em vista que tanto a Unio Europeia quanto a Argentina, Partes contrrias no litgio, 213

apresentavam escopo de interpretaes diferentes ao Artigo XX (d), concluiu que os argumentos apresentados pela Argentina levantavam uma presuno, no refutada pela Unio Europeia, do que realmente poderia ser considerado como necessrio. Isto porque o Painel apontou que a estrutura e a forma da medida demonstravam o seu carter necessrio. A Unio Europeia alegou que uma medida pode ser tida como necessria apenas se nenhuma outra medida alternativa compatvel com o GATT 1994 estiver disponvel ao Membro. J a Argentina rejeitou esta abordagem por restringir demasiadamente o direito de um Membro invocar a exceo prevista no Artigo XX (d). Para. 11.304. Having clarified this point, it should be recalled, next, that the parties are in disagreement over the correct interpretation to be given to the term necessary as it appears in Article XX(d). For the European Communities, a measure can be said to be necessary only if no alternative measure which is consistent with the GATT 1994 is reasonably available to a Member. Argentina, on the other hand, rejects this approach as overly restrictive of a Member's right to invoke the exception set forth in Article XX(d). We see no need to resolve this interpretative issue. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Dominican Republic - Measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes (Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes), Demandante: Honduras, WT/DS302/AB/R, 25 de abril de 2005, para. 71 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao confirmou a deciso do Painel que recorreu aos diversos aspectos estabelecidos no caso Korea - Various Measures on Beef a fim de avaliar se os selos fiscais poderiam ser utilizados de forma eficaz a monitorar a cobrana de impostos sobre os cigarros, evitando a evaso fiscal. Para.71. As regards the first factor, the Panel [did] not disagree with the Dominican Republic's argument that tax stamps may be a useful instrument to monitor tax collection on cigarettes and, conversely, to avoid tax evasion. The Panel also recognized that the collection of tax revenue (and, conversely, the prevention of tax evasion) is a most important interest for any country and particularly for a developing country such as the Dominican Republic. With respect to the trade impact of the measure, the Panel noted that the tax stamp requirement did not prevent Honduras from exporting cigarettes to the Dominican Republic and that its exports had increased significantly over recent years. Accordingly, the Panel assumed that the measure has not had any intense restrictive effects on trade. As far as the third factor is concerned, the Panel noted the Dominican Republic's claim that the tax stamp requirement secures compliance with its tax laws and regulations generally, and more specifically with the provisions governing the Selective Consumption Tax. The Panel, however, was of the view that the tax stamp requirement was of limited effectiveness in preventing tax evasion and cigarette smuggling. According to the Panel, requiring that tax stamps be affixed in the Dominican Republic under the supervision of the tax authorities in and of itself, would not prevent the forgery of tax stamps, nor smuggling and tax evasion. In this respect, the Panel indicated that other factors, such as security features incorporated into the tax stamps, or police controls on roads and at different commercial levels, would play a more important role in preventing forgery of tax stamps, tax evasion and smuggling of tobacco products. Having considered the importance of the interests protected by the tax stamp requirement, its trade impact, and its contribution to the realization of the end pursued, we are of the view that the Panel conducted an appropriate analysis, following the approach set out in the Appellate Body Reports in Korea Various Measures on Beef and in EC Asbestos, and affirmed in US - Gambling. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Measures relating to shrimp from thailand (US Shrimp (Thailand), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS343/AB/R e WT/DS345/AB/R, paras. 316-317 O rgo de Apelao revalidou os argumentos utilizados no caso Korea - Various Measures on Beef para determinar quando uma medida necessria para assegurar a aplicao das leis e regulamentos, mostrando-se em consonncia com a jurisprudncia do rgo de Apelao. O rgo de Apelao manteve a determinao do Painel de que uma exigncia de um maior vnculo, como o aplicado ao assunto camaro, no era medida necessria para assegurar a aplicao de certas leis e regulamentos, nos termos do Artigo XX (d).

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Para. 316. We see no error in the Panel's analysis of the meaning of the term necessary and the factors relied upon by it to evaluate the necessity of the EBR to secure compliance with certain laws and regulations of the United States, as the Panel's analysis is in consonance with the previous jurisprudence of the Appellate Body. Para. 317. The EBR is intended to secure potential additional liability that might arise from significant increases in the amount of dumping after the imposition of an anti-dumping duty order. The United States has not demonstrated that the margins of dumping for subject shrimp were likely to increase significantly so as to result in significant additional liability over and above the cash deposit rates. Like the Panel, we do not, therefore, see how taking security, such as the EBR, can be viewed as being necessary in the sense of it contributing to the realization of the objective of ensuring the final collection of anti-dumping or countervailing duties in the event of default by importers. Relatrio do Painel no caso Colombia - Indicative prices and restrictions on ports of entry, (Colombia Ports of Entry), Demandante: Panama, WT/DS366/R, paras. 7.485, 7.487 e 7.507 O Painel avaliou a defesa da Colmbia, justificada no Artigo XX (d), de que suas medidas para a entrada de bens foram necessrias para garantir a aplicao conforme as leis da Colmbia e combater o subfaturamento e o contrabando. No entanto, o Painel determinou que, apesar das leis aduaneiras do pas serem compatveis com o GATT, a Colmbia no apresentou provas para demonstrar o aumento da aplicao decorrente da medida, demonstrando a ineficcia de tal medida. Assim, o Painel concluiu que as medidas de entrada no foram suficientes para evitar a fraude aduaneira e o contrabando na Colmbia. Para. 7. 485. Colombia submits that the ports of entry measure meets the conditions to be provisionally justified under paragraph (d) of Article XX. First, Colombia asserts that its customs laws and regulations are not inconsistent with the GATT 1994. Second, the ports of entry measure is designed to secure compliance with those laws and regulations. Third, the ports of entry measure is necessary to secure such compliance. Para. 7.487. In assessing whether the measure is necessary to secure compliance with those laws, Colombia argues that the Panel should weigh and balance a series of factors, including the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of those laws and regulations. Para. 7.507. In the Panel's view, Colombia has not met its burden (nor has it attempted) to demonstrate that each of the requirements within the ports of entry measure contributes to enforcement of its customs laws. As the arguments and evidence provided by Colombia are of a general nature, it is not possible to evaluate, for instance, the extent to which the restriction on entry to Bogota and Barranquilla contributes to enforcement, as separate from the contribution of the advance import declaration requirement, and so forth. Hence, the Panel will not examine whether each of the requirements in the ports of entry measure which have been separately found inconsistent with different provisions of the GATT 1994, are nevertheless justified by Article XX(d). c) Aspectos de uma medida para ser justificada como necessria (Aspects of a measure to be justified as necessary) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Brasil e Venezuela, WT/DS2/AB/R, pgina 14 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao foi de encontro deciso do Painel com relao interpretao do Artigo XX (d), criticando que o Painel se absteve de questionar se o tratamento menos favorvel concedido gasolina importada foi destinado principalmente conservao dos recursos naturais, ao invs de questionar se a medida foi destinada principalmente conservao do ar limpo. O rgo de Apelao concluiu que o Painel errou ao referir a sua concluso jurdica sobre o Artigo III:4 em vez de se apoiar na medida necessria.

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Pag. 14. One problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the less favourable treatment of imported gasoline was primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources, rather than whether the measure, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were primarily aimed at conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided less favourable treatment under Article III:4 before the Panel examined the General Exceptions contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the measures which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of less favourable treatment. Relatrio do Painel no caso Canada - Measures relating to exports of wheat and treatment of imported grain (Canada - Wheat), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS276/R, para. 4.464 Nesse caso, o Painel apontou que o Canad deveria demonstrar trs elementos para que as medidas alegadas pelos EUA como violadoras do regime da OMC pudessem ser enquadradas no Artigo XX (d): (i) a medida que se busca justificar deve assegurar o cumprimento de outras leis e regulamentos; (ii) essas leis e regulamentos no podem ser incompatveis com as disposies do GATT de 1994; e, (iii) deve ser necessria para assegurar o cumprimento de outras leis e regulamentos. Contudo, o Canad no conseguiu provar que tais medidas eram necessrias para o cumprimento das disposies de algumas leis nacionais. Para. 4.464 Canada attempts to invoke Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 to justify the discriminatory measures under Section 57 of the CGA and Section 56(1) of the Regulations. However, Canada fails to meet its burden of proof with regard to this affirmative defence. d) Leis ou regulamentos (laws or regulations) Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs (EC - Trademarks), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS174/R, paras. 7.296-7.297 e 7.306 Neste litgio, os EUA alegam violao ao tratamento nacional por parte da Unio Europeia, em virtude da disponibilidade de proteo s indicaes geogrficas, rotulagem dos produtos com indicao geogrfica, entre outras. A Unio Europeia, em contrapartida, afirmou que a promulgao deste regulamento estava embasada no Artigo XX (d), visto que a busca de informaes e a cooperao com o pas sede da indicao geogrfica eram indispensveis para a implementar o regulamento da Unio Europeia, justificando-se como medida necessria para assegurar o cumprimento de sua prpria regulamentao. O Painel concluiu que o regulamento da Unio Europeia era incompatvel com as regras do GATT, pois a Unio Europeia no conseguiu provar que os requisitos de exame e transmisso configuravam uma medida protegida pelo pargrafo d do Artigo XX. Para. 7.296. The Panel takes note that paragraph (d) refers to laws or regulations, including those relating to the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices. The Regulation provides for the protection of GIs and is an analogous law or regulation, as the European Communities points out. However, the term laws or regulations is qualified by the phrase not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement. Para. 7.297. The European Communities argues that the requirements of examination and transmission of applications by governments secure compliance with the Regulation. The Panel has found that the Regulation is inconsistent with the provisions of GATT 1994 for the reasons set out in this report. Therefore, the Regulation is not a law or regulation within the meaning of paragraph (d). In response to questions, the European Communities argued that these requirements secure compliance with a provision within the Regulation. However, if that provision could itself be a law or regulation within the meaning of paragraph (d), the European Communities did not demonstrate that it was not inconsistent with GATT 1994.

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Para. 7.306. Therefore, the Panel considers that the European Communities has not discharged its burden of proving that the requirements of examination and transmission of applications by governments is covered by paragraph (d) of Article XX. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the chapeau of Article XX. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Mexico - Tax measures on soft drinks and other beverages (US Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS308/AB/R, paras. 69 e 77 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao delimitou o sentido do termo leis ou regulamentos em regras que formam parte do sistema jurdico interno de um Membro da OMC. Apesar de no considerar as obrigaes dos Membros no mbito de acordos internacionais, o rgo de Apelao considerou que leis ou regulamentos poderiam incluir regras internacionais que tenham efeito direto dentro do sistema jurdico interno de um Membro da OMC. Conclui sua anlise afirmando que leis ou regulamentos com as quais um Membro da OMC invoque o Artigo XX (d) podem assegurar a aplicao de obrigaes no includas no sistema jurdico interno de um Membro da OMC, no mbito de um acordo internacional. Ainda, nesta mesma deciso, o rgo de Apelao rejeitou a interpretao do Mxico sobre leis ou regulamentos que inclua obrigaes internacionais de outro Membro da OMC, j que logicamente implicaria a invocao de um Membro da OMC s excees do Artigo XX (d) para justificar medidas destinadas a assegurar o cumprimento de obrigaes de outro Membro da OMC. Assim, o rgo de Apelao considerou que caso fosse aceita tal interpretao, permitiria que qualquer Membro da OMC adotasse medidas incompatveis com o regime da OMC. Para. 69. In order to answer this question, we consider it more helpful to begin our analysis with the terms laws or regulations in Article XX(d) (which we consider to be pivotal here) rather than to begin with the analysis of the terms to secure compliance, as did the Panel. The terms laws or regulations are generally used to refer to domestic laws or regulations. As Mexico and the United States note, previous GATT and WTO disputes in which Article XX(d) has been invoked as a defence have involved domestic measures. Neither disputes that the expression laws or regulations encompasses the rules adopted by a WTO Member's legislative or executive branches of government. We agree with the United States that one does not immediately think about international law when confronted with the term laws in the plural. Domestic legislative or regulatory acts sometimes may be intended to implement an international agreement. In such situations, the origin of the rule is international, but the implementing instrument is a domestic law or regulation. In our view, the terms laws or regulations refer to rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member. Thus, the laws or regulations with which the Member invoking Article XX(d) may seek to secure compliance do not include obligations of another WTO Member under an international agreement. Para. 77. We observe, furthermore, that Mexico's interpretation of Article XX(d) disregards the fact that the GATT 1994 and the DSU specify the actions that a WTO Member may take if it considers that another WTO Member has acted inconsistently with its obligations under the GATT 1994 or any of the other covered agreements. As the United States points out, Mexico's interpretation of the terms laws or regulations as including international obligations of another WTO Member would logically imply that a WTO Member could invoke Article XX(d) to justify also measures designed to secure compliance with that other Member's WTO obligations. By the same logic, such action under Article XX(d) would evade the specific and detailed rules that apply when a WTO Member seeks to take countermeasures in response to another Member's failure to comply with rulings and recommendations of the DSB pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 22 and 23 of the DSU. Mexico's interpretation would allow WTO Members to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures based upon a unilateral determination that another Member has breached its WTO obligations, in contradiction with Articles 22 and 23 of the DSU and Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994. Relatrio do Painel no caso Brazil - Measures affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil - Retreated Tyres), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS332/R, paras. 7.388-7.389

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O Painel recusou-se a avaliar a defesa levantada pelo Brasil de que as multas impostas s importaes de pneus reformados eram justificadas, sob o abrigo do Artigo XX (d), como necessrias para assegurar a aplicao da proibio imposta s importaes de pneus reformados. O Painel concordou que as multas objetivavam assegurar o cumprimento da proibio de importao; no entanto, concluiu que elas no poderiam ser justificadas nos termos do Artigo XX (d), uma vez que no se inserem no mbito das medidas que se destinam a garantir aplicao s leis e regulamentos no compatveis com algumas disposies do GATT de 1994. Para. 7.388. However, for the reasons explained in paragraphs 7.375-7.380, we found that the import ban, a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, could not be justified by Article XX(b). Therefore, the Panel is of the view that the fines cannot be justified under Article XX(d) since they do not fall within the scope of measures that are designed to secure compliance with the laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994. (emphasis added) Para. 7.389. Having found that Brazil has failed to demonstrate that the import ban the domestic measure with which the fines are allegedly designed to secure compliance is consistent with the GATT 1994 and thus has failed to show that the fines can be justified under Article XX(d), we do not consider it necessary to proceed to examine whether the fines are necessary to secure such compliance. Relatrio do Painel no caso China - Measures affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (China - Auto Parts), Demandantes: Unio Europeia, WT/DS339/R; EUA, WT/DS340/R; Canad, WT/DS342/R, paras. 7.294 e 7.296 No caso envolvendo China, de um lado, e Unio Europeia, EUA e Canad, do outro, sob os auspcios do Artigo XX (d), a China alegou interpretao vlida de suas disposies tarifrias referentes aos veculos automotores. O Painel, por sua vez, considerou que a interpretao chinesa de suas concesses em veculos automotores no poderia integrar a sua pauta tarifria, e concluiu que tal interpretao no constituiu defesa suficiente para enquadrar-se em leis ou regulamentos do Artigo XX (d). Para. 7.294. The Panel thus notes that the law or regulation that China claims the measures secure compliance with is its interpretation of the tariff provisions for motor vehicles in China's domestic tariff schedule. While not conceding that the law or regulation that is not inconsistent within the meaning of Article XX(d) includes an interpretation of certain tariff provisions of a Members' Schedule, the complainants submit that even if China's interpretation of its tariff provisions for motor vehicles were to be considered as the law or regulation under Article XX(d), China has not proved that the measures meet the requirements under Article XX(d) because China's interpretation of the tariff provisions for motor vehicles is in fact inconsistent with the GATT 1994. Para. 7. 296. Accordingly, if we were to accept China's position that the law or regulation that the measures secure compliance with is China's interpretation of its tariff provisions for motor vehicles, we conclude that China has failed to prove that the measures are justified under Article XX(d) because the measures do not secure compliance with the law or regulation that is not inconsistent with the GATT 1994 within the meaning of Article XX(d). Relatrio do Painel no caso Thailiand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Thailand - Cigarettes) (Philippines), Demandante: Filipinas, WT/DS371/R, para. 7.758 Nesse caso, o Artigo XX (d) foi levantado pela defesa da Tailndia para justificar que as exigncias administrativas impostas aos vendedores de cigarros importados (e as sanes aplicveis em caso de descumprimento) foram necessrias para garantir o cumprimento das leis de Imposto sobre Valor Agregado (VAT - Value Added Tax). Entretanto, o Painel considerou que as Leis VAT em questo eram incompatveis com o regime jurdico da OMC.

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Para. 7.758. Regarding both the administrative requirements imposed on resellers of imported cigarettes as well as penalties imposed in case of failure to meet such administrative requirements, Thailand alleges that these requirements and penalty provisions are necessary to secure compliance with the Thai VAT laws. According to Thailand, this is because the filing obligations are the only way to verify that importers comply with the VAT laws. As addressed in Section VII.F.6 (b)(ii) above, however, we found that the Thai VAT laws that Thailand purports to secure compliance with through the administrative requirement at issue, were not WTO consistent. Therefore, we find that Thailand has not discharged its burden of showing that the administrative requirements and the imposition of penalties for failure to complete VAT filing requirements are necessary to secure compliance with the Thai VAT laws within the meaning of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994. e) assegurar aplicao (to secure compliance) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages (US - Gasoline), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS308/AB/R, para. 75 Nesse caso, o rgo de Apelao, contrariando o Painel, afirmou que uma medida pode ser considerada para assegurar aplicao, mesmo que no possa garantir que ir atingir com absoluta certeza seu resultado, e que o uso da coero no um elemento necessrio de uma medida que vise assegurar a aplicao de leis ou regulamentos. Para. 75. Nevertheless, while we agree with Mexico that the Panel's emphasis on certainty and coercion is misplaced, we consider that Mexico's arguments miss the point. Even if international countermeasures could be described as intended to secure compliance, what they seek to secure compliance with - that is, the international obligations of another WTO Member - would be outside the scope of Article XX(d). This is because laws or regulations within the meaning of Article XX(d) refer to the rules that form part of the domestic legal order of the WTO Member invoking the provision and do not include the international obligations of another WTO Member. 5. Artigo XX (g) a) Conservao dos recursos naturais exaurveis (the conservation of exhaustible natural resources) A conservao dos recursos naturais exaurveis o ponto central da exceo trazida pela alnea g. O termo foi interpretado por Painis no GATT 1947 e pelo rgo de Apelao da OMC. So exemplos de temas j abordados pelo sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC, a questo da extino de tartarugas e determinadas espcies de peixes. Nesse sentido, o rgo de Apelao, de maneira a acompanhar o desenvolvimento de uma sociedade preocupada com padres ambientais, interpretou o termo recursos naturais exaurveis incluindo, tambm, os organismos vivos. Entre os aspectos interessantes do termo podem ser citadas: as limitaes jurisdicionais para analisar a competncia para a conservao das espcies e o significado de termos da alnea, como recursos naturais renovveis relacionadas com ( relating to), destinado principalmente a (primarily aimed at) e medidas aplicadas conjuntamente com (measures made effective in conjunction with). (i) Limitaes jurisdicionais (jurisdictional limitations) Relatrio do Painel United States - Restrictions of Imports of Tuna (US - Tuna-Dolphin II), Demandante: Unio Europeia, WT/DS29/R, paras. 3.32 e 5.42 Nesse caso, a partir da sustentao dos EUA acerca da inexistncia de limitaes jurisdicionais dispostas no Artigo XX, e tambm de sua alegao de que a OMC no seria o frum apropriado para discutir a respeito das limitaes jurisdicionais, isto , sobre a aplicao de novas matrias entre as Partes contratantes, o Painel concluiu que a questo levada discusso era saber se os EUA, na persecuo dos seus objetivos ambientais, 219

poderiam impor embargos comerciais para assegurar mudanas nas polticas ambientais dos outros pases dentro de sua prpria jurisdio. Para. 3.32. The United States maintained that, since there are no jurisdictional limitations in the provisions of the General Agreement as they are currently written, to apply such a limitation would be essentially legislating on the ability of contracting parties to adopt and enforce measures related to environmental protection. A dispute settlement proceeding was not the forum in which to negotiate new disciplines on the use of measures by contracting parties. That was properly the province of the Contracting Parties, which were free to pursue this issue, as they were currently doing, through a working group established for that purpose, or through negotiations. Para. 5.42. The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable development, which includes the protection and preservation of the environment, has been widely recognized by the contracting parties to the General Agreement. The Panel observed that the issue in this dispute was not the validity of the environmental objectives of the United States to protect and conserve dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its environmental objectives, the United States could impose trade embargoes to secure changes in the policies which other contracting parties pursued within their own jurisdiction. The Panel therefore had to resolve whether the contracting parties, by agreeing to give each other in Article XX the right to take trade measures necessary to protect the health and life of plants, animals and persons or aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, had agreed to accord each other the right to impose trade embargoes for such purposes. The Panel had examined this issue in the light of the recognized methods of interpretation and had found that none of them lent any support to the view that such an agreement was reflected in Article XX. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 133 O Painel considerou que os EUA no poderiam justificar seu embargo importao de camares sob a alegao da alnea g do Artigo XX. Referido embargo havia sido imposto como reivindicao de que os pases exportadores adotassem condutas de proteo s tartarugas marinhas, as quais estariam sendo incidentalmente extintas no momento da captura do camaro. O rgo de Apelao, reavaliando a deciso do Painel, considerou que no seria de sua competncia apreciar se haveria uma limitao jurisdicional aplicao do Artigo XX nesse caso, j que inegavelmente as tartarugas marinhas deslocam-se pelas guas ocenicas da jurisdio de um pas para outro. Para. 133. () We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article XX(g). (ii) Significado de recursos naturais exaurveis (Meaning of exhaustible natural resources) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, paras. 128, 130 e 131 Nesse Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao enfatizou a necessidade de interpretar-se o termo exaurveis de forma dinmica, a fim de acompanhar os valores de uma comunidade pautada em padres de sustentabilidade e proteo ambiental. Ademais, ressaltou a evoluo do prembulo da OMC ao enquadrar o desenvolvimento sustentvel entre os objetivos do sistema multilateral de livre comrcio. Para tanto, o rgo utilizou-se de instrumentos internacionais outros alm dos Acordos da OMC. Para. 128. Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of mineral or non-living natural resources. The complainants' principal argument is rooted in the notion that living natural resources are 220

renewable and therefore cannot be exhaustible natural resources. We do not believe that exhaustible natural resources and renewable natural resources are mutually exclusive. One lesson that modern biological sciences teach us is that living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction and, in that sense, renewable, are in certain circumstances indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities. Living resources are just as finite as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources. Para. 130. From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term natural resources in Article XX(g) is not static in its content or reference but is rather by definition, evolutionary. It is, therefore, pertinent to note that modern international conventions and declarations make frequent references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-living resources. For instance, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in defining the jurisdictional rights of coastal states in their exclusive economic zones, provides [...]. Para. 131. Given the recent acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources, and recalling the explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may be read as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural resources. Moreover, two adopted GATT 1947 panel reports previously found fish to be an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g). We hold that, in line with the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX(g). (iii) Aspectos de uma medida para que seja justificada como relacionado com (Aspect of the measure to be justified as relating to) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, pg. 14 O Painel decidiu que a medida adotada pelos EUA no poderia se enquadrar nas excees do Artigo XX (g), tendo em vista no haver conexo direta entre o tratamento menos favorvel dado gasolina importada (que era quimicamente idntica gasolina interna americana) e a alegao de ser altamente poluidora, segundo os padres de qualidade de ar dos EUA. Contrariamente, o rgo de Apelao afirmou que tal conduta se enquadraria na alnea g no havendo necessidade de se ponderar acerca do nexo entre a conduta discriminatria americana e os objetivos da poltica de preservao ambiental, apesar de ser inconsistente com o caput do Artigo XX. Pag. 14. One problem with the reasoning in that paragraph is that the Panel asked itself whether the less favourable treatment of imported gasoline was primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources, rather than whether the measure, i.e. the baseline establishment rules, were primarily aimed at conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a finding that the measure provided less favourable treatment under Article III:4 before the Panel examined the General Exceptions contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the measures which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of less favourable treatment. (iv) Significado de relacionado com e destinado principalmente a (Meaning of relating to and primarily aimed at) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, pgs. 15 e 17-18 221

Nesse julgamento, o rgo de Apelao asseverou que a expresso relativo a se ria equivalente expresso destinado principalmente a. Criticou a anlise do Painel que havia baseado em analisar se o aspecto discriminatrio do embargo americano estaria relacionado ao objetivo da poltica declarada, afirmando que o Painel utilizou-se de concluso feita para outro caso, transpondo-o, erroneamente, para este. Ademais, o rgo conclui que as regras americanas estabelecidas produo de gasolina realmente eram destinadas conservao dos recursos naturais, na acepo do Artigo XX (g). Pag. 18. All the participants and the third participants in this appeal accept the propriety and applicability of the view of the Herring and Salmon report and the Panel Report that a measure must be primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the scope of Article XX(g). We note that the same interpretation has been applied in two recent unadopted panel reports: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (1994); United States - Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R (1994). Pag. 15. Furthermore, the Panel Report appears to have utilized a conclusion it had reached earlier in holding that the baseline establishment rules did not fall within the justifying terms of Articles XX(b); i.e. that the baseline establishment rules were not necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life. The Panel Report, it will be recalled, found that the baseline establishment rules had not been shown by the United States to be necessary under Article XX(b) since alternative measures either consistent or less inconsistent with the General Agreement were reasonably available to the United States for achieving its aim of protecting human, animal or plant life. In other words, the Panel Report appears to have applied the necessary test not only in examining the baseline establishment rules under Article XX(b), but also in the course of applying Article XX(g). Pag. 17. The baseline establishment rules, taken as a whole (that is, the provisions relating to establishment of baselines for domestic refiners, along with the provisions relating to baselines for blenders and importers of gasoline), need to be related to the non-degradation requirements set out elsewhere in the Gasoline Rule. Those provisions can scarcely be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves, totally divorced from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which certainly constitute part of the context of these provisions. The baseline establishment rules whether individual or statutory, were designed to permit scrutiny and monitoring of the level of compliance of refiners, importers and blenders with the non-degradation requirements. Without baselines of some kind, such scrutiny would not be possible and the Gasoline Rule's objective of stabilizing and preventing further deterioration of the level of air pollution prevailing in 1990, would be substantially frustrated. The relationship between the baseline establishment rules and the non-degradation requirements of the Gasoline Rule is not negated by the inconsistency, found by the Panel, of the baseline establishment rules with the terms of Article III:4. We consider that, given that substantial relationship, the baseline establishment rules cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the United States for the purposes of Article XX(g). Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 141 O rgo de Apelao, afirmando que a finalidade do embargo americano importao de camares destinava-se principalmente conservao dos recursos naturais, opinou que a medida no era meramente uma proibio geral e constatou a existncia da relao entre meio e fins da medida adotada e a poltica de preservao ambiental. Pag. 141. In its general design and structure, therefore, Section 609 is not a simple, blanket prohibition of the importation of shrimp imposed without regard to the consequences (or lack thereof ) of the mode of harvesting employed upon the incidental capture and mortality of sea turtles. Focusing on the design of the measure here at stake, it appears to us that Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and 222

ends relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real one. In our view, therefore, Section 609 is a measure relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994. (v) Medidas aplicadas juntamente com (measures made effective in conjunction with) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, pgs. 20-21 No Relatrio desse caso, o rgo de Apelao descreveu a expresso medidas aplicadas em conjunto com como uma exigncia de imparcialidade na imposio de restries, expressando que no equivaleria a uma exigncia de identidade de tratamento. Ademais, rejeitou o argumento de que o termo made effective teria sido delineado para exigir uma avaliao prtica dos efeitos. Pg. 20. Viewed in this light, the ordinary or natural meaning of made effective when used in connection with a measure - a governmental act or regulation may be seen to refer to such measure being operative, as in force, or as having come into effect. Similarly, the phrase in conjunction with may be read quite plainly as together with or jointly with. Taken together, the second clause of Article XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline establishment rules being promulgated or brought into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of natural resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we believe that the clause if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or consumption is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of evenhandedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources. Pg. 21. There is, of course, no textual basis for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported products. Indeed, where there is identity of treatment - constituting real, not merely formal, equality of treatment - it is difficult to see how inconsistency with Article III:4 would have arisen in the first place. On the other hand, if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products are imposed at all, and all limitations are placed upon imported products alone, the measure cannot be accepted as primarily or even substantially designed for implementing conservationist goals. The measure would simply be naked discrimination for protecting locally-produced goods. In the present appeal, the baseline establishment rules affect both domestic gasoline and imported gasoline, providing for - generally speaking - individual baselines for domestic refiners and blenders and statutory baselines for importers. Thus, restrictions on the consumption or depletion of clean air by regulating the domestic production of dirty gasoline are established jointly with corresponding restrictions with respect to imported gasoline. That imported gasoline has been determined to have been accorded less favourable treatment than the domestic gasoline in terms of Article III:4, is not material for purposes of analysis under Article XX(g). It might also be noted that the second clause of Article XX(g) speaks disjunctively of domestic production or consumption. Pg. 21. We do not believe that the clause if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption was intended to establish an empirical effects test for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. In the first place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both domestic and international law, is always a difficult one. In the second place, in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The legal characterization of such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are not, however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never relevant. In a particular case, should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, it would very probably be because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation to begin with. In other words, it would not have been primarily aimed at conservation of natural resources at all. 223

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 144 O rgo de Apelao, nesse caso, considerou que a medida adotada pelos EUA enquadrava-se nas excees do Artigo XX (g). Para alcanar essa concluso, o rgo referiu-se ao julgamento do caso US Gasoline, especificamente na parte que afirma que se tais medidas foram aplicadas em conjunto com restries sobre o produto ou o consumo interno, haveria uma exigncia de imparcialidade no Artigo XX (g). Para. 144. We earlier noted that Section 609, enacted in 1989, addresses the mode of harvesting of imported shrimp only. However, two years earlier, in 1987, the United States issued regulations pursuant to the Endangered Species Act requiring all United States shrimp trawl vessels to use approved TEDs, or to restrict the duration of tow-times, in specified areas where there was significant incidental mortality of sea turtles in shrimp trawls. These regulations became fully effective in 1990 and were later modified. They now require United States shrimp trawlers to use approved TEDs in areas and at times when there is a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles, with certain limited exceptions. Penalties for violation of the Endangered Species Act, or the regulations issued thereunder, include civil and criminal sanctions. The United States government currently relies on monetary sanctions and civil penalties for enforcement. The government has the ability to seize shrimp catch from trawl vessels fishing in United States waters and has done so in cases of egregious violations. We believe that, in principle, Section 609 is an evenhanded measure . Accordingly, we hold that Section 609 is a measure made effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp, as required by Article XX (g). b) Objetivo poltico da medida (political objective of the measure) Dois aspectos importantes podem ser destacados quanto anlise do objetivo poltico da medida: a necessidade da medida; e, qual tipo de poltica correspondente alnea g. (i) necessidade da medida (necessary) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, pgs. 15 e 27 A necessidade da exceo contida na alnea g do Artigo XX foi expressa nesse julgamento, em que o rgo de Apelao afirmou a relevncia do enquadramento das condutas dos pases litigantes nas excees do Artigo, e no a avaliao de que tais medidas apresentam tratamento menos favorvel. Pg. 15. The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. () The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the 'measures' which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of 'less favourable treatment'. Pg. 27. It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what this [the Appellate Body's finding] does not mean. It does not mean, or imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the fact that Article XX of the General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state interests including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources - to find expression. The provisions of Article XX were not changed as a result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision on Trade and Environment, [footnote omitted] there is specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of coordinating policies on trade and the environment. WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to 224

determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements. c) Interpretao do termo da alena g relacionado com (relating to) Relatrio do Painel no caso Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada - Unprocessed Herring and Salmon), GATT L/6268 - 35S/98, para. 4.6 Nesse caso, o Painel combinou a interpretao da alnea g com o caput do Artigo XX para definir a expresso em conjunto com e relacionado com. Concluiu que o recurso a essa alnea no requer a comprovao de ela ser necessria ou essencial conservao dos recursos naturais, desde que seja relacionada com a conservao. Ademais, afirmou serem equivalentes as expresses destinadas principalmente a e relacionada com. Para. 4.6. The Panel noted that some of the subparagraphs of Article XX state that the measure must be necessary or essential to the achievement of the policy purpose set out in the provision (cf. subparagraphs (a), (b), (d) and (j)) while subparagraph (g) refers only to measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. This suggests that Article XX(g)does not only cover measures that are necessary or essential for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources but a wider range of measures. However, as the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources. The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as relating to conservation within the meaning of Article XX(g). The Panel, similarly, considered that the terms in conjunction with in Article XX(g) had to be interpreted in a way that ensures that the scope of possible actions under that provision corresponds to the purpose for which it was included in the General Agreement. A trade measure could therefore in the view of the Panel only be considered to be made effective in conjunction with production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions. Relatrio do Painel United States - Prohibition of Import of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (US Tuna from Canada), Demandante: EUA, L/518 - 29S/91, paras. 3.19 e 4.9 O Painel adotou entendimento restritivo a respeito da utilizao da medida em questo pelos EUA, e de sua adequao poltica de conservao dos recursos naturais. Em que pese os EUA terem alegado que o Artigo XX (g) aplicava-se a medidas relacionadas com a conservao de recursos naturais, e de que no haveria a exigncia de uma motivao exclusiva acerca do direcionamento de tal conservao, o Painel considerou que a medida americana no se enquadrava nas excees do Artigo. Para. 3.19. The representative of the United States stated that Article XX(g) applied to measures relating to conservation of exhaustible resources, and did not require that the exclusive motivation or effect of such measure necessarily be conservation. Certainly, it was not necessary that every official of the party taking the action always explain the action in terms of its ultimate effect on conservation. Similarly, it was not necessary that the interim agreement specify on its face that its purpose was conservation. The important point was that the effect of the interim agreement was consistent with the international management approach to conservation of tuna. He further stated that the import prohibition satisfied the relating to test in Article XX(g), noting that the legislative history of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, and Section 205 in particular, showed that conservation was a substantial motive for the measure. He added that the United States did monitor and impose restrictions on the production of tuna of its own industry, and that

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the import embargo, catch restrictions and other measures taken together comprise the whole of a comprehensive tuna conservation policy, and thus were taken in conjunction with each other. Para. 4.9. The Panel furthermore noted that both parties considered tuna stocks, including albacore tuna, to be an exhaustible natural resource in need of conservation management and that both parties were participating in international conventions aimed, inter alia, at a better conservation of such stocks. However, attention was drawn to the fact that Article XX(g) contained a qualification on measures relating to the conservation if they were to be justified under that Article, namely that such measures were made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 135 Retomando o entendimento do caso US - Gasoline, o rgo de Apelao considerou que uma medida para ser corretamente enquadrada como relacionado com, deve, objetivamente, remeter-se conservao das tartarugas marinhas. Para. 135. Article XX(g) requires that the measure sought to be justified be one which relat[es] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. In making this determination, the treaty interpreter essentially looks into the relationship between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy of conserving exhaustible natural resources. It is well to bear in mind that the policy of protecting and conserving the endangered sea turtles here involved is shared by all participants and third participants in this appeal, indeed, by the vast majority of the nations of the world. None of the parties to this dispute question the genuineness of the commitment of the others to that policy. d) em conjunto com restries na produo e no consumo domstico (in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US - Gasoline), Demandantes: Venezuela e Repblica da Bolvia, WT/DS2/AB/R, pgs. 18-19 A interpretao do rgo de Apelao com relao s restries na produo e no consumo domstico de que elas devem ser realizadas em conjunto com as medidas relacionadas conservao de recursos naturais esgotveis. Nessa deciso, o rgo de Apelao concluiu que a expresso em conjunto com similar ao termo junto com (together with) ou unido a (jointly with). Trata-se de uma condio para a validade dessas medidas de conservao, isto , que tais medidas em questo sejam aplicadas em conjunto com as polticas internas do pas de forma efetiva e cuidando para no impedir o livre comrcio. O objetivo evitar que os pases importadores sejam parciais e que no criem barreiras ao comrcio. Pg. 18. [T]he ordinary or natural meaning of 'made effective' when used in connection with a measure - a governmental act or regulation - may be seen to refer to such measure being 'operative', as 'in force', or as having 'come into effect'. [footnote omitted] Similarly, the phrase 'in conjunction with' may be read quite plainly as 'together with' or 'jointly with'. [footnote omitted] Taken together, the second clause of Article XX(g) appears to us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline establishment rules being promulgated or brought into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or consumption of natural resources. Put in a slightly different manner, we believe that the clause 'if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product or consumption' is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.

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Pg. 19. We do not believe, finally, that the clause 'if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption' was intended to establish an empirical 'effects test' for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception. In the first place, the problem of determining causation, well-known in both domestic and international law, is always a difficult one. In the second place, in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable. The legal characterization of such a measure is not reasonably made contingent upon occurrence of subsequent events. We are not, however, suggesting that consideration of the predictable effects of a measure is never relevant. In a particular case, should it become clear that realistically, a specific measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals, it would very probably be because that measure was not designed as a conservation regulation to begin with. In other words, it would not have been 'primarily aimed at' conservation of natural resources at all. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US - Shrimp), Demandantes: ndia, Malsia, Paquisto e Tailndia, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 143 Nesse julgado, o rgo de Apelao, analisando como um dos ltimos requisitos o enquadramento da medida em questo no Artigo XX (g), definiu que uma medida seja aplicada em conjunto com medidas internas elemento fundamental para enfatizar de maneira justa e imparcial s polticas de conservao ao meio ambiente que se excepcionar. Para. 143. In United States - Gasoline, we held that the above-captioned clause of Article XX(g), () is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources. In this case, we need to examine whether the restrictions imposed by Section 609 with respect to imported shrimp are also imposed in respect of shrimp caught by United States shrimp trawl vessels. III. Comentrios

Objetivo do Desenvolvimento Sustentvel No mbito das excees previstas nos pargrafos b e g, perceptvel a importncia que o rgo de Apelao tem gradativamente emprestado ao objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel para ampliar o espao de polticas de meio ambiente e sade na OMC. O objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel est previsto no prembulo do Acordo que estabelece a OMC:
Reconhecendo que as suas relaes na esfera da atividade comercial e econmica devem objetivar a elevao dos nveis de vida, o pleno emprego e um volume considervel e em constante elevao de receitas reais e demandas e demanda efetiva, o aumento da produo e do comrcio de bens e servios, permitindo ao mesmo tempo a utilizao tima dos recursos mundiais em conformidade com os objetivos de um desenvolvimento sustentvel e buscando proteger e preservar o meio ambiente e incrementar os meios de faz-lo, de maneira compatvel com suas respectivas necessidades e interesses segundo diferentes nveis de desenvolvimento econmico, (grifos nossos).

Artigo XX, caput O caput do Artigo XX uma obrigao de boa f, ao passo que os pargrafos do Artigo XX destinam-se ao contedo das medidas propriamente ditas. O caput refere-se forma de aplicao dessas medidas. Desse modo, as medidas enquadradas provisoriamente dentro de uma das excees previstas nos pargrafos devem,

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de acordo com os critrios do caput, ser aplicadas de maneira a no constituir uma discriminao arbitrria ou injustificada, ou uma restrio disfarada ao comrcio internacional. O requisito da discriminao arbitrria e injustificada entre os Membros foi interpretado desde os dois primeiros Painis envolvendo comrcio e meio ambiente, ainda sob o GATT 1947. Os primeiros casos foram US - Tuna, US - Dolphin I e US - Tuna, US - Dolphin II. Nestes primeiros casos, destacou-se o fato de que os Membros no estariam agindo de modo discriminatrio, caso assegurassem: que as medidas adotadas so necessrias, no discriminatrias; e, que elas no constituem restries ao comrcio. No caso Atum II, os EUA poderiam ter se baseado na alnea g do Artigo XX, caso tivessem demonstrado que se tratava de uma proteo justificada, por exemplo, em razo do cumprimento de Tratados Multilaterais Ambientais (TMAs). Estas condies foram confirmadas e pormenorizadas tanto no caso US - Gasoline, quanto no caso US Shrimp. Um aspecto importante sobre este Artigo foi a interpretao de se o caput, ou o pargrafo, deveria ser primeiramente analisado. No contencioso US - Gasoline, o rgo de Apelao ressaltou a necessidade de a anlise primeiramente recair sobre as excees, para depois ser verificado o atendimento aos requisitos do caput. A importncia desse fato decorre da garantia de um tratamento inicial medida que se pretende protetora de uma poltica pblica como a proteo do meio ambiente. Posteriormente, pretende-se a anlise da existncia de uma discriminao ao comrcio. No que diz respeito interpretao do caput do Artigo XX, pelo menos dois casos merecem destaques. O primeiro foi US - Gasoline, em que o rgo de Apelao condenou os EUA por aplicarem suas medidas de forma discriminatria. Mais especificamente, o rgo de Apelao criticou o fato de que anteriormente adoo da medida restritiva de comrcio, os EUA: 1) no levou em considerao os custos da medida para os pases importadores; e 2) no tentou realizar arranjos cooperativos com os governos da Venezuela e Brasil. Tais falhas, na opinio do rgo de Apelao, impediram que os EUA atendessem aos requisitos do Artigo XX, caput, agindo de forma discriminatria. No caso US - Gasoline, pela primeira vez, o rgo de Apelao fez referncia ao objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel e Deciso Ministerial sobre Comrcio e Meio Ambiente:
As disposies do Artigo XX no foram alteradas como resultado da Rodada Uruguai de Negociaes Comerciais Multilaterais. De fato, h um reconhecimento especfico a ser considerado sobre a importncia de coordenar polticas de comrcio e meio ambiente. (US - Gasoline, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, pg. 30).

No caso US - Shrimp, o rgo de Apelao entendeu que os EUA deixaram de cumprir com os requisitos do caput do Artigo XX por: 1) exigirem que outros Membros adotem um programa regulatrio que no meramente comparvel ao seu, mas essencialmente o mesmo; e 2) falharem em engajar as Partes da disputa em uma negociao ampla com o objetivo de concluir Acordos bilaterais ou multilaterais para a proteo e conservao de tartarugas marinhas. Neste mesmo caso, ainda no contexto do caput do Artigo XX, o rgo de Apelao pautou-se no objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel para emitir uma de suas principais obiter dicta:
Ns mais uma vez salientamos que esta linguagem [Prembulo Acordo da OMC] demonstra um reconhecimento pelos negociadores da OMC que o uso timo dos recursos naturais do mundo deveria ser feito de acordo com o objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel. Como esta linguagem preambular reflete as intenes dos negociadores do Acordo da OMC, ns acreditamos que deva imprimir cor, textura e contorno interpretao dos acordos anexados ao Acordo da OMC, neste caso, o GATT 1994. (Grifos nossos). (US - Shrimp, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, para. 153.)

Artigo XX, pargrafo a

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O pargrafo a do Artigo XX do GATT tem sido bastante importante para avanar objetivos de polticas culturais adotadas pelos Membros. Antes do caso China - Publication and Audiovisual Products, especulavase a utilizao do pargrafo f (medidas impostas para a proteo de tesouros nacionais de valor artstico, histrico ou arqueolgico). Entretanto, hoje parece pacfica a utilizao do pargrafo a como forma de proteo da moralidade pblica de um determinado Membro frente importao de determinados produtos culturais. O fundamento da utilizao do argumento da moralidade pblica encontra-se no caso US - Gambling, sob o Acordo GATS. Este caso envolveu uma reclamao de Antigua relacionada a certas medidas que tornaram ilegal para fornecedores de fora dos EUA disponibilizarem jogos de azar para consumidores dentro dos EUA. Os EUA defenderam-se, inter alia, com base no Artigo XIV (a) do GATS (medidas necessrias para proteger moralidade pblica ou manter a ordem pblica). O Painel, chancelado posteriormente pelo rgo de Apelao, entendeu que o termo moralidade pblica denota standards de conduta certa e errada mantidos por ou em nome de uma comunidade ou nao. (US - Gambling, Relatrio do Painel, para. 6.465; Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, paras. 296 e 299). O Painel tambm entendeu que o contedo desses conceitos para os Membros pode variar no tempo e no espao, dependendo de uma gama de fatores, inclusive valores sociais, culturais, ticos e religiosos. (US - Gambling, Relatrio do Painel, para. 6.461). Finalmente, o Painel concluiu que, ao implementar esses valores, os Membros deveriam ter oportunizado alguma margem para definir e aplicar por eles prprios os conceitos de moralidade pblica ... nos seus respectivos territrios, de acordo com os seus prprios sistemas e escalas de valores. (US - Gambling, Relatrio do Painel, para. 6.461). As interpretaes do Painel e rgo de Apelao neste caso tiveram impacto direto no caso China Publications and Audiovisual Products, que tambm trata da moralidade pblica, mas sob o enfoque do Artigo XX (a) do GATT. Neste caso, a China foi demandada pelos EUA perante a OMC, por restringir a importao de uma srie de produtos culturais entendidos como atentatrios contra a moralidade pblica chinesa. Na opinio da China, produtos culturais importados, porque so vetores de diferentes valores culturais, podem colidir com standards de conduta certa ou errada que so especficos China. (China Publications and Audiovisual Products, Relatrio do Painel, para. 7.712). Perante o rgo de Apelao, a China requereu que fosse considerada a natureza peculiar dos bens culturais no contexto do Artigo XX (a) do GATT:
China aponta que produtos e servios culturais tem uma natureza muito especfica como vetores de identidade, valores e significado, quando eles no apenas satisfazem uma necessidade comercial, mas tambm desenpenham um papel crucial para influenciar e definir as caractersticas da sociedade. (China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, para. 25).

Atualmente, alguns acadmicos especializados no debate comrcio e cultura defendem a incluso da cultura como elemento integrante do desenvolvimento sustentvel. Como se observa das disputas comrcio e meio ambiente e comrcio e sade, o objetivo de desenvolvimento sustentvel, presente no Prembulo do Acordo da OMC, tem possibilitado uma interpretao mais fluida do Artigo XX, desta forma aumentando o espao de polticas ambientais e de sade dentro da OMC. Esses acadmicos esperam que o mesmo movimento possa surgir em favor da cultura, a partir do seu reconhecimento como parte do conceito de desenvolvimento sustentvel. Artigo XX, pargrafos b e g Tendo como objeto de anlise o meio ambiente como poltica estatal que possa resultar em uma barreira ao comrcio, analisamos diretamente os pargrafos b e g. Algumas questes importantes podem ser destacadas da interpretao desses pargrafos, como por exemplo as diferenas nas anlises do pargrafo b e do pargrafo g. No caso Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, o Painel, em suas concluses, afirmou que para ser utilizado o inciso b do Artigo XX, a medida deve estar includa na poltica do Estado de realizao da proteo sade e ao meio ambiente. Alm disso, deve ser necessria para o alcance deste objetivo, devido existncia de efetivo risco 229

para a sade humana, dos animais ou dos vegetais. Como o Brasil alegou a proteo ao meio ambiente, o Painel se manifestou no sentido de que o Artigo XX, pargrafo b, trata do meio ambiente ao se referir aos animais e vegetais. Nesse contexto, afirmou que o Brasil conseguiu provar que os pneus remoldados causam, no final de sua vida til, danos sade pela possibilidade de ocorrncia de doenas como a dengue ou a febre amarela, alm de doenas ligadas liberao de txicos aps a sua queima. O Painel disps que a poltica adotada e os nveis de proteo ambiental fazem parte da discricionariedade dos Estados, no sendo competncia da OMC analis-los, como foi ressaltado no caso EC - Asbestos. Dessa forma, foram estendidos os argumentos do caso EC - Asbestos, no que tange sade, para a sua aplicao ao meio ambiente no caso Brazil - Retreated Tyres. Na anlise sobre a necessidade da medida, o Painel examinou trs critrios: a importncia do interesse protegido; a contribuio da medida para o fim perseguido; e, ainda, a repercusso desta para o comrcio. Quanto ao primeiro argumento, foi confirmada a importncia da proteo sade, aos animais e vegetais. Com relao ao segundo, o Painel aponta que para essa anlise deve ser utilizado tanto o argumento da quantificao, quanto o da possibilidade de se atingir o objetivo conforme a qualidade da medida empregada. Alm disso, entendeu que mesmo diante da impossibilidade da importao de pneus recauchutados, a indstria brasileira teria condies de comportar a demanda de produo de pneus remoldados. Logo aps, o Painel passou a analisar se haveria a possibilidade de utilizao de medidas alternativas proibio de importaes, o que ficou definido como impossvel, tendo em vista a j utilizao destas tcnicas pelo Brasil, como medidas complementares proibio da importao. O rgo de Apelao, no nosso entender, pautou-se no objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel para flexibilizar a obrigao do Brasil de aplicar medidas alternativas razoavelmente disponveis (reasonably available alternatives):
A capacidade de um pas de implementar medidas que seriam particularmente custosas, ou que requereriam tecnologias avanadas, pode ser relevante para a averiguao se tais medidas ou prticas so razoalvemente alternativas a uma medida preventiva, tal como a barreira importao, que no envolve custos proibitivos ou dificuldades tcnicas substanciais. (Brazil - Tyres, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, para. 171).

Quanto conformidade da medida com o caput do Artigo XX, o Painel afirmou que deve ser analisada a relao entre o direito que um Membro tem de alegar uma exceo do Artigo XX e o direito dos outros Membros de no serem discriminados. Incumbia ao Brasil demonstrar que no aplicou essa medida de maneira discriminatria. No que concerne discriminao arbitrria ou injustificvel, o Painel alegou que as vantagens conferidas ao MERCOSUL correspondem a uma discriminao no arbitrria e no injustificada, em funo da existncia de uma sentena do Tribunal do MERCOSUL obrigando tal medida. Ademais, de acordo com o Painel, as importaes no comprometiam o objetivo da medida adotada pelo Brasil, pois ocorriam em pequenos volumes. A fim de assegurar que as importaes dos Membros do MERCOSUL permanecessem em volumes considerados aceitveis pelo Painel, e tendo presente os impactos negativos ao meio ambiente e sade pblica, no que se refere importao de pneus reformados, o Brasil editou a Resoluo CAMEX n 38, de 22 de agosto de 2007, estabelecendo quotas importao de pneus recauchutados provenientes do Paraguai e do Uruguai, com base em valores histricos de importao. A Portaria SECEX n 30, de 19 de outubro de 2007, fixou os critrios para a distribuio das quotas. Entretanto, em dezembro de 2007, o rgo de Apelao reverteu a deciso do Painel no que tange possibilidade de exceo s importaes realizadas dos pneus provenientes dos Membros do MERCOSUL. O rgo de Apelao considerou que, independente do volume de importaes, a exceo para estes Estados viola o caput do Artigo XX do GATT, haja vista contrariar o objetivo perquirido pelo Brasil de proteo ao meio ambiente e sade pblica, nos termos da alnea b. Alm disso, o rgo de Apelao ressaltou a incoerncia, exposta pelo Painel, entre a necessidade de proteo ao meio ambiente e sade das pessoas, e a existncia de liminares no pas que permitiam a importao de pneus recauchutados vindos de outros Estados. 230

Diante dessa perspectiva, para que o Brasil cumprisse a deciso dada pelo rgo de Apelao, duas medidas foram fundamentais: em primeiro lugar, a adequao do ordenamento nacional s liminares emitidas pelos tribunais, liberando a importao de pneus usados; em segundo, a negociao com o MERCOSUL sobre a melhor forma de evitar as importaes de pneus remoldados dos Membros do bloco, sem causar um problema institucional, em funo do descumprimento de uma deciso tomada pelo Tribunal Permanente de Reviso do bloco. O Brasil procurou se adequar a essas duas medidas, conforme argumentos apresentados pelo Brasil em sua defesa arbitragem fundada no Artigo 21.3 do DSU, circulada em agosto de 2008. Com relao s liminares emitidas pelo judicirio, as quais permitiram a importao desses pneus, houve o julgamento de uma Ao de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) que pretendeu cassar essas liminares. Em 24 de junho de 2009, a ao foi julgada procedente em parte, com uma interpretao favorvel ao meio ambiente. No entanto, h dvidas quanto a sua efetividade no que tange s importaes dos pneus usados, tendo em vista que h algumas liminares que no podem ser cassadas, pois j transitaram em julgado. No que diz respeito ao MERCOSUL, o Brasil conseguiu poltica e gradativamente reduzir as importaes. No dia 7 de janeiro de 2009, foi notificado pelas CE ao DSB um acordo nos termos do Artigo 22 do DSU. Na reunio de 25 de setembro de 2009, o Brasil informou que havia cumprido todas as determinaes de implementao emitidas pelo DSB. Essa deciso deixou evidente o argumento de que caso a Parte alegue uma proteo ambiental sustentada em dados cientficos coerentes, baseada nos riscos, pode haver uma interpretao protetiva ao meio ambiente pela OMC. Todavia, as medidas nacionais tm de estar em conformidade com os argumentos utilizados para a proteo ambiental. V-se, claramente, nesse caso, que a interpretao pelo rgo de Apelao da medida brasileira como discriminatria foi justamente a existncia das liminares emitidas pelos tribunais nacionais, liberando a importao de pneus usados, bem como a permisso de importao dos pneus provenientes de Membros do MERCOSUL. A deciso da OMC foi adequada no sentido de aceitar as alegaes ambientais brasileiras, mas no garantiu o uso da exceo em razo das incompatibilidades existentes no mbito interno do Estado, que tiveram de ser resolvidas. importante tambm analisar a interpretao da alnea g. A jurisprudncia manifestou-se quanto aplicao da alnea g, no que concerne s medidas de restrio produo nacional e ao consumo, relacionadas conservao de recursos naturais esgotveis. De acordo com estas interpretaes, preciso demonstrar o nexo de causalidade entre a medida e a sua utilizao para a conservao. Ademais, a medida pode expandir-se para o mbito extraterritorial, de modo a ocorrer a responsabilizao apenas dos nacionais do Membro, e no de outros Estados, como ficou delimitado no caso Atum II. Neste caso, os EUA poderiam ter expandido suas medidas para outros territrios, mas, sob a condio de no discriminar e nem responsabilizar os no nacionais. Assim, o Membro deve aplicar as mesmas regras no mbito nacional, sua produo e consumo e aos produtos importados. Esta interpretao foi conferida tambm no caso US - Gasoline, no qual os EUA no puderam aplicar medidas restritivas gasolina brasileira e venezuelana, pois no comprovaram que no praticavam esse fato no mbito nacional. Outra interpretao foi sobre a expresso recursos naturais esgotveis. No caso US - Shrimp, houve a defesa de que os nicos recursos esgotveis seriam os no-vivos. Entretanto, o rgo de Apelao aplicou a tcnica da interpretao evolutiva para ampliar o significado de recursos naturais exaurveis a fim de incluir seres vivos. O rgo de Apelao justificou sua conduta com base em preocupaes contemporneas da comunidade de naes sobre a proteo e conservao do meio ambiente, presente no objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel:
Enquanto o Artigo XX no foi modificado na Rodada Uruguai, o prembulo anexado ao Acordo OMC demonstra que os signatrios deste Acordo estavam, em 1994, inteiramente conscientes da importncia e legitimidade da proteo ambiental como um objetivo de poltica nacional e internacional. O prembulo do Acordo OMC que informa no apenas o GATT 1994, mas tambm os outros acordos ambrangidos -

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explicitamente reconhece o objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel. (US - Shrimp, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, para. 129).

A partir da considerao a respeito do objetivo do desenvolvimento sustentvel, o rgo de Apelao evocou a Agenda 21, a Conveno sobre a Diversidade Biolgica, entre outros Tratados, para dispor que os recursos biolgicos so esgotveis. Note-se, entretanto, que o uso de Acordos alm dos abrangidos pela OMC so utilizados pela jurisprudncia da OMC apenas para fins de interpretao dos Acordos da OMC. Isso diferente de adjudicar Acordos no-OMC pelo mecanismos de soluo de controvrsias da Organizao. Artigo XX, pargrafo d Percebe-se que as interpretaes concedidas pelo rgo de Apelao e pelo Painel da OMC, quanto alnea d do Artigo XX, caminham no sentido de autorizar medidas que assegurem o cumprimento de uma outra norma compatvel com as regras multilaterais de comrcio. Tais medidas encontram limite de abrangncia na interpretao do termo necessria, o qual, conforme o caso concreto, apresenta diferentes motivaes. Assim, ao avaliar se uma medida necessria para assegurar a aplicao de uma lei compatvel com o regime da OMC, tambm se leva em considerao a importncia relativa dos interesses em comum e valores que a lei ou o regulamento a ser cumprido se destina a proteger. Alguns desafios para a interpretao do Artigo XX No que concerne interpretao do Artigo XX, pargrafo a, o desafio est em aumentar o espao para a adoo de polticas pblicas culturais sem violar os Acordas da OMC. Como observa-se do caso China Publications and Audiovisual products, este espao ainda parece ser bastante restrito. Pases que adotam ou pretendem adotar medidas de comrcio para proteger a cultura local poderiam se beneficiar do argumento segundo o qual cultura/ proteo da diversidade cultural parte integrante do objetivo de desenvolvimento sustentvel. Hoje pacfico que o conceito de desenvolvimento sustentvel engloba desenvolvimento econmico, desenvolvimento social e proteo do meio ambiente. Esta viso alternativa ao desenvolvimento unicamente econmico tem influenciado positivamente a resoluo de casos entre meio ambiente/ sade e comrcio, aumentando o espao desses valores sociais no comrcio internacional. Estima-se que a incluso da cultura como elemento integrante do conceito de desenvolvimento sustentvel gere um efeito parecido nas disputas entre cultura e comrcio, de forma a ampliar o espao para polticas culturais sem violar Acordos da OMC. Ainda h tambm diversos desafios para que as interpretaes sejam cada vez mais objetivas no mbito dos pargrafos b e g do Artigo XX. Podem ser citados: a subjetividade de alguns termos; a aleatoriedade na aplicao das alneas b ou g em casos especficos; e, o tratamento dos tratados multilaterais ambientais no mbito da OMC. Constata-se, diante desse cenrio, que a interpretao do Artigo XX ainda no estvel, em razo das expresses no to objetivas existentes, e interpretadas na medida em que os contenciosos aparecem. Podem ser citadas as expresses necessrias (alnea b) e relacionadas a (alnea g). Para alguns, preciso negociar a resoluo de ambiguidades substanciais e procedimentais, adotando-se uma interpretao formal das obrigaes existentes. Para outros, as interpretaes jurisprudenciais so eficazes no direcionamento da aplicao dos dispositivos, sendo suficientes para delimitar a questo. Um outro desafio, o fato de os pargrafos b e g serem, em determinados momentos, utilizadas de modo aleatrio pela jurisprudncia. O pargrafo b aborda a necessidade de proteo da vida humana, animal ou vegetal; enquanto o g trata das medidas relacionadas conservao dos recursos naturais esgotveis. Dessa forma, subentende-se que os pargrafos tratam de diferentes tipos de polticas e medidas. Para medidas relacionadas proteo da sade humana, deveria ser aplicado o pargrafo b e no o g. Entretanto, a jurisprudncia entende correta a aplicao do Artigo XX (g), para medidas consideradas na alnea b, como ocorre no caso da proteo do ar, um recurso natural esgotvel, no contencioso US - Gasoline.

232

Da mesma maneira, o pargrafo b especificamente designado para a vida animal, mas, medidas adotadas para a proteo das tartarugas foram classificadas no mbito do pargrafo g. Ademais, no h indicao se um dos pargrafos especfico para medidas internas dos Membros, enquanto o outra seria aplicado apenas para os problemas globais. Essas interpretaes, as quais no percorrem uma direo precisa, podem resultar em uma insegurana jurdica. Outras posies sublinham que, de qualquer forma, o resultado ser o mesmo, pois os pargrafos esto ligados ao caput. Por outro lado, a existncia da ambiguidade permite maior maleabilidade em novas solues para as questes futuras. De qualquer forma, necessrio existir uma interpretao coerente dos termos, para que haja uma maior objetividade na aplicao dos termos. Por outro lado, h entendimento doutrinrio que compreende que o rgo de Apelao, no caso Brazil Tyres, aproximou os requisitos dos pargrafos b e g. (84) Tradicionalmente, o pargrafo g (medidas relacionadas conservao de recursos naturais) era considerado mais amplo em alcance, enquanto o Artigo XX (b) (medidas necessrias para a proteo da sude) requeria um teste de necessidade mais rgido. De acordo com este entendimento, a jurisprudncia Brazil - Tyres parece ter fundido esses dois testes a fim de que o requisito da relao entre a medida adotada e o objetivo perseguido entre estes dois pargrafos seja equivalente, aproximando as excees de meio ambiente e sade. (85) At Brazil - Tyres, a verso mais recente do teste para medidas necessrias (pargrafo XX, b) era inspirado no caso Korea - Various Measures on Beef, um caso de Artigo XX (d):
(i) [t]he more vital or important those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as necessary a measure designed as an enforcement instrument; (86) [t]he greater the contribution [to the end pursued], the more easily a measure might be considered to be necessary; (87) and (iii) [a] measure with a relatively slight impact upon imported products might more easily be considered as necessary than a measure with intense or broader restrictive effects. (88)

No caso Brazil - Tyres, percebe-se que o rgo de Apelao afastou-se do teste desenvolvido em Korea Beef para fins de necessidade ao enfatizar um elemento: esta medida restritiva contribuir materialmente para o objetivo de poltica invocado? De acordo com Marceau e Wyatt, o rgo de Apelao pode ter adotado esta alternativa interpretativa para dar coerncia entre as excees ambientais presentes nos Artigo XX (b) e (g) do GATT, e Artigo XIV (b) do GATS, uma vez que o GATS no apresenta um pargrafo equivalente ao pargrafo g do GATT. (89) Por esta nova abordagem, a rigidez interpretativa do pargrafo b do GATT foi suavizada, ampliando o espao para polticas de meio ambiente e sade. Este novo teste, que aproxima os pargrafos b e g do Artigo XX do GATT foi assim elaborado pelo rgo de Apelao:
Uma contribuio existe quando houver uma genuna relao de fins e meios entre o objetivo perseguido e a medida em questo. Para ser caracterizada como necessria, a medida no precisa ser indispensvel. Entretanto, sua contribuio ao alcance do objetivo deve ser material, no meramente marginal ou insignificante (...). (Brazil Tyres, Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, para. 210).

Um outro desafio, o tratamento conferido aos tratados multilaterais ambientais (TMAs). H o questionamento sobre a necessidade de modificar ou no o Artigo XX para a previso da possibilidade de aplicar ou no os TMAs na OMC. Um critrio que poderia ser acrescentado ao Artigo XX, seria a ideia de ser possvel a adoo de medidas para a implementao de obrigaes contidas nesses tratados ambientais. H a opo, tambm, de negociar um mnimo de regras de proteo ambiental em um Acordo TREMs (Agreement on Trade Related Environmental Protection). Diante da perspectiva de que a OMC no tem competncias em matria de meio ambiente, essa ltima alternativa dificilmente seria concretizada, tendo em vista a inexistncia de um consenso sobre as questes ambientais entre os Membros desenvolvidos, em desenvolvimento e os de menor desenvolvimento relativo. Por ora, a interao entre tratados da OMC e TMAs tem ocorrido de forma bastante limitada. Como vimos no caso US - Shrimp, os painis e o rgo de Apelao podem utilizar Acordos no-OMC, aqui includos os TMAs, para fins de interpretar disposies presentes nos Acordos da OMC. O uso mais extensivo dos TMAs em solues de controvrsias da OMC feririam o Artigo 3.2 do DSU, segundo o qual as recomendaes e decises do DSB no podem aumentar ou diminuir os direitos e obrigaes previstos nos Acordos da OMC. 233

O maior de todos os desafios, no que diz respeito futura interpretao do Artigo XX, parece, atualmente, pesar sobre as medidas relacionadas reduo de gases de efeito estufa, adotadas pelos Membros da OMC. Diante do impasse em encontrar solues multilaterais no regime de mudanas climticas, observa-se um nmero crescente de Membros adotando medidas unilaterais, com vistas a reduzir a emisso de gases de efeito estufa nacionalmente. Algumas dessas medidas nacionais, supostamente, violariam Acordos da OMC. Uma defesa possvel para os Membros que adotam-nas, seria fundada no Artigo XX, pargrafos b e g do GATT. (90) At o presente momento, nenhum Membro provocou o DSB com relao a uma medida como esta, mas a OMC j se prepara para o desafio. (91)

FOOTNOTES:
Footnote 84: Gabrielle Marceau e Julian Wyatt, Trade and the enviro nment: The WTOs efforts to balance economic and sustainable development, in Liber Amicorum Anne Petitpierre-Sauvain: Economie Environnement Ethique, 225, 229-230 (Rita Trigo Trindade et al. Eds, 2009). Footnote 85: Id., p. 230. Footnote 86: Relatrio do rgo de Apelao, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beefs (DS 161/ DS 169, 11 Dezembro 2000, para 162. Footnote 87: Id., para. 163. Footnote 88: Id. Footnote 89: Marceau & Wyatt, p. 231. Footnote 90: Fabio Morosini. Trade and climate change: unveiling the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities from the WTO agreements. The George Washington International Law Review, v. 42, n 4, 2010. Footnote 91: WTO-U.N. Envt Programme, Trade and Climate Change (Ludivine Tami otti et al., 2009), disponvel em: <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf>.

234

 IA.

Artigo XXI Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XXI Security Exceptions Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) (b) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) (ii) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or

(iii) (c) IB.

to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XXI Excees Relativas Segurana Nenhuma disposio do presente Acordo ser interpretada: (a) (b) como impondo a uma Parte Contratante a obrigao de fornecer informaes cuja divulgao seja, a seu critrio, contrria aos interesses essenciais de sua segurana; ou como impedindo uma Parte Contratante de tomar todas as medidas que achar necessrias proteo dos interesses essenciais de sua segurana: (i) (ii) relacionando-se s matrias desintegrveis ou s matrias primas que servem sua fabricao; relacionando-se ao trfico de armas, munies e material de guerra e a todo o comrcio de outros artigos e materiais destinados direta ou indiretamente a assegurar o aprovisionamento das foras armadas; aplicadas em tempo de guerra ou em caso de grave tenso internacional; cumprimento paz e a

(iii) (c)

ou como impedindo uma Parte Contratante de tomar medidas destinadas ao de suas obrigaes em virtude da Carta das Naes Unidas, a fim de manter a segurana internacionais.

IC.

Comentrios sobre a Traduo

Nenhum comentrio. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XXI

Este Artigo no foi objeto de disputas no DSB da OMC. III. Comentrios

Nenhum comentrio. 235

 IA.

Artigo XXII Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XXII Consultation

22.1

Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XXII Consultas

22.2

IB.

22.1

Cada Parte Contratante examinar com compreenso as representaes que lhe sejam encaminhadas por qualquer outra Parte Contratante e dever se prestar a consultas a respeito daquelas representaes, desde que elas digam respeito a questes relativas aplicao do presente Acordo. As Partes Contratantes podero, a pedido de uma das Partes Contratantes, entrar em entendimentos com uma ou vrias Partes Contratantes sobre questes para as quais a soluo satisfatria no poderia ser alcanada atravs das consultas previstas no pargrafo primeiro. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

22.2

IC.

Nada a observar. II. Interpretao e aplicao do Artigo XXII

A clusula de consultas, estabelecida no Artigo XXII do GATT 1994, corresponde a uma das disposies dos Acordos abrangidos sobre consultas e resoluo de disputas, as quais so administradas pelo DSB, com base nas normas do DSU. III. Comentrios

Nada a observar.

236

Artigo XXIII

Alessandra Deliberato Thoenen Geraldo Vidigal Neto IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XXIII Nullification or Impairment 23.1 If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) (b) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.

(c)

23.2

If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph 1 (c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which such notice is received by him. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XXIII Proteo de Concesses e Vantagens

IB.

23.1

No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, est sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do Acordo est sendo dificultado, em consequncia: a) b) do no cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo; da aplicao por outra das Partes Contratantes de uma medida, contrria ou no s disposies do presente Acordo; ou da existncia de qualquer outra situao, dita Parte Contratante, a fim de obter soluo satisfatria para a questo, poder dirigir representaes ou propostas por escrito outra ou 237

c)

outras Partes Contratantes que lhe parecerem interessadas. Qualquer Parte Contratante, por essa forma interpelada, examinar, com boa vontade, as representaes ou propostas que lhe tenham sido dirigidas. 23.2 Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas no chegarem a um Acordo satisfatrio dentro de um prazo razovel, ou se a dificuldade for uma das previstas no 1 (c) deste Artigo, a questo poder ser submetida s Partes Contratantes. As Partes Contratantes iniciaro, sem demora, uma investigao sobre qualquer assunto que lhes seja submetido e, se julgarem conveniente, dirigiro recomendaes especiais e apropriadas s partes Contratantes que julguem interessadas, ou baixaro normas sobre a questo. As Partes Contratantes, quando acharem necessrio, podero efetuar consultas com as outras Partes Contratantes, com o Conselho Econmico e Social das Naes Unidas e com qualquer outra organizao intergovernamental competente. Se as Partes Contratantes acharem que as circunstncias so suficientemente graves para justificar tal medida, podero autorizar a uma ou a vrias Partes Contratantes a suspenso, relativamente a tal ou a tais Partes Contratantes, da aplicao de qualquer obrigao ou concesso resultante do presente Acordo. Se, a observncia de uma obrigao ou o benefcio de uma concesso em favor de uma Parte Contratante for suspenso efetivamente, essa Parte Contratante poder dentro de um prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data da aplicao da medida, notificar o Secretrio Geral das Naes Unidas por escrito, de sua inteno de denunciar este Acordo e tal denncia ter efeito, expirado o prazo de sessenta dias a contar da data em que o Secretrio Geral das Naes Unidas receba notificao escrita da denncia.

(Decreto n 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

O ttulo originalmente conferido (verso oficial em ingls) ao Artigo XXIII pelo GATT 1947 e, subsequentemente, pelo GATT 1994, refere-se anulao ou prejuzo enquanto conceitos imprescindveis para a apresentao de uma demanda perante o DSB com base no Artigo XXIII GATT. O conceito de anulao ou prejuzo a benefcios decorrentes do Acordo requisito essencial aplicvel a qualquer um dos tipos de demanda previstas nos incisos do Artigo XXIII, quais sejam, (a) violao; (b) no-violao e; (c) situao. O prprio sistema de soluo de controvrsias acabou por confirmar, em inmeras oportunidades (92), que qualquer violao a um dos Acordos da OMC configuraria uma anulao ou prejuzo prima facie (93) a benefcios decorrentes dos Acordos. A traduo para a lngua portuguesa adotada pelo Decreto n 1355, de 30 de Dezembro de 1994, em contrapartida, no reflete este mesmo esprito, mas restringe o ttulo conferido ao mesmo Artigo XXIII finalidade de um dos seus mecanismos (demandas fundadas em casos de no-violao), qual seja, a proteo de concesses tarifrias recprocas da utilizao de medidas que acabem por anular ou reduzir benefcios previstos nos Acordos da OMC. Ainda que o ttulo do Artigo XXIII, da forma como incorporado ao sistema legal brasileiro, acabe por restringir o verdadeiro alcance do mencionado Artigo, suas provises legais parecem ter sido traduzidas em observncia verso original publicada em ingls, francs e espanhol, de forma a evitar qualquer efeito distorsivo na aplicao global do mencionado dispositivo legal. II. 1. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XXIII Artigo XXIII:1 a) uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, est sendo anulada ou reduzida O Painel aponta para a necessidade de especificao, pelo demandante, sobre o que de fato estaria cansando a anulao ou prejuzo de benefcios, para que seja efetivamente autorizada a aplicao da suspenso de 238

concesses, nos termos do Artigo XXIII do GATT 1994. Segundo o Painel, o Artigo XXIII:1 prev trs causas distintas para legitimar uma reclamao: a violao; no-violao; e as situaes de reclamaes fundadas nos pargrafos a, b e c do Artigo em questo. Com efeito, o conceito de expectativas razoveis, mencionado pelo Painel como expectativas legtimas, um conceito desenvolvido no contexto de reclamaes de no-violao. Relatrio do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 14 Para. 14. (...) The Panel thought it essential to have a clear idea as to what would constitute a nullification or impairment. In its view impairment and nullification in the sense of Article XXIII does not arise merely because of the existence of any measures; the nullification or impairment must relate to benefits accruing to the contracting party under the General Agreement. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso United Kingdon - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC - Computer Equipment), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS67/AB/R, para. 80 Para. 80. We disagree with the Panel's conclusion that the meaning of a tariff concession in a Member's Schedule may be determined in the light of the legitimate expectations of a n exporting Member. First, we fail to see the relevance of the EEC - Oilseeds panel report with respect to the interpretation of a Member's Schedule in the context of a violation complaint made under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. The EEC - Oilseeds panel report dealt with a non-violation complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994, and is not legally relevant to the case before us. Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for three legallydistinct causes of action on which a Member may base a complaint; it distinguishes between so-called violation complaints, non-violation complaints and situation complaints under paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). The concept of reasonable expectations, which the Panel refers to as legitimate expectations, is a concept that was developed in the context of non-violation complaints. (94) As we stated in India - Patents, for the Panel to use this concept in the context of a violation complaint melds the legally-distinct bases for violation and non-violation complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action (95), and is not in accordance with established GATT practice. 2. Artigo XXIII:1(a) a) do no cumprimento por outra das Partes Contratantes dos compromissos pela mesma assumidos em virtude do presente Acordo Relatrio do Painel no caso Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962 Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 15 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT fixou a presuno de que uma medida em contradio com as normas do GATT ocasiona anulao ou prejuzo de benefcios. Para. 15. (...) In cases where there is a clear infringement of the provisions of the General Agreement, or in other words, where measures are applied in conflict with the provisions of GATT and are not permitted under the terms of the relevant protocol under which the GATT is applied by the contracting party, the action would, prima facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment and would ipso facto require consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adotado em 17 de Junho de 1987, Demandante: Canad, L/6175, BISD 34S/136, paras. 5.1.4-5.1.6

239

Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT consolidou a presuno de que qualquer medida contrria s regras do GATT causa anulao ou prejuzo. No h, portanto, possibilidade de refutar a anulao ou prejuzo, por exemplo, com uma demonstrao de que a medida no gera efeitos sobre o comrcio do demandante. Para. 5.1.4. (...) the practice of the Contracting Parties is to make recommendations or rulings on measures found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement independent of the impact of such measures (...). Para. 5.1.5. [Citing paragraph 5 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding:] Thus, the 1979 Understanding does not refer to the adverse impact of a measure, and the possibility of a rebuttal, in connection with the power of the Contracting Parties to make recommendations or give rulings on measures inconsistent with the General Agreement; it does so only in connection with the authorization of compensatory action. This, in the view of the Panel, supports the conclusion that the impact of a measure inconsistent with the General Agreement is not relevant for a determination of nullification or impairment by the Contracting Parties. Para. 5.1.6. The Panel examined how the Contracting Parties have reacted in previous cases to claims that a measure inconsistent with the General Agreement had no adverse impact and therefore did not nullify or impair benefits accruing under the General Agreement to the contracting party that had brought the complaint. The Panel noted such claims had been made in a number of cases but that there was no case in the history of the GATT in which a contracting party had successfully rebutted the presumption that a measure infringing obligations causes nullification and impairment (...). 3. Artigo XXIII:1(b) a) Viso Geral da reclamao de no-violao Relatrio GATT Working Party no caso The Australian Subsidy on ammonium Sulphate, adotado em 03 de Abril de 1950, Partes: Austrlia e Chile, GATT/CP.4/39, BISD II/188, para. 12 Nesta controvrsia, uma das primeiras do GATT, o Painel do GATT determinou que a reclamao de noviolao procedente quando a Parte demandante poderia razoavelmente esperar da Parte demandada a adoo de determinada conduta, e a Parte demandada contraria com suas medidas a conduta esperada. Para. 12. The working party next considered whether the injury that the Government of Chile said it had suffered represented a nullification or impairment. (...) It was agreed that such impairment would exist if the action of the Australian Government which resulted in upsetting the competitive relationship between sodium nitrate and ammonium sulphate could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Chilean Government, taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances and the provisions of the General Agreement, at the time it negotiated for the duty-free binding on sodium nitrate. The working party concluded that the Government of Chile had reason to assume, during these negotiations, that the war-time fertilizer subsidy would not be removed from sodium nitrate before it was removed from ammonium sulphate. In reaching this conclusion, the working party was influenced in particular by the combination of the circumstances that:
(a) The two types of fertilizer were closely related; (b) Both had been subsidized and distributed through the same agency and sold at the same price; (c) Neither had been subsidized before the war, and the war-time system of subsidization and distribution had been introduced in respect of both at the same time and under the same war powers of the Australian Government; (d) This system was still maintained in respect of both fertilizers at the time of the 1947 tariff negotiations.

For these reasons, the working party also concluded that the Australian action should be considered as relating to a benefit accruing to Chile under the Agreement, and that it was therefore subject to the provisions of Article XXIII. (...) The inequality created and the treatment Chile could have expected at the time of the negotiation, after taking into consideration all pertinent circumstances, including the circumstances 240

mentioned above, and the provisions of the General Agreement, were important elements in the working partys conclusions. The situation in this case is different from that which would have arisen from the granting of a new subsidy on one of the two competing products. In such a case, given the freedom under the General Agreement of the Australian Government to impose subsidies and to select the products on which a subsidy would be granted, it would be more difficult to say that the Chilean Government had reasonably relied on the continuation of the same treatment for the two products. In the present case, however, the Australian Government, in granting a subsidy on account of the war-time fertilizer shortage and continuing it in the post-war period, had grouped the two fertilizers together and treated them uniformly. In such circumstances it would seem that the Chilean Government could reasonably assume that the subsidy would remain applicable to both fertilizers so long as there remained a local nitrogenous fertilizer shortage. Relatrio do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 147-148 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT entendeu que, no caso de reclamaes de no-violao, no cabe uma recomendao para que a medida questionada seja removida, mas apenas para que se reequilibrem as vantagens negociadas, pela via da suspenso de concesses se necessrio. Para. 147. (...) The Panel examined whether it was reasonable for the United States to expect that the Community would not introduce subsidy schemes systematically counteracting the price effect of the tariff concessions. (...) The essential argument of the Community in this respect was that it is not legitimate to expect the absence of production subsidies even after the grant of a tariff concession because Articles III:8(b) and XVI:1 explicitly recognize the right of contracting parties to grant production subsidies. This right would be effectively eliminated if its exercise were assumed to impair tariff concessions. Para. 148. The Panel (...) found the following: () At issue in the case before it are product -specific subsidies that protect producers completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds. The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides an assurance of better market access through improved price competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily to obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff negotiations on the expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions will not be systematically offset. If no right of redress were given to them in such a case they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for incorporating the results of trade negotiations. The Panel does not share the view of the Community that the recognition of the legitimacy of such expectations would amount to a re writing of the rules of the General Agreement. The contracting parties have decided that a finding of impairment does not authorize them to request the impairing contracting party to remove a measure not inconsistent with the General Agreement; such a finding merely allows the contracting party frustrated in its expectation to request, in accordance with Article XXIII:2, an authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations under the General Agreement. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation thus essentially means the recognition of the legitimacy of such a request. The recognition of the legitimacy of an expectation relating to the use of production subsidies therefore in no way prevents a contracting party from using production subsidies consistently with the General Agreement; it merely delineates the scope of the protection of a negotiated balance of concessions. For these reasons the Panel found that the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated the introduction of subsidies which protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, and which have as one consequence that all domestically produced oilseeds are disposed of in the internal market notwithstanding the availability of imports.

241

Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities -Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 186 Nesta controvrsia, o rgo de Apelao determinou que a reclamao de no-violao deve ficar restrita a casos excepcionais, uma vez que permite o questionamento perante os rgos da OMC de medidas que no foram proibidas nos acordos negociados pelos Membros. Para. 186. Like the Panel in Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan Film), we consider that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) should be approached with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy. That Panel stated:
Although the non-violation remedy is an important and accepted tool of WTO/GATT dispute settlement and has been on the books for almost 50 years, we note that there have only been eight cases in which panels or working parties have substantively considered Article XXIII:1(b) claims. (96) This suggests that both the GATT contracting parties and WTO Members have approached this remedy with caution and, indeed, have treated it as an exceptional instrument of dispute settlement. We note in this regard that both the European Communities and the United States in the EEC Oilseeds case, and the two parties in this case, have confirmed that the non-violation nullification or impairment remedy should be approached with caution and treated as an exceptional concept. (97) The reason for this caution is straightforward. Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules. (98)

(i) Finalidade Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grani from (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 144 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT determinou que o objetivo das disposies legais do GATT proteger as expectativas legtimas das Partes, quanto s oportunidades competitivas que obtero com uma concesso tarifria. protegida a expectativa das Partes, ainda que no haja conflito da medida que frustra essa expectativa com as disposies do GATT. Para. 144. (...) The Panel noted that these provisions, as conceived by the drafters and applied by the contracting parties, serve mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions. The idea underlying them is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement. Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar - containing Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Heanote in Schedule of Tariff Concessions BISD 37S/228, adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econmica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT determinou a obrigao Parte que realiza uma reclamao de noviolao, de apresentar uma justificativa detalhada de sua reclamao. Para. 5.21. According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is called upon to provide a detailed justification ... The Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions ... The party bringing a complaint under that provision would therefore normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired. (...) 242

Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.50 Neste Relatrio, o Painel reforou o objetivo da reclamao de no-violao, de proteger o equilbrio de concesses, fornecendo um meio de lidar com medidas governamentais no reguladas pelo GATT, mas que causem anulao ou prejuzo s expectativas legtimas dos Membros. Para. 10.50. [The purpose of Article XXIII:1(b)] is to protect the balance of concessions under GATT by providing a means to redress government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT rules that nonetheless nullify or impair a Members legitimate expectations of benefits from tariff negotiations. (99) (ii) Alcance Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products (India - Quantitative Restrictions), Demandante: EUA, WTO/DS90/AB/R, paras. 87-88 Nesta controvrsia, o rgo de Apelao determinou a possibilidade de uso do Artigo XXIII para questionar medidas relacionadas balana de pagamentos dos Membros. Para. 87. Any doubts that may have existed in the past as to whether the dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII were available for disputes relating to balance-of-payments restrictions have been removed by the second sentence of footnote 1 to the BOP Understanding, which reads:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of restrictive import measures taken for balance-ofpayments purposes. (emphasis added)

Para. 88. In our opinion, this provision makes it clear that the dispute settlement procedures under Article XXIII, as elaborated and applied by the DSU, are available for disputes relating to any matters concerning balance-of-payments restrictions. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-189 Neste Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao especificou que a reclamao de no-violao pode ser impetrada, inclusive, em relao a medidas que sejam reguladas pelo GATT 1994. Para. 187. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a benefit is being nullified or impaired through the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement . (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states that a claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure conflicts with some substantive provisions of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure conflicts with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that this reading of Article XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan - Film and EEC - Oilseeds, which both support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, we decline the European Communities first ground of appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Para. 188. [W]e look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that the application by another Member of any measure may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word any suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts 243

the European Communities argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b). Para. 189. In any event, an attempt to draw the distinction suggested by the European Communities between so-called health and commercial measures would be very difficult in practice. By definition, measures which affect trade in goods, and which are subject to the disciplines of the GATT 1994, have a commercial impact. At the same time, the health objectives of many measures may be attainable only by means of commercial regulation. Thus, in practice, clear distinctions between health and commercial measures may be very difficult to establish. Nor do we see merit in the argument that, previously, only commercial measures have been the subject of Article XXIII:1(b) claims, as that does not establish that a claim cannot be made under Article XXIII:1(b) regarding a noncommercial measure. b) Teste nos termos do Artigo XXIII:1(b) Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.41 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel determinou os elementos que um Membro precisa demonstrar para ingressar com uma reclamao de no-violao. Para. 10.41. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a complaining party must demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure. c) nus da prova Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar containing Products Applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of of Tariff Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econmica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, paras. 5.20-5.21 e 5.23 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT observou que necessrio ao demandante demonstrar as razes de sua reclamao de no-violao. Para. 5.20. (...) The Panel ... concluded that the fact that the restrictions found to be inconsistent with Article XI:1 conform to the terms of the Waiver does not prevent the EEC from bringing a complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) of the General Agreement but it is up to the EEC to demonstrate that a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement has resulted from these restrictions. Para. 5.21. According to the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, a contracting party bringing a complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) is called upon to provide a detailed justification (...) The Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b), as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting Parties, serves mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions (...) The party bringing a complaint under that provision would therefore normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired. (...) the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the meaning of that provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General Agreement (...). Para. 5.23. For the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the Panel did not examine the case before it in the light of Article XXIII:1(b). The Panel would however like to stress that nothing in this report is 244

meant to preclude the EEC from bringing a complaint under that provision with the required detailed justification. Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, para. 10.32 Neste Relatrio, o Painel observou que o nus da prova nas reclamaes de no-violao cabe ao demandante. Para. 10.32. Consistent with the explicit terms of the DSU and established WTO/GATT jurisprudence, and recalling the Appellate Body ruling that precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish () a presumption [that what is claimed is true] will necessarily vary from () provision to provision, we thus consider that the United States, with respect to its claim of non -violation nullification or impairment under Article XXIII:1(b), bears the burden of providing a detailed justification for its claim in order to establish a presumption that what is claimed is true. It will be for Japan to rebut any such presumption. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.280-8.282 e 8.292 Neste Relatrio, o Painel observou que o nus da prova do demandante sobre a sua expectativa aplica-se inclusive a medidas distantes no tempo, de forma que cabe ao demandante provar que ele possua uma expectativa de que a regulamentao de um produto no seria alterada com o passar do tempo. Para. 8.280. We do not consider that Canada has correctly interpreted the Panel report in Japan - Film. First of all, the presumption to which the Panel refers is that, if it is shown that a measure has been introduced after the conclusion of the tariff negotiations in question, then the complainant should not be considered as having anticipated that measure, which is only one of the tests applied by the Panel. Moreover, if the interpretation of the burden of proof suggested by Canada were followed, the obligation to present a detailed justification for which Article 26.1(a) provides might in certain cases be evaded. Accordingly, we do not follow the interpretation proposed by Canada but the rule laid down in Japan - Film. Para. 8.281. Furthermore, in the light of our reasoning in paragraph 8.272 above, we consider that the special situation of measures justified under Article XX, insofar as they concern non-commercial interests whose importance has been recognized a priori by Members, requires special treatment. By creating the right to invoke exceptions in certain circumstances, Members have recognized a priori the possibility that the benefits they derive from certain concessions may eventually be nullified or impaired at some future time for reasons recognized as being of overriding importance. This situation is different from that in which a Member takes a measure of a commercial or economic nature such as, for example, a subsidy or a decision organizing a sector of its economy, from which it expects a purely economic benefit. In this latter case, the measure remains within the field of international trade. Moreover, the nature and importance of certain measures falling under Article XX can also justify their being taken at any time, which militates in favour of a stricter treatment of actions brought against them on the basis of Article XXIII:1(b). Para. 8.282. Consequently, the Panel concludes that because of the importance conferred on them a priori by the GATT 1994, as compared with the rules governing international trade, situations that fall under Article XX justify a stricter burden of proof being applied in this context to the party invoking Article XXIII:1(b), particularly with regard to the existence of legitimate expectations and whether or not the initial Decree could be reasonably anticipated. Para. 8.292. [W]e consider that in view of the time that elapsed between those concessions and the adoption of the Decree (between 50 and 35 years), Canada could not assume that, over such a long period, there would not be advances in medical knowledge with the risk that one day a product would be banned on health grounds. For this reason, too, we also consider that the presumption applied in Japan - Film cannot be applied 245

to the concessions granted in 1947 and 1962. Any other interpretation would extend the scope of the concept of non-violation nullification well beyond that envisaged by the Panel in Japan - Film. On the contrary, it is for Canada to present detailed evidence showing why it could legitimately expect the 1947 and 1962 concessions not to be affected and could not reasonably anticipate that France might adopt measures restricting the use of all asbestos products 50 and 35 years, respectively, after the negotiation of the concessions concerned. In the present case, the burden of proof must be all the heavier inasmuch as the intervening period has been so long. Indeed, it is very difficult to anticipate what a Member will do in 50 years time. It would therefore be easy for a Member to establish that he could not reasonably anticipate the adoption of a measure if the burden of proof were not made heavier. d) Medida Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Canned Fruit (US - Canned Fruit), adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 51 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT observou que a anulao ou prejuzo ocorrido em relao a medidas que no podiam ser antecipadas pela Parte demandante, afeta as condies competitivas de produtos importados. Para. 51. The Panel considered the definition given to 'nullification or impairment' of tariff concessions in past GATT Panel reports which had examined non-violation complaints in respect of tariff concessions (BISD II/193; 1S/58). It agreed with the findings in these reports that nullification or impairment of tariff concessions would exist if the measure in question: (1) could not have reasonably been anticipated by the party bringing the complaint at the time of negotiation of the tariff concessions and (2) the measure resulted in the upsetting of the competitive position of the imported products concerned. In the present case, this meant that nullification or impairment of the tariff concessions would exist if the introduction or increase of the EEC production aids could not have been reasonably anticipated by the United States at the time of the negotiations for the tariff concessions on those products (below under b) and the aid systems had upset the competitive position of imported canned peaches, canned pears, canned fruit cocktail and dried grapes on the EC market (below under c). Relatrio do Painel no caso United States - Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar containing Products applied under the 1955 Waiver and under the Headnote in Schedule of Tariff Concessions (US - Sugar Waiver), adotado em 07 de Novembro de 1990, Demandante: Comunidade Econmica Europeia, L/6631, BISD 37S/228, para. 5.21 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT determinou que mesmo uma medida coberta por uma derrogao pode causar anulao ou prejuzo. Para. 5.21. (...) The EEC has not claimed that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession made by the United States in accordance with Article II have been nullified or impaired as a result of measures taken under the Waiver. The main justification for its claim of nullification or impairment that the EEC presented to the Panel was that the restrictions, in spite of the Waiver, have remained inconsistent with the General Agreement. The Panel recognized that Article XXIII:1(b) does not exclude claims of nullification or impairment based on provisions of the General Agreement other than Article II. However, the Panel noted that Article XXIII:1(b) applies whether or not the measure at issue conflicts with the General Agreement and that, therefore, the question of whether a measure inconsistent with Article XI:1 remains inconsistent with the General Agreement even if covered by a waiver cannot, by itself, determine whether it nullifies or impairs benefits accruing under the General Agreement within the meaning of that provision. A complaint under Article XXIII:1(b) must therefore be supported by a justification that goes beyond a mere characterization of the measure at issue as inconsistent with the General Agreement. Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film na Paper (Japan Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.49, 10.52 e 10.57-10.59

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Neste Relatrio, o Painel determinou que mesmo medidas no-obrigatrias podem causar anulao ou prejuzo, mas que necessrio que as medidas sejam medidas governamentais e que sejam aplicadas no momento da demanda. Medidas antigas que continuam produzindo efeitos tambm podem ser questionadas, mas cabe ao demandante demonstrar que a anulao ou prejuzo fruto dessas medidas. Para. 10.49. [A] government policy or action need not necessarily have a subs tantially binding or compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so as to nullify or impair legitimately expected benefits within the purview of Article XXIII:1(b). Indeed, it is clear that nonbinding actions, which include sufficient incentives or disincentives for private parties to act in a particular manner, can potentially have adverse effects on competitive conditions of market access. For example, a number of non-violation cases have involved subsidies, receipt of which requires only voluntary compliance with eligibility criteria. Para. 10.52. As the WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in respect of which only national governments and separate customs territories are directly subject to obligations, it follows by implication that the term measure in Article XXIII:1(b) and Article 26.1 of the DSU, as elsewhere in the WTO Agreement, refers only to policies or actions of governments, not those of private parties. Para. 10.57. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) is written in the present tense, viz. If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired () as the result of () (b) the application by another Member of an y measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement. It thus stands to reason that, given that the text contemplates nullification or impairment in the present tense, caused by application of a measure, whether or not it conflicts (also in the present tense), the ordinary meaning of this provision limits the non-violation remedy to measures that are currently being applied. Para. 10.58. Moreover, GATT/WTO precedent in other areas, including in respect of virtually all panel cases under Article XXIII:1(a), confirms that it is not the practice of GATT/WTO panels to rule on measures which have expired or which have been repealed or withdrawn. (100) In only a very small number of cases, involving very particular situations, have panels proceeded to adjudicate claims involving measures which no longer exist or which are no longer being applied. In those cases, the measures typically had been applied in the very recent past. (101) Para. 10.59. [W]e do not rule out the possibility that old measures that were never officially revoked may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. Similarly, even if measures were officially revoked, the underlying policies may continue to be applied through continuing administrative guidance. However, the burden is on the United States to demonstrate clearly that such guidance does in fact exist and that it is currently nullifying or impairing benefits. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 187-188 Neste Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao determinou que as reclamaes de no-violao so cabveis em qualquer caso de anulao ou prejuzo, ainda que a medida em questo possa tambm ser contestada como incompatvel com as regras do GATT, e ainda que no se trate de uma medida classificada pela Parte que a toma como comercial. Para. 187. Against this background, we turn now to the European Communities' argument that Article XXIII:1(b) does not apply to measures that fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. The text of Article XXIII:1(b) stipulates that a claim under that provision arises when a benefit is being nullified or impaired through the application () of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement . (emphasis added) The wording of the provision, therefore, clearly states that a claim may succeed, under Article XXIII:1(b), even if the measure conflicts with some substantive provisions of the GATT 1994. It follows that a measure may, at one and the same time, be 247

inconsistent with, or in breach of, a provision of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under Article XXIII:1(b). Of course, if a measure conflicts with a provision of the GATT 1994, that measure must actually fall within the scope of application of that provision of the GATT 1994. We agree with the Panel that this reading of Article XXIII:1(b) is consistent with the panel reports in Japan Film and EEC Oilseeds, which both support the view that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which simultaneously fall within the scope of application of other provisions of the GATT 1994. 189 Accordingly, we decline the European Communities' first ground of appeal under Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Para. 188. The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding that Article XXIII:1(b) applies to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which can, therefore, be justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Once again, we look to the text of Article XXIII:1(b), which provides that the application by another Member of any measure may give rise to a cause of action under that provision. The use of the word any suggests that measures of all types may give rise to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure. Clearly, therefore, the text of Article XXIII:1(b) contradicts the European Communities' argument that certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of application of Article XXIII:1(b). e) Vantagem Relatrio do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, paras. 150-152 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT determinou que a vantagem protegida pelos Acordos da OMC no consiste em determinadas quantidades exportadas, mas em condies de concorrncia dos produtos. Por isso, no relevante para o resultado da controvrsia que no tenha havido reduo das exportaes, bastando-se demonstrar a alterao nas condies de concorrncia. Para. 150. In the past Article XXIII:1(b) cases, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have adopted the same approach: their findings of nullification or impairment were based on a finding that the products for which a tariff concession had been granted were subjected to an adverse change in competitive conditions. In none of these cases did they consider the trade impact of the change in competitive conditions to be determining. In one case they specifically rejected the relevance of statistics on trade flows for a finding on nullification and impairment. It is of course true that, in the tariff negotiations in the framework of GATT, contracting parties seek tariff concessions in the hope of expanding their exports, but the commitments they exchange in such negotiations are commitments on conditions of competition for trade, not on volumes of trade. Para. 151. The approach of the CONTRACTING PARTIES reflects the fact that governments can often not predict with precision what the impact of their interventions on import volumes will be. If a finding of nullification or impairment depended not only on whether an adverse change in competitive conditions took place but also on whether that change resulted in a decline in imports, the exposure of the contracting parties to claims under Article XXIII:1(b) would depend on factors they do not control; the rules on nullification and impairment could consequently no longer guide government policies. Moreover, the contracting parties facing an adverse change in policies could make a claim of nullification or impairment only after that change has produced effects. Such claims could consequently not be made to prevent adverse effects; they could only be made to obtain redress ex post. If Article II were considered to be protecting expectations on trade flows it would be necessary for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to determine what export volumes a contracting party can reasonably expect after having obtained a tariff concession. The Panel is not aware of any criteria or principles that could be applied to make such a determination. The Panel further noted that changes in trade volumes result not only from government policies but also other factors, and that, in most circumstances, it is not possible to determine whether a decline in imports following a change in policies is attributable to that change or to other factors. The provisions of Article XXIII:1(b) could therefore in practice hardly be applied if a contracting party claiming nullification or impairment had to demonstrate not only that an adverse change in competition has taken place but also that the change has resulted in a decline in imports. 248

Para. 152. For these reasons the Panel found that benefits accruing to the United States under Article II of the General Agreement in respect of the zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the Community Schedule of Concessions were impaired as a result of subsidy schemes which operate to protect Community producers of oilseeds completely from the movement of prices of imports and thereby prevent the oilseeds tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds. Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.64-10.66 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel estabeleceu que as expectativas legtimas so geradas a cada rodada de negociaes e, portanto, expectativas geradas por concesses tarifrias da poca do GATT 1947 podem servir de base para reclamaes de no-violao na OMC. Para. 10.64. GATT 1994 incorporates both protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions under paragraph 1(b)(i) and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994 under paragraph 1(d). The ordinary meaning of the text of paragraphs 1(b)(i) and 1(d) of GATT 1994, read together, clearly suggests that all protocols relating to tariff concessions, both those predating the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994, are incorporated into GATT 1994 and continue to have legal existence under the WTO Agreement. Para. 10.65. Where tariff concessions have been progressively improved, the benefits expectations of improved market access - accruing directly or indirectly under different tariff concession protocols incorporated in GATT 1994 can be read in harmony. This approach is in accordance with general principles of legal interpretation which, as the Appellate Body reiterated in US - Gasoline, teach that one should endeavour to give legal effect to all elements of a treaty and not reduce them to redundancy or inutility. Para. 10.66. The conclusion that benefits accruing from concessions granted during successive rounds of tariff negotiations may separately give rise to reasonable expectations of improved market access is consistent with past panel reports. (102) The panel in EEC - Canned Fruit found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EECs 1974 tariff concessions pursuant to Article XXIV:6 negotiations and 1979 Tokyo Round tariff concessions (even though the panel separately found that the United States could have anticipated certain subsidies in respect of the Tokyo Round tariff concessions). (103) And the EEC - Oilseeds panel found that the United States had a reasonable expectation arising from the EECs 1962 Dillon Round tariff concessions. (104) As the United States points out, these findings would not have been possible if subsequent multilateral tariff agreements or enlargement agreements were deemed to extinguish wholesale the tariff concessions in prior tariff schedules. f) Expectativas legtimas Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.76-10.77, 10.79-10.80 Neste Relatrio, o Painel formulou diretrizes para a determinao do que so expectativas legtimas e do que pode razoavelmente ser antecipado pelos Membros na concluso de uma negociao tarifria. Cabe ao Membro demandante provar que no podia, no momento da negociaom, antecipar a medida questionada. Para. 10.76. As suggested by the 1961 report (105), in order for expectations of a benefit to be legitimate, the challenged measures must not have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concession was negotiated. If the measures were anticipated, a Member could not have had a legitimate expectation of improved market access to the extent of the impairment caused by these measures. Para. 10.77. Thus, under Article XXIII:1(b), the United States may only claim impairment of benefits related to improved market access conditions flowing from relevant tariff concessions by Japan to the extent that the United States could not have reasonably anticipated that such benefits would be offset by the subsequent application of a measure by the Government of Japan.

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Para. 10.79. We consider that the issue of reasonable anticipation should be approached in respect of specific measures in light of the following guidelines. First, in the case of measures shown by the United States to have been introduced subsequent to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that the United States has raised a presumption that it should not be held to have anticipated these measures and it is then for Japan to rebut that presumption. Such a rebuttal might be made, for example, by establishing that the measure at issue is so clearly contemplated in an earlier measure that the United States should be held to have anticipated it. However, there must be a clear connection shown. In our view, it is not sufficient to claim that a specific measure should have been anticipated because it is consistent with or a continuation of a past general government policy. As in the EEC - Oilseeds case (106), we do not believe that it would be appropriate to charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures, such as measures to improve what Japan describes as the inefficient Japanese distribution sector. Indeed, if a Member were held to anticipate all GATT-consistent measures, a non-violation claim would not be possible. Nor do we consider that as a general rule the United States should have reasonably anticipated Japanese measures that are similar to measures in other Members markets. In each such instance, the issue of reasonable anticipation needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Para. 10.80. [I]n the case of measures shown by Japan to have been introduced prior to the conclusion of the tariff negotiations at issue, it is our view that Japan has raised a presumption that the United States should be held to have anticipated those measures and it is for the United States to rebut that presumption. In this connection, it is our view that the United States is charged with knowledge of Japanese government measures as of the date of their publication. We realize that knowledge of a measures existence is not equivalent to understanding the impact of the measure on a specific product market. For example, a vague measure could be given substance through enforcement policies that are initially unexpected or later changed significantly. However, where the United States claims that it did not know of a measures relevance to market access conditions in respect of film or paper, we would expect the United States to clearly demonstrate why initially it could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or paper market and when it did realize the effect. Such a showing will need to be tied to the relevant points in time (i.e., the conclusions of the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) in order to assess the extent of the United States legitimate expectations of benefits from these three Rounds. A simple statement that a Members measures were so opaque and informal that their impact could not be assessed is not sufficient. While it is true that in most past non-violation cases, one could easily discern a clear link between a product-specific action and the effect on the tariff concession that it allegedly impaired, one can also discern a link between general measures affecting the internal sale and distribution of products, such as rules on advertising and premiums, and tariff concessions on products in general. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (India - Patents), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 42 e 45 Neste Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao corrigiu a confuso feita pelo Painel entre reclamaes de violao e de no-violao, observando que expectativas legtimas que no esto previstas no tratado no podem ser causa de violao. Para. 42. The meaning of this provision is clear: the only cause of action permitted under the TRIPS Agreement during the first five years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement is a violation complaint under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994. This case involves allegations of violation of obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. However, the Panel's invocation of the legitimate expectations of Members relating to conditions of competition melds the legally-distinct bases for violation and nonviolation complaints under Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 into one uniform cause of action. This is not consistent with either Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 or Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement (). Para. 45. The Panel misapplies Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Panel misunderstands the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are reflected in the language of the treaty itself. The duty of a treaty interpreter is to examine the words of the treaty to determine the intentions of the parties. This should be done in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna 250

Convention. But these principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, paras. 8.291, 8.295-8.298 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel rejeitou a alegao do Canad de que no poderia ter antecipado a proibio da comercializao e uso do amianto, dadas as diversas indicaes sobre a periculosidade da substncia j existentes poca da negociao tarifria. Para. 8.291. [P]revious panels found that a number of elements were not relevant. We consider it necessary to assess their applicability in relation to the circumstances of the present case.
(a) First of all, we note that the reports in Japan Film and EEC Oilseeds concluded that a specific measure could not be considered foreseeable solely because it was consistent with or a continuation of a past general government policy. However, we note that, in contrast to the two cases mentioned above, France had already developed a specific policy in response to the health problems created by asbestos before the adoption of the Decree. This factor must certainly be taken into account in our analysis. (b) The Panel in Japan Film, also concluded that it would not be appropriate to charge the United States with having reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures. Consequently, we do not consider that Canada reasonably anticipated all GATT-consistent measures, or even possible measures justifiable under Article XX. (c) Finally, insofar as the Decree postdates the most recent tariff negotiations, we could apply the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan Film, according to which normally Canada should not be considered to have anticipated a measure introduced after the tariff concession had been negotiated. However, we do not consider such a presumption to be consistent with the standard of proof that we found to be applicable in paragraph 8.272 above in the case of an allegation of non-violation nullification concerning measures falling under Article XX of the GATT 1994.

Para. 8.295. As we have found () the presumption applied by the Panel in Japan - Film cannot be applied to the present case. (107) Unlike Canada, which claims that no recent scientific development could have made the measure foreseeable, we consider that there is evidence to show that regulations restricting the use of asbestos could have been anticipated. First of all, the hazardous nature of chrysotile has long been known (). Para. 8.296. Moreover, in the light of the information submitted by the parties and the experts, we consider that the study of the diseases associated with the inhalation of asbestos is a field of science in which any possible conclusion would appear to be based on the observation of pathological cases day by day (). Para. 8.297. On the other hand, the accumulation of international and Community decisions concerning the use of asbestos, even if it did not necessarily make it certain that the use of asbestos would be banned by France, could not do other than create a climate which should have led Canada to anticipate a change in the attitude of the importing countries, especially in view of the long-established trend towards ever tighter restrictions on the use of asbestos. We also note that the use of chrysotile asbestos was banned by Members of the WTO well before it was banned by France. Admittedly, in Japan - Film the Panel considered that the adoption in other Members markets of measures similar to the measures in question could not make the latter foreseeable. However, here again it was a question of commercial measures. We consider that in the present case the situation is different since it concerns public health and the competent international organizations have already taken a position on the question. The adoption, in an already restrictive context, of public health measures by other States, faced with a social and economic situation similar to that in France, creates an environment in which the adoption of similar measures by France, is no longer unforeseeable. Para. 8.298. Moreover, as noted above, at the end of the Uruguay Round France already had in place a number of measures regulating the use of asbestos. These included, in particular, measures relating to the exposure of workers taken after asbestos was recognized as a carcinogen by the IARC (Decree 77-949 of 17 August 1977) and the adoption of ILO Convention 162, as well as for the purpose of implementing 251

Community directives applicable. The Panel also notes that Decree 88-466 of 28 April 1988 on products containing asbestos had prohibited the use of chrysotile asbestos in the manufacture of certain products. (108) Relatrio do Painel no caso Korea - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (Korea - Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, para. 7.75 Neste Relatrio, o Painel apontou que as expectativas legtimas devem ser examinadas luz do conhecimento disponvel sobre as intenes comuns, no apenas das Partes na controvrsia como tambm de todas as Partes na negociao. Para. 7.75. At the outset of our analysis of this issue, we must address some relevant issues relating to use of negotiating history which arose in the European Communities - Computer Equipment dispute. In that dispute, the Appellate Body specifically found that the standard of reasonable expectation or legitimate expectation existing with respect to non-violation cases had no role in reviewing negotiating history in order to aid in resolving the issues pertaining to a violation case. One of the reasons is that in a non-violation case the relevant question is what was the reasonable expectation of the complaining party. However, if it is necessary to go beyond the text in a violation case, the relevant question is to assess the objective evidence of the mutual understanding of the negotiating parties. (109) This involves not just the complaining and responding parties, but also involves possibly other parties to the negotiations. It is also important to note that there is a difference in perspectives of the reasonable expectations of one party as opposed to the mutual understanding of all the parties. The information available at the time of the negotiations may be available to some parties but not all. In other words, the evidence before the panel may be different in the two analyses and the weighting and probative value may also differ. g) Anulada ou reduzida Relatrio do Painel no caso Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan - Film), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS44/R, paras. 10.82, 10.84-10.88 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel estabeleceu a diviso do nus da prova, determinando que a Parte demandante deve demonstrar uma clara correlao entre as medidas questionadas e os efeitos adversos causados s condies de concorrncia de seus produtos. Para. 10.82. [I]t must be demonstrated that the competitive position of the imported products subject to and benefitting from a relevant market access (tariff) concession is being upset by (nullified or impaired () as the result of) the application of a measure not reasonably anticipated. The equation of nullification or impairment with upsetting the competitive relationship established between domestic and imported products as a result of tariff concessions has been consistently used by GATT panels examining non-violation complaints. For example, the EEC - Oilseeds panel, in describing its findings, stated that it had found () that the subsidies concerned had impaired the tariff concession because they upset the competitive relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds, not because of any effect on trade flows. (110) The same language was used in the Australian Subsidy and Germany - Sardines cases. Thus, in this case, it is up to the United States to prove that the governmental measures that it cites have upset the competitive relationship between domestic and imported photographic film and paper in Japan to the detriment of imports. In other words, the United States must show a clear correlation between the measures and the adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationships. Para. 10.84. As to the first issue () Japan should be responsible for what is caused by measures attributable to the Japanese Government as opposed, for example, to what is caused by restrictive business conduct attributable to private economic actors. At this stage of the proceeding, the issue is whether such a measure has caused nullification or impairment, i.e., whether it has made more than a de minimis contribution to nullification or impairment. Para. 10.85. In respect of the second issue () even in the absence of de jure discrimination (measures which on their face discriminate as to origin), it may be possible for the United States to show de facto 252

discrimination (measures which have a disparate impact on imports). However, in such circumstances, the complaining party is called upon to make a detailed showing of any claimed disproportionate impact on imports resulting from the origin-neutral measure. And, the burden of demonstrating such impact may be significantly more difficult where the relationship between the measure and the product is quest ionable. Para. 10.86. We note that WTO/GATT case law on the issue of de facto discrimination is reasonably well developed, both in regard to the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment under GATT Article I (111) and in regard to that of national treatment under GATT Article II (112) () We consider that despite the fact that these past cases dealt with GATT provisions other than Article XXIII:1(b), the reasoning contained therein appears to be equally applicable in addressing the question of de facto discrimination with respect to claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, subject, of course, to the caveat, that in an Article XXIII:1(b) case the issue is not whether equality of competitive conditions exists but whether the relative conditions of competition which existed between domestic and foreign products as a consequence of the relevant tariff concessions have been upset. Para. 10.87. The third issue is the relevance of intent to causality (). We note () that Article XXIII:1(b) does not require a proof of intent of nullification or impairment of benefits by a government adopting a measure. What matters for purposes of establishing causality is the impact of a measure, i.e. whether it upsets competitive relationships. Nonetheless, intent may not be irrelevant. In our view, if a measure that appears on its face to be origin-neutral in its effect on domestic and imported products is nevertheless shown to have been intended to restrict imports, we may be more inclined to find a causal relationship in specific cases, bearing in mind that intent is not determinative where it in fact exists. Para. 10.88. Finally, as for the US position that the Panel should examine the impact of the measures in combination as well as individually (a position contested by Japan), we do not reject the possibility of such an impact. It is not without logic that a measure, when analyzed in isolation, may have only very limited impact on competitive conditions in a market, but may have a more significant impact on such conditions when seen in the context of - in combination with - a larger set of measures. Notwithstanding the logic of this theoretical argument, however, we are sensitive to the fact that the technique of engaging in a combined assessment of measures so as to determine causation is subject to potential abuse and therefore must be approached with caution and circumscribed as necessary. Relatrio do Painel no caso European Communities - Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/R, para. 8.289 Neste Relatrio, o Painel observou que a proibio de importaes claramente afeta de modo negativo as condies de concorrncia de importados. Nesse caso, a questo relevante se a proibio poderia ter sido antecipada razoavelmente pelo governo demandante. Para. 8.289. [T]he Panel finds it appropriate to consider that in view of the type of measure in question the upsetting of the competitive relationship can be assumed. By it s very nature, an import ban constitutes a denial of any opportunity for competition, whatever the import volume that existed before the introduction of the ban. We will therefore concentrate on the question of whether the measure could reasonably have been anticipated by the Canadian Government at the time that it was negotiating the various tariff concessions covering the products concerned. h) Reclamao de no-violao com relao ao Acordo de Compras Governamentais Relatrio do Painel no caso Korea - Measures Affecting Government Procurement (Korea Procurement), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS163/R, paras. 7.93 e 7.101 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel posicionou-se no sentido de que preciso verificar a anulao ou prejuzo no apenas observando o cumprimento da letra do tratado, mas tambm o que foi negociado. Para. 7.93. [T]he non-violation remedy as it has developed in GATT/ WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles of customary international law. As noted above, the basic premise 253

is that Members should not take actions, even those consistent with the letter of the treaty, which might serve to undermine the reasonable expectations of negotiating partners. This has traditionally arisen in the context of actions which might undermine the value of negotiated tariff concessions. In our view, this is a further development of the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the context of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1947 and disputes that arose thereunder, and subsequently in the WTO Agreements, particularly in Article 26 of the DSU. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention (113) in the following manner:
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Para. 7.101. [W]e will review the claim of nullification or impairment raised by the United States within the framework of principles of international law which are generally applicable not only to performance of treaties but also to treaty negotiation. (114) To do otherwise potentially would leave a gap in the applicability of the law generally to WTO disputes and we see no evidence in the language of the WTO Agreements that such a gap was intended. If the non-violation remedy were deemed not to provide a relief for such problems as have arisen in the present case regarding good faith and error in the negotiation of GPA commitments (and one might add, in tariff and services commitments under other WTO Agreements), then nothing could be done about them within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism if general rules of customary international law on good faith and error in treaty negotiations were ruled not to be applicable. As was argued above, that would not be in conformity with the normal relationship between international law and treaty law or with the WTO Agreements. 4. Relao entre Artigo XXIII:1(a) e Artigo XXIII:1(b)

Relatrio do Painel no caso EEC - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and related Animal - Feed Proteins (EEC - Oilseeds I), adotado em 25 de Janeiro de 1990, Demandante: EUA, L/6627, BISD 37S/86, para. 142 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT confirmou a possibilidade de exame de uma reclamao de noviolao mesmo no caso de uma alegao de violao,pois pode haver violao em relao a determinados agentes econmicos e anulao ou prejuzo em relao a outros agentes econmicos. Para. 142. (...) The Panel (...) examined whether its finding that the payments to the pro cessors are inconsistent with the General Agreement might make an examination of the question of the nullification or impairment of the tariff concessions unnecessary. The Panel noted that this would be the case if compliance by the Community with the finding on Article III:4 would necessarily remove the basis of the United States claim of nullification or impairment. The Panel noted that the subsidies the Community presently grants to producers of oilseeds result from the maintenance of producer prices at levels generally exceeding the price of competing imports through payments to processors conditional upon the purchase or transformation of domestic oilseeds. The finding of the Panel under Article III:4 does not relate to the benefits accruing to the Community producers under the Community subsidy schemes but only to the benefits accruing to processors. The Panel further noted that the Community could comply with the Panels finding on Article III and still make available in the Community market oilseeds produced with the benefit of producer prices maintained at levels exceeding the price of competing imports. Compliance with the finding on Article III thus could, but would not necessarily, eliminate the basis of the United States complaint that the benefits accruing to the Community producers of oilseeds impair the Communitys tariff concessions for oilseeds. The Panel therefore decided that it had to examine that complaint as well. Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso European Communities - Measures Afecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (EC - Asbestos), Demandante: Canad, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 185 Neste Relatrio, o rgo de Apelao citou um Relatrio de Painel do GATT descrevendo o objetivo das reclamaes de no-violao como sendo a proteo de oportunidades competitivas que possam legitimamente ser esperadas em virtude das concesses tarifrias realizadas.

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Para. 185. Article XXIII:1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has failed to carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A claim under Article XXIII:1(a), therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994. Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a Member has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to another Member, whether or not that measure conflicts with the provisions of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as non-violation cases; we note, though, that the word non-violation does not appear in this provision. The purpose of this rather unusual remedy was described by the panel in European Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins () in the following terms:
The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement. (115) (emphasis added)

5.

Artigo XXIII:2 a) Se as Partes Contratantes interessadas no chegarem a um Acordo satisfatrio

Relatrio do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, para. 10 Este Painel do GATT chancelou a exigncia, hoje codificada no DSU, de que uma tentativa de soluo negociada (consultas) preceda o ingresso com uma reclamao perante os rgos de adjudicao. Para. 10. Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides that the Contracting Parties shall promptly investigate any matter referred to them under that paragraph. From the context it is obvious, however, that before a matter can be so referred to the Contracting Parties it must have been the subject of representations or proposals made pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Article which have not resulted in a satisfactory adjustment (unless the difficulty is of the type referred to in paragraph 1(c) of the Article). (116) b) as Partes Contratantes ... dirigiro recomendaes especiais e apropriadas ... ou baixaro normas sobre a questo Relatrio do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962, Demandante: Uruguai, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 11-12 e 20 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT explicitou a distino entre recomendao e deciso: a primeira cabe sempre que necessrio para levar a uma soluo satisfatria do caso; a segunda quando houver uma questo controversa acerca do direito ou dos fatos. Caso se determine que uma medida contrria s regras do GATT, o Painel deve recomendar que esta seja removida. Para. 11. Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII provides, apart from promptly investigating any matter so referr ed to them, for two kinds of action by the Contracting Parties, namely:
(i) they shall make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling on the matter; (ii) they may authorize the suspension of concessions or obligations. The action stated under (i) is obligatory and must be taken in all cases where there can be an appropriate recommendation or ruling. The action under (ii) is to be taken at the discretion of the Contracting Parties in defined circumstances.

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Para. 12. The paragraph states that the Contracting Parties shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be concerned or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. Whilst a ruling is called for only when there is a point of contention on fact or law, recommendations should always be appropriate whenever, in the view of the Contracting Parties, they would lead to a satisfactory adjustment of the matter. Para. 20. Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with th e provisions of the General Agreement (and is not covered by the existing legislation clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in all cases recommended that the measure in question be removed. c) Recomendaes com relao a reclamaes de violao segundo Artigo XXIII:1(a) Relatrio do Painel no caso Norway Trondheim Toll Ring, adotado em 13 de Maio de 1992, Demandante: EUA, GPR.DS2/R, BISD 40S/319, para. 4.21 Neste Relatrio, o Painel do GATT consolidou o entendimento, hoje codificado no DSU, de que a compensao deve ser adotada somente se a remoo da medida for impraticvel. A compensao deve ser adotada temporariamente, at que a medida incompatvel com as regras multilaterais seja removida. Para. 4.21. Moreover, the Panel observed that, under the GATT, it was customary for panels to make findings regarding conformity with the General Agreement and to recommend that any measures found inconsistent with the General Agreement be terminated or brought into conformity from the time that the recommendation was adopted. The provision of compensation had been resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure was impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which were inconsistent with the General Agreement (BISD, 26S/216). Questions relating to compensation or withdrawal of benefits had been dealt with in a stage of the dispute settlement procedure subsequent to the adoption of panel reports. d) Recomendaes com relao a reclamaes de no-violao segundo Artigo XXIII:1(b) Relatrio do Painel no caso EEC - Canned Fruit, adotado em 20 de Fevereiro de 1985, Demandante: EUA, L/5778, para. 82 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT observou que a recomendao, em casos de no-violao, deve ser para que o Membro - cuja medida causou anulao ou prejuzo - considere maneiras de remover a desigualdade de concorrncia causada pela medida. Esta recomendao no gera uma obrigao jurdica de remoo da medida e no prevalece sobre outras maneiras de solucionar a controvrsia. Para. 82. Having established the existence of nullification and impairment of tariff concessions with respect to canned peaches, canned pears, and canned fruit mixtures, the Panel considered what suggestions it could make so as to assist CONTRACTING PARTIES in their task of formulating recommendations to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the matter. The Panel noted that in past non -violation complaints of nullification or impairment of tariff concessions (BISD II/195; 1S/30, 31, 59) the CONTRACTING PARTIES had recommended that the party against which the finding had been made consider ways and means to remove the competitive inequality brought about by the measure at issue. The Panel was aware of the finding of the Working Party Report on the Australian subsidy on ammonium sulphate that there is nothing in Article XXIII which would empower the CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to withdraw or reduce a consumption subsidy (...) and that the ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII is that of authorizing an affected contracting party to suspend the application of appropriate obligations or concessions under the General Agreement (BISD II/195, para. 16). In making the following draft recommendation, the Panel also wishes to emphasize that the recommendation cannot constitute a legal obligation for the EEC to remove or reduce its domestic production subsidies and does not preclude other modes of settling the dispute such as granting of compensation or, in the last resort, a request for authorization of suspension of concessions. The Panel also wishes to emphasize that this recommendation cannot detract from the rights of contracting parties under Article XXIV:6 of the General Agreement. 256

Relatrio do Painel no caso EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile (II), (EEC - Dessert Apples), adotado em 22 de Junho de 1989, Demandante: Chile, L/6491, BISD 36S/93, paras. 12.35-12.36 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT manifestou o entendimento, hoje consolidado no DSU, de que a recomendao no caso de medidas incompatveis com os Acordos deve ser para a remoo da medida. No h obrigao da Parte de oferecer compensao, a qual voluntria. A compensao, portanto, deve ser negociada pelas Partes, no cabendo ao Painel emitir uma recomendao nesse sentido. Para. 12.35. The Panel observed that it was customary for a panel examining complaints under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII to make a finding regarding nullification or impairment of benefits and to recommend the termination of measures found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement. It noted that there was no provision in the General Agreement obliging contracting parties to provide compensation, and that the Annex to the 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance indicated that:
(...) The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which are inconsistent with the General Agreement.

The Panel further recalled that a 1965 Secretariat note discussed this issue in relation to residual quantitative restrictions affecting developing countries. This note indicated:
(...) Where a proposal for compensation has been made, it would appear that it is open to the Contracting Parties to make an assessment of the loss sustained (...) and to make a recommendation that pending elimination of these restrictions the country applying such restrictions should consider the establishment of other appropriate concessions which would serve to compensate this loss. There are, however, two points which need to be noted in this connection. Firstly, any such recommendation under the provisions of the present Article XXIII can be implemented only to the extent that it proves acceptable to the contracting party to whom it is addressed. If such contracting party is not in a position to accept the recommendation, the final sanction must remain the authority for withdrawing equivalent obligations as provided in paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. Secondly, the nature of the compensatory concessions and the items on which these are offered would have to be determined by the contracting party to whom the recommendation is directed and would have to be a matter of agreement between the parties concerned. It would not be possible for a panel or other body set up by the Contracting Parties to adjudicate on the specific compensations that should be offered (...).

Para. 12.36. The Panel endorsed the views contained in this note. It recognized that it would be possible for the EEC and Chile to negotiate compensation consistent with the provisions of the General Agreement; however the Panel did not consider that it would be appropriate for it to make a recommendation on this matter. e) As circunstncias suficientemente graves para justificar suspenso da aplicao de qualquer obrigao ou concesso Relatrio do Painel no caso Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, adotado em 16 de Novembro de 1962, Demandante: EUA, L/1923, BISD 11S/95, paras. 13 e 20-21 Nesta controvrsia, o Painel do GATT formalizou o procedimento, hoje codificado no DSU, em duas fases. Na primeira fase, o Painel determina a incompatibilidade da medida com as regras do sistema multilateral de comrcio e recomenda que a medida seja removida. Caso a medida no seja removida, o Painel passa segunda fase o ltimo recurso , na qual recomenda s Partes Contratantes (hoje, ao DSB) que autorize a suspenso de concesses e outras obrigaes devidas pelo Membro violador ao Membro prejudicado.

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Para. 13. The latter part of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII states that if the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances. In the view of the Panel the requirement that the situation must be serious enough limits the applicability of the provision to cases where there is nullification or impairment; it would at any rate be difficult to conceive a situation in which the suspension of concessions or obligations could be appropriate where nullification or impairment was not involved. Para. 20. Where the Panel finds that there is prima facie nullification or impairment of benefits accruing to Uruguay under the Agreement, it has proposed recommendations based on that finding. Where a measure affecting imports is maintained clearly in contradiction with the provisions of the General Agreement (and is not covered by the existing legislation clause of a Protocol), the Panel has in all cases recommended that the measure in question be removed. Reference is made in these recommendations based on nullification or impairment to the possibility of further action, in the event of non-fulfillment, by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII. In respect of these particular cases the Panel proposes the following procedure for adoption by the CONTRACTING PARTIES: The contracting parties concerned be asked to report on their action taken to comply with the CONTRACTING PARTIES' Recommendations or any other satisfactory adjustment (such as the provision of suitable concessions acceptable to Uruguay) by 1 March 1963. If by that date the Recommendations are not carried out and no satisfactory adjustment is made, the circumstances shall be deemed to be serious enough to justify action under the penultimate sentence of Article XXIII:2 and Uruguay shall be entitled immediately to ask for the authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations. The CONTRACTING PARTIES should make arrangements for prompt determination as to what concessions or obligations the suspension of which should be authorized. Para. 21. In recommending this two-stage procedure, the Panel had principally in mind, once again, the requirement stated in Article XXIII:2 that the situation must be serious enough before suspension should be authorized. It noted, as a report of the ninth session (BISD, Third Supplement, pages 250-251) had made it clear, the action of authorization of suspension of concessions or obligations should never be taken except as a last resort; it also noted that the aim of Uruguay at this stage was to seek the prompt removal of the measures in question. III. Comentrios

Ainda sob a gide do antigo GATT e, portanto, previamente criao da OMC, o Artigo XXIII do GATT definiu as linhas gerais do sistema de soluo de controvrsias, bem como os seus respectivos instrumentos (violation, non-violation e situation complaints). Diferentemente da maioria dos acordos internacionais, as disposies relativas soluo de disputas no GATT no fazem qualquer meno a direitos e obrigaes das Partes Contratantes, violao de obrigaes decorrentes do tratado e, tampouco, a controvrsias legais sobre interpretao do tratado ou qualquer questo de direito internacional. (117) Ao contrrio, adotou-se no Artigo XXIII do GATT o conceito chave de anulao ou reduo de uma vantagem decorrente direta ou indiretamente do Acordo (118) (nullification or impairment of any benefit ... accruing under this Agreement) cuja aplicao foi referendada tanto pela jurisprudncia desenvolvida no antigo sistema do GATT, bem como pelos Relatrios do atual sistema de soluo de controvrsias da OMC. At mesmo casos nos quais foi alegada violao a obrigaes do Acordo (conforme disposto no Artigo XXIII:1(a) do GATT), reconheceu-se a anulao ou reduo de vantagem prima facie. (119) Muitos dos conceitos incorporados pelo Artigo XXIII do GATT, no entanto, carecem de preciso jurdica: conceitos como anulao ou reduo; qualquer vantagem; qualquer objetivo e qualquer situao jamais foram objeto de anlise e definio, seja pelo prprio GATT, seja pelos sistemas de soluo de controvrsias do GATT 47 e da OMC. Tendo como origem tratados bilaterais de comrcio, negociados nos anos 20 e 30, o conceito de anulao ou reduo foi concebido para evitar que concesses tarifrias fossem enfraquecidas por barreiras no -tarifrias 258

ou medidas governamentais sem carter comercial. Buscava-se, portanto, impedir que medidas em conformidade com os termos dos tratados pudessem ter, em contrapartida, o efeito de anular ou reduzir os objetivos e obrigaes assumidas sob os mesmos. A evoluo jurisprudencial confirma, no entanto, que a falta de segurana jurdica dos conceitos adotados pelo Artigo XXIII, principalmente em relao aos casos de no-violao, acabou por inibir a utilizao do mencionado instrumento pelos Membros da OMC: dos 15 casos em que o Artigo XXIII:1(b) foi utilizado como argumento jurdico principal, apenas 6 tiveram seus respectivos pedidos acolhidos (120) (todos, ressalte-se, durante a existncia do GATT). Em contrapartida, dos 4 casos em que demandas de no-violao foram analisadas pelo DSB da OMC (121), todos tiveram seus pedidos rejeitados. Relatrios de Painis da poca do GATT, adotados pelas Partes Contratantes, ressaltaram que o termo anulao ou reduo de vantagens no se refere a danos ao comrcio, mas sim a mudanas imprevisveis nas condies de competitividade dos produtos importados em relao aos produtos domsticos. No seria necessria, portanto, a prova do dano para que se reconhecesse a anulao ou reduo de um benefcio. Questiona-se, no entanto, se a proteo do equilbrio dos interesses das Partes Contratantes, finalidade almejada quando da elaborao do Artigo XXIII, ainda estaria apta a fornecer parmetros para a reviso de medidas questionveis perante os Acordos da OMC. A prpria teoria das expectativas legtimas foi muito pouco explorada com relao a demandas de no-violao para se permitir o uso efetivo do Artigo em questo. Ademais, no h qualquer parmetro desenvolvido jurisprudencialmente que permita a utilizao do Artigo XXIII:1(c) (situation complaints) como clusula de escape para impedir que mudanas nas circunstncias acabem por prejudicar o gozo de benefcios acordados sob a gide da OMC a um determinado Membro. Embora muito tenha sido desenvolvido atravs do mecanismo de soluo de controvrsias, existem ainda muitas lacunas a serem preenchidas na interpretao dos instrumentos previstos pelo Artigo XXIII. Em alguns dos poucos casos de no-violao (122) analisados ainda na poca do GATT 1947, os termos vantagens resultantes ... deste Acordo foram aplicados tambm a outros benefcios sem carter tarifrio decorrentes do GATT. No ficou clara, no entanto, a extenso da aplicabilidade do Artigo XXIII para se determinar, por exemplo, quais outros benefcios alm dos no-tarifrios seriam acionveis sob os Artigos XXIII:1(b) e (c). Tampouco foi possvel definir, atravs da jurisprudncia, a precisa relao entre as demandas de violao e a proteo suplementar oferecida pelo uso de alegaes de no-violao.

FOOTENOTES:
Footnote 92: EC - Commercial Vessels, para. 8.2; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15; EEC - Bananas II, para. 8.4 etc. Footnote 93: Artigo 3.8 DSU: In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge. Footnote 94: Appellate Body Report, India - Patents, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, paras. 36 and 41. Footnote 95: Adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 42. Footnote 96: Original footnote: Report of the Working Party on Australia - Ammonium Sulphate; Panel Report on Germany Sardines; [Panel Report on] Uruguay - Recourse to Article XXIII; Panel Report on EC - Citrus; Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit; [Panel Report on] Japan - Semi-Conductors; EEC - Oilseeds I; [Panel Report on] US - Sugar Waiver. Footnote 97: Original footnote: In EEC - Oilseeds I, the United States stated that it concurred in the proposition that non -violation nullification or impairment should remain an exceptional concept. Although this concept had been in the text of Article XXIII of the General Agreement from the outset, a cautious approach should continue to be taken in applying the concept. EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 114. The EEC in that case stated that recourse to the non -violation concept under Article XXIII:1(b) should remain exceptional, since otherwise the trading world would be plunged into a state of precariousness and uncertainty. Ibid, para. 113. Footnote 98: Original footnote: Panel Report on Japan - Film, para. 10.36. Footnote 99: Original footnote: GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144. Footnote 100: Original footnote: See Panel Report on US - Gasoline, para. 6.19, where the panel observed that it had not been the usual practice of a panel established under the General Agreement to rule on measures that, at the time the panels terms of reference were fixed, were not and would not become effective. See also Panel Report on Argentina - Footwear, Textiles and Apparel, pp. 8486. Footnote 101: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on US - Wool Shirts and Blouses, where the panel ruled on a measure that was revoked after the interim review but before issuance of the final report to the parties; Panel Report on EEC - Measure on Animal Feed Proteins, where the panel ruled on a discontinued measure, but one that had terminated after the terms of reference of the panel

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had already been agreed; Panel Report on United States - Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, para. 4.3., where the panel ruled on the GATT consistency of a withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties agreement to this procedure; Panel Report on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, where the panel ruled on a measure which had terminated before agreement on the panels terms of reference but where the terms of reference specifically included the terminated measure and, given its seasonal nature, there remained the prospect of its reintroduction. Footnote 102: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on EEC - Canned Fruit; and EEC - Oilseeds I. Footnote 103: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Canned Fruit, para. 54. Footnote 104: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 144-146. Footnote 105: Original footnote: The 1961 report referenced to is the GATT Panel Report on Operation of the Provisions of Article XVI, adopted on 21 November 1961, BISD 10S/201. Footnote 106: Original footnote: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, paras. 147 and 148. Footnote 107: Original footnote: Even if it were applicable, we consider that the EC rebutted this presumption by their references to the systems established at international and Community level concerning the use of asbestos. Footnote 108: Original footnote: See Annex II, reply of the European Communities to the Panels question No. 4 at the Second Meeting with the Parties, paras. 254 to 261. Footnote 109: Original footnote: Appellate Body Report on EC - Computer Equipment at paragraphs 81-84, 93. Footnote 110: Original footnote: Follow-up on the GATT Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds, BISD 39S/91, para. 77 (emphasis added). Footnote 111: Original footnote: See, e.g., Panel Report on European Economic Community - Imports of Beef from Canada, paras. 4.2, 4.3. Footnote 112: Original footnote: See Panel Reports on US - Section 337, para. 5.11; Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, paras. 5.12-5.14 and 5.30-5.31; US - Malt Beverages, para. 5.30; and Panel Reports on US - Gasoline, para. 6.10; Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 6.33; and EC - Bananas III, paras. 7.179-7.180. Footnote 113: Original footnote: A reference to the rule of pacta sunt servanda also appears in the preamble to the Vienna Convention. Footnote 114: Original footnote: We note that DSU Article 7.1 requires that the relevant covered agreement be cited in the request for a panel and reflected in the terms of reference of a panel. That is not a bar to a broader analysis of the type we are following here, for the GPA would be the referenced covered agreement and, in our view, we are merely fully examining the issue of non-violation raised by the United States. We are merely doing it within the broader context of customary international law rather than limiting it to the traditional analysis that accords with the extended concept of pacta sunt servanda. The purpose of the terms of reference is to properly identify the claims of the party and therefore the scope of a panels review. We do not see any basis for arguing th at the terms of reference are meant to exclude reference to the broader rules of customary international law in interpreting a claim properly before the Panel. Footnote 115: Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds I, para. 144. Footnote 116: Original footnote: However, at least in respect of quantitative import restrictions applied inconsistently with the General Agreement, it has been agreed by the Contracting Parties that the holding of a consultation under paragraph 1 of Article XXII would fulfil the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article XXIII (see BISD, Ninth Supplement, pages 19-20). Footnote 117: O Artigo 36 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justia, por seu turno, menciona em seu pargrafo segundo que: 2. Os Estados, partes do presente Estatuto, podero, em qualquer momento, declarar que reconhecem como obrigatria, ipso facto e sem acordos especial, em relao a qualquer outro Estado que aceite a mesma obrigao, a jurisdio da Corte em todas as controvrsias de ordem jurdica que tenham por objeto: a) a interpretao de um tratado; b) qualquer ponto de direito internacional; c) a existncia de qualquer fato que, se verificado, constituiria violao de um compromisso internacional; d) a natureza ou extenso da reparao devida pela ruptura de um compromisso internacional. (<http://www.mp.ma.gov.br/site/centrosapoio/DirHumanos/EstatCorteInternacional.htm>). Footnote 118: Artigo XXIII:1: No caso de uma Parte Contratante considerar que uma vantagem qualquer resultante para ela, direta ou indiretamente, do presente Acordo, est sendo anulada ou reduzida, ou que um dos objetivos do Acordo est sendo dificultado (...). Footnote 119: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, para. ; EEC Bananas II, paras. 456-477; EC - Biotech Products, para. 8.15. Footnote 120: EC - Citrus; EEC - Oilseeds I; EEC - Oilseeds II; EC - Canned Fruit; Australia Subsidies e Germany Sardines. Footnote 121: Japan - Film; EC Asbestos; EC Poultry e Korea Procurement. Footnote 122: Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII; EEC - Citrus; Japan Nullification or Impairment of the Benefits Accruing to the EEC under the General Agreement and Impediment to the Attainment of GATT Objectives; US - Nicaragua Trade; e Japan Semi-Conductors.

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Artigo XXIV

Joo Henrique Ribeiro Roriz Lucas da Silva Tasquetto IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingls Article XXIV Territorial Application - Frontier Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas 24.1 The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs territories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting party; Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to create any rights or obligations as between two or more customs territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application by a single contracting party. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to mean any territory with respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory with other territories. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent: (a) Advantages accorded by any contracting party to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in conflict with the Treaties of Peace arising out of the Second World War.

24.2

24.3

(b)

24.4

The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that: (a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of trade with contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be; with respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a freetrade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation of such free trade area or the adoption of such 261

24.5

(b)

interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may be; and (c) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time.

24.6

If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a contracting party proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation already afforded by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other constituents of the union. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that agreement and taking due account of the information made available in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a), the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations. Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5 (c) shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the contracting parties concerned to consult with them if the change seems likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the free-trade area.

24.7

(b)

(c)

24.8

For the purposes of this Agreement: (a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories; and, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union;

(ii)

(b)

A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories. 262

24.9

The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be affected by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or adjusted by means of negotiations with contracting parties affected.* This procedure of negotiations with affected contracting parties shall, in particular, apply to the elimination of preferences required to conform with the provisions of paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b).

24.10 The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article. 24.11 Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent States and recognizing the fact that they have long constituted an economic unit, the contracting parties agree that the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from entering into special arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis.* 24.12 Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territories. IB. Texto do Artigo em Portugus Artigo XXIV Aplicao Territorial Trfico Fronteirio Unies Aduaneiras e Zonas de Livre Troca 24.1 As disposies do presente Acordo aplicar-se-o ao territrio aduaneiro metropolitano das Partes Contratantes, assim como a qualquer outro territrio aduaneiro, a respeito do qual o presente Acordo tenha sido aceito nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em virtude do Artigo XXXIII ou de Acordo com o Protocolo de Aplicao Provisria. Cada um desses territrios aduaneiros ser considerado como se fosse uma parte no Acordo, exclusivamente para fins de aplicao territorial desse Acordo, com a condio de que as estipulaes do presente pargrafo no sero interpretadas como estabelecendo os direitos e obrigaes entre dois ou vrios territrios aduaneiros, a respeito dos quais o presente Acordo tenha sido aceito nos termos do Artigo XXVI ou seja aplicado em virtude do Artigo XXXIII ou na conformidade do Protocolo de Aplicao Provisria, por uma s Parte Contratante. Para os fins de aplicao do presente Acordo, entende-se por territrio aduaneiro todo o territrio para o qual tarifas aduaneiras distintas ou outras regulamentaes aplicveis s trocas comerciais sejam mantidas a respeito de outros territrios para uma parte substancial do comrcio do territrio em questo. As disposies do presente Acordo no devero ser interpretadas como obstculo: (a) s vantagens concedidas por uma Parte Contratante a pases limtrofes, para facilitar o trfico fronteirio; ou s vantagens concedidas ao comrcio com o Territrio livre de Trieste pelos pases limtrofes desse Territrio, com a condio de que tais vantagens no sejam incompatveis com as disposies dos tratados de paz resultantes da segunda guerra mundial.

24.2

24.3

(b)

24.4

As Partes Contratantes reconhecem que recomendvel aumentar a liberdade do comrcio desenvolvendo, atravs de acordos livremente concludos, uma integrao mais estreita das economias dos pases participantes de tais acordos. Reconhecem igualmente que o estabelecimento de uma unio aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre comrcio deve ter por finalidade facilitar o comrcio 263

24.5

entre os territrios constitutivos e no opor obstculos ao comrcio de outras Partes Contratantes com esses territrios. Em consequncia, as disposies do presente Acordo no se oporo formao de uma unio aduaneira entre os territrios das Partes Contratantes ou ao estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca ou adoo de Acordo provisrio necessrio para a formao de uma unio aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre troca, com a condio de que: (a) no caso de uma unio aduaneira ou de um Acordo provisrio concludo visando formao de uma unio aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros, estabelecidos no momento da formao dessa unio ou da concluso desse Acordo provisrio, no sero, no seu conjunto, no que respeita ao comrcio com as Partes Contratantes estranhas a tais unies ou acordos, de uma incidncia geral mais elevada, nem os regulamentos de trocas comerciais mais rigorosos, que os direitos e as regulamentaes aplicveis s trocas comerciais nos territrios constitutivos dessa unio, antes da formao de tal unio ou da concluso do acordo, segundo o caso; no caso de uma zona de livre troca ou de um Acordo provisrio concludo visando a formao de uma zona de livre troca, os direitos aduaneiros mantidos em cada territrio constitutivo, no que respeita ao comrcio das Partes Contratantes que no fazem parte de um tal territrio ou que no participam de tal acordo, no momento da formao da zona ou da concluso do Acordo provisrio, no sero mais elevados, nem as outras regulamentaes de trocas comerciais mais rigorosas que os direitos e regulamentaes correspondentes existentes nos mesmos territrios antes da formao dessa zona ou da concluso do Acordo provisrio, segundo o caso; e com a condio de que todo Acordo provisrio, tendo em vista as alneas (a) e (b), compreenda um plano e um programa para a formao de uma unio aduaneira ou o estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca num prazo razovel.

(b)

(c)

24.6

Se, em lugar das condies enumeradas na alnea (a) do 5, uma Parte Contratante se proponha majorar um direito de maneira incompatvel com as disposies do Artigo II, o procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII ser aplicvel. Na determinao das compensaes, levar-se- devidamente em conta a compensao que j tenha provindo das redues do direito correspondente aplicado pelos outros territrios constitutivos da unio. (a) Toda Parte Contratante que resolva participar de uma unio aduaneira ou de uma zona de livre troca ou de um Acordo provisrio, concludo para o estabelecimento de tal unio ou de tal zona, comunicar sem demora s Partes Contratantes e lhes fornecer, a respeito dessa unio ou dessa zona, todas as informaes que lhes permitam enderear s Partes Contratantes os relatrios e recomendaes que julgarem apropriados; Se, depois de ter estudado o plano e o programa compreendidos no Acordo provisrio de que trata o pargrafo 5, de Acordo com as partes deste acordo, e ter devidamente em conta as informaes fornecidas nos termos da alnea (a), as Partes Contratantes verificarem que o acordo no suscetvel de resultar em uma unio aduaneira ou no estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca, nos prazos previstos pelas partes de acordo, ou que tais prazos no sejam razoveis, faro recomendaes s partes do acordo. As partes no mantero nem poro em vigor, conforme o caso, tal acordo, se no estiverem dispostas a modific-lo, tendo em vista essas recomendaes. Qualquer modificao substancial do plano ou do programa previsto na alnea (c) do pargrafo 5 dever ser comunicada s Partes Contratantes, que podero pedir s Partes Contratantes interessadas que a consultem, se a modificao parecer suscetvel de comprometer ou retardar, indevidamente, a formao da unio aduaneira ou o estabelecimento da zona de livre troca.

24.7

(b)

(c)

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24.8

Para fins de aplicao do presente Acordo: (a) entende-se por unio aduaneira, a substituio, por um s territrio aduaneiro, de dois ou mais territrios aduaneiros, de modo que: (i) os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentaes restritivas das trocas comerciais (com exceo, na medida necessria, das restries autorizadas nos termos dos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV e XX) sejam eliminados para a maioria das trocas comerciais entre os territrios constitutivos da unio, ou ao menos para a maioria das trocas comerciais relativas aos produtos originrios desses territrios; e, exceo das disposies do pargrafo 9 os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentaes idnticas em substncia sejam aplicadas, por qualquer membro da unio, no comrcio com os territrios no compreendidos naqueles;

(ii)

(b)

entende-se por zona de livre troca um grupo de dois ou mais territrios aduaneiros entre os quais os direitos aduaneiros e outras regulamentaes restritivas das trocas comerciais (com exceo, na medida necessria, das restries autorizadas nos termos dos Artigos XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV e XX) so eliminados para a maioria das trocas comerciais relativas aos produtos originrios dos territrios constitutivos da zona de livre troca.

24.9

As preferncias previstas no pargrafo 2 do Artigo I no sero afetadas pela formao de uma unio aduaneira ou pelo estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca; podero, entretanto, ser eliminadas ou ajustadas por via de negociao com as Partes Contratantes interessadas. Este procedimento de negociao com as Partes Contratantes interessadas se aplicar notadamente na eliminao das preferncias necessrias para que os dispositivos das alneas (a), (i) e (b) do pargrafo 8 sejam observadas.

24.10 As Partes Contratantes podero, por deciso tomada por maioria de dois teros, aprovar as propostas que no estejam inteiramente de Acordo com as disposies dos pargrafos 5 a 9, inclusive, com a condio de que elas visem formao de uma unio aduaneira ou ao estabelecimento de uma zona de livre troca, no sentido do presente Artigo. 24.11 Levando em conta as circunstncias excepcionais que resultam da constituio da ndia e do Paquisto em estados independentes, e reconhecendo que esses dois estados formaram, durante muito tempo, uma unidade econmica, as Partes Contratantes ajustam que as disposies do presente Acordo no impediro aqueles pases de concluir acordos particulares referentes ao comrcio mtuo, atendendo a que as suas relaes comerciais recprocas sejam estabelecidas definitivamente. 24.12 Cada Parte Contratante tomar todas as medidas razoveis de sua alada, para que as autoridades governamentais ou administrativas, regionais ou locais, em seu territrio, observem as disposies do presente acordo. Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo 24 em Ingls Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Members, Having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994; Recognizing that customs unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in number and importance since the establishment of GATT 1947 and today cover a significant proportion of world trade;

265

Recognizing the contribution to the expansion of world trade that may be made by closer integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements; Recognizing also that such contribution is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded; Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other Members; Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of the Council for Trade iin Goods in reviewing agreements notified under Article XXIV, by clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agreements; Recognizing the need for a common understanding of the obligations of Members under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV; Hereby agree as follows: 1 Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of that Article.

Article XXIV:5 2 The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. The Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties collected in accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For this purpose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the applied rates of duty. It is recognized that for the purpose of the overall assessment of the incidence of other regulations of commerce for which quantification and aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations, products covered and trade flows affected may be required. The reasonable length of time referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases. In cases where Members parties to an interim agreement believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods of the need for a longer period. Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when a Member forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty. In this regard Members reaffirm that the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be commenced before tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the formation of a customs union or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union. These negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to achieving mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, as required by paragraph 6 of Article XXIV, due 266

account shall be taken of reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other constituents of the customs union upon its formation. Should such reductions not be sufficient to provide the necessary compensatory adjustment, the customs union would offer compensation, which may take the form of reductions of duties on other tariff lines. Such an offer shall be taken into consideration by the Members having negotiating rights in the binding being modified or withdrawn. Should the compensatory adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations should be continued. Where, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII as elaborated by the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be reached within a reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall, nevertheless, be free to modify or withdraw the concessions; affected Members shall then be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII. 6 GATT 1994 imposes no obligation on Members benefiting from a reduction of duties consequent upon the formation of a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union, to provide compensatory adjustment to its constituents. Review of Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas 7 All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall be examined by a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of this Understanding. The working party shall submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on its findings in this regard. The Council for Trade in Goods may make such recommendations to Members as it deems appropriate. In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures required to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area. It may if necessary provide for further review of the agreement. Members parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial changes in the plan and schedule included in that agreement to the Council for Trade in Goods and, if so requested, the Council shall examine the changes. Should an interim agreement notified under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV not include a plan and schedule, contrary to paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV, the working party shall in its report recommend such a plan and schedule. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review of the implementation of the recommendations. Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report periodically to the Council for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their instruction to the GATT 1947 Council concerning reports on regional agreements (BISD 18S/38), on the operation of the relevant agreement. Any significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should be reported as they occur. Dispute Settlement 12 The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area. Each Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all provisions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.

10

11

13

267

14

The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked in respect of measures affecting its observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member. When the Dispute Settlement Body has ruled that a provision of GATT 1994 has not been observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure its observance. The provisions relating to compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such observance. Each Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the operation of GATT 1994 taken within the territory of the former. Texto do Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo 24 em Portugus Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo XXIV do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comrcio 1994 Os Membros, Tendo em vista as disposies do Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994;

15

Reconhecendo que o nmero e importncia das unies aduaneiras e reas de livre comrcio cresceram muito desde o estabelecimento do GATT 1947 e hoje cobrem uma proporo significativa do comrcio mundial; Reconhecendo a contribuio que pode ser feita expanso do comrcio mundial pela maior integrao entre economias das partes em tais Acordos; Reconhecendo tambm que tal contribuio ser maior quando a eliminao das taxas e outros regulamentos restritivos ao comrcio entre territrios constitutivos for estendida a todo o comrcio e menor quando qualquer setor importante for excludo; Reafirmando que o propsito de tais acordos deveria ser facilitar o Comrcio entre os territrios constitutivos e no elevar barreiras ao comrcio de outros Membros com aqueles territrios, e que ao estabelecerem ou ampliarem tais acordos as partes nos mesmos deveriam na maior medida possvel evitar o surgimento de efeitos adversos ao comrcio de outros Membros; Convencidos tambm da necessidade de reforar a eficcia do papel do Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens no exame dos acordos notificados sob o Artigo XXIV, mediante o esclarecimento dos critrios e procedimentos para a avaliao de acordos novos ou ampliados e o aperfeioamento da transparncia de todos os acordos sob o Artigo XXIV; Reconhecendo a necessidade para um entendimento comum sobre as obrigaes dos Membros sob o pargrafo 12 do Artigo XXIV; Acordam o seguinte: 1 As unies aduaneiras, reas de livre comrcio e acordos interinos que levem formao de unies aduaneiras ou reas de livre Comrcio, para serem compatveis com o Artigo XXIV, devem satisfazer entre outras, as disposies dos pargrafos 5, 6, 7 e 8 daquele Artigo. A avaliao, ao amparo do pargrafo 5(a) do Artigo XXIV, da incidncia geral das taxas e outros regulamentos sobre o comrcio aplicveis antes da formao de uma unio aduaneira dever, no que se refere a taxas e tributos, basear-se no exame global da mdia ponderada das tarifas e taxas alfandegrias cobradas. Este exame se basear nas estatsticas de importao durante um perodo precedente representativo, a ser fornecido pela unio aduaneira com valores e quantidades por linha 268

tarifaria, desagregada segundo a origem por pas membro da OMC. O Secretariado computar a mdia ponderada das tarifas e taxas alfandegrias de acordo com a metodologia utilizada na avaliao das ofertas tarifarias na Rodada Uruguai de Negociaes Comerciais Multilaterais. Para este fim, as tarifas e taxas a serem consideradas sero aquelas aplicadas. Fica reconhecido que para uma avaliao global da incidncia de outros regulamentos comerciais para os quais a quantificao e agregao so difceis, o exame individual de medidas, regulamentos, produtos cobertos e fluxos afetados poder ser necessrio. 3 O prazo razovel de tempo referido no pargrafo 5(c) do Artigo XXIV s deve exceder dez anos em casos excepcionais. Nos casos em que acreditarem que os dez anos so insuficientes, os Membros partes de um acordo interino fornecero explicao completa ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens sobre a necessidade de um perodo mais longo.

Artigo XXIV:6 4 O pargrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV estabelece os procedimentos a serem seguidos quando um Membro parte em uma unio aduaneira se prope elevao de uma tarifa consolidada. A esse respeito, os Membros reafirmam que o procedimento previsto no Artigo XXVIII, tal como desenvolvido nas linhas de orientao (guidelines) adotadas em 10 de novembro de 1980 devem ser iniciados antes que as concesses tarifrias sejam modificadas ou retiradas com a formao de uma unio aduaneira ou de um acordo interino que leve formao de uma unio aduaneira. Essas negociaes sero realizadas de boa f com vistas a lograr um ajustamento compensatrio mutuamente satisfatrio. Em tais negociaes, conforme disposto no pargrafo 6 do Artigo XXIV sero plenamente levadas em conta as redues de direitos em uma mesma linha tarifaria realizadas por outros pases partes quando da formao da unio aduaneira. Se tais redues no forem suficientes para prover o ajustamento compensatrio necessrio, a unio aduaneira ofereceria compensao, a qual poderia tomar a forma de redues em outras linhas tarifarias. Esta oferta ser considerada pelos membros que tenham direitos de negociao na consolidao a ser modificada ou retirada. Se o ajustamento compensatrio permanecer inaceitvel, as negociaes continuaro. Nos casos em que, a despeito dos esforos realizados, aps um prazo razovel de tempo no seja possvel chegar a um acordo nas negociaes sobre ajustamentos compensatrios ao amparo do Artigo XXVIII, tal como desenvolvido no Entendimento sobre a Interpretao do Artigo XXVIII do GATT 1994, a unio aduaneira estar livre para modificar ou retirar a concesso, os Membros afetados estaro ento livres para retirar concesses substancialmente equivalentes em conformidade com o Artigo XXVIII. O GATT 1994 no impe obrigaes sobre os Membros que venham a se beneficiar da reduo de tarifas resultantes da formao de uma unio aduaneira ou de acordo interino que leve formao de uma unio aduaneira no sentido de prover ajustamento compensatrio aos pases partes nos mesmos. Exame das Unies Aduaneiras e reas de Livre Comrcio 7 Todas as notificaes feitas ao amparo do pargrafo 7(a) do Artigo XXIV sero examinadas por um grupo de trabalho luz das disposies relevantes do GATT 1994 e do pargrafo 1 do presente Entendimento. O grupo de trabalho submeter um relatrio ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens com suas concluses a esse respeito. O Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens poder fazer aos Membros as recomendaes que julgar apropriadas. Com relao aos acordos interinos, o grupo de trabalho, em seu relatrio, poder fazer recomendaes sobre o prazo proposto e sobre as medidas necessrias a completar a formao da unio aduaneira ou rea de livre comrcio. Poder, se necessrio, prover novo exame do acordo.

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Os Membros partes em um acordo interino notificaro modificaes substanciais no plano e no calendrio includos naquele acordo ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens que, se for solicitado, poder examinar ditas modificaes. Caso o acordo interino no apresente um plano e um calendrio, contrariamente ao que dispe o pargrafo 5(c) do Artigo XXIV, o grupo de trabalho dever, em seu relatrio, recomendar um plano e um calendrio. As partes no mantero em vigor o referido acordo ou, conforme o caso, no o colocaro em vigor se no estiverem preparadas para modific-lo de acordo com essas recomendaes. Sero previstos exames subseqentes da implementao das recomendaes. As unies aduaneiras e os pases partes em reas de livre comrcio reportaro periodicamente ao Conselho para o Comrcio de Bens, como previsto nas instrues das PARTES CONTRATANTES do GATT 1947 ao Conselho do GATT 1947, sobre relatrios de acordos regionais (BISD 188/38) relativos operao do acordo de que se trate. Quaisquer modificaes ou evoluo nesses acordos sero reportadas medida que ocorrerem. Soluo de Controvrsias

10

11

12

As disposies dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994, tal como regulamentadas e aplicadas pelo Entendimento sobre Soluo de Controvrsias, podem ser invocadas com respeito a qualquer assunto resultante da aplicao das disposies do Artigo XXIV relativas a unies aduaneiras, reas de livre comrcio e acordos interinos que levem formao de unies aduaneiras ou reas de livre comrcio. Cada Membro plenamente responsvel sob o GATT 1994 pela observncia de todas as disposies do GATT 1994 e tomaro as medidas razoveis que estejam a sua disposio para assegurar tal observncia por governos e autoridades regionais e locais dentro de seu territrio. As disposies dos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994 tal como regulamentadas e aplicadas pelo Entendimento sobre Soluo de Controvrsias podem ser invocadas com respeito a medidas que afetem essa observncia adotadas por governos e autoridades regionais e locais dentro do territrio de um Membro. Quando o rgo de Soluo de Controvrsias houver determinado que uma disposio do GATT 1994 no foi observada, o Membro responsvel tomar as medidas razoveis que estejam a sua disposio para assegurar tal observncia. As disposies relativas a compensao e suspenso de concesses e outras obrigaes se aplicaro nos casos em que no houver sido possvel garantir dita observncia. Cada Membro se compromete a considerar com compreenso e oferecer oportunidade adequada para consultas relativas a quaisquer gestes realizadas por outro Membro concernentes a medidas que afetem a operao do GATT 1994, adotadas dentro de seu territrio. Comentrios sobre a Traduo

13

14

15

IC.

H vrios detalhes nas tradues brasileiras do Artigo XXIV e do Entendimento sobre a interpretao deste dispositivo, os quais podem causar insegurana e dvida ao intrprete ou aplicador. Uma leitura comparativa atenta dos textos demonstrar vrias passagens problemticas nas verses traduzidas, que do espao a interpretaes diversas. Sem almejar exaurir todos os pontos duvidosos na traduo, selecionamos alguns que demonstram as diferentes inadequaes do texto em portugus: a) Passagens onde o tradutor acrescentou palavras que no constavam na verso original. Por exemplo:

No pargrafo segundo do Artigo XXIV, a verso brasileira acrescenta a palavra aplicao em Para os fins de aplicao do presente Acordo (...), enquanto que na verso original no h: For the purposes of this Agreement (...). Ainda neste pargrafo, na verso brasileira foi acrescentada a palavra aplicveis em (...) outras regulamentaes aplicveis s (...), enquanto a verso original dispe: (...) other regulations of commerce (...). Na alnea a do pargrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV a verso brasileira inclui termos no 270

dispostos na verso original: a palavra concludo em (...) Acordo provisrio concludo visando (...) ((...) interim agreement leading to (...) e a palavra momento em (...) estabelecidos no momento da (...) ((...) imposed at the (...)). b) Tradues que podem alterar o sentido do texto original. Por exemplo: No pargrafo quarto do Artigo XXIV, a verso brasileira traduziu o termo desirability em (...) recognize the desirability (...) como recomendvel, (...) reconhecem que recomendvel (...), o que pode alterar o sentido da frase. Na alnea a do pargrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV, a verso traduzida alterou o sentido original da seguinte passagem: (...) be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence (...); j que foi traduzida da seguinte forma: (...) uma incidncia geral mais elevada, nem os regulamentos de trocas comerciais mais rigorosos (...). Ainda nesse mesmo dispositivo, o termo duties, aparece duas vezes traduzido como direitos em (...) unio aduaneira, os direitos aduaneiros (...) e em (...) que os direitos e as regulamentaes aplicveis (...); sendo que na primeira vez as palavras and other regulations, que aparecem na verso original, no so traduzidas na verso brasileira. No Entendimento sobre a interpretao do Artigo XXIV, pargrafo segundo, a verso brasileira no incluiu a palavra after de (...) commerce applicable before and after the formation (...) e a traduo ficou assim: (...) comrcio aplicveis antes da formao (...). Ainda no Entendimento, no pargrafo quarto, a verso original assim disposta: (...) the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD 27S/26-28) and in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must be commenced (...) e toda a parte em itlico no consta na verso traduzida: (...) nas linhas de orientao (guidelines) adotadas em 10 de novembro de 1980 devem ser iniciados (...). c) Passagens com erros de pontuao. Por exemplo:

No pargrafo primeiro do Artigo XXIV, no se pontua corretamente a abreviao do Artigo XXXIII, pois utilizada uma vrgula na verso brasileira (Artigo XXXIII), e troca-se um ponto-e-vrgula por uma vrgula em (...) a contracting party; Provided that (...) (verso brasileira: (...) desse Acordo, com a condio de que (...)). No pargrafo quinto do Artigo XXIV, a expresso (...) as between the territories of contracting parties, (...) est inserida entre vrgulas logo aps o incio da frase: Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, (...), e, portanto, d sentido a todo o restante da frase que vem a seguir, e faz referncia tanto unio aduaneira, quanto rea de livre comrcio. Diferentemente, a verso brasileira insere a traduo dessa expresso da seguinte forma: (...) formao de uma unio aduaneira entre os territrios das Partes Contratantes (...), restringindo o sentido da expresso inicial somente unio aduaneira. importante ressaltar que h passagens em que o texto foi traduzido de forma interpretada, no alterando, necessariamente, o contedo original. Por exemplo: no pargrafo primeiro, a verso brasileira traduziu o termo more, em (...) as between two or more customs territories (...), como vrios, (...) entre dois ou vrios territrios aduaneiros (...), quando o mais exato seria mais. Como exemplo de um possvel problema que a traduo pode causar, destacamos uma passagem interpretada pelo rgo de Apelao da OMC, o subpargrafo 8(a)(i) (comentada com mais detalhes no item III. Comentrios). Na verso brasileira a expresso (...) substantially all trade (...) foi traduzida como (...) a maioria das trocas comerciais (...). Visto a dificuldade do rgo de Apelao em explicar melhor o significado de substancialmente, a traduo brasileira inadequada ao quantificar este fluxo comercial como maioria. II. Interpretao e Aplicao do Artigo XXIV a) Interpretao da expresso shall not prevent do Artigo XXIV, caput Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), AB-1999-5, Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 45

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Para. 45. First, in examining the text of the chapeau to establish its ordinary meaning, we note that the chapeau states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not prevent the formation of a customs union. We read this to mean that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a customs union. Thus, the chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be invoked as a possible defence to a finding of inconsistency. b) Interpretao da expresso the formation of a customs union do Artigo XXIV, caput Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 46 Para. 46. Second, in examining the text of the chapeau, we observe also that it states that the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall not prevent the formation of a customs union. This wording indicates that Article XXIV can justify the adoption of a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions only if the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union, and only to the extent that the formation of the customs union would be prevented if the introduction of the measure were not allowed. c) Interpretao da expresso substantially all the trade do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(i) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 48 Para. 48. Sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV establishes the standard for the internal trade between constituent members in order to satisfy the definition of a customs union. It requires the constituent members of a customs union to eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to substantially all the trade between them. Neither the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term substantially in this provision. It is clear, though, that substantially all the trade is not the same as all the trade, and also that substantially all the trade is something considerably more than merely some of the trade. We note also that the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) provide that members of a customs union may maintain, where necessary, in their internal trade, certain restrictive regulations of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles XI through XV and under Article XX of the GATT 1994. Thus, we agree with the Panel that the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(i) offer some flexibility to the constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their internal trade in accordance with this sub-paragraph. Yet we caution that the degree of flexibility that sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) allows is limited by the requirement that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce be eliminated with respect to substantially all internal trade. d) Interpretao da expresso substantially the same do Artigo XXIV, 8(a)(ii) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 49-50 Para. 49. [] The constituent members of a customs union are thus required to apply a common external trade regime, relating to both duties and other regulations of commerce. However, sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) does not require each constituent member of a customs union to apply the same duties and other regulations of commerce as other constituent members with respect to trade with third countries; instead, it requires that substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce shall be applied. Para. 50. We also believe that the Panel was correct in its statement that the terms of subparagraph 8(a)(ii), and, in particular, the phrase substantially the same offer a certain degree of flexibility to the constituent members of a customs union in the creation of a common commercial policy. Here too we would caution that this flexibility is limited. It must not be forgotten that the word substantially qualifies the words the same. Therefore, in our view, something closely approximating sameness is required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii). Sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii) requires the constituent members of a customs union to adopt

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substantially the same trade regulations. In our view, comparable trade regulations having similar effects do not meet this standard. A higher degree of sameness is required by the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(ii). e) Invocao do Artigo XXIV como Defesa (dupla condio) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, paras. 52 e 58 Para. 52. Given this proviso, Article XXIV can, in our view, only be invoked as a defence to a finding that a measure is inconsistent with certain GATT provisions to the extent that the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs union which meets the requirement in sub-paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV relating to the duties and other regulations of commerce applied by the constituent members of the customs union to trade with third countries. Para. 58. Accordingly, on the basis of this analysis of the text and the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV, we are of the view that Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case involving the formation of a customs union, this defence is available only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the party claiming the benefit of this defence must demonstrate that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV. And, second, that party must demonstrate that the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. Again, both these conditions must be met to have the benefit of the defence under Article XXIV. f) Teste econmico colocado pelo Art. XXIV, 5(a) Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 55 Para. 55. We agree with the Panel that the terms of Article XXIV:5(a), as elaborated and clarified by paragraph 2 of the Understanding on Article XXIV, provide: () that the effects of the resulting trade measures and policies of the new regional agreement shall not be more trade restrictive, overall, than were the constituent countries' previous trade policies. And we also agree that this is: an economic test for assessing whether a specific customs union is compatible with Article XXIV. g) Artigo XXIV, 4, como contexto para a interpretao do Artigo XXIV, 5, caput Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), Demandante: ndia, WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 56 Para. 56. The text of the chapeau of paragraph 5 must also be interpreted in its context. In our view, paragraph 4 of Article XXIV constitutes an important element of the context of the chapeau of paragraph 5. The chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV begins with the word accordingly, which can only be read to refer to paragraph 4 of Article XXIV, which immediately precedes the chapeau. h) Definio da natureza da linguagem do Artigo XXIV, 4 Relatrio do rgo de Apelao no caso Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey - Textile), WT/DS34/AB/R, para. 57 Para. 57. [] Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. It does not set forth a separate obligation itself but, rather, sets forth the overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV which is manifested in operative language in the specific obligations that are found elsewhere in Article XXIV. Thus, the purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of Article XXIV, including the chapeau of paragraph 5. For this reason, the chapeau of paragraph 5, and the conditions set forth therein for establishing the availability of a defence under Article XXIV, must be interpreted in the light of the purpose 273

of customs unions set forth in paragraph 4. The chapeau cannot be interpreted correctly without constant reference to this purpose. III. Comentrios

O Artigo XXIV do GATT 1994 segue praticamente a mesma redao do Artigo correspondente no GATT 1947, complementado pelo Entendimento sobre o Artigo XXIV, que resulta das negociaes da Rodada Uruguai. Em que pese a redao frgil e confusa, e a multiplicao da assinatura de acordos de livre comrcio pelas principais economias do mundo, somente um contencioso do sistema GATT/OMC, no caso Turkey Textile, enfrentou de maneira efetiva a compatibilidade entre o regionalismo e o multilateralismo comercial. Como boa parte dos pases possui acordos potencialmente passveis de serem questionados no Sistema de Soluo de Controvrsias da OMC, a tendncia que os Membros evitem questionar as iniciativas de acordos regionais dos outros pases. No caso, o rgo de Apelao entendeu o caput do pargrafo 5 do Artigo XXIV como a disposio chave para resolver a controvrsia. Para determinar o significado e importncia do mesmo, deve-se olhar para o texto do caput e seu contexto, entendido como sendo o pargrafo 4 do Artigo XXIV, que daria os instrumentos de interpretao para o esclarecimento dos pargrafos seguintes. O caput do pargrafo 5 afirma que as disposies do GATT 1994 no devem obstar (shall not prevent) a formao de uma unio aduaneira. Ao examinar o texto, o rgo de Apelao entende que tais disposies no devem tornar impossvel (shall not make impossible) a formao de uma unio aduaneira. Por sua vez, o subpargrafo 8(a)(i) estabelece o critrio para o comrcio interno entre os membros constituintes a fim de satisfazer a definio de unio aduaneira. Ao fazer isso, requer que os membros constituintes eliminem taxas e outras regulaes restritivas ao comrcio em relao substancialmente todo o comrcio. Tal obrigao limita o grau de flexibilidade dado pelo dispositivo. Todavia, o significado de substancialmente, que no foi esclarecido nem entre as partes contratantes do GATT nem entre os Membros da OMC, no encontra maior clareza na deciso do rgo de Apelao. Ainda que afirme que substancialmente todo o comrcio no o mesmo que todo o comrcio, e substancialmente todo o comrcio algo consideravelmente mais do que somente algum comrcio, no so dadas as bases mediante as quais ser feita essa anlise pelos prximos Painis em torno do tema. Assim, a leitura do rgo de Apelao permite que o Artigo XXIV possa justificar uma medida inconsistente com outras disposies especficas do GATT, alm da clusula da nao mais favorecida. Em suma, para tanto, primeiro, a parte que reclama o benefcio dessa defesa deve demonstrar que a medida em questo introduzida sob o processo de formao de uma unio aduaneira que preencha plenamente os requisitos dos subpargrafos 8(a) e 5(a) do Artigo XXIV. E, segundo, a parte deve demonstrar que a constituio da unio aduaneira seria obstada caso no autorizada a introduo de medidas dessa natureza.

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