Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought By M.K.

Venkatarama Iyer Chapter 1: Introductory: Advaitic Trends in the Mantras of the Rig Veda the Upanishads, Pre !an"ara thin"ers #hartruhari, #haratruprapancha, #rah$adatta, Mandana Misra, %audapada Post !an"ara thin"ers, !ures&ara, Pad$apada, Vachaspati, Pra"asat$an, #harati Tirtha, Vidyaranya, Madhusudhana !aras&ati' Advaita Vedanta has a long history. This long period falls into three divisions, the pre-Sankara, Sankara and post-Sankara periods. The pre-Sankara period starts as early as the time of Rig Veda and extends up to the advent of Sankara. The post Sankara period starts with the direct disciples of Sankara like Sureswara and admapada and goes right up to the present time. Though several mantras of the Rig veda give clear evidence of advaitic learnings, special mention must !e made of the "asadiya Sukta, otherwise known as the #ymn of $reation. This hymn is remarka!le for its speculative tone. All knowledge, it is said, !egins in wonder and worship. This clear attitude of wonder and worship can !e clearly seen in this hymn. %n the spirit of true philosophy it en&uires into the origin of the world. '(id it have its origin in existence or non-existence) *ho could enlighten us on this point) The +ods were not then !orn and hence it would !e no use looking to them for light on this &uestion. ,ven the -ord in #eaven could not explain this mystery to us'. Apart from the sense of mystery which this poem !reathes, it is also remarka!le for the impersonal tone in which the highest is descri!ed. %t is called Tad ,kam. %t means that one. This way of characterising it is intended to convey the idea that it simply existed and that nothing more could !e said a!out it. %t could not !e descri!ed as existent or non-existent, as death or deathlessness, as darkness or light. %t emphasi.es the essential incomprehensi!ility of the #ighest /eing. %n this respect it comes very close to the Advaitic conception of /rahman, as attri!ute less. %t is, therefore, no wonder that Sankara makes fre&uent references to this hymn in his writings. %n his commentary on Veda Sutra %%.0.1 he makes a reference to this poem in support of his contention that /rahman cannot !e known !y perception or !y inference. Again in Vedanta Sutra %%. iv.2 he &uotes a few lines from this hymn to show that the Tad ,kam simply existed and, though it is said to have !reathed, the !reathing should not !e interpreted literally as then there was no air to !reathe.

The concept of 3aya, the central doctrine in Advaita Vedanta, can also !e traced to the earliest mantras of the Rig Veda. %n Rig Veda %V.vii.44.4. there is an unmistakea!le reference to this concept. This term is not used in any vague or general sense !ut almost exactly in the same sense in which it is employed !y Sankara. %t is said in this mantra that %ndra, meaning, of course, the #ighest +od, 5ust to make #imself known, transformed #imself into many forms !y means of #is powers of 3aya. The idea intended to !e conveyed is that /rahman appears as %svara, as 5iva and as the world due to #is association with ad5uncts like the internal organ 6 antah karana7 and the external sense organs. %t is needless to give more examples to show that the !eginnings of advaitic thought could !e traced !ack to the earliest mantras of the Rig Veda. As for the 8panishads, it is unnecessary to la!our the point. The trend of thought in the classical 8panishads, especially the $handogya and the /rihadaranyaka, is definitely in favour of advaita Vedanta. 8ddalaka9s instruction to Svetaketu !egins !y posing the &uestion relating to the one reality !y knowing which one couold claim to know everything else. The answer is given in terms of the 'Sat', or !are existence which presents itself to our perception. This :Sat9, it is further stated, was one without a second. %t continues to !e so even now. The idea is that the world of diversity and change is only a superimposition on this :Sat9. %f we have eyes to see we could discover, !ehind and !eneath all the diversities of the world of names and forms, the one changeless, uniform :Sat9 as its su!strate. -ittle need !e said a!out the trend of ;agyavalkya9s discourses in the /rihadaranyaka 8panishad. %n his address to his wife, 3aitreyi, as well as in his instruction to ,mperor <anaka, he makes it clear that the #ighest reality is !eyond mind and speech, that it could, therefore, !e descri!ed only in negative terms as :not this9, and that, nevertheless, it is no non-entity !ut the very self in us. %t is the unfailing light which illumines not only the states of the mind !ut also the heavenly luminaries like the sun and the moon. A!out the thinkers of the upanishadic period, we have to make special reference to /artruhari, /rahmadatta, !artru rapancha, 3andana 3isra and +audapada. =f these +audapada9s thought, as he has developed it is his :karika9 on the 3andukya 8panishad, comes very close to the line of thought adopted !y Sankara. #ence Sankara makes very respectful references to him in his commentary on Vedanta Sutra.

%n the ost-Sankara period the leading thinkers are admapada, Sureswara, Vachaspati 3isra, rakasatman, Sarva5natma 3uni, /harati Tirtha, Vidyaranya, 3adhusudana Sarawswati and Appayya (ikshita. %n more recent times, the advaitic torch has !een kept alive !y Ramakrishna aramahamsa, Auro!indo, Ramana 3aharishi, the pontiffs of the Sarada eetam, Sringeri, especially Sri $handrasekhara /harati and interpreters like Radhakrishnan and #iriyanna. Among the ost-Sankara thinkers, though Sureswara, Vachaspati and rakasatman have something fresh to say, special mention, however, must !e madeof /harati Tirtha and Vidyaranya. /oth of them occupied the Sringeri throne in succession and there is evidence to show that they colla!orated in their literary endeavours. Their definitely philosophical works are> 07 the Vivarana rameya Sangraha, ?7 the (rig- (risya Viveka, 47 the Vedanta ancadasi and @7 the <uvan 3ukti Viveka. %t is neither necessary nor is it possi!le to assess the respective contri!ution made !y each one of the two thinkers to the development of advaitic thought. Since much of their work is the product of 5oint la!our, we may attri!ute the whole of it either to /harati Tirtha or to Vidyaranya. This will mean no in5ustice to either of them. /oth of them are luminaries of great splendour in the advaitic hori.on and !oth take a very high place among the religious and philosophical thinkers of the post- Sankara period. *e may go so far as even to ay that they take their rank only next to the great Sankara himself. %n what follows we will speak of Vidyaranya without coupling his name with that of /harati Tirtha. *hat we will say a!out Vidyaranya, will !e e&ually true of /harati Tirtha also. *e may note in passing that the name of Vidyaranya denotes an individual who was very much alive and kicking in his times and that it does not merely connote an attri!ute, :forest of learning9, which was ascri!ed to !oth /harati Tirtha and 3adavacharya as an honorific epithet. The thought that Vidyaranya has developed in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha, (rig A (risya Viveka, ancadasi and <ivan 3ukti Viveka can !e presented under the following heads> 0. metaphysics, ?. sycology, 4. the doctrine of 3aya, @. Truth and ,rror, B. -ogic and Theory of Cnowledge, 1. ,thics, D. Religion and ,thics, 2. the doctrine of <ivan 3ukti. These are !y no means clear cut divisions. %n the actual treatment it will !e found that they cross and recross one another9s path. They are only !road divisions introduced fro purposes of clear presentation. Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought

By M.K. Venkatarama Iyer Chapter II Metaphysics: - Brahman the subject of vedanta - Brahman as Sat, Chit and Ananda - Kutastha Isvara and Jiva - isvara and his creatorship of the or!d - three sta"es in creation . The term metaphysics literally means that which comes after 6meta7 science 6physics7. *hen Aristotle9s writings came to !e classified, his papers on science were given the first place and his speculations relating to super sensuous reality !rought up the rear. The name :metaphysics9, arising from this physical arrangement, ac&uired a deeper significance in course of time. hilosophy comes at the end of science not only in the physical sense !ut also in the logical sense. %n the later sense, philosophy means the fulfilment of the sciences. *hat !rings out the ultimate import of the scientific knowledge is metaphysics. The term :Vedanta9 also carries the same dou!le sense it stands not only for what comes at the end of the mantra and /rahmana portions of the Veda, !ut connotes also the speculations, which !ring out the final import of the earlier portions of the Veda. The word :anta9 and the cognate word :end9 have this dou!le sense. 0. /rahman as :sat' *hat we should, therefore, look for in the Vedanta is a description of the nature of the highest Reality and 3an9s relation to it. This highest reality is called /rahman, which literally means the utmost limit of growth. /eing the highest, it should naturally !e the sole reality. The $handogya 8panishad speaks of it as :the one only without a second, ,kamevaadwiteeyam. ,ach of the three words which go to make this sentence carries a special significance. The word ,ka signifies that /rahman or :sat9 has no internal divisions. %t follows that it has no parts. %t is not an organism consisting of various mem!ers nor is it a whole made up of parts. A tree, for example, admits of differentiation into the stem, the !ranches, the twigs, the leaves, the flowers and the fruits. /ut such internal differentiation is denied of /rahman !y the word ,ka 6 one7. The second

word ,va 6only7 denies the possi!ility of comparison with similar things. A mango tree, for example, can !e compared with other trees, which are similar though different in certain respects. /ut so far as /rahman is concerned there is nothing similar to it with which it could !e compared. A tree, finally, can !e contrasted with dissimilar things like stocks and stone. "eedless to say that there are no dissimilar things with which /rahman can !e contrasted. The denial of dissimilar things is signified !y the word adviteeyam 6 without a second7. %n effect, this sentence denies, Sa5atiya, vi5atiya and swagata !heda of /rahman. %t, therefore stands in a class !y itself. %t is suigeneris. %t can not !e !rought under a genus which is higher than itself nor can it !e distinguished from other cognate species !y a differentia. The three kinds of differentiation which may !e considered possi!le even for the ,xistent reality are negatived in order !y the three expressions, one, only, without a second, which signify homogeneity, the emphatic restriction and the denial of a second thing. "o parts can !e postulated of the Sat 6,xistent7 for it is not possi!le to demonstrate or show any parts in it. "ame and form are not its parts as they have not come out then 6that is !efore creation7. 6Vedanta anchadasi %%.?0-??.7E Since /rahman is !are existence devoid of any content, it is indefina!le. %t can not !e conceived !y the mind in terms of any of the categories of the understanding. %t can not therefore !e thought of as a su!stance possessed of attri!utes, or as a cause in relation to an effect or as a whole made up of parts or as an identity in the midst of differences. The only description that could !e given of it is that it exists. AstItyevolavdhavyaH 6Catha %%.iii.047 'all this was only !are existence at the !eginning' 6 $handogya V%. %i.07 /efore creation or manifestation what existed was the !are :sat9. *e are to understand that the world of diversity which appears later is a supercreation, only the ,xistent, the one only without a second, name and form did not exist then.

Such is the teaching of Aruni 68ddalaka to his son Svetaketu79 6V. .%%.0F7.

/y an analysis of the gross elements, Vidyaranya shows that what is common to all of them is the fact of existence. ,ther, air, fire, water and earth have their own special properties. %n respect of their peculiar features they are mutually exclusive. =n can not function for another. ,ther is not present in the remaining four elements. Similarly neither air nor fire nor water nor earth is to !e found in the other four gross elements. %f an element is determined to !e water, for example, it follows that it is not ether or fire or air or earth. =ne shuts out others. /ut there is one fact that is common to all of them and that is the fact of 'existence'. *hen, !y discrimination, the :sat9 is separated from the elements, the latter will !ecome unreal. /y the process of analysis the elements and their products are eliminated one !y one. *hat remains is not the void !ut the positive fact of existence. %t survives the process of analysis and elimination. *hen the unreality of elements, the evolutes of the elements and 3aya has deeply im!i!ed, the conclusion that :sat9, the real thing, is without a second will never undergo any change' 7 V. . %%.F27 '=f the unreal there is no existence and what is real is never non existent' 6 +ita.%%.01,7 Thus the real and the existent are shown to !e closely !ound together. %t is as meaningless to speak of what is real as non-existent as it is to speak of the unreal as existent. There is no reality without existence and, !y the same token, there is no existence without !eing real. *hen the unreal is eliminated !y discrimination what is left over is !are existence which is its su!strate. Sankara has clarified this point in his commentary on +ita %%.01. ' ,very effect, such as a pot, is unreal !ecause it is not perceived !efore its production and after its destructionG likewise the cause such as clay is unreal !ecause it is not perceived apart from its cause. #ere the o!5ector

might say, :then it comes to this, nothing at all exists'. /ut no such o!5ection applies here. ,very fact of experience involves a two-fold consciousness, the consciousness of something real and the consciousness of something unreal. That is said to !e real which our consciousness does not fail and that to !e unreal of which our consciousness fails. Thus the distinction of reality and unreality depends on our consciousness' 6 3ahadeva Sastri9s translation7. $ommenting on the Taittriya text :Satyam <nanam Anantam /rahma9 Sankara makes a similar o!servation regarding the nature of what is real. Satyamiti yadrUpeNa yannishcita.m tadrUpa.m na vyabhicarati tatsatya.m yadrUpeNa yannishcita.m tadrUpa.m vyabhicarati tadanrutaminyucyate | :*hatever does not deviate from the form in which it has !een once ascertained to !e is real, and whatever deviates from the form in which it has !een ascertained to !e unreal 6 3ahadeva Sastri9s translation.7 As Vachaspati remarks in his /hamati, 'that which is constant in what is varia!le, that is different from the latter as a string from the flowers strung on it'. *hat is real does not suffer su!lation !y anything at any time or place. %n Vedanta ancadasi %% .4?.@1 Vidyaranya undertakes an examination of the nihilist doctrine that in the !eginning there was only non-existence. %f this is so, he asks how we can make the transition to existence. ,xistence and non-existence are polar opposites and there can !e no passage from the latter to the former. The 8panishad asks how the existent could come out of non-existent. The nihilist may say that 5ust as the world of names and forms is superimposed on the !are :sat9 even so existence may !e superimposed on what is nonexistent.. /ut this contention is untena!le, for all superimposition implies a positive existent !asis or

su!strate. "on-existence is not such positive !asis on which existence may !e superimposed. 9 %f you urge that !oth name and form are imposed even on the existent reality, then tell me on what is your imposition !ased) "o mistaken perception is anywhere experienced without a su!stratum'. V. . %% 4B. ,ven the mirage has a positive !asis. Na mrugatruSNAdayo.api nirAspadA bhavanti | %n the ancha 3aha!huta, Viveka Vidyaranya adopts the o!5ective method of study and shows that what uniformly underlies all the names and forms of the world of diversity is !are existence. %n the next two $hapters he makes a su!5ective approach to the pro!lem and shows !y a thorough- going analysis of the five sheaths, the annamaya, the pranamaya, the manomaya, the vi5nanamaya and anandamaya, that what remains when all the five vestures are transcended is not the void !ut the self which animates all of them. 'As the witnessing consciousness remains when the five kosas are eliminated, that consciousness itself is the true nature of oneself. %t is not possi!le to ascri!e voidness to it' 6 .(.%%% ??7. The physical !ody is the annamaya kosa, the su!tle !ody comprises the pranamaya, manomaya and vi5nanamaya kosas and the casual !ody is made up of the anandamaya kosa. The hysical !ody is lost sight of in sleep and the su!tle !ody comprising the three sheaths lapses in the state of dreamless sleep. The casual !ody, made up of the anandamaya kosa vanishes in the state of samadhi. Though the content of the three states, waking dream and dreamless sleep, varies, the light that illumines them is the light of the self. '%n all the three states the cognising entity is the same'. 7 V. . %.4.D7 ?. /rahmam as $hit

/rahman is self-luminous since it is characterised as ra5nana +hana in the 8panishad. *hile it is illumines all the states of the human mind and all the o!5ects of the world including the heavenly luminaries, it stands in no need of !eing illumined !y any other luminous !ody. Na dIpasya anya dIpecChA H =ne lamp does not re&uire to !e revealed !y another lamp. Since /rahman is the ultimate source of light it necessarily underlies all the so-called cognising agents. All knowing su!5ects derive their light from this source. #ence it is the su!strate of all su!5ects. /eing the presupposition of the su!5ect- o!5ect relation, it can never !ecome an o!5ect in relation to any su!5ect. %t follows that it is not known in the way in which other things are known. VijnAtAra.m are ena vijAnItham | /y what means can we know the knower) %t stands self-revealed. "or does it stand in need of any proof. %t is selfcertifying. SvataH siddha | All the ramanas derive their authority from this source. "either pratyaksha nor anumana nor even sruti can have any authority !ut for the light which illumines them. SiddhehyAtmani pramAtari pramitsoH pramANAnveSaNA bhavati | '*hen the existence of the knower, the ramata, is already determined, then only is possi!le a search for proper authorities on the part of the knower with a view to o!tain right knowledge' yeneda.m sarva.m vijAnAti ta.n ena vijAnIyAt H 'Though what should one know that owing to which all this is known' 6 Swami 3adhavananda9s translation7. %n this connection, Vidyaranya takes exception to the views of some other thinkers who do not hold that consciousness is integral to /rahman. The ra!hakaras, for instance, !elieve that consciousness is an adventitious &uality of the self like desire and aversion. They maintain that consciousness, like desire and aversion is a &uality that is produced in the self when it comes into contact with the mind due to the potency of adrshta. *hen this contact is

snapped, as in sleep, the self lapses into unconsciousness. The naiyayikas also take the same view. ' The re!hakaras and the Tarkikas ascri!e the nature of unconsciousness to the Atma. Atma is a su!stance like AkasaG consciousness is its &uality as sound is of AkasaG (esire, aversion and effort, virtue and sin and the mental impressions made !y them I these are said to !e its &ualities like consciousness.. *hen there is contact for the Atma with the mind on account of Adrshta, the &ualities are manifested. *hen the Adrshta is exhausted, they lapse in sleep'. 6V. .V%.22-FJ7 According to the /hattas the Atma in !oth conscious and unconscious. ' The /hattas scri!e this nature inertness-cum-consciousness to the Atma !y inferring a hidden consciousness. This interference of consciousness arise from the recollection after getting up from sleep. There is a recollection of inertness thus. ' % was inert and then slept'. *ithout an experience of inertness at that time, such a recollection is in no way intelligi!le. The non-ceasing sight of the seer in deep sleep is mentioned in the Veda. Therefore the Atma is in #imself accompanied !y consciousness and unconsciousness 5ust as a firefly which is !oth !right and dark'. V. . V% FB-FD. The sankhyas do not agree with this view. They hold that urusha is pure sentience, !ut owing to its false identification with rakriti, it forgets its real nature and experiences misery. Vidyaranya refers to these views only to show that they are imperfect and, !y contrast, the advaitic view that the Atman is self luminous, that it stands like a silent spectator of the states of the mind, and is, therefore, not affected in the least !y its 5oys and sorrows, is the only correct view. 4. /rahman as Ananda iya.m AnmA parAnandaH paramapremAspada! yataH H 'This Atman is the highest !liss as it is the o!5ect of the highest love'. %t is a fact of common

experience That our love is greater for those who are very near and relations than it is for those who are distant and remote relations. %f we pursue this to its logical conclusion we will have to admit that our love is greatest for our own self !ecause it is the nearest to usG %n fact it is our very own self. #ence it is, as the 8panishad says, dearer than son, dearer than wealth and dearer than everything else. "reyaH putrAt preyaHvittAt preyaH anyasmAt sarvasmAt | %t is loved for its own sake and not as instrumental for something else. =!5ects which give pleasure at one time may cease to do so at other times. *hat is loved at one time may !ecome an o!5ect of hatred at some other time, and what is hated at one time may !ecome an o!5ect of love at some other time. /y contrast, the Atman is the only o!5ect that is loved at all times for its own sake. Sankara has made this clear in sata-Sloki 60J7. The Atman is a value in its own right. *e value only those things, which afford happiness to us. Kor proof that the self is the o!5ect of the greatest love Vidyarnanya refers to the fact that no man likes to put an end to his own life. ,ven when he takes the desperate step of committing suicide, it is the !ody that he wants to get rid of. '%f it is said that sometimes the desire to die is seen in people who are overwhelmed !y disease or anger and that, as there is hatred of the Atman, it is capa!le of !eing a!andoned, it is not so. The status of the Atman is not in the !ody which is capa!le of !eing thrown off. That status is only in the thrower. There is no such hatred in the thrower. %f there is hatred, however, in a thing which can !e thrown off, what is the harm) 6V. .L%%.?2.?F.7 Kor additional proof that the Self is the o!5ect of the highest love, Vidyarnya refers to the conversation !etween ;a5navalkya and his wife. #e tells her that the o!5ect of our greatest love is the Atman and that the love that we !ear to other things is only !ecause it is instrumental to the happiness of the Atman. 'The affection which the wife has towards the

hus!and is not for the hus!ands sake !ut only for her own sake similarly the hus!and has affection towards his wife only for his own sake and never for the sake of the wife. ,ven when there is mutual inducement, the conduct of the hus!and and the wife is similar, that is, only !ecause of their respective individual desires' 6V. .L%%.2.F.7 The happiness that we find in the things of the world is only a pale reflection of the !liss of /rahman. %t is 5ust !y a minute fraction of the !liss of /rahman. That they commend themselves to us. Strictly speaking an illegitimate transfer. *e superimpose the !liss of !elieve that we derive pleasure from them. *e forget that real !liss is in /rahman and we go a!out seeking it in the wrong direction. =ur !ehavior in this respect is like that of the musk-deer which, not realising that it is carrying the musk in the hind part of its own !ody, keeps running a!out the forest in search of it. The ephemeral nature of the pleasure that we derive from the o!5ects of the world is a well- worn theme. %t lasts for a few moments and then it turns to misery. #ehi ma.msparshajA bhogA duH hayonaya evate H This is the -ordMs verdict in the +ita. 6V.??7. 'The pleasures that arise from attachments are only sources of pain' 'That which springs from the contact of the senses and their o!5ects and which is like nectar at first and like poison at the end, such pleasure is said to !e passionate.'6gita LV%%%42.7 %t is not always that we succeed in securing even these o!5ects which give fleeting pleasure. 3ore often thatn not, our efforts to secure them meet with failure. Something or other stands in the way. Things work at cross purposes. *hat happens is that we get what we do not want and fail to get what we want. These disappointments cause any amount of misery. %f the o!structions are !eyond our power to remove,

our misery !ecomes all the greater. %f perchance we get what we want, there is the fear that it may !e snatched away from our hands. *hat the fates give with their right hand, they may snatch away with their left. %f others are more fortunate than ourselves, we grow envious of them. This is how we make ourselves unhappy !y looking upon sensuous pleasures as the poal of our life. Sooner or later we are !ound to realise the utter futility of this endeavor. The sooner we realise that real happiness is not in the o!5ects of sense !ut in the Atman the !etter for us. Sense must dawn on us to arrive at this realisation The disillusionment that comes as we grow older will open our eyes and we will !e a!le to see things in their proper perspective. There is a common !elief that some o!5ects give more pleasure than others and that some people en5oy more happiness than others. The 8panishads confirm this !elief when they speak of various orders of !eings., graded in respect of the happiness that they en5oy. %n Taittiriya 00,viii and /rihadharanyaka iv iii 44 there is reference to the calculus of happiness. *e are to imagine a young man who is fortunate in every respect. #e is strong and healthy. #e is well educated. #e has plenty of wealth. The happiness that such a young man en5oys is to !e treated as the unit. Then there is mention of eleven orders of !eings. /rahma coming at the end. %n this list each succeeding order of !eing is said to en5oy a hundred fold more happiness than the one which precedes it. %f the multiplication is carried out, the figure that we get at the end will give us some idea of the !liss of /rahma. /ut even this is an inade&uate description of the !liss that is /rahman. Really there are no grades in !liss itself. %t is one and entire like the Sat and $hit aspects of /rahman. <ust as there appear to !e difference in respect of existence and consciousness owing to their association with extraneous ad5uncts, even so there appear to !e grades of happiness owing to the purity or impurity of the psychosis of the mind which reflects it. sychoses are of three kinds, the pure,

the tur!ulent, and the dull. %t reflects the !liss of /rahman more perfectly than when ra5as or tamas predominates. /ut even in the sattva dominated psychosis the !liss of /rahman is not fully reflected. %t is the man who is not smitten !y any kind of desire, the a Ama dhruta who en5oys the !ills of /rahman in full. =ne should firmly turn his !ack on the o!5ects of the world and set the goal of his life in the realm of spirit to !e a!le to en5oy the !liss that is /rahman. *e cannot worship at two altars. +od and 3ammon do not go together. =ne shuts out the other. 3aitreyi firmly re5ected the pleasures of the world to taste the !liss of /rahman. Vidyarnya has made out these points in V. LV 0?-??. ,xistence, consciousness and !liss- these three are the essential characteristics of /rahman. They constitute /rahman9s swarupa laksana. They are not to !e treated as three attri!utes inherent in /rahman. They are neither attri!utes nor aspects nor parts of /rahman. Rather they are of the very nature of /rahman. -ike Sattva, ra5as and tamas which are constitutive of rakriti as the Sankhya system understands it. Sat, $hit and Ananda are the constituents of /rahman. The human intellect !eing una!le to grasp it in its real nature, !reaks it up and speaks of /rahman as possessing three attri!utes. Strictly speaking. %t is not even a positive characterisation of /rahman. The three constituents are mentioned only to deny that /rahman is either non existent or insentient or unhappy. %n a severely non dual system there negative descriptions are admissi!le. Vachaspati 3isra has said in his /ha5ati. '=f /rahman we do not affirm unity, !ut only deny duality'. Since they are constitutive of /rahman, they are insepara!le. Sat viewed apart from $hit and Ananda will !e reduced to something insentient and misera!le. , similarly $hit taken in isolation will !e reduced to a non entity. The same is the case with Ananda if it is separated from sat and $hit.

%n his (rg (rsya Viveka Vidyaranya says every o!5ect h&s five characteristics. %t exists, it shines,it is lova!le, it has a form and it has a name. =f these five, the first three !elong to /rahman and the last two to the finite world. Asti bhAtopriya.mrUpa.m nAmacetya.mshapancha am | AdyA traya.m vrahyarUpa.m jagadrUpa.m tato dvayam || As an instance of name and form !eing illusory, Vidyaranya refers to spatiality 6avakasa7 which is the distinctive feature if ether. %t is a mode of 3aya and conse&uently illusory. 'The first evolute is akasa, i%t exists, it shines and it is also lova!le. Spatiality in its form. That form is unreal as it is derived from loval!ility are not unreal as they are derived from /rahman' V. .L%%%.1D. @. The Cutastha %n the Cutastha (eepa Vidyaranya defines the Cutastha as the self which witnesses the states of the two !odies, the gross and the su!tle. %t is so called !ecause like the !lacksmith9s anvil it remains unchanged. *hile others things are !eaten to shape on the anvil, the anvil itself remains unchanged. ,ven the Cutastha, while it illumines the vicissitudes of the gross and the su!tle !ody, itself remains unaffected !y the latter. %t is simply the silent witness having the part or lot in what takes place in the two !odies. %n his Siddhanta -esa Sangraha, Appayya (iskshita states VidyaranyaMs view of the Cutastha as follows dehadvayAdhiS$anabhUta.m U$hasya caitanya.m svAvacCheda asya dehadvayasya sA shAdi shaNa.m nirvi Ara anvAt sA shIti ucyate | %t is unattached. %t is the foundational intelligence that reveals !oth the presence of the mental modes and their a!sence. The difference !etween /rahman and Cutastha is nominal.

B. %svara and <iva As distinct from /rahman and Cutastha, !oth %swara and <iva are reflections. #ence they are illusory and unreal. %svara is the reflection of /rahman in 3aya while <iva is the reflection of the same /rahman in Avidya. The difference !etween 3aya and Avidya is only in respect of their composition. The rakriti in which pure Sattva dominates is 3aya while the prakriti in which impure Sattva dominates is Avidya. %n another context Vidyaranya says that in 3aya the power to pro5ect is prominent while in Avidya the power to coneal is much in evidence. #e illustrated the relation in which /rahman, Cutastha, %svara and <iva stand to one another !y means of the example of ,ther reflected in a suita!le medium. There is unlimited Akasa called 3ahakasa. Then there is the akasa delimited !y the pot 6ghatakasa7G then there is akasa reflected in the water contained in the pot 65alakasa7 and lastly there is the akasa reflected in the particles of water which are contained in the clouds 63ehghakasa7. /rahman is likened to the 3ahakasa, Cutastha to the +hatakasa, %svara to the 3eghakasa and <iva to the <alakasa.%f the reflection of akasa in the water contained in the pot is small, that of akasa in the water particles contained in the clouds is large. %t is to !e noted that in !oth cases akasa is a reflection in water. The difference is only in respect of the si.e of the reflection. 3ahakasa and +hatakasa are not reflected in any medium. %n the latter case akasa appears under a limitation while in the former case it is unlimited. Since Cutastha is associated with the two !odies it is said to !e limited !y them. %t is, therefore, likened to the akasa that is delimited !y the pot. /rahman is unlimited and it is appropriately likened to the reflected character of %svara and <iva as distinct from /rahman and Cutastha which are not reflections. %t also !rings out the difference !etween /rahman and Cutastha on the one hand and !etween %svara and <iva on the other.

Vachaspati thinks !that !oth %svara and <iva are the products of Avidya. Avidya has its locus in the <iva and its content in %svara. <ust as knowledge is the knowledge of some one and is the knowledge of something even so ignorance is the ignorance of some one and it is the ignorance a!out something. <ust as knowledge implies a knowing su!5ect and a known o!5ect even so ignorance presupposes a su!5ect and an o!5ect. %t is located in the <iva and has %svara for its content. #e does not !elieve that 3aya and Avidya are different or that %svara is a reflection of /rahman in one medium and that the <iva is a reflection of the same /rahman in another medium. Avidya is the ad5unct. %ts characteristic is to !reak up the whole and introduce differentiation where there is really none. The differentiation is !i-polar. At one end appears the <iva and at the other end appears %svara. The ad5unct is the intellect. %ts nature is to !reak up the original integral whole into a su!5ect in relation to an o!5ect. As a result of the !reaking up, /rahman appears as the <iva which is the su!5ect and as %svara which is the o!5ect. This is Vachaspati9sview. rakasatman, the author of anchapadika Vivarna thinks that <iva is a reflection of %svara. %f it is remem!ered that %svara is itself a reflection, it will !ecome clear that according to rakasatman, the <iva is a reflection. /ut neither Vachaspati nor Vidyarnaya agrees with this view. %t will !e seen that in this respect there is more agreement !etween Vidayrnaya and rakasatman. Though Vidyaranya defends the stand of the author of the Vivarana in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha, he is not a wholehogger. #e uses his discretion and tries to minimise the difference !etween the two rasthanas as much as possi!le. The only difference !etween Vachaspati and Vidyaranya is that while the former !elieves that !oth %svara and <iva are reflections of /rahman in the same medium, vi.., Avidya, the latter !elieves

that the two are reflections of /rahman in two different media, namely, 3aya and Avidya. /ut this is a distinction without a difference. There is very little to differentiate 3aya from Avidya. *e will see later that Vidyarnya gives in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha a definition which is e&ually applica!le to 3aya and Avidya. The important point is that according to !oth Vachaspati and Vidyaranya. %svara and <iva are independent reflections of /rahman. The <iva is not the reflection of a reflection. %n its relation to /rahman, it stands on a footing of e&uality with %svara. #ence !oth have the same ontological status. /oth stand or fall together. %f, due to the dawn of right knowledge, the <iva proves unreal, so does %svara. The 5iva merges in Cutastha and %svara in in /rahman. The Cutastha, as we have noted already, is likened to the +hatakasa and the <iva to the <alakasa. %t is !ut natural that the akasa reflected in the particles of water contained in the clouds should merge in unlimited ether. /etween the akasa delimited !y the pot and unlimited akasa, the difference is due to an adventitious ad5unct and , therefore, artificial. %f the ad5unct is knocked down, +hatakasa merges in 3ahakasa. This means that the difference !etween the Cutastha and /rahman is more ver!al that material. Though the <iva and %svara merge in the first instance in the Cutastha and /rahman, ultimately they merge in the same /rahman. 1. %svara %svara is the real cause of the world. #e is its efficient and its material cause as well. #e is, therefore, its a!hinnanimitta upadana karana. Sruti supports the view. The statement 9it desired9 tada shat implies that %svara is the efficient cause of the world, since desisting is the act of a sentient !eing. Such a sentient !eing can only !e the efficient cause. The statement 'may % !ecome many' bahu% syAm ' implies that %svara is the material cause as well. *hat can assume many different forms and names must necessarily !e the material cause. $lay, for example, may assume different forms and names such as pet, 5ar, pitcher and so forth. (esiring !elongs to the potter, while

assuming different forms and names !elongs to clay. %n regard to the creation of the world, we do not have two different causes one efficient and the other material, !ut only one. That is %svara. #e com!ines in himself the duty of desiring and the duty of assuming many different forms and names. Such a view stands to reason also. %f %svara were the efficient or material cause alone, he would re&uire to !e supplemented !y another cause. This other cause would act as a limit on him. #e would no longer !e infinite. %t would also take away from his omnipotence. %f he should stand in need of another entity to complete his work, he could hardly !e looked upon as all-powerful. The notion of %svara a !eing !oth the efficient and material cause of the world need not !e considered unintelligi!le since there is the example of the spider weaving the we! out of its own saliva. This is the example given in the 8panishad. %svara is not only creator of the world !ut also its sustainer and destroyer. %t is clay which sustains the pot and it is into clay that the pot returns when it is !roken. The threads sustain the cloth and when the latter is torn it !ecomes threads again. %t is gold that sustains the chain and it is into gold that the chain returns when it is melted. Theses examples, given !y Vidyaranya, serve to reinforce the conclusion that %svara is not only the efficient cause of the world !ut also its material cause since. %t is said in the 8panishads that %svara creates, sustains and a!osr!s the world into himself at the end. %t is clear that he does not agree with Vachaspati9s view that %svara fashions the world out of the various Avidya lodged in the several 5ives. The 5ives are !oth agents and en5oyers. They form part of the product of 3aya. They could, therefore, have nothing to do with the creation of the world. To clarify his position still further, Vidyaranya wants us to understand what exactly he means !y saying that %svara is !oth the efficient and material cause of the world. This view shuts out !oth the theory of origination and the theory of modification %t is not to !e identified with the aram!ha vada of the "aiyayikays who maintain that the world takes shape !y the coming together of atoms nor is it to !e identified with the arinama vada of the Sankhyas

who maintain that the world is the outcome of the evolution of rakriti. According to the "aiyayika the atoms are the material cause of the world and %svara its efficient cause. According to the Sankhya, rakriti is the material cause of the world and efficient cause, if there is one at all, is urusha. According to !oth aram!ha and parinama vada, the two causes are different. /ut according to the Vedanta, !oth are rolled up into one. #ence !oth the theory of origination and the theory of modification are ruled out. The only other theory is that of apparent modification. *ithout undergoing any real modification, %svara pro5ects the appearance of the world. Since #e remains intact he is the efficient cause and since pro5ects the appearance of the world, he is the material cause. The example of rope appearing as the snake will make the point clear. The snake comes out of the rope and ultimately disappears into the rope. #ence rope is the material cause of the snake. /ut all the time the rope remains a rope. %t does not undergo the least change. #ence it must !e regarded as the efficient and material cause of the appearance. The view that %svara is !oth the efficient and material cause of the world. %f interpreted properly, culminates in what is known as Vivarta Vada. 'the mere appearance of a different state is the seeming as in the rope appearing as the snake. The seeming is possi!le even in things which are partless as in the attri!ution of a flooring or dirtiness to the sky. Therefore, let it !e granted that the world is a seeming that is superimposed on the impartite %svara.The power of 3aya is the creator of that seeming 5ust like the powers of a magician'. V. L%%% F-0J. Thinkers hold different views a!out the relation !etween +od and the world. Vidyaranya refers to them in V. V% 00?J. #e shows that all of them are imperfect for one reason or other. /y contrast, he shows that the advaitic view is the only correct one. The Sruti passage :know 3aya as the primal cause and +od as the wielder of 3aya9 supports the advaitic view. %n the Vivarana rameya Sangraha, Vidyaranya maintains that %svara is the sole cause of the world, !ut in his anchadasi he modifies his views a little and makes the

<iva also partly responsi!le for it. The world is not chaos !ut a cosmos. $areful o!servation shows that there is a great deal of design in its making. The elements have fixed &ualities. ,ach has its own function and one could not function for another. The heavenly !odies move each in its own path. They never come into headlong collision. The events that take place within the world exhi!it causal relation. "o event takes place without a sufficient cause. There is no such thing as accident in the world. The law of causal relation applies to the voluntary actions of human !eings also. As we sow so we reap. "o one can escape the conse&uences of his deeds at the proper time and in the proper place. The world, therefore, is so designed as to make for the en5oyment of the finite selves. (esign implies not only a designer !ut also one who profits !y it. The purpose for which a house is !uilt is also one of its causes. %t is what is known as the final cause. The 5ives are the final cause of the world since the latter furnishes the environment for the en5oyment of the rewards arising from their deeds. %svara therefore, creates the world for the en5oyment of the finite selves. As our author puts it> 'it is Ishvara sruS$am jIva bhogyam 6V. .%V.027.' MThe cosmos which has its origination in the -ord9s contemplation, finds its completion in the production of the <iva. =f the entire external world of the living and non-living, the -ord is the artificer. =f the internal world of transmigratory existence which !egins in the state of waking and ends in release, the <iva, is the author.M There are three stages in the process of creation, the unmanifest, the partially manifest and the fully manifest. %svara contains the world within himself. %n this unmanifest condition it is known only as %svara. %n the second stage it !ecomes partially manifest and it is now known as #iranyagar!ha or Sutratman. *hen it !ecomes fully manifest as the world of names and forms it is known as Virat. 'The creation may !e understood as following a regular order,. #iranyagar!ha is known as Sutratman. #e is called the su!tle !ody. #e is of the nature of the aggregate of all living !eings as he !ears the sense of '%' in all of them and has the powers of activity and knowledge. <ust as the world immersed in semi-darkness !efore dawn or after sunset shines imperfectly, so is the universe seen indistinctly in the stage of #iranyagarha.

<ust as a grain or vegeta!le sprouting in all directions, is very tender, so is the sprout of the universe tender in the stage of #iranyagar!ha. <ust as the world shining well !y sunlight or a crop whiach has ripened, so is the Virat who has clear percepti!le !ody' V. .V% 0FF-?J4. The author illustrates the process !y reference to the stages in which a picture takes shape on a canvas. A piece of cloth is first !leached, then it is made stiff !y smearing starch on it, then drawings are made rather indistinctly with pencil and finally the drawings are made clear pictures !y the application of paint. '<ust as four stages are o!served in the making of a picture on canvas, so four steps must !e recognised in the Supreme Self in its !ecoming the universe. <ust as the canvas is well-washed, made stiff, outlines are marked on it and then colored, so is the Atman, said to !e :$hit9 or ure $onsciousness, Antaryami, the inner ruler, Sutratman and Virat. $hit is pure consciousness.' Antaryami has 3aya for his ad5unct. Sutratman represents the partial manifestation of the universe. Virat is the stage of the full manifestation of the universe' 6V. .V% 0.? and @7

Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought /y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer $hapter %%% "sychology!&'e(inition o( )iva & theories o( its origin & the limitation theory & the re(lection theory & the abhasa theory & San ara*s vie+s & , a )iva vada versus Ane a )iva vada & the vestures% the bodies% the states and the psychic (orms o( the )iva & the -itness Sel(. 1. Jiva So far we have dealt with the metaphysics of Advaita as it is expounded !y Vidyaranya. *e have now to set forth its psychology. syche means the soul and a systematic account of its origin, its nature and its final destiny may !e called sychology. 3odern sychology, however, has lost sight of the soul altogether. %t does not even deal with the functions of the mind. %t occupies itself with studying the external !ehavior of man. /ut we are using the term in its original sense.

The <iva is a reflection of ure %ntelligence in Avidya which is riakriti dominated !y impure sattva. %f ra5as and tamas dominate over the sattva constituent of rakriti, it then !ecomes impure Avidya. *hen ure %ntelligence is reflected in Avidya, it ceases to !e homogeneous and !ecomes heterogeneous. %t !ecomes a complex entity made up of an element of the !asic intelligence, the su!tle !ody and reflection of intelligence in the internal organ. 'That which is the !asic consciousness, that which is the su!tle !ody and the lustre of consciousness cast on the su!tle !ody, a com!ination of these is the <iva'. 6V. %V.%%7 %n :Swatma rakasika9 Sankara says that the <iva is a complex of three entities, !asic consciousness, its reflection in the intellect and su!tle !ody. %t is endowed with a psycho-physical vesture and deems itself to !e !oth agent and en5oyer. As a conse&uence of this false !elief it goes through repeated !irths and deaths. 'They 6the 5ives7 do actions for purposes of en5oying. They en5oy for the purpose of doing actions. They go from one !irth to another 5ust like a worm that is caught up in a stream passes speedily from one whirlpool to another. They do not get happiness at all'. 6V. .0-4J7 The <iva is thickly overlaid with five vestures known as kosas. They are the physical !ody called annamaya kosa, the su!tle !ody comprising the pranamaya, manomaya and vi5nana maya kosa, and the causal !ody made up the anandamaya kosa. (eluded !y these sheaths, the <iva has !ecome o!livious of its real nature. =ne has to pierce through these five sheaths to get at the real nature of the <iva. The three !odies mentioned a!ove, the gross, the su!tle and the causal are associated with the three states of the <iva, the waking, the dream and the dreamless. $orresponding to the three cosmic forms of %svara, namely, #iranyagar!ha or Sutratman and Virat, there are three psychical forms for the <iva, the ra5na, the Tai5asa and Viswa. *hen the internal organ is resolved in deep sleep, the witness of !are nescience is ra5naG when the internal organ has its conceit in the individual su!tle !ody, it is called Tai5asaG when the internal organ has its conceit in the gross physical !ody in the waking condition it is called Viswa. The parallelism !etween the state, the !ody, the sheath and the psychical form may !e set forth as follows> 0. *aking state, physical !ody, annamaya kosa and viswa.

2. (ream state,su!tle !ody,pranamaya and vi5nana maya -- kosa and Tai5asa

3. (eep sleep, causal !ody, ananda maya kosa and pra5ana.

1. <iva and /rahman The relation !etween the <iva and /rahman has !een differently conceived !y the thinkers who came after Sankara. ressing the analogies a given !y Sankara !eyond their proper limits they developed sharp differences !etween themselves and as a conse&uence fell into two camps which later came to !e known as the /hamati rasthana and Vivarana rasthana. The /hamati School takes its stand on the views expressed !y Vachaspati in his commentary on Sankara9s !hasya known as /hamati. Vachaspati himself follows the lead of 3andana 3isra, a senior contemporary of Sankara. The views of the /hamati school are therefore ultimately tracea!le to the :/rahmasiddhi9 of 3andana 3isra. The Vivarana School takes its stand on the views expressed !y admapada, a direct disciple of Sankara, in the fragment of his commentary on Sankara9s !hasya known as anchapadika. These views are more clearly stated and given a sharip point !y rakasatman in his gloss on the anchapadika called anchapadika Vivarana. Vidyaranya strongly defends these views against criticism in his !ook known as :Vivarana rameya Sangrah9. admapada himself is inde!ted for his views not a little to Sureswara. The /hamati view of the relation of the <iva to /rahman may !e stated as :the process of the finitising of the %nfinite.9 *hen /rahman is delimited !y the internal organ, it !ecomes the <iva. This is known as :Avaceda Vada9 or limitation theory. <ust as unlimited space appears as so many limited spaces owing to artificial ad5uncts 6upadhis7 even so /rahman appears as so many 5ives when it is delimited !y so many internal organs. *hen a pot, for example, which delimits spaces, is produced or destroyed, the space the pot is carried to a different place, the space delimited !y it is not produced or destroyed. *hen the pot is carried to a different place, the space contained in it is not

also carried to a different place. *hen the pot is destroyed the space delimited !y it merges in unlimited spaces. ,ven so when the limitations of time, space and causality are removed, the 5ives !ecomes one with the %nfinite /rahman. *hen the defining limits are got rid of, there is no longer any difference !etween the 5iva and /rahman. Sankara has given this analogy in many contexts. $ommenting on Vedanta Sutra 0, iii. D he writes> #astu% sarva.m sharIreSu% upAdhibhirvitA upalabhyeta paraeva sa bhavati | yathA gha$AdicChindrANi ma$hAdhibhivirtA upala shyamANAni mahA Asha eva bhavati | %n his minor poem known as :Atma!odha9 60J7 he writes> #athA Asho hruSI esho nAnopAdhi gatovibhuH | $adbhedAbhdinnavabhdAti tannAshe evalo bhavet || %n spite of the support this view en5oys from the writings of Sankara, it comes in for very sharp criticism at the hands of Vidyaranya. #e writes 'The unattached /rahman cannot at all !ecome a <iva merely !ecause of a limitation %f it could !ecome a <iva !y a limitation, the status of a <iva must !e ascri!ed to it when it is limited !y the pot or the wall' 6V%%% ?27. The point of the criticism is that what can act as a limit can only !e inert matter. The !are intellect is a product of rakriti and, therefore, !are matter. %f the inner organ, which is su!tle matter, can transform /rahman into a <iva, the pot or the wall must also !e credited with the power to transform /rahman into a <iva. This is a!surd. %t is only when the inner organ is illuminated !y the intelligence that it can transform /rahman into a <iva. %n that case the internal organ does not operate as a limitation. %t only serves to reflect the /rahman-intelligence and this reflection is what we call <iva. There is also another o!5ection to the limitation theory. This is !ased on ethical grounds. *hen a <iva goes to #eaven !y virtue of its meritorious deeds, the intelligence limited !y the internal organ that goes to #eaven cannot !e the same as the one which ac&uired merit on earth. *e cannot attri!ute motion to what is all-pervading. %f a different intelligence goes to #eaven, then it will have to suffer for evil deeds which it has not done or fail to

get the reward for the good deeds that it has done while it was on earth. This will mean a ruta abhyAgama and hruta nAsha.This o!5ection is stated !y Sankara in his commentary on Vedanta Sutra%%, iii @F. The reflection theory is sponsored !y rakasatman in his ancapadika Vivarana and it is endorsed !y Vidyaranya in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha. According to this theory the <iva is a reflection of /rahman in the medium of the internal organ. %n the anchapadika Vivarana this theory is explained as follows> Th <iva is a reflection of intelligence in the internal organ. Since there is no difference !etween the prototype and the reflection, the <iva is non different from /rahman. The reflected face in the mirror is not other that its prototype. %t is in fact identical with original face. -ike the reflection of the sun and moon in water, the individual souls are reflections in Avidya of the one Reality. *hen the water gets dried up, sun and moon remain the heavens, only the reflections disappear. ,ven so on the a!olition of Avidya, the reflections will cease to exist and only the real will remain. The A!solute is the original 6!im!a7 and the 5ives are the reflections 6prati !rim!a7. The A!solute which is without a second appears as different individual souls through reflection in different internal organs. According to this view, the internal organ is not so much a limiting ad5unct as a reflecting medium. %t is not a necessary unessential, adventitious which receives the reflection of the original intelligence. %t does not !elong to the <iva as part of its composition. This view also en5oys the support of Sankara. $ommenting on Vedanta Sutra %%.iii.BJ he writes! AbhAsa eva eSa jIvaH parasyAmato jala sUrya Adivat pratipattavyaH H $ommenting on the Agama rakarana of the 3andukya Carika 617 he writes> atah sarva janayati prANaH ceto a.mshUn a.mshava iva raveshcidAtma asya puruSasya ceto rUpA jalAr a samAH prAj.na taijasa vishva bhedena deva manuSya tiryagAdi deha bhedeSu% vibhAvyamAnAh ceto a.mshavo ye etc.. /ut this view is also open to o!5ection. A thing devoid of form can not cast any reflection> much less can it do so in a reflector which is e&ually formless. /ut this is no o!5ection, says Vidyaranya. The reflection of even the formless is possi!le 5ust like the non-material ether, together with the stars and clouds,

is reflected in water. =f pure /rahman, however, there can !e no reflection, !ut there can !e a reflection of /rahman &ualified !y 3aya. The author of the anchapadika Vivarana seeks to get over the difficulty mentioned a!ove !y making out that the rays preceding from the eyes are o!structed !y the reflector, namely, the mind. They then turn !ack and make the actual face percepti!le. The reflection is thus the original itself. /ut Vidyaranya does not endorse this rather ingenious explanation. Vidyaranya9s own theory is known as A!hasa Vada. 'Slightly shining in A!hasa'. The reflected image is of the same kind, without possessing all the characteristics of the originalG yet it shine like the original' V. . V%%%.4?. The A!hasa is an illusory product. %t resem!les the original in a fee!le manner since it has the &uality of shining like ure %ntelligence. /ut the A!hasa is changeful and attached while ure %ntelligence is unchanging and unattached. #e seeks to make this view plausi!le !y likening it to the ether with stars and clouds reflected in the water in a pot. /ut even so, the theory is not &uite convincing. After a careful consideration of Vidyaranya9s views on this &uestion as he has stated them in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha, (rg- (rsyo Viveka and Vedanta achadasi one is inclined to think that he is drifting, though, !y impercepti!le degrees, towards the avacceda vada of Vachaspati. This !ecomes increasingly clear from his interpretation of the 3ahavakya :tat Tvam Asi'. According to his interpretation what this text declares is the non-difference !etween /rahman and the <iva defined !y the %nternal organ and not the illusory 'A!hasa'. Those who re5ect all these theories declare that the <iva is the unchanging /rahman, ignorant of its real nature. Sankara is inclined to this view. So also is Sureswara. Sankara makes this clear in his commentary on /rihadaranyaka %%.i.?J. where he narrates the story of the price who, having fallen into low company, had forgotten his royal descent and who realised it as soon as he was reminded of it. ' ersonal consciousness', as (r. Radhakrishnan puts it, ' is an inexplica!le presentation of /rahman. The <iva appears !ut we do not know, how.' ?. ,ka <iva Vada versus Aneka <iva Vada

Some hold that there is only one <iva and one material !ody. The other !odies and finite souls are like those seen in a dream. They lack personal consciousness. =thers hold that there is only one <ivaG he is #iranyagar!ha and he is the reflection of /rahman. The other 5ives are only sem!lances of #iranyagar!ha. /ut these thinkers admit that there are many material !odies, each provided with an unreal <iva. A third view holds that there is only one <iva which resides in each of the many !odies !y means of its powers 6saktis7. These views are not accepta!le to Sankara. They !order on solipsism of an extreme type. <ust as /uddhist Vi5nana Vada reduces the o!5ective world to an idea in the mind of the seer, even so the views mentioned a!ove reduce other 5ives and other material !odies to the level of dream perceptions. %t is a matter of common experience that the lion or the tiger that we perceive in a dream is either the creation of the perception or its creation is simultaneous with the perception thereof. rakasananda, in his !ook called Vedanta Siddhanta 3uktavali, has tried to 5ustify this view known as (rsti Srsti vada, !ut his defence has failed to carry conviction. Sankara9s criticism of Vi5nana vada is well known. The author of the anchapadika Vivarana is !elieved to have advocated the theory of one 5iva and Vidyaranya in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha tries to defend this view. #e mentions that in the sight of each person he alone is the self and all others are mere illusory presentations of avidya. This view of Vidyaranya !orders on solipsism. /ut his solipsism is more apparent than real. A closer study will show that from the phenomenal point of view he recognises many 5ives though from the transcendental point of view there is !ut one reality, /rahman, who is !oth the locus and the content of avidya. #e seems to !e !ound as it were and released as it were. %n Reality there is none !ound, none striving for release and none released. This is from the highest point of view. Krom a lower point of view, however, he admits the reality of many 5ives which are reflections of ure %ntelligence. 'Kor the man shown in the picture seeming cloths are separately provided. They are notionally created resem!lances of cloth which is the !ackground of the picture. As regards the em!odied !eings imposed on ure consciousness, seeming consciousness is provided separately for them in the name of 5ives 6individual souls7 and those wander a!out in various ways'.6V. . Vl D-27 %t is to distinguish these 5ives from inert things that they are drawn on the canvas with apparent cloths.

Kollowing the lead of 3andana 3isra, Vachaspati !elieves in many finite souls. #is reason for holding this view is that when one <iva is released, all the others are not released. The <iva which ac&uires knowledge is released and not the others. Cnowledge can remove the ignorance of only that person who has ac&uired it and not ignorance of the others also. #is knowledge must relate to that o!5ect of which he was ignorant !efore. Cnowledge relating to one thing cannot remove the ignorance relating to a wholly different thing. This knowledge must arise in the person who is ignorant and it must relate to the particular o!5ect of which he was ignorant !efore. %t is clear therefore, that each <iva must ac&uire the saving knowledge purely !y its own efforts and the knowledge that it ac&uires must relate to the notion of the <iva. =therwise the false notion that the <iva has of itself will not !e dispelled. The final intuition has, therefore, the <iva for its locus and again the nature of the <iva for its. $ontent. Thus the <iva !ecomes !oth the su!5ect and the o!5ect of the final psychosis 6carama vritti7. This is Vachaspati9s view and it en5oys the support of Sankara. This is also the view of Vidyaranya. #e is not, therefore, a wholesale supporter of the Vivarana view. #e exercises his discretion and adopts the view which most reasona!le. #e tries to !ridge the gulf !etween the two opposing camps as far as possi!le 1. The *itness Self Rid of its appurtenances, the <iva is the self-luminous intelligence which reveals all the changing modes of the mind, itself standing aloof like a disinterested witness. This witness-self continues to shine in all the three states, the waking, the dream and dreamless sleep. (uring the waking state it reveals the perceptions arising from the contact of the mind with the o!5ects through the sense-organs. (uring the state of dreaming it illumines the perceptions of that state though all sources of external light are shut out. %n deep sleep it shows that there are no perceptions. Thus it illumines all the states and all the modes of the mind, it itself stands in no need of any other light to reveal it, since it is self-luminous. Vidyaranya gives the example of the light that is set on the stages which illumines the manager of the show, the actors and the audience. %t continues to shine even when the stage is emptied of all people. %t then shows that there is nothing on the stage. 'The lamp placed in a dancing hall illumines the master, the assem!led persons and the dancing girl without any difference. %t will shine even if there is no!ody. Similarly the witness illumines the :% sense'. The mind and also

the o!5ects. ,ven in the a!sence of the :% sense9 it will continue to shine as !efore' 6 V. .L. 00-0?7 0. Their witness-self is the Cutastha which was likened to the ether delimited !y the pot in V. .V%, ??. %n a previous chapter we have made the reference to the point. *e have said also that the <iva ultimately merges in the Cutashta. Since the Cutastha is the su!strate, the foundational intelligence, which underlies the two !odies, the gross and the su!tle, it is !ut natural that the witness-self should merge in it. %t is not even a &uestion of merging as realising. The witness-self comes to the realisation will ultimately result from the #ighest /rahmin. Vidyaranya explains the stages !y which this realisation comes a!outG when it disengages itself from its vestures, the witness-self realises that the :% notion' which stands for the $ida!ahasa is a superimposition on the Cutasthas. Rid of its :%-ness9. The witness-self is non-different from the Cutastha. Then comes the realisation that there is little difference !etween the Cutashta and /rahman. #ence the light which illumines !oth the presence and the a!sence of knowledge in the mind is none other than /rahman-%ntelligence itself. All the Vedanta texts proclaim this great truth in one voice. %t is the light which never goes out. %t is not contradicted or su!lated !y any other experience. Vidyaranya makes all the &uite clear in the chapter entitled :Cutastha (eepa9. ,specially in stan.as @D@F, B1 and 11. Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought

/y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer $hapter %V /aya !& $he 'octrine o( /aya & di((erence bet+een /aya and Avidya & inessence both the same & the locus o( /aya & vachaspati* vie+ & the Vivarana Vie+ & Vidyaranya*s vie+ & three

standpoints in rgard to the study o( /aya & 0rahman could only be partially concealed by /aya. The concept of 3aya occupies a very important place in the philosophy of Advaita. %n fact, it may !e regarded as the keystone of the advaitic edifice. %f this pulled down, the whole !uilding will collapse like a house of cards. $ritics of advaita, therefore, concentrate their attack on this concept. They feel that if this conception is proved to !e untena!le, the demolition of the other doctrines of the system, such as "irguna /rahman, the identity of the <iva with /rahman and unreality of the universe will automatically follow. %t is well known that Ramanu5a spent all his powder and shot in attacking this concept and drew up a formida!le list of o!5ections. They look unanswera!le !ut on closer examination they will disappear like mist !efore the rising sun. 3aya is not concept that Sankara has important from /uddhism. %t is germane to his system and t o the line of thought developed in the 8panishads. *e have mentioned this fact in the introductory chapter. %t is admitted that ultimate reality is strictly one to admit also the concept of 3aya for we cannot otherwise account for the appearance of the world of diversity and the plurality of finite slaves. As aul (eusssen has o!served in his : hilosophy of the 8panishads9 the concept of 3aya is the inevita!le logical complement of the metaphysical doctrine of the oneness of ultimate reality. The term :3aya9 itself occurs in the 8panishads and it is remarka!le that it is used almost exactly in the sense in which Sankara employs it in his system. Avidya, its e&uivalent, occurs &uite fre&uently the logical development of the thought of the 8panishads, has naturally given an important place to the concept of 3aya. Some advaitic thinkers make a distinction !etween 3aya and Avidya. 3aya, they say, is one and collective while Avidya is multiple and distri!utive. 3aya is the ad5unct of %svara while Avidya is the ad5unct of <iva. 3aya is rakriti in which pure sattva is predominant while Avidya is rakriti in which impure sattva predominates. 3aya has only the power to pro5ect what is unreal while Avidya has the power to pro5ect as well as to conceal and delude the finite two kinds are called 3aya and Avidya !y reason respectively of the purity and impurity of the &uality of Sattva. The Self reflected in 3aya is %svara and #e has entire control over it. #e is the -ord, the omniscient. The other,

the <iva, however is in the grip of Avidya and on account of its variedness, is of various sorts'6V. . %. 01-0D7 /ut these differences cannot !e pressed too far. %n essence 3aya and Avidya are the same. #ence in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha, Vidyaranya gives a definition e&ually applica!le to !oth. '3aya or Avidya is the power which o!structs the presentation of real and which is responsi!le for the presentation of what is unreal. %t is indetermina!le in nature'. AnirvacanIyatve sati tatvAbhAsa pratibandha viparyAvabhAsayoH hetunva.m la shaNa.m taccobhay1H avishiS$am | %t is stated in this definition that !oth 3aya and Avidya have the common characteristic of concealing the real and pro5ecting the unreal and that !oth could !e characterised as either real or as unreal. /oth have a relative existence and !oth are ultimately unreal. That which is not yAmA is 3ayA. Vidyaranya illustrates its unreal character !y referring to the story which the nurse narrated to the children. 'Kor the entertainment of a !oy, the nurse tells an interesting story> :=h !oy, somewhere there were three handsome princes. =f them two were not !orn and the third did not exist even in the wom!. %nvested with virtues, they lived in a town which did not exist at all' 6V. . L%%%. ??.?47 Krom this account we should not conclude that maya or Avidya is mere a!sence of knowledge. They are not mere negative entities. Rather they are positive for every individual has the positive experience of his own ignorance. Aham a5Nna# H Since this is an experience it must have a positive character. =nly what is positive and existent can !ecome an o!5ect of experience and not what is negative and non-existent. There can !e no contact whether through sense organs or through the mind, with what is non existent. %t follows that if 3aya or Avidya were merely a!sence of knowledge, we could have no experience of either. /ut we do have the experience of our ignorance. #ence it must !e treated as a positive entity. "ow arises the &uestion regarding the locus of maya. *herefrom does it operate) Two answers are given and they represent the views of the /hamati and the Vivarana school of thought. Vacaspati following the lead of mandana 3isra, assrts that the <iva is the locus of Avidya. #is reason is that it is dispelled !y the knowledge which the individual self ac&uires. %f it were located elsewhere, say in /rahman,then it could not !e demolished !y

the knowledge which the finite self ac&uires. The ignorance of one can not !e destroyed !y the knowledge which some other person re&uires. 8nless ignorance !elongs to the man who ac&uires the knowledge, it can not !e removed !y such knowledge. *e find that a particular <iva ac&uires the saving knowledge and that <iva is li!erated. Vacaspati recognises a plurality of Avidyas and necessarily a plurality of <ivas as their resting places. %t is open to each individual to get rid of his Avidya !y the ac&uisition of the knowledge of his own real nature and get released. =rdinary ignorance may !e removed !y ac&uiring the knowledge of the o!5ect to which it relates., !ut this primeval ignorance can !e dispelled only !y the knowledge of /rahman or Atman. Realising one9s own true nature also comes to the same thing. To this view it is possi!le to raise the o!5ection of reciprocal dependence. %t may !e asked how the <iva which is the product of Avidya can itself !e the seat of Avidya. There was no <iva !efore the operation of Avidya. %t came into existence only after Avidya had screened the real and pro5ected the unreal. #ow can that which own its origin to avidya !e itself the locus of avidya) This is no dou!t a powerful o!5ection and Ramanu5a has given it the first place in his list of o!5ections. /ut it will not stand examination. %t presupposes the existence of time. The &uestion which is earlier and which is later is meaningful only in relation to time. /ut Avidya did not come into existence at any particular point of time. %t is !eginning-less, Anadi. The <iva is also e&ually Anadi, Vacaspati dos not say that at any particular point of time there was only Avidya and the <iva did not exist nor does he say that at any time there was only the <iva and Avidya did not exist. #is view is that !oth are coeval. /oth are !eginningless and it is as meaningless to ask which came first and which came later as it is to ask whether the seed came first or the tree. The Vivarana view is that /rahman is the locus of 3aya. Since the only reality admitted in the system is /rahman, it logically follows that it must !e the seat of 3aya. This is the view of Suresvara and, as we have already stated, the Vivarana follows his lead in this as in many other respects. The Vivarana maintains that there is contradiction involved here. There is nothing wrong in recognising that 3aya, which is ignorance, has its locus in /rahman which is pure sentience. 3aya can co-exist with Suddha $haitanyaG what can not do so is Vritti- $haitanya.

*e are to understand that /rahman is !ound as it were !y its own ignorance and li!erated as it were !y its own knowledge. This view however places too great a strain on our sense of pro!a!ility. %t is rather difficult to !elieve that !oth !ondage and li!eration !elong to /rahman. The :as it were9 does not remove the difficulty. ,ven in the case of the finite self the !ondage and the release are only as it were from the correct point of view. The li!erated individual in the fullness of his knowledge, will only say that he was never !ound and never set free. /oth !ecome unreal in the wake of the plenary experience. There is, however, some meaning in saying that the finite self feels !ound at one time and li!erated at another time !ut none in saying that /rahman feels !ound at one time and li!erated at another time. Vidyaranya strikes a middle course in regard to this &uestion. #e appreciates the reasoning in !oth positions. /ut his sympathies are with the views of Vachaspati. %t en5oys the support of Sankara also. %n his commentary on Vedanta Sutra %V.0.0B he asserts that no one has the right to &uestion the experience of an individual who feels that he is li!erated, merely !ecause he is still continues in the em!odied condition. Since he speaks of the individualMs experience we have to infer that the finite self was the locus of ignorance. VidyaranyaMs leanings are towards the /hamati view though he recognises the force in the reasoning of the Vivarana view. 3aya can !e studied from three stand points. To the man in the street the world is perfectly real. #e never suspects that it is unreal or that it is the pro5ection of 3aya. #ence he is not worried !y this pro!lem at all. To those who are well versed in the sastras, 3aya is a non-entity, a mere figment of the imagination. %n sastraic parlance it is spoken of a :tucca9. They dismiss it as wholly unreal and never worry a!out it. To the philosopher who !rings an intellectual approach to this &uestion, it !ecomes a pro!lem. #e finds it difficult to admit it as realG he finds it e&ually difficult to dismiss it as unreal. #ence he treats its nature as something indetermina!le. #e speaks of it as : sadasad Vila shana2 *hich-ever is its seat, 3aya cannot wholly conceal the reality. %f it did so, it would itself !ecome invisi!le. 3aya has no power to reveal it self, !eing insentient. %f it is known at all, it is !ecause of its light of the /rahman. The cloud seeks to hide the sun, a!out does it succeed) "o. %f it did, it would itself !ecome

invisi!le. %f the sun were completely hidden there would !e nothing !ut darkness and in that darkness nothing could !e seen,. *e will not then !e in a position to say that the cloud is hiding the sun. The cloud is such a small thing and how can it hide the sun whose si.e is so great) ,ven so, 3aya can never wholly conceal the /rahman. %t can do so only partially. -ike the cloud hiding the sun from our view, 3aya also can conceal /rahman only to our limited vision. Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought /y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer

$hapter V 314IC AN' $H,15# 16 7N1-3,'4,!& Vidyaranya*s vie+s have to be gathered (rom casual hints & si8 pramanas% "ratya sha% Anumana & Sruti & tests to determine the poport(ul te8ts & interpretation o( $at tvam Asi & syntactical unity & ho+ the meaning o( a sentence as a +hole is grasped & the objections o( the logician & +hether there is need (or "rasam hyana. The %sta Siddhi of Vimuktaatman and the Vedanta aria!hasa of (harmara5a focus attention on the ,pistemology of Advaita Vedanta. /ut the works of Vidyaranya pay more attention to the metaphysics of Advaita than ot its -ogic and theory of knowledge. #ence we cannot look for a systematic treatment of the ramanas and allied topics in the anchadasi or Vivarana rameya Sangraha. There are, however, occasional references to them arising from the discussion of metaphysical doctrines and these we may !ring together in this chapter. A ramana is a means of valid knowledge. *e get to know the real nature of things only !y applying the proper means. These are classified as six> erception 6 ratyaksha7, %nference 6Anumana7, Analogical Reasoning 68pamaana7, Ver!al testimony 6Sa!da7, resumptive Reasoning 6 Arthaapatti7 and noncognition 6Anupala!di7. Adaviata Vedanta agrees with the mimamsa in admitting the validity of these six pramanas. All of them means valid knowledge.

1.

ratyaksha =f these six, perception comes first. %t is the earliest source of valid knowledge to us. %t arises from the contact of the sense-organ with corresponding o!5ects in the external world. These sense-organs are five, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. The senses are faculties of perception set in particular parts of the !ody. The physical appendages attached to these faculties merely serve as aids. These are not to !e treated as sense-organs proper.

The natural tendency of these faculties is to flow out and not to look within. The ear grasps sound, the skin apprehends the changes in the weather, the eye perceives color, the tongue apprehends taste and the nose apprehends smell. These sense-organs receive impressions from their contact with o!5ects and these are worked up into knowledge. The intellect 6!uddhi7 decides on the nature of the action that will suit the occasion. The action that is decided on is left to !e carried out !y the motor organs 6Carmendriyas7 which are also five in num!er. Krom this account it is clear that the mind is not a passive entity which simply receives knowledge even as a vessel receives the water that is poured into it. Rather the mind plays an active part in giving rise to knowledge. %t is spoken of as the -ord of the sense-organs, This means that the mind dominates them. %t is stated in the 8panishad that if the mind does not actively co-operate with the sense-organs , one may have his eyes wide open and yet see nothing, one may have his ears wide open and yet hear nothing. This raises the &uestion whether the mind is to !e treated as a senseorgan on a par with the other five or to !e treated as a different faculty. Vachaspaati thinks that the mind is the inner sense-organ, the other five !eing outer sense-organs. The mind may therefore !e treated as the sixth sense-organ 6shastendriya7. This inners senseorgan makes us directly and immediately aware of our feelings emotions such as pleasure and pain, happiness and misery. <ust as the five outer sense-organs give us direct and immediate knowledge of the o!5ects and events in the external world, even so the mind gives us direct and immediate knowledge of the inner states such as pleasure and pain. %t is therefore, the instrument 6karana7 of inner perception.

Sankara says that thought the9Sruti9 is not in favor of rtreating the mind as a sense-organ, the Smritis lend support to that view. Vachaspati takes this as lending support to his view. /ut the author of the Vivarana thinks that the mind is not a senseorgan !ut a different faculty. #e thinkds that happiness and misery are made known !y the witness self and not the mind. They are evala sA shi bhAsya. Though Vidyaranya defends this view in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha, he modifies his view in the anchadasi. %n %%.0? he speaks of the mind as the inner instrument. Kurther he recommends mental concentration6dhyana7 as an aid to /rahman-reali.ation. 'Thus the Veda and Smriti prescri!e concentration of mind6dhyana7 on the Self for the eradication of the wrong conception'.6V00 0JF7. ' he who is una!le to make the en&uiry either !ecause of the great dullness of his intellect or !ecause of the want of necessary means must contemplate /rahman incessantly'.60L B@7. (hyana and upaasana are activities of the mind. %t must therefore !e treated as an instrument 6karana7 like the outer senses. This is another instance to show that Vidyaranya does not identify himself with the Vivarana view as a matter of course. #e uses his discretion. *e have now to descri!e the process !y which perceptual knowledge arises. =rdinarily we think the two factors are involved in giving rise to perceptual knowledge, the congni.er and the cognised or the su!5ect and the o!5ect. The su!5ect is the knower and the o!5ect is the known. Vidyaranya adds two more. The four factors involved in perception are>07the intelligence which has the internal organ as its ad5unct,?7the intelligence &ualified !y the psychosis together with the reflection of intelligence, 47the intelligence defined !y the o!5et, e.g., the pot and @7the reflection of intelligence which is generated !y the contact of the cognitive psychosis with the o!5ect. The first factor is known as the perceiving agent or ramatsG the second as the cognitive psychosis or the means of valid knowledge 6 ramana, the third is known as the cognised o!5ect or Visaya $haitanya and the last is known as the fruit intelligence 6 hala chaitanya.7 %n anchadasi V000 @-0D, Vidyaranya has mentioned these four factors involved in perception. #is theory that the <iva in an illusory presentation 6$hida!hasa7 has made it necessary for him to formulate these four steps in the perceptive process. (ue to the impulsion of previous merit and demerit, the internal organ which is a transformation of ure %ntelligence due to nescience, goes out through the sense-organs, reaches the o!5ect, pervades it and assumes its form. %t is like water going out from a tank through the

small canals, entering the field and assuming its form. =r, it is like molten metal taking the form of the mould into which it is poured. =r, it may!e compared to sunlight assuming the form of the o!5ect which it illumines. /y such pervasion the cogni.er and the cognised are identified with each other. All this is clearly set forth in V. .0V. ?2-4J. %t has !een said a!ove that the internal organ in the form of the cognitive psychosis connects the cogni.er with the cognised. The cogni.er is ure intelligence which is unattached. #ow does it get attached to the internal organ which is a modification of nescience) %f it could get attached to the internal organ, it may as well get attached to the o!5ects of the world directly without the aid of the internal organ. To this o!5ection the answer is that the intellect is the product of nescience when sattva predominates in it,. #ence it is sufficiently refined to reflect the intelligence of the Self. %t is also nearest to the Self. #ence there is a natural affinity !etween the Self and the internal organ. /ut the o!5ects of the world are the products of nescience when tamas predominates in it. They are, therefore, inert and cannot reflect the intelligence of the Self. They can shine only when the intelligence that is im!edded in the internal organ falls on them. #ence the Self cannot get into direct contact with the o!5ects. %t can do so only through the mediation of the internal organ. Though pure intelligence is one homogeneous whole, it yet appears as the cogni.er, the means of cognition, the o!5ect of cognition and the fruit intelligence owing to its association with the internal organ which is divisi!le. Space appears to move when the pot which contains it is moved from one place to another. %n the /rihadaranyaka 6%V iii,D7 it is said> 'it thinks as it were, it moves as it were'. This apparent thinking and moving is due to the association of the Self with the intellect. That is how Sankara explains it. A simple explanation will make it clear how pure %ntelligence which is impartite can yet appear under the a!ove mentioned four forms. %n perceiving an o!5ect that is outside, the internal organ has to go out through the sense-organs, reach it, pervade it and assume its form. /ut in regard to the perception of the mental states like happiness and misery, there is no need for the internal organ to go out. #ere the o!5ect is not outside !ut inside the mind. #ence the internal organ has only to assume the form of the mental state and illumine it. This is likened to the heated iron-!all which is a glow !ut does not shed light on anything else. 'The heated iron shows forth only itself and not

anything else. Similarly the mental activities accompanied !y the reflected self show forth only themselves'. 6V. . V%%%. 0F7 ?.%nference The only kind of inference that Vidyaranya employs is the argument from co-presence and co-a!sence. %t is called Anvaya Vyatireki. %n the ancha 3aha!huta Viveka he shows !y adopting this line of reasoning that though five gross elements differ in respect of their distinctive &ualities, all of them have one characteristic in common and that is the fact of !are existence. This &uality is uniformly present in all of them. #e shows also that in its a!sence, the elements are reduced to naught. #ence the author concludes that eh a!iding &uality in the elements is the fact of existence. That is their essential truth. The distinctive features of the elements are in the nature of superimposition on !are existence. %n the next chapter called ancha Cosa Viveka he adopts a similar line of reasoning and shows that what is uniformly present in the five sheaths and actuates them is the self. #e reinforces this conclusion !y showing that what remains when all of them are transcended is not nothing !ut the Self. Vidyaranya undertakes a similar analysis of the three states, waking, dream and dreamless sleep, and demonstrates conclusively that though the content of these states vary, there is one constant entity which illumines all of them without !eing affected in the least !y their vicissitudes. %n the waking state !oth the mind and sense-organs are active. Aided !y some extraneous light we ac&uire knowledge of the external world. /ut what really illumines the perceptions of the waking state is the light of the inner self. The presence of artificial lights hides this truth from our view. /ut it !ecomes clear when we go from the waking to the dream state. %n this state the sense-organs cease to function. #ence we lose touch with the external world. This means that we no longer have the aid of external light. And yet we have dream perceptions. These are the creation of the mind. %t is clear that what illumines the perceptions of the dream-state is the light of the inner self. This fact is esta!lished !eyond a shadow of dou!t when we go from dream to dreamless sleep. %n that state we perceive nothing. *e remem!er this and exclaim the next morning, :% slept well, % saw nothing9. =nly an experienced fact can !e recalled later. That the state of dreamless sleep was a !lank must have !een perceived then. The light which made this perception possi!le was surely the light of the witness self. %n the fourth state known as :samadhi9 even the

nescience that is perceived in deep sleep lapses ad what remains is ure $onsciousness. /y employing the method of reasoning called Anvaya Vyatireki Vidyaranya proves conclusively that what illumines all the states in the light of the witness self. 4. Sruti *e may pass over upamana, arthaapatti and anupala!di as our author has not made any use of them in his writings. =f the six pramanas, Sruti or Ver!al testimony is the most important one, for the central doctrines of Advaita Vedanta derive their support largely from that source alone. That /rahman is attri!ute-less, that the finite soul is non-different from it, that the world of diversity and change is only an apparent presentation, these ultimate truths are too deep for thought. They can not !e comprehended !y the human intellect. %t is wrong to swear !y the intellect and deny the existence of /rahman merely !ecause it can not !e grasped !y the intellect. The human intellect has its well defined limitations. %t can operate only in the region where su!5ect- o!5ect relation prevails. The experiences of sages transcend this region. The truths that have dawned on them in their unself-conscious moods are preserved for us in the 8panishads. This !ody of knowledge is what we call sruti. %t is our sole authority in regard to trans-empirical matters. AtAndriyArtheSuviSayeSu shrutiH naH pramANam | This is what Sankara has said. Though the 3imamsaka also attaches great importance to the authority of the Veda, There is a vital difference !etween his attitude towards the Veda and that of the Vedantin. The 3imamsaka maintains that only those statements of the Veda are purportful which en5oin some action. The others are either to !e dismissed as meaningless or they must !e shown to !ear some relation to the purportful texts. The Advaitin sharply differs from this view while not denying the value of the texts which en5oin some ritual, he maintains that the really purportful texts are those which call attention to an existing fact. The 3ahavakyas come under this head. 'Tat Tvam Asi' 6 That thou art 7, :Aham /rahma Asmi9 6%9m indeed /rahman7, :Ayam Atma /rahma9 6 This Atma is /rahman7 and : ra5nanam /rahma9 6pure Sentience is /rahman7, these four are considered to !e the most powerful texts since they remind us of an ever-existing, ever-present fact, namely, the identity of the individual soul with /rahman.

That they are the most purportful texts is determined !y the application of the six tests. 8pakarma- upasamhara 6 !eginning and end7, a!hyasa 6 repetition7, apurvata 6 novelty7, phala 6fruit7, arthavada 6 glorification7 and upapatti 6 standing to reason7. Sankara has proved !y the application of these tests that the uniform purport of all the 8panishads is the identity of the individual self with /rahman. Vidyaranya also mentions this in V. .V%% 0J?. %n regard to the interpretation of these texts we must remem!er that the direct literal meaning of the words which compose them will not do, as that will not render the texts intelligi!le. /etween :Tat9 6 %svara7 and :Tvam 6 you7, for example, there is such difference. %svara is all knowing, all powerful and all-pervasive. The <iva is &uite the opposite of these &ualities. #ence we can never affirm the identity of the two. And yet the text affirms their identity. To understand their identity we must give up the direct, literal meaning and go in for the indirect, implied, meaning. This secondary meaning is known as :lakshyaartha9. %nterpretation in terms of the secondary meaning may take three forms> 07 *e may wholly a!andon the primary meaning of the words and interpret the sentence in terms of their secondary meaning. :There is a cottage in the +anga9. This does not mean that the cottage is in the !ed of the river !ut on the !anks. ?7 *e may retain the primary meaning !ut add something more to it to make it fully intelligi!le. :people holding um!rellas are going9. To understand the full meaning of this statement we must add something that is not stated in it ."ot only people with um!rellas are going !ut also those without um!rellas. The latter are taking cover under the um!rellas of others. 47 =r, finally ,we may retain a part of the primary meaning and a!andon another part. :This is that (evadatta9. This is an identity 5udgement and not an attri!utive one. %t does not state the attri!utes of (evadatta !ut affirms the essential identity of the individual. Though he was seen on two different places, at two different times and under two different sets of circumstance, he is still the same person. That is, we a!andon the differences in respect of time, place and circumstance as unessential and lay the emphasis on the marks which are essential to him. %n spite of the differences, we affirm the identity of the individual. The first method of interpretation is called <ahallakshana, the second a5ahallakshana and the third 5ahada5ahallakshana or /hagatyagalakshana. The 3ahavakya, :Tat Tvam Asi9 has to !e interpreted !y the third method. Tat and Tvam have many differences. *e have already mentioned them, %svara and <iva are polar opposites in respect of their

&ualities. Since the text says that the two are identical, we have to re5ect these differences as adventitious and look for the &uality which is common to !oth of them. And that common &uality is that !oth are sentient entities. %n respect of their sentience there is no difference !etween them. %f this fact is !rought to the forefront, the differences will go to the !ackground. *ith the disappearance of their distinctive &ualities, %svara will cease to !e %svara and the <iva will cease to !e <iva. /oth will merge in /rahman. %t is in this deeper sense that the <iva is identical with %svara and not in the primary, literal sense. Vidyaranya has discussed this mode of interpreting the 3ahavakyas in Vedanta anchadasi V%% D0-D2. -et it not !e imagined that the secondary meaning is something wholly different from the primary meaning and that it is imported from without to make the text yield a preconceived meaning. %t is something implicit in the primary meaning and therefore suggested !y it. %n his :Vakya Vritti9 Sankara has defined the secondary meaning as follows> mAnAntaravirodhe tu mu hyArthasya aparigrahe | mu hyArthenA vinA bhUte pratItirla shaNocyate || 3ahavakyas, like ordinary sentences, must have syntactical unity. A sentence is made up of words and unless they stand in a particular relation they cannot yield a consistent meaning. The relation in which they should stand is determined !y four conditions. These are expectancy 6akanksa7, competency 6yogyata7, close 5uxtaposition 6sannidhi7, and intelligi!ility 6tatparya 5anana7. *hen a word is uttered it must raise a curiosity in the hearer9s mind. The word that is uttered must !e such as to make the hearer to expect something more. The next word must !e such as to fulfil that expectation. That is, it must cohere with the word already uttered. The third condition necessarily follows from the second. The coherence of the second word with the first can !e grasped only if the former is uttered in close succession. 3uch time must not !e allowed to lapse !etween the utterance of the first word and the second. /y the same token, the utterance should not !e too rapid either. Rama characterises #anuman9s speech as avilambitamadrutam. #is utterance of words was neither too slow nor too rapid. *hen all the words are taken together they must yield a consistent meaning. Vidyaranya makes mention of these conditions in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha> anyonyA AngdhA sannidhi yogyatAvanti padAni vA yam H

The next &uestion is whether the final import of the sentence is grasped simultaneously with the grasping of the meaning of the separate words or later !y putting together the meanings of the separate words. The ra!hakaras and the /hattas are divided in their opinion on the &uestion. The ra!hakara view is that the purport of the sentence is grasped simultaneously with the grasping of the meaning of separate words. According to this view the meaning of the words and the meaning of the sentence as a whole are grasped at the same time. "o special effort is necessary to grasp the purport of the sentence. This view is known as anvita!hidana vada. The /hatta view is that the words cease to function when they have yielded their meaning. A special effort is, therefore, necessary to know the meaning of the sentence as a whole. The meaning of the words has to !e recalled and pieced together. This view is known as a!hihitanavaya vada. %n his Vivarana rameya Sangraha Vidyaranaya sums up the difference !etween the two views as follows> AbhihitAnvayavAde hi padAni padArthAnabhidhIya padArthebhyo vA yArthapratipattiH anvItAbhidhAnavAdetu padAnAmeva vA yArtha pratipAda atva.m iti visheSaH | Advaitins are divided in their allegiance towards either of these two views. Vachaspati adopts the view of the /hatta School while the author of the Vivarana holds that !oth views are accepta!le. %n his Vivarana rameya Sangraha Vidyaranya places a new interpretation on the ra!hakara view and makes it accepta!le to the advaitin also. According to ra!hakara the ver! is the most important word in a sentence as its main function is to en5oin some ritual. All the other words must !e directly or indirectly related to the ver!. /ut Vidyaranya shifts the emphasis. The other words need not necessarily !e related to the ver! as that is not the most important word. They may !e related to the su!stantive or to the ad5ective. ,n5oining some ritual is, not therefore, the main function of a sentence. %t may call attention to an existing fact also. Thus he makes out that ra!hakara9s view is also accepta!le to the advaitin. The purport of the 3ahavakya must !e gathered !y !ringing thought to !ear on it after we have heard it from the teacher. After Sravana comes 3anana. %n his Aparoksanu!huti Sankara says that clear knowledge will not arise except !y hard thinking. notpadyate vinA jnAna.m vicAreNAnyasAdhanaiH 6%%7. (ou!ts can !e laid to rest only !y clear thinking and anaysis. $ontrary notions which stand in the way of clear understanding can !e removed only !y the method of Tarka. Tarka is a process of reasoning which !egins !y accepting the contrary

view and then, !y drawing out its logical implications, !rings out its a!surdity at the end. The essence of the Tarka mode of reasoning is to show the inconceiva!ility of the opposite. Tapas is only another word for hard thinking. Several instances can !e cited from the 8panishads to show how the mediate and indirect knowledge gathered !y listening to the discourses of the teacher was transformed into immediate and direct experience !y tapas, !y repeated &uestioning and !y the process of super-imposition and su!se&uent withdrawal. ',xistence alone, dear one, was this in the !eginning, one only without a second'. This instruction given to Svetaketu !y his father was mediate and indirect and it !ecame immediate and direct after Svetaketu was told that he himself was that very self. /hrigu was told !y his father that /rahman was the creator and sustainer of the world. This mediate knowledge !ecame an immediate experience !y his repeated tapas. %ndra went to ra5apati four times to have his dou!ts cleared a!out the nature of /rahman. /y repeated &uestionings !e o!tained clear notions. %n the Aitreya 8panishad there is the statement '%n the !eginning there was only the Self, nothing else existed'. This statement gains content and !ecomes an immediate experience !y the process of super-imposition and su!se&uent denial. Vidyaranya has mentioned these instances in Vivarana rameya Sangraha V%% 10-1F. The logician, however, maintains that a sentence can give only indirect and mediate knowledge. #e states his o!5ection in the from of a syllogism> The 3ahavakya can give only mediate knowledge. Kor it is a sentence, like the sentence. :There is #eaven9. #ence the 3ahvakya can give only mediate knowledge. /ut this syllogism is vitiated !y the fallacy of :avyapti9. The statement :there is #eaven9 may give only mediate knowledge, !ut all sentences need not !e of the type. The sentence :thou art the tenth9 give immediate knowledge> #eaven is a distant place and we may not get any direct knowledge a!out it !y merely hearing the sentence, :there is #eaven9. /ut that is not the case with the sentence :thou are the tenth9. "othing is nearer to us than our self. %t is due to ignorance that we think that it is something remote, something uncertain and something other that ourselves. The 3ahavakya directly !ears on the inmost self in us. And hence after hearing it and after cogitating we get direct and immediate experience.

The logician raises a further o!5ection. #e asks whether ver!al testimony is real or unreal. %f it is real, then /rahman is no longer the one without a second, for there is ver!al testimony which is another reality. %f it is unreal, how can the knowledge arising from an unreal and, therefore, untrustworthy source, give direct and immediate knowledge) The advaitin9s answer is that all ramanas are ultimately unreal. The Veda itself admits this when it say avedA avedA. /ut there is nothing to prevent a lower level of experience giving rise to knowledge which !elongs to a higher level. A dream is unreal, !ut the tiger that we see in the dream may !ring us to the waking state. Satya prAptistvasatyAdapi bhavati says Sankara in his Satasloki 6427. ,ven after Sravana, 3anana and "ididhyasana the 3ahavakya can give only mediate knowledge and to get it transformed into an immediate and direct experience a long and sustained course of contemplation, called rasamkhyana is necessary. This is the view of Vachaspati. a%n this, as in other respects, he follows the lead of 3andana 3isra. /ut the author of the anchapadika Vivarana opposes this view. Sureswara also thinks that the 3ahavakya, when once it is properly heard and understood, can give rise to direct and immediate experience without the aid any extraneous agency like rasmkhyana, Vidyaranya also takes the same view. #e gives the instance of the tenth man, who on !eing told that he was the tenth, realised the truth, free from any trace of dou!t. %f the o!5ect referred to is something outside of us, then it may !e true to say that the sentence relating it can give only indirect knowledge. /ut the o!5ect referred to in the 3ahavakya is nothing outside of us. =n the other hand, it is our inmost self nothing can !e nearer than the self in us. #ence there is nothing to prevent direct and immediate experience arising from the hearing of the 3ahvakya. This view, that Aparoksha <nana can arise from the mere hearing of the 3ahavakya is known as SA/(A AR=CS#A. This is one of the points of difference !etween the /hamati rasthana and the Vivarana rasthana. %n so far as Vidyaranya insists on hard thinking and the removal of contrary notions !y employing the method of tarka, he may !e said to strike a middle course. #e says that no cause will produce its proper effect if there are o!structions in the way. The rule applies to the hearing of the 3ahavakya as well. =ne may hear it any num!er of times and yet the direct experience may not result. This failure must !e attri!uted to the presence of counteracting circumstances. To remove them the proper antidote must !e employed. Vachaspati and others of his way of thinking recommend rasamkhyana as the

antidote. Vidyaranya prescri!es hard thinking and reasoning !y the method of tarka. The difference !etween the two prescriptions is more ver!al that material. %n this, as in the other cases of difference, Vidyaranya strikes a middle course. #is o!5ect is not to accentuate the differences !ut to reduce them as far as possi!le. The middle course that he adopts amounts to the throwing of a !ridge across the gulf. %n regard to transemprical matter, Sruti is our final authority. %t derives its authoritativeness from its flawlessness and complete freedom from the short-comings that are incident to the findings of human reason. Sruti is the collective name given to the external verities that dawned in the minds of the purified sages of yore. /ut it need not !e accepted as dogmatic truth. Though we may accept it on trust in the initial stages, we need not always take it on trust. That it stands to reason will !ecome clear to us in course of time. And then there will come a time when its truth will !e realised in our own experience. %t over-rides perception in supersensuous matters. erception says that there is difference !ut Sruti is emphatic that there is no difference whatsoever. The two statements are exact contradictories and hence !oth cannot !e true. =ne of them must !e re5ected as false. Since this a matter relating to the nature of ultimate reality, Sruti must prevail and perception must go down, The knowledge that /rahman is one without a second cannot arise except !y su!lating the perceptual notion that the world is full of difference. *e say first :This is a snake9G we say later :this is a rope9. The second notion cannot arise except !y su!lating the first notion. erception may come first !ut that is no reason for treating it as superior to Sruti. %n fact, that it comes first may itself !e sufficient ground for re5ecting it. This is known as :apacceda myaya9. %t means that the earlier notion must !e re5ected in favor of the later notion, especially when the latter cannot arise without su!lating the former one. /ut in regard to matters which are purely empirical perception is our authority and Sruti has nothing to say here. ,ven a hundred Sruti texts, as Sankara says, cannot make us !elieve that fire is cold or that is does not evolve heat and light. Vachaspati has said that perception must yield not to any and every vedic statement !ut only to purportful Sruti. Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought

/y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer $hapter V% $5U$H AN' ,5515!& criterion o( truth & levels o( e8perience & degrees o( truth & the highest truth & ignorance the root cause o( error & the essence o( error & the process by +hich error arises. According to Advaita Vedanta the criterion of truth is not correspondence or coherence or practical utility !ut non-contradiction. That 5udgment is true which remains uncontradicted at all times and in all the levels of experience. /y contrast, that 5udgment is false which suffers contradiction at the same level or at a high level. Since levels of experience are admitted in the system it necessarily recognises degrees of truth. *hat we perceive in a dream or continue to cherish the illusion. Similarly what we perceive in the state of waking is true so long as we continue in the waking state. <ust as we do not suspect the truth of dream perceptions and illusory perceptions as long as we continue to remain in those states even so we do not suspect the truth of our waking perceptions. As long as we continue in that state. <ust as the illusory perception vanishes and !ecomes false when light is !rought even so our dream perceptions vanish and !ecome false when we come to the waking state ./y the same token, our waking perceptions also vanish and !ecome false when we rise to a higher level of experience. This higher level experience relates to /rahman realisation. %t is called the aramartika level as distinct from the two previous ones known as the Vyavaharika and the rati!hasika. <ust as the Vyavaharika perceptions !elong to a level which is higher than the level to which the rati!hasika perceptions !elong., even so the aramartika perceptions !elong to a level which is higher than the one to which the Vyavaharika perceptions !elong. <ust as the rati!hasika perceptions are taken to !e true so long as we continue in that state, even so the Vyavaharika perceptions are taken to !e true so long as we remain in that state. <ust as rati!hasika perceptions are contradicted !y the perceptions of the Vyavaharika state Since there no level of experience higher than the aramartika state, the perceptions of that level remain uncontradicted. They are therefore the highest truths. The perceptions of the two previous levels are not dismissed as a!solutely falso !ut assigned a lower degree of truth. Thus Advaita recognises degrees of truth. The world that we see in the waking state is true for all practical purposes> it !ecomes falso only when we rise to the state of /rahman 3ithiya is not what is a!solutely false or unreal !ut what is perfectly true and real at one level and untrue and unreal at a higher level. According to Advaita nothing that

is perceived even for !rief moment !y 5ust one individual can !e dismissed as a!solutely false. ,ven the mirage, Sankara says, is not without a !asis of reality. na hi mrugatruSNAdayopi nirAspadA bhavanti | =nly words which have no o!5ects corresponding to them, like :the sky-lotus9. The !arren woman9s son9 are dismissed as a!solutely untrue , as Tucca. %llusions like the rope-serpent and dream o!5ects like the lion seen in it are perceived for a !rief moment !y 5ust one individual. They are not perceived even !y the same individual at a later time. /y contrast, the o!5ects of the waking state, for example, the rope, are perceived !y the same individual at different times. They are also perceived as such and such !y different individual at the same time. %t follows that such perceptions !elong to al level that is higher than the previous one. #ence arises the difference in degree. /ut, as we have already stated, even the world which is the same to the same individual at different times and the same to the same individual at the same time suffers contradiction when we rise to the highest level of experience, !rahmasaksatkara. #ence it must !e dismeissed as falso even as we dismiss the dream perceptions as false when we rise to the waking state. %n his Aparokshannu!huti 6B17 Sankara writes> anubhUtopyaya.m lo o vyavahAra shamopi san| asadrUpo yathA svapna uttara shaNabAdhataH || Again in his Atma /odha 6D7 we read> tAvatsatya.m jagadbhAto shu ti Arajata.m yathA | yAvanna jnAyate brahma sarvAdhiS$Anamadvayam HH So far we have elucidated non-contradiction as the criterion of truth. Sometimes another criterion, novelty is mentioned. /ut that is not very important. %t is laid down to prevent the possi!ility of what we recall from memory also !eing treated as true,. This condition has only a negative value. %t can shut out certain kinds of knowledge as not fit to !e treated as true !ut it cannot determine what is true. The next &uestion is whether truth or validity is esta!lished !y a process different from the one which along with the rise of knowledge in other words., the &uestion is whether validity is intrinsic or extrinsicG swatah-pramanya or aratah- ramany. The "aiyayikas !elieve that !oth the validity and the invalidity of a 5udgement are

determined !y the application of factors which are other than those which give rise to it. This is what is called aratah- ramanya Vada. The Sankhyas !elieve that !oth the validity and the invalidity of a 5udgement are determined !y the very factors which give rise to it. This view is known as :swatah ramanya Vada9. The /uddhists !elieve that every 5udgement is intrinsically invalid and its validity has to !e esta!lished !y resort to extraneous considerations. The 3imamsakas hotly discuss this &uestion and come to the conclusion that every 5udgement is intrinsically valid unless there are counteracting circumstances which render it invalid. "ormal functioning of senseorgans and the activity of the mind are the factors which give rise to the perceptual 5udgement. These very factors ensure the validity of that 5udgement. /ut if our vision is not normal or if the mind is not sufficiently active, the resulting 5udgement may prove to !e invalid. #ence validity is intrinsic while invalidity is extrinsic. This is the advaitic view also. -ike the 3imamsakas the Advaitins also !elieve that knowledge, as it rises, carries its own validity with it. %f there is no flaw in the factors which give rise to knowledge, there can no flaw in the resulting 5udgement. %f, however, there is any flaw either in the sense-organ or in the internal organ which goes out to meet the o!5ect and assume its form, the resulting 5udgements is !ound to invalid. Such invalid 5udgements naturally suffer contradiction. %n his Vivarana rameya Sangraha Vidyaranya states the advaitic view as follows> prAmANyasya utpattau jnaptauca jnAnotpAda a jnApa Aniri ta anape shanva la shaNa.m svastva.m | yAvat svAshraya grAha a grAha yatva.m svato grAhayatvam H The root cause of error is ignorance. (ue to non-discrimination !etween what is real and what is unreal we superimpose the real and its attri!utes on what is unreal and vice versa. This is the essence of error as Sankara has shown in his cele!rated introduction to his commentary on the Vedanta Sutra. The process !y which error arises is explained more in detail !y Vidyaranya in his Vivarana rameya Sangraha. Kirst there is the sense contact with wat is in front of us, say, nacre. Since there is some flaw in the sense-organ which apprehends it, the psychosis of the internal organ generated !y it has :this9 alone for its content. %t misses the specific content of the :this9. Then arises the psychosis of nescience which, aided % !y the past impressions, apprehends the silver which is not there. Though there are two cognitions, they get mixed up since their locus is the same. They conse&uently appear as one and we exclaim :this is silver9. %n Vedanta anchadasi 6V%%% B47 also Vidyaranya makes a !rief reference to the process !y which error arises.

Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought /y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer $hapter V%% ,$HICS AN' 5,3I4I1N! & Sadharana dharma and Visesa dharma ta en (or granted & the need (or per(orming Nitya and naimitti a arma & the per(ormance o( Vedic ritual only a remote aid & bha ti occupies a more important place & saguna 0rahman and other lesser 4ods are (it objects o( +orship & 'hyana & )nana the sole means to the (inal intuition *e have already stated that in Vidyaranya9s writings the main emphasis is on metaphysics and not on logic or ethics. <ust as we have to gather his views on logic and theory knowledge from the stray hints found in different places, even so we have to form some idea of the sadhana that he considered necessary for /rahman-realisation from casual remarks that he has made in several contexts. #is <ivan 3ukti Viveka is a little more helpful than his other works in this respect. /ut even in this work he is more concerned with a!solute renunciation, Sannyasa, than with the initial steps that lead up to it. There is no mention anywhere of the elementary virtues, sadharana dharma, like truth-speaking, non-violence, non-covetousness, purity of mind and !ody and the rest. atan5ali has listed ten elementary virtues under the first two steps of his eight-fold yoga. The ten virtues that he mentions under these two hears are characterised as sarva !hauma mahavrata. +enerally writers on Advaita Vedanta do not make any special mention of these virtues, !ut take them for granted. They constitute the necessary preliminary &ualification for one aspires for anything higher. They are the :must9 which no!ody could afford to ignore. %n the language of %mmanuel Cant, they fall within the sphere of the :$ategorical imperative9. There is no holiday from them for any!ody. =ne who is !orn as a human !eing is under a moral o!ligation to cultivate these ten virtues, non-in5ury 6ahimsa7, truth-speaking 6satyam7, a!stention from stealing or misappropriation of the property of others 6assaya7 celi!acy 6!rahmacharya7, disowning of possessions 6aparigraha7, purity 6saucha7, contentment 6santosa7, right aspiration 6tapas7, study of philosophic texts 6svadhyaya7 and devotion to +od 6%svara ranidhana7.

/ut Sankara does not undermine the importance of Vedic karma. Rather he insists on its proper performance till the knowledge of /rahman is attained. Sureswara also takes the same view. *hen, however, /rahman-knowledge has dawned on an individual, there is no &uestion of his dropping the ritualsG rather they drop of their own accord. -ike clouds disappearing at the end of the rainy season, they fall off when once the final intuition has downed. /#ACT% %n the scheme of sadhana a more important place is assigned to /hakti. Sankara speaks of it in his Viveka $hudamani 64?7 as the most important of the ingredients which make for deliverance. Saguna /rahman and the other lesser manifestations of %savara are recognised only as supports for meditation. This is the reason why Saguna /rahman is spoken of a as 8pasana /rahman. Vidyaranya recognises the need for 8pasana or worship. *rong notions relating to the #ighest are to !e removed !y the steady practice of devout meditation. '*rong notions are to !e removed !y concentration. This concentration arises from worship. That is the reason why upasana is considered even in the sastra relating to /rahman'. V. . V%% 0J@-0JB. As all the lower gods are only aspects of Saguna /rahman, they are also fit o!5ects for worship. 'The -ord, Sutraman, Virat, /rahma, Vishnu, Rudra, %ndra, Agni and the rest, as all these are verily the lim!s of the -ord, they will give fruits if they are worshipped'. V. . V% ?JB-?J1. A!out the practice of yoga 6mind concentration7 Vidyaranya is not very enthusiastic. %t will secure cessation of duality only for the time !eing. %t is therefore no sure remedy. This opinion he expresses in V. . %V. 42.4F. /ut he grows more enthusiastic a!out it in the chapter entitled :;ogananda9. %n his Vedanta anchadasi. %n this chapter he lays down a two-fold discipline, that of <nana which he calls Sankhya after the +ita, and that of yoga. The former is meant for men with sharp intellects and the latter for men of dull understanding. ;oga is comtemplation of /rahman in a steady and continuous manner. The knowledge of /rahman that men of dull understanding will derive from the formal study of the Veda 6adhyayana7 will serve for purposes of contemplation. *ith the steady practice of contemplation, their knowledge of /rahman will !ecome clearer and ultimately lead them to the path of <nana.

The surest means to deliverance, however, is <nana. As !ondage is due to ignorance, it can !e removed only !y the ac&uisition of knowledge. %t is of course the knowledge of /rahman that will dispel the wrong notion a!out our own real nature. %n his Vivarana rameya Sangrah, Vidyaranya has made his position very clear in regard to this &uestion #e has said that <nana is the sovereign remedy for removing the !ondage arising from our ignorance. Though he recognises the need for karma and !hakti he does not !elieve that either of them or !oth in com!ination can take us to li!eration. They are at !est preliminary aids that prepare the ground for the final intuition. That intuition itself could come only from the knowledge arising from the hearing, the cogitating and the meditating of the 3ahavakyas. There is no &uestion of com!ining Carma with <nana as some of the preSankara period advaitins !elieved or !hakti with <nana as 3adhusudan Saraswati, a thinker of the post-Sankara period !elieved. <nana is the sole means. Contribution of Bharati Tirtha and Vidyaranya to Development of Advaitic Thought /y 3.C. Venkatarama %yer $hapter V%%% /17SHA! & the nature o( bondage & (reedom only be no+ledge & the joy o( (reedom & no inconsistency in the conception o( )ivan /u ti & positive advantage & +hether the )ivan /u ta +ill merge% +hen his body (alls% in the conditioned or unconditioned 0rahman & Vidyaranya*s contribution in the matter o( reducing the di((erences bet+een the 0hamati "rasthana and the Vivarana "rasthana. %n his <ivan 3ukti Viveka, Vidyaranya defines !ondage as consisting in these functions of the mind which are characterised !y feelings of pleasure and pain. These are the concomitants of action and en5oyment. To get over one9s !ondage one should neutralise the impressions 6vasanas7 which draw a man to further action and further en5oyment. Such neutralisation is possi!le !y determined effort. 3an need not think that he is helpless !efore an overmastering fate or !lind power. #e is a free !eing and he can overcome all o!stacles !y suita!le means. #e need not think that the vasanas will act like a dead-weight on him and !ind him hand and foot,. #e is the master of his own destiny. Vidyaranya strikes this refreshingly cheerful not in the !eginning of his <ivan 3ukti Viveka. As if to reinforce what he has said in his Vivaran rameya Sangraha, he affirms again that <nana is the

sole means for getting over all ovstacles and realising our true nature. *e can ac&uire <nana even without formal renunciation. *ith the onset of the right kind of knowledge all !ondage will snap and the man will feel free like the !irds of the air. This 5oy that comes of that freedom is fully set forth in the anchadasi V%%. ?F?-?FD. Vidyaranya goes into ecstasies while descri!ing the 5oy that comes with the !reaking of the !onds. 'Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G % know directly myself as eternal. Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G The !liss of /rahman shines clearly in me. Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G % do not now see the misery of Samsara. Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G 3y ignorance has run away somewhere. Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G "othing remains to !e done !y me. Kortunate am %, fortunate am %G All that need !e o!tained has now !een o!tained'. *ith this attainment of freedom he will feel that he is not !ound !y o!ligations of any kind. The in5unctions and prohi!itions of the Veda will not !ind him any longer. #e will no allow them to sit tight on him. Rather he will feel that he is &uite free to interpret them in his own way in the light of his plenary experience. This, however, does not mean that he will do what is wrong or what is prohi!ited in the Veda. %t only means that automatically and as if !y instinct he will do what is right. #is mind will not !e torn !y dou!ts and difficulties or !y alternative courses of action. *ithout any effort, without weighing the pros and cons, he will put his finger on the right spot and do what is right. Virtues like non-violence, non-hatred, non-aggression will come to him automatically without calling for any special effort. Supernatural powers also may come to him with the onset of knowledge !ut he will not !e lured !y them. #e will not allow them to deflect him from his main purpose. 'The ac&uisition of such powers helps not a 5ot towards the attainment of the highest !eatitude of life'. This is his opinion of supernatural powers 6 siddhis7 and he has expressed it categorically in his <ivan 3ukti Viveka.

-ike Sankara, Vidyaranya thinks that Sanyasa is necessary to !e a!le to pursue knowledge in a single minded manner without distractions of any kind. 8nless one frees oneself from o!ligations of every kind one will not !e a!le to devote oneself whole-heartedly to the pursuit of knowledge. <anana marga is like a 5ealous mistress. She will not !rook a rival. She will not allow her devotee to divide his attention !etween her and some one else. Such thorough-going devotion to the <nana 3arga is possi!le only for one who has freed himself from o!ligations of every kind. Such freedom comes only with formal renunciation. This is vidvat sannyasa. ' %f the li!erated is over oppressed !y any of the least sense of duty, he is 5ust so many removes away from right knowledge'. Such a <ivan 3ukta may continue in the em!odied condition till the karma that has !ecome operative is exhausted. *hen it has spent its force, his !ody will fall and there is no further re!irth for him. 3erely !ecause he continues in the em!odied condition for sometime, we need not think that his knowledge is not full or that there is a trace of ignorance still left in him. Vachaspati, following 3andana, thinks that <ivan 3ukti is a contradiction in terms. Since there is an unresolved conflict in that condition, it can not !e said to !e real freedom. The only real freedom is that which comes after death. /ut there is no 5ustification for this !elief. %f he continues in the em!odied condition it does not necessarily mean that there is still a trace of ignorance 6a5nana lesa7 left in him. #is continuing in the em!odied condition may !e otherwise explained. Carma which has !ecome operative is like the potter9s wheel. %t will come to a stop only when the momentum that it has received is exhausted. =r, it may !e likened to the sped arrow. =nce the arrow has left our hands, there is no recalling it. %t will fall down only when it has hit the mark. The important point is that though the <iva continues to live in the !ody. %t does not identify itself with it. #e uses it as an instrument wherewith to carryout +od9s will. #e disowns it and places it completely at the disposal of %svara. %t is for %svara to use it as #e thinks fit. #e will not longer !e affected !y the vicissitudes of the !ody. An incidental advantage arising from the <ivan 3ukta continuing in the em!odied condition for sometime is that he will !e a living example to the rest of mankind in selfless action. Such an example will prove more useful than do.ens of discourses on "iskarma karma. Another advantage is that such a man is the fittest one to give us instruction a!out /rahman. =nly those who have realised /rahman can speak

with authority a!out the nature of /rahman. Those who rely on mere !ook-knowledge cannot prove to !e efficient teachers. This is stated in the 8panishad 6Catha 0.ii.2.7 and in Sankara9s commentary on +ita 6 %V. 4@7. Vidyaranya refers to ;agnavalkya who taught the highest truth to king <anaka. %f physical death should synchronise with the dawn of enlightenment, we will !e the losers. There will !e none to instruct truth from direct experience. *hether the realisation is of the conditioned or unconditioned /rahman is again a de!ated &uestion. Vachaspati thinks that it is the conditioned or Saguna /rahman that is realised. The unconditioned or attri!uteless /rahman is !eyond all relations. There is no &uestion of its !eing veiled !y ignorance and later manifested !y knowledge. %t must, therefore, !e Saguna /rahman that is veiled !y avidya and is su!se&uently revealed !y knowledge. #ence, according to Vachaspati, realisation means merger in Saguna /rahman or %svara. Any <iva that is so merged will have to stay on till all the <ivas find their way into it. Then all the <ivas along with %svara will merge in the attri!uteless /rahman. This is the doctrine of Sarva 3ukti. Appayya (iksitar endorses this view. /ut author of the Vivarana and Vidyaranya do not agree with this view. They rather !elieve that any <iva that ac&uires the right knowledge will straightaway !e a!sor!ed in the attri!uteless /rahman as soon as the !ody falls. There is no &uestion of its having to wait in a half-way house till all the other <ivas also find their way into it. They cite the $handogya text 6 V%. Liv.? 7 tasya tAvadevacira.m yAvanavimo shye atha sa%mpatsye of their contention. This text means that for his complete a!sorption in the attri!uteless /rahman he has to wait only till his !ody falls. The Carma mukti, of which Sankara speaks, does not really lend support to Vachaspati9s view. %t does not mean that all finite selves has to rest in %svara till all souls find their way into it. %t means that those who have worshipped Saguna /rahman while they were living, go, after death, to /rahmaloka !y the way of the +ods 6(evayana7. They rest there for sometime, ac&uire the knowledge of the "irguna /rahman and then are merged in it. ,ST%3AT, Krom the account of Vidyaranya9s contri!ution to the development of advaitic thought that is given in the foregoing pages it will !ecome clear that he occupies perhaps the top-most place among postSankara exponents of Advaita Vedanta. Readers will also notice that his conclusions have an authentic ring a!out them. They arise from

first hand experience. /eing a <ivan 3ukta himself he is a!le to speak from personal conviction. Another remarka!le feature a!out his exposition is his attempt to lessen the difference !etween the two opposing camps and !ring a!out a rapprochement !etween them. Attention has !een called to the several instances in which he has tried to do this. *ith his penetrating intellect he could discover that the socalled differences arose from pressing analogies !eyond their proper limits and hence they were more ver!al than material. Vidyaranya9s writings, therefore, furnish a refreshing contrast to the polemical writings of many others.