FLORES vs. COMELEC Case Digest FLORES vs.

COMELEC 184 SCRA 484 Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed secondin the election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal CircuitTrial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latters total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for Flores only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him tosecond place. The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based onSection 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay elections on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellatejurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679? Held: The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over a

Galido vs ComelecDate: January 18, 1991Petitioner: Perfecto GalidoRespondents: Comelec and Saturnino GaleonPonente: PadillaFacts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January1988 local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner wasproclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protestbefore the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner.Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Divisionreversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor.After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration andaffirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15)ballots in the same precinct containing the initial C after the name Galido weremarked ballots and, therefore, invalid.Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the presentpetition for certiorari and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded ingetting a temporary

restraining order. In his comment to the petition, privaterespondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC inelection contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, andnot appealable. Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial courtsdecision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition forcertiorari by the aggrieved party? Held: YesRatio:The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contestsinvolving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and notappealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civilaction of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, whichpetitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or bylaw, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to theSupreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receiptthereof. We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power of review of this Court. The COMELECfound that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15)ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design toidentify the ballots and/or voters. This finding should be conclusive on the Court. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdictionover all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all electiveregional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contestsinvolving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction orinvolving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.(Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution). In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondentCOMELEC found that fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the letter"C" after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May this COMELEC decision bebrought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the hereinpetitioner)?Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites insupport of this petition, it is stated: "(U)nless otherwise provided by thisConstitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrievedparty within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2),paragraph 2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final orders, orrulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal andbarangay offices shall be final, executory , and not appealable . (Emphasis supplied)We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, finalorders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving electivemunicipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does notpreclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari . Theproceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioneddecision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferiorcourt or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it fromcommitting a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide anelection contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent towhich such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which shouldnot be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of eitherparty. Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed theposition of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipalityby virtue of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend allaction and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light,the petition at bar has become moot and academic. Guevara v Guevara Digest Guevara v. Guevara Digest Facts: 1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter. 2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her. 3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded. 4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory. Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. L-31455. February 28,1985)Facts: In preparation for the national elections, the Commissioners of the COMELEC issuedan "INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127", calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths withspecifications and descriptions.Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the invitationwere the petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and Machine

Shop, and the privaterespondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company. The COMELEC BiddingCommittee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the proceedingstaken pursuant to the invitation to bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was made of black iron sheets, that were painted, andtherefore not rust proof or rust resistant and that it was also heavy (51 kilos inweight). The Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded thecontract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made.An ocular inspection was conducted by the COMELEC of all the samples that weresubmitted. The Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid and that itshould be awarded the contract. Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order denied the writ prayed for. Public respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit, and that the complaint stated nocause of action. The Judge dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration of Filipinas. Issues/Held/Ratio:1. Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suitinvolving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising fromits invitation to bid? - YES The lower court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit involving the award of contract of COMELEC. The COMELEC resolutionawarding the contract to Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial function but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative function over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, nocontempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct andexclusive appeal by certiorari to the SC may be derived from such order. Anyquestion arising from the order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action beforethe trial courts. PEOPLE vs. INTING Case Digest PEOPLE vs. INTING 187 SCRA 788 Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition. Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. AZNAR VS. COMELEC, digested Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 GR # 83820, May 25, 1990 (Constitutional Law Alien, Loss of Citizenship) FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration certificate. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien. HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship. Sanchez vs Comelec 153 scra 67

FACTS:

Candidate Augusto Sanchez filed his petition on 28 May 1987 praying that respondent Comelec after due hearing, be directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast three months ago in the 11 May 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last 4 winning candidates on the ground that the votes intended for him were declared as stray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from Comelec election forms.

ISSUE:

W/N the petition for recount is a pre-proclamation controversy congnizable by COMELEC (Omnibus Election Code).

HELD:

No. Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or reappreciation on Section 243, paragraph (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 234 thereof with regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. He contends that the canvassed returns discarding "Sanchez" votes as stray were "incomplete" and therefore warrant a recount or reappreciation of the ballots under Section 234. A simple reading of the basic provisions of the cited Section shows readily its inapplicability. By legal definition and by the very instructions of the Comelec (Res. No. 1865, Sec. 6, promulgated on March 11, 1987), an election return is incomplete if there is "omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes" (Sec. 234) or "in case the number of votes for a candidate has been omitted." (Sec. 6, Res. No. 1865) Here, the election returns are complete and indicate the name of Sanchez as well as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The fact that some votes written solely as "Sanchez" were declared stray votes because of the inspectors' erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate, involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by the law as well as jurisprudence that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of the ballots. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a "proceeding of the board of canvassers" for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the boards of election inspectors at the precinct level. It does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to issues enumerated under sec 243 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The enumeration

is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects(sec 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the results of the election(sec 236) which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petition must fail. The complete election returns those authenticity is not in question is prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing and proclamation of the winning candidates. Otherwise, it will open floodgates to claims by the losing candidates and delay the canvass and proclamation. The allegation of invalidation of Sanchezs votes intended for him bears no relation to the correctness and authenticity and correctness of the election returns canvassed. Furthermore, Comelec has no power to look beyond the face of the ballots once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes vs Comelec). CHAVEZ VS GONZALES Leave a comment FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed rigging the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacaang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been spliced to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the womans voice in the compact discs was not President Arroyos after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the AntiWiretapping Law. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the acts, issuances, and orders of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds: (1) respondents conduct violated

freedom of expression and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes. ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression. 1. Standing to File Petition Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity. 2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of expression: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity. The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.

If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts. Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or lowvalue expression. By definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading advertisement as unprotected expression only in October 2007. Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint. Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public. While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression. However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or hate speech against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint. If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before prior restraint on such expression can be justified. The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression pornography,31 advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security is the clear and present danger test.32 The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.

Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms it may be a law, administrative regulation, or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies. 3. Government Action in the Present Case The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations. Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent. The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC also concedes that only after a prosecution or appropriate investigation can it be established that the Garci Tapes constitute false information and/or willful misrepresentation. Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation. 4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTCs claim that the Garci Tapes might contain false information and/or willful misrepresentation, and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. 6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations. In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.

Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression. 7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely fairly warned radio and television stations to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have not explained how and why the observance by radio and television stations of the AntiWiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public airing of the Garci Tapes. Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or endanger the security of the State. 8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent. 9. Conclusion In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, had cause of action under the premises,against the COMELEC and Acme to enjoin them from complying with their contract? - NO Filipinas, had no cause of action against the COMELEC and Acmeto enjoin them from complying with their contract. The COMELEC's "Invitation toBid No. 127", dated September 16, 1969, expressly stipulated that the COMELECreserved the right to reject any or all bids and to waive any information therein or accept such bid as may in its discretion be considered most reasonable andadvantageous. It's also stated that the call for bidders and proposals do not bound theCommission in accepting any bid. The COMELEC also specifically mentioned thatthe call for bids by itself does not confer a right to any bidder to initiate an action for damages for unrealized or expected profits unless the bid was duly accepted by theCommissions resolution. Pursuant to the COMELEC's "Invitation to Bid No.127", a bidder may have the right to demand damages, for unrealized or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted by resolution by the COMELEC.Filipinas' bid, although recommended for award of contract by the biddingcommittee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Thus, Filipinas had no cause of action.

G.R. No. L-52749 March 31, 1981SOTERO OLFATO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO E. LIRIO, FACTS: In the local elections held last January 30, 1980,petitioner Olfato and the other petitioners werethe official Nationalista Party (NP) candidates for Mayor and Sanggunian Bayan, respectively, of Tanauan, Batangas.Respondent Francisco E. Lirio was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for mayor of said town.On the basis of the results of its canvass of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanauan, Batangas, proclaimedpetitioner Olfato and the rest of the petitioners as the duly elected Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan,respectively.Earlier, on February 2, 1980 or three (3) days before petitioners were proclaimed, respondent Lirio, together with thecandidates on his ticket for Vice Mayor and Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas, filed withrespondent COMELEC a petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation of "Winning candidates" for the electivepositions of Tanauan and they alleged as grounds the following: fake voters, fake voters identification cards, flyingvoters, substitute voters and massive disenfranchisemenConsequently, respondent urged for the suspension of the canvass of election returns prior to the identification and thesegregation of the alleged fake ballots from the genuine ballots. Respondent filed with respondent a supplementarypetition which averred, among others "... that these election irregularities involving fake voters and massive disenfranchisement are proper grounds for a pre-proclamation , because they affect the very integrity of the electionreturn.Hence, respondent Lirio prayed for the annulment of the proclamation of herein petitioners and further prayed thatthe matters raised in the petition for suspension of canvass and of proclamation filed on February 2, 1980 be set for hearing after respondents of said petition, Municipal Board of Canvassers and Sotero Olfato have filed their answers.Respondent Commission issued Minute Resolution No. 9092, suspending the effects of the proclamation of hereinpetitioners as duly elected Mayor and Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Tanauan, Batangas. Subsequently, petitionersfiled with respondent Commission, an urgent motion for reconsideration of Minute Resolution No. 9092 and COMELEC,acting on said urgent motion for reconsideration issued Minute Resolution

No. 9306. dismissing the petition andreinstated the proclamation made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers in favor of the respondent and his entire ticket.ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the pre-proclamation controversiesRULING: Yes. It is now our submission that the respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the nature of P.P. Case No.118.The Constitution grants respondent COMELEC the general power to 'enforce and administer all laws relative to theconduct of elections, 'makes it the sole judge of all contests relating to the elec- tions, returns, and qualification of elections ... provincial and city officials,' and mandates it to 'perform such other functions as may be provided by law'(sec.1, pars. 1, 2 and 8, Art. XII, Constitution).The 1978 Election Code, provides that 'the Commission shall be the sole judgeof all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory' (Sec. 175) andthat it shall 'have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections' (lst par., Sec. 185), with power and authority to 'enforce andexecute the decisions, directives, orders and instructions on any matter affecting the conduct of any electoral process(Sec 185[c]).Previous court rulings that respondent Commission on Elections has the power and authority to inquire into the allegationof fake voters, with fake Ids Identification slips in a pre-proclamation controversy in order to determine the authenticity or integrity of the election returns or whether such election returns faithfully record that only registered or genuine electorswere allowed to vote.While admittedly the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction over election contests involvingmunicipal or municipal offices (Sec. 190, 1978 Election Code), WE must not lose sight of the fact that the instant suitinvolved a pre- proclamation controversy filed by the private respondent before the respondent Commission. IMAPOROV.HRETFACTS: This is a petition brought by Congressman Dimaporo seeking tonullify the twin Resolutions of the HRET which denied his Motion for Technical Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in theVoters Registration Records and Motion for Reconsideration of ResolutionDenying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records.P u r s u a n t t o t h e 1 9 9 8 H R E T R u l e s C o n g r e s s i o n a l candidate Mangotara Petition of Protest (Ad Cautelam) seeking thetechnical examination of the signatures and thumb the protested precinctsof the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged thatthe massive substitution of voters and other electoral irregularitiesperpetrated by Dimaporos supporters will be uncovered and proven. Fromt h i s a n d o t h e r p r e m i s e s , h e c o n c l u d e d t h a t h e i s t h e d u l y e l e c t e d representative of the 2ndDistrict of Lanao del Norte.Noting that the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questionedballots because there are no ballots but only election documents to consider HRET granted Mangotara's motion and permitted the latter toengage an expert to assist him in prosecution of the case, NBI conductedthe technical examination. ISSUE: 1. W/N Dimaporo was deprived by HRET of Equal Protection whenthe latter denied his motion for technicalexamination.2. W/N Dimaporo was deprived of procedural due processor the right to present scientific evidence to show themassive substitute voting committed in counter protested precincts. RULING: 1. Resolution of HRET did not offend equal protectionclause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and thingssimilarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferredand the liabilities imposed. It follows that the existence of a valid andsubstantial distinction justifies divergent treatment.

According to Dimaporo since the ballot boxes subject of hispetition and that of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, hismotion, like Mangotaras, should be granted.The argument fails to take into account the distinctionsextant in Mangotaras protest vis--vis Dimaporos counter-protest whichvalidate the grant of Mangotaras motion and the denial of Dimaporos. First. The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotaras protest. The opposite is true with regard to Dimaporos counter-protest as he contested the election results in all municipalities butSND.Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election recordsof SND are determinative of the final outcome of the election protestagainst Dimaporo. The same cannot be said of the precincts subject of Dimaporos motion. I t s h o u l d b e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e g r a n t o f a m o t i o n f o r technical examination is subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.In this case, the Tribunal deemed it useful in the conduct of therevision proceedings to grant Mangotaras motion for technicalexaminati on. Conversely, it found Dimaporos motion unpersuasiveand accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely actedwithin the bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. After all,the Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of theHouse of Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 2. Anent Dimaporos contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence tosubstantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in thecounterprotested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET itself mayascertain the validity of Dimaporos allegations without resort to technicalexamination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots, electiondocuments and other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutinyin the appreciation of evidence.It should be noted that the records are replete with evidence,documentary and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. Dimaporos allegation of denial of due process is an indefensible pretense.The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit

office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerousnational organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an internationalcampaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.Pamatong also attacked the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by theCOMELEC. He claimed that the form did not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it did not ask for the candidates bio-data andhis program of government. Issue Whether or not Elly Pamatong has a constitutional right to run for or hold public officeand, particularly, to seek candidacy for presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. Rationale/Doctrine/Ruling Elly Pamatong has no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject tolimitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a rightnor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plainlanguage of the provision which suggests such a thrust or

justifies an interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generallyconsidered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatmentto the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies aguideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise toany cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the presentSection 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equalaccess," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." The provision is not intended tocompel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possibleinto public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framersto cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of theimposition of a clear State burden. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desiredif it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause asoperative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properlydefined. Broadly written, the countless of claims that can be subsumed under this issue appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "publicservice" are susceptible to limitless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness.Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative butamorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilegeof equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some validlimitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of theOmnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution 645210 dated 10December 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may refuse to give due course toor cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equallywithout discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is notsacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. Herein, there is no showing that any person isexempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. G.R. No. 163295 January 23, 2006FRANCISG.ONG, Petitioner,vs. JOSEPHSTANLEYALEGREandCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS, Respondents.FACTS:Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, CamarinesNorte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and haveassumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full termscorresponding to those elections.The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was proclaimed winner. Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998mayoralty contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoraltyterm and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect. Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution 5

dismissing the saidpetition of Alegre. Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution 6 reversing theresolution of the COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis " as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004" ; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates;and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing acertificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, assubstitute candidate for his brother Francis. However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong should be denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete hisname from the list of candidates.ISSUE:a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should beconsidered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionin declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to runc) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommelscertificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.HELD:a) Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit rule for electivelocal officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. For the three-term limit for electivelocal government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1

Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. L-31455. February 28,1985)Facts: In preparation for the national elections, the Commissioners of the COMELEC issuedan "INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127", calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths withspecifications and descriptions.Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the invitationwere the petitioner, Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop, and the privaterespondent, Acme Steel Manufacturing Company. The COMELEC BiddingCommittee Chairman and Members submitted their Memorandum on the proceedingstaken pursuant to the invitation to bid which stated that Acme's bid had to be rejected because the sample it submitted was made of black iron sheets, that were painted, andtherefore not rust proof or rust resistant and that it was also heavy (51 kilos inweight). The Committee instead recommended that Filipinas be awarded thecontract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an ocular inspection be made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made.An ocular inspection was conducted by the COMELEC of all the samples that weresubmitted. The Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid and that itshould be awarded the contract. Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the respondent Judge in an order denied the writ prayed for. Public respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the nature of the suit, and that the complaint stated nocause of action. The Judge dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration of Filipinas. Issues/Held/Ratio:1. Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suitinvolving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising fromits invitation to bid? - YES The lower court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suit involving the award of contract of COMELEC. The COMELEC resolutionawarding the contract to Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial function but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative function over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, nocontempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from

said order, and no direct andexclusive appeal by certiorari to the SC may be derived from such order. Anyquestion arising from the order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action beforethe trial courts.

2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, had cause of action under the premises,against the COMELEC and Acme to enjoin them from complying with their contract? - NO Filipinas, had no cause of action against the COMELEC and Acmeto enjoin them from complying with their contract. The COMELEC's "Invitation toBid No. 127", dated September 16, 1969, expressly stipulated that the COMELECreserved the right to reject any or all bids and to waive any information therein or accept such bid as may in its discretion be considered most reasonable andadvantageous. It's also stated that the call for bidders and proposals do not bound theCommission in accepting any bid. The COMELEC also specifically mentioned thatthe call for bids by itself does not confer a right to any bidder to initiate an action for damages for unrealized or expected profits unless the bid was duly accepted by theCommissions resolution. Pursuant to the COMELEC's "Invitation to Bid No.127", a bidder may have the right to demand damages, for unrealized or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted by resolution by the COMELEC.Filipinas' bid, although recommended for award of contract by the biddingcommittee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Thus, Filipinas had no cause of action.

DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 120 SCRA 760, 1983 Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office. Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.