G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984 JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR.

, BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC.,petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents. Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1 In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With

this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic. Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...". Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months. Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5 Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus: Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided. The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo] Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition. Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question. 1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. 2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states: Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is

more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 2082[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b]. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8 3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit: Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense; [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. 4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are

considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. 5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13 In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case. Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise: 1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. 2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and, 3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, 1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; 2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969 3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524; 4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang." In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana. On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises. Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19 That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated: 2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs. SO ORDERED. ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON. REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents, Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner. RELOVA, J.: On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of 1. Printed copies of Philippine Times; 2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times; 4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners; 5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo) On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal properties alleging among others that: 2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition. 3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually affirmed by evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr. 4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has dismissed said case against the accused on all documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent Agrava Report. (p. 27, Rollo) On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions of which state: ... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not under the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo) Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order to enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. S3-Q29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge

Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio and that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw, Ermita, Manila. In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea for temporary restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence for the state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in Criminal Cage No. Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner), pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the Court. Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action is premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a search was conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches. There is merit in the petition. Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in question before coming to Us. This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a prerequisite. As held in Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not apply where, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only when questions are raised for the first time before the high court in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the same." Further, in the case ofMatute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in

which the error occurred is a patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al., L16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already been presented to and passed upon by the court a quo. Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides: SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that: SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs, Ruiz,supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times: ... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo) and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others

... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo) The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They can not serve as basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant issued, the items confiscated from the premises of the office of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following: 1. One bundle of assorted negative; 2. One bundle of assorted lay out; 3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by Philippine Times news and other paraphernalias; 4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged speeches of Aquino and a speech of one various artist; 5. One bundle Dummies; 6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on different dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15): 7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No. J-2479373; 8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011; 9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio City (p. 26, Rollo) In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants. In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence

is, the printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry." Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was issued on September 29, 1983 and was executed on the very same day, it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1) month and six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the warrant and the return of the documents/personal properties. Having failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is guilty of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35). In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less than forty-two (42) hours after the military operatives shut down his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he was charged with the crime of inciting to sedition before the City Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November 8, 1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976, entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B. Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce, In the same month, November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to return the seized documents. When respondent judge denied the motion, he came to Us. Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the possession of the seized properties is incorrect. WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET ASIDE. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Manila. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62992 September 28, 1984 ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL, CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL.,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2, BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET AL., respondents. RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.: This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB). Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads: Madam: Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee. Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law. Very truly yours, (SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA Brig. General, AFP

(Ret.) Chairman Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by respondents. The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations. In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange Ideas and that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated. The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit. Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted. The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have

therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters. Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation. Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed. Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent. Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33615 April 22, 1977 MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, petitioners, vs.

HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge, CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented in this instance by JESUS F. GUERRERO, Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Sur,respondents.

FERNANDO, J: It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez 1 to grant motion to quash of petitioners, who
were the accused in a prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of their constitutional right to 2 freedom of expression that led to this suit for certiorari and prohibition. All that could be alleged in the information against them was the publication in the Evening News, a newspaper of general circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News Service, a reputable news-gathering agency. It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of Vincent Crisologo, the offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned. This excerpt from the recent 3 case of Bocobo v. Estanislao comes to mind: "This is contrary to the legal tradition of the Philippines dating back to the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, where Justice Malcolm emphasized that to prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free press, every libel prosecution should be tested by the rigorous and exacting standard of whether or not it could be violative of such fundamental 4 guarantee. It is easily understandable then why in the motion to quash, the main reliance was on the Bustos doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of the 5 information. When respondent Judge ignored such a fundamental constitutional principle, the proper basis for a certiorari and prohibition proceeding was laid. Petitioners are entitled to the remedies sought. The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the Philippine News Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the Editor-in-Chief. It reads thus: "Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, son of Rep. Floro Crisologo ( N, Ilocos Sur ) as among his four companions the night of the alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one of four principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible abduction with rape and robbery filed against him and his companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, 28, and Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses. Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his companions while testifying in his defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local court of first instance. Jose claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went voluntarily with his group to the Queen's Court motel here in the early morning of July 4, 1966. Jose said Zenaida and Crisologo went to a room together. However, Jose said, the two girls complained when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money. 6 ... This was the continuation of such news item: "The girls charged that they were robbed by Jose and his friends of cash and jewelry inside the hotel. In their original complaint filed with the fiscal's office, the two girls named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused. The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by Miss de la Cruz, also Identified Vincent Crisologo among the five youths in the incident. But the girls later executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken in Identifying Crisologo as among the five men who allegedly abused them. Jose testified that he and Tillman were about to go to a party in Mandaluyong, Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo with three companions arrived. Jose said that young Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since his car would be used by his congressman father. Jose said that after the party they proceeded to Pasay City where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside nightclub to look for Crisologo's girl friend. Minutes later, Crisologo and his friend went out of the club and they all proceeded to the Barbecue Plaza where they drank liquor. Shortly before 2 a.m., July 4, the group allegedly started for home in Jose's two-toned Mercedez Benz car. On the way, a taxicab overtook them. The cab allegedly carried Zenaida and Araceli. Jose said that Zenaida called Vincent and shouted for 7 them to stop. They then proceeded to Queen's Court motel, Jose said. The alleged offended party, according to the information filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent Crisologo. The information is dated February 5, 1970. Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by petitioners on August 14, 1970. An opposition was then filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on September 25, 1970. The order by respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December 17, 1970. An extensive motion for reconsideration submitted on February 23, 1971 having proved futile in

view of an order of denial a month later from respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court. As noted at the outset, certiorari and prohibition lie. 1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of September 1, 1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service. It was a faithful and accurate summary of what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case. That was all. The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo, was repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. It would have been a plain and simple distortion thereof if such a fact were omitted by the Philippine News Service. The Evening News in turn published such item. This is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press provision found in the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the point. It cannot justify a prosecution for libel. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, under the previous organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, which contained a similar provision mandating a free 8 press, this Court, in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos decided almost sixty years ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the principle that the freedom of the press is "so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be protected and 9 carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself." Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free 10 press guarantee. This Court has since then been committed to such an authoritative doctrine. The 11 opinion of Chief Justice Paras in Quisumbing v. Lopez, a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the matter. Thus: "The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or 12 imperfection in the choice of words. At the beginning of this decade, this Court in Lopez v. Court of 13 Appeals expressed its commitment to such a principle in these words: "No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. ... If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public attendant on the 14 business of publishing cannot be ignored. 2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication implicit in freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and 15 incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. He then quoted this excerpt from an American Supreme Court decision, Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce: "The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the 16 evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Considering how ample is the protection afforded a person alleged to have injured another's reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent Judge did infringe on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when it denied the motion to quash. He apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the Malcolm opinion: "A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged 17 communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. By no stretch of the imagination then could it be said that the Philippine News Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides by the mere fact of narrating in a news item the testimony of a witness in a rape case just because it did cast a reflection on the conduct of a third party. The prosecution in its pleadings before the lower court could not deny the accuracy of what was reported. Petitioners then ought not to have been subjected to the annoyance, inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant province and defend themselves against a charge

unwarrant under well-settled norms of constitutional dimension. The doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the absence of "good intention" and "justifiable motive" thus: "A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public 18 officers in the exercise of their functions. 3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a jurisdictional issue was raised. It has been a well-settled 19 doctrine since Conde v. Rivera, that under such circumstances, the competence of a court to continue 20 with a pending case ceases. Nor is it to indulge merely in general propositions. In People v. 21 Andres, this Court precisely sustained a court of first instance when it quashed an information for libel, the accused, respondent Andres, relying on press freedom to show that the fact charged do not constitute an offense. As pointed out in the opinion of Justice Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution "that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to he proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant-appellee's publication is a matter of 22 defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel ... ." That contention was rejected in this wise: "While there is some point to this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an 23 24 offense of libel. Similarly, a motion to quash was sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez, In the opinion of Justice Regala, it was pointed out: "As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in favor of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in judicial pleadings. In U.S. v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found occasion to express ills opinion on privileged communications, to wit: ... A privileged communication should not be subjected to miscroscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrunity would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. ... It is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no allegation of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the cause. Considering the above, We are of the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the lower court in considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as privileged and in consequently dismissing the information for lack of cause of 25 26 action. In a third case, People v. Aquino, reference was made to People v. Andres to demonstrate that

it is fitting and appropriate for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to quash where the privileged character of the, alleged offending publication is apparent. Respondent Judge ought not to have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the categorical pronouncements of this Court in the above three decisions that call for application, 4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the heading of the news item arising from the testimony of Jaime Jose was worded thus: "LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY RAPE CASE." How else could it have been expressed? That was to portray with accuracy what was contained in the news item. What was testified to was to that effect. It succinctly set forth the facts. There was no attempt to sensationalize. The tone is both neutral and objective. Again there is relevance to the following excerpt from Quisumbing v. Lopez: "The Court of Appeals found 'that the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true report of official or public proceeding authorized by law. The news item was the result of a press release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division, N. B. I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate report of the official proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. The article merely reported a raid on the 'business offices of three alleged money lenders;' and related the steps actually taken or to be taken by the proper officials relative to the investigation. It did not go beyond the actual report of official actuations. The theory of the petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item may be considered as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official investigation of the Anti-Usury Division of the National Bureau of Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI MEN RAID

OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS, admittedly not forming part of the basic press release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se, because the petitioner had thereby been branded and condemned as a 4 usurer' when as a matter of fact no criminal charge was even filed against him for the crime of 27 usury in any court of justice. Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable. The Chief Justice then explained why: "We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct. The petitioner, while assuming that the article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per se) added by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said headline is not borne out by the facts recited in the context. We believe that nobody reading the whole news item would come to the conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or convicted of usury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said to contain a correct description of the news story. The fact that the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and two others, coupled with the announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury Division that criminal action would be filed in the city fiscal's office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved were usurers. Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested the Idea that the petitioner 28 was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury. WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the order of respondent Judge of March 25, 1971 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners are set aside and nullified. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on June 10, 1971 made permanent, respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his place being prohibited from taking any action in Criminal Case No. 11-V for Libel except for the purpose of dismissing the same. No costs. Antonio and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concuring: Concurs, not because there is a denial of a constitutional right, but because there is grave abuse of discretion in not recognizing what is clearly not libelous. Antonio, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice Barredo.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concuring: Concurs, not because there is a denial of a constitutional right, but because there is grave abuse of discretion in not recognizing what is clearly not libelous.
G.R. No. L-16027 May 30, 1962 LUMEN POLICARPIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE MANILA TIMES PUB. CO., INC., CONSTANTE C. ROLDAN, MANUEL V. VILLA-REAL, E. AGUILAR CRUZ and CONSORCIO BORJE, defendant-appellees. Mario Bengzon for plaintiff-appellant. Alfredo Gonzales and Rafael M. Delfin for defendants-appellees. CONCEPCION, J.: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff's complaint and defendants' counterclaim, without special pronouncement as to costs. Originally certified to the Court of Appeals, the record on appeal was subsequently forwarded to us in view of the amount involved in the complaint (P300,000.00). Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official transactions, and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first article and the managing editor, the associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said newspapers. After its motion to dismiss the complaint had been denied by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in which the present action was initiated, the defendants filed a joint answer admitting the formal

allegations of the complaint, denying the other allegations thereof, alleging special defenses and setting up a counterclaim for P10,000, as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. In due course, later on, said court rendered the aforementioned decision, upon the ground that plaintiff had not proven that defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false. Plaintiff is a member of the Philippine bar. On August 11 and 13, 1956, and for sometime prior thereto, she was executive secretary of the local UNESCO National Commission. As such officer, she had preferred charges against Herminia D. Reyes, one of her subordinates in said Commission, and caused her to be separated from the service. Miss Reyes, in turn, preferred counter-charges which were referred to Col. Crisanto V. Alba, a Special Investigator in the Office of the President. Pending completion of the administrative investigation, which began in June, 1956, Miss Reyes filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, on August 8, 1956, a complaint against the plaintiff for alleged malversation of public funds and another complaint for alleged estafa thru falsification of public documents, which were scheduled for investigation by said office on August 22, 1956, at 2:00 p.m. Meanwhile, or on August 11, 1956, the following appeared, with a picture of the plaintiff, in the front page of The Saturday Mirror: WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS Unesco Official Head Accused on Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague By Constante C. Roldan Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco national commission here, was charged with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission today. The criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative investigation against the Unesco official being conducted by Col. Crisanto V. Alba, Malacaan technical assistant, on charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, a Unesco confidential assistant. The Unesco commission functions under the Office of the President. Fiscal Manases G. Reyes, to whom the cases were assigned, immediately scheduled preliminary investigation of the charges on August 22 at 2 p.m. Colonel Alba, in turn, indicated that the administrative phase of the inquiry will continue Monday and then resume on August 21 at Malacaan Park. The Palace Investigator said there are other charges, but would not specify these. Alba said Miss Reyes had testified on circumstances supposedly substantiating the malversation charge. Testimony had allegedly indicated that the accused had used Unesco stencils for private and personal purposes. Specification reputedly said that Miss Policarpio had taken stencils from the Unesco storeroom and used these for French lessons not at all connected with Unesco work; for the preparation of contracts of sale of pianos in her business establishment; for preparation of invitations sent to members of the League of Women Voters of which she is one of the officers. Cited as witnesses on this charge are Miss Reyes, Francisco Manalo of Barrio Salabat, Taal, Batangas, Federico Vergara and Pablo Armesto both of the Unesco.
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Regarding the charge of estafa through falsification of public documents allegedly also committed sometime in 1955, Miss Policarpio was accused of having collected expenses for supposed trips. The accusation said the Unesco official had sought reimbursement of expenses for a trip to Baler,

Quezon, on Aug. 19, last year, representing expenses of her car when in fact she supposedly rode in an army plane. Testimony indicated that a newspaper woman who was a supposed co-passenger had even written about the plane trip in her newspaper column. The same voucher also allegedly collected expenses for going to a Unesco Bayambang (Pangasinan) project, although records reputedly showed that she was absent in that conferences. Witnesses cited on the charge include Aurelio Savalbaro, a Philippine Air Force pilot, Lt. Clemente Antonio and others, also of the PAF. Miss Policarpio becomes the second high-ranking woman government official to face charges involving financial disbursements in their office. The first was Sen. Pacita M. Gonzales who is still under charge mis-spending funds of the Social Welfare Administration and the UNAC while she had charge of these. The complainant, Miss Reyes, was earlier ordered relieved from her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio on charges including conduct "unbecoming a lady", and as a result had not been paid her salary. She appealed to Malacaan which dismissed her suit and later she sued before Judge Rafael Amparo to compel payment of her salary. The court also rejected her plea on the ground that she had not exhausted all administrative remedies, the Palace not having made a clearcut decision on her case. The Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, likewise, carried on its first page with a picture of plaintiff and of Miss Reyes, taken during the administrative investigation being conducted by Col. Alba another news item, reading: "PALACE OPENS INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO Alba Probes Administrative Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz Of Criminal Suit on Aug. 22. The administrative phase of two-pronged investigation Miss Lumen Policarpio, head of the Unesco national commission here, opened in Malacaan before Col. Crisanto V. Alba. The judicial inquiry of charges filed by Herminia D. Reyes, also the complainant in the Malacaan case before the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, will be conducted by Fiscal Manases G. Reyes on Aug. 22 at 2 p.m. Miss Policarpio stands accused by Reyes of having malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of supposed official expenses. Colonel Alba, at the start of his investigation at the Malacaan Park, clarified that neither he nor the PCAC had initiated the criminal action before the city fiscal's office. The complaint before the fiscal was started by an information she naming Herminia D. Reyes as complainant and citing other persons as witnesses. Fiscal Reyes set preliminary investigation of these charges for Aug. 22. Miss Reyes, technical assistant of the Unesco, stated at the Palace inquiry that during 1955 Miss Policarpio allegedly used several sheets of government stencils for her private and personal use, such as for French lessons, contracts of sale of pianos and for invitations of the League of Women

Voters of which she (Miss Policarpio) is an officer. The Unesco commission here functions under the Office of the President. The charge was filed with the PCAC, and the PCAC endorsed it to Colonel Alba for investigation. Miss Policarpio this morning was not represented by an lawyer. Federico Diaz, lawyer representing complainant Miss Reyes, petitioned for the suspension of Miss Policarpio, executive secretary of the Unesco. Alba did not act immediately on the petition. He said he was holding a hearing on the petition on August 15. During this morning's investigation three witness appeared. The first witness was Atty. Antonio Lopez of the PCAC who brought with him 18 sheets of stencil which were allegedly used by Miss Policarpio for her personal use. These sheets were admitted as temporary exhibits. The second witness was Federico Vergara of the Unesco who said that he received four of the 18 sheets, but he could not identify which of the sheets he had received. The third witness was Francisco Manalo who certified on the charge of oppression in office against Miss Policarpio. The other charge of Miss Reyes corresponded to supposed reimbursements sought by Miss Policarpio for a trip to Quezon Province and to Pangasinan. On the first, Miss Reyes' complaint alleged the Unesco official had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when, Miss Reyes claimed she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Miss Reyes also said Miss Policarpio was absent from the Bayambang conference for which she also sought allegedly refund of expenses. The complainant had previously been ordered relieved of her Unesco post by Miss Policarpio and had later sued at the Palace and before the Court for payment of her salary. The title of the article of August 11, 1956 "WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED" was given prominence with a 6-column (about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types. Admittedly, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO PIO ON FRAUD" printed in bold one-centimeter types, is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of the article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission" otherwise known as PCAC is untrue, the complaints for said offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was initiated as a result of current administrative, investigation", as stated in the second paragraph of the same article. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements was to give the general impression that said investigation by Col. Alba had shown that plaintiff was guilty, or, at least, probably guilty of the crimes aforementioned, and that, as a consequence, the PCAC had filed the corresponding complaints with the city fiscal's office. She alleges, also, that although said article indicates that the charges for malversation and for estafa through falsification against her referred, respectively, to the use by her of Unesco stencils allegedly for private and personal purposes, and to the collection of transportation expenses, it did not mention the fact that the number of stencils involved in the charge was only 18 or 20, that the sum allegedly misappropriated by her was only P54, and that the

falsification imputed to her was said to have been committed by claiming that certain expenses for which she had sought and secured reimbursement were incurred in trips during the period from July 1, 1955 to September 30, 1955, although the trips actually were made, according to Miss Reyes, from July 8 to August 31, 1955. By omitting these details, plaintiff avers, the article of August 11, 1956, had the effect of conveying the idea that the offenses imputed to her were more serious than they really were. Plaintiff, likewise, claims that there are other inaccuracies in the news item of August 13, 1956, but, we do not deem it necessary to dwell upon the same for the determination of this case. Upon the other hand, defendants contend that, although the complaints in the city fiscal's office were filed, not by the PCAC, but by Miss Reyes, this inaccuracy is insignificant and immaterial to the case, for the fact is that said complaints were filed with said office. As regards the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused and the amount said to have been misappropriated by plaintiff, as well as the nature of the falsification imputed to her, defendants argue that these "details" do not affect the truthfulness of the article as a whole, and that, in any event, the insignificant value of said sheets of stencil and the small amount allegedly misappropriated, would have had, if set forth in said article, a greater derogatory effect upon the plaintiff, aside from the circumstance that defendants had no means of knowing such "details". It appears, however, that prior to August 11, 1956, Col. Alba had already taken the testimony of Antonio P. Lopez, Francisco Manalo and Federico Vergara, as witnesses for Miss Reyes. Hence, defendants could have ascertained the "details" aforementioned, had they wanted to. Indeed, some of the defendants and/or their representatives had made appropriate inquiries from Col. Alba before said date, and some "details" though not those adverted to above appear in the article then published, whereas the number of sheets of stencil allegedly misused was mentioned in the news item of August 13, 1956. Moreover, the penalty prescribed by law for the crime either of estafa or of embezzlement depends partly upon the amount of the damage caused to the offended party (Articles 315 to 318, Revised Penal Code). Hence, the amount or value of the property embezzled is material to said offense. Again, it is obvious that the filing of criminal complaints with the city fiscal's office by another agency of the Government, like the PCAC, particularly after an investigation conducted by the same, imparts the ideal that the probability of guilty on the part of the accused is greater than when the complaints are filed by a private individual, specially when the latter is a former subordinate of the alleged offender, who was responsible for the dismissal of the complainant from her employment. It is only too apparent that the article published on August 11, 1956, presented the plaintiff in a more unfavorable light than she actually was. It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks. Defendants maintain that their alleged malice in publishing the news items in question had not been established by the plaintiff. However, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, provides: Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of other functions. In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious". Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable motive in falsely stating that the complaints had been filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by the PCAC as a result of the administrative investigation of Col. Alba? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, then the publication would be actually malicious. If they did not or if they acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they were guilty of negligence in making said statement, for the consequences of which they are liable solidarily (Articles 2176, 2194, 2208 and 2219 [I], Civil Code of the Philippines; 17 R.C.L. sec. 95, p. 349). We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all parties concerned would be served if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fees. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendants herein to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff the aforementioned sums of P3,000, as moral damages, and P2,000, by way of attorney's fees, in addition to the costs. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-26549 July 31, 1970 EUGENIO LOPEZ, publisher and owner of the "MANILA, CHRONICLE and JUAN T. GATBONTON,petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ, respondents. Salonga, Ordoez, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

FERNANDO, J.:

There is an element of novelty in this appeal by certiorari from a decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding petitioners, the then publisher and editor of This Week Magazine, liable in damages to the tune of eleven thousand pesos arising from the publication of a picture of respondent, Fidel G. Cruz, as being responsible for the hoax of the year. The absence of any connection either fanciful or remote with such event is admitted. The view is pressed by petitioners, invoking a liberal construction of the implications of press freedom, owning up to the mistake, unfortunately not discovered until it was too late, and publishing a correction as an earnest of its good faith, that they should not be made to pay at all. This Court, without discounting the elements of plausibility of their contention, cannot, however, close its eyes to the injury inflicted on respondent and indulge them in such a plea. It is not disposed though to affirm respondent Court's decision in its entirety. Considering all the circumstances, the damages awarded to private respondent appear to be far too generous. A reduction is in order. The sum of one thousand pesos would be enough. So we decide. The antecedents of the case follow: In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila Chronicle, of which petitioner Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955. Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer-menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz. That was the term employed by the other newspapers when referring to the above-mentioned incident. This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by petitioner Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to be false if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. As soon, however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the attention of petitioners, the following correction was immediately published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were rushing to meet: the deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel

Cruz, who was connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here express our profound regrets that such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing correction, petitioners published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the correction moreover were enclosed by four lines the type used was bolder than ordinary, and the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such amends being made. 1 Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded five thousand pesos as actual damages, another five thousand pesos as moral damages, and one thousand pesos for attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to respondent Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari with the result, as already announced at the opening of this opinion, that while respondent Cruz is entitled to Prevail, the damages awarded him should be reduced. 1. It is on the freedom of the press that petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate that no action for libel would lie arising from the publication of the picture of respondent Cruz identified as responsible for the hoax of the year, when such was not the case at all. It is easily understandable why. No liability would be incurred if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the well-nigh all embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies attendant on newspapers and other publications being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing could be plausibly made, however, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of such quasi-delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui, 2 that "the repeal of the
old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not abolish the civil action for libel." 3 A libel was defined in that Act as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule," 4 There was an express provision in such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from libel. 5 There is reinforcement to such a view in the new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. 6

There has been no time then in our judicial history when civil actions for libel did not form a staple part of litigations which had reached this Court. 7 Such is the case in a far greater measure in the United
States. According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."8 In support of the above statement, he made reference to several cases. 9 Other decisions to the same effect have been promulgated since the fourth edition of Newell published in 1924. 1 0 Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since reputation is a thing of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches , an impairment of it is a personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as the guardian of the public peace. Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or imprisonment." 1 1

The first decision cited by Newell is a decision of Justice Holmes. The case is Peck v. Tribune Co. 1 2 Plaintiff there complained of her picture being published in an advertisement in defendant's
newspaper. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, with certain words of commendation for a brand of liquor attributed to her when in fact she did not make such a statement at all and could not have made it, as she was a total abstainer. The defendant was held liable, for as Justice Holmes pointed out: "There was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait, or was not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. If the

publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whenever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.' ... The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without other justification than exists for an advertisement or a piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable if the statements are false, or are true only of someone else." 1 3

Learned Hand, in holding that an action for libel would lie arising from a publication in an advertisement of plaintiff's photograph yielding a "grotesque monstrous and obscene impression" and that he was "substantially enough ridiculed" to complain reached the conclusion "that because the picture taken with the legends was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima facie actionable; that the fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is irrelevant; and that in consequence the publication is actionable." 1 4 It is likewise an accepted fact
that such publications do occasion greater injury to reputation than would mere words alone. Cardozo so aptly put the matter thus: "'It has its genesis in evils which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and transmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abide and Perpetuates the scandal.' ... When one speaks of a writing in this connection, one does not limit oneself to writings in manuscripts or books. Any symbol suffices Pictures, hieroglyphics shorthand notes if only what is written is intelligible to him who reads." 1 5

2. That is only one side of the picture, however. There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right Thus, in the first leading case, United States v. Bustos, 1 6 Justice Malcolm could correctly stress:
"The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not to be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good." 1 7 On this aspect of the question which, as answered by him, would require that a criminal suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for stifling press freedom, he categorically declared: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege." 1 8

In another civil action for libel, such a thought is expressed differently in this wise: "So long as it is done in good faith, newspapers have the legal right to have and express opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would infringe upon the freedom of the press." 1 9 The last word on the
subject, up to now at least, came from Quisumbing v. Lopez. 2 0 In the language of the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned the opinion: "The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the news item under Consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words." 2 1

It was not until 1964 that the United States Supreme Court had occasion to speak its mind on the subject. In the leading case of New York Times Co. v. Sulivan, 2 2 the nature of the question presented
was set forth by Justice Brennan for the Court in the opening paragraph of his opinion: "We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct." 2 3 This is the Court's approach to such an issue: "In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor Policy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law. ... Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." 2 4 Continuing the same trend, the opinion stressed further: "Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ... The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection." 2 5

For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 2 6 The United States Supreme Court went further
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 2 7 where such immunity, was held as covering statements concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials. Why there should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a commentator: "Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the men involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but agree that the Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times rule to all public figures." 2 8

The significance of the foregoing line of decisions impressive for their consistency is quite obvious. No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of. This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the cases moan anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly offended a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored. To single out one decision, Quisumbing v. Lopez so speaks in tones loud and clear. 3. It is to the haven thus afforded by such a highly sympathetic ruling to press freedom that petitioners would seek refuge. The defamatory matter complained of in the Quisumbing case appeared in the headline. It was without basis, as shown by the text of the news item itself. Nonetheless, for the reasons expressed with vigor and clarity by former Chief Justice Paras, no liability was deemed incurred by the then publisher of the Manila Chronicle A newspaper, it is stressed, "should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words." The above ruling, coupled with the requirement in the New York

Times decision of the United States Supreme Court, would for the writer of this opinion, furnish a sufficient basis for the success of this appeal. The Court, however, is not inclined to view matters thus. Obviously Quisumbing v. Lopez is not squarely in point. Here there was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet no occasion to act with haste as the picture of respondent was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover, there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by such decision which from the facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be concluded then that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate of press freedom is not ignored, but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not decisive of the basic issue. By itself, it does not have a controlling significance. So we hold. 4. Petitioners would make much, likewise, of their correction, which has all the force of a retraction, as a basis from being absolved from any pecuniary responsibility. The present Chief Justice in Policarpio v. Manila Times 2 9restated the controlling principle: "We note that the news item published
on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52)." 3 0

The correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a reduction in the damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary logs arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them." 3 1 WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 25, 1966 affirming the lower court decision of March 22, 1958 is hereby modified, petitioners Eugenio Lopez and Juan T. Gatbonton being ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P500.00 as moral damages and the additional amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees. Costs against petitioners. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar and Teehankee, JJ., concur. Castro and Barredo, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

DIZON, J., dissenting: Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the scholarly opinion penned for the majority by Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando. I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on pp. 2-3 of the majority opinion and, precisely on the basis thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed from should be reversed.

The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the 'light of New York Times Company vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the ruling therein laid down was amplified in Curtis Publishing Company vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967). After considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid down in said cases, the majority opinion says that for liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication, without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no criminal liability for libel. As far as liability in damages is concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that there is no evidence of actual malice that is, there is no evidence showing that petitioners or their subordinates knew that the imputation made to respondent Cruz was false or that, in publishing that imputation, they had recklessly disregarded the question of whether it was false or true. On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part of petitioners, on the basis of tort would seem to be equally untenable. In the first place, the alleged hoax to which respondent Cruz 1 person
was related as a result of the publication in question if considered without passion and in the right perspective-ascribes to him nothing immoral or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case, whatever negligence there might have been on the part of petitioners or their subordinates would amount only to what might be legitimately considered as "excusable negligence" thus eliminating any idea of malice or intention to cause injury, on their part.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from.

# Separate Opinions DIZON, J., dissenting: Much to my regret I am constrained to dissent from the scholarly opinion penned for the majority by Mr. Justice Enrique Fernando. I accept the antecedent facts of the case as set forth on pp. 2-3 of the majority opinion and, precisely on the basis thereof, I hold the view that the decision appealed from should be reversed. The case should be resolved, in my opinion, in the 'light of New York Times Company vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as the ruling therein laid down was amplified in Curtis Publishing Company vs. Butts, 388 U.S. 120 (1967). After considering the facts involved and the doctrine laid down in said cases, the majority opinion says that for liability in damages to arise from an alleged libelous publication, without offending press freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Under the facts of the present case, there is obviously no criminal liability for libel. As far as liability in damages is concerned, it is equally clear upon the record that there is no evidence of actual malice that is, there is no evidence showing that petitioners or their subordinates knew that the imputation made to respondent Cruz was false or that, in publishing that imputation, they had recklessly disregarded the question of whether it was false or true.

On the other hand, any liability in damages, on the part of petitioners, on the basis of tort would seem to be equally untenable. In the first place, the alleged hoax to which respondent Cruz 1 person
was related as a result of the publication in question if considered without passion and in the right perspective-ascribes to him nothing immoral or involving moral turpitude. In the second place, in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case, whatever negligence there might have been on the part of petitioners or their subordinates would amount only to what might be legitimately considered as "excusable negligence" thus eliminating any idea of malice or intention to cause injury, on their part.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to reverse the decision appealed from.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement in the south that defamed the Plaintiff. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Facts. The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The advertisement was entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices and it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libe lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed. Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public officials official conduct?

Held. No. Reversed and remanded. * Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.

* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words were published of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars. * Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that the need to survive. * The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. * The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a States power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. * The Defendants failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiffs demand is not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories in the Defendants own files. Also, the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting the jurys finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made of and concerning the Plaintiff. Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution do not merely delimit a States power to award damages, but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.

Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct, malice must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 77422 April 15, 1988 LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC. AND U.S. AUTOMOTIVE CO., INC., petitioners, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HON. RAMON A. DIAZ, DEPUTY MINISTER, HON. MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA COMMISSIONER, respondents. G.R. No. 79126 April 15, 1988 BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION (BULLETIN), petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) SECRETARY RAMON A. DIAZ AND COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C.J.: These two cases are jointly resolved because of the common identity of and related issues by the parties, without prejudice to the writing of an extended opinion. G.R. 77422 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order filed on February 24, 1987 by Liwayway Publishing, Inc. (Liwayway hereafter) and U.S. automotive Co., Inc. (US Automotive hereafter) seeking to annul and set aside two writs of sequestration issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (Commission hereafter) on February 12, 1987 on the shares of stocks of U.S. Automotive in Liwayway, as well as the implementing directive addressed to the Central Bank Governor of even date and to prohibit the Commission from conducting proceedings in connection with the said sequestration. G.R. 79126 is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction and urgent ex-parte restraining order filed on July 27, 1987 by Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin hereafter) to set aside the April 14, 1987 order issued by the Commission which declared their intent to vote the "sequestered shares" in Bulletin; to prohibit the voting of Bulletin shares by respondents, their successors, on their representatives, to enjoin respondents, their successors, or their representatives from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts, in the management of Bulletin; and to direct the immediate acceptance by the Commission of Bulletin's offer to debosit in cash, under escrow, so as to protect the interest of the government, if any, a specific amount for the value of sequestered shares in the Bulletin pursuant to the restrictions on their transferability as provided in its Articles of Incorporation, with any banking institution as may be designated by this Court, pending and subject to final determination/adjudication of the ownership of said shares and to lift the sequestration order of April 11, 1986. Liwayway and Bulletin are domestic corporations engaged in the business of publication of newspapers and magazines. The former publishes a daily newspaper, the "Balita," and three weekly vernacular magazines, namely, "Liwayway," "Bisaya" and "Bannawag," while the latter publishes the "Manila Bulletin" a daily newspaper and its weekly magazines, The "Philippine Panorama," all of general and national circulation. In both corporations, Mr. Emiho T. Yap is the biggest stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors. As of February 21, 1986, he held 2,617 Bulletin shares, while, U.S. Automotive, 1 a corporation wholly owned and controlled by him and his family, held 318,084
shares out of the total outstanding Bulletin shares of 567,808.5 with 198,052.5 thereof as treasury shares and 765,861 subscribed shares. 2 In Liwayway, "(B)y April, 1986, ... U.S. Automotive Co. owned almost 70% of total Liwayway issued shares ... 3

I. LIWAYWAY CASE In G.R. 77422, the Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986. On the same date, the Commission requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements,

including safety deposit boxes, stocks and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and Management, Inc. (hereafter HMH&M). Petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being limited to whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway, considering the Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not to allow any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries and wages" which would virtually shut down its publications. The then Solicitor General, now Secretary of Justice, Sedfrey Ordoez, as well as the Commission's then Vice-Chairman, now Chairman, Ramon Diaz, assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than half of that in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante pending joining of the issues on the merits or a showing of some irregularity that would warrant the Commission's intervention. On February 27, 1987, the Solicitor General filed his manifestation as undertaken by him, submitting a copy of the Commission's letter dated February 26, 1987, to the CB Governor, Jose Fernandez, modifying its previous memorandum of February 12th and asking him to instruct all banks to honor all checks of Liwayway and further stating that "(A)lthough mention is made in the letter of the naming of a fiscal agent, respondent Commission is not naming anyone at this time. On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted with commendation the Solicitor General's pledge at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The Court gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned. This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the Commission and impairment of press freedom. But with the closing out of this case, as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea to lift the sequestration orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the composition of the Commission or of other public officials concerned. As to the sequestration orders, the Commission claims that Emilio Yap, founder of U.S. Automotive Co., organized long before martial law, is a "crony" if not downright "dummy" of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Mr. Yap, in turn, has strongly countered the Commission's allegations as to his alleged business association with Mr. Marcos and their prima facie sufficiently in this wise: On March 2, 1987, petitioners filed its manifestation and reply to the opposition alleging the following: 1. Mr. Yap admits that he owns 2,508 shares of stocks of BASECO which constitute less than 2% of the total 218,819 outstanding shares of stocks of the company. He acquired the original 240 shares by subscription at the time of incorporation and augmented by stock dividends to the present stockholding of 2,508 shares.

2. Regarding the BASECO certificates of shares of stocks purportedly belonging to Yap and endorsed to "someone" whose name was left in blank this Court should require the respondents to produce the originals of said stock certificates in order to verify the claim that they have been endorsed in blank. 3. He had resigned from the chairmanship of BASECO since October 20, 1983. Out of his duly paid investment of P60,000, he never received any cash dividend nor profited from BASECO. 4. He has never been a stockholder nor an officer of the Jai-Alai Corporation. 5. He owned only one qualifying share in the Manila International Port Terminals, Inc.(MIPTI) which he later endorsed to the new MIPTI Chairman. He resigned as chairman of the Board before the Aquino administration. 6. He invested in the Bulletin in 1961, as second biggest stockholder on the invitation of Gen. Menzi long before Mr. Marcos became president. 7. All original stock certificates issued to U.S. Automotive and treasury shares are all in the respective possession of the registered owners and have not been endorsed to anyone. But as the Court has consistently held and reiterated in PCGG vs. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, decided also this month, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the parties' conflicting factual contentions have to be threshed out and adjudged in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the case. II. BULLETIN CASE In G.R. 79126, the Commission issued on April 22, 1986 an order sequestering the shares of former President Marcos, Emilio Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., their nominees or agents in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In an order dated April 14, 1987, the Commission declared their intent to vote the sequestered shares. Thus, on July 27, 1987, the instant petition was filed seeking the nullification of the above mentioned order. It is petitioner's contention that what is at stake here is the freedom of our press institutions to independently manage their own affairs and effectively preserve editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government participation in the same, that governmental presence in petitioner's board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press as an institution of mass media protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court issued a temporary retraining order on July 28, 1987 ordering the respondents, their successors, agents or representatives to cease and desist from voting Bulletin shares, or otherwise from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts in the management of the Bulletin daily newspaper. Respondents' comment alleged that the Commission will vote only the shares of Cesar Zalamea (121,178 shares), Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (46,626 shares), and Jose Y. Campos (46,620.5 shares) for a total of 214,424.5 shares which were the subject of the sequestration order and that the shares of Emilio Yap were excluded by virtue of the Commission's order dated March 16, 1987. Subsequently, however, petitioner alleged 4 in its memorandum of January 2, 1988 that on July 31,
1987, the Commission sold to it 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and voucher and 121,178 Bulletin shares of Cesar Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 per PTC Check No. 607887 and voucher issued on October 15, 1987.

As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cojuangco, Jr., under sequestration, the petitioner has offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with the Commission, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC Check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987 which awaits the Commission's acceptance.

Respondents' memorandum of January 26, 1988, however, stated that only Mr. Campos' shares were voluntarily surrendered, hence, they were accepted by the Commission. On the matter of the shares of Cojuangco and Zalamea, it contended that unless there is a confession or admission that the said shares are "ill-gotten assets" of Mr. Marcos and/or his cronies, the true ownership of the shares has still to be determined by the Sandiganbayan where Civil Case No. 0022 entitled "Republic ... vs. Emilio T. Yap, et al." is pending. Petitioner, however, denies being a party therein. Subject to said admission, the Commission considers it premature to enter into any transaction affecting those shares pending determination of their ownership. In their Memorandum, respondents Commission and members expressly have declared that the Commission no longer intends to exercise its right to vote the sequestered shares, that the Commission's present role is confined largely to monitoring Bulletin's activities in terms of preventing any dissipation and disposition of funds and assets and does not extend to the exercise of the voting of the shares, unless subsequent events or circumstances call for such exercise pursuant to law. Thus, respondents urge the dismissal of the petition "for want of factual basis." As in the Liwayway case, the Commission concedes that it may not lawfully intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass media such as Bulletin for the purpose of maintaining its freedom and independence as guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987 ordering the Commission or its representative to "cease and desist from voting the shares or otherwise from intervening directly or indirectly in the management of petitioner Bulletin" will be made permanent. The issue left for resolution is whether the Commission may continue to refuse to accept the cash deposit offered for the present balance of 46,626 minority sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco as prayed for in the petition. It is admitted of record that the Sequestration Order of April 22, 1986 is limited to a minority of 214,424.5 shares in the name of Messrs. Cesar Zalamea, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Jose Y. Campos at the time of its issuance, as follows: Cesar Zalamea 121,178 shares Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. 46,626 shares Jose Y. Campos 46,620.5 shares Total 214,424.5 shares and that the Bulletin shares of Emilio Yap owned by him since 1961 were excluded from the said sequestration, by virtue of the Commission's order of March 16, 1987. Likewise, in consonance with the Commission's very purpose and objective of preserving the assets and ill-gotten wealth that may be recovered, pertaining to the deposed President Marcos, and converting them into cash to be returned to the people in government projects such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it has acknowledged the recognized vested right of the Bulletin to purchase Bulletin shares that may be put up for sale, since the government is barred anyway from acquiring ownership and management of private mass media such as the Bulletin Publishing, Inc. under Art. XVI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 11(1). The

ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens." In the letter dated July 8, 1987 of Commission Chairman Diaz to Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Media ng Pilipinas (KAMMP), he recognized the restrictions on the transferability of Bulletin shares accruing in favor of petitioner Bulletin when he wrote. In view of the foregoing, when and if we dispose of those shares, the first step to take is to offer the same to the corporation, and the corporation may offer it to the other stockholders if it so desires. But we cannot avoid the circumstance that the corporation itself will desire to buy the stocks and therefore, the transaction will end here. (1) Thus, on July 31, 1987, PCGG sold to petitioner Bulletin 46,620.5 Bulletin shares of Mr. Jose Y. Campos for a total price of P8,173,506.06 per PTC Check No. 606380 and Voucher (pp. 11-12, Petitioner's Addendum). (2) The PCGG also sold to petitioner Bulletin 121,178 Bulletin shares of Mr. Cesar C. Zalamea for a total price of P21,244,926.96 and accepted PTC Check No. 607887 and Voucher issued on October 15, 1987 (pp. 12-13, Petitioner's Addendum), now as (Annex 'A'). As already noted hereinabove, there is a counter-allegation on the part of the Commission that it had not sold the Zalamea shares but there are indications that it had accepted the check and voucher therefor as stated herein. Whatever be the case, this is immaterial in the light of the resolution of the case providing for the exercise of petitioner Bulletin's right of preemption over such shares. (3) As to the remaining 46,626 Bulletin shares of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. under sequestration, petitioner Bulletin has consistently offered to deposit in cash the value of the shares with respondent PCGG, in the amount of P8,174,470.32 per PTC check No. 607590, issued on October 15, 1987, and which awaits PCGG acceptance. (pp. 13-14, Petitioner's Addendum). Petitioner correctly maintains that its offer in good faith to PCGG of the cash deposit for the sequestered shares will protect the interest of the government, if any, pending final determination/adjudication of the matter. The offer of cash deposit is in line with the government program on privatization and in keeping with constitutional guarantee of press freedom and to maintain private mass media free from government intervention in its management directly or indirectly. The Commission has nothing to lose and everything to gain by accepting the cash deposit offered by petitioner for the shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The cash deposit being offered by petitioner is similar in nature and purpose to a cash bond put up for a litigant during the pendency of the case. In both situations, the rights of the parties and of the government, are adequately protected. This cash deposit including interest earning is to be applied on the said 46,626 shares under any of the following two (2) alternatives specifically proposed by petitioner: Alternative "A" To standby as full payment plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final judgment of the Court declaring the Republic of the Philippines as owners of the 46,626 shares, accompanied by the corresponding original stock certificates,

issued in the name of the government, duly endorsed in favor of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation, free from liens and encumbrances; or Alternative "B" To immediately return to Bulletin Publishing Corporation the cash deposit in the amount of P8,174,470.32 plus whatever interest earnings thereon upon final judgment by the Court declaring that Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is the true owner of the 46,626 shares. This Resolution is issued to uphold the freedom of our press institutions to independently manage their affairs and effectively preserve their editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government participation and intervention. The Commission itself has recognized that government presence in petitioner's Board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the independence of the press which is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, and hence had given up its initial Idea to vote the sequestered shares in petitioner Bulletin. ACCORDINGLY, in the Liwayway case, G.R. No. 77422, judgment is rendered. 1. As per agreement of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the Commission from any act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management or operations or afffirms of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and 2. Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin respondents from enforcing in any manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over the questioned Liwayway shares whose ownership will have to be tried and determined in the Sandiganbayan. In the Bulletin case, G.R. No. 79126, judgment is likewise rendered. 1. Making permanent the temporary restraining order heretofore issued on July 28, 1987; 2. Directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit of P8,174,470.32 offered by petitions; for the 46,626 sequestered shares in the name of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. expressly subject to the alternative conditions (A and B) hereinabove set forth, and likewise directing the Commission to accept the cash deposit, if it has not actually sold the Cesar C. Zalamea Bulletin shares to petitioner (supra, p. 13, par. [2]) of P21,244,926.96 for the sequestered shares of Bulletin in the name of Mr. Cesar Zalamea under the same alternatives already mentioned; and 3. Remanding the case regarding the issue of ownership of the said sequestered Bulletin shares for determination and adjudication to the Sandiganbayan. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., took no part. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.