Cultures of Belief Post Print

Correspondence: Jonathan Mair, CRASSH, Cambridge CB3 9DT; jrm35@cam.ac.
uk
veision of iecoiu: http:ant.sagepub.comcgiuoi1u.1177146S499612469S88
uoi: 1u.1177146S499612469S88
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Cultures of Belief
Jonathan Mair. Anthropological Theory (2012), 12(4), pp.448466.

Introduction: A Empirical Question About Religious Belief

The uebate about whethei ieligion ieally iequiies liteial belief in
uivine beings anu iealms has become anothei pantomime, with the
likes of Kaien Aimstiong anu Naik veinon.shouting "oh no it isn't!"
while the atheists in the auuience ciy back "oh yes it is!" But what we
shoulu ieally be shouting is "behinu you!" If only we'u look, we'u see a
bettei way to iesolve the uispute: eviuence. You cannot ueciue a piioii
what actual ieligion ieally is. To know you neeu to see what people
actually believe anu uo. (Baggini, 2u11a).

In a iecent seiies of aiticles in !"# %&'()*'+, the populai philosophei }ulian
Baggini has complaineu that the public uebate about ieligion has stalleu on a
uisagieement about the natuie of ieligious belief (2u11a; 2u11b; 2u11c). 0n
the one hanu, he aigues, the New AtheistsRichaiu Bawkins, AC uiayling,
Baniel Bennett, Sam Baiiis, Chiistophei Bitchens, anu the iestinsist that
ieligious people's language anu piactice must be taken liteially, as
iepiesentative of an unueilying system of piopositional belief. 0n the othei
hanu, a less vocal, but nonetheless influential gioup of wiiteis who seek to
uefenu ieligious faithincluuing Kaien Aimstiong, a ieligious stuuies
scholai anu populai authoi, anu Naik veinon, a jouinalistinsist with equal
Mair, J., 2012. Cultures of belief. Anthropological Theory, 12(4), pp.448466.

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ueteimination that ieligious piactice expiesses ueep oi tianscenuent tiuths
in a non-liteial foim, oi that ieligious belief is about something othei than
piopositions, anu that the liteial beliefs that the atheists finu so pioblematic
aie not in fact essential to ieligious belief at all. Anu yet, as Baggini points out,
while iefusing to allow ieligious people to be helu accountable foi these
beliefs, they also fiequently iefuse to uisavow liteial inteipietations entiiely.
The iesult is a louu conveisation at cioss puiposes: the atheists
continue to iail against what appeais to be a giotesque uistoition of actual
ieligious life, anu theiefoie miss theii maik, while the othei siue iefuses to
pioviue a cleai account that might coiiect the caiicatuie. Baggini suggests
that the way out of this impasse is to piouuce a piecise list of the
piopositions, if theie aie any, that ieligious people (as a geneial class, as
membeis of paiticulai confessions, oi as inuiviuual believeis) actually uo,
liteially, believe. 'Symbolic' oi 'metaphoiical' beliefs coulu be incoipoiateu
into the list by giving them a liteial gloss. Tiauitional foimulae that aie no
longei unueistoou oi meant in eainest woulu not be incluueu.
Baggini's iuea is that such a list woulu pioviue a cleai iuea of which
ieligious beliefs can be taken seiiously ', (#',-+, anu thus of which beliefs
can meaningfully be submitteu to, oi uefenueu fiom, iationalist ciiticism.
Biawing up the list woulu ueny uefenueis of ieligion the iefuge of vagueness
to which Baggini thinks they often ietieat, but in ietuin the atheists woulu be
foiceu to give up the iight to uefine ieligion as a stiaw man. The conveisation,
he (iathei optimistically) concluues, might then iesume. In one of his aiticles,
Baggini suggests a minimal set of liteial, piopositional beliefs that he thinks

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many ieligious believeis might be willing to sign up to anu to uefenu (2u11c),
but, aftei these weie iejecteu by his inteilocutois on both siues, he issueu the
appeal, quoteu above, foi empiiical uata about what people 'actually believe
anu uo'.
Pait of the puipose of this papei will be to piopose an anthiopological
anu ethnogiaphic iesponse to this plea foi eviuence. Ny ieason foi wanting
to uo this is not only that I think anthiopologists have something valuable to
contiibute to the public uebate (though I uo, anu it is to be iegietteu that
contempoiaiy anthiopology makes so little impact on public uebates that
Baggini uiu not think to tuin to it foi an answei in the fiist place). As I uiscuss
below, I also think that the muuule that Baggini has helpfully pinpointeu at
the heait of the 'ieligion wais'."# /'*0&(# .- ,1#2*/3 ."# #4.#+. .- 5"*2"
6#0*#/, 2'+ 6# 2-+,*)#(#) (#',-+,is a souice of impiecision that also afflicts
anthiopology, especially the anthiopology of ieligion, but one that we fail to
notice because a ceitain view of belief, especially ieligious belief, has come to
be taken foi gianteu by anthiopologists. So iesolving the pioblem by
leaining to be ethnogiaphically sensitive to belief is of funuamental
impoitance foi anthiopology too anu this aiticle shoulu be seen as a fiist step
towaius that goal. Ny aigument will be that in oiuei to answei Baggini's
question we will neeu to go beyonu it, to ask not only 5"'. people believe,
but also "-5 they believe it. That is, we will neeu to pay attention to
moualities oi styles of belief.
0n the face of it, this obseivation might sounu little uiffeient fiom the
position of the uefenueis of ieligion whom Baggini ciiticises, who have

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pioposeu a numbei of similai uistinctions that sepaiate eveiyuay belief fiom
a special categoiy of ieligious belief. Aimstiong's uivision of thought into
73."-, anu 0-8-, is typical of this genie: "In the piemouein woilu, both
73."-, anu 0-8-, weie iegaiueu as inuispensable. .Yet the two weie
essentially uistinct, anu it was helu to be uangeious to confuse mythical anu
iational uiscouise" (Aimstiong, 2uu1:xv); only mouein funuamentalists anu
atheists make the mistake of confusing the two. 0thei piominent examples
with a similai logic incluue Wilfieu Cantwell Smith's notion of 'faith' (196S),
uevastatingly skeweieu by Talal Asau (2uu1), anu Stephen }ay uoulu's notion
of 'Non-0veilapping Nagisteiia' (2uu2). These uistinctions all have in
common the iuea that theie is a univeisal foim of thought oi piactice which
is calleu into seivice when we appiehenu the sacieu oi the moial. This
univseisality is one of the causes of the vagueness that Baggini ueploies.
0niveisal, binaiy mouels can pioviue no guiuance about how to specify
piecisely, foi any paiticulai ieligious gioup oi inuiviuual, which aspects of
theii thought, anu which of theii behavioui, might fall unuei the non-liteial
umbiella of myth oi faith, anu which aie to be taken liteially.
Bowevei, what I am pioposing heie is quite uiffeient fiom the
schemes auvanceu by these authois foi two ieasons. Fiist, the appioach I am
iecommenuing uoes not assume any univeisal 'ieligious oiientation' oi style
of thought. Insteau, I aigue foi the impoitance of making an effoit to uesciibe
with piecision "*,.-(*2'003 ,1#2*/*2 7-)#, -( ,.30#, -/ 6#0*#/9 in ielation to theii
specific contexts. A paiticulai moue of belief may be wiuespieau, oi taken foi
gianteu, within a society, anothei may be piactiseu by only a few. Fai fiom

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being a common sense ieaction to the sacieu, some moues of belief may be
countei-intuitive, peihaps only achieveu as a iesult of sustaineu haiu woik.
Taking an ethnogiaphic appioach to belief that can account foi this vaiiety is
the only way to unueistanu the vaiiation of belief with a uegiee of piecision.
Seconu, iathei than aiguing that theie is a ieligious oi spiiitual spheie of
activity in any society foi which ieason is inappiopiiate, I suggest that
specific moues of belief founu in paiticulai contexts can impose specific
conuitions on ieasoning that can be piecisely uesciibeu anu unueistoou
ethnogiaphically.
Bau Baggini sought an anthiopological answei to his question, what
woulu it have been. 0ne answei suggests itself immeuiately. Anthiopology
"', piouuceu an enuuiing anu useful contiibution to thought about belief:
namely, the obseivation that ieligious behavioui anu language aie not
explaineu by systems of well thought out beliefs as often as some people tenu
to think. Insteau, the ethnogiaphic iecoiu shows many cases of toleiance of
contiauiction, so-calleu 'syncietism', anu vagueness. It is cleai that wheieas
the vision of a Bawkins sees a woilu of competing belief systems, in veiy
many cases, actual ieligious people place no moie than a minimal piioiity on
monitoiing anu imposing oiuei on theii own beliefs, that they piactice
because of habit oi tiauitions, oi because of the social meanings that piactice
has.
The impoitance of this obseivation oiiginally lay in iefuting the
positions of eaily anthiopologists, such as Tyloi anu Fiazei, who inteipieteu
cultuies above all as systems of beliefs, anu ieligious oi magical piactices as

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eviuence of manifestly infeiioi beliefs. The iejection of the intellectualist
appioach
1
can be tiaceu to Robeitson Smith's :#2.&(#, -+ ."# ;#0*8*-+ -/ ."#
<#7*.#, (1889) an exeicise in Biblical scholaiship that also uiew on
mouein ethnogiaphy but it has been iepeateu in many subsequent
anthiopological woiks= Classic examples incluue Evans-Piitchaiu's
uesciiption in >*.2"2('/.9 ?('20#,9 '+) @'8*2 of the Azanue's lack of inteiest
in theoietical questions (19S7), anu the essay in which Leach exoneiates the
Tiobiianueis fiom the tioubling accusation that they actually believe what
they say about viigin biith (1966).
The iiielevance of belief in unueistanuing ieligion has been so well
attesteu that it has become something of an anthiopological tiuism. It has
also been accepteu in ielateu fielus such as ieligious stuuies (hence the iole
of Kaien Aimstiong, mentioneu by Baggini), paitly unuei the influence of
scholais such as libeial theologian }ohn Robinson anu Chiistian stuuent of
Islam Wilfieu Cantwell Smith. Robinson anu Smith, like Aimstiong, weie
themselves ieligious in a way that maue paiticulai, explicit statements of
belief at best supeifluous anu at woist misleauing.
Although the obseivation about the wiuespieau unimpoitance of belief
is olu news to anthiopologists, anu I am about to suggest we move on fiom it,
it beais iepeating. In the minus of many who aie not peisonally familiai with
ieligious life, anu some who aie, it still comes as a suipiise that eveiy
believei eveiywheie is not a funuamentalist oi a systematic theologian. Still
a useful obseivation, then, but it is not the enu of the stoiy, foi while it has
been shown that many ieligious people aie not inteiesteu in beliefs, many

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otheis, anu not just Chiistians, uo expenu a gieat ueal of effoit on
unueistanuing, monitoiing, uebating anu cultivating paiticulai foims of
belief.
Ny own inteiest in the question began with my woik on the ievival of
Tibetan Buuuhism in Innei Nongolia. Innei Nongolian Buuuhists uo not fit
easily into the mouel favouieu by eithei siue in the uebate. These aie neithei
the soit of ieligious people who have a cieeu, a set of piopositions, which
they leain anu pass on, anu which they use to ieason about othei beliefs anu
as piemises foi uecision-making, noi the unieflective, piactice-oiienteu
woishippeis who uo what they uo simply out of habit oi in oiuei to satisfy
some ueep neeu foi symbolic expiession. They aie not veiy inteiesteu in the
2-+.#+. of theii belief. But what they uo caie veiy much about is uefining,
juuging anu achieving the iight ,.30# of belief. This style is not some
univeisally encounteieu, non-liteial mythic oiientation to the holy, as
Baggini's uefenueis of ieligion woulu have it, but a specific Innei Nongolian
Buuuhist set of attituues, associateu with specific moues of expeiience,
piactices anu ielationships. It is, in othei woius, a cultuie of belief.
Without a way of thinking about belief as a cultuial piactice
something that is intentionally leaineu anu passeu on anu piactiseu anu
peifecteu anu uebateuInnei Nongolian Buuuhists' accounts of theii
ieligious lives make little sense. To uo justice to them, we neeu an
anthiopology of belief, by which I mean both an ethnogiaphic sensibility that
allows foi people's ieflexive ielationship to theii own belief to iegistei, anu a
compaiative anthiopology that helps us to unueistanu its contouis. So

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besiues pioviuing a possible answei to Baggini's question, that is what I want
to uo in this papei: to make a case foi the uevelopment of a systematic
anthiopology of belief. Below, aftei uiscussing the existing anthiopological
woik on belief, I intiouuce the Innei Nongolian Buuuhist appioach to belief,
befoie outlining some concepts fiom a numbei of othei souices on
meuiaeval }uuaism, on uieek ieligion, anu on contempoiaiy Evangelical
Chiistianity in the 0S that might contiibute aspects of the soit of
compaiative theoiy of belief that I am pioposing.

!"#$%&'&(&)* &, -.(/.,

The anthiopological liteiatuie, of couise, incluues countless uesciiptions of
the content of people's beliefs, but theie aie only a hanuful of ciitical
examinations of the concept of belief itself. This was iecogniseuanu
iecogniseu as pioblematicby Rouney Neeuham, whose book, A#0*#/9
0'+8&'8#9 '+) #41#(*#+2# (1972) staiteu out as an attempt to iectify the
situation. Neeuham's conclusion, aftei uiveiting but ultimately fiuitless
uetouis thiough etymology, psychology anu philosophy, is that the use of the
concept of belief foi ethnogiaphic anu compaiative puiposes shoulu be
abanuoneu altogethei. No anthiopologist uaieu to ievisit the task fiom which
Neeuham ultimately withuiew, that is, to pioviue a theoietical account of
belief that is giounueu in the ethnogiaphic liteiatuie. A numbei of
anthiopologists have iatifieu Neeuham's uecision, while iecognising that his

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ban on belief teims woulu be impossible to implement in piacticeamong
them Nalcolm Ruel (1982), anu }ean Pouillon (1982), anu most iecently
Linuquist anu Coleman in the intiouuction to theii special euition of <-2*'0
B+'03,*,, titleu 'Against Belief' (2uu8). Bowevei, uespite these aiguments
against the use of belief, we go on using it. Inueeu, it is uifficult to think what
a belief-fiee account of human life woulu look like.
2

The failuie of anthiopologists to face up to this pioblem may have
something to uo with the intimiuating eiuuition of Neeuham's woik who
woulu gainsay a man who was able to wiestle, between the coveis of one
book, with questions of Inuo-Euiopean etymology, Biblical ciiticism, theology,
empiiicist psychology anu all that the gieat philosopheis hau been able to
thiow at the question. It may also have something to uo with a iesiuual anti-
psychologism that still affects many anthiopologists, a hangovei fiom the
uays when stiuctuialism neaily tuineu to behaviouiism as Eumunu Leach
conuemneu the foolishness of speculating about the "inteinal psychological
state" of ethnogiaphic subjects (Leach, 1966:4u). 0i peihaps it is because, in
moie iecent times, mainstieam anthiopologists have ceueu questions
touching on cognition to specialist cognitive anthiopologists, who, in theii
cognitive-science-inspiieu incaination, aie avoweuly not inteiesteu in belief,
but only in infoimation.
S

It is tiue that, in the absence of any attempt to woik up a consoliuateu
theoiy, anthiopologists have pioviueu a wealth of ielatively isolateu
ethnogiaphic obseivations on belief. Woithy examples incluue uilbeit Lewis'
woik on the unau of Papua New uuinea, in which he iecoius the vaiiation in

1u
uegiee of conviction oi sinceiity with which beliefs aie helu (198u; 1986);
anu eaily woik by cognitive anthiopologists Ban Speibei, on what he calls
'semi-piopositional belief' (198S), anu Pascal Boyei on tiauition (199u)
both of whom show how belief can be affecteu by vaiiations in the uegiee of
claiity with which it is helu. Theie aie many othei examples too. But what
seems to be pioblematically lacking, apait fiom an attempt to integiate these
uiveise obseivations, is an iuea that the vaiiation in belief might be anything
othei than the iesult of univeisal vaiiability in a basic human faculty (they
aie 'univeisalist' in this sense: we can '00 believe with gieatei oi lessei
ceitainty, oi with moie oi less conviction). Theie's nothing wiong with this
univeisalist appioach, but none of these obseivations can ieally begin to
auuiess the Innei Nongolian Buuuhist asseition that theie aie uiffeient
kinus of belief, anu that one kinu of belief in paiticulai neeus to be leaint anu
cultivateu.

0"".% 1&")&(/2" -344$/56

Innei Nongolia is a iegion in noithein China, in which Tibetan Buuuhism has
been unueigoing something of a ievival since the 199us, as the iegional
goveinment has peimitteu, anu even funueu, the ieconstiuction of some 4uu
of the thousanu-plus temples that stoou befoie the Cultuial Revolution.
Buuuhists in Innei Nongolia agiee that the ievival has been impiessive, that

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moie anu moie people aie inteiesteu in Buuuhism, anu that followeis aie
becoming moie anu moie faithful. Anu they agiee that the influence of
Tibetan Buuuhism is spieauing into paits of society wheie it was not
pieviously populai, as incieasing numbeis of Ban Chinese as well as the
Nongols who aie the tiauitional constituency have staiteu attenuing
temples anu have been accepteu by Nongolian lamas as uisciples. In the
capital city, at the main temple, Ih }uu, it is cleai that the ieligion is even
becoming populai among Communist Paity officials anu police officeis.
Bowevei, theie is a wiuespieau feeling that this giowth masks an
unueilying lack of content, that the piactices that have been ieviveu aie
supeificial because they aie not unueipinneu by ieal unueistanuing, on the
pait of laypeople, noi, moie impoitantly, on the pait of the lamas. The loss of
knowleuge anu unueistanuing, anu the inevitability of ignoiance, aie things
that Innei Nongolian Buuuhists spenu a gieat ueal of time uiscussing in
fact, this talk about ignoiance is itself so peivasive it must be counteu an
impoitant pait of Innei Nongolian Buuuhist life.
The Innei Nongolian Buuuhists I stuuieu stiess the impoitance of
humility in ieligious life, anu often ieplieu to my clumsy, eaily questions
about the meaning of this oi that iite by saying that they uiu not know anu
that if I wanteu to finu an answei to my questions I shoulu look in a book oi
go to Lhasa oi Inuia oi Beijing. 0n the face of it, this sounus ieminiscent of
the piactical oiientation that many anthiopologists have iecoiueu aiounu
the woilu such an inteipietation woulu go something like this: Innei
Nongolian Buuuhists aie inteiesteu in theii ieligious iituals anu specialists

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foi piactical, oi social, oi tiauitional, ieasons anu have little inteiest in the
fact that theie might be an abstiact theoiy unueilying them.
But, in fact, Innei Nongolian Buuuhists '(# inteiesteu in 6#0*#/, if not
beliefs. They constantly emphasise the impoitance of having faith oi belief,
anu having as much of it as possible. By this they say they mean believing
actively anu sinceiely in the tiuth of the teachings of the Buuuha. This is
impoitant because cultivating faith anu getting it just iight is the only way to
achieve spiiitual piogiess now that, foi vaiious ieasons, it has become
impossible to piogiess by leaining oi by peifecting piactice oi by moial
conuuct. So theie can be no piogiess thiough knowleuge, oi thiough
piactices such as meuitation oi 'woiks' (goou ueeus) only faith in
poweiful beings such as the Buuuhas anu bouuhisattvas can make ieligious
activity efficacious. In this, Innei Nongolian Buuuhism is similai to many
othei histoiic anu contempoiaiy Buuuhist tiauitions that have ueciueu that
the ioute to spiiitual piogiess lies in ielying on 'othei-powei' iathei than
'self-powei'.
So one must iely upon faith not woiks. But theie is a twist. 0iuinaiy
Buuuhists must believe the teachings aie tiue, but they can neithei know noi
unueistanu them because the tiuths of Buuuhism aie ueep. The ueep
meaning (8C+ &.8')
4
of the teachings is what one unueistanus when one is
enlighteneu, anu oiuinaiy Buuuhists, as opposeu to the enlighteneu incainate
lamas, aie not enlighteneunot yet. Conveisely, by the same piinciple,
whatevei oiuinaiy, unenlighteneu beings can unueistanu anu know is not
woithy of faithful belief. All that talk about ieincaination, the Buuuhas anu so

1S
on is not false, but it is only the suiface meaning (D+8D+ &.8'), not the ieal
teaching. So when it comes to ieligion, belief anu knowleuge aie consiueieu
mutually exclusive classes.
Relying on othei-powei, in this context, means uevotional piactice in the
piesence of souices of powei. These incluue buuuhas anu bouhisattvas
they can help fiom afai, but since pioximity is impoitant, one can access theii
powei thiough images of them that have been 'switcheu on'. Theie aie also
local incainations oi 'living buuuhas' these aie the best of all because they
aie piesent in peison anu can inteiact uiiectly with uevotees. Though
contempoiaiy lamas aie it is agieeu inauequate, they aie still
consiueieu to geneiate powei because of theii oiuination. A whole iange of
objects also emanate powei, fiom volumes of sciiptuies, to all the
paiapheinalia that is associateu with lamas anu woiship: ielics of monks,
theii long-helu possessions, offeiings that have been piesenteu in iituals, anu
so on. All these beings anu objects aie classeu togethei unuei the teim
,"&.##+: objects of woiship.
The uegiee to which uevotees can ueiive benefit fiom theii piactice
uepenus on two factois: (1) the powei of the object of woiship, anu (2) the
intensity of faith (,CEC8), oi belief (*.8#0) (these two teims aie useu
inteichangeably in this context; the lattei is the same teim that is useu in
ielation to belief in eveiyuay situations) with which they woiship oi
otheiwise inteiact with the object. As a iesult, to the extent that people exeit
themselves in ielation to Buuuhism, theii thoughts anu effoits aie mainly
aimeu at maximising these two vaiiables. But the powei of the object is

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uifficult to ueteimine. What is in the powei of the believei to change is the
sinceiity of his oi hei faith. This is not something that can be ueployeu at will,
one will have a ceitain uisposition foi humble faith, anu one must woik fiom
that point, piactising woishipping anu uevotion (echoes of Pascal anu his
Wagei Aigument heie), making offeiings anu peifoiming piostiations,
piogiessively cultivating the ability to woiship with evei moie intense,
sinceie belief.
Ny infoimants see ieligious belief as a single piactice, but foi the
puiposes of exposition, it is possible to isolate some key uistinctive featuies,
which I uesciibe below. All these things come togethei as an act of homage oi
woiship in a moment of intensity that can biing teais.
F= G-8+*.*H# ',1#2.,= In teims of attituue to piopositional belief. Belief is
founueu on iespect. Scepticism is an act of uisiespect, so uoubt is foibiuuen.
0ne of my teacheis, put it like this:

Faith is the open expiession of the iespectful minu. The founuation of
belief is iespect. If you have faith in the Buuuha, you will believe that
the sciiptuies aie ieal anu tiue. Foi tiuth some people offei theii lives.
If I cannot unueistanu something in the teachings, that shows my level
of unueistanuing is too low. I must nevei ask whethei it is iight.
Boubting is unacceptable.

The uuty to believe that faith imposes is iestiicteu to the negative
uuty of avoiuing giving assent to, oi even consiueiing, iueas that aie ciitical

1S
of the object of faith. Theie is no positive uuty to be cleai about anu affiim
the content of beliefs, beyonu the belief that the teachings aie gieat anu tiue
anu the beings that ieally unueistanu the teachings aie immensely poweiful
anu woithy of iespect.
I= J&7*0*.3KB#,."#.*2 ,.'+)'(). Bumility is absolutely key, one must
cultivate a feeling of lowness in ielation to poweiful beings. This is not so
much a mattei of iecognising the fact cognitively, but moie a question of
acquiiing a ceitain sensibility anu set of bouily uispositions; something like
what Nichael Caiiitheis has uesciibeu as 'aesthetic stanuaiu' in othei
Buuuhist anu in }ain contexts (199u; 1992). This is expiesseu in the
automatic awaieness of the location of lamas, incainations, statues anu othei
objects of woiship, anu in the automatic expiession of submission thiough
postuie, voice anu so on.
L= ;#0'.*-+'0*.3. Because Innei Nongolian faith involves a soit of
uistiibuteu knowleuge, belief is always ielational; one must believe in
ielation to a teachei (noimally many teacheis) who aie the holueis of the
knowleuge in which one believes.
M= !#71-('0*.3= This is not faith one acquiies in conveision. The stoiy
(in some accounts at least) in Chiistianity is that one acquiies belief in
chiluhoou oi in latei conveision anu one is then a believei all the time, even
in one's sleep. Even in the veiy active anu piactice-baseu foims of Chiistian
belief that anthiopologists have wiitten about (uiscusseu latei in this papei),
the aim seems to be to achieve evei gieatei constancy of belief by
inteinalising anu extenuing foims of naiiative anu sensibility. In Chiistianity,

16
then, it often makes sense to say one is a paiticulai kinu of peison: a
Chiistian, a believei, anu this status might continue, notwithstanuing uoubts,
unless one actually loses faith uefinitively.
Innei Nongolian Buuuhist faith is not like this at all; it is not so much a
chaiacteiistic of a peison as a mannei of uoing things. In oiuei to biing it
about one must be uoing something in a faithful way. This might mean
ieciting mantias, caiing foi one's mastei, watching monks chanting, oi an
almost limitless numbei of othei things, while cultivating a feeling of
humility anu confiuence in the tiuth of the philosophy that unueilies these
things, anu of acceptance that that philosophy is beyonu the unueistanuing of
oiuinaiy believeis.
N= O."*2'0 1('2.*2# '+) ,#0/P2&0.*H'.*-+= Finally, belief foi Innei
Nongolians can be seen as an ethical piactice of self-cultivation. Buuuhism
has often been uesciibeu in these teims, but what is inteiesting in this case is
that the believeis uo not aspiie, even in most cases in the veiy long teim, to
foim themselves in the image of the Buuuhas anu bouhisattvas they woiship.
Rathei theii tiue exemplais aie othei faithful people who aie noteu foi theii
humility, oi theii steaufast uevotional piactice. Emulating such people is the
way to piouuce the iight kinu of mental habits to achieve the iight kinu of
belief.
All of these things aie impoitant in themselves, anu help togethei to
explain Innei Nongolian Buuuhists' piactice anu its oiientation to faith. But
they aie also consequential foi othei aieas of uevotees' lives. Foi instance,
the iequiiement of faith foi humility means that Innei Nongolian Buuuhists

17
uo not, with veiy few exceptions, ieau Buuuhist sciiptuies oi even seconuaiy
liteiatuie in the hope of unueistanuing a little of theii ieligion; anu while
they aie toleiant of all soits of piactice, they uo look uown on people who uo
not unueistanu enough about Buuuhism to know this soit of stuuy uoes
moie haim than goou. Anu though the Buuuhists I know say that Buuuhism is
a ieligion of compassion, the iuea that one coulu unueistanu enough about
the complex chains of cause anu effect at woik in the woilu to make ethical
uecisions as a Buuuhist woulu also be subject to ciiticism.
This is cleaily an ouu oi exceptional notion of belief so why call it
belief at all. Fiist, because the teim that Innei Nongolian Buuuhists
themselves use in ieligious contexts, *.8#0, is the same teim foi the action
they may engage in when they listen to the news, oi that they iefiain fiom
when they suspect a neighboui is lying to them. They themselves see
ieligious belief as a counteiintuitive foim of belief in geneial, anu something
that is uifficult to unueistanu anu uifficult to implement; it is not common
sense. Seconu, howevei iemote this foim of belief fiom the eveiyuay vaiiety,
cultivating belief in this way is still, in pait, an effoit to contiol one's own
ielationship to tiuth, howevei inuiiect oi attenuateu that ielationship may
be. It has cognitive consequences, uespite the uisconnection fiom knowleuge,
foi example, the negative uuty to avoiu uoubt, iathei than the positive uuty
to accept specifieu piopositions, anu its episouic natuie that means this uuty
is felt with sometimes iauically uiffeient uegiees of intensity in the same
peison on the same uay.


18

7&3%8.5 &, 2" 2"#$%&'&(&)* &, 9.(/.,

I hope that this biief intiouuction to the meaning of belief in the context of
Innei Nongolian Buuuhism has shown the potential impoitance of paying
attention to tiauitions of thought about belief, anu of piactices oiienteu
towaius cultivating belief, in unueistanuing what believeis aie up to. In the
seconu pait of this papei, I want to look at some souices of inspiiation that
might help to tuin my isolateu ethnogiaphic obseivation anu otheis like it
into a compaiative anthiopology of belief. The fiist is the iuea of 'iegimes of
tiuth', as uesciibeu by Paul veyne in his Q*) ."# %(##R, 6#0*#H# *+ ."#*( 73.",S
(1988). The seconu is the powei of ieflection that people involveu in
tiauitions of thought about thought have ovei theii own belief. To illustiate
what I mean by this, I will biiefly intiouuce the uebate ovei the meaning of
belief in meuiaeval }uuaism, as uesciibeu by Nenachem Kellnei (1986).
Finally, I want to consiuei the bioauei significance of iecent anthiopological
woik on Chiistian Evangelicals in the 0S.
These souices, in the oiuei I piesent them, builu piogiessively gieatei
iichness in theii conceptualisation of belief. veyne is mostly inteiesteu in
cognitive aspects of specific genies of tiuth, each of which has its own tiuth
conuitions anu is ielateu to othei tiuths metaphoiically. The }ewish example,
in which a seiies of iabbis uebate the meaning of belief in Naimoniues'
!"*(.##+ T(*+2*10#,, the closest }uuaism comes to a cieeu, fits veyne's mouel

19
to a point. Paities to the uebate acknowleuge that theie aie uiffeient kinus of
belief, uistinguisheu by theii conuitions anu ielation to othei kinus of tiue
belief. Bowevei, wheieas veyne uesciibes believeis as being in a constant
state of lethaigy that pievents them fiom being awaie of the multiplicity of
foims of belief, in this case, those conceineu aie fully cognisant of the fact,
anu aie making ieflexive uecisions about the ielative value of uiffeient kinus
of belief in a given situation. This is suiely typical of many cultuies of meta-
cognition, anu not only ieligious ones: scientific anu philosophical thinkeis
have been no less awaie of the impoitance of belief. Finally, the iecent woik
on 0S Evangelists, who aie often thought to be exception to the iule of non-
belief in ieligion (these aie the people who ieally aie supposeu to believe in a
list of piopositions), shows that although piopositional beliefs aie inueeu
impoitant in this context, these believeis, like the meuiaeval iabbis anu like
Paul veyne also uistinguish a multiplicity of foims of belief. But wheieas
veyne anu the iabbis aie inteiesteu essentially in epistemological uiffeiences
between foims of belief, the Evangelicals see ieligious belief as a whole-
peison skill, with uistinctive cognitive aspects, but with equally impoitant
embouieu skills (incluuing uifficult cognitive anu linguistic skills), emotional
content anu associateu ielationships. The combination of these things takes
effoit to acquiie, maintain anu peifect, so becoming a believei is a lifetime's
task, not something that happens in an instant on conveision.

U#3+#V, (#8*7#, -/ .(&."=

2u

0ne of the best attempts in mouein acauemic liteiatuie to uesciibe
moualities of belief as histoiical piouucts, oi tiauitions was maue not by an
anthiopologist, but by Paul veyne, a Fiench classical histoiian, in his shoit
book, Q*) ."# %(##R, 6#0*#H# *+ ."#*( 73.",S (1988) Bis answei to this
question is complex: theie aie many kinus of belief, oi iathei, many ways of
believing.
The uiffeient foims of belief have in common that each is conceineu
with tiuth. But each way, oi as he calls it, 7-)'0*.3 of belief is pait of a
uistinct 'piogiamme of tiuth', in which tiuth is measuieu by uistinct tiuth
conuitions anu in which only ceitain ways of aiiiving at tiuth aie legitimate.
The ielation of tiuth in one piogiamme oi 'iegime of tiuth' to 'tiuth' in othei
piogiammes is '+'0-8*2'0.

Thioughout the ages a pluiality of piogiammes of tiuth has existeu,
anu it is these piogiammes, involving uiffeient uistiibutions of
knowleuge, that explain the subjective uegiees of intensity of beliefs,
the bau faith, anu the contiauictions that coexist in the same
inuiviuual (1988:27).

veyne says that we aie not noimally awaie of the uiffeiences that sepaiate
these iegimes, we lethaigically accept as tiue tiuths belonging to uiffeient
iegimes. Now although this obseivation is a univeisalist one this is a
uesciiption of believing that applies 'thioughout the ages' veyne is going a

21
step fuithei than the univeisalist scholais I mentioneu eailiei, because if he
is iight about piogiammes of tiuth then the task of the histoiian anu the
ethnogiaphei will be to unueistanu the specific logic of paiticulai foims of
belief, each of which may be quite unique.
To ietuin to veyne's question: Biu the uieeks believe in theii myths.
veyne answeis that they uiu. They believeu that theie was a heioic woilu, in
which gous anu humans communicateu anu inteiacteu, anu they believeu
that a special value attacheu to these inteiactions. But this belief was not the
same as theii belief in eveiyuay facts. The events in myths,

...took place "eailiei," uuiing the heioic geneiations, when the gous
still took pait in human affaiis. Nythological space anu time weie
secietly uiffeient fiom oui own. A uieek put the gous "in heaven," but
he woulu have been astounueu to see them in the sky. Be woulu have
been no less astounueu if someone, using time in its liteial sense, tolu
him that Bephaestus hau just iemaiiieu oi that Athena hau ageu a
gieat ueal lately. Then he woulu have iealiseu that in his own eyes
mythic time hau only a vague analogy with uaily tempoiality; he
woulu also have thought that a kinu of lethaigy hau always kept him
fiom iecognizing this uiffeience. The analogy between these tempoial
woilus uisguises theii hiuuen pluiality (veyne, 1988:17f).

veyne uiscusses a seiies of piogiammes oi iegimes of tiuth in
auuition to mythology, he also analyses ancient anu mouein histoiy, mouein

22
jouinalism, theatie anu liteiatuie taken togethei, his examples show us
how believing can be a piocess, oi a seiies of piocesses, each with its own
histoiy, anu with its own tiuth conuitions anu specific ielation to othei
piactices anu ielationships. While we may iecognise the iesponses to all the
uiveise piogiammes of tiuth as species of belief, simply because they aie
piemiseu on a ielationship to a tiuth, anu because uiveise foims of tiuth aie
analogically ielateu to each othei, we aie no longei uealing with a univeisal
piactice. What we have is a tiauitional piactice that is suitable foi
ethnogiaphic uesciiption, anu whose uesciiption is inuispensable if we aie to
unueistanu how inuiviuuals aie ielateu to the content of theii beliefs.

;#/0#4*H*.3 *+ 2&0.&(#, -/ 7#.'P2-8+*.*-+W 7#)*'#H'0 X&)'*,7

}uuaism is often tieateu as a paiauigm case of a ieligion that emphasises
coiiect piactice ovei belief.
S
Bowevei, at times, the question of what one
neeus to believe anu how one ought to believe it has been uebateu by }ews,
often in uialogue with othei iueas about belief that weie ciiculating in the
laigei communities in which they weie living. In an inteiesting book on the
subject of uogma in }ewish thought (1986), the histoiian Nenachem Kellnei
explains that, although the tiauition of Biblical }uuaism, anu the latei
iabbinical tiauition that stemmeu fiom it, weie not at all conceineu with
foimulating statements of oithouox belief, fiom at least the tenth centuiy the
ieligion uiu uevelop a tiauition of systematic theology.

2S
Fiom that peiiou, }uuaism faceu challenges to its legitimacy fiom insiue
anu out: fiom Islam, fiom the uieek philosophy Islam hau incoipoiateu anu
uisseminateu, anu fiom the Kaiaite Sect (}ews who hau auopteu aspects of
uieek thought). Kellnei aigues that this imposeu a neeu to set out, foi the
fiist time, oithouox }ewish beliefs in an oiueily way, in oiuei to be able to
explain why they weie not infeiioi to those of ascenuant, monotheistic Islam,
anu why the Kaiaites weie objectionable, even though in teims of oithopiaxy
theii piactices uiffeieu little fiom those of iabbinical }ews.
The systematisation of }ewish theology that iesulteu began in the tenth
centuiy with Sa'auia uaon, a iabbi whose main contiibution was piecisely
ieuefining the piactice of believing in the context of }uuaism, something he
uiu in beguilingly conciete teims in his A--R -/ 6#0*#/, '+) -1*+*-+,:

We say that belief is a notion that aiises in the soul in iegaius to the
actual chaiactei of anything that is appiehenueu. When the cieam of
investigation emeiges, |anuj is embiaceu anu unfolueu by the minus
anu, thiough them acquiieu anu uigesteu by the souls, then the peison
becomes convinceu of the tiuth of the notions he has thus acquiieu.
Be then ueposits it in his soul foi a futuie occasion oi futuie
occasions... (Kellnei, 1986:S)

Although uaon began a tiauition of tiying to set out tiauitional beliefs in a
systematic foim it took until the thiiteenth centuiy foi this to be uone in such

24
a way that it was possible to couify a set of inuispensable, funuamental
beliefs the equivalent of the Nuslim oi Chiistian cieeu. The fiist, anu most
influential of these, was wiitten by Noses Naimoniues. Naimoniues came to
be ieveieu as a legal scholai anu one of the gieatest iabbis, but uespite his
piominence, his attempt to impose a cieeu on }uuaism nevei ieally caught on.
Bis !"*(.##+ T(*+2*10#, weie, howevei, the subject of fieice uebate about two
hunuieu yeais aftei he penneu them. What is inteiesting is that the uebate
shows that foi }ews like Naimoniues, aiiiving at the content of the belief was
only half the battle the othei half was ueciuing in what way the content
shoulu be believeu.
Naimoniues' stateu intention was to uiaw up a list of statements, belief in
which was a necessaiy anu sufficient conuition foi salvation (access to 'the
woilu to come') anu membeiship of the community. Latei scholais, accoiuing
to Kellnei, objecteu little to the list of beliefs, though some suggesteu minoi
alteiations. Bowevei, a numbei of impoitant iabbis weie veiy conceineu
about Naimoniues' piemise that belief in itself coulu be a conuition of
salvation. Reactions incluueu the following views, uesciibeu by Kellnei,
which mostly emeigeu in the fifteenth centuiy.
Rabbi Ciescas aigueu the Law is a mysteiious mattei anu iecognition of
its mysteiiousness is an impoitant aspect of faith: Naimoniues hau been
'seuuceu' by the ways of the philosopheis. Rabbi Albo aigueu that
Naimoniues' Piinciples coulu be seen as fiist piinciples, oi axioms, as in
Aiistotelian science; they weie the founuations on which the iest of

2S
knowleuge in the fielu stoou. Rabbi Buian agieeu, anu aigueu that those who
accept the ioots oi axioms of the Toiah, as iuentifieu by Naimoniues, aie not
uenieis, even if theii philosophical speculation leaus them to uisbelief in
lessei aspects of the Toiah.
But Rabbi Abianavel aigueu that theie was a uiffeience between
scientific anu ieligious tiuth: in the sciences, one can uistinguish between
piemises, which aie given, anu speculations, which may be mistaken. In
ieligion, the Toiah is given by uou, anu it is all coiiect. Be uefenus
Naimoniues on the basis of the heuiistic inteipietation of his piinciples, but
aigues that no belief in the Toiah is piioi, oi moie axiomatic than any othei.
Anyone who uenies a uetail of any naiiative oi belief in the Toiah is a heietic.
So this uoes not appeai to be a ietuin to the pie-theological iabinnic faith,
but iathei, an extension of the iequiiement to have coiiect piopositional
faith to the whole of the Toiah, oi at least to avoiu having incoiiect beliefs in
ielation to the whole.
This uebate is inteiesting foi seveial ieasons. It is notable that none of
those who expiesseu a view took seiious issue with the substance oi content
of the beliefs that Naimoniues hau pioposeu. The uisagieement focuseu on
whethei belief in the !"*(.##+ T(*+2*10#, ought to be the same kinu of belief as
belief in geneial, belief in the fiuits of scientific ieason (on the Aiistotelian
mouel oi axioms anu speculations) oi belief in the tiuth of the Toiah as a
whole. Was Naimoniues' cieeu to be funuamental, anu othei beliefs
uepenuent anu ielatively uispensable, oi was it meiely heuiistic, with a

26
ueiivative value, oi was it linkeu to faith in the Toiah by ieason as an axiom
is to a syllogism. Cleaily, these uebates acknowleugeu uistinctions between
foims of belief, uistinctions that weie uiffeient in content, but similai in
piinciple to those uesciibeu by veyne. 0nlike veyne's uieeks, howevei, these
believeis weie ieflexive about theii belief anu thought it possible to teach
otheis about uiffeient kinus of belief. 0ne thing this ieflexivity allows is the
explicit ethical evaluation of competing foims of belief. It becomes cleai
when we see the contiibutions of each of the iabbis that Kellnei uiscusses in
the context of an on-going aigument that none is seeking to make a uefinitive,
univeisalistic claim about what ieligious belief oi the language it is expiesseu
in is '2.&'003 like in the way anthiopologists (such as ueeitz oi Tambiah)
have often sought to uo. Insteau, each is piesenting a competing noimative
view of what excellent ieligious belief, within a specific histoiical community
of piactice, ought to be like.

G-+.#71-('(3 OH'+8#0*2'0 G"(*,.*'+*.3 *+ ."# Y<

As we have seen, familiaiity with Chiistianity has been blameu by
Neeuham, Ruel anu otheis foi giving social scientists an uniealistic view of
belief in othei contexts. Bowevei, one of the fiuits of the emeiging
anthiopology of Chiistianity has been to show that theie is much moie to

27
Chiistian belief than that in places wheie conveision is a iecent memoiy,
such as Nelanesia, but also in societies wheie Chiistianity is well establisheu,
such as the 0niteu States, even among those Chiistians who might be thought
to be the most focuseu on tenets of faith, Evangelical Piotestants. 0ne of the
things that has become paiticulaily appaient is the way in which belief is
iegaiueu as a skill that one acquiies thiough piactice anu in which one can
be moie oi less accomplisheu cleai paiallels with the Innei Nongolian
case heie. Theie aie specific ways in which this is woikeu out in paiticulai
gioups, but the woik of the anthiopologists I am about to uiscuss shows that
theie is also a uegiee of commonality. In each case ieligious belief is
uistinguisheu fiom othei kinus of belief in such a way that it might be useful
to apply veyne's iuea of multiple iegimes of tiuth to theii piactice, but like
the iabbis in the !"*(.##+ T(*+2*10#, uebate, they make the uistinctions self-
consciously, anu the soit of uistinctions that veyne anu the iabbis weie
inteiesteu in, logical uistinctions baseu on uiffeient sets of tiuth conuitions,
aie only half the stoiy heie.
So foi example, in his papei, Faith beyonu belief, 0mii Elisha, uesciibes
the piocess of coming to believe among 0S Evangelicals (2uu8). Be founu
that his infoimants acteu as he expecteu, stuuying the Bible uiligently to
leain about theii ieligion. Bowevei, they also, peiplexingly, he thought,
fiequently tolu him that the point was not to concentiate on 'factual uata'.
That woulu leau to what they calleu 'heau knowleuge', but,


28
In theii view, the main goal of Bible stuuy was to cultivate a ieceptive
moial uisposition conuucive to 'heait knowleuge', which was seiveu
by the specific contents of one's piopositional beliefs but not
exclusively ueteimineu by them. .Rational compiehension anu
affiimation of biblical sciiptuies aie uesiieu, but they alone uo not
constitute 'faithfulness' (Elisha, 2uu8:6u).

A similai pictuie is painteu by Susan Fiienu Baiuing in hei A--R -/ X#((3
Z'05#00 (2uu1). Like Elisha, Baiuing finus that while membeis of the
chuiches she attenus aie veiy much conceineu with belief, they aie much
moie inteiesteu in uiffeient kinus of believing anu the ways of moving fiom
one to the othei than they aie inteiesteu in specific uoctiines, though these
aie also impoitant.
Specifically, she finus they uistinguish between ."(## states: uisbelief,
being unuei conviction, anu being a boin-again believei. Bisbelief anu belief
aie about accepting oi iejecting specific uoctiines, as one woulu expect, but
these things aie also about being willing oi unwilling to paiticipate in a
ceitain naiiative moue of being in the woilu, in which eveiyuay life events
aie naiiateu using Biblical language. Becoming a believei means acquiiing
the ability to uo this, so as well as willingness to take pait anu to accept the
piopositional content, it also iequiies the acquisition of ceitain linguistic
abilities, anu the ability to be awaie of Biblical paiallels anu inteipietations
so it also involves a veiy specific foim of sensibility oi seeing the woilu.

29
'Coming unuei conviction of the Boly Spiiit' is a soit of inteimeuiate
phase, in which one is willing to paiticipate by listening anu enteitaining the
Biblical naiiative as it is applieu to one's own life, but one is unable oi
unwilling to piouuce the speech of a believei oneself.

Coming unuei conviction (listening to gospel stoiies oi voices) is
easily compaieu to being saveu (speaking, telling stoiies). When you
come unuei conviction, you cioss thiough a membiane into belief;
when you get saveu, you cioss anothei membiane out of uisbelief.
This passage is moie pioblematic foi some lost souls, foi what
outsiueis woulu say weie ieasons of euucation, class, oi intellect, anu
insiueis woulu say was haiuness of the heait, piiue, oi the woik of the
uevil.
0nce you aie saveu, the Boly Spiiit assumes youi voice, speaks
thiough you, anu begins to iephiase youi life. Listening to the gospel
enables you to expeiience belief, as it weie, vicaiiously. But geneiative
belief, belief that inuisputably tiansfiguies you anu youi ieality, belief
that becomes you, comes only thiough speech: speaking is believing
(Baiuing, 2uu1:6u).

Tanya Luhimann, in hei woik on Biitish witchciaft, uesciibeu univeisal-
type belief piocesses such as compaitmentalism (1989). In hei moie iecent
woik on 0S Evangelical Chiistianity she takes a uiffeient appioach, paying

Su
attention to specific local tiauitions of thought about belief, as well as
psychological finuings, foi example on the capacity of the minu to piouuce
paiticulai uissociative states (2uu8a; 2uu8b; 2uuS). Like Baiuing, she takes
Chiistian uesciiption of the piocess of leaining to believe moie seiiously
than anthiopologists have been willing to uo in the past, though she uoes it in
a uiffeient waypeihaps a moie uetacheu anu psychological way, but one
that nonetheless acknowleuges anu tiies to unueistanu the impoitance of
emotion anu ielationships in belief.
Woiking with uiffeient Evangelical chuiches in Chicago anu Califoinia,
Luhimann accepts Baiuing's asseition that foi contempoiaiy Evangelicals
speaking is believing, but she says it is also about /##0*+8 it. New Evangelism
emphasises the intense emotional expeiience that can be achieveu thiough
belief, anu the feeling of intimacy with uou that is associateu with it.
Achieving this feeling is uifficult anu it is something that neeus to be leaineu
anu piactiseu.
Specifically, Luhimann aigues, this involves S kinus of leaining: (1)
Cognitive Linguistic. This involves leaining facts oi piopositions, but it also
involves the acquisition of the specific foims of language skills similai to
those that Baiuing uiscusses. (2) What Luhimann calls 'metakinesis'. By this
she means specific foims of leaineu psychological skills anu expeiiences
incluuing: paying attention to one's stieam of consciousness, achieving
uissociational states, expeiiencing a sense of intimacy thiough piayei,
expeiiencing specific emotions (e.g. the 'Peace of uou'), expeiiencing

S1
hallucinations anu loss of bouily contiol. (Bow fai we have come fiom Leach!)
(S) Relational Piactice: leaining to expeiience an intimate, even 'pally',
ielationship with uou, thiough piayei anu Bible ieauing, thiough which the
believei iespectively speaks to anu heais fiom uou.
To ieuuce these active foims of ielationship with uou that believeis see
themselves as cultivating, involving the whole peison, physically, emotionally,
anu socially, as meiely so many foims of belief woulu be missing the point of
these excellent ethnogiaphies, anu that is not what I am suggesting. But if one
is inteiesteu, specifically, in unueistanuing people's use of knowleuge, one
neeus to see the cognitive aspects of belief in the context of the whole,
complex, ieflexive piactice of which those aspects aie a pait.

!"#$%&'("#'

To ietuin to Baggini's question, on the basis of the few examples I have
ievieweu in this papei it is alieauy obvious that unueistanuing the natuie of
'actual ieligious belief' oi non-ieligious belief piactices, foi that mattei
might often iequiie a iounueu contextual unueistanuing of all aspects of that
paiticulai piactice, one that takes in all of its components, incluuing the
ielationships, embouieu knowleuge anu aesthetic stanuaius, with which
cognitive aspects of belief aie tieu up. This is why the suivey of the 2-+.#+. of
ieligious beliefs that Baggini suggests is unlikely to uniavel in any significant

S2
way the tangleu uebates that have fiustiateu him so fai without a
complementaiy stuuy of ,.30#, of belief. This is tiue even if, as is the case foi
Baggini, what one is ieally inteiesteu in is belief as cognition; as the Innei
Nongolian case shows, the skills that aie leaineu in belief piactices can
piofounuly affect the couise of thought.
The Innei Nongolian Buuuhist case is something of an extieme case, in
that the believeis expiessly iule out theii own masteiy of the content of the
belief towaius which theii belief is oiienteu, so it is ieally impossible to miss
the impoitance of styles of belief in this case. Foi just that ieason, it shoulu
act as something of a waining foi anthiopologists; in how many othei cases
in which content *, unueistoou have we uisiegaiueu consequential
subtleties in the style of belief that is applieu to that content. Foi me, as an
anthiopologist of ieligion, the most exciting aspect of moving beyonu a
univeisalist mouel to a compaiative anthiopology of belief is that it allows us
to see the wiuely vaiying accounts of ieligious belief in the woik of thinkeis
such as Naimoniues, Tsongkhapa, Bacon, Newman anu Kieikegaiu not as
competing, anu theiefoie mostly mistaken, folk anthiopologies of belief, but
as uesciiptions of uistinct aspiiational cultuies of belief, each with a uiffeient
ielationship to tiuth as its goal.
In iecent yeais, a few anthiopologists have begun to iecognise the
potential of an anthiopological stuuy of belief foi instance those I
mentioneu in connection with Ameiican Evangelism, oi Anuiew Bucksei who
has wiitten about the changing meaning of belief among Banish }ews since

SS
the eighteenth centuiy (2uu8), oi Catheiine Bell, who wiote in a similai vein
in hei woik on Chinese ieligion (2uu2). Bowevei, no one has tiieu to
systematise this woik oi to put uiffeient but similai piactices of belief in a
compaiative fiame. It seems likely that if we stait looking we will finu
eveiywheie uistinct, histoiically specific iegimes of tiuth. In some cases,
people will be lethaigically unawaie of the uisciepancies between these
uiffeient foims of tiuth, in othei cases they will ieflect on some of the
contiasts explicitly, anu they may evaluate uiffeient styles of belief, as uiu the
iabbis. In othei cases still, we may uiscovei piojects of self-conscious belief
cultivation, in which, like the Ameiican Evangelists anu the Innei Nongolian
Buuuhists uiscusseu above, people not only appiehenu the complexity anu
multiplicity of theii ielationship to tiuth, but also seek to objectify anu act on
that ielationship. Recognising anu unueistanuing the specificities of cultuies
of belief will eniich oui unueistanuing of the woilus we stuuy.

)*+*,*#$*'

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S4
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S7

-$.#"/%*01*2*#3'
Eaily veisions of this papei weie piesenteu to uepaitmental seminais at
uolusmith's College, Nanchestei 0niveisity anu the 0niveisity of Cambiiuge
anu I am veiy giateful to paiticipants foi theii questions anu suggestions.
Conveisations with Catheiine Alexanuei, Natei Canuea, }o Cook, uigoiy
Belaplace, Caioline uatt, Caioline Bumphiey, }ames Laiulaw, Soumhya
venkatesan anu Pieis vitebsky weie paiticulaily helpful in claiifying my
aigument anu I owe them my thanks. The fielu ieseaich on which paits of
this papei aie baseu weie funueu by the William Wyse Funu foi Social
Anthiopology anu St }ohn's College, Cambiiuge.

1
Foi uefinitions of this teim, see Evans-Piitchaiu (19SS) anu Skoiupski
(1976).
2
Although iecently anthiopologists have shown that Nelanesians (2uu8) anu
uieenlanueis (2u12) uo, oi at least aspiie to uo, just that.
S
The uevelopment of cognitive science, anu the cognitive anthiopology that
is baseu on it, was a iesult of the "Cognitive Revolution", a methouological
move in which the question of the status of consciousness was set asiue anu
thought was to be tieateu as infoimation, on the mouel of uata within a
piocessoi.
4
Foieign-language teims in this section aie in Nongolian.

S8

S
In fact, Ruel aigueu that }uuaism, among all woilu ieligions, contiasts most
stiongly with Chiistianity in teims of its uisinteiest in belief (1982).

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Correspondence: Jonathan Mair, CRASSH, Cambridge CB3 9DT; jrm35@cam.ac.

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