[G.R. No. 76714. June 2, 1994.

]
SALUD TEODORO VDA.. DE PEREZ, Petitioner, v. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC Bulacan, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF DECEDENTS ESTATE; ALLOWANCE OF
WILLS PROBATED ABROAD; EVIDENCE NECESSARY THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. The respective wills of
the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance
with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. . . . Thus, proof that both wills conform
with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence
necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are
as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in
such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all
the needed evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF TESTATORS KNOWN HEIRS, LEGATES, AND DEVISEES, A PREREQUISITE THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on
a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan
and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify
his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent
Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. The rule
that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in
case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will
that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The
brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioners claim are entitled to notices of the
time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court
shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JOINT PROBATE OF SEPARATE WILLS PROPER IN CASE AT BAR; REASON. In the case
at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same
provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations
dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore
should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding." A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result
in the delay in the administration of justice.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated
November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico
A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
I
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a
successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey,
Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the
remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p.
35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and
grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will
and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
"If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my
estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo,
p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing
the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will estates:
"If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my
estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo,
p. 31.)
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that
gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills,
filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga,
New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in
his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to
the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of
the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la
Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon
her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special
administratrix.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance
Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy

taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries.
The trial Court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to
her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings
Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F.
Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving
petitioners motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and
therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p.
110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan
collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no
legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene" ; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the
solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with
Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code" ; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was
presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither
distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by
operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioners motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the
Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to
disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn PerezCunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate
wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole
heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in violation
of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of
the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that
the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special
administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney,
authorized his father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan,
Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines
belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special
administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of
the estate of the deceased spouses.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of

all monies received by her in trust for the estate.

In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals" ; hence they were complete strangers
to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and
address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two
wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is
Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that
nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same
provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the
Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his wordly goods to his
wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully
disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly
assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs
had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that
under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to
be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185). law library
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with
the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged
that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga,
New York which rendered a decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanans executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs
by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs,
executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix: (3) that
she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular
administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982"
(Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to
attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p.
242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had
received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogates Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills,
recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of
an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents
moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on

procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of
succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there
were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984,
where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and
testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the
suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the
other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality
to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the
reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that" (W)hen the last will and testament . . . was
denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given
finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the
estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed
(Records, p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and
termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her
a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of
April 30, 1985.chanrobles law library
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying
that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as
special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed
a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the
Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of
the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan
spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate"
(Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging
lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for
reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator
domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property;
that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs

taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his
findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question. "However, respondent Judge said that
the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p.
381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law.
After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded
that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing
additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his
order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986"
but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records,
p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second for reconsideration stating that she
was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she
be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the
probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single
proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition
takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first
submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing
Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for
a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which
contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective
wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings"
(Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v.
De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had
been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her
compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan
heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they
are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April
11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.
II

Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are
sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of
the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts
that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of Onondaga which is a court of record, that
his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the
respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their
records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the
exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");chanrobles.com : virtual law library
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H"
and "F");
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified
copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken (Exhs.
"H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G.
Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills
to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and "I10");
j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they properly executed, genuine and valid and that the
said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal
property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each others
signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held
in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6")" (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Courts Decision of April 13,
1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
"Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes."
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws
is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the

Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970
ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]. Except for
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is
based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent
procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While
the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is
to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated
jointly. Respondent Judges view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and
therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of
the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the
administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the
Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and
pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their
joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation
(Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider
herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original

will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioners claim are entitled to notices of the
time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court
shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . ." .
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time
within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see
to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.

[G.R. NO. 139868 : June 8, 2006]

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
Spouses Audrey O Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July
29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan's Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard's renunciation of his
appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta
Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey's will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of
Audrey's estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties:
(1) Audrey's conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park,
Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey's name
with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.6 The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphan's Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips
was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richard's will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July
24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle
as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey's estate, with
Richard being apportioned the - undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the - undivided interest in the Makati
property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds
of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (' undivided interest) and Kyle (' undivided interest); directing the
Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111
shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard's - undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent,
while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard's three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent's opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard's entire - undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court's Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey's estate in accordance with her
will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property
should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely - thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent's allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had
no knowledge of the State of Maryland's laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that
he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they
would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already
final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court's Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W. Richard
Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and the issuance
of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey. SO ORDERED. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August
27, 1999.
Hence, the herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA
gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 "IN THE
MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q.
ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND
HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER
EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF
AUDREY O NEIL GUERSEY'S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in
all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the
same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of
the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine
laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey's
will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the
estate will be divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner's breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey's
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the
express terms of Aubrey's will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because
petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she
was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey's will bequeathing entirely her estate to
Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the
settlement of Richard's estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding
effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of
the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground
that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. 27 For

fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, 28 and must be brought
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent's cause and found that petitioner's
failure to follow the terms of Audrey's will, despite the latter's declaration of good faith, amounted to
extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent
that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey's estate in accordance with the terms
of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey's estate in accordance
with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey's adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent's cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey's will, 30 and the complaint was filed only in
1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner's acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it
was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her
inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her
interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent's knowledge of
the terms of Audrey's will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is
petitioner's failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent's discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard's estate, the opposition thereto,
and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all
done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it
was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of
petitioner's acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the
annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet
prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the Court
stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the
unwary."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it
was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud
refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial
of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as
by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any

knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest
trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he
expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair
average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which
his conduct is to be judged.36
Petitioner's failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey's estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the
RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of
Audrey's death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and
Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan's Court in Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and
attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan's Court of Baltimore City on
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice
Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary,
or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts

and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will
may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey's estate, was dutybound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of
Audrey's will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or
a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioner's protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as
the reprobate of Audrey's will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey
was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior
partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." 39 He had all the legal
resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey's heirs, and distributing Audrey's estate according to the project of
partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the
rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audrey's
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern
over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly
stated, which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta
invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam v.
Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins v.
Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it
appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator
was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O Neill Guersey. Considering the
principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the

avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove
the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O Neill
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing
the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a
different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff's
adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta's action appears to have breached his
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant's position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent's
last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant
Alonzo H. Ancheta's omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter's last will,
in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law
as a result of petitioner's abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner's
pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear.
Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or
negligence of her own, as petitioner's omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze
the legal implications of petitioner's omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have
the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights. 42
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the
State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon
his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for administration
and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly
indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which
is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a
personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances". 43
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey's conjugal
share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey's death.
Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the

entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the
proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire
estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special
Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in
Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove
the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her
share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by
appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of
First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court
as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see
Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the
laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the
CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard's estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audrey's and Richard's estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not according
to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to
respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument
known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the
creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioner's motive in equitably distributing Audrey's estate cannot prevail over
Audrey's and Richard's wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.47
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who
owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified
that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises
the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private
agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973
Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary
succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15,
Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits nonFilipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by
way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on
to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys
of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August
27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the
court.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. NO. 153798. September 2, 2005]

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners, v. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad
Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the herein
respondent Aleli "Corazon" Angeles-Maglaya.
The legal dispute between the partiesstarted when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition 2 for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged,
among other things, the following:
1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January 21,
1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;
2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco's estate;
3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and,
together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedent's wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs
of the decedent; andcralawlibrary
4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Francisco's estate.3 In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having
married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union
which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City,
and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also
averred that respondentcould not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as
Francisco's legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on,
petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva Mercado,has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced
any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk respondent's claim of being the
only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage,
legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of
Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices,
the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the
alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply, respondent
dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court
of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. 4

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of
her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as the
legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988.5 She also
testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other
witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,6 Francisco Yaya,7 Jose O. Carreon8 and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz.9 Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry
stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question
"Legitimate? (Legitimo?)"; pictures taken during respondent's wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.
Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government
service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of
action", it being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her
filiation vis - -vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."10
To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioner's reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder.
Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,11 the trial court, on its finding that respondentfailed to prove
her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to state
a cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word
in bracket added]
Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of
December 17, 1999.12 Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29,
2002,13 reversed and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as
administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint
petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:
1. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;14
2. Petitioner's motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence to rebut respondent's testimonial and documentary evidence; and

3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.
Hence, petitioner's instant Petition for Review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in reversing the trial court's order of dismissal; 15 (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondentis a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in
decreeing respondent's appointment as administratrix of Francisco's intestate estate.
We resolve to grant the petition.
The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is the
legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals resolved
the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint
respondent as administratrix of Francisco's estate.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court's conclusion on the legitimate status of
respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of,
and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison v. Court of
Appeals,16 stated that since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence", the presumption on
respondent's legitimacy stands "unrebutted."17
Following is an excerpt from Tison:
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
'The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
'Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status
of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still be
easily available.'
'Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . . '(Words in bracket added;
Emphasis ours)

Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a
child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of
such child cannot be attacked collaterally.
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.18 For, a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima
facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, 19 the presumption of
legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code20 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual
basis therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate
does not arise.
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from
what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondent's supposed legitimacy arose.
But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondent's gratuitous
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent's marriage to
respondent's mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized 21 - was
offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box
to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent
presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their testimonies
proved that respondent was Francisco's daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de la
Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas') father and her (Paulita's)
mother, who are both Francisco's siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon would testify seeing
respondent in 1948 in Francisco's house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva
before the war.23In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the Francisco AngelesGenoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was solemnized; the identity of the
solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.
While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and
Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to
testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly,
therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy
which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To
reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there
was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in 1938,
respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-Belen
Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were,
she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion - as well as the appellate court's
conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had declared
that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage
with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already "spouses". Now, then, if,
as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco were
married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or prior to
Genoveva's death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void,24 in which case petitioner could not

be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a "surviving spouse" of the
decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:
4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN
S. Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who is
about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . "
We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of
a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the
marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil registeror a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. "E"). In it, her birth was
recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word "married" is
written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled . . . that [respondent's] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter
of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married".
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even
by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its
execution: the fact of birth of a child.25 Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as
validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the probative
value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name by
the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary. 27
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it
were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes - and "indubitably" at that - not only respondent's filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the limit.
In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not

just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally
married. In the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician
who merely certified having attended "the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created " a
marriage that of - Francisco and Genoveva', and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of 'Francisco' "' 28
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. 29 It
cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother,
with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father's name in the appropriate space in
the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried
mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias.
How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her
legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any
lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima
facie evidence - when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx30
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty.
Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show that
Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco
giving respondent's hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or
the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition. 31 And needless
to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.
The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records and
the testimony of respondent's witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous
possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have
been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at
issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of
administration on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother,
Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein.
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another
compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.
As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition of
spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and two
others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned "Aleli
'Corazon' Angeles Maglaya v. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco Angeles
and Belen S. Angeles", respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should have been
notified of the adoption proceedings.
Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to RTC,
Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision 32 dated December 17, 2003, the Court of

Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary
to her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of a lawful wedlock between Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado". Wrote the appellate court in that case:
Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is a
legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the
record to support petitioner's claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at
anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938
While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the
war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the
existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness
was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . .
Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient
evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.
To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner's birth certificate and even her marriage
contract.. . . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are
petitioner's school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .
Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)
Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No.47832 was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No.
163124, denying Aleli "Corazon" Maglaya's petition for Review on Certiorari, 33 and Resolution dated
October 20, 2004,34 denying with "FINALITY" her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated
January 24, 2005 resolved to "NOTE WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya's second motion for reconsideration.
In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,35 one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle. Following
the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent's
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter's marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in
a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again
be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent
action, regardless of the form of the latter.36
Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court's order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child of
Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss37 interposed by herein

petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot
and academic. It need not detain us any minute further.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. 38 When the law speaks of
"next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the
decedent's property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and
pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed
relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON

Binding Effect of Judgments

490 SCRA 140
June 8, 2006
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will
wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in real estate improvements at
Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard
married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and project of partition were
granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richards will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of
Richards undivided interest in the Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was
allocated to their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where
Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the
legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as
dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

[G.R. NO. 133743 : February 6, 2007]

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
19963 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its
May 15, 1998 Resolution4 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A.7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed
that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage
of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 25616 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also
filed a motion for reconsideration20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the
twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20,25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration26 and for the disqualification27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied.28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in
its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.30and Pilapil v. IbaySomera.31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus'
With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of
E.O. No. 227, - there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity
to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari .35 Rodolfo
later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray37 and Romualdez v. RTC,
Br. 7, Tacloban City,38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one
domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void

bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she
has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining
the residence - as contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
- residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time
of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc.,47 letter-envelopes48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3.51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on
June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need
not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the
divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce
and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton v. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be

discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera55 where the Court recognized the validity of
a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect
or cast obloquy on the other."56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties
in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."59 In Garcia v. Recio,60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to

avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. lbrr
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 1565 and 1766 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine
law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to
err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.71
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent.75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 14476 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it
is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property

acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we
ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent's defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.]

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking to annul the
Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

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Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros
M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the
province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalos Machine Shop with offices at No. 19
Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,
namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and
directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their
respective addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order "declaring the whole
world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16,
1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days
within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filing of an
Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9,
1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order 9 which resolved, thus:

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A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of
considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the
dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of the
present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

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E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the
deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30, 1993 was denied by the
trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for certiorari with the appellate court, they
contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4)
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification
of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution 11
promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was
likewise dismissed. 12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver
that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of
the petition but that the same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments which, according to them, are
indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

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Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not made
any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. . . . the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper
accounting, to his own benefit and advantage. . . .
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his
own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs . . . .
Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced
to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the
services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per
appearance in court . . . . 13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the

Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver
in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and the
character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person
such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of
Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit:

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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

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(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration of
the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this Honorable
Court may fix.
(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just
debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.
c) That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount
of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs of
suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO. 18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary
civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and filed their
so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and
denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
plus attorneys fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately
seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis, Article 222 of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said
petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20

and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary
civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained
in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1 (j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same by
virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding." Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2,
of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear enough,
to wit:

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ARTICLE 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035 (Emphasis supplied). 22
The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term "suit" that
it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at
law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:

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It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than strangers.25

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It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any
cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 The petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly
recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition in the above entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

[G.R. No. 44888. February 7, 1992.]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. FIDEL P. DUMLAO
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; ALLEGATION THAT A PETITIONER SEEKING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION IS AN INTERESTED PERSON IS NOT AMONG THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS UNDER PARAGRAPH (A),
SEC. 2, RULE 79. The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province. These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. The fact of death of
the intestate and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings
in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to
grant letters of administration in any county. Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration
is an interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts.
2. PETITION FILED NOT BY AN INTERESTED PERSON MAY BE DISMISSED ON GROUND OF LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY
TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, NOT ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF JURISDICTION. Of course, since the opening
sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a
motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of
lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
3. INTERESTED PERSON, DEFINED. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not
merely indirect or contingent. (Citing Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, 22 August 1951; Espinosa v. Barrios,
70 Phil. 311)
4. AN OBJECTION TO THE PETITION ON GROUND THAT IT WAS NOT FILED BY AN INTERESTED PERSON MAY BE
BARRED BY WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL. Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask
for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez
because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy,
one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latters intestate estate. The
failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court provides that: "A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and
all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as
administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by
the latter.
5. A PARTY WHO HAS AFFIRMED OR INVOKED JURISDICTION OF A COURT CANNOT AFTERWARDS DENY THAT SAME
JURISDICTION. Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction

in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez prayer to be appointed as
administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shells amended claim
against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the
jurisdiction of the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a
party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.

Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to
be stated in a petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person", and (b) whether the
administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for letters of administration filed by one
who is not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the
latters intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines. Inc. for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as
Shell), filed on 8 January 1973 a petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Regino Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzalez, Petitioner" with the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein
that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The case was
docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was raffled to Branch II of the trial court.
On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an Order (1) setting the hearing on
the petition for 23 March 1973 at 3:30 a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioners
expense, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a nationwide circulation
published regularly by a government agency or entity, or in any newspaper published and edited in any
part of the country which is in operation during the existence of the present national emergency and of
general circulation in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City, if any there be; and (3)
ordering that copies of the order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the petitioners
expense, to each of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, within the periods prescribed by
Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. 1
In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2
private respondents, who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, allege that Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the
intestate estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the estate; he is a resident of Davao
City and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he
would not be able to perform his duties efficiently," and he is an employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an
alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest
of the estate in case of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since Bonifacio Canonoy, one of
Reginos sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he
should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding letters of
administration be issued in his favor."
On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed-Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate
estate of Regino Canonoy, 3 having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to reconsider this
Order or appealed therefrom. On 23 November 1973, herein petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc.,
filed its claim against the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio
Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an
Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the estate. 5 On 12 May 1975, the administrator. filed his
Reply to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 6 On 20 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by
Shell. 7 In the said Answer, he interposes compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49
representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and
wages of service attendants, sales commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney a fees.
Petitioner filed an Answer to the Counterclaim.

Upon joinder of the issues on Shells claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P.
Dumlao, set the pre-trial for 15 August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9
On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial administrator to file an inventory of the properties
of the deceased. 10
At the pre-trial held on 23 September 19757 counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to
Dismiss the case. In an Order issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion, opposing
counsel was likewise-given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to
file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The motion was filed on 30 September 1975.
It alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner
therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12
Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on 16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired
jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a
jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez lack of interest in the estate of the
deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator. In an Order dated 8 November 1975,
respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed the case. 14 The motion for its
reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January 1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it
denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition, 16 the
latter complied with the same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court resolved, inter alia,
to treat the petition for review as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and require the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum on 4 April 1977 19 while the respondents filed
theirs on 3 June 1977. 20
The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed SP PROC. No. 343 after having set for pre-trial petitioners amended claim against the estate. That said
dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person,"
and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case,
serves only to compound the error.
1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:

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"SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

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(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration."

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The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate
and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant
letters of administration in any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is
an interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening
sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a
motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of
lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.
This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, 24 where the dismissal of a petition for letters of
administration was affirmed because the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no
material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this
interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. 26
The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on
that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.
Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of
capacity to sue; 27 they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition
but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is
a stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased
Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latters intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal
amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:

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"A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived."

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However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a
motion, except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may
be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 28 Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a)
failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits, and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, 29 subject to the exception as hereinafter discussed.
In Insurance Company of North America v. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this Court ruled:
"Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now too
late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant
below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion."

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By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have
in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter.

In Eusebio v. Valmores, 31 We held that:

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"The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he
did not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances, such
defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that the surviving spouse of
Rosalia Saquitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules.
Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the application for the appointment of an administrator;
he only objected to the appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right
as surviving spouse to be appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the
deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the
petition for the appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband,
Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed."
2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the
filing of the case, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27
January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973, petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by
submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on
the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as administrator and finally directed that
letters of administration be issued to him, and that he take his oath of office after putting up a surety or property
bond in the amount of P5,000,00. 32
It is to be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a
motion to dismiss petitioners claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and
an Answer to petitioners amended claim against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35 praying thus:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to dismiss the above-mentioned Amended Claim
Against the Estate and to order the claimant to pay unto the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy the said sum of
P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from the date hereof, the reasonable
attorneys fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs;
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and payable by the said intestate estate of
Regino Canonoy in favor of the said claimant, the said amount be deducted from the above-mentioned sum and,
thereafter, to order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy,
together with interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the reasonable attorneys fees for the
prosecution of this counterclaim and costs."

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Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and
remedies in their favor namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of
Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shells amended claim against the estate, and (d) the
granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it
may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape penalty.
In Tijam, Et. Al. v. Sibonghanoy, Et Al., 36 this Court held:

"It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean v.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the-rule, it was further said that the
question whether (sic) the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated
obviously for reasons of public policy.

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Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease v. Rathbun-Hones etc.
243 U.S. 273, 61 L.Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. v. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.Ed. 659). And in Littleton v.
Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty."

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The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy instead of peremptorily granting the motion
to dismiss in an Order which does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to be meritorious.
He exhibited undue haste in removing the case from his docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility.
Howsoever viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP
PROC. No. 343 is hereby SET ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioners claim against
the estate in said case, unless supervening events had occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and terminated.
Costs against private respondents.