Islamabad Campus

Programme: M. Phil International Relations

Article: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

Submitted to: Dr. Amna

Submitted by: Muhammad Fa ad Ashra!

M. Phil "#st Semester$ Registration % #&'((#(#)&

THE EVOLUTION OF TERRORISM SINCE 9/11

By Lauren B. OBrien, M.S.F.S.

Approximately 10 years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States faces a more diverse, yet no less formidable, terrorist threat than that of 2001. n this increasin!ly complex and dynamic threat environment, not only does "akistan#based al $aeda possess the ability to pro%ect itself across the !lobe to sta!e attacks a!ainst the &est b't so do !ro'ps based in (emen, Somalia, and ra). n many *ays, al $aeda in the Arabian "enins'la +A$A", poses as serio's a threat to the nation as core al $aeda, *ith t*o attempted attacks a!ainst the U.S. homeland in the past 2 years. n this ever#chan!in! threat environment, America constantly m'st evolve to keep pace *ith this adaptive enemy. -he United States has had si!nificant s'ccesses in combatin! the terrorism threat, most visibly *ith the .ay 2, 2011, death of al $aeda leader Usama /in 0adin. 1'rther, the lives saved by U.S. co'nterterrorism efforts2the arrest of a home!ro*n violent extremist +345, *ho attempted to attack a 6hristmas tree#li!htin! ceremony in "ortland or the disr'ption of three al $aeda#trained operatives in the United States before they co'ld attack the 7e* (ork 6ity transit system2stand as e)'ally meanin!f'l victories. 8isc'ssin! the c'rrent threat environment re)'ires an 'nderstandin! of ho* terrorism trends have evolved. -hese trends remain relevant today in the decade since 9/11. *errorism in the +a,e o! '-## ./ol/ing *hreat !rom Al 0aeda n 2001, *hat emer!ed *ith clarity o't of the ashes of the -*in -o*ers *as that no !reater threat to the homeland existed from a nonstate actor than that posed by core al $aeda in "akistan. -en years later, the !ro'p still demonstrates the intent and capability to attack the United States. Altho'!h al $aeda9s last s'ccessf'l &estern attack *as in the United :in!dom in 200;, a steady stream of the !ro'p9s operatives have been detected and disr'pted over the past 10 years in the United States, 7or*ay, 8enmark, the United :in!dom, <ermany, and "akistan.

6o'nterterrorism efforts a!ainst al $aeda in "akistan9s 1ederally Administered -ribal Areas +1A-A, that be!an *ith =peration 5nd'rin! 1reedom in =ctober 2001 have de!raded al $aeda9s abilities, res'ltin! in the loss of key leaders and trainers and makin! it more diffic'lt for al $aeda to train operatives, comm'nicate, and transfer f'nds. n response to these setbacks, the !ro'p has refined its mod's operandi and developed practices that have allo*ed it to persevere in a post#9/11 environment. Sei>ed by the s'ccess of 9/11, al $aeda has maintained its intent to cond'ct ?spectac'lar@ hi!h#cas'alty attacks a!ainst the United States and its &estern allies. A revie* of disr'pted al $aeda plots since 9/11 reveals that the !ro'p has contin'ed to foc's on hi!h#profile political, economic, symbolic, and infrastr'ct're tar!ets, *ith a partic'lar fixation on aviation. Al $aeda also has p'rs'ed its interest in sta!in! sim'ltaneo's attacks2a theme it has follo*ed from the 199; /o%inka plot to attack planes over the "acific, to 9/11, and to the 200A plan to attack m'ltiple fli!hts from the United :in!dom to the United States. S'ch sophisticated plots re)'ire m'ltiple operatives and lon!er plannin! cycles than a simply constr'cted, less#spectac'lar plan. n recent years, al $aeda has evolved and expanded its interests to incl'de small#scale attacks in addition to its p'rs'it of the spectac'lar, *ith the aim of sta!in! a s'ccessf'l attack re!ardless of si>e. Al $aeda9s preference for ac)'irin! its attack capabilities from locally available reso'rces has held relatively constant. &ith the exception of ?shoe bomber@ Bichard Beid in 2001, for its &estern plots, al $aeda has relied on *ell#trained operatives to constr'ct an explosive device after bein! deployed, 'sin! locally available materials. 1or example, in the C'ly D, 200; attacks in 0ondon, bombers spent *eeks in their !ro'nd#floor flat in 0eeds constr'ctin! explosive devices from readily available commercial in!redients. =ver the past decade, al $aeda has developed the practice of 'sin! operatives *ith le!al access to the United States and other &estern nations to tar!et their co'ntries of ori!inE for example, al $aeda deployed American le!al permanent resident 7a%ib'llah Fa>i to attack the 7e* (ork 6ity s'b*ay system in 2009 and U.:. citi>en .ohammad Sidi)'e :han to carry o't the C'ly 200; attacks in 0ondon. -he three individ'als convicted of the most serio's char!es in the 200A U.S.#U.:. aviation plot, as *ell as most of their coconspirators, consisted of /ritish citi>ens of "akistani descent. Usin! operatives *ho

not only possess le!al travel doc'ments b't also lan!'a!e skills and &estern c'lt'ral 'nderstandin! can help them to evade sec'rity and operate 'ndetected. 8espite setbacks to its trainin! pro!ram d'e to the loss of key leaders and an increasin!ly diffic'lt operatin! environment, al $aeda has contin'ed to recr'it and train potential operatives. dentifyin! American al $aeda recr'its *ho may travel from the United States to "akistan to receive trainin!, m'ch like 7a%ib'llah Fa>i, is one of the 1/ 9s hi!hest co'nterterrorism priorities. (et, U.S. a'thorities also m'st remain concerned abo't 5'ropean trainees. /eca'se of their visa#free access to the United States thro'!h the 4isa &aiver "ro!ram, al $aeda co'ld deploy 5'ropean operatives to the United States for homeland attacks or 'se 5'rope as a la'nchin! pad for attacks a!ainst America, as it did in the disr'pted U.S.#U.:. aviation plot. 1irth o! the 2lobal 3ihadist Mo/ement 1ollo*in! 9/11, the United States faced a threat from al $aeda not only as an or!ani>ation b't also as an ideolo!y. A ne* !lobal %ihadist movement composed of al $aeda#affiliated and #inspired !ro'ps and individ'als be!an to 'nfold. Altho'!h these !ro'ps threatened U.S. interests overseas, they did not rival al $aeda in the threat they posed to the homeland. 3o*ever, over time, the spread of this decentrali>ed, diff'se movement has increased the threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. n the early 2000s, a n'mber of al $aeda affiliates and re!ional terrorist !ro'ps emer!ed, and, altho'!h they took on the name of al $aeda and adopted its ideolo!y, they lar!ely adhered to a local a!enda, foc'sin! on re!ional iss'es and attackin! local tar!ets. At the time of the 200D 7ational ntelli!ence 5stimate p'blication, al $aeda in ra) +A$ , *as the only al $aeda affiliate kno*n to have expressed a desire to strike the homeland. &ithin ra), A$ inflicted tho'sands of cas'alties on coalition forces and ra)i civilians. /eyond the co'ntry9s borders, A$ fanned the flames of the !lobal %ihadist movement and claimed credit for the C'ne 200D failed vehicle#borne improvised explosive device +4/ 58, attack on <las!o* Airport in Scotland. n addition to al $aeda#affiliated !ro'ps, the United States also sa* the emer!ence of a !eneration of 'naffiliated individ'als inspired by al $aeda9s ideolo!y b't lackin! ties to

any forei!n terrorist or!ani>ation. -hese 345s have developed into one pron! of a m'ltifaceted homeland threat. Altho'!h many have lacked the capability to match their intent, others took steps to move from violent rhetoric into action. Some of these al $aeda#inspired Americans so'!ht to travel to "akistan, Af!hanistan, or other fronts in the !lobal %ihad to !ain fi!htin! experience or participate in terrorist trainin!. -he 4ir!inia Cihad 7et*ork2a !ro'p of individ'als disr'pted in 2001 after ac)'irin! trainin! from "akistani militant !ro'p 0ashkar#e#-ayyiba in preparation for %ihad a!ainst American forces in Af!hanistan2*as one of the first cases to shed li!ht on this trend. Since 9/11, American 345s have traveled to "akistan, Somalia, and (emen for terrorist trainin! and 'ltimately %oined terrorist !ro'ps in those co'ntries. 1or example, /ryant 7eal 4inas, a convert to slam *ho *as raised in 0on! sland, 7e* (ork, traveled to "akistan in September 200D and mana!ed to %oin al $aeda. -here, he participated in attacks a!ainst coalition forces and provided al $aeda *ith insi!ht for homeland attacks, incl'din! one potentially tar!etin! the 0on! sland Bail Boad. -he primary concern *ith 4inas and other American trainees is that al $aeda or its affiliated !ro'ps *ill levera!e them for homeland attacks, as they so'!ht to do *ith 7a%ib'llah Fa>i before his plot to attack the 7e* (ork 6ity transit system *as disr'pted in 2009.

=ther 345s have attempted to sta!e attacks inside the United States. n the years since 9/11, the 1/ and its la* enforcement partners have disr'pted over a do>en plots perpetrated by 345s. Altho'!h many *ere 'nsophisticated, small#scale plots, like 8errick Sharreef9s 200A plot to attack a shoppin! mall food co'rt *ith a hand !renade, others *ere more ambitio's, like the one involvin! five individ'als *ho conspired in 200D to attack soldiers stationed at the 1ort 8ix Army /ase in 7e* Cersey. /ased on the n'mber of disr'ptions and indictments, the n'mber of 345s 'ndertakin! terrorist actions in the United States appears to have increased over the past 10 years. Unfort'nately, the appeal of the al $aeda narrative has not diminished, and iss'es, like the *ar in ra), the United States and 7A-= presence in Af!hanistan, and <'antanamo,

serve to inflame and, perhaps, radicali>e those sympathetic to al $aeda9s ideolo!y. -he decentrali>ed !lobal %ihadist movement has become a many#headed hydra, *ith al $aeda# affiliated and #inspired !ro'ps playin! an increasin!ly prominent role in the overall threat. Current *hreat .n/ironment -hese vario's terrorism trends have res'lted in a threat environment more complex and diverse than ever before. n the past 2 years, al $aeda, its affiliates, and 345s all have attempted attacks on the homeland. 7e* tactics and tradecraft have emer!ed that f'rther complicate the myriad threats facin! the United States. -he nternet has allo*ed terrorist !ro'ps to overcome their !eo!raphic limits and plays an increasin! role in facilitatin! terrorist activities. n this diff'se and decentrali>ed threat environment, the next attack co'ld come at the hands of a *ell#trained A$A" operative e)'ipped *ith a sophisticated improvised explosive device + 58, or a lone 345 'sin! an a'tomatic *eapon to attack a shoppin! mall.

Al 0aeda4s Persistent *hreat =ne of the most si!nificant recent chan!es to al $aeda comes *ith the death of /in 0adin. Altho'!h the f'll ramifications of his demise are not kno*n yet, the U.S. !overnment contin'es to assess and monitor ho* his death affects al $aeda9s or!ani>ation and operations. /eca'se of /in 0adin9s stat're and his personal connections *ith leaders of al $aeda affiliates and allies, his demise also may chan!e the *ay these !ro'ps relate to one another.

-he past 10 years have demonstrated that despite the co'nterterrorism efforts a!ainst al $aeda, its intent to tar!et the United States remains steady. 1or example, one al $aeda homeland plot involved three operatives27a%ib'llah Fa>i, Farein Ahmed>ay, and Adis .ed'n%anin2*ho *ere disr'pted by the U.S. !overnment in fall 2009. -hese individ'als received trainin! in "akistan from al $aeda and then ret'rned to the United States, *here they planned to 'se homemade 58s to attack the 7e* (ork 6ity s'b*ay system. -he 2009 plot also demonstrated al $aeda9s contin'ation of tar!etin! trends that evolved over the previo's years, s'ch as its interest in &estern re#cr'its for a homeland plot, its preference for 58s constr'cted locally, and its desire to tar!et transit infrastr'ct're. Altho'!h these aspects of al $aeda9s mod's operandi have remained consistent, al $aeda has expanded and diversified its strate!y in hopes of perpetratin! more attacks. 1or example, *hile al $aeda remains committed to lar!e#scale attacks, it also may p'rs'e smaller, less sophisticated ones that re)'ire less plannin! and fe*er reso'rces and operational steps. nstead of plots reminiscent of 9/11 that involve more than a do>en operatives, they no* may employ only a fe*. Rise o! A!!iliates &hile /in 0adin9s death represents an important victory in U.S. co'nterterrorism efforts, it does not mean a red'ced terrorism threat. -he threat from al $aeda affiliates, like A$A" and -ehrik#e -aliban "akistan +--",, has drastically chan!ed and represents the most si!nificant difference in the terrorist threat environment since 9/11. A$A", *hich has attempted t*o homeland attacks *ithin the past 2 years, no* poses as serio's a threat to the homeland as core al $aeda. A$A" has proven itself an innovative and sophisticated enemy capable of strikin! beyond the Arabian "enins'la. &hile the tactics core al $aeda developed and refined contin'e to threaten the United States, the inventive tactics created by A$A" pose an additional dan!ero's threat. &ith the 6hristmas 8ay 2009 attempt by 7i!erian national Umar 1aro'k Abd'lm'tallab to detonate an 58 onboard 7orth*est 1li!ht 2;G, A$A" became the first al $aeda affiliate to attempt an attack on the homeland. &ith this attack, A$A" broke from al $aeda9s typical mod's operandi in several *ays. Abd'lm'tallab *as a sin!le operative

travelin! alone. Bather than constr'ctin! his device in the tar!et co'ntry, he carried an 58 on his person all the *ay from the fli!ht he first boarded in Africa to the airspace over 8etroit, and he evaded detection systems in vario's airports. Unlike Fa>i, Abd'lm'tallab *as not based in the United States, providin! fe*er chances for the 1/ to look for cl'es of possible terrorist associations. After this attempted attack, A$A" revealed its capacity to adapt and innovate by follo*in! *ith the =ctober 2010 packa!e#bomb plot. &ith this plot, A$A" obviated the need for a h'man operative by sendin! sophisticated 58s concealed in printer cartrid!es inside packa!es aboard airfrei!ht airlines. -his tactic eliminated the potential for h'man error in the operation or detonation of the device. A$A" claims the total operation cost *as only HI,200, a vastly smaller fi!'re than the estimated HI00,000 to H;00,000 spent by al $aeda to plan 9/11. n this ?death by 1,000 c'ts@ approach, A$A" moved the &est to spend many times that to reexamine and stren!then its sec'rity proced'res. 1rom A$A"9s perspective, this failed attempt *as a s'ccess2not in prod'cin! mass cas'alties, b't in achievin! a hi!h economic cost. n addition to cond'ctin! its o*n attacks, A$A" also has so'!ht to radicali>e and inspire others to cond'ct attacks. n C'ly 2010, A$A" p'blished the first edition of its 5n!lish# lan!'a!e online ma!a>ine, nspire, a !lossy, sophisticated p'blication !eared to a &estern a'dience. n the five p'blished editions of nspire, A$A" has provided reli!io's %'stification and technical !'idance, incl'din! information on man'fact'rin! explosives and trainin! *ith an A:#ID, to enco'ra!e 345s to sta!e independent attacks. n all facets of its operations, A$A" benefits from the expertise and insi!hts provided by its American members to tar!et an 5n!lish#speakin! a'dience. An*ar al#A'la)i2a former U.S.#based imam and no* a leader of A$A"2is a charismatic fi!'re *ith many 5n!lish#lan!'a!e sermons available online. =ver the past fe* years, A'la)i has !one from a radicali>er to an individ'al *ho no* plays an increasin!ly operational role in A$A". 3e has recr'ited individ'als to %oin the !ro'p, facilitated trainin! at camps in (emen, and prepared Abd'lm'tallab for his attempted bombin! of 7orth*est 1li!ht 2;G. Samir :han, an American %ihadist blo!!er *ho traveled to (emen in =ctober 2009, helps oversee A$A"9s prod'ction of nspire ma!a>ine. -o!ether, A'la)i and :han have dra*n

on their 'nderstandin! of the United States to craft a radicali>in! messa!e tailored to American .'slims. A$A" is not the only al $aeda affiliate to pose an increased threat to the homeland. -ehrik#e -aliban +--",2a "akistani militant !ro'p that has voiced its desire since 200J to strike the United States2demonstrated for the first time its ability to sta!e attacks a!ainst America *ith 1aisal Shah>ad9s failed 4/ 58 attack on -imes S)'are in .ay 2010. Shah>ad, a nat'rali>ed U.S. citi>en of "akistani ori!in, traveled to "akistan to ac)'ire terrorist trainin! from --" and then 'sed those skills to constr'ct a 4/ 58 *hen he ret'rned to the United States. =ther al $aeda allies and affiliates also have expanded their foc's. n C'ly 2010, Somalia#based terrorist !ro'p al#Shabaab sta!ed its first attack o'tside of Somalia *ith an attack in U!anda that killed do>ens. Al#Shabaab also has attracted &estern recr'its, incl'din! AmericansE at least 2 do>en have traveled to Somalia to train or fi!ht over the past fe* years. Some of these Americans even have ass'med leadership positions, raisin! the possibility that they co'ld help expand al#Shabaab9s !lobal reach. As these examples sho*, the rise of al $aeda affiliates presents an increasin!ly complex terrorism threat. U.S. a'thorities no lon!er can prioriti>e al $aeda threats over those emanatin! from affiliate !ro'psE they no* m'st cover them all. Increasing *hreat !rom 56.s n addition to these external threats, the United States faces a serio's threat from 345s inside its borders. -he disr'ptions over the past several years reveal that 345s come from a diverse set of back!ro'nds, a!es, and life experiences. 345s s'pport terrorism in a variety of *ays, from travelin! overseas to fi!ht to plottin! attacks inside the United States. n 2009, 345s cond'cted their first s'ccessf'l attacks inside the United States. -he most lethal occ'rred on 7ovember ;, 2009, *hen the 1ort 3ood military base *as attacked by *hat appeared to be a lone !'nman, killin! 1G and *o'ndin! IG. -he s'spected shooter, .a%or 7idal .alik 3asan, is believed to have acted alone and 'sed small arms to cond'ct his attack2factors that 'nderscore the diffic'lty in interceptin! 345s.

1'rther complicatin! the 345 threat is their adept 'se of the nternet, *hich serves as a facilitator for terrorist activity and a platform for radicali>ation. "revio'sly, the nternet *as 'sed primarily to spread propa!andaE today, it facilitates recr'itment, trainin!, and f'nd#raisin! activities and allo*s 345s to overcome their !eo!raphic isolation to connect *ith other like#minded extremists. -he disr'ption of at least three 345s plottin! homeland attacks d'rin! 2010 serves as a reminder that their threat sho*s no si!ns of abatin!. Conclusion -he threat environment has transformed si!nificantly since 9/11 and *ill contin'e to evolve over the months and years ahead. &hile the 1/ 9s n'mber one priority holds constant2to prevent, deter, and disr'pt terrorist activities2the *ays in *hich it accomplishes this mission m'st not. -o better position itself to adapt to this chan!in! threat environment, the 1/ is 'nder!oin! a transformation in the *ay it collects and 'ses intelli!ence. -he b'rea' is implementin! a ne* proactive, intelli!ence#driven model that enables it to develop a comprehensive threat pict're and enhances its ability to prioriti>e reso'rces to address and miti!ate terrorist threats. -he 1/ also contin'es to enhance its relationships *ith intelli!ence and la* enforcement partners at all levels of !overnment and abroad. -hese national and international collaborative co'nterterrorism efforts have played a key role in enablin! the b'rea' to th*art myriad terrorist threats over the past decade. -o echo the *ords of 1/ 8irector Bobert .'eller option.@ &hile 10 years have elapsed since 9/11 and m'ch has chan!ed d'rin! that time, the sense of 'r!ency that the 1/ brin!s to its co'nterterrorism mission has not *aned. -oday, the United States faces a threat environment more complex and dynamic than ever before. And, yet, as ne* terrorist threats evolve, the 1/ *ill adapt to confront them. , ?*orkin! side by side is not only o'r best option, it is o'r only