Maturana, H. R. (1988). Ontology of observing: The biological foundations of self consciousness and the physical domain of existence. In R. E.

Donaldson (Ed.), Conference Workbook for "Texts in Cybernetics Theory": An In-Depth Exploration of the Thought of Humberto R. Maturana, William T. Powers, and Ernst von Glasersfeld (pp. 153). Felton: American Society for Cybernetics.

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

CONTENT

PAGE

1 2 3 4

PURPOSE

...........................................................

THE PROBLEM

....................................................... 4 .............................................. 5 5 5 6 8

N A T U R E OF THE ANSWER

T H E S C I E N T I F I C D O M A I N ............................................. 4.0 P r a x i s of L i v i n g a n d E x p l a n a t i o n s ......................... 4. 1 S c i e n t i f i c E x p l a n a t i o n s ................................... 4.2 Science ...................................................

O B J E C T I V I T Y IN P A R E N T H E S E S ....................................... 9 5.0 I l l u s i o n an d P e r c e p t i o n : the t r a d i t i o n a l a p p r o a c h ... . . . . . .9 5.1 A n I n v i t a t i o n ............................................ 10 5. 2 O b j e c t i v i t y in P a r e n t h e s e s ............................... 11 5.3 T h e U n i v e r s u m v e r s u s th e M u l t i v e r s a ...................... 11 B A S I C N O T I O N S ................................................... 12 6. 1 T h e O b s e r v e r ............................................. 12 6.2 U n i t i e s .................................................. 12 6.3 S i m p l e an d C o m p o s i t e U n i t i e s ............................. 12 6.4 O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d S t r u c t u r e ............................... 13 6.5 S t r u c t u r e D e t e r m i n e d S y s t e m s ............................. 14 6.6 E x i s t e n c e ................................................ 16 6.7 S t r u c t u r a l C o u p l i n g a n d A d a p t a t i o n ....................... 16 6.8 D o m a i n of E x i s t e n c e ...................................... 16 6.9 D e t e r m i n i s m .............................................. 17 6 . 1 0 S p a c e .................................................... 17 6 . 1 1 I n t e r a c t i o n s ............................................. 18 6 . 1 2 P h e n o m e n a l D o m a i n s ....................................... 18 6 . 1 3 M e d i u m , N i c h e , a n d E n v i r o n m e n t ........................... 18 BASIS 7.1 7.2 7 .3 7.4 7 .5 7.6 7.7 F O R T H E A N S W E R : T H E L I V I N G S Y S T E M ........................... 19 Science Deals Only with Structure Determined Systems . 19 R e g u l a t i o n a n d C o n t r o l ................................... 19 L i v i n g S y s t e m s A r e S t r u c t u r e D e t e r m i n e d S y s t e m s ..... . 20 D e t e r m i n i s m a n d P r e d i c t i o n ............................... 20 O n t o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l D r i f t ............................... 21 S t r u c t u r a l I n t e r s e c t i o n .................................. 24 T h e L i v i n g S y s t e m ........................................ 26 My C l a i m ............................................ 26 I m p l i c a t i o n s ........................................ 26 C o n s e q u e n c e s ........................................ 27 7.8 P h y l o g e n i c S t r u c t u r a l D r i f t .............................. 28 7.9 O n t o g e n i c P o s s i b i l i t i e s .................................. 30 7 . 1 0 S e l e c t i o n ................................................ 31

T HE A N S W E R .................................................... 8. 0 D o m a i n of E x i s t e n c e and P r a x i s ........................ 8.1 C o g n i t i o n ........... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... 8.2 L a n g u a g e ..............................................

32 32 32 34

C O N S E Q U E N C E S .................................................. 36 9.1 E x i s t e n c e E n t a i l s C o g n i t i o n in L i v i n g S y s t e m s .......... 36 9.2 T h e r e Are as m a ny C o g n i t i v e D o m a i n s as t h e r e are D o m a i n s of E x i s t e n c e ................................... 37 9.3 L a n g u a g e Is the H u m a n C o g n i t i v e D o m a i n ................. 37 9.4 O b j e c t i v i t y ............................................ 38 9.5 L a n g u a g i n g Is O p e r a t i o n in a D o m a i n of S t r u c t u r a l C o u p l i n g ............................................... 38 9 .6 L a n g u a g e Is a D o m a i n of D e s c r i p t i o n s .................... 39 9.7 S e l f - C o n s c i o u s n e s s A r i s e s w it h L a n g u a g e ................. 39 9. 8 H i s t o r y ................................................ 40 9.9 T h e N e r v o u s S y s t e m E x p a n d s the D o m a i n of S t a t e s of the L i v i n g S y s t e m ................................... 40 9 . 1 0 O b s e r v i n g T a k e s P l a c e in L a n g u a g i n g .................... 41 T HE D O M A I N OF P H Y S I C A L E X I S T E N C E REALITY .............................. 43 48

10 11 12

.......................................................

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND REALITY

................................ 49

O N T O L O G Y OF O B S E R V I N G : T H E B I O L O G I C A L F O U N D A T I O N S OF S E L F C O N S C I O U S N E S S AN D T H E P H Y S I C A L DO MA I N OF E X I S T E N C E H u m b e r t o R. M a t u r a n a

PURPOSE My purpose in thi s es s a y is to e x p l a i n cognition as a biological phenomenon, and to show, in the p r o c e s s , how l a n g u a g e arises and g i v e s o r i g i n to self c o n s c i o u s n e s s , revealing the ontological f o u n d a t i o n s of the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as a limiting cognitive domain. In orde r to do this, I shall start f r o m two u n a v o i d a b l e e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s that ar e at the same tim e my p r o b l e m and my e x p l a n a t o r y i n s t r u m e n t s , n am e l y ; a) that cognition, as is a p p a r e n t in the fact th at an y a l t e r a t i o n of the b i o l o g y of our n e r v o u s s y s t e m a l t e r s our c o g n i t i v e c a p a c i t i e s , is a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n tha t mu st be e x p l a i n e d as such; and b) th at we, as is a p p a r e n t in this very sam e e s sa y , e x i s t as human beings in l a n g u a g e u s i n g l a n g u a g e for our explanations. These two e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s are my s t a r t i n g po in t b e c a u s e I must be in t h e m in any e x p l a n a t o r y a t t e m p t ; th ey ar e my problem because I c h o o s e to e x p l a i n them; and they ar e my unavoidable i n s t r u m e n t s b e c a u s e I m u s t use c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e in o r d e r to e x p l a i n c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e . In o t h e r w or ds , I p r o p o s e not to take c o g n i t i o n and l a n g u a g e as g i v e n u n e x p l a i n a b l e p r o p e r t i e s , but to t a k e them as p h e n o m e n a of our h u m a n d o m a i n of e x p e r i e n c e s that a r i s e in the praxis of our li vi ng , and that as s uc h d e s e r v e e x p l a n a t i o n as biological phenomena. At the s am e time, it is my p u r p o s e to use our c o n d i t i o n of e x i s t i n g in l a n g u a g e to s ho w h o w the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s in l a n g u a g e as a c o g n i t i v e do ma in . T h a t is, I i n t e n d to s h o w that the o b s e r v e r and o b s e r v i n g , as b i o l o g i c a l phenomena, a r e o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i m a r y w i t h r e s p e c t to the object and the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e . THE PROBLEM I sh a l l t a ke c o g n i t i o n as the f u n d a m e n t a l p ro b l e m , a nd s h a l l e x p l a i n l a n g u a g e in the p r o c e s s of e x p l a i n i n g c o g n i t i o n . 2.

1.

We h u m a n b e i n g s a s s e s s c o g n i t i o n in any d o m a i n by s p e c i f y i n g t he domain w it h a q u e s t i o n and d e m a n d i n g a d e q u a t e behavior or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in that d o m a i n . If w h a t we o b s e r v e as an a n s w e r satisfies us as a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r or as a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the domain s p e c i f i e d by the q u e s t i o n , we a c c e p t it as an e x p r e s s i o n of c o g n i t i o n in that d o m a i n , and c l a i m that he or she who a n s w e r s our q u e r y k n o w s . Th u s , if s o m e o n e c l a i m s to k n o w a l g e b r a that

is, to be an a l g e b r a i s t - - w e d e m a n d of him or her to p e r f o r m in the d o m a i n of w ha t we c o n s i d e r a l g e b r a to be, and if a c c o r d i n g to us she or he p e r f o r m s a d e q u a t e l y in that do ma i n , we a c c e p t the claim. If the question a s k e d is not a n s w e r e d with wh at we c o n s i d e r to be a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the do mai n th at it s p e c i f i e s , the b e i n g ask ed to p e r f o r m (the a l g e b r a i s t ) disintegrates or d i s a p p e a r s , it lo s es its cla ss i d e n t i t y as an entity existing in th e o p e r a t i o n a l domain specified by the q u e s t i o n , and the q u e s t i o n e r p r o c e e d s h e n c e f o r t h a c c o r d i n g to its nonexistence. In these circumstances, si n ce a d e q u a t e b eh a v i o r (or a d e q u a t e a c t i o n ) is the o nl y c r i t e r i o n that we h av e and can use to assess cognition, I s h a l l take a d e q u a t e behavior or adequate a c t i o n in an y d o m a i n s p e c i f i e d by a q u e s t i o n , as the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d w h e n e x p l a i n i n g c o g n i t i o n . N A T U R E OF T H E A N S W E R I am a b i o l o g i s t , a nd it is from my experience as a biologist that in th is es s a y I am t r e a t i n g the phenomenon of c o g n i t i o n as a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n . Furthermore, s i n c e as a biologist I am a s c i e n t i s t , it is as a s c i e n t i s t t h at I sh a ll p r o v i d e a b i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of the p h e n o m e n o n of cognition. In order to do this: a) I s h a l l m ak e e x p l i c i t w h a t I shall consider as an adequate b e h a v i o r in the c o n t e x t of what I c o n s i d e r is a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e c t i o n 4), so t h at all the i m p l i c a t i o n s of my e x p l a n a t i o n may be a p p a r e n t to the r e a d e r and she or he m ay k n o w w h e n it is a t t a i n e d ; b) I s h a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t my e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n d i n g w i t h r e s p e c t to the n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y ( s e c t i o n 5), so t h at the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of my e x p l a n a ti o n may be a p p a r e n t ; c) I s h a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t the n o t i o n s that I shall use in my e x p l a n a t i o n by s h o w i n g how th ey b e l o n g to our daily l i fe ( s e c t i o n 6), so tha t it may be a p p a r e n t ho w we are i n v o l v e d as h u m a n b e i n g s in the e x p l a n a t i o n th at I s ha l l p ro vi de ; and d) I sh a l l m a k e e x p l i c i t the nature of the biological p h e n o m e n a i n v o l v e d in my e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e c t i o n 7), so tha t it may be a p p a r e n t ho w we are i n v o l v e d as l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the e x p l a n a t i on as well as in the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n i t s e l f . Finally, in the p r o c e s s of e x p l a i n i n g the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n as a biological phenomenon I s h a l l s h o w h o w it is tha t scientific theories a r i s e as fr ee c r e a t i o n s of the h u m a n mi n d, h ow it is that they explain human experience and not an independent objective world, and how the p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s in the e x p l a n a t i o n of th e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r as a f e a t u r e of the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g ( s e c t i o n s 8 to 11). 4. THE SCIENTIFIC DOMAIN We find o u r s e l v e s as h u m a n b e i n g s her e and now in the p r ax is of li vi ng , in the happening of bein g human, in language l a n g u a g i n g , in an a p r i o r i e x p e r i e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g that is, everything that happens, is and h a p p e n s in us as p a r t of our p r a x i s of l i v i n g . In the se c i r c u m s t a n c e s , whatever we say a b o u t how a n y t h i n g h a p p e n s t ak e s pl a c e in the p r a x i s of o ur l i v i n g as a c o m m e n t , as a r e f l e c t i o n , as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n , in s h o r t , as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r a x i s of our li vi ng , and as suc h
5

3,

it does not r e p l a c e or c o n s t i t u t e the p r a x i s of l i v i n g that it p u r p o r t s to e x p l a i n . T h u s , to say that we ar e m ad e of ma tter, or to say that we are i d e a s in the mi nd of God, are both explanation s of that w h i c h we live as our e x p e r i e n c e of being, yet n e i t h e r m a t t e r nor ideas in the min d of G o d constitute the experience of be in g that w h i c h they are s u p p o s e d to exp la in . Explanations take p la c e operationally in a metadomain wi th r e s p e c t to that w h i c h the y e x p l a i n . F u r t h e r m o r e , in daily life, in the ac tua l d y n a m i c s of h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n s , an e x p l a n a t i o n is a l w a y s an a n s w e r to a q u e s t i o n a b o u t the o r i g i n of a gi ve n p h e n o m e n o n , and is a c c e p t e d or r e j e c t e d by a l i s t e n e r who a c c e p t s or rejects it a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r or not it satisfies a particular i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i o n of a c c e p t a b i l i t y that he or she s p e c i f i e s . Therefore, t he r e a re as m a n y different k i n d s of e x p l a n a t i o n s as th er e are d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a of a c c e p t a bility of reformulations of the h a p p e n i n g of living of the o b s e r v e r s that the o b s e r v e r s sp ec if y. A c c o r d i n g l y , ev er y d o ma in of e x p l a n a t i o n s as it is d e f i n e d by a p a r t i c u l a r criterion of acceptability, c o n s t i t u t e s a c lo se d c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n as a d o ma in of a c c e p t a b l e s t a t e m e n t s or a c t i o n s for the o b s e r v e r s that a c c e p t that c r i t e r i o n of a c c e p t a b i l i t y . Science, m o d e r n sci en ce , as a cognitive d o m a i n is not an e x c e p t i o n to this. I nd e e d , modern science is th at p a r t i c u l a r c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n that ta ke s wh at is c a l l e d the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of validation (acceptability) of the s t a t e m e n t s that p e r t a i n to it. Let me m a k e this e x p l i c i t . i) Scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s . S c i e n t i s t s u s u a l l y do not reflect u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of sc i e n c e . Yet, it is p os s i b l e to a b s t r a c t , f r o m w h a t m o d e r n s c i e n t i s t s do, an o p e r a t i o n a l (and, h e nc e, e x p e r i e n t i a l ) s p e c i f i c a t i o n of w ha t c o n s t i t u t e s a s c i e n t if i c explanation as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of w ha t they claim are t he i r scientific statements. Furthermore, it is possible to d e s c r i b e this c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific statements as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of w h a t is usually called the scientific method. A. D i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of h u m a n a c t i v i t i e s e n t a i l d i f f e r e n t i n t e n tions . Thus , as the i n t e n t i o n of d o i n g ar t is to g e n e r a t e an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e , a nd the i n t e n t i o n of d o i n g t e c h n o l o g y is to p ro d u c e , the i n t e n t i o n of d oi n g s c i e n c e is to e x p l a i n . It is, therefore, in the c o n t e x t of e x p l a i n i n g th at the criterion of validation of a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n is the c o n j o i n e d satisfaction, in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of an o b s e r v e r , of fou r o p e r a tional conditions, one of wh ic h, the p r o p o s i t i o n of an ad hoc m e c h a n i s m that g e n e r a t e s the p h e n o m e n o n e x p l a i n e d as a p h e n o m e n o n to be w i t n e s s e d by the o b s e r v e r in his or h er p r a x i s of living, is the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n . And, it is in the context of explaining that it must be understood t ha t the scientific explanation is the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c statements. F i n a l l y , it is a l s o in the c o n t e x t of e x p l a i n i n g that it must be r e c o g n i z e d that a modern scientific community is a community of observers (henceforth called standard observers) tha t use the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of validati on of thei r s t a t e m e n t s . Now, the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of 6

s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s e n t a i l s fo ur o p e r a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s : a) The specification of the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d through the stipulation of the o p e r a t i o n s t ha t a standard observer m u s t p e r f o r m in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g in or d e r to a l so be a w i t n e s s of it in his or her p r a x i s of li vi ng . b) T h e p r o p o s i t i o n , in the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s of the p r a x i s of l i vi ng of a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r , of a m e c h a n i s m , a g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , w h i c h w he n a l l o w e d to o p e r a t e gi v e s ri se as a c o n s e q u e n c e of its o p e r a t i o n to the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , to be w i t n e s s e d by the o b s e r v e r a l s o in his or her praxis of liv ing. This generative mechanism, th at is u s u a l l y c a l l e d the explanatory hypothesis, t a k e s pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r in a d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n t h a n the p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n in w h i c h the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d is w i t n e s s e d , and the latter as a consequence of the former stands in an operational metadomain wi th respect to it. I nd e e d , the phenomenon to be e x p l a i n e d and its generative mechanism take plac e in different nonintersecting phenomenal domains in the prax i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r . c) T he d e d u c t i o n , th at is, the c o m p u t a t i o n , in the d o m a i n of operational c o h e r e n c e s of the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the standard o b s e r v e r e n t a i l e d by the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m p r o p o s e d in (b), of other phenomena tha t the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s h o u l d be a b l e to witness in hi s or her d o m a i n of e x p e r i e n c e s as a r e s u l t of the o p e r a t i o n of s u ch o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s , and the s t i p u l a t i o n of the o p e r a t i o n s th at he or she s h o u l d p e r f o r m in o r d e r to do so. d) The actual witnessing, in h is or her domain of experiences, of the p h e n o m e n a d e d u c e d in (c) by the standard o b s e r v e r w ho a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m s in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g the o p e r a t i o n s s t i p u l a t e d a ls o in (c). If these four operational conditions are conjointly s a t i s f i e d in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d observer, the generative mechanism proposed in (b) becomes a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n of the p h e n o m e n o n b r o u g h t fo r t h in (a). These fou r operational conditions in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the observer constitute th e c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific explanations, an d s c i e n c e ( m o d e r n s c i e n c e ) is a d o m a i n of statements directly or indirectly v a l i d a t e d by scientific explanations. Accordingly, it f o l l o w s tha t the re ar e no s uc h t h i n g s as scienti f i c observations, scientific hypotheses, or scientific predictions; there are o nl y s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s and scientific statements. It al so f o l l o w s that t he s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r c a n m a ke s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in any d o m a i n of his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g in w h i c h he or she can m a ke s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s . B. A c c o r d i n g to A a s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t is v a l i d as a s c i e n tif ic s t a t e m e n t o n l y w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers tha t is d e f i n e d as such b e c a u s e th ey ca n r e a l i z e an d a c c e p t the scientific e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of th e ir statements. This makes scientific statements consensual state-

ments, a nd the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers a scientific community. That in p r i n c i p l e any h u m a n b e i n g can belong to the scientific c o m m u n i t y is due to two f ac t s of e x p e r i e n c e : one is that it is as a l i v i n g h u m a n bein g th at an o b s e r v e r can realize and a c c e p t t h e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a tion of h is or her s t a t e m e n t s and b e c o m e a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r , the other is th at the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of scientific statem en ts is the o p e r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of a c t i o n s and statements in d ai l y life, ev en if it is not us ed w it h the same car e in o r d e r to a vo i d c o n f u s i o n of p h e n o m e n a l dom ai ns . In de ed , these two e x p e r i e n t i a l fact s c o n s t i t u t e the f u n d a m e n t for the cl a i m of u n i v e r s a l i t y that s c i e n t i s t s m a k e for thei r s t a t e m e n t s , but w h a t is p e c u l i a r to s c i e n t i s t s is t h at they a re careful to a v o id c o n f u s i o n of p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s w h e n a p p l y i n g the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in the p ra xi s of li vi ng . C. Scientists and p h i l o s o p h e r s of s c i e n c e u s u a l l y b e l i e v e that the o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n c e and t e c h n o l o g y reveals an i n d e p e n d e n t o b j e c t i v e rea l it y, and t ha t s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s re ve al the f e a t u r e s of an i n d e p e n d e n t u n i v e r s e , of an o b j e c t i v e world . Or, in ot h e r words, many s c i e n t i s t s and p h i l o s o p h e r s of science believe that w i t h o u t the i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e of an objective reality, s c i e n c e co ul d not take pl ac e. Yet, if one does, as I h a v e don e ab ove , a constitutive, an ontological, a n a l y s i s of t he c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s , one c an se e tha t s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s do not require the a s s u m p t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y b e c a u s e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s do not explain an independent objective reality. Scientific explanations e x p l a i n the p ra xi s of l i v i n g of the observer, and t h ey do so w i t h the o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s b r o u g h t f o r t h by the observer in his or her p r ax is of li vi n g . It is this f a ct that g i v e s s c i e n c e its b i o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s a nd that m a k e s s c i e n c e a cognitive domain bound to the b i o l o g y of the observer with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s tha t ar e d e t e r m i n e d by the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g . ii) S c i e n c e . In c o n c l u s i o n , the o p e r a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n of w h a t constitutes a scientific explanation as the criterion of validation of scientific statements, reveals the following characteristics of scientific s t a t e m e n t s in gen e ra l, an d of s c i e n c e as a d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s in p a r t i c u l a r : A. Scientific s t a t e m e n t s are c o n s e n s u a l s t a t e m e n t s va l id on ly within the c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that g e n e r a t e s them; an d s c i e n c e as the d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s does not n ee d an i n d e p e n d e n t o b j e c t i v e re al i ty , nor d o es it r e v e a l one. Therefore, the operational e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s c i e n c e as a c o g n i t i v e domain r e s t s o n l y on the o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e that takes pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that generate it as a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions in the p r a x i s of th ei r l iv i ng t o g e t h e r as a s c i e n t i f i c c o m m u n i t y . Science is no t a m a n n e r of r e v e a l i n g an i n d e p e n d e n t re al i ty ; it is a manner of b r i n g i n g fo rt h a p a r t i c u l a r on e bo un d to the c o n d i t i o n s t ha t c o n s t i t u t e the o b s e r v e r as a h u m a n being. B. Since t he m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d observers ca n

generate scientific s t a t e m e n t s in any p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n of the pr a x i s of l i v i n g in w h i c h they can ap p l y the c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a tion of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s , the u n i v e r s a l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r body of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s w i t h i n the huma n d o m a i n w i ll d e pe nd on the u n i v e r s a l i t y in th e h u m a n d o m a i n of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r s that can g e n e r a t e su ch a body of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s . Finally, scientific statements a re v a l i d on ly as long as t he scientific explanations that s u p p o r t t he m a re valid, and t h e s e ar e va li d only as long as the four o p e r a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s t h at must be c o n j o i n t l y s a t i s f i e d in th e ir c o n s t i t u t i o n are s a t i s f i e d for all the phenomena that ar e d e d u c e d in t h e p ra xi s of l i v i n g of the standard observers in the domain of operational coherences s p e c i f i e d by the p r o p o s e d g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m . C. It is frequently said that scientific explanations are reductionist propositions, adducing that they consist in expressing the p h e n o m e n a to be e x p l a i n e d in m or e bas ic terms. This v i ew is i n a d e q u a t e . Scientific explanations a re consti tutively non-reductionist e x p l a n a t i o n s b e c a u s e they c o n s i s t in generative p r o p o s i t i o n s an d not in e x p r e s s i n g the phenomena of one domain in p h e n o m e n a of a n o t h e r . T h i s is so b e c a u s e in a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n the p h e n o m e n o n e x p l a i n e d m u s t a r i s e as a result of the o p e r a t i o n of the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , and c a n n o t be par t of it. In fact, if the l a tt er were the case, the explanatory proposition w o u l d be c o n s t i t u t i v e l y i n a d e q u a t e and would have to be r e j e c t e d . The phenomenon explained a nd the phenomena proper to the generative mechanism constitutively p e r t a i n to n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s . I). T h e generative mechanism in a s c i e n t i f i c explanation is brought f o r t h by a s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r f r om his or h e r domain of experiences in his or her p r a x i s of l i v i n g as an ad hoc p r o p o s i t i on th at in p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , the c o m p o n e n t s of the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m , as w e l l as the p h e n o m e n a proper to t h e i r o p e r a t i o n , have a foundational character with respect to the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , a nd as such their v a l i d i t y is in p r i n c i p l e a c c e p t e d a p r i o r i . Accordingly, every s c i e n t i f i c d o m a i n as a d o m a i n of s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s is f o u n d e d on basi c e x p e r i e n t i a l p r e m i s e s n ot j u s t i f i e d in it, a nd constitutes in the p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the s t a n d a r d o b s e r v e r a d o m a i n of operational coherences brought fo r t h in the operational coherences entailed in the generative mechanisms of the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s t ha t v a l i d a t e it. 5. O B J E C T I V I T Y IN P A R E N T H E S E S If on e loo ks at the two s h a d o w s of an o b j e c t that s i m u l taneously partially i n t e r c e p t s th e pa t h s of two d i f f e r e n t li gh ts , on e w h i t e and one red, a n d if o n e h a s t r i c h r o m a t i c v is i o n , then one see s t ha t the a r e a of the s h a d o w f r om the w h i t e li g h t that receives red l ig h t l o o k s red, an d th at the a r ea of the s h a d o w from the red l i g h t t ha t r e c e i v e s w h i t e l ig h t l o o k s b l u e - g r e e n . T h i s e x p e r i e n c e is c o m p e l l i n g and u n a v o i d a b l e , e v e n if one k n o w s th at the a r e a of the s h a d o w f r o m the red li g h t s h o u l d look white or gray b e c a u s e it r e c e i v e s onl y w h i t e light . If on e a s k s h o w it

is that one sees blue-green where there is white light only, one is told by a reliable authority that the experience of the bluegreen shadow is a chromatic illusion because there is no bluegreen shadow to justify it as a perception. We live numerous experiences in our daily life that we class like this as illusions or hallucinations and not as perceptions, claiming that they do not constitute the capture of an independent reality because we can disqualify them by resorting to the opinion of a friend whose authority we accept, or by relying upon a different sensory experience that we consider as a more acceptable perceptual criterion. In the experience itself, however, we cannot distinguish between what we call an illusion, a hallucination, or a perception: illusion, hallucination, and perception are experientially indistinguishable. It is only through the use of a different experience as a metaexperiential authoritative criterion of distinction, either of the same observer or of somebody else subject to similar restrictions, that such a distinction is socially made. Our incapacity to experientially distinguish between what we socially call illusion, hallucination, or perception, is constitutive in us as living systems, and is not a limitation of our present state of knowledge. The recognition of this circumstance should lead us to put a question mark on any perceptual certainty. i) invitation. n A The word "perception" comes from the Latin expression per capire. which means "through capture" and carries with it the implicit understanding that to perceive is to capture the features of a world independent of the observer. This view assumes objectivity, and, hence, the possibility of knowing a world independent of the observer, as the ontological condition on which the distinction between illusion, hallucination, and perception that it entails is based. Therefore, to question the operational validity in the biological domain of the distinction between illusion, hallucination, and perception, is to question the ontological validity of the notion of objectivity in the explanation of the phenomenon of cognition. But, how then to proceed? Any reflection or comment about how the praxis of living comes about is an explanation, a reformulation of what takes place. If this reformulation does not question the properties of the observer, if it takes for granted cognition and language, then it must assume the independent existence of what is known. If this reformulation questions the properties of the observer, if it asks about how cognition and language arise, then it must accept the experiential indistinguishability between illusion, hallucination, and perception, and take as constitutive that existence is dependent upon the biology of the observer. Most philosophical traditions pertain to the first case, assuming the independent existence of something, such as matter, energy, ideas, God, mind, spirit,...or reality. I invite the reader to follow the second path, and to take seriously the constitutive condition of the biological condition of the observer, following all the consequences that this constitutive condition entails. ii) Obj ectivity in p arentheses. The assumption of objectivity is not needed for the generation of a scientific explanation.

10

Therefore, in the process of being a scientist explaining cognition as a biological phenomenon I shall proceed without using the notion of objectivity to validate what I say; that is, I shall put objectivity in parentheses. In other words, I shall go on using an object language because this is the only language that we have (and can have), but although I shall use the experience of being in language as my starting point while I use language to explain cognition and language, I shall not claim that what I say is valid because there is an independent objective reality that validates it. I shall speak as a biologist, and as such I shall use the criterion of validation of scientific statements to validate what I say, accepting that everything that takes place is brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of living as a primary experiential condition, and that any explanation is secondary. iii) The universum versus the multiversa. The assumption of objectivity, objectivity without parentheses, entails the assumption that existence is independent of the observer, that there is an independent domain of existence, the universum, that is the ultimate reference for the validation of any explanation. With objectivity without parentheses, things, entities, exist with independency of the observer that distinguishes them, and it is this independent existence of things (entities, ideas) that specifies the truth. Objectivity without parentheses entails unity, and, in the long run, reductionism, because it entails reality as a single ultimate domain defined by independent existence. He or she who has access to reality is necessarily right in any dispute, and those who do not have such access are necessarily wrong. In the universum, coexistence demands obedience to knowledge. Contrary to all this, objectivity with parentheses entails accepting that existence is brought forth by the distinctions of the observer, that there are as many domains of existence as kinds of distinctions the observer performs: objectivity in parentheses entails the multiversa. entails that existence is constitutively dependent upon the observer, and that there are as many domains of truths as domains of existence she or he brings forth in her or his distinctions. At the same time, objectivity in parentheses entails that different domains of existence constitutively do not intersect because they are brought forth by different kinds of operations of distinction, and, therefore, it constitutively negates phenomenal reductionism. Finally, under objectivity in parentheses, each versum of the multiversa is equally valid if not equally pleasant to be part of, and disagreements between observers, when they arise not from trivial logical mistakes within the same versum but from the observers standing in different versa, will have to be solved not by claiming a privileged access to an independent reality but through the generation of a common versum through coexistence in mutual acceptance. In the multiversa, coexistence demands consensus, that is, common knowledge.

11

6.

BASIC NOTIONS Everything said is said by an o b ser ver to another observer that could be him or herself. Since this condition is my e xpe riential starting point in the praxis of living as well as my problem, I shall make explicit some of the notions that Ishall use as my tools for explaining the ph enomena of cognition and language, and I shall do so by reve ali ng the actions in the praxis of living that they entail in our daily life when we do science. Indeed, by revealing what we do as observers I am making e x pli ci t the ontology of the observer as a con stitutive human c o n d i t i o n .

i) The o b s e r v e r . An observer is, in general, any being operating in language, or, in particular, any human being, in the un der s t a n d i n g that language defines h umanity. In our individual ex perience as human beings we find o u r sel ves in language, we do not see o u r se lve s growing into it: we are already observers by being in language when we begin as o b s erv ers to reflect upon language and the condition of being observ ers . In other words, whatever takes place in the praxis of living of the observ er takes place as distinctions in language through languaging, and this is all that he or she can do as such. One of ray tasks is to show how the observer arises. ii) Unities. The basic operation that an observer performs in the praxis of living is the op eration of distinction. In the ope ra tio n of di stinction an observer brings forth a unity (an entity, a whole) as well as the med i u m in which it is distinguished, and entails in this latter all the o p er ati ona l coheren ces that make the distinction of the unity possible in his or her praxis of living. iii) Simple and composite u n i t i e s . An observer may d i s t i ng ui sh in the praxis of living two kinds of unities, simple and c omposite unities. A simple unity is a unity brought forth in an o p e ra tio n of dis tinction that c o n s t i t u t e s it as a w h ol e by specify ing its properties as a col lec ti on of di me nsi ons of i n t era cti on s in the medium in which it is distinguished. Therefore, a simple unity is ex c l u s i v e l y and complete ly c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the properties through which it is brought forth in the praxis of living of the observer that di stinguishes it, and no fur th er expla nat ion is needed for the origin of these properties. A simple unity arises defined and charact eri zed by a c o l l ect ion of properties as a matter of d i s t i n cti on in the praxis of living of the observer. A c o m p o s i t e unity is a unity d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a simple unity that th rough further operations of d i s t i n c t i o n is decomposed by the o b s erv er into components that through their composition would c ons tit ut e the original simple unity in the domain in which it is di sti ng uis hed . A co mposite unity, therefore, is oper ati on all y di sti n g u i s h e d as a simple unity in a m e t a d o m a i n with respect to the domain in which its components are d i s t i ngu ish ed because it results as such from an operation of c o m pos iti on . As a result, the components of a composite unity and its correlated simple

12

unity are in a constitutive relation of mutual specification. Thus, the properties of a composite unity distinguished as a simple one entail the properties of the components that constitute it as such, and conversely, the properties of the components of a composite unity and their manner of composition determine the properties that characterize it as a simple unity when distinguished as such. Accordingly, there is no such thing as the distinction of a component independently of the unity that it integrates, nor can a simple unity distinguished as a composite one be decomposed into an arbitrary set of components disposed in an arbitrary manner of composition. Indeed, there is no such thing as a free component floating around independently of the composite unity that it integrates. Therefore, whenever we say that we treat a simple unity as a composite one, and we claim that we do so by distinguishing in it elements that when put together do not regenerate the original unity, we in fact are not decomposing the unity that we believe that we are decomposing but another one, and the elements that we distinguish are not components of the composite unity that we say that they compose. iv) Organization and structure. A particular composite unity is characterized by the components and relations between components that constitute it as a composite unity that can be distinguished, in a metadomain with respect to its components, as a particular simple unity of a certain kind. As such, a particular composite unity has both organization and structure. These can be characterized as follows: a) The relations between components in a composite unity that make it a composite unity of a particular kind, specifying its class identity as a simple unity in a metadomain with respect to its components, constitutes its organization. In other words, the organization of a composite unity is the configuration of static or dynamic relations between its components that specifies its class identity as a composite unity that can be distinguished as a simple unity of a particular kind. Therefore, if the organization of a composite unity changes, the composite unity loses its class identity; that is, it disintegrates. The organization of a composite unity is necessarily an invariant while it conserves its class identity, and vice v ersa, the class identity of a composite unity is necessarily an invariant while the composite unity conserves its organization. b) In a composite unity, be this static or dynamic, the actual components plus the actual relations that take place between them while realizing it as a particular composite unity characterized by a particular organization, constitute its structure. In other words, the structure of a particular composite unity is the manner in which it is actually made by actual static or dynamic components and relations in a particular space, and a particular composite unity conserves its class identity only as long as its structure realizes in it the organization that defines its class identity. Therefore, in any particular composite unity the configuration of relations between components that constitutes its organization must be realized in its structure as a subset of

13

all the actual relations that hold between its actual entities interacting in the composition.

components

as

It follows from all this that the characterization of the organization of a composite unity as a configuration of relations between components says nothing about the characteristics or properties of these components other than that they must satisfy the relations of the organization of the composite unity through their interactions in its composition. It also follows that the structure of a composite unity can change without it losing its class identity if the configuration of relations that constitutes its organization is conserved through such structural changes. At the same time, it also follows that if the organization of a composite unity is not conserved through its structural changes, the composite unity loses its class identity, it disintegrates, and something else appears in its stead. Therefore, a dynamic composite unity is a composite unity in continuous structural change with conservation of organization. v) Structure determined systems. Since the structure of a composite unity consists in its components and their relations, any change in a composite unity consists in a structural change, and arises in it at every instant necessarily determined by its structure at that instant through the operation of the properties of its components. Furthermore, the structural changes that a composite unity undergoes as a result of an interaction are also determined by the structure of the composite unity, and this is so because such structural changes take place in the interplay of the properties of the components of the composite unity as they are involved in its composition* Therefore, an external agent that interacts with a composite unity only triggers in it a structural change that it does not determine. Since this is a constitutive condition for composite unities, nothing external to them can specify what happens in them: there are no instructive interactions for composite unities. Finally, and as a result of this latter condition, the structure of a composite unity also determines with which structural configurations of the medium it may interact. In general, then, everything that happens in a composite unity is a structural change, and every structural change occurs in a composite unity determined at every instant by its structure at that instant. This is so both for static and for dynamic composite unities, and the only difference between these is that dynamic composite unities are in a continuous structural change generated as part of their structural constitution in the context of their interactions, while static ones are not. It follows from all this that composite unities are structure determined systems in the sense that everything that happens in them is determined by their structure. This can be systematically expressed by saying that the structure of a composite unity determines in it at every instant: a) the domain of all the structural changes that it may undergo with conservation of organization (class identity) and adaptation at that instant; I call this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible changes of state of the composite unity.
14

b) the d o m a i n of all the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that it m ay undergo w i t h l os s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a nd a d a p t a t i o n at tha t i ns t a n t ; I c al l this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible d i s i n t e g r a t i o n s of the c o m p o s i t e unity . c) the d o m a i n of all the d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m that it a d m i t s at that i n s t a n t in interactions that trigger in it changes of stat e; I call this domain the instantaneous domain of the possible perturbations of the c o m p o s i t e unity. d) the d o m a i n of all the d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m that it a d m i t s at th at i n s t a n t in interactions that trigger in it its disintegration; I c a l l th is domain the instantaneous d o m a i n of the p o s s i b l e d e s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s of the c o m p o s i t e unity. These fo ur domains of structural determinism that characterize ev e r y s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m at ev e r y instant a re o b v i o u s l y not fixed, a n d th ey c h a n g e as the s t r u c t u r e of the structure determined system changes in the f l o w of its own i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r a l d y n a m i c s or as a r e s u l t of its interactions. These general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s t r u c t u r e determined systems have several a d d i t i o n a l c o n s e q u e n c e s of w h i c h I s h a l l mention six. T h e f i r s t is tha t d u r i n g the o n t o g e n y of a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r mined s y s te m, its four d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m c h a n g e following a c o u r s e c o n t i n g e n t to its i n t e r a c t i o n s an d its own internal structural dynamics. T h e s e c o n d is th at s o me s t r u c t u r e determined s y s t e m s ha ve r e c u r r e n t d o m a i n s of structural determinism because they h a v e r e c u r r e n t structural configurations, while others do not because their structure changes in a nonrecurrent manner. T he t h i r d is t h at a l t h o u g h the s t r u c t u r e of a structure determined system determines the structural c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the m e d i u m w i t h w h i c h it ma y i n t e r a c t , al l its i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t s y s t e m s a r i s e as c o i n c i d e n c e s , and these coincidental i n t e r a c t i o n s c a n n o t be predicted from the structure of the s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m a l o n e . The fourth is t h a t a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e x i s t s o nl y w h i l e it m o v e s t h r o u g h the medium in i n t e r a c t i o n s tha t a re p e r t u r b a t i o n s , and th at it d i s integrates a t the f i r s t d e s t r u c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n . The fifth is t ha t s i n c e the m e d i u m c a n n o t s p e c i f y w ha t h a p p e n s in a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m b e c a u s e it o nl y t r i g g e r s the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that occur in the s y s t e m as a r e s u l t of the system's interactions, al l that ca n h a p p e n to a c o m p o s i t e un i t y in r e l a t i o n to its i n t e r a c t i o n s in the m e d i u m is t h at the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by its structural changes is c o n t i n g e n t u p on the sequence of th e s e interactions. F in a l l y , the sixth is t ha t since mechanistic systems ar e s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s , a nd s i n c e scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s e n t a i l the p r o p o s i t i o n of m e c h a n i s t i c s y s t e m s as the systems tha t generate the phenomena to be e x p l a i n e d , in scientific explanations we deal, and we c a n only deal, with structure determined systems. vi) Existence. By p u t t i n g o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , we a c c e p t

15

that c o n s t i t u t i v e l y we c a n n o t c l a i m the i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e of t h i n g s (e nt i t i e s , u ni t i e s , id eas , etc.), and we r e c o g n i z e that a u n i t y e x i s t s o nl y in its d i s t i n c t i o n , in the p r a x i s of living of the o b s e r v e r , th at b r i n g s it fo rt h . But we a l so r e c o g n i z e that t he distinction takes pl a c e in the p r a x i s of l iv in g of the o b s e r v e r in an o p e r a t i o n that s p e c i f i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y the c l a s s i d e n t i t y of the un i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d , e i t h e r as a s i m p l e un it y or as a c o m p o s i t e one, and its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of t he o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s in w h i c h its d i s t i n c t i o n m a k e s se ns e as a f e a t u r e of his or her p r a x i s of l ivi ng. S i n c e the c la s s i d e n t i t y of a c o m p o s i t e un i t y is d e f i n e d by its o r g a n i z a t i o n , and since th is can be r e a l i z e d in a c o m p o s i t e u ni t y only while it i n t e r a c t s in a d o m a i n of p e r t u r b a t i o n s , e x i s t e n c e in a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e n t a i l s the c o n s e r v a t i o n of its o r g a n i z a t i o n as w el l as the c o n s e r v a t i o n of its o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in the domain of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s in wh i c h it is distinguished. Similarly, si n c e the c l a s s i d e n t i t y of a s i m p l e u n i t y is d e f i n e d by its p r o p e r t i e s , and s i n c e th e s e are d e f i n e d in r e l a t i o n to the operational d o m a i n in w h i c h the s i m p l e u ni t y is distinguished, existence in a s i m p l e u ni t y e n t a i l s the conservation of the properties tha t d e f i n e it and the operational structural c o r r e s p o n d e n c e in w h i c h th e se p r o p e r t i e s are r e a l i z e d . vii) Structural coupling or adaptation. I call structural c o u p l i n g or a d a p t a t i o n the r e l a t i o n of d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r a l correspondence w i th the m e d i u m in w h i c h a un i t y c o n s e r v e s it s cl as s identity (organization in the ca se of a c o m p o s i t e uni ty , and operation of its p r o p e r t i e s in the c as e of a s i m p l e on e ), and which is e n t a i l e d in its d i s t i n c t i o n as it is b r o u g h t f o r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of living. Therefore, conservation of class identity and conservation of adaptation are constitutive conditions of e x i s t e n c e for a n y unity (en tity, system, w h ol e, etc.) in the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e in w h i c h it is b r o u g h t fo r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or he r p r a x i s of l i v i n g . As c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e for any u n i t y , conservation of class identity and c o n s e r v a t i o n of adaptation are p a ir ed conditions of e x i s t e n c e th at e n t a i l e a ch o t h e r so that if o ne is l os t the o t h e r is lost, an d the un i t y e x i s t s no mo r e . W h e n this happens, a composite u n i t y d i s i n t e g r a t e s and a simple un i ty disappears. vi i i) Domain of e x i s t e n c e . T h e o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n that b r i n g s f o r t h and s p e c i f i e s a u n it y, a l s o b r i n g s f o r t h an d s p e c i fies its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of t he operational coherences e n t a i l e d by t he o p e r a t i o n of the properties through which the u n i t y is c h a r a c t e r i z e d in its d i s t i n c t i o n . In other w o r d s , the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of a s i m p l e u n i t y is the d o m a i n of operational validity of th e p r o p e r t i e s that d e f i n e it as such , an d the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y is the d o m a i n of operational validity of the p r o p e r t i e s of t he components that constitute it. Furthermore, the c o n s t i t u t i v e operational coherence of a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l validity of the properties of the e n t i t i e s tha t define it, e n t a i l s all that s uc h v a l i d i t y r e q u i r e s . Accordingly, a simple unity exists in a s i n g l e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e s p e c i f i e d by its

16

properties, and a composite unity exists in two in the domain of existence specified by its properties as it is distinguished as a simple unity, and in the domain of existence specified by the properties of its components as it is distinguished as a composite unity. The entailment in the distinction of a unity of its domain of existence as the domain of all the operational coherences in the praxis of living of the observer in which it conserves class identity and adaptation, is a constitutive condition of existence of every unity. A unity cannot exist outside its domain of existence, and if we imagine a unity outside its domain of existence, the unity that we imagine exists in a different domain than the unity that we claim that we imagine. ix) Determinism. To say that a system is deterministic is to say that it operates according to the operational coherences of its domain of existence. And this is so because due to our constitutive inability to experientially distinguish between what we socially call perception and illusion, we cannot make any claim about an objective reality. This we acknowledge by putting objectivity in parentheses. In other words, to say that a system is deterministic is to say that all its changes are structural changes that arise in it through the operation of the properties of its components in the interactions that these realize in its composition, and not through instructive processes in which an external agent specifies what happens in it. Accordingly, an operation of distinction that brings forth a simple unity brings forth its domain of existence as the domain of operational applicability of its properties, and constitutes the simple unity and its domain of existence as a deterministic system. At the same time, the operation of distinction that brings forth a composite unity brings forth its domain of existence as a domain of determinism in terms of the operational applicability of the properties that characterize its components, in the praxis of living of the observer. Accordingly, the operation of distinction that brings forth a composite unity brings forth the composite unity as well as its domain of existence, as deterministic systems in the corresponding domains of operational coherences of the praxis of living of the observer. x) Space. The distinction of a unity brings forth its domain of existence as a space of distinctions whose dimensions are specified by the properties of the unities whose distinctions entail it as a domain of operational coherences in the praxis of living of the observer. Thus, a simple unity exists and operates in a space specified by its properties, and a composite unity exists and operates in a space specified by its properties as a simple unity if distinguished as such, and in a space specified by the properties of its components if distinguished as a composite unity. Accordingly, as a simple unity exists and operates in a single space, a composite unity exists and operates in two. Finally, it follows that without the distinction of a unity there is no space, and that the notion of a unity out of space, as well as the notion of an empty space, are nonsensical. A space is a domain of distinctions.

17

xi) Interactions. Two simple unities interact when they, as a result of the interplay of their properties, and in a manner determined by such interplay, change their relative position in a common space or domain of distinctions. A composite unity interacts when some of its components as a result of their interactions as simple unities with other simple unities that are not its components, change their manner of composing it, such that it undergoes a structural change. It follows that a simple unity interacts in a single space, in the space that its properties define, and that a composite unity interacts in two, in the space defined by its properties as a simple unity, and in the space that its components define through their properties, also as simple unities, as they constitute its structure. xii) Phenomenal domains. A space is constituted in the praxis of living of the observer when he or she performs a distinction. The constitution of a space brings forth a phenomenal domain as the domain of distinctions of the relations and interactions of the unities that the observer distinguishes as populating that space. A simple unity operates in a single phenomenal domain, the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of its properties as a simple unity. A composite unity operates in two phenomenal domains, the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of its properties as a simple unity, and the phenomenal domain constituted through the operation of the properties of its components, which is where its composition takes place. Furthermore, the two phenomenal domains in which a composite unity operates do not intersect and cannot be reduced one to the other because there is a generative relation between them. The phenomenal domain in which a composite unity operates as a simple unity is secondary to the composition of the composite unity, and constitutes a metaphenomenal domain with respect to the phenomenal domain in which the composition takes place. Due to this circumstance, a composite unity cannot participate as a simple unity in its own composition. xiii) M e d i u m , n i c h e . and environment. I call the medium of a unity the containing background of distinctions, including all that is not involved in its structure if it is a composite one, with respect to which an observer distinguishes it in his or her praxis of living, and in which it realizes its domain of existence. The medium includes both that part of the background that is distinguished by the observer as surrounding the unity, and that part of the background the observer conceives as interacting with it, and which it obscures in its operation in structural coupling (in its domain of existence). I call this latter part of the medium operationally defined moment by moment in its encounter with the medium in structural coupling, the niche of the unity. Accordingly, a unity continuously realizes and specifies its niche by actually operating in its domain of perturbations while conserving adaptation in the medium. As a consequence, the niche of a unity is not a fixed part of the medium in which a unity is distinguished, nor does it exist with independency of the unity that specifies it; it changes as the domain of interactions of the unity changes (if it is a composite 18

one) in its d y n a m i c s of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e ( s e c t i o n v c). In these circumstances, a n o b s e r v e r c a n d i s t i n g u i s h the n i c h e of a unity, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r it is s i m p l e or c o m p o s i t e , o nl y by using the u n i t y as an i n d i c a t o r of it. Finally, I c a ll the environment of a un i t y all tha t an o b s e r v e r distinguishes as s u r r o u n d i n g it. In o t h e r w o r d s , w h i l e the ni c h e is that part of the m e d i u m tha t a uni ty e n c o u n t e r s ( i n t e r a c t s with) in its o p e r a t i o n in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g , a nd o b s c u r e s w i t h its p r e s e n c e f r om t he v i e w of the o b s e r v e r , the e n v i r o n m e n t is that pa rt of the medium th at an o b s e r v e r s ee s a r o u n d a unity . Thus , a dynamic c o m p o s i t e u n i t y (like a l i v i n g s y s t e m ) , as it is d i s t i n g u i s h e d in th e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r , is s e en in an e n v i r o n m e n t as an e n t i t y w i t h a c h a n g i n g n i c h e that it s p e c i f i e s while it slides t h r o u g h the m e d i u m in c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l change with c o n s e r v a t i o n of cl a s s i d e n t i t y an d a d a p t a t i o n . A composite unity in its m e d i u m is like a t i g h t r o p e w a l k e r that m o v e s on a r op e in a g r a v i t a t i o n a l field, an d c o n s e r v e s its balance (adaptation) while its s h a p e ( s t r u c t u r e ) c h a n g e s in a m a n n e r c o n g r u e n t w it h t he v i s u a l an d g r a v i t a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s that it u n d e r g o e s as it w a l k s ( r e a l i z i n g its n ic h e ) , a nd f a l l s w h e n th is s t o p s b e i n g the case. 7. B A S I S F OR T H E AN SW ER ; T H E L I V I N G S Y S T E M T h e a n s w e r to the q u e s t i o n of c o g n i t i o n r e q u i r e s no w that we reflect u p o n the c o n s t i t u t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of living systems, a nd t ha t we m a k e some a d d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l an d o n t o l o g i c a l considerations a bo u t the c o n d i t i o n s that our understanding of l i v i n g s y s t e m s m u st s a t i s f y . i) S c i e n c e d e a l s only w it h s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s . To the e x t e n t that a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n e n t a i l s the p r o p o s i t i o n of a structure d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m as the m e c h a n i s m th at g e n e r a t e s the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d , we as s c i e n t i s t s can d ea l on ly with structure determined systems, a nd we c a n n o t h a n d l e s y s t e m s that c h a n g e in a m a n n e r s p e c i f i e d by the e x t e r n a l a g e n t s t h a t impinge u p o n them. A c c o r d i n g l y , w h a t e v e r I say a b o u t l i v i n g s y s t e m s w il l be said in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h at all the p h e n o m e n a to w h i c h the y give r is e a r i s e t h r o u g h t h e i r o p e r a t i o n as s t r u c t u r e determined systems in a d o m a i n of existence also brought forth as a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m by th e o b s e r v e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n . ii) R e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l . As w a s i n d i c a t e d in s e c t i o n 6 xii, the d i s t i n c t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e n t a i l s the d i s t i n c t i o n in th e praxis of l i v i n g of the o b s e r v e r of two p h e n o m e n a l domains t h a t do not i n t e r s e c t b e c a u s e the o p e r a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e unity as a s i m p l e on e is s e c o n d a r y to i ts c o m p o s i t i o n . As a re s ul t, th e w h o l e c a n n o t o p e r a t e as i t s o wn c o m p o n e n t , and a c o m p o n e n t cannot operate in place of the w h o l e th at it integrates. In these circumstances, notions of c o n t r o l or r e g u l a t i o n do not connote actual operations in the c o m p o s i t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y , b e c a u s e s u ch o p e r a t i o n s t ak e p l a c e o n ly in th e r e a l i z a t i o n in the present of the p r o p e r t i e s of the composite unity's components in th e ir a c t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n s . N o t i o n s of r e g u l a t i o n an d c o n t r o l o nl y c o n n o t e r e l a t i o n s t a k i n g pl a c e in a descriptive
19

domain as the observer relates mappings in language of his or her distinctions of a whole and its components in his or her praxis of living. iii) Living systems are structure determined systems. In order to explain the phenomenon of cognition as a biological phenomenon, I must treat living systems-as structure determined systems. I consider that to do so is legitimate for several reasons. I shall mention three. The first is an operational one: we know as a feature of our praxis of living that any structural change in a living system results in a change in its characteristics and properties, and that similar structural changes in different members of the same species result in similar changes in their characteristics and properties. The second is an epistemological one: if we do not treat living systems as structure determined systems we cannot provide scientific explanations for the phenomena proper to them. The third is an ontological one: the only systems that we can explain scientifically are structure determined systems; therefore, if I provide a scientific explanation of the phenomenon of cognition in 1iving systems, I provide a proof that living systems are structure determined systems in our praxis of living as standard observers, which is where we distinguish them. iv) Determinism and prediction. The fact that a structure determined system is deterministic does not mean that an observer should be able to predict the course of its structural changes. Determinism and predictability pertain to different operational domains in the praxis of living of the observer. Determinism is a feature that characterizes a system in terms of the operational coherences that constitute it, and its domain of existence, as it is brought forth in the operations of distinction of the observer. Accordingly, there are as many different domains of determinism as domains of different operational coherences the observer brings forth in her or his domain of experiences. At difference with this, a prediction is a computation that an observer makes of the structural changes of a structure determined system as she or he follows the consequences of the operation of the properties of the components of the system in the realization of the domain of determinism that these properties constitute. As such, a prediction can only take place after the observer has completely described the system as a structure determined system in terms of the operational coherences that constitute it in his or her domain of experiences. Therefore, the success or failure of a prediction only reflects the ability or inability of an observer to not confuse phenomenal domains in his or her praxis of living, and to indeed make the computation that constitutes the prediction in the phenomenal domain where he or she claims to make it. In these circumstances, there are two occasions in which an observer who does not confuse phenomenal domains in dealing with a structure determined system will not be able to predict its structural changes. One occasion is when an observer knows that she or he is dealing with a structure determined system by virtue of experience, in the praxis of living, with its components, but cannot encompass it in his or her

20

descriptions, and, thus, cannot effectively treat it as such in its domain of existence and compute its changes of state. The other occasion is when an observer in his or her praxis of living aims at characterizing the present unknown state of a system assumed to be structure determined, by interacting with some of its components. By doing this the observer triggers in the system an unpredictable change of state that he or she then uses to characterize its initial state and predict in it a later one within the domain of determinism specified by the properties of its components. Therefore, since the domain of determinism of a structure determined system as the domain of operational coherences of its components is brought forth in its distinction in the praxis of living of the observer, and since in order to compute a change of state in a system the observer must determine its present state through an interaction with its components, any attempt to compute a change of state in a structure determined system entails a necessary uncertainty due to the manner of determination of its initial state within the constraints of the operational coherences of its domain of existence. This predictive uncertainty may vary in magnitude in different domains of distinctions, but it is always present because it is constitu tive of the phenomenon of cognition as a feature of the ontology of observing and not of an objective independent reality. With this I am also saying that the uncertainty principle of physics pertains to the ontology of observing, and that it does not characterize an independent universe because, as I shall show further on, the physical domain of existence is a cognitive domain brought forth in the praxis of living of the observer by the observer as an explanation of his or her praxis of living. v) Ontogenic structural drift. It is said that a boat is drifting when it slides floating on the sea without rudder and oars, following a course that is generated moment after moment in its encounter with the waves and wind that impinge upon it, and which lasts as long as it remains floating (conserves adaptation) and keeps the shape of a boat (conserves organization). As such, a drifting boat follows a course without alternatives that is deterministically generated moment after moment in its encounters with the waves and the wind. As a consequence of this, a drifting boat is also always, and at any moment, in the only place where it can be, in a present that is continuously emerging from the sequence of its interactions in the drift. The deterministic process that generates the course followed by a drifting boat takes place as a feature of the structural dynamics of the structure determined system constituted by the boat, the wind, and the waves, as these are brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of living. Therefore, if an observer cannot predict the course of a drifting boat, it is not because his or her distinction of the boat, the wind, and the waves, in his or her domain of experiences, does not entail a structure determined system in which the course followed by the boat arises in a deterministic manner, but because he or she cannot encompass in his or her description of the interactions between the boat, the wind, and the waves, the whole structure of the structure determined system in which the course followed by the boat is a

21

fe a tu re of its c h a n g e s of s t r uc tu re . W h at h a p p e n s w i t h the g e n e r a t i o n of the c o u r s e f o ll o we d by a drifting boat, is the g e n e r a l ca se for the g e n e r a t i o n of the course followed by the structural changes of any s t r u c t u r e determined s y s t e m that the o b s er ve r d i s t i n g u i s h e s in his or her p r ax is of l i v i n g , as it i n t e r a c t s in the m e d i u m as if w i t h an independent entity with conservation of class identity (organization) an d adaptation (structural coupling). Si n ce l i vi ng s y s t e m s ar e d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e determined systems, this applies to th e m; and the o n t o g e n y of a l i v i n g sys tem, as its history of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s wit h c o n s e r v a t i o n of o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n , is its o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l drift. All th at applies to the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by a d r i f t i n g boat ap pl i e s to the c o u r s e f o l l o w e d by the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s t ha t take pla ce in the ontogeny of a l i v i n g s y s t e m and to the c o u r s e f o l lo we d by the displacement of a living system in the medium during its ontogeny. L e t me m a k e th is c le ar. In g e n e r a l terms, a d r i f t is the c o u r s e followed by the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m that a r i s e m o m e n t a f t e r m o m e n t g e n e r a t e d in the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the s y s t e m w it h a n o t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t sy st em , wh i l e its r e l a t i o n of correspondence (adaptation) w it h thi s ot h er system (medium) and its o r g a n i z a t i o n (class identity) remain invariant. A c c o r d i n g l y , the i n d i v i d u a l l i f e h i s t o r y of a l i v i n g s y s t e m as a h i s t o r y of c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that f o l l o w s a course g e n e r a t e d m o m e n t aft er m o m e n t in the b r a i d i n g of its internally generated structural dynamics with the s t r u c t u r a l changes t r i g g e r e d in it by its r e c u r r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the medium as an i n d e p e n d e n t e nt ity , and w h i c h l a s t s as long as its organization an d a d a p t a t i o n are c o n s e r v e d , ta k e s plac e as a structural drift. S i m i l a r l y , s i n c e the c o u r s e of the d i s p l a c e ment of a l i v i n g s y s t e m in the m e d i u m is g e n e r a t e d m o m e n t after moment as a r e s u l t of its i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the m e d i u m as an independent entity w h i l e its o r g a n i z a t i o n an d adaptation ar e conserved, th e displacement of a l i v i n g s y s t e m in the medium while it realizes its n ic h e ta k es p l a c e as a drift. Living systems exist in continuous structural a nd p o s i t i o n a l drift (ontogenic drift) while they are alive, as a m a t t e r of constitution. As in th e c a s e of a d r i f t i n g boat, at any m o m e n t a l i v i n g s y s t e m is w h e r e it is in the me di um , and ha s the s t r u c t u r e t ha t it has, as th e p r e s e n t of its o n t o g e n i c d r i f t in a d e t e r m i n i s t i c manner, a nd c o u l d not be a n y w h e r e o t h e r t ha n w h e r e it is, nor c ou l d it h a v e a s t r u c t u r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the one that it has. T h e m a n y d i f f e r e n t p a t h s that an o b s e r v e r ma y c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e for a d r i f t i n g boa t to f o l l o w at a n y instant, or the m a n y different ontogenic courses that an observer may consider p o s s i b l e for a l i v i n g s y s t e m at any m o m e n t , ar e p o s s i b l e o nl y as i m a g i n e d a l t e r n a t i v e s in the d e s c r i p t i o n of w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n in e a c h c a s e if the c o n d i t i o n s were d i f f e r e n t , a nd not a c t u a l a l t e r natives in th e c o u r s e of the boat or in the o n t o g e n y of the living system. A d r i f t is a p r o c e s s of c h a n g e , and as is the c a se with all processes of c h a n g e in structure determined systems, it f o l l o w s a c o u r s e w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s in the d o m a i n

22

of determinism in which it is brought forth by the distinctions of the observer. Indeed, such imagined alternatives are imaginable only from the perspective of the inability of the observer to treat the boat, the wind, and the waves, or the living system and the medium, that he or she brings forth in his or her praxis of living, as a known structure determined system whose changes of structure he or she can compute. If we are serious about our explanations as scientists, then we must accept as an ontological feature of what we do as observers that every entity that we bring forth in our distinctions is where it is, and has the structure that it has, in the only manner that it can be, given the domain of operational coherences (domain of determinism) that we also bring forth as its domain of existence in its distinction. Finally, let me mention several implications of all this for the entities that we bring forth as living systems in our praxis of living: a) Since for a living system a history of inter actions without disintegration can only be a history of perturbations, that is, a history of interactions in the niche, a living system while living necessarily slides in ontogenic drift through the medium in the realization of its niche. This means that aim, goal, purpose, or intention, do not enter into the realization of a living system as a structure determined system. b) Since the structure of a living system is continuously changing, both through its internal dynamics and through the structural changes triggered in it in its interactions with operationally independent entities, the niche of a living system (the features of the medium that it actually encounters in its interactions) is necessarily in continuous change congruent with the continuous structural drift of the living system while it remains alive. Furthermore, this is so regardless of whether the observer considers that the environment of the living system changes or remains constant. This means that as an observer brings forth a living system in her or his praxis of living, it may appear to her or him as continuously changing in its use of a constant environment, or, conversely, as unchanging in a continuously changing environment, because the observer cannot see the encounter of a living system and its niche, which is where conservation of adaptation takes place. c) Conservation of adaptation does not mean that the manner of living of a living system remains invariant. It means that a living system has an ontogeny only while it conserves its class identity and its dynamic structural correspondence with the medium as it undergoes its interactions, and that there is no constitutive restriction about the magnitude of its moment after moment structural changes other than that they should take place within the constraints of its structural determinism and its conservation of organization and adaptation. Indeed, I could speak of the laws of conservation of organization and adaptation as ontological conditions for the existence of any structure determined system in the same manner as physicists speak of the laws of conservation in physics as ontological conditions for the occurence of physical phenomena.

23

Every l i v in g system, i n c l u d i n g us o b s e r v e r s , is at an y m o m e n t w h e r e it is, has the s t r u c t u r e tha t it has, a nd do es w h a t it d oe s at th at mo m en t, a l w a y s in a s t r u c t u r a l and relational situation that is the p r e s e n t of an o n t o g e n i c d ri f t that starts at its i n c e p t i o n as s u c h in a p a r t i c u l a r pl a c e w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r structure, and follows the only c o u r s e t ha t it can fo l lo w. Different k i n d s of l i v i n g s y s t e m s d i f f e r in the spectrum of ontogenies that an o b s e r v e r c a n c o n s i d e r p o s s i b l e for e ac h of th e m in his or her d i s c o u r s e as a r e s u l t of their different initial s t r u c t u r e s a nd different starting p la c e s , but e a ch o n t o g e n y tha t take s pl ac e t a k e s pl a ce as a u n i q u e o n t o g e n i c dr i f t in a p r o c e s s w i t h o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s , vi) Structural intersection. W h e n an o b s e r v e r b r i n g s fo r th a c o m p o s i t e un i t y in his or her p r a x i s of l ivi ng , he or she b ri ng s forth an e n t i t y in w h i c h the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between c o m p o n e n t s that c o n s t i t u t e s its o r g a n i z a t i o n , is a s u b s e t of all the a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s th at ta ke p l a c e b e t w e e n its components as these r e a l i z e its s t r u c t u r e and c o n s t i t u t e it as a w h o l e in the domain of e x i s t e n c e in w h i c h th ey a r e b r o u g h t f o r t h (see s e c t i o n 6, iv). As such, the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y d o e s not exhaust the r e l a t i o n s and i n t e r a c t i o n s in w h i c h the components that realize it may p a r t i c i p a t e in the ir d o m a i n of existence. The result of this c i r c u m s t a n c e is th at in the structural r e a l i z a t i o n of a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y , its c o m p o n e n t s ma y p a r t i c i p a t e , through other properties t h a n tho se th at i n v o l v e t h e m in the realization of its organization, in the realization of the organization of m a n y other composite unities w h ic h, thus, i n t e r s e c t s t r u c t u r a l l y w i t h it. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n the c o m p o n e n t s of a composite unity are themselves composite unities, the c o m p o s i t e u n i t y may p a r t i c i p a t e in s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r s e c t i o n s that take place t h r o u g h the c o m p o n e n t s of its components. In any ca s e, when an o b s e r v e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s two or m o r e structurally intersecting s ys t e m s , he or s he distinguishes two or more d i f f e r e n t c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h the s a m e body. Structurally intersecting systems exist an d operate as s i m p l e u n i t i e s in d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s s p e c i f i e d by thei r different organizations. Yet, d e p e n d i n g on ho w t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l intersection ta k e s p la ce , structurally intersecting composite unities ma y e x i s t as s u c h in t h e s am e or d i f f e r e n t domains of existence. Th u s, when tw o composite unities structurally intersect through th e i r c o m p o n e n t s , they share components and have as c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s the s a m e d o m a i n of existence. But, when tw o composite unities structurally intersect through the components of the c o m p o n e n t s of on e or both, t he y do not sh a r e components and as c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s h a ve d i f f e r e n t domains of existence. Nevertheless, since in a structural intersection t h e r e are c o m p o n e n t s or c o m p o n e n t s of c o m p o n e n t s , or both, tha t simultaneously p a r t i c i p a t e in th e s t r u c t u r e of s e v e r a l systems, s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s t h a t t a k e p l a c e in one of s e v e r a l s t r u c t u r a l l y i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s as p a r t of i ts o n t o g e n i c d r i f t m ay g iv e rise to s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s in t h e o t h e r i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s and thus p a r t i c i p a t e in the ir o t h e r w i s e i n d e p e n d e n t o n t o g e n i c d r i f t s . In other w or ds , s t r u c t u r a l l y i n t e r s e c t i n g s y s t e m s ar e s t r u c t u r a l l y
24

interdependent because, either through the intersection of their domains of structural determinism, or though the intersection of the domains of structural determinism of their components, or through both, they affect each o t h e r s structures in the course of their independently generated structural changes, and although they may exist as composite unities in different domains, their ontogenic drifts intersect forming a network of coontogenic drifts. Thus, an observer may distinguish in the structural realization of a human being as a living system the simultaneous or successive intersection of a mammal, a person, a woman, a doctor, and a mother, all of which are different composite unities defined by different organizations that are simultaneously or successively conserved while they are realized in their different domains of existence, with particular characteristics that result from the continuous braiding of their different ontogenic drifts through the continuous interplay of their structural changes* Furthermore, these structural intersections result in dependent domains of disintegrations as well as dependent domains of conservations which need not be reciprocal, when the conservation of one class identity entails the conservation of structural features that are involved in the conservation of another. For example, in the structural intersection of a student and a human being in a living system, the conservation of the class identity "student" entails the conservation of the class identity "human being," but not the reverse: the disintegration of the student does not entail the disintegration of the human being, but the disintegration of the human being carries with it the disintegration of the student. Also, a particular composite unity may disintegrate through different kinds of structural changes, like disintegrating as a student through failing an examination or through attaining the final degree, with different consequences in the network of structural intersections to which it belongs. The structural intersection of systems does not mean that the same system is viewed in different manners from different perspectives, because due to their different organizations structurally intersecting systems exist in different phenomenal domains and are realized through different structural dynamics. It only means that the elements that realize a particular composite unity as its components through some of their properties as simple unities, participate through other of their properties as simple unites as components of other unities that exist as legitimately different ones because they have different domains of disintegrations. The interactions and relations in which the components of a system participate through dimensions other than those through which they constitute it, I call orthogonal interactions and relations, and it is through these that structurally intersecting systems may exist in nonintersecting phenomenal domains and yet have unidirectional or reciprocal relations of structural dependency. Finally, it is also through the orthogonal interactions of their components that structurally independent systems that exist in nonintersecting phenomenal domains may also have coontogenic drifts.

25

vii) The living s y s t e m . In 1970 I p r o p o s e d th at l i v i n g s y s t e m s are dynamic s y s t e m s c o n s t i t u t e d as a u t o n o m o u s unities through bei n g closed circular concatenations ( c l os ed networks) of molecular p r o d u c t i o n s in w h i c h the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of molecules that c o m p o s e t h e m p a r t i c i p a t e in the p r o d u c t i o n of e a ch ot her , and in w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g c an c h a n g e e xc ep t the c l o s e d c i r c u l a r i t y of the c o n c a t e n a t i o n of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s that constitutes th e m as u n i t i e s (see M a t u r a n a 1970, in M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1980). In 1973 F r a n c i s c o V a r e l a and I e x p a n d e d thi s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of li v i n g s y s t e m s by s a y i n g : first, that a c o m p o s i t e u ni t y whose o r g a n i z a t i o n ca n be d e s c r i b e d as a c l o s e d n e t w o r k of productions of components th at t h r o u g h th ei r i n t e r a c t i o n s constitute the network of productions that produce t h e m an d specify its extension by c o n s t i t u t i n g its b o u n d a r i e s in their domain of existence, is an a u t o p o i e t i c sy st em ; and s ec o n d , th at a l i v i n g system is an a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m wh o s e c o m p o n e n t s are molecules. Or, in o t h e r w o rd s, we p r o p o s e d th at l i v i n g s y s t e m s are m o l e c u l a r autopoietic s y s t e m s an d t h at as s u ch th ey e xi s t in the m o l e c u l a r space as c l o s e d n e t w o r k s of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s that specify their o wn l i m i t s (see M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1973, in M a t u r a n a and Varela 1980; a nd Maturana 1975). N o t h i n g is said in t h is description of the m o l e c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n of l i v i n g systems as autopoietic systems about thermodynamic constraints, b e c a u s e the realization of l i v i n g s y s t e m s as m o l e c u l a r s y s t e m s e n t a i l s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s . In fact, the s t a t e m e n t t ha t a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y e x i s t s as s uc h in the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of its components, implies the satisfaction of the conditions of e x i s t e n c e of t he s e c o m p o n e n t s . T he recognition that living systems are molecular autopoietic systems c a r r i e s w i t h it s e v e r a l implications and c o n s e q u e n c e s of w h i c h I sh a l l m e n t i o n a few: A. Implications: a) L i v i n g s y s t e m s as a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s are structure determined systems, an d e v e r y t h i n g tha t applies to s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s a p p l i e s to them. In p a r t i c u l a r this m e a n s t ha t e v e r y t h i n g th at o c c u r s in a l i v i n g s y s t e m t a k e s pla ce in it in the a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n of the p r o p e r t i e s of its c o m p o n e n t s through relations of neighborhood (relations of contiguity) c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e s e v er y same o p e r a t i o n s . Accordingly, notions of regulation and control do not a nd cannot reflect actual operations in th e s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of a living system because th ey do not c o n n o t e a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s of n e i g h b o r h o o d in it. These notions only reveal relations that the o b s e r v e r establishes when he or she c o m p a r e s d i f f e r e n t moments in the course of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s in the n e t w o r k of p r o c e s s e s that take p la c e in the structural r e a l i z a t i o n of a particular living system. T h e r e f o r e , th e o n ly p e c u l i a r thi ng a b o u t l i v i n g s y s t e m s as structure determined s y s t e m s is tha t t he y a r e molecular autopoietic systems. b) A u t o p o i e s i s is a d y n a m i c p r o c e s s that ta k e s p l a c e in the o n g o i n g f l o w of its o c c u r r e n c e and c a n n o t be grasped in a static instantaneous v i e w of distribution of components. Therefore, a l i v i n g s y s t e m e x i s t s onl y t h r o u g h the c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n e n t a i l e d in its a u t o p o i e s i s , and only while t h is is c o n s e r v e d in the c o n s t i t u t i o n of its

26

ontogeny. Th is c i r c u m s t a n c e ha s two ba s ic r e s u l t s : one is that living systems c a n be r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h m a n y d i f f e r e n t changing dynamic structures, the other is th at in th e generation of l i n e a g e s t hr o u g h r e p r o d u c t i o n , l i vi ng s y s t e m s a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e l y open to c o n t i n u o u s p h y l o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e . c) A l i vi ng s y s t e m e i t h e r e x i s t s as a d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in the m e d i u m in w hi c h it is b r o u g h t forth by the o b s e r v e r , th at is, in a r e l a t i o n of c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n t h r o u g h its c o n t i n u o u s s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e in the realization of its n ic he, or it d o e s n ot e x is t. Or, in o t h e r w o rd s, a l iv in g system while living is n e c e s s a r i l y in a d y n a m i c relation of correspondence with the m e d i u m t h r o u g h its operation in its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , an d to l iv e is to gl i d e t h r o u g h a d o m a i n of perturbations in an o n t o g e n i c d ri f t that t a k e s p l a c e t h r o u g h the r e a l i z a t i o n of an e v e r c h a n g i n g niche. d) A l i v i n g s y s t e m as a structure determined s y s t e m o p e r a t e s only in t he p r e s e n t that is, it is d e t e r m i n e d by the s t r u c t u r e that it ha s at an y in st a n t in the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of its a u t o p o i e s i s in the m o l e c u l a r s p a c e and therefore it is n e c e s s a r i l y o p e n to the f lo w of molecules t h r o u g h it. At the s am e time, a l i v i n g s y s t e m as an autopoietic system g i v e s r i se o nl y to s t a t e s in autopoiesis; o t h e r w i s e it d i s i n t e g r a t e s . T h e r e f o r e , l i v i n g s y s t e m s a re c l os ed s y s t e m s wi th r e s p e c t to t h e i r d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s . B. Consequences: a) To the e x te nt that a l i v i n g s y s t e m is a structure determined system, and e v e r y t h i n g in it takes pl ac e through neighborhood relations b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s in the present, notions of p u r p o s e and goal tha t i m p l y t h a t at eve ry instant a la t e r s t a t e of a s y s t e m as a w h o l e o p e r a t e s as part of it s s t r u c t u r e in t he p r e s e n t do not ap p l y to l i v i n g s y s t e m s and c a n n o t be used to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e i r o p e r a t i o n . A living system may appear to o p e r a t e as a p u r p o s e f u l or goal-directed system o n l y to an o b s e r v e r who , h a v i n g s e e n the o n t o g e n y of o th e r l i v i n g s y s t e m s of the s a me k i n d in the s am e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in h is or her praxis of l ivi ng , c o n f u s e s p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s by putting the c o n s e q u e n c e s of it s o p e r a t i o n as a w ho l e a m o n g t he p r o c e s s e s that c o n s t i t u t e it. b) B e c a u s e t h ey ar e s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m s , for living systems there is no i n s i d e or outside in thei r operation as a u t o p o i e t i c u n i t i e s ; they ar e in a u t o p o i e s i s as c l o s e d w h o l e s in t h e i r d y n a m i c s of st ates, or t h ey d i s i n t e g r a t e . At the sam e time, an d for the sa me reason, l i v i n g s y s t e m s do not use or m i s u s e an e n v i r o n m e n t in th ei r o p e r a t i o n as autopoietic unities, nor do t h e y c o m m i t m i s t a k e s in t he i r o n t o g e n i c drift s. In fact, a living s y s t e m in its o p e r a t i o n in a m e d i u m wi th conservation of organization and a d a p t a t i o n as b e f i t it as a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d s y s t e m , b r i n g s f or t h its e v e r c h a n g i n g ni ch e as it r e a l i z e s i t s e l f in i ts d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , th e b a c k g r o u n d of o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s w h i c h it does not d i s t i n g u i s h and with w h i c h it do es not i n t e r a c t . c) L i v i n g s y s t e m s n e c e s s a r i l y form, through their r e c u r r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h e a c h o t h e r as we ll as with the n o n b i o t i c m e d i u m , c o o n t o g e n i c and c o p h y l o g e n i c s y s t e m s of b r a i d e d s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t s that last as l o ng as th ey conserve their a u t o p o i e s i s t h r o u g h t he c o n s e r v a t i o n of their reciprocal structural couplings. Such is biological evolution. As a re s ul t, ev e r y living system, including us human b e in gs as

27

observers, is a l w a y s f ou n d in its s p o n t a n e o u s r e a l i z a t i o n in its domain of e x i s t e n c e in c o n g r u e n c e w i t h a b i o t i c and a n o n b i o t i c m ed iu m. Or, in o t h e r words , e ve r y l i v i n g s y s t e m is at ev er y instant as it is a n d wh e r e it is a n o d e of a network of coontogenic d r i f t s t ha t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s all the entities with which it i n t e r a c t s in the d o m a i n in w h i c h it is br ou g h t fo r t h by the o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of living. As a consequence, an o b s e r v e r as a l i v i n g s y s t e m c a n on ly d i s t i n g u i s h an e n t i t y as a no de of the n e t w o r k of c o o n t o g e n i c d r i ft s to w h i c h it be lon gs , an d w h e r e it e x i s t s in s t r u c t u r a l co up l i n g . d) The o n ly th in g peculiar to living systems is that th ey are autopoietic s y s t e m s in the m o l e c u l a r s p a c e . In these circums ta nc es , a gi v e n p h e n o m e n o n is a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n o nl y to the e x t e n t that its r e a l i z a t i o n e n t a i l s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the autopoiesis of at l e a s t one a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m in the m o l e c u l a r spac e. e) M o d e r n p r o k a r y o t i c and e u k a r y o t i c c e l l s are typical autopoietic s y s t e m s in the m o l e c u l a r s p ac e, an d b ec a u s e their autopoiesis is not the r e s ul t of t h e i r b e i n g c o m p o s e d by m or e ba s ic a u t o p o i e t i c s u b s y s t e m s , I call them f i r s t or d e r a u t o p o i e t i c sy s t e m s . I c al l s e c o n d o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s s y s t e m s whose autopoiesis is the r e s u l t of th e i r bei ng c o m p o s e d of m o re ba s i c a u t o p o i e t i c un i t i e s ; o r g a n i s m s as m u l t i c e l l u l a r s y s t e m s a re such. Yet, organisms may also " be," and I t hi n k t h a t m o s t of t h em a c t u a l l y are, fi r s t o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s as c l o s e d n e t w o r k s of m o l e c u l a r p r o d u c t i o n s t h at i n v o l v e i n t e r c e l l u l a r p r o c e s s e s as m u c h as i n t r a c e l l u l a r ones. A c c o r d i n g l y , an o r g a n i s m wo u ld ex i st as s u ch in the structural intersection of a first o rd e r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m w i t h a s e c o n d o r d e r one, b o th r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h th e a u t o p o i e s i s of the c e l l s that compose th e la tter. T hi s happened originally with the eukaryotic cell as this arose through the e n d o s y m b i o s i s of p r o k a r y o t i c o n e s (Margulis 1981). f) An o r g a n i s m as a second order autopoietic system is an e c t o c e l l u l a r s y m b i o n t c o m p o s e d of c el ls , u s u a l l y of c o m m o n o r i g i n but not a l w a y s so, t h a t c o n s t i t u t e it t h r o u g h t he i r c o o n t o g e n i c d r if t. An o r g a n i s m as a f i r s t o r d e r a u t o p o i e t i c sy st em, h o w e v e r , is not c o m p o s e d of c e l l s e ve n t h o u g h its r e a l i z a t i o n d e p e n d s on the r e a l i z a t i o n of the a u t o p o i e s i s of the c e l l s that intersect structurally w i t h it as th ey c o n s t i t u t e it in t h e i r coontogenic drift . The fi r s t a nd second order autopoietic systems that i n t e r s e c t s t r u c t u r a l l y in the r e a l i z a t i o n of an organism, ex i st in d i f f e r e n t n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s . viii) P h v l o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t . R e p r o d u c t i o n is a p r o c e s s in which a s y s t e m g i v e s o r i g i n t h r o u g h its f r a c t u r e to two systems characterized by t he s a me o r g a n i z a t i o n ( c l a s s identity) that characterized the o r i g i n a l one, but w i t h s t r u c t u r e s th at vary w it h r e s p e c t to it ( M a t u r a n a 1980). A r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y or l in e a g e , then , is a s u c c e s s i o n of s y s t e m s generated through s e q u e n t i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n s th at c o n s e r v e a p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , e a c h p a r t i c u l a r r e p r o d u c t i v e l i n e a g e or p h y l o g e n y is defined by the particular organization conserved through th e sequential reproductions t ha t constitute it. Therefore, a reproductive phylogeny or l i n e a g e l a s t s o n l y as long as the o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t d e f i n e s it is c o n s e r v e d , r e g a r d l e s s of h ow m u ch the s t r u c t u r e t ha t r e a l i z e s thi s o r g a n i z a t i o n in e a c h successive

28

member of the l i n e a g e c h a n g e s w i t h e ac h r e p r o d u c t i v e step ( s ee M a t u r a n a 1980, and M a t u r a n a and V a r e l a 1987). It f o l l o w s t ha t a reproductive p h y l o g e n y or l i n e a g e as a s u c c e s s i o n of ontogenic drifts, constitutively o c c u r s as a d r i f t of the s t r u c t u r e s that realize the o r g a n i z a t i o n c o n s e r v e d a l o n g it. It a l s o follows tha t each of the reproductive steps th at constitute a r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y is the o c c a s i o n th at op e n s the p o s s i b i l i t y for a discrete, l ar g e or sm al l , c h a n g e in the c o u r s e of its s t r u c t u r a l d r if t. As such, a r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y or l i n e a g e comes to a n end t h r o u g h the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of its m e m b e r s . And th is o c c u r s e i t h e r b e c a u s e a u t o p o i e s i s is lo st a f t e r the las t of th em , or b e c a u s e t h r o u g h the c o n s e r v a t i o n of a u t o p o i e s i s in the o f f s p r i n g of the las t of them , a p a r t i c u l a r set of r e l a t i o n s of the d r i f t i n g s t r u c t u r e b e g i n s to be c o n s e r v e d through the following sequential reproductions as the organization that defines a nd starts a ne w l i n e a g e . T h i s has several general i m p l i c a t i o n s of w h i c h I sh al l m e n t i o n on ly a few: a) A m e m b e r of a reproductive phylogeny either stays in structural coupling (conserves adaptation) in its d o m a i n of existence u nt i l its reproduction, an d the p h y l o g e n y c o n t i n u e s , or it d i s i n t e g r a t e s b e f o r e t h e n and the p h y l o g e n y e n d s w i t h it. b) A l i v i n g system is a m e m b e r of the r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n y in w h i c h it a r i s e s o n l y if it conserves through its o n t o g e n y the organization that d e f i n e s the p h y l o g e n y , and c o n t i n u e s the p h y l o g e n y onl y if such organization is c o n s e r v e d t h r o u g h its reproduction. c) Many d i f f e r e n t r e p r o d u c t i v e p h y l o g e n i e s c an be c o n s e r v e d o p e r a t i o n a l l y embedded in e a ch o th er , f o r m i n g a s y s t e m of n e s t e d p h y l o g e n i e s , if t h e r e is an i n t e r s e c t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of the different organizations tha t d e f i n e them . When this happens th e r e is always a fundamental reproductive phylogeny whose realization is n e c e s s a r y for the r e a l i z a t i o n of a l l t h e o t h e r s . This h a s o c c u r r e d in the e v o l u t i o n of l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the f o rm of the phylogenic dr if t of a system of branching nested reproductive phylogenies in w h i c h the f u n d a m e n t a l reproductive p h y l o g e n y is that in w h i c h a u t o p o i e s i s is c o n s e r v e d (see M a t u r a n a 1980, and Maturana and V a r e l a 1 9 87 ). Th u s, the system of branching p h y l o g e n i e s d e f i n e d by t he c o n s e r v a t i o n of a u t o p o i e s i s t h r o u g h r e p r o d u c t i v e c el l s in e u k a r y o t i c o r g a n i s m s , has carried embedded in it, t h r o u g h th e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r s e c t i o n of their realizations, many staggered nested organizations th at c h a r a c t e r i z e the c o i n c i d e n t l i n e a g e s c o n s e r v e d t h r o u g h it. This c i r c u m s t a n c e we r e c o g n i z e in the m a n y n e s t e d t a x o n o m i c c a t e g o r i e s th at we d i s t i n g u i s h in any o r g a n i s m w h e n we c l a s s i f y it. For example, a h u m a n b e i n g is a v e r t e b r a t e , a mammal, a primate, a H o m o , a nd a H om o s a p i e n s a l l d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m s of p a r t i a l l y o v e r l a p p i n g phylogenies that ar e conserved together t h r o u g h the c o n s e r v a t i o n of the human being's autopoiesis. d) T h e o n t o g e n i c d r i f t s of the m e m b e r s of a reproductive phylogeny ta ke place in r e c i p r o c a l structural coupling with many different, and also continuously changing, living and n o n l i v i n g s y s t e m s th at f o r m pa rt of the medium in w h i c h t h e y r e a l i z e th e i r n i c h e s . As a re su l t , ev e r y i n d i v i d u a l ontogeny in l i v i n g s y s t e m s f o l l o w s a c o u r s e e m b e d d e d in a s y s t e m of coontogenies th at constitutes a network of cophylogenic structural drifts. This can be g e n e r a l i z e d by s a y i n g t h at

29

evolution is constitutively a coevolution, and that every living system is at any moment where it is, and has the structure that it has, as an expression of the present state of the domain of operational coherences constituted by the network of cophylogenic structural drifts to which it belongs. As a result, the operational coherences of every living system at every instant necessarily entail the operational coherences of the whole biosphere. e) The observer as a living system is not an exception to all that has been said above. Accordingly, an observer can only make distinctions that, as operations in his or her praxis of living, take place as operations within the present state of the domain of operational coherences constituted by the network of coontogenic and cophylogenic structural drifts to which he or she belongs. ix) Ontogenic possibilities. The ontogeny of every structure determined system starts with an initial structure that is the structure that realizes the system at the beginning of its existence in its inception. In living systems such initial structure is a cellular unity that may originate either a) as a single cell or as a small multicellular entity through a reproductive fracture from a cellular maternal system whose organization it conserves, or b) as a single cell de novo from noncellular elements. In every living system the s y s t e m s initial structure constitutes the structural starting point that specifies in it what an observer sees as the configuration of all the courses of ontogenic drifts that it may undergo under different circumstances of interactions in the medium. As a result, what constitutes a lineage in living systems is the conservation through their reproduction of a particular initial structure that specifies a particular configuration of possible ontogenic drifts; and what constitutes the organization conserved through reproduction that specifies the identity of the lineage is that configuration. Accordingly, a lineage comes to an end when the configuration of possible ontogenic drifts that defines it stops being conserved. The configuration of possible ontogenic drifts that specifies a lineage through its conservation I call the ontogenic phenotype of the lineage. In each particular living system, however, only one of theontogenic courses deemed possible in the ontogenic phenotype by the observer, is realized as a result of its internal dynamics under the contingencies of the particular perturbations that it undergoes in its domain of existence with conservation of organization and adaptation. Consequently, and in general, it is only within the domain of possibilities set by their different or similar initial structures that different composite unities may have different or similar ontogenic structural drifts under different or similar histories of perturbations in their domains of existence. Indeed, nothing can happen in the ontogeny of a living system as a composite unity that is not permitted in its initial structure. Or, in other words, and under the understanding that the initial structure of a living system is its genetic constitution, it is apparent that nothing can happen in the ontogenic structural drift of a living system that is not allowed in its genetic constitution as a feature of its possible

30

a l iv in g sy s te m, c o n s e r v a t i o n of l iv i ng ( c o n s e r v a t i o n of auto poiesis and of a d a p t a t i o n ) c o n s t i t u t e s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in those circumstances, and, h en ce , k n o w l e d g e : l i v i n g s y s t e m s are c o g n i tive s y s t e m s , and to l i ve is to k n o w . But, by s h o w i n g this I hav e a l so s h o w n tha t an y i n t e r a c t i o n wi th a l i v i n g s y s t e m can be vi ew ed by an o b s e r v e r as a q u e s t i o n posed to it, as a c h a l l e n g e to its li fe th at c o n s t i t u t e s a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e w h e r e he or she e x p e c t s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n of it. And, at the same time, I have al so shown, then, t h at the a c t u a l a c c e p t a n c e by th e o b s e r v e r of an a n s w e r to a q u e s t i o n posed to a living s y s t e m , e n t a i l s his or her r e c o g n i t i o n of a d e q u a t e a c t i o n by the l i v i n g s y s t e m in the domain s p e c i f i e d by the q u e s t i o n , and th at t h is r e c o g n i t i o n of adequate a c t i o n c o n s i s t s in the d i s t i n c t i o n of the l i v i n g s y st em in that d o m a i n u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of c o n s e r v a t i o n of autopoiesis and a d a p t a t i o n . In w h a t f o l l o w s I p re s e n t t hi s g e n e r a l e x p l a n a tory proposition under the gu is e of a particular scientific explanation: a) Th e p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d is a d e q u a t e a c t i o n by a l iv in g system at any m o m e n t in w h i c h an o b s e r v e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s it as a living s y s t e m in a c t i o n in a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n . And I pr op o s e this as the p h e n o m e n o n to be e x p l a i n e d in the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that the a d e q u a t e a c t i o n s of a l i v i n g s y s t e m are its i n t e r a c t i o n s with conservation of class i d e n t i t y in the d o m a i n in which it is distinguished. b) Given that s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in its d o m a i n of existence ( c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n ) is a c o n d i t i o n of e x i s t e n c e for any s y s t e m d i s t i n g u i s h e d by an o b s e r v e r , the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m for adequate action in a l i v i n g s y s t e m as a s t r u c t u r a l l y changing s ys tem , is the s t r u c t u r a l d ri f t with c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n through which it s t a y s in c o n t i n u o u s a d e q u a t e a c t i o n while it realizes its niche, or disintegrates. Since a system is distinguished o nl y in s t r u c t u r a l coupling, when an observer d i s t i n g u i s h e s a l i v i n g s y s t e m he or she n e c e s s a r i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s it in a d e q u a t e a c t i o n in the d o m a i n of its distinction, and distinguishes it as a s y s t e m th at constitutively remains in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g in its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e r e g a r d l e s s of how m u ch its structure, or the s t r u c t u r e of the m e d i u m , or both, c h a n g e w h i l e it s t a y s a l i v e . c) G i v e n the g e n e r a t i v e m e c h a n i s m pr o p o s e d in (b), the f o l l o w i n g phenomena can be deduced to tak e p la c e in the d o ma in of e x p e r i e n c e s of an o b s e r v e r : i) the o b s e r v e r s h o u l d see a d e q u a t e a c t i o n ta kin g p la c e in th e for m of c o o r d i n a t e d b e h a v i o r in li vi n g systems that are in coontogenic structural drift wh i l e in recurrent interactions with conservation of reciprocal adaptation; ii) the o b s e r v e r s h o u l d see that l i v i n g s y s t e m s in coontogeny separate or disintegrate, or both, wh en the ir r e c i p r o c a l a d a p t a t i o n is lost. d) T h e p h e n o m e n a d e d u c e d in (c) are a p p a r e n t in the domain of experiences of an o b s e r v e r in the d y n a m i c s of c o n s t i t u t i o n and realization of a s o c i a l s y s t e m , and in all circumstances of recurrent interactions between li vin g systems during their

33

o n t o g e ni es , in w h a t a p p e a r s to us as l e a r n i n g to live One of these c a s e s is our hu m a n o p e r a t i o n in l a n g u ag e.

tog eth er.

The s a t i s f a c t i o n of th es e four c o n d i t i o n s re sul ts : a) in the validation, as a s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n , of ray p r o p o s i t i o n that c o g n i t i o n as a d e q u a t e a c ti on in living sy s te ms is a consequence of t h e i r structural dri ft with conservation of o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n ; b) in s h o w i n g th a t a d e q u a t e a ct io n ( cog nit io n) is c o n s t i t u t i v e to l iv ing s y s t e m s be ca us e it is en t a i l e d in th e i r existence as such; c) in entailing that different l i v i n g s y s t e m s d i f f e r in th e i r domains of adequate actions ( d o m a i n s of c o g n i t i o n ) to the e x t e n t that they realize d i f f e r e n t n ich es ; and d) in s h o w i n g that the d o m a i n of adequate actions ( d o ma in of c o g n i t i o n ) of a li vi ng s y s t e m ch an g e s as its st ru ctu re , or th e s t r u c t u r e of the m e d i u m , or both, chang e wh il e it c o n s e r v e s o r g a n i z a t i o n and a d a p t a t i o n . At the sam e tim e, it is a p p a r e n t f r o m all of the a bo v e that wh at I say of c o g n i t i o n as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p ra xi s of l iv ing takes place in the p r a x i s of living , a nd t h a t to the e xt en t that what I say is effective action in the generation of the p h e n o m e n o n of c o g n i t i o n , what I say take s p l a c e as c o gn it io n. If this s ou nd s s t r a n g e , it is only be ca u s e we a r e in the habit of th i n k i n g about cognition in the e x p l a n a t o r y pa t hw ay of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t p a r e n t h e s e s , as if the p h e n o m e n o n c o n n o t e d by the word c o g n i t i o n e n t a i l e d p o in t in g to s o m e t h i n g wh os e e x i s t e n c e can be a s s e r t e d to be i n d e p e n d e n t of the pointing of the ob s er ve r. I h av e s h o w n that th is is not a n d c a n n o t be the case. Cognition cannot be u n d e r s t o o d as a b i o l o g i c a l phenomenon if objectivity is no t put in p a r e n t h e s e s , nor ca n it be u n d e r s t o o d as su ch if o ne is not w i l l i n g to f o l l o w al l the c o n s e q u e n c e s of such an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l act. Let us no w t r e a t h u m a n o p e r a t i o n in l a n g u a g e as one of the p h e n o m e n a w h i c h t a k e p l a c e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the o p e r a t i o n of c o g n i t i o n as a d e q u a t e (or e f f e c t i v e ) a c t i o n . It is p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary to p r o c e e d in this m an ne r b e c a u s e our operation in la n g u a g e as o b s e r v e r s in the prax is of l i v i n g is, at the same time, our problem an d our instrument for analysis and explanation. ii) L a n g u a g e . W e h u m a n b e i n g s are l i v i n g s y s t e m s that exis t in l a n g u ag e. This m e a n s th at a l t h o u g h we e x i s t as hu ma n beings in l a n g u a g e and a l t h o u g h o ur c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s ( d o m a i n s of adequate a c ti on s) as s u c h t a k e p l a c e in the d o m a i n of languaging, our languaging ta k e s p l a c e t h r o u g h our o p e r a t i o n as l i v i n g sys tem s. A c c o r d i n g l y , in w h a t f o l l o w s I sha ll c o n s i d e r w h a t tak es place in l a n g u a g e as l a n g u a g e a r i s e s as a b i o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n o n from the operation of living systems in r e c u r r e n t interactions wi th conservation of organization and a d a p t a t i o n through the ir coontogenic structural drift, and t h u s show l a n g u a g e as a c o n s e q u e n c e of th e s am e m e c h a n i s m that e x p l a i n s th e p h e n o m e n o n of cognition: a) W he n two or m o r e a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t em s i n t e r a c t r e c u r r e n t l y ,
34

and

the dynamic structure of e ac h follows a course of change contingent up on the h i s t o r y of e a c h ' s interactions w i t h the others, there is a c o o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l dr if t that g i v e s rise to an o n t o g e n i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions between them which appears to an o b s e r v e r as a domain of consensual coordinations of actions or distinctions in an environment. T h i s o n t o g e n i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions I call a d o m a i n of consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s or d i s t i n c t i o n s , or, mo re g e n e r a l l y , a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n of interactions, be ca us e it a r i s e s as a p a r t i c u l a r manner of living t o g e t h e r c o n t i n g e n t u po n the u n i q u e h i s t o r y of recurrent interactions of the participants during th e i r coontogeny. Furthermore, because an o b s e r v e r can d e s c r i b e such a d o m a i n of recurrent interactions in semantic terms, by referring the different c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s (or d i s t i n c t i o n s ) i n v o l v e d to the d i f f e r e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s that th ey h av e in the d o m a i n in w h i c h they a re distinguished, I a l s o cal l a c o n s e n s u a l domain of interactions a linguistic domain. Finally, I ca ll th e b e h a v i o r through w h i c h an o r g a n i s m p a r t i c i p a t e s in an o n t o g e n i c d o m a i n of recurrent interactions, c o n s e n s u a l or l i n g u i s t i c according to whether I w a n t to e m p h a s i z e the o n t o g e n i c o r i g i n of the b e h a v i o r (consensual), or its i m p l i c a t i o n s in the p r e s e n t s t a t e of the ongoing interactions (linguistic). Similarly, I speak of coordinations of actions or coordinations of distinctions, a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r I wa nt to e m p h a s i z e w ha t t a k e s p l a c e in the interaction in r e l a t i o n to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s (coordinations of actions), or w h a t tak es p l a c e in the i n t e r a c t i o n s in r e l a t i o n to an e n v i r o n m e n t ( c o o r d i n a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n s ) . b) When o n e or mor e l i vi n g s y s t e m s c o n t i n u e th e i r coontogenic structural drift t hr o u g h t he i r recurrent interactions in a consensual domain, it is p o s s i b l e for a r e c u r s i o n to t ak e plac e in their c o n s e n s u a l b e h a v i o r r e s u l t i n g in the p r o d u c t i o n of a consensual c o o r d i n a t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions. If t h i s w e r e to h ap pe n, what an o b s e r v e r w ou l d see w o u l d be tha t the p a r t i c i p a n t s of a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n of i n t e r a c t i o n s w o u l d be operating in thei r consensual behavior making consensual distinctions u po n their c o n s e n s u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , in a process that would recursively make a consensual action a consensual token for a c o n s e n s u a l d i s t i n c t i o n that it obscures. In de ed , this p r o c e s s is p r e c i s e l y w h a t t a k e s p l a c e in our l a n g u a g i n g in the p r a x i s of li vin g. Accordingly, I c l a i m tha t the p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g e ta k e s plac e in t he c o o n t o g e n y of l i v i n g s y s t e m s w h e n two or m o r e o r g a n i s m s o p e r a t e , t h r o u g h th e i r r e c u r r e n t o n t o g e n i c consensual interactions, in an o n g o i n g process of recursive consensual c o o r d i n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions or d i s t i n c t i o n s ( M a tu ra na , 1 9 78 ). Or, in o t h e r w o r d s , I c l a i m th a t s uc h recursive consensual coordination of consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s or d i s t i n c t i o n s in any d o m a i n , is the p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , I c l a i m th at o b j e c t s a r i s e in language as consensual coordinations of actions that o p e r a t i o n a l l y o b s c u r e for f u r t h e r r e c u r s i v e c o n s e n s u a l coordinat i o n s of a c t i o n s by the o b s e r v e r s the c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s ( d i s t i n c t i o n s ) that they c o o r d i n a t e . O b j e c t s are, in the process of l a n g u a g i n g , c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s that

35

sys te ms . T h i s is a r b i t r a r y si n c e wha t I h av e said in r e l a t i o n to existence applies to eve ry e n t i t y brought fo r t h through an operation of d i s t i n c t i o n . Therefore, I m a k e thi s distinction only because I am s p e a k i n g of l i v i n g systems and the wo rd c o g n i t i o n is h i s t o r i c a l l y bound to t h em t h r o u g h us. W i t h i n this restriction we as observers can say that th e re are as man y d o m a i n s of c o g n i t i o n as th er e are d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e specified by the d i f f e r e n t i d e n t i t i e s that l i v i n g s y s t e m s c o n s e r v e t h r o u g h the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r a u t o p o i e s i s . These different cognitive domains intersect in the s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n of a living system as the l i v i n g s y s t e m r e a l i z e s t he different identities that define them as d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s of simultaneous or successive structural couplings, o r t h o g o n a l to th e fundamental structural coupling in w h i c h the l i v i n g system realizes its autopoiesis. As a r esu lt , t he s e d i f f e r e n t c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s may ap p e a r or d i s a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y or i n d e p e n d e n t l y a c c o r d i n g to whether the different structurally intersecting unities that specify t he m i n t e g r a t e or d i s i n t e g r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y or simul taneously (see s e c t i o n 7 vi). Thus, when a student graduates, the c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s p e c i f i e d by the o p e r a t i o n in the d o m a i n of structural coupling that defines t he identity "student" disappears t o g e t h e r w i t h the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the st ud e nt , or, when a bachelor marries, the c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n that the identity "bachelor" defines as a d o m a i n of operational coherences in structural coupling, d i s a p p e a r s t o g e t h e r w i t h the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the bachelor. Conversely, w h e n a s t u d e n t g r a d u a t e s and a bachelor marries, the i d e n t i t i e s " g r a d u a t e " and " h u s b a n d " a p p e a r w i th the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s s p e c i f i e d by the operat i on al c o h e r e n c e s t ha t t he s e i d e n t i t i e s e nt a i l . It f o l l o w s , therefore, that a l i v i n g s y s t e m may o p e r a t e in as m an y different cognitive d o m a i n s as there a re different identities that the different dimensions of its structural c o u p l i n g a l l o w it to r e a l i z e . It a l so f o l l o w s that the d i f f e r e n t identities that a l i v i n g s y s t e m may realize are necessarily flui d, and c h a n g e as the d i m e n s i o n s of its s t r u c t u r a l coupling c h a n g e w i t h its s t r u c t u r a l dr i ft in the h a p p e n i n g of its li vi n g . To h a ve an identity, to o p e r a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r domain of cognition, is to o p e r a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n of structural coupling. iii) Language is t he h u m a n c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n . Human beings as living systems operating in l a n g u a g e o p e r a t e in a d o m a i n of recursive reciprocal consensual perturbations that constitutes the ir domain of e x i s t e n c e as such. Therefore, l a n g u a g e as a domain of r e c u r s i v e c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions is a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e , and, as such, a c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n d e f i n e d by the recursion of consensual distinctions in a d o m a i n of consensual distinctions. Furthermore, h u m a n be ing s as living systems o p e r a t i n g in l a n g u a g e c o n s t i t u t e o b s e r v i n g , and become ob s e r v e r s , by b r i n g i n g forth objects as primary consensual coordinations of actions distinguished through secondary consensual coordinations of a c t i o n s in a p r o c e s s that obscures the a c t i o n s t ha t t h e y c o o r d i n a t e . H u m a n be in g s , t h e r e f o r e , e x i s t in the d o m a i n of objects th at t h ey bring forth through

37

la n g u a g i n g . At the s am e time, hu m a n b e i n g s by e x i s t i n g as observers in the domain of objects brought forth t hro ugh l an g u a g i n g , ex i s t in a d o m a i n that a l l o w s t h em to ex p la in the happening of the ir l i v i n g in l a n g u a g e t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e to their o p e r a t i o n in a d o m a i n of d y n a m i c r e c i p r o c a l s t r u c t u r a l co u pl in g. iv) Objectivity. Objects ar is e in language as c o n s e n s u a l coordinations of actions that in a domain of consensual d i s t i n c t i o n s a re t o k e n s for mor e basic c o o r d i n a t i o n s of act io ns, w h i c h they o b s c u r e . W i t h o u t la n g u a g e and o u t s i d e l a ng u ag e there are no o b j e c t s , because objects o nl y arise as c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s in the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a tions of a c t i o n s that l a n g u a g i n g is. For l i v i n g sy st e m s that do not o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e , the re are no o b j e c t s ; or in other words, o b j e c t s are not part of th ei r c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n s . Sin ce we hum an b ei ng s are o b j e c t s in a d o m a i n of o b j e c t s that we bring forth and operate upon in l a n g u a g e , l a n g u a g e is our p e c u l i a r d o ma in of existence and ou r peculiar cognitive domain. Within these circumstances, objectivity arises in l a n g u a g e as a m a n n e r of operating with o b j e c t s w i t h o u t d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the a c t i o n s that th ey o b s cu re . In th is m a n n e r of o p e r a t i n g , d e s c r i p t i o n s a ri s e as c o n c a t e n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s that r e su lt in f urt he r consensual coordinations of actions wh ich , if performed without distinguishing how objects arise, can be distinguished as manners of l a n g u a g i n g that t ak e p l a c e as if objects e x i s t e d o u t s i d e of l a n g ua ge . Objects a re operational r e l a t i o n s in l a n g u a g i n g . v) L a n g u a g i n g : o p e r a t i o n in _a d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g . To the e xt ent that l a n g u a g e a r i s e s as a c o n s e n s u a l d o m a i n in the coontogenic structural dr i f t of living systems involved in recurrent interactions, the o r g a n i s m s that o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e o p e r a t e in a d o m a i n of r e c i p r o c a l c o o n t o g e n i c s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g through reciprocal structural perturbations. Therefore, to operate in l a n g u a g e is not an a b s t r a c t a c t i v i t y , as we usually think . To l a n g u a g e is to i n t e r a c t s t r u c t u r a l l y . L a n g u a g e ta k e s p la c e in the domain of r e l a t i o n s between organisms in the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions, but at the s a m e time l a n g u a g e ta k e s place through structural interactions in the d o m a i n of the b o d y h o o d s of the languaging organisms. In ot h e r words, a l t h o u g h l a n g u a g i n g takes place in the s o c i a l d o m a i n as a d an c e of r e c u r s i v e r e l a t i o n s of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s , i n t e r a c t i o n s in l a n g u a g e as s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e o r t h o g o n a l to that do m ai n, and as such tr ig g e r in the bodyhoods of the p a r t i c i p a n t s s t r u c t u r a l changes that c h a n g e as m uc h the p h y s i o l o g i c a l b a c k g r o u n d ( e m o t i o n a l standing) on wh i c h they c o n t i n u e thei r l a n g u a g i n g , as the c o u r s e that this physiological change follows. The r e s u l t is that the s o c ia l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s th at c o n s t i t u t e l a n g u a g i n g , as e l e m e n t s of a d o m a i n of r e c u r s i v e o p e r a t i o n in s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g , b e c o m e p ar t of the medium in w h i c h the participant l i vi ng systems conserve organization an d adaptation through the s t r u c t u r a l changes that t he y u n d e r g o c o n t i n g e n t to t he i r participation in that do m ai n. T hu s , although the d o m a i n of coordinations of actions and the d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e of the participants
38

in l an guage do not intersect, their chan ge s are coupled o r th o g o n a l l y through the structu ra l in te ra ct io ns that take place in language. As the body changes, languaging changes; and as l a n g u a g i n g changes, the body changes. Here resides the power of words. Words are nodes in c o or di na ti on s of act io ns in l anguaging and as such they arise through s tructural i nt e rac ti on s between bodyhoods; it is through this interplay of c oo r d i n a t i o n s of a ct ion s and changes of bodyhood that the world that we bring forth in languaging becomes part of the domain in which our o nt o ge n ic and phylogenic str uc tu ra l drifts take place. vi) Language is a domain of d e s c r i p t i o n s . La nguage is a system of re cu r si ve consensual c oo rd in a ti o ns of actions in which every c on s en s u a l co ord in at io n of actions becomes an object through a recursion in the consensual co or d in at i on s of actions, in a p ro ce ss that becomes the oper at io n of distinction that d i s t i n g u i s h e s it and c o nst itu te s the observer. In these c i r c u m stances, all pa rticipants in a language domain can be ob servers with respect to the sequences of coor di na ti on s of a ct io ns in w hi ch they participate, c o n st i tu ti n g a system of re cursive distinctions in which systems of d is ti nc ti ons become obje ct s of di st in c ti o n. Such rec urs iv e d is ti nc ti on s of d is t in c ti o ns in the happening of living in language that bring forth sys te ms of ob jects, c ons ti tu te the ph eno me no n of de scription. As a result, all that there is in the human domain are d es c ri p t i o n s in the h ap p e n i n g of living in language which, as ha p pe n in gs of living in language, become objects of d es c ri pti on s in language. Descriptions, however, do not rep la ce the h appening of living that they constitute as d escriptions; they only expand it in recurs io ns that fo ll ow its op erational co herences. Accor di ng ly , scientific e x p l a na t io n s, as systems of des cr ipt io ns , do not r e pl ac e the p h e n o m en a that they explain in the domain of h ap pen ing of living of the observer, but bring forth opera ti on al c o h e r e n c e s in that do ma in that allow for further d e sc ri pt ion s in it. vii) S e l f - c o n sc i ou s ne ss arises wi th language. For a living sy s te m in its operation as a closed system, there is no inside or ou ts id e; it has no way of m ak in g the d i st i nc ti on . Yet, in language such a d i s t i n c t i o n arises as a p ar ti cu la r consensual c oo r din at io n of a c ti o ns in which the pa rt i ci p an ts are r e cur si ve ly brought f o r th as di st in ct io ns of systems of d is ti nc t io n s. When this happens, self-consciousness arises as a domain of d i s t i n c t i o n s in which the obse rv er s pa rt icipate in the consensual distinctions of their p a r ti c ip at i on s in l an gu ag e through languaging. It follows from this that the individ ua l exists only in language, that the self exists only in language, and that self-consciousness as a p he n om e no n of self distinction takes place only in language. F urt he rm or e, it also follows that since la ng u ag e as a domain of c on s en su a l c oo r di na t io n s of a c ti ons is a social phenomenon, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a social ph en omenon, and as such it does not take place within the anatom ica l c onf in es of the bodyhood of the living systems that g en er ate it; on the contrary, it is external to them and pertains to their domain of i nt e ra c ti on s as a manner of c oexistence.

39

viii) H i s t o r y . Th e s i g n i f i c a n c e or m e a n i n g of any giv en b e h a v i o r resides in the circumstances of its enaction, not in the characteristics of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the b e h a v i n g l i vi ng s y s t e m or in any p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e of the b e h a v i o r i tse lf . In ot h e r words, it is not the c o m p l e x i t y of the inn e r s t a t e s of a living system or of its n e r v o u s s yst em , nor any a s p e c t of the b e h a v i o r it se l f , that d e t e r m i n e s the na tur e, me a n i n g , r e l e v a n c e , or c o n t e n t of any gi v en be h av i or , but r a t h e r its p l a c e m e n t in the o n g o i n g h i s t o r i c a l pr oc es s in w h i c h it ar i se s. The h i g h e r hum an functions do not take plac e in the brain: language, abstract thinking, love, devotion, reflection, rationality, altruism, etc., ar e not f e a t u r e s of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the hu ma n be i ng as a l i v i n g s y s t e m or of its n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a n e u r o n a l ne t w o r k ; th ey are s o c ia l h i s t o r i c a l p h e n o m e n a . At the same time, history is not part of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of a l i v i n g s y s t e m because thi s l a t t e r ta ke s place only in the pre se nt, instant after instant, in the o p e r a t i o n of its s t r u c t u r e in c h a n g e s that o c c u r out of time. History, time, fu t ur e , and p a s t as w el l as s p a c e e x i s t in l a n g u a g e as form s of e x p l a n a t i o n of the h a p p e n i n g of living of the o b s e r v e r , and p a r t a k e of the involvement of l a n g u a g e in this h a p p e n i n g of liv ing. Therefore, it is in the explanation of the h a p p e n i n g of l i v i n g t h r o u g h the c o h e r e n c e s of language th at an o b s e r v e r can c l a i m t h at the structure of a l i v i n g s y s t e m that d e t e r m i n e s its c h a n g e s of st a t e in the p r e s e n t always embodies its history of interactions because it continuously arises in the present in a structural drift c o n t i n g e n t to s u c h h i st or y . ix) Th e n e r v o u s s y s t e m e x p a n d s the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the l i v in g s y s t e m . For l i v i n g s y s t e m s to o p e r a t e in l a n g u a g e , the d i v e r s i t y an d p l a s t i c i t y of their i n t e r n a l s t a t e s m u s t m a t c h the d i v e r s i t y of the changing circumstances generated in their recursive c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s . In o t h e r words , although language does not take pla ce w i t h i n the b o d y h o o d of the living system, the structure of the l i v i n g s y s t e m m us t p r o v i d e the diversity an d p l a s t i c i t y of s ta te s r e q u i r e d for l a n g u a g e to take p l ac e. T h e n e r v o u s s y s t e m c o n t r i b u t e s to the f u l f i l l m e n t of this requirement by e x p a n d i n g the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the organism through the richness of its d y n a m i c s as a c l o s e d network of changing r e l a t i o n s of n e u r o n a l a c t i v i t i e s (see Maturana 1983), an d by e x p a n d i n g in the o r g a n i s m the d o m a i n of its c h a n g e s of states tha t f o l l o w in it a c o u r s e c o n t i n g e n t u po n b ot h its own c h a n g e s of s t a t e s and its i n t e r a c t i o n s in the me di u m . And this the n e r v o u s s y s t e m does: a) by a d m i t t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the o r g a n i s m as o r t h o g o n a l p e r t u r b a t i o n s f r om the m e d i u m , a c o n d i t i o n t h a t m a k e s its s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t as a c e l l u l a r n et w o r k , as we ll as the s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t of the o r g a n i s m and its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the generation of behavior, c o n t i n g e n t u p o n the h i s t o r y of tho se i n t e r a c t i o n s ; and b) by admitting orthogonal interactions f ro m the components of the o r g a n i s m , a condition that makes its s t r u c t u r a l d r i f t as a c e l l u l a r ne t w o r k , as w el l as the s t r u c t u r a l drift of the o r g a n i s m and its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the g e n e r a t i o n of behavior, r e c u r s i v e l y c o n t i n g e n t u po n the d y n a m i c s of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s of the o r g a n i s m . T h e r e s u l t of all this for the o r g a n i s m (including its nervous system) is the possibility of the

40

recursive i n v o l v e m e n t of its d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s wi th the o n g o i n g f lo w of its own d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s t h r o u g h its b e h a v i o r , if it ha s s u f f i c i e n t p l a s t i c i t y in the n e r v o u s s y s t e m and participates in a s u f f i c i e n t l y lar ge d o m a i n of r e c u r r e n t interactions with ot h e r organisms. I nd e e d , this r e c u r s i v e i n v o l v e m e n t is w h a t permits the production of l a n g u a g e as th is arises w h en the internal r e c u r s i v e n e s s of the d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s of the nervous s y s t e m c o u p l e s w i t h the r e c u r r e n c e of s o c i a l c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a ti o ns of actions, g i v i n g ris e to the r e c u r s i o n of c o n s e n s u a l coordinations as an o n g o i n g p r o c e s s in the g e n e r a t i o n of s o c i a l behavior, The o n g o i n g r e c u r s i v e c o u p l i n g of b e h a v i o r a l and s t r u c t u r a l changes th at g i v e s o r i g i n to l a n g u a g e , is p o s s i b l e because a structure determined system exists in two nonintersecting phenomenal domains realized through orthogonally dependent structur e s, namely, its d o m a i n of s t a t e s and its d o m a i n of interact i on s. It is our basi c d o u b l e e x i s t e n c e as s t r u c t u r e d e t e r m i n e d systems in two nonintersecting but orthogonally coupled phenomenal d o m a i n s th at p e r m i t s us in our o p e r a t i o n in language to g e n e r a t e e n d l e s s o r t h o g o n a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t and yet n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n s in the h a p p e n i n g of our l i vin g. x) O b s e r v i n g t a k e s pl a c e in l a n g u a g i n g . T h e n e r v o u s s y s t e m is a closed n e t w o r k of i n t e r a c t i n g a c t i v e n e u r o n a l e l e m e n t s ( ne ur o n s , effectors, and receptors) that are structurally realized as c e l l u l a r c o m p o n e n t s of the o r g a n i s m . As such, it o p e r a t e s as a closed network of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y between its components; that is, it is c o n s t i t u t i v e to the o r g a n i z a t i o n of th e nervous system that an y c h a n g e of relations of activity between its c o m p o n e n t s l e a d s to f u r t h e r c h a n g e s of r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n them, and that in that s e n s e it o p e r a t e s w i t h o u t inputs or o u t p u t s . Therefore, any a c t i o n u po n an environment tha t an o b s e r v e r s e es as a r es ul t of the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s sy s t e m , is a f e a t u r e of the s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s that t a ke pl ac e in the n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a c e l l u l a r n e t w o r k , and not a f e a t u r e of its operation a s such. In de ed, the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system and the a c t i o n s of the o r g a n i s m t a k e pl a c e in noninter secting phenomenal domains realized by orthogonally related structures. S i m i l a r l y , any p e r t u r b a t i o n of the m e d i u m i m p i n g i n g up o n the organism is a p e r t u r b a t i o n in the structure of the nervous system, not an input into the n e r v o u s s y s t e m ' s d y n a m i c s of st a te s, an d if th is d y n a m i c s of s t a t e s c h a n g e s , it doe s so because the s t r u c t u r e of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m c h a n g e s in a m a n n e r c o n t i n g e n t to the p e r t u r b a t i o n , not b e c a u s e it a d m i t s an in p u t to its o p e r a t i o n . As a re s ul t, all th at t a k e s p l a c e in the n e r v o u s system is a d a n c e of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of neuronal activities th at in the d o m a i n of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g w h e r e the o b s e r v e r beholds the o r g a n i s m a p p e a r s as a d a n c e of changing configurati o n s of e f f e c t o r - s e n s o r c o r r e l a t i o n s . An o b s e r v e r tha t s ee s an effector-sensor correlation as an a d e q u a t e behavior d oe s so because he or s he b e h o l d s the o r g a n i s m in the d o m a i n of struct u r a l c o u p l i n g in w h i c h the d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e h a v i o r ta k e s p l a c e in the f l o w of its c o n s e r v a t i o n of a d a p t a t i o n . T h e o r g a n i s m in its o p e r a t i o n d o e s not ac t up on an e n v i r o n m e n t , nor doe s the n e r v o u s

41

system operate wi th a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an e n v i r o n m e n t in the g e n e r a t i o n of the a d e q u a t e b e h a v i o r of the o r g a n i s m ; the e n v i r o n m en t e x i s t s only for an o b s e r v e r (see s e c t i o n 6,p a r a g r a p h xiii), and as s u ch it is a p h e n o m e n o n of l a n g u a g i n g . That the n e r v o u s s y s t e m s h o ul d o p e r a t e as a c l o s e d ne tw o r k of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s , and not w it h representations of an environment, has two fundamental c o n s e q u e n c e s a ) For the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system, e v e r y t h i n g is the same. Or, in othe r w o r ds , all that tak es place in the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m are c h a n g e s of relations of a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n its c o m p o n e n t s , and it do es not d i s t i n g u i s h in its o p e r a t i o n w h e t h e r its c h a n g e s of st a t e a r i s e th ro u g h its i n t e r n a l d y n a m i c s or as a r e s u l t of s t r u c t u r a l c h a n g e s triggered in it through w ha t an o b s e r v e r se es as external structural perturbations. b) For the o b s e r v e r , the o r g a n i s m o p e r a t e s in m an y different d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g which intersect operationally in the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the nervous system through the structural p e r t u r b a t i o n s t r i g g e r e d in it by the interactions of the o r g a n i s m in the se d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s . As a result of thi s c i r c u m s t a n c e , several things happen that are r e l e v a n t for the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d o m a i n s of r e a l i t y that the o b s e r v e r b r i n g s for th (see the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s ) . F i r s t l y , an observer ca n always trea t a s ta t e of a c t i v i t y of the nervous s y s t e m (a c o n f i g u r a t i o n of c h a n g e s of r e l a t i o n s of a c t i v i t y ) that arises as a r e s u l t of a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r a c t i o n of the organism, as a representation of th at i n t e r a c t i o n , and can do so by constituting the domain of d e s c r i p t i o n s as a m e t a phenomenal domain in w h i c h bo th the o r g a n i s m and the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of its interactions are d i s t i n g u i s h e d together. Secondly, different states of a c t i v i t y of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m that for an observer represent interactions of the organism in nonintersecting phenomenal domains ( d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l coupling), can a f f e c t e a c h o t h e r and g iv e ris e to b e h a v i o r s of the organism that c o n s t i t u t e m et a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the phenomena that t a ke place in tho se n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g phenomenal do m a i n s . Thirdly, the m e t a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h their operational i n t e r s e c t i o n in the d o m a i n of s t a t e s of the nervous system of o t h e r w i s e n o n i n t e r s e c t i n g p h e n o m e n a that a r i s e in the o p e r a t i o n of the o r g a n i s m in its d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of structural coupling, constitute, through the b e h a v i o r s that t h e s e intersections generate, n ew d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g of the o r g a n i s m th at do not i n t e r s e c t w it h the ot he r s . And, f o u r th ly , the o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r s e c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of intera c t i o n s ( d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of s t r u c t u r a l c o u p l i n g ) of an o r g a n i s m in the o p e r a t i o n of its n e r v o u s s y s t e m , a l l o w s it to o p e r a t e in recurrent interactions w i t h o t h e r o r g a n i s m s in the continuous recursive g e n e r a t i o n of m e t a d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s which b e c om e phenomenal domains in t h e i r own r i g h t in the o n g o i n g flow of those recurrent interactions. T h e r e s u l t of all this intersection of d o m a i n s of r e l a t i o n s in the c l o s e d o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system t h r o u g h its c o u p l i n g to the i n t e r a c t i o n s of the organism, is the p o s s i b i l i t y of the a r i s i n g of self o b s e r v i n g as the c l o s e d o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m b e c o m e s r e c u r s i v e when it c o u p l e s to the d y a n m i c s of o b s e r v i n g as two or m o r e organisms
42

generate a r e c u r s i v e d o m a i n of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions. Th at is, the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m as a c l o s e d n e t w o r k of interactions permits observing and the o b s e r v e r to a r i s e as operations in language brought forth through the operational coherences of languaging. Or, in ot h e r words, si n c e the operation of the nervous system appears in the d o ma in of operation of the o r g a n i s m as sensory-effector correlations, observing is c o o r d i n a t i o n s of b o d y h o o d s of observers through t h e i r g e n e r a t i o n of a c h o r e o g r a p h y of i n t e r l a c e d s e n s o r y e f f e c t o r correlations, b e c a u s e all tha t t h e r e is for the o p e r a t i o n of the nervous system of the o b s e r v e r in observing is its c l os ed dynamics of c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its n e u r o n a l components. It is only for an o b s e r v e r who see s two or more interacting organisms in his or her p r a x i s of li vin g, t ha t the sensoryeffector correlations of these organisms appear recursively involved with each o t h e r in a n e t w o r k of recursive sensorye f f e c t o r c o r r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h the o r t h o g o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s of the ir n e r v o u s s y s t e m s . And, f i n a l l y , it is only for an o b s e r v e r that such a n e t w o r k of r e c u r s i v e s e n s o r y - e f f e c t o r c o r r e lations becomes l a n g u a g e and c o n s t i t u t e s a m e t a domain (with respect to the o p e r a t i o n of the n e r v o u s s y s t e m ) w h e r e explanations and o b s e r v i n g tak e p l ac e, w h en the organism's recurrent interactions become a r e c u r s i v e s y s t e m of c o n s e n s u a l coordinati o n s of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s . 10. T H E D O M A I N OF P H Y S I C A L E X I S T E N C E A d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e is a d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l coherences entailed by the d i s t i n c t i o n of a uni ty by an o b s e r v e r in his or her p r a x i s of li vi n g . As such, a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e a r i s e s as the d o m a i n of the o p e r a t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of the p r o p e r t i e s of the u n i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d if it is a s i m p l e unit y, or as the d o m a i n of validity of the properties of the components of the uni ty d i s t i n g u i s h e d if the u n i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d is a c o m p o s i t e one. As a consequence, the d i s t i n c t i o n of a un it y e n t a i l s its d om ai n of existence as a c o m p o s i t e u n i t y t h at i n c l u d e s the distinguished unity as a c o m p o n e n t * Therefore, t h e r e are as m a n y d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e as k i n d s of u n i t i e s an o b s e r v e r may b r i n g f o r t h in his or her o p e r a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n . In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , si nc e the notion of determinism a p p l i e s to the operation of the properties of the c o m p o n e n t s of a unit y in its c o m p o s i t i o n (see s e c t i o n s 6 i x , and 7 iy), all d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e , as c o m p o s i t e entities that include the unities tha t specify them, are deterministic systems in th e s e n s e i n d i c a t e d a b o v e . T hi s has c e r t a i n c o n s e q u e n c e s for us l i v i n g s y s t e m s e x i s t i n g in l an gu ag e, and for the e x p l a n a t i o n s t h a t we g e n e r a t e as s u c h be in g s . Th e f o l l o w i n g are so me of t h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s : i) O ur d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as the c o m p o s i t e u n i t i e s that we are as m o l e c u l a r a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s , is the d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of our component molecules, and entails all the operational coherences p r o p e r to the m o l e c u l a r existence. Therefore, our existence as a u t o p o i e t i c s y s t e m s i m p l i e s the s a t i s f a c t i o n of all the c o n s t r a i n t s that the d i s t i n c t i o n of m o l e c u l e s entails, and o ur operation as m o l e c u l a r systems implies the determinism

43

entailed in the d is ti n ct i on of molecules. ii) If we d i st in gu is h mole cu le s as c omposite entities, they exist in the domain of exi st en ce of their components, and as such their e x is te nc e implies the satisfaction of the d e t e r m i n i s m that the di stinction of the latter entails. The same a p pl i es to the decom po si tio n of the compone nt s of molecules, and so on recursively. Since unities and their domains of exis te nc e are brought forth and specified in their dis ti nct io n in the happening of living of the observer, the only limit to the r e cu rs io n in distin ct ion s is the limit of the diversity of ex pe ri e nc es of the o bserver in his or her h appening of living (praxis). iii) Since the ob server as a living system is a c o m p os i te entity, the observer makes d i s t in ct io n s in his or her i n te r ac ti on s as a living system through the o peration of the p ro pe rt i es of his or her components. If the observer uses an inst ru me nt , then his or her d is tin ct io ns take place through the ope r at io n of the properties of the instrume nt as if this were one of its components. The result of all this is that an ob se rv er cannot make d is ti nc ti on s outside its domain of e x i s t en ce as a co mposite entity. iv) D es c ri pt io ns are series of consensual d i s t i n c t i o n s subject to recursive consens ua l d i st i nc ti on s in a c om mu ni ty of observers. Obs er ve rs operate in language only through their recursive i n te r ac ti on s in the domain of structural c oup li ng in which they recursively co or di n at e consens ua l actions as o p e r a t i o n s in their d omains of e xp er i en c es through the praxis of their living. Therefore, all i nt er a ct io n s in language between o bs er v er s take place through the op er a ti on of the properties of their c om po ne nt s as living systems in the domain of their rec ip ro ca l structural coupling. Or, in other words, we as human beings ope ra te in language only through our interac ti ons in our d om ai n of e xistence as living systems, and we cannot make d e s c r i p t i o n s that entail i ntera ct io ns outside this domain. As a c o n s e qu e nc e , although language as a domain of recu rs iv e consen sua l d i s t i n c t i o n s is open to unending recursions, language is a closed o p e r a t i o n a l domain in the sense that it is not possible to step o ut s i d e language thr ou gh language, and d es c ri p t i o n s cannot be c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of i nde pe nd en t entities. v) Since ev ery th in g said is said by an ob se r ve r to another observer, and since o bj ec ts (entities, things) arise in language, we cannot oper at e with obj ec ts (entities or things) as if they exist ed outside the d i s t i n c t i o n s of d is t in c t i o n s that co ns ti t ut e them. Furthermore, as e nt ities in language, o b jec ts are brought forth as exp la na to ry el em en ts in the explanation of the oper at io na l co h er e nc es of the happening of living in which langua gi ng takes place. Wit ho ut o b ser ve rs not hi ng exists, and with o bservers e v er y th in g that e xists exists in ex pla nations. vi) As we put o bj e ct i v i t y in p ar entheses beca us e we that we cannot e xp e r i e n t i a l l y di st in g ui sh between social ly call p er ce pt io n and illusion, we ac cept that recognize what we e xistence

44

is s p e c i f i e d by an o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n : nothing pre-exists its distinction. In this s en se , h ous es , pe rso ns , a to m s or elementary particles, a re not d i f f e r e n t . A l so in this sense, existence as an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r a x i s of living of the ob s er v e r , is a c o g n i t i v e p h e n o m e n o n that r e f l e c t s the o n t o l o g y of o b s e r v i n g in su ch pra x is of li vin g, and not a c l a i m a bo u t o b j e c tivity. Therefore, wit h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , an e n ti ty has no c o n t i n u i t y beyond or o u t s i d e that specified by the coherences that c o n s t i t u t e its d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as this is br o u g h t f o r t h in its d i s t i n c t i o n . Th e c l a i m that the h o u s e to whic h I r e t u r n eve ry e v e n i n g fro m w o rk is the same that I left in the morning, or that w h e n e v e r I see my m o t h e r I see the sam e p e r s o n that ga ve bi r th to me, or that all the p o i n t s of the path of an e l e c t r o n in a b u b b l e c h a m b e r are tr ac es left by the s am e electron, ar e c l a i m s that c o n s t i t u t e c o g n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s that d e f i n e s a m e n e s s in the d i s t i n c t i o n of the un i t y (hous e, m ot h e r , or e l e c t r o n ) as this is s p e c i f i e d in the o p e r a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i o n that brings it for th t o g e t h e r w i t h its domain of e x i s t e n c e . S i n c e a c c o r d i n g to all that I h av e said, c o g n i t i v e s t a t e m e n t s are not, an d cannot be, statements ab o u t the properties of independent objects, s a m e n e s s is n e c e s s a r i l y a l w a y s a r e f l e c t i o n by the o b s e r v e r in the p r o c e s s of o b s e r v i n g in the domain of e x i s t e n c e tha t he or she b r i n g s fo r t h in his or her d i s t i n c t i o n s . Furthermore, since no e n t i t y can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d o u t s i d e its domain of e x i s t e n c e as the d o m a i n of o p e r a t i o n a l coherences in which it is p o s s i b l e , every distinction specifies a domain of e x i s t e n c e as a d o m a i n of p o s s i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n s ; th at is, ev e r y distinction specifies a d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as a v e r s u m in the multiversa, or, colloquially, every distinction specifies a d o m a i n of r e a l i t y . vii) A scientific explanation entails the proposition of a m e c h a n i s m (or c o m p o s i t e e n t i t y ) that, if r e a l i z e d , w o u l d g e n e r a t e the phenomenon to be e x p l a i n e d in the domain of experiences (p r a x i s or h a p p e n i n g of l iv i n g ) of the o b s e r v e r (see s e c t i o n 4). T h e g e n e r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of the s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n is c o n s t i tutive to it. I nd e e d , this o n t o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n in science carries w i t h it the l e g i t i m a c y of the f o u n d a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of the phenomenal domain in which the generative explanatory mechanism takes pl ace , as well as the l e g i t i m a c y of treating ev e r y e n t i t y d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a c o m p o s i t e unity, a s k i n g for the o r i g i n of its p r o p e r t i e s in its o r g a n i z a t i o n and s t r u c t u r e . And because thi s is a ls o the cas e for our c o m m o n s e n s e explanations in our e f f e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n in our d a i l y life, it s e e m s n a t u r a l to us to as k for a s u b s t r a t u m i n d e p e n d e n t of the o b s e r v e r as the u l t i m a t e m e d i u m in w hi c h e v e r y t h i n g ta ke s place. Yet, although it is an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y to e x p e c t suc h a s u b s t r a t u m , we c o n s t i t u t i v e l y c a n n o t a s s e r t its e x i s t e n c e through distinguishing it as a c o m p o s i t e e n t i t y and t h e r e b y c h a r a c t e r i z e it in te r ms of c o m p o n e n t s and r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c o m p o n e n t s . In or d e r to do so, we wo u l d h a ve to d e s c r i b e it, that is, we wo u l d h a ve to br i ng it f or t h in l a n g u a g e and g iv e it for m in the domain of recursive c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s of a c t i o n s in w h i c h we exist as hum a n beings. However, to do so wo ul d be tantamount to characterizing the substratum in te rm s of e n t i t i e s (th in gs,

45

properties) that arise through languaging, and which, as c o n s e n sual distinctions of consensual c o o r d i na t io ns of actions, are c o n st it ut iv el y not the substratum. T h r ou g h language we remain in language, and we lose the su bs tr a tu m as soon as we attempt to language it. We need the substratum for epistemological reasons, but in the s ub st r at u m there are no objects, entities, or p r o p e r ties; in the s ub st ra tu m there is nothing (no-thing) because things belong to language. In other words, nothing exists in the substratum, viii) D i s t i n c t i o n s take place in the domain of experiences, in the h a pp en in g or praxis of living of the observer as a human being. For this reason, the domain of operational c o he re n ce s that an ob se rve r brings forth in the d is ti nc ti on of a unity as its d om ai n of existence, also o cc ur s in his or her domain of exp er ie nc es as a human being as part of his or her praxis of living. Therefore, since language is op eration in a domain of recursive c on s en su al coo rd in at io ns of co nse ns ua l coordinations of actions in the domain of e xperiences of the observers as human beings, all dimen si on s of the d om ai ns of experiences of the o bservers exist in language as c o o r d i n a t i o n s of actions between observers. As such, all de sc r ip ti o ns co ns ti t ut e co nf ig u ra t io ns of c o o r d i n a t i o n s of acti on s in some dime nsi on of the doma in s of e x per ie nc es of the members of a c om m un i ty of obs er ver s in c oo ntogenic s tr uc tu r al drift. Physics, biology, mathematics, philosophy, cooking, politics, etc., are all different doma in s of languaging, and as such are all di f fe re nt domains of rec ur si ve c onsen su al c o o r d i na t io ns of consen su al c o ord ina ti on s of act io ns in the praxis or happ eni ng of living of the members of a c ommunity of observe rs . In other words, it is only as di ff e re nt domains of l an gu a gi n g that physics, biology, philosophy, cooking, politics, or any cogni ti ve domain exists. Yet, this does not mean that all c og ni ti ve domains are the same; it only means that different c o g n it i ve domains exist only as they are brought forth in language, and that langua gi ng c o n s t i t u t e s them. We talk as if things exist ed in the a b se nc e of the observer, as if the d omain of op er a ti o na l c oh ere n ce s that we bring forth in a d i s t i n c t i o n would o pe r a t e as it o pe rates in our d i s ti n ct io ns regardl es s of them. We now k n ow that this is c o n s t i t u t i v e l y not the case. We talk, for example, as if time and m at te r were i n de pe nd en t d im en si o ns of a physical space. Yet, it is apparent from my e x p l an a ti o n of the phenom en on of c o g n i t i o n that they are not and cannot be. Indeed, time and m atter are ex planations of some of the operational c o he re nc es of the doma in s of existence brought forth in the d i s t i n c t i o n s that c o n s t i t u t e the ongoing l an gu ag i ng in the p raxis of living of the m em b er s of a co mmunity of observers. Thus, time with past, present, and f uture a r i s e s as a feature of an exp la na tor y m e c h an i sm that would generate what the o bs er ve r e x p e r i e n c e s as s uc ce s si v e no ns i mu l ta ne o us phenomena; and m atter a ri s e s as a feature of an e xp l an a t o r y m echanism that would generate what he or she e xp e ri e n c e s as m ut ual ly i m p en et ra bl e s i m u lt a ne o us di st in ct i on s. Without o b s e r ve r s nothing can be said, not hi ng can be explained, nothing can be claimed,... in fact, without o b s e rv e rs nothi ng exists, because ex istence is speci fi ed in the o pe r at i on of distinction of the

46

observer. For epistemological reasons, we ask for a s u b s t r a t u m that could provide an i n d e p e n d e n t ultimate justification or v a l i d a t i o n of d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y , bu t, for o n t o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , such a s u b s t r a t u m r e m a i n s b e y o n d o u r r e a c h as observers. All that we ca n say o n t o l o g i c a l l y a b o u t th e s u b s t r a t u m t h a t we ne ed fo r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , is t h a t it p e r m i t s w h a t it p e r m i t s , a n d t h a t it p e r m i t s a l l t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o h e r e n c e s t h a t w e bring f o r t h in the h a p p e n i n g of l i v i n g as we e x i s t in l a n g u a g e . ix) As we operate in l a n g u a g e we o p e r a t e in a domain of reciprocal structural coupling in o u r d o m a i n of existence as composite unities (molecular autopoietic systems), that is, we o p e r a t e in t h e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of o u r c o m p o n e n t s . Therefore, a n y t h i n g t h a t we say, a n y e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t we p r o p o s e , ca n o n l y entail d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t i n v o l v e t h e o p e r a t i o n of o u r c o m p o n e n t s in their domain of e x i s t e n c e as we o p e r a t e as observers in language. Accordingly, it is in t h e d o m a i n w h e r e we e x i s t as composite entities, t h a t we d i s t i n g u i s h molecules, atoms, or elementary p a r t i c l e s as e n t i t i e s t h a t we b r i n g f o r t h in l a n g u a g e through o p e r a t i o n s of d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t s p e c i f y t h e m as well as the operational c o h e r e n c e s of t h e i r d o m a i n s of e x i s t e n c e . If w h a t w e c a l l th e p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e is the dom a i n where p h y s i c i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h m o l e c u l e s , a t o m s , or e l e m e n t a r y p a r t i c l e s , then we as living systems specify the domain of physical existence as our l i m i t i n g c o g n i t i v e d o m a i n as we operate as o b s e r v e r s in l a n g u a g e , i n t e r a c t i n g in th e d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e of o u r c o m p o n e n t s as we b r i n g f o r t h t h e p h y s i c a l d o m a i n of e x i s t e n c e as an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e h a p p e n i n g of o u r l i v i n g . We do not e x i s t in a p r e - e x i s t i n g d o m a i n of p h y s i c a l e x i s t e n c e ; w e b r i n g it f o r t h a n d s p e c i f y it a s we e x i s t as o b s e r v e r s . T h e e x p e r i e n c e of the p h y s i c i s t , be t h i s in c l a s s i c , r e l a t i v i s t i c , or quantum physics, does not reflect t h e n a t u r e of "the universe"; it r e f l e c t s th e o n t o l o g y of th e o b s e r v e r as a l i v i n g s y s t e m as he or s h e o p e r a t e s in l a n g u a g e b r i n g i n g f o r t h th e p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s a n d the operational coherences of their domains of existence. Einstein made th e a s s e r t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s (explanat i o n s ) a r e f r e e c r e a t i o n s of t h e h u m a n m i n d ; and then, in what s e e m e d t o r e v e a l a p a r a d o x , he a s k e d t h e q u e s t i o n , " H o w is it, if that is the case, t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e is intelligible through them?" In t h i s a r t i c l e I h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e r e is no p a r a d o x if one reveals the ontology of o b s e r v i n g and the ontology of scientific explanations through putting objectivity in parentheses. Indeed, I have shown that a scientific explanation entails: a) the p r o p o s i t i o n of a p h e n o m e n o n to be explained, b r o u g h t f o r t h as s u c h a p r i o r i in t h e p r a x i s of l i v i n g ( d o m a i n of experiences) of th e o b s e r v e r ; b) th e p r o p o s i t i o n of a n ad hoc generative mechanism, a l s o b r o u g h t f o r t h a p r i o r i in t h e p r a x i s of living of t h e o b s e r v e r , t h a t if a l l o w e d to operate would generate the p h e n o m e n o n b e i n g e x p l a i n e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e to be w i t n e s s e d by th e o b s e r v e r in h e r or h i s p r a x i s of l i v i n g ; c) t h e operational coherence of th e f o u r o p e r a t i o n a l conditions that c o n s t i t u t e i t s c r i t e r i o n of v a l i d a t i o n , as they are r e a l i z e d in t h e p r a x i s of l i v i n g of t h e o b s e r v e r ; an d d) t h e s u p e r f l u i t y an d i m p e r t i n e n c e of the a s s u m p t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y . F r o m al l t h i s it follows t h a t th e e x p l a n a t o r y m e c h a n i s m p r o p o s e d in a scientific

47

e xpl a na ti o n is c on s ti tu t iv e ly "a free creation of the human mind" because it is brought forth con st it ut iv el y a priori in the praxis of living of the observer, that is, without any other ju st i fi ca t ion than the ad hoc g en er ati ve character of the phenomenon explained. It also foll ow s from all this, that a scientific e xp la n at i on co ns ti t ut iv e ly explains the uni ve rs e (versum) in which it takes place because both the exp lanatory mech an ism and the phenomenon being expl ai ne d occur, in a g en er at iv e relation, as n o ni n te rse ct in g phe no me na of the same o pe r at i o n a l domain of the praxis of living of the observer. Or, in other words, it also follows from all this, that since the op eration of di st in ct i on specifies the entity dist in gui sh ed as well as its d om ai n of existence, a scient if ic e xp la na ti on consti tu ti ve ly ex pl ai ns the universe (versum) in which it takes place because it brings with it the domain of o pe rational c o h e r e n c e s (the versum of the multiversa) of the praxis of living of the observer that it makes intelligible. Strictly, then, there is no paradox: s ci en ti fi c ex pl an at io ns do not explain an i n de pe nd en t world or universe; they explain the praxis of living (the domain of e xp er ie nc es ) of the o bserver, making use of the same oper at io nal c o he r e n c e s that c on s ti t ut e the praxis of living of the observer in languaging. It is here that science is poetry.

REALITY The word "reality" comes from the Latin noun res that means "objec t" (thing), and as it is co mmonly used signifies o b je c ti vi t y without p ar en th es es . The real, and s o me ti me s the really real, is meant to be that which exists in d ep e nd en t ly of the observer. Now we know that the concepts e n ta i le d in this way of speaking cannot be sustained. Objects, things, arise in l an guage when a co n se ns u al c oo rd in at ion of a ctions, by being c on s en s u a l l y d is ti ngu is he d in a recursion of c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a tions of actions, o bs cu re s the actions that it c o o r d i n a t e s in the praxis of living in a c o n s e n s u a l domain. Since a cc o rd in g to this c i rc um st an ce , an object, a unity, is brought forth in language in an o pe r at i on of di st in c ti on that is a c o n f i gu r at io n of consensual coordinations of action s, when an object is d is t in g u i s h e d in l a n gu a ge its domain of e x i s te n ce as a coherent do ma in of consensual c oo r di n at io n s of a c ti on s becomes a d omain of objects, a d om a in of reality, a v e r s u m of the m u lt ive rs a such that all that is in it is all that is en ta il ed in the c on s en s ua l c o o r d in at i on s of a c tio ns that c on st i tu t e it. Every domain of e xi st en ce is a do ma in of reality, and all doma ins of reality are equa ll y valid d o ma in s of e xistence b r ou gh t forth by an ob ser v er as domains of c oh er e nt consen su al a c t i o n s that specify all that is in them. O n c e a d omain of reality is brought forth, the o b s er v er can treat the objects or entities that c ons ti t ut e it both as if they were all that there is and as if they existed i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o p e r a t i o n s of di st i nc t io n that bring them forth. And this is so beca us e a domain of r e ali ty is brought forth in the praxis of l iv in g of the observer as a domain of o p er at i o n a l c oh er en c es that r e q ui r es no internal j u s t i f i ca ti o n. It follows from all this, that an o b s er v er o p er at in g in a

11.

48

domain of reality n ece ss ar i ly op er at es in a domain of e ffective actions, and that another observ er claims that the first one commits a m i sta ke or has an illusion only when the first observer begins to o pe ra te in a domain of reality di fferent from the one that the second observ er expected. Thus, if we specify the o pera ti on of d i st in ct io n "ghost," then ghosts exist, are real in the domain of e x is te nc e brought forth in their distinction, and we can do e ff ec ti ve acti on s with them in that domain, but they are not real in any other domain. Indeed, e ve ry th in g is an i llusion o ut si de its domain of existence. In other words, every domain of reality as a domain of o pe rat ion al co he re n ce s brought forth in the hap pe ni ng of living of the ob se rv er in language, is a closed domain of effe ct iv e c on se ns u al actions, that is, a c o g nit iv e domain; and conversely, every cogn it iv e domain as a domain of o p e ra ti o na l c oh er en ce s is a domain of reality. What is uncanny, perhaps, is that although d i ff er en t domai ns of reality are seen by an ob ser ve r as different dom ai ns of c o o r d in a ti on s of act io ns in an enviro nm en t, they are lived by the ob server as dif fe re nt domains of l an gu ag in g which differ only through their ongoing t r a n s f or m at i on in the d if fe ren t c i r c u ms t an c es of recursion in which they arise. We as o b se rv er s can explain this now by saying that, as we opera te in langu age through our c on se ns ual i n t er a c t i o n s in the h ap pe ni ng of living of a comm un it y of observers, our st r uc tu r al drift in the ha pp en i ng of our living becomes co nt in ge nt upon the course of those c o ns e ns ua l interactions, and that this takes place in a manner that keeps the tr an sf or m at io n of the h ap p en in g of our living c on gr ue nt with the domain of reality that we bring forth in that comm un it y of observers, or we d i si n t e g r a t e as m em be rs of it. It is this that makes us o b s e r ving systems s y st em s capable, through language, of an endless re cu rs i ve generation of new cogni ti ve domains (new dom ai ns of reality) as new domains of praxes of obse rv in g in our c o nt inu ou s st ru ct ur al drifts as living systems.

12. S E L F - C O N S C I O U S N E S S AND REALITY The self a ri se s in language in the linguis ti c recursion that brings forth the observ er as an entity in the e x p la na t io n of his or her o pe r at i on in a domain of co ns en su al di st inctions. Self c o n s c io u sn e ss a ri s es in language in the l in gu is tic recu rs io n that brings forth the d i st in c t i o n of the self as an entity in the exp la na ti on of the o p er at io n of the ob server in the d i s ti nc t io n of the self from other en tities in a c on s en su a l domain of di st in ctions. As a result, reality arises with selfc o n s c io u sn e ss in la ng ua ge as an e x pl a na t io n of the di sti n ct io n between self and no n-s el f in the praxis of living of the observer. Self, se lf - co ns c io u sn es s , and reality exist in la nguage as explanations of the ha pp en i ng of living of the observer. Indeed, the observer as a human being in language is primary with respect to self and s el f- c on sc io u sn es s , and these arise as he or she o pe ra te s in l an guage ex pl ai n in g his or her experience, his or her praxis of living as such. That the e nt it ie s brought forth in our e xp l an a t i o n s should have an u n av oi da bl e pr es en c e in our domain of existence, is because we are realized as o bs er ver s as we d i s ti ng u is h these en ti ti es in the

49

domain of operational coherences tha t they de fi ne as we distinguish them. We do not go t h r o u g h a w a l l in the p r a x i s of living b e c a u s e we ex i s t as l i v i n g s y s t e m s in the same d o m a i n of operational coherences in w h i c h a wall e x i s t s as a m o l e c u l a r en t it y, and a w a l l is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a c o m p o s i t e entit y in the molecular space as th at e n t i t y t h r o u g h w h i c h we c a nn ot go as molecular entities. The o b s e r v e r is p r im ar y, not the o b j e c t . Better , o b s e r v i n g is a g i v e n in the p r a x i s of l i vi ng in language, and we are a l r e a d y in it w h e n we be gi n to r e f l e c t up on it. Matter, en e rg y , ideas, notions, mind, sp ir i t , G o d , . . . are e x p l a n a t o r y p r o p o s i tio ns of ( ab o u t ) the p r a x i s of l i vi ng of the ob s er ve r. Furthermore, matter, e ne r g y , ideas, not io n s, mind , spirit, or God, as explanatory p r o p o s i t i o n s e n t a i l d i f f e r e n t m a n n e r s of l i v i n g of the observer in r e c u r s i v e c o n s e r v a t i o n of adaptation in the domains of operational coherences brought fo rt h in thei r different distinctions. Thus, w he n the o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e s w i t h objectivity without parentheses, he or sh e operates in an explanatory avenue th at entails neglecting the e x p e r i e n t i a l i n d i s i n g u i s h a b i l i t y b e t w e e n wh at we call p e r c e p t i o n and i l l u s i o n , and w h e n he or sh e o p e r a t e s w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s he or she o p e r a t e s in an e x p l a n a t o r y a v e n u e th at e n t a i l s a c c e p t i n g this indistinguishability as a s t a r t i n g poi n t. In the e x p l a n a t o r y path of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t p a r e n t h e s e s , the o b s e r v e r , l a n g u a g e , and p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y b e c a u s e in this explanatory path it is a s s u m e d that the observer can mak e reference to e n t i t i e s th at ex i s t i n d e p e n d e n t l y of wha t he or she does, an a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h is in c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h the s t r u c t u r a l d e t e r m i n i s m of l i v i n g s y s t e m s ; w h i l e in the e x p l a n a t o r y p a th of objectivity in p a r e n t h e s e s ther e is no s u c h contradiction. At the same time, as on e o p e r a t e s w i t h i n an y g i v e n d o m a i n of r e a l i t y one can operate with objectivity without parentheses without contradiction, but when a disagreement arises wi th another observer, a nd on e t h i n k s that it is not a m a t t e r of a s i m p l e l o g i c a l m i s t a k e , one is f o r c e d to c l a i m a p r i v i l e g e d a c c e s s to an objective r e a l i t y to r e s o l v e it, and to d e a l w i t h e r r o r s as if they w e re m i s t a k i n g s of w h a t is. If in s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s one is o p e r a t i n g w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , o ne fin ds t ha t the d i s a g r e e i n g p a r t i e s o p e r a t e in d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s of r e a li ty , and that the d i s a g r e e m e n t d i s a p p e a r s on ly w h e n th ey be g in to o p e r a t e in the s a m e one . Furthermore, on e a l s o f i n d s that e r r o r s are c h a n g e s of d o m a i n of r e a l i t y in the o p e r a t i o n of an o b s e r v e r that he or she n o t i c e s on ly a p o s t e r i o r i . Finally, by o p e r a t i n g in th e explanatory p a t h w a y of o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h o u t parentheses we cannot e x p l a i n h o w an o b s e r v e r o p e r a t e s in the g e n e r a t i o n of a scientific e x p l a n a t i o n b e c a u s e we ta ke for g r a n t e d the a b i l i t i e s of the observer. C o n t r a r y to thi s s t a t e of affairs, if we o p e r a t e in the e x p l a n a t o r y p a t h w a y of o b j e c t i v i t y in p a r e n t h e s e s , scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s and the o b s e r v e r a p p e a r as c o m p o n e n t s in a single closed generative explanatory mechanism, in w h i c h the properties or a b i l i t i e s of the o b s e r v e r a r e s h o w n to a r i s e in a d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a l d o m a i n than the one in w h i c h its components operate.

50

We human beings exist only as we exist as self-conscious entities in language. It is only as we exist as self-conscious entities that the domain of physical existence exists as our limiting cognitive domain in the ultimate explanation of the human observer's happening of living. The physical domain of existence is secondary to the happening of living of the human observer, even though in the explanation of observing the human observer arises from the physical domain of existence. Indeed, the understanding of the ontological primacy of observing is basic for the understanding of the phenomenon of cognition. Human existence is a cognitive existence and takes place through languaging; yet, cognition has no content and does not exist outside the effective actions that constitute it. This is why nothing exists outside the distinctions of the observer. That the physical domain of existence should be our limiting cognitive domain does not alter this. Nature, the world, society, science, religion, the physical space, atoms, molecules, trees,... indeed all things, are c o g n i t i v e entities, explanations of the praxis or happening of living of the observer, and as such, as this very explanation, they only exist as a bubble of human actions floating on nothing. Every thing is cognitive, and the bubble of human cognition changes in the continuous happening of the human recursive involvement in coontogenic and cophylogenic drifts within the domains of existence that he or she brings forth in the praxis of living. Every thing is human responsibility. The atom and the hydrogen bombs are cognitive entities. The big bang, or whatever we claim from our present praxis of living gave origin to the physical versum, is a cognitive entity, an explanation of the praxis of living of the observer bound to the ontology of observing. That is their reality. Our happening of living takes place regardless of our explanations, but its course becomes contingent upon our explanations as they become part of the domain of existence in which we conserve organization and adaptation through our structural drifts. Our living takes place in structural coupling with the world that we bring forth, and the world that we bring forth is our doing as observers in language as we operate in structural coupling in it in the praxis of living. We cannot do anything outside our domains of structural coupling; we cannot do anything outside our domains of cognition; we cannot do anything outside our domains of languaging. This is why nothing that we do as human beings is trivial. Everything that we do becomes part of the world that we live as we bring it forth as social entities in language. Human responsibility in the multiversa is total.

51

ONTOLOGY OF OBSERVING

52

BIBLIOGRA P H Y

Maturana H. R . (1970) "Biology of Cognition", In Autopoiesis and Cognition by Haturana E. B. and F. G. Varela. Reidal 1980.

Maturana H. R . and F. G. Varela (1973) "De naquinas y seres vivos" in english "Autopoiesis: the organisation of the liv ing", in Autopoiesis and Cognition by Maturana H. R . and F. G. Varela, Beidel 1960.

Maturana H. R . (1973) The organisation of the living: a theory of the living organisation. Internet. J. of Man-Machisna Studlea 7 ; 313-332

Maturana H . R .(1978) "Biology of language: epistemology of reality", in Psychology and biology of language and thought. Editors: G. A. Miller and Elizabeth Lenneberg. Acadenlc Press.

Maturana H . R .(l960) "Autopoiesis: reproduction, heredity and evolution", in Autopoieeis, dissipative structures and spontaneous social orders. Edited by Milan Zeleny. AAAS Selected Sym posium 55. Westviev. Maturana H. B. and P. J. Varela (1987) The tree of knowledge. New Science Library. Shambhala. Margulis Lynn (1961) Symbiosis in cell evolution. Freeman.

53