SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 91192 December 2, 1991 ROBINSON V. CASIO, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, GINGOOG GALLERA, INC., represented by its President and Manager, LINDY L. DE LARA, respondents. Feliciano A. Sia for petitioner. Josefino B. Remotigue for private respondent. REGALADO, J.:p This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-156966 which affirmed the judgment 2rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, declaring the city mayor's permits 3 issued in favor of petitioner Robinson V. Casio as null and void, and ordering him, his agents, and/or authorized representatives and all persons acting in his behalf, to desist from further operating the cockpit in question, known as the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum (here inafter, Coliseum). However, the writ of preliminary injunction ordered by the trial court to be made permanent was deleted in the appealed decision, the former having theretofore been dissolved. Prior to the passage by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City of Resolution No. 49, Code Ordinance, Series of 1984, the Coliseum, located on Block 125 at the corner of Lugod and Jadol Streets, Gingoog City and owned by petitioner, was a licensee of a cockpit under Sections 2285 to 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Thereafter, the aforesaid resolution classified certain areas of the city as residential zones, declaring, among others, the site of Coliseum as such. The classification led to the cancellation of petitioner's license to operate the cockpit. Article 10, Section 6.44 of the same resolution provides: Sec 6.44. Amendments to the zoning ordinance. Changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amendment provided that any amendment to the zoning ordinance or provision thereof shall be carried out through a resolution of three fourths vote of the Sangguniang Panglunsod. Said amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC. On August 13, 1985, Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, Series of 1985, reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending Resolution No. 49. Nine (9) members of the said sangguniang panlungsod, participated, with four (4) members voting for the amendment, while four (4) voted against, and with one (1) abstention. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment. When Resolution No. 378 was transmitted to then City Mayor Miguel Paderanga for approval, he returned the same to thesangguniang panlungsod within ten days, without any action, stating that his approval thereof was not necessary since it did not involve a disposition of city government funds, as provided by Section 180 of the Local Government Code and Section 14 of the charter of Gingoog City. By virtue of said Resolution No. 378, the succeeding city mayor, Arturo S. Lugod, issued to petitioner the aforestated permit to operate a cockpit dated April 2, 1986, which was renewed by another permit issued on January 5, 1987. 4 Private respondent Gingoog Gallera, Inc., (hereafter, Gallera) protested the operation of Coliseum before the Philippine

Gamefowl Commission (PGC, for short). The protest was founded on the fact that no certificate of registration had as yet been issued by the PGC, 5 although city mayor's permits were issued to petitioner. On April 11, 1986, the PGC, through OIC Pacifico L. Orog sent a telegram to the Station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend in the meantime the operation of the cockpit. On April 24, 1986, the PGC eventually sent a telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its failure to register with the PGC. 6 Thereafter, Special Civil Action No. 86-020 for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVII, Gingoog City, against petitioner, 7 on the ground that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning Ordinance No. 49, is invalid. It asserted that the classification of Coliseum's site as still within the residential zone of Gingoog City was accordingly maintained and unchanged, thereby rendering the mayor's permits issued to the latter null and void for being in violation of Section 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the PGC. On April 25, 1986, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner to desist from operating the Coliseum until the PGC shall have finally decided the controversy between petitioner and private respondent Gallera. Resolving the case on July 25, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, declaring the aforesaid mayor's permits null and void and ordering herein petitioner and all persons representing him or acting in his behalf from further operating the cockpit in question. Petitioner appealed the said unfavorable judgment to respondent court which, on May 30, 1989, issued the decision under consideration. Hence, this present recourse, after petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit on October 27, 1989. 8 In his memorandum, petitioner takes issue with what he conceives as respondents' erroneous contentions that: (1) the Philippine Gamefowl Commission controls the operations of the Don Romulo Rodriguez Coliseum with respect to the local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays, holidays and fiestas in Gingoog City, despite the fact that the Mayor of Gingoog City issued a mayor's permit for 1986 and 1987 (Exhs. "1" and "9") with the concurrence of the sangguniang panlungsod (Exhs. "20", "21", and "22"); and (2) the mayor's permits (Exhibits "1" and "9") issued by the Mayor of Gingoog City for the years 1986 and 1987 are allegedly null and void because Resolution 378 (Exh. "O") did not amend Section 6.44 of Resolution 49 (Exh. "L"), Code Ordinance of 1984, the three-fourths (3/4) votes not having been obtained in passing said Resolution 378. 9 On the first objection of petitioner, it is true that the PGC has the power not of control but only of review and supervision. This power was validly exercised by said commission over Coliseum when it sought to stop the former's operations through the local officials. It did not whimsically order the suspension and the consequent stoppage of Coliseum's operations. Rather, PGC only exercised its power of review over the acts performed by the local authorities in relation to or which affect the exercise of its functions. Review is a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance with law. 10 This the PGC did by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the

non-compliance by petitioner with the rules involved in this case which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge of the regulatory functions of PGC. PGC may, for that purpose and as it did here, indicate its disapproval of the acts of the local officials concerned 11 to stress and perform its role with respect to the regulation of cockpits. On this aspect of the corresponding powers of the PGC and the local authorities, respondent court amply clarified in its resolution of October 27, 1989 the position it had taken in its main opinion, thus: With respect to private respondentappellant's (herein petitioner) Motion for Reconsideration his interpretation that the decision of the First Division of this Court, promulgated on April 28, 1989, in CA-G.R. SP No. 15024, entitled Gingoog Gallera, Inc. vs. The Philippine Gamefowl Commission is "diametrically opposed to" the decision rendered in this case in regard to the primacy of the power/authority between the local officials of the City of Gingoog and the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) is erroneous. Both decisions are in accord with one another. The decision of the First Division that it is the Municipal/City Mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits is of the same tenor and effect as the decision of this case as can be seen in the following wordings: The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is lodged with City and Municipal Mayor with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians. This is specifically granted to them by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1802-A which states: Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision. This is not to say that the power to grant licenses is absolute. It must be noted that certain requirements must be complied (with) before a license may issue. First, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in connection with the operation of cockpits must be observed. And second, that there must be concurrence of the Sanggunians. (Decision, p. 6) While this Court agrees with the movant that a mayor's permit/ license is a condition

precedent to the issuance of the PGC Registration Certificate, in the case at bar, the city mayor's permits issued to movant were null and void as they were granted pursuant to Resolution No. 578 which never took effect because of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed in Resolution No. 49. And because of the nullity of the Mayor's permit, the Registration Certificate No. C-86816 issued to movant is likewise null and void. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. 12 The foregoing discussion brings us to the determinant legal query to be resolved, which is the validity of Resolution No. 378. Petitioner argues for the legality of Resolution No. 378 because the same was passed by the sanggunian by a majority of five (5) affirmative votes as against four (4) negative votes. He contends that the three-fourths vote requirement under Section 6.44, Resolution No. 49, aside from its being merely a formal requirement, is an enactment of the sanggunian which is ultra vires. We do not agree. Resolution No. 378 was declared invalid by the Court of Appeals for failure to comply with the required votes necessary for its validity. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the Local Government Code require only a majority for the enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with the categorical requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. The pertinent provisions in the aforesaid city charter and the Local Government Code obviously are of general application and embrace a wider scope or subject matter. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. Undeniably, however, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. 13 In the instant case, although the general law on the matter requires a mere majority, the higher requisite vote in Resolution No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular statute and, therefore, to pass the appropriate ordinance to attain the main object of the law. 14 This more stringent requirement on the necessary votes for amendments to Resolution No. 49 apparently forestalled the apprehended contingency for, to borrow the words of respondent court, "in an apparent attempt to get rid of this legal stumbling block (the prohibition against a cockpit in a residential zone under Proclamation 49), the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, series of 1985," . . . "thereby reclassifying Block 125 into a recreational zone." 15Withal, it is legally permissible, as exceptions to the general provisions on measures covered by city charters and the Local Government Code, that the vote requirement in certain ordinances may be specially provided

for, as in the case of Section 6.44 of Resolution No. 49, instead of the usual majority Vote. 16 In sum, Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein is prohibited. This weighty consideration, which should actually be the principal basis for the nullification by respondent court of the two mayor's permits issued to petitioner (private respondent-appellant therein), was explained as follows: The rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission on June 1, 1981 in connection with the operation of all cockpits in the Philippines particularly Section 6 and 12 thereof reads as follows: Sec. 6. Site and Constructions of cockpits. Cockpits shall be constructed and operated within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances. Sec. 12. Registration of cockpits. All cockpits in the Philippines shall register with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission not later than September 30, 1981. No cockpit shall be allowed to operate without the proper registration certificate being secured annually, not later than January 31. xxx xxx xxx In the case at bar, there was no registration certificate issued, much less authorization to operate given by the PGC to the private respondent-appellant, a condition precedent before a grant of mayors permit or license to conduct cockfighting. Therefore, the mayor's permits issued to private respondent are null and void. Obviously, the PGC did not grant the private respondent-appellant the proper registration certificate to operate his cockpit because the same was not constructed within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or ordinances of Gingoog City pursuant to Section 6 of Rules and Regulation of the PGC. . . . 17 It bears mention, however, that the issue in this case is the validity of the city mayor's permits of April 22,1986 and January 5, 1987 and the nullity whereof is affirmed in this opinion. Respondents observe that they see no useful purpose in having said permits declared null and void since they are already functus officio. We agree, however, with the stance taken respondent court that this adjudication would still be in order since it can hereafter serve as a guide for the proper and legal issuance of mayor's permits to cockpits owners. As pertinently quoted, justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged rights, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. 18 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 30, 1989 and its resolution dated October 27, 1989 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 134213. July 20, 1999] Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr., petitioner, vs. Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta, respondents. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The query herein is purely legal. May an incumbent ViceGovernor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside over the sessions of theSangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)? The facts are not in dispute. In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held its regular session on September 6, 1995, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, seven (7) members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four (4) others voted against with one (1) abstention. On September 22, 1995, respondents filed before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, on October 2, 1995, the Governor re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting Governor.[1]Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local officials involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel issue under the existing laws on local government. Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provide that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP.[2] In addition to such function, he become(s)[3] the Governor and assume(s)[4] the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions[5] of the Governor. It may be noted that the Code provides only for modes of succession in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor and the Vice-Governor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor, just like the 1983 Local Government Code.[6] It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as the Governor but does not become the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the ViceGovernor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. But the problem is, while in such

capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP? Sad to say the new Local Government Code is silent on this matter, yet this query should be answered in the positive. A ViceGovernor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a nonmember of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress.[7] Unlike under the old Code, where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive,[8] but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body,[9] the new Code delineated the union of the executivelegislative powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a member thereof.[10] This is clear from the law, when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP,[11] which is the legislative body of the province, and enumerates therein its membership consisting of the: 1.) Vice-Governor, as presiding officer, 2.) regular elective SP members, 3.) three elective sectoral representatives, and 4.) those ex-officio members, namely: a.) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, c.) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of municipalities and component cities.[12] Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded applying the rule in legal hermeneutics that when the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. On the contrary, local executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor.[13] Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance between the two. It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is considered effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latters absence. [14] This doctrine should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably construed to mean effective absence,[15] that is, one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.[16] There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.[17] By virtue of the foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor during such

contingency. Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office.[18] This is so because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.[19] Such is not only consistent with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the ViceGovernor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.[20] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur. EN BANC G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994 ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET

AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents. Alfonzo M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners. PUNO, J.: The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses of government. One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru initiatives where local ordinances and resolutions can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected. In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227. On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states: I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon.

II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan: (A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman. (B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan. (K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan. (D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan. (E). Ibase sa laki ng kanyakanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA. (G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa. (H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan. (I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan. (J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility." 5 We quote the letter, viz: The Executive Director C O M E L E C Intramuros, Metro Manila S i r:

In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, relative to the conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, may we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the issues raised by the proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other government agencies by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the petitioners with the corresponding actions undertaken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit: ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993. II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung: a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pag-aaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval Reservation; b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila sa SSEZ; c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan; d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan; e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng dalawang (2) pinto pa; (f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan; g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar. ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG 1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, all actions of LGU's correlating on the above issues are merely recommendatory in nature when such provisions were already embodied in the statute. 2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and approved Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg. 12, Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same issues raised by the petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).

3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying letter from BCDA Vice-Chairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated June 3, 1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA. 4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of Morong, Bataan Mayor Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of Concurrence to SBMA was submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of completion of Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road) Project, including the Morong-Poblacion-Mabayo Road to DPWH. (Attached and marked as Annex "C"). Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had accommodated the clamor of the petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps drag for several months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan. Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility. Thank you and more power. Very truly yours, (SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." 6 On July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. 7 These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench. The petition makes the following submissions: 5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus. 5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside Comelec Resolution Nos. 93-1676 and 931623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as it disallowed the initiation of a local initiative to annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and authentication of the required number of signatures in support thereof.

5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe due process in the conduct of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions, Annexes "E" and "H", were issued ex parte and without affording petitioners and the other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. More importantly, these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of discretion. A Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, Constitution) 5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command the respondent Comelec to schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of the petition, and should the required number of signatures be obtained, set a date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof. 5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely ministerial. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support of the petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of signatures are obtained. If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative during which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h) R.A. 7160. Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. 8 We grant the petition. The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative. Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which has been delegated by the

sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people." 9 Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary laws. Section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Similarly, section 1, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided that "the Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa." 10 Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. So total was their trust that the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The omission was to prove unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed the expectations of the people especially when former President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which could have bridled the nation's downslide from democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day. In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled down the government of former President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American Constitution." 11 For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law. To be sure, it was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the state of South Dakota has adopted initiative and referendum in its constitution 12 and many states have followed suit. 13 In any event, the framers of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide: Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law

or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereto. The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. 14 Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra any act or law passed by Congress or local legislative body. In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put into operation the constitutionalized concept of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American laws, 15 R.A. No. 6735, among others, spelled out the requirements 16 for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum; 17procedure of local initiative and referendum; 18 and their limitations. 19 Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and referendum. In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance." We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be

necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used." 22 The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz: Sec. 3. Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean; (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours) Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on ordinance orresolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance." There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. We quote some of the interpellations when the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of Representatives,viz: THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized. MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative ad referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we

consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation. I move that we approve the consolidated bill. MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader? MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions? THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say? MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker. THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed. MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none. MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation. MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.? MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker. MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have acomplete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national legislation. MR. ROCO. That is correct. MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well asmunicipal resolutions? MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker. MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution? MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years. 23 Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend anyordinance. It does not, however, deal with the

subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states: Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year. (b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. xxx xxx xxx This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides: "Limitations upon Sanggunians. Anyproposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the inclusion of the wordproposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives. The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, espouses the same view. In his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz: 24 4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California, for example, direct initiatives were proposed to enact a fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to levy a special tax to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to prevent discrimination in the sale of housing and similar bills. Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures provided that these are within the power of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other requisites enumerated in the Section. 5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance," although the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the registered voters can propose ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions. The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may indeed be the subject of local initiative. We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in

general. 25 Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. 26 In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit: Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and thesangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein. The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies: (a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments; (b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into a exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and dutyfree importations of raw material, capital and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines: (c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three

percent (3%) of the of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base areas. In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter; (d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone; (e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone; (f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation; (g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after issuance thereof. (h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces; and (i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall operate and function in

accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides: Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units. (a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Subic Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over the Subic Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority. (b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on matters affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and security, the decision of the Subic Authority shall prevail. Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong. Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the mushrooming abuses in government. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July 6, 1993 and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, JJ., are on leave. EN BANC [G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996] SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it institutionalized people power in law-making. Learning

from the bitter lesson of completely surrendering to Congress the sole authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution concurrently vested such prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to ordain legislation directly through the concepts and processes of initiative and of referendum. In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses the practical and legal implications of such differences. It also sets down some guidelines in the conduct and implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular democracy, as well as settles some relevant questions on jurisdiction -- all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the people's exercise of direct democracy. In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27, 1996[1] denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. The Facts On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone, thus: "Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein." (Underscoring supplied) RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.[2] Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency.[3] On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed aPambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morongsubmitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition prayed for the following: "I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang kundisyon. II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEFZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan: (A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman. (B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan. (K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment' (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan. (D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling 'special economic zones' ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan. (E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA. (G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa. (H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan. (I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-TalaOrani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan. (J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan." The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E) and (G) of private respondents' petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President. Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991,[4] Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides as follows: "Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. xxx xxx xxx

(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned. xxx xxx x x x." On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 931676) further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents. On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorariand mandamus[5] before this Court against the Commission on Elections and theSangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annulPambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures. On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of thePhilippines issued proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of theSangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan". On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. x x x" The Issues The petition[6] presents the following "argument": "Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in scheduling a local initiative which seeks the amendment of a national law." In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has failed to show the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) x x x petitioner seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and executory; (3) x x x public respondent has not abused its discretion and has in fact acted within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) x x x the concurrence of local government units is required for the establishment of the Subic Special Economic Zone." Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his Reply (should be Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's Chairman

and staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas discovered that the demands in the petition for a local initiative/referendum were not legally feasible."[7] The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues, as follows: "1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local intiative proposing to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan. 2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the request of petitioner SBMA to stop the local initiative." On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which, it issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attached Comment filed by counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the: (a) Reply (should be comment) to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunctiom, filed by counsel for respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated July 22, 1996; (b) Separate Comments on the petition, filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor General for respondent Commission on Elections dated July 19, 1996 and (b-2) counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner dated July 22, 1996. At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for respondent Catalino Calimbas. Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Zenaida HernandezPerez appeared for respondent Commission on Elections with Solicitor General Goco arguing. Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM this Court by Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on Elections would push through with the initiative/referendum this Saturday, July 27, 1996. Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution. At 2:50 p.m. July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order dated also on July 23, 1996 from the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc inter alia 'to hold in abeyance the scheduled referendum (initiative) on July 27, 1996 pending resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In view of this Order, the petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic and will thus not be passed upon by this Court at this time. Puno, J., no part due to relationship. Bellosillo, J., is on leave." After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and arguments of the parties, the Court believes that the issues may be restated as follows: (1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and executory"; namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.; (2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and

(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law." First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T. Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.[8] on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject proposition -- the very same proposition, it bears emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now sought to be enjoined by petitioner x x x". We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution as contradistinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum. We quote from our said Decision:[9] "In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: 'Local Initiative Defined. -- Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.' We reject respondent's narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government of 1991 on initiative and referendum. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x'. An actincludes a resolution. Black defines an acts 'an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards and determination x x x.' It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulates, we held in In Re Guarina that if there is doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more construction, that interpretations will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.' " Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole issue presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum".[10] In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substancefor submission to the people for their approval; in

fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848 The main issue in this case may be re-started thus: Did respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848? We answer the question in the affirmative. To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUMonly. In fact, in the body of the Resolution[11] as reproduced in the footnote below the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,[12] Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus: (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action. (c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely: c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies. Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz[13] defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing definitions, which are based on Black's[14] and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows: "SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. "SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local

government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum." Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If its refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x". On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections.[15] In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the lawmaking body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot. [Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.] From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"[16] although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".[17] It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition." In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its

powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution. Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra Vires? Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite, namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact,[18] stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such ordinances or resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact.[19] After the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned (Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and bounds had already been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer within the authority and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. Hence, such withdrawal can no longer be enacted or conditionalities imposed by initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the creation of SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation. Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived therefrom. Once created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern. It has become a national project. On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is premature and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal. Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.[20] We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides[21] that "(n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act x x x." So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.[22] It passes upon errors of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers. Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission -- to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact."[23] Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon. While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful for the parties and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether Grande Island and the "virgin forests" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong to the national government and thus cannot be segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of passing a municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of the full subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized capital stock of the Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from cash and other assets, the "... lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, ..." which includes said island and forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that may be taken up in the proper forum -- the Commission on Elections. Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon remand of the initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to enact, may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall, nullify and render without effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of 1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said resolution with another municipal resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder would be granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong and Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want a totaldismemberment of Morong from the Authority -- but may not agree with any of the conditions set forth in Item II. Should the

proposal then be divided and be voted upon separately and independently? All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity. Epilogue In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question of whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of law. In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and processes, are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper corrective measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby."[24] In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people."[25]Impelled by a sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased initiative and referendum into the workings of local governments by including a chapter on this subject in the local Government Code of 1991.[26] And the Commission on Elections can do no less by seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local use, in implementation of these laws. For its part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary import of reserving people power in the process of law-making.[27] Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound public policy to enable the electorate to express their free and untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very rules and laws by which our society shall be governed and managed. WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 isREMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing discussion. No costs. IT IS SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave. Puno, J., no part due to relationship.