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Policies:

MYCAPES
DND Directive 1-2004
DPG 2007/2008-2013
Annual Planning Budget
AFP MOBilization PLAN
AFP Capability Upgrade Plan
Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020
Defense Acquisition System

Internal Documents:

Revolution in Military Affairs


2007-2008 AFP Strategic Assessment (Azul, Milo)
2007 Chief of Staff Program Assessment
Bantay Laya Assessment
Philippines - 1998 Defense Policy Paper - Chapter 7

External Documents:

US Annual Report to Congress - Military Power of the People’s Republic of China


2009
Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific (Mar 2005)
Meeting National Security Challenges of 2020
Science and Technology for Naval Warfare, 2015—2020 (Sept 4,2007)
The World In 2020 Key Trends

I. Building the scenario: What is ideal?

Recent developments show that Asia-Pacific nuclear development and arms


acquisition go beyond mere modernization as countries push their limits in acquisition
and development of advanced munitions of greater lethality and precision at greater
ranges, improved battlefield knowledge, command and control, and increased
operational maneuver and speed. These capabilities, taken together, provide their
respective militaries with capabilities that could significantly change their concept and
conduct of warfare and in turn, could seriously disturb or even destabilize regional or
bilateral military balances. More importantly, undisclosed modernization plans and
programs raise concern in terms of future conflicts and how future wars would be
fought. There are unprecedented risks which could occur and the consequences could
be critical but what is important is that the future Armed Forces would be prepared for
this scenario.
As such, the AFP needs to take into consideration how these developments
could transform and affect its future organization and military operations considering
that its main thrust is anchored on internal security. This would necessitate an interim
augmentation program which would bridge the capability gaps from ISO to territorial
defense and manage resources to support air and naval force development.
Consequently, enhancement of naval capabilities and the development of more
advanced warfare technologies that would allow it to operate with its allies and potential
coalition partners in the region should be given due consideration. It has to account for
technological, organizational and doctrinal changes in preparation for future warfare.
Finally, the PN has to establish its force development priorities in anticipation of the
future operational environment.

II. Indicators:

The AFP Vision points toward the defeat of CTM by 2010 by invigorating ISO
notwithstanding the reservations in the conclusion of the Bantay Laya Assessment,
which sets a conservative forecast of defeat at 2018. Moreover, the Mobilization
Planning Guidance for External Defense has not been updated since 2004 and thus
needs to be assessed in line with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Based on the RP-US Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) conducted last 2003, the
AFP is not capable of neutralizing threats to Philippine stability due to systemic failures
brought about by disparities in policy, planning, and development; weak personnel
management and leadership; poor budgeting and resource management; and long
procurement and delayed acquisition process.

Based on the Program Objective Memorandum of the Philippine Navy 2008-


2012, the resource planning guidance for Territorial defense is to maintain existing
capability level until 2013 which is currently at Readiness standard 3 with 65-74 percent
operational level or partially mission capable even with CUP. Moreover, as per the DPG
2007/2008-2013, territorial defense is least of the thrusts of the PN.

III. Measuring the gap:

In analyzing and comparing the military capabilities of the different countries in


the region, the following considerations should be examined: First, economic conditions
and national allocation for defense. Second, the defense posture, current thrusts and
defense plans which include modernization and procurement and acquisition programs.
Third, the operational requirements of armed forces based on its mission, vision, and
long-term plans and priorities.

On a confined spectrum, the assessment of a country’s naval capability must


take into account three factors: first, how it compares with the existing capabilities and
priorities of major powers in terms of mission areas; second, the existing naval
capability for territorial defense with emphasis on operational readiness and
modernization standards; third, concrete policies based on accurate and reasonable
strategic assessment which will necessitate the procurement and acquisition of
advanced systems such as submarines, advanced corvettes, frigates and destroyers.

IV. Title:

“Philippine Navy Capability Outlook: Bridging the gap from ISO to Territorial
Defense “

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