Labor Justice System Compositions and Powers of the Commission Adjudicatory Power

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA 166 SCRA 533 Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

PRIME SECURITY SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR FRANKLIN DRILON and PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF LABOR (A' PRIME SECURITY SERVICES, INC. U.S. EMBASSY CHAPTER) LOCAL PFL, respondents. G.R. No. 91987 July 17, 1995 Facts: On October 3, 1988, respondent union filed before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) a petition for certification election (BLR Case No. A-12-327-88) among the security guards employed by petitioner and assigned at the U.S. Embassy. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, contending: (1) that the security guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy were ineligible to join a labor organization; (2) that even assuming that they were eligible, the mandatory 20% subscription requirement was not met since only 77 out of the total 872 security guards under its employ joined the petition; and (3) that respondent union did not represent the proper bargaining unit. Held: When respondent union filed on October 3, 1988 its petition for certification election, the law in force was Article 259 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which provided that appeals from certification election orders issued by the Med-Arbiter were to be taken to the BLR. Accordingly, the Order dated November 22, 1988 of the Med-Arbiter dismissing the petition was appealed by respondent union to the BLR. Pending determination of said appeal, R.A. No. 6715 was passed on March 2, 1989 and took effect on March 21, 1989. Republic Act No. 6715 amended, among others, Article 259 of the Labor Code of the Philippines to read as follows: Appeal from certification election orders. Any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment [Bureau] on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the conduct of the election have been violated. Such appeal shall be decided within fifteen (15) calendar [working] days. The transfer of jurisdiction, notwithstanding, and consistent with the rule that jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is terminated, the BLR continued to exercise its jurisdiction over the appeal, resolving the same in its Order of April 27, 1989.

It is evidently in circumvention of that warning that respondent union filed its second motion for reconsideration before the DOLE Secretary. For while it continued to recognize the Bureau's jurisdiction over their appeal even after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715 by filing a motion for reconsideration, it suddenly had a change of mind and decided that jurisdiction was then lodged with the DOLE Secretary. We consider this act of respondent union a trifling with the orderly administration of justice. In lodging its second motion for reconsideration with an office other than that which rendered the order sought to be reconsidered, it not only evaded the dire consequences of the warning issued by the BLR Director, but also avoided the final and unappealable character of the orders of BLR as provided in the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. In effect, respondent union availed itself of a two-tiered review of the Med-Arbiter's ruling, the first by BLR and the second by the DOLE Secretary, contrary to the intent of speedy adjudication of cases under the Labor Code. Indeed, respondent union's second motion for reconsideration was not only a blatant defiance of the warning issued by the BLR Director, it likewise constituted an act partaking of the nature of forum-shopping. Clearly, the DOLE Secretary had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeals of respondent union from the BLR decision. Accordingly the questioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary and Acting Secretary should be set aside.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), AND/OR HERNANI BUENO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LUZ MENDERO, REBECCA GABATO, MERCEDES ABERILLA AND NORMA ROJO, respondents. G.R. No. 101181-84 June 22, 1992 Facts: Petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), Cebu City Branch, on the ground of retrenchment occasioned by alleged severe economic losses, terminated the employment of private respondents Luz Mendero, Rebecca Gabato and Norma Rojo. Subsequently, in June 1987, private respondent Mercedes Aberilla was also retrenched. Disputing the basis of their retrenchment,. private respondents filed complaints against petitioners for illegal dismissal. On July 11, 1988, after hearing in Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII of Cebu City, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision which was subsequently affirmed by correspondent Commission. The Labor Arbiter did not direct the reinstatement of private respondents because of their so-called "strained relations" with petitioners. Quite significantly, private respondents did not appeal from the award made by the Labor Arbiter directing payment of separation pay at the rate of one (1) month for every year of service. Thus, invoking the time-honored procedural rule that "a party who did not appeal cannot assign errors as are designed to have the judgment modified," public respondent disregarded the efforts of private respondents expressed through their appellees' memorandum filed with the NLRC to have the decision modified to include their reinstatement with payment of backwages. Held: Considering that under the circumstances the retrenchment of private respondents is not authorized by law, it must follow that their termination is illegal. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Thus, substantive rights like reinstatement and award of backwages resulting from illegal dismissal must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules. In the instant case, We hold that there is sufficient justification to order the reinstatement of private respondents although they failed to bring this matter up to public respondent on appeal. For it is clear that the Labor Arbiter erred in simply awarding separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service despite his finding that the retrenchment was not justified, and in invoking, albeit erroneously, "strained relations" for withholding reinstatement when the records fail to disclose any ill-will between the parties except perhaps what would normally go with ordinary litigations. In other words, the mere filing of a complaint by an employee for illegal dismissal should not be treated as the kind of "strained relations" that would make reinstatement "impracticable", for, he is merely exercising a right under the law. Certainly, it is unfair and unjust to deprive the private respondents of their just due by reason of a mere technicality.

SHOEMART, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MORIS INDUSTRIES WORKERS UNION, respondents. G.R. Nos. 90795-96 August 13, 1993 Facts: On June 15, 1985, the UNION, through PAFLU, sent a letter to MORIS informing it of the UNION's existence, and inviting the latter to enter into negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). MORIS's reaction was as swift as it was unexpected. Within two days, it suddenly closed shop and ceased operations, claiming that such a closure had become inevitable because of business reverses. On June 20, 1985, the UNION (PAFLU) filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MORIS. A week later, it commenced another case against MORIS, this time for recovery of wage differentials and other monetary benefits (emergency cost of living allowance [ECOLA], sick leave, vacation leave benefits, etc.). Shoemart, Inc., the other corporation involved in these cases, was impleaded by the UNION in both cases, together with the former's president, Mr. Henry Sy, on the stated theory that Shoemart, Inc. (hereafter, simply SHOEMART) and MORIS were one and the same juridical entity. SHOEMART's position paper set up the claim inter alia that its corporate personality was separate and distinct from that of MORIS, and there was no employer-employee relationship between it and the UNION's members. SHOEMART and Henry Sy, Sr. moved to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, there being no employment relationship between SHOEMART and the UNION members, MORIS' employees. SHOEMART (and Henry Sy, Sr.) filed in this Court on October 29, 1987 a special action of certiorari to annul the Order of Labor Arbiter Linsangan, and in the proceedings before the latter, a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Proceedings pending resolution of their certiorari action. At this time however, Arbiter Linsangan had already rendered a decision (dated October 26, 1987) in favor of the UNION, holding both MORIS and SHOEMART "equally liable" to the complaining UNION. The respondent NLRC rendered its decision on the consolidated cases, affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter with modification. Issue: The basic question involved in these appeals is whether or not the respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in (1) holding, on the one hand, SHOEMART "equally liable" with MORIS for unfair labor practice, illegal termination of employment and non-payment of mandated benefits to the latter's employees; and, on the other, (2) conceding to the UNION monetary awards less than those claimed by it. Held: Whatever merit it might have in the context of ordinary civil actions, where the rules of evidence apply with more or less strictness, disappears were adduced in connection with proceedings before Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission; for in said proceedings, the law is explicit that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the (law's) spirit and intention that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the fact in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process." Indeed, it is not the Rules of Court enacted by the Supreme Court but rather the regulations promulgated by the National Labor Relations Commission which govern "the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional branches . . . ." The "Revised Rule of Court of the Philippines and prevailing jurisprudence," the law says, may be applied to labor cases only under quite stringent limits, i.e., "in the absence of any applicable provision (in the Rules of the Commission), and in order to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code . . ., in the interest of expeditious labor justice and whenever practicable and convenient, by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect." Under these rules, the proceedings before a Labor Arbiter are "non-litigious in nature" in which, "subject to the requirements of due process, the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law . . . (do not) strictly apply;" "trialtype" hearings are not required; cases may be decided on the basis of verified position papers submitted by the parties, accompanied by the affidavits of their witnesses and such other authentic documents as are relevant. Cadlin vs POEA G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994 Facts: Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

Issue: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. Held: As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law. A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the one -year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Sec. 48, Rule on Civil Procedure if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines. GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the foreign statute of limitations. EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy.

BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997 Facts: Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. Respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual. Respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issue: The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code. Held: Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations . . . .

The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided: The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation vs Juco, that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1]) In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is exluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Lapanday vs CA G.R. No. 112139 January 31, 2000 Facts: Commando Security Service Agency, Inc., and defendant Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation entered into a Guard Service Contract. Plaintiff provided security guards in defendant's banana plantation. The contract called for the payment to a guard of P754.28 on a daily 8-hour basis and an additional P565.72 for a four hour overtime while the shift-in-charge was to be paid P811.40 on a daily 8-hour basis and P808.60 for the 4-hour overtime. Wage Orders increasing the minimum wage in 1983 were complied with by the defendant. Wage Order No. 5 was promulgated directing an increase of P3.00 per day on the minimum wage of workers in the private sector and a P5.00 increase on the ECOLA. This was followed by Wage Order No. 6 which further increased said minimum wage by P3.00 on the ECOLA. Plaintiff demanded that its Guard Service Contract with defendant be upgraded in compliance with Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6. Defendant refused. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff. Issue: THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS (SIC) IS THE PROPER FORUM THAT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE WAGE AND ALLOWANCE INCREASES MANDATED UNDER WAGE ORDER NOS. 5 AND 6. Held: As regards the jurisdiction of the RTC, private respondent alleges that the suit filed before the trial court is for the purpose of securing the upgrading of the Guard Service Contract entered into by herein petitioner and private respondent in June 1983. The enforcement of this written contract does not fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRC because the money claims involved therein did not arise from employer-employee relations between the parties and is intrinsically a civil dispute. Thus, jurisdiction lies with the regular courts.

We resolve to grant the petition. We resolve first the issue of jurisdiction. We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following: 1. Unfair labor practices; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral exemplary and other form of damages arising from employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this case.

EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003 Facts: Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities upon the vessels departure from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater. Subsequently, he contracted fever on November 11 which was later on accompanied by loose bowel movement for the succeeding 12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast Guard Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he could be evacuated, he died on November 18, 1992. Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for damages against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel, Mario Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus legal interest, as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was vacated and the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation, the damages awarded were not proper as she is not an employee, but merely the wife of an employee. Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioners action. (2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has already reached finality. Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming damages under the Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court was convinced that the allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. Also, she had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can be recovered in an action based on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual connection with the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBAs. It must be noted that a workers loss of earning capacity and backlisting are not to be equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the realm of Civil Law. In the present case, Evelyn Tolosas claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or CBAs. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of

obligation such as a tort. (2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals first, this cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the right to due process against the respondents to do so.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG, respondent. G.R. No. 157010 June 21, 2005 Facts: In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. At the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch Credit Officer and was accepted. She was later commended for a job well done as with regards to her performance. However, barely 3 months at work, while Florence O. Cabansag was in the flat, which she and Cecilia Aquino, the Assistant Vice-President and Deputy General Manager of the Branch and Rosanna Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of the said Branch, rented, she was told by the two (2) that Ruben C. Tobias has asked them to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job. Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of events and the runabout way Ruben C. Tobias procured her resignation from the Bank. The next day, Florence O. Cabansag talked to Ruben C. Tobias and inquired if what Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna Sarmiento had told her was true. Ruben C. Tobias confirmed the veracity of the information and gave different reasons on different occasion when both had a conversation to discuss the matter: 1) Cost cutting measure. 2) The bank will be sold and converted into a remittance company. 3) The bank needed a Chinese speaking employee. Respondent finally, on his last meeting with petitioner issued a letter of termination. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against the Respondents for illegal dismissal. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision, but reduced the moral damages to P100,000 and the exemplary damages to P50,000. In a subsequent Resolution, the NLRC denied PNBs Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy. Held: FIRST ISSUE: JURISDICTION The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as follows: "ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. x x x x x x x x x."

More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part: "SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x x x x x x x" Based on the foregoing provisions, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers (OFW). Significantly, respondents employment by the Singapore branch office ha d to be approved by Benjamin P. Palma Gil, the president of the bank whose principal offices were in Manila. This circumstance militates against petitioners contention tha t respondent was "locally hired"; and totally "governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs" of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the labor arbiter. SECOND ISSUE: PROPER VENUE Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure reads: "Section 1. Venue (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner; Provided, however that cases of Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) shall be filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch where the complainant resides or where the principal office of the respondent/employer is situated, at the option of the complainant. "For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose. It shall include the place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail, assignment or travel. In the case of field employees, as well as ambulant or itinerant workers, their workplace is where they are regularly assigned, or where they are supposed to regularly receive their salaries/wages or work instructions from, and report the results of their assignment to their employers." Under the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" (RA 8042), a migrant worker "refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker." Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of "migrant worker" or "overseas Filipino worker." As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.

SMART vs Astorga G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008 Facts: Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Incorporated (SMART) on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. This was made known to the employees on February 27, 1998. Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division. Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga filed a case with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the companys car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Astorga. Subsequently the RTC ruled denying Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA, which, in its February 28, 2000 Decision, reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and, consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the illegal dismissal case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its September 27, 1999 Decision, the NLRC sustained Astorgas dismissal and reversed the Labor Arbiters decision. Held: We do not agree. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well wit hin its discretion in denying Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters/NLRC Powers and Duties Fortune Cement vs NLRC (Lagdameo) G.R. No. 79762 January 24, 1991 Facts: Lagdameo is a registered stockholder of FCC. On October 14, 1975, at the FCC Board of Directors' regular monthly meeting, he was elected Executive Vice-President of FCC effective November 1, 1975. Some eight (8) years later, or on February 10, 1983, during a regular meeting, the FCC Board resolved that all of its incumbent corporate officers, including Lagdameo, would be "deemed" retained in their respective positions without necessity of yearly reappointments, unless they resigned or were terminated by the Board. At subsequent regular meetings held on June 14 and 21, 1983, the FCC Board approved and adopted a resolution dismissing Lagdameo as Executive Vice-President of the company, effective immediately, for loss of trust and confidence (p. 4, Rollo). On June 21, 1983, Lagdameo filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), National Capital Region, a complaint for illegal dismissal against FCC (NLRC-NCR Case No. 1-228-85) alleging that his dismissal was done without a formal hearing and investigation and, therefore, without due process FCC moved to dismiss Lagdameo's complaint on the ground that his dismiss as a corporate officer is a purely intra-corporate controversy over which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has original and exclusive jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, however, the NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter's order and remanded the case to the Arbitration Branch "for appropriate proceedings". The NLRC denied FCC's motion for reconsideration. Dissatisfied, FCC filed this petition for certiorari. Issue: The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a corporate executive vicepresident for illegal dismissal, resulting from a board resolution dismissing him as such officer. Held: The issue of the SEC's power or jurisdiction is decisive and renders unnecessary a consideration of the other questions raised by Lagdameo. Thus did this Court rule in the case of Dy vs. National Labor Relations Commission (145 SCRA 211) which involved a similar situation: It is of no moment that Vailoces, in his amended complaint, seeks other reliefs which would seemingly fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, because a closer look at these underpayment of salary and nonpayment of living allowance shows that they are actually part of the perquisites of his elective position, hence, intimately linked with his relations with the corporation. The question of remuneration, involving as it does, a person who is not a mere employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and management, and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.

The Solicitor General pointed out that "a corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act and/or intra-corporate controversy and that nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action." The dispute between petitioner and Lagdameo is of the class described in Section 5, par. (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, hence, within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC.

Cayena vs NLRC G.R. No. 76137 February 18, 1991 Facts: This case began in 1983 when Francisco Cayena filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with prayer for payment of termination pay and other money claims before the Labor Arbiter of the Regional Arbitration Board, Branch No. 10, Cagayan de Oro City against his alleged employers. He claimed that he was originally employed by respondent Cereal Land, Inc. in 1972 as a warehouseman/caretaker of its bodega in Manday, Cotabato City. In 1975, he joined respondent Maguindanao Progress Enterprises managed by Alfonso Lim Bok, Jr. and used the same bodega. In short, he was an employee of both respondent firms which are family corporations headed by Richard Lim as president. In their motion to dismiss, private respondents denied that Cayena was ever their employee. They alleged that Cayena was a regular member of the Civilian Home Defense Forces in Cotabato City under Battalion Commander Richard Lim until September 7, 1983 when he obtained a sick leave of absence on account of his pulmonary tuberculosis. As a CHDF member, Cayena was assigned and detailed in Manday to oversee the protection of all private establishments in that area, one of which was the warehouse building belonging to private respondents. Cayena's removal from respondents' premises on September 7, 1983 was due to his own request for a leave of absence which was duly approved by Richard Lim, his battalion chief. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner but later reversed itself. On appeal by petitioner Cayena, the National Labor Relations Commission issued the two (2) questioned resolutions: a) Resolution dated January 29, 1986 dismissing the appeal in the abovementioned case filed by the petitioner Francisco Cayena for allegedly having been filed out of time; and b) Resolution dated July 23, 1986 denying his Motion for Reconsideration dated April 22, 1986 for lack of merit. Held: We rule for petitioner Cayena. The questioned resolutions must be set aside, not for the reason that there was grave abuse of discretion, but because the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the Labor Tribunal was a nullity for lack of jurisdiction. From the very start, the instant case has been embroiled in procedural errors committed by both parties and further exacerbated by the Labor Arbiter. It is axiomatic that a judgment, whether correct or not, becomes final when the litigant does not appeal said judgment and the court is without jurisdiction over the case once its judgment has assumed the character of finality. The court which rendered it cannot lawfully modify or alter the same, most especially when the changes are material and substantial. This rule is peremptory even if the judgment is erroneous in the view of the magistrate looking at it. Thus, when the Labor Arbiter acceded to private respondents' petition and reopened the illegal dismissal case, he acted without legal authority. The new decision dated September 20, 1986 absolving private respondents completely from their liability to petitioner was utterly void. Essentially therefore, there was no appealable judgment to speak of since the second decision was non-existent in contemplation of law.

Boy Scout vs NLRC G.R. No. 80767 April 22, 1991 Facts: On 19 October 1984, the Secretary-General of petitioner BSP issued Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85 addressed separately to the five (5) private respondents, informing them that on 20 November 1984, they were to be transferred from the BSP Camp in Makiling to the BSP Land Grant in Asuncion, Davao del Norte. These Orders were opposed by private respondents who, on 4 November 1984, appealed the matter to the BSP National President. A complaint for illegal transfer was filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch IV, San Pablo City, Laguna. Private respondents there sought to enjoin implementation of Special Orders Nos. 80, 81, 83, 84 and 85, alleging, among other things, that said orders were "indubitable and irrefutable action[s] prejudicial not only to [them] but to [their] families and [would] seriously affect [their] economic stability and solvency considering the present cost of living."

Respondents were eventually terminated from employment. Private respondents amended their original complaint to include charges of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against petitioner BSP. The Labor Arbiter ordered the dismissal of private respondents' complaint for lack of merit. However, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by public respondent, NLRC, which held that private respondents had been illegally dismissed by petitioner BSP. Held: We are fortified in this conclusion when we note that the Administrative Code of 1987 designates the BSP as one of the attached agencies of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). 20 An "agency of the Government" is defined as referring to any of the various units of the Government including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, government-owned orcontrolled corporation, or local government or distinct unit therein. We believe that the BSP is appropriately regarded as "a government instrumentality" under the 1987 Administrative Code. It thus appears that the BSP may be regarded as both a "government controlled corporation with an original charter" and as an "instrumentality" of the Government within the meaning of Article IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution. It follows that the employees of petitioner BSP are embraced within the Civil Service and are accordingly governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations. It remains only to note that even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution employees of the BSP already fell within the scope of the Civil Service. The complaint in NLRC Case No. 1637-84 having been filed on 13 November 1984, when the 1973 Constitution was still in force, our ruling in Juco applies in the case at bar. In view of the foregoing, we hold that both the Labor Arbiter and public respondent NLRC had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private respondents in NLRC Case No. 1637-84; neither labor agency had before it any matter which could validly have been passed upon by it in the exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction. The appealed Decision and Resolution in this case, having been rendered without jurisdiction, vested no rights and imposed no liabilities upon any of the parties here involved. That neither party had expressly raised the issue of jurisdiction in the pleadings poses no obstacle to this ruling of the Court, which may motu proprio take cognizance of the issue of existence or absence of jurisdiction and pass upon the same.

G.R. No. L-66880 August 2, 1991 VICTORIAS MILLING CO. INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ALBERT W. ONSTOTT, respondents. Facts: Private respondent Onstott filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXVIII at Pasay City) a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8822-P, against Pacific Airways Corporation (PACO) and Victorias Milling Company (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) for the recovery of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and the costs of suit, based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as a consequence of his alleged dismissal without any valid or just cause as President and General Manager of PACO. The dismissal is contained in a Resolution of the Board of Directors of PACO. He had served the corporation for 34 years. There is no allegation whatsoever that he was even employed by petitioner. As far as could be gathered from the complaint, the only possible ground for impleading petitioner as party defendant is that it "owns the majority and controlling interest in PACO." The trial court, through then Judge Enrique Agana, Sr., issued an Order dismissing the complaint: (a) for lack of cause of action against herein petitioner and (b) for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange Commission with additional Powers, etc.). Onstott sought to reconsider the same in his motion filed on 26 April 1982, wherein he faults the trial court for failing to give due consideration to the fact that the complaint is essentially one for damages based on Articles 19, 20, 21 and 32 of the Civil Code, and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Petitioner filed an Opposition on 14 May 1982 wherein it reiterated its argument that the mere allegation that petitioner owns the majority and controlling interest in PACO is not sufficient to spell out a cause of action against the former; as a mere stockholder of PACO, it has no interest in the controversy; and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case it falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442) as amended by P.D. No. 1691. Held: There is merit in the petition. We agree with the trial court that the subject matter of Civil Case No. 8822-P falls within the Labor Arbiters' exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 1691. Presidential Decree No. 1691, which took effect on 1 May 1980, restored to the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC their jurisdiction over all money claims of workers and all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including moral and exemplary

damages. This authority over the latter was earlier removed by P.D No. 1367 which took effect on 1 May 1978. Presidential Decree No. 1691 was even given retroactive application to pending cases as the precise purpose of the amendment was to hopefully settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction between regular courts and labor agencies. This is the law that governs the case at bar. His complaint for damages is indubitably one which arises out of his alleged illegal dismissal as President and General Manager of PACO.

G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents. Facts: PALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith. On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction. Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989, and resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Secretary Drilon later took over the labor dispute and declared the strike as legal. Issue: In issue in this case is the authority of the Secretary of Labor to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them. Held: Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantine (Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677, 685 [1987]). Indeed, as found by the Labor Secretary in his Order of January 21, 1989, the only issues involved in the dispute were: 1. determination of the minimum entry rate 2. wage adjustment due to payscale study 3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution. The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. Art. 217, par. a, subpar. 5 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural. xxx xxx xxx 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied.) In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 91231 February 4, 1991 NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents. Facts: UFE was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file employees at the petitioner's Cagayan de Oro factory, as well as its Cebu/Davao Sales Office. In August, 1987, while the parties, were negotiating, the employees at Cabuyao resorted to a "slowdown" and walk-outs prompting the petitioner to shut down the factory. Marathon collective bargaining negotiations between the parties ensued. On September 2, 1987, the UFE declared a bargaining deadlock. On September 8, 1987, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to work order. In spite of that order, the union struck, without notice, at the Alabang/Cabuyao factory, the Makati office and Cagayan de Oro factory on September 11, 1987 up to December 8, 1987. The company retaliated by dismissing the union officers and members of the negotiating panel who participated in the illegal strike. The NLRC affirmed the dismissals on November 2, 1988. On January 26, 1988, UFE filed a notice of strike on the same ground of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practices. However, on March 30, 1988, the company was able to conclude a CBA with the union at the Cebu/Davao Sales Office, and on August 5, 1988, with the Cagayan de Oro factory workers. The union assailed the validity of those agreements and filed a case of unfair labor practice against the company on November 16, 1988. After conciliation efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) yielded negative results, the dispute was certified to the NLRC by the Secretary of Labor on October 28, 1988. The NLRC issued a resolution with regard to the Retirement Plan, the NLRC held: Anent management's objection to the modification of its Retirement Plan, We find no cogent reason to alter our previous decision on this matter. While it is not disputed that the plan is non-contributory on the part of the workers, tills does not automatically remove it from the ambit of collective bargaining negotiations. On the contrary, the plan is specifically mentioned in the previous bargaining agreements, thereby integrating or incorporating the provisions thereof to the agreement. By reason of its incorporation, the plan assumes a consensual character which cannot be terminated or modified at will by either party. Consequently, it becomes part and parcel of CBA negotiations.

Held: The NLRC's resolution of the bargaining deadlock between Nestl and its employees is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor whimsical. The benefits and concessions given to the employees were based on the NLRC's evaluation of the union's demands, the evidence adduced by the parties, the financial capacity of the Company to grant the demands, its long term viability, the economic conditions prevailing in the country as they affect the purchasing power of the employees as well as its concommitant effect on the other factors of production, and the recent trends in the industry to which the Company belongs (p. 57, Rollo). Its decision is not vitiated by abuse of discretion.

Sarmiento vs Tuico G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988 Issue: Whether or not a return-to-work order may be validly issued by the National Labor Relations Commission pending determination of the legality of the strike; and Held: The authority for the order is found in Article 264(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227, which provides as follows: When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export- oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions

prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law-enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. There can be no question that the Minister of Labor and Employment acted correctly in certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC, given the predictable prejudice the strike might cause not only to the parties but more especially to the national interest.

Telefunken vs Sec. of Labor G.R. Nos. 122743 & 127215 December 12, 1997 Facts: On 25 August 1995 the dispute between the parties started when the COMPANY and the UNION reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. Hence on 28 August 1995 the UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. On 8 September 1995, upon petition of the COMPANY considering the nature of its business and the corresponding effects to the country's economy, then Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Jose S. Brillantes, after ascertaining that the labor dispute involved a matter of national interest, intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Art. 263, par. (g), of the Labor Code. Nevertheless, on 14 September 1995 the UNION struck. Two (2) days later, or on 16 September 1995, Acting Secretary Brillantes ordered the striking workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours. But the striking UNION members failed to return to work; instead, they continued with their pickets. As a result, on 23 September 1995 violence erupted in the picket lines. The service bus ferrying non-striking workers was stoned causing injuries to its passengers. Thereafter complaints for threats, defamation, illegal detention and physical injuries were filed against the strikers. On 2 October 1995 letters of termination for cause were personally delivered to UNION members who failed to report for work notwithstanding the assumption and return-to-work orders. On 29 October 1995 Acting Secretary Brillantes issued an Order dated 27 October 1995 a portion of which reads Pending resolution of the issue involving the legality of the strike, the Company is hereby directed to accept back all striking workers, except the Union Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges, whose termination shall be among the issues to be heard by Atty. Genilo. Held: To exclude union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the directive to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers without first determining whether they knowingly committed illegal acts would be tantamount to dismissal without due process of law. We therefore hold that the Honorable Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in excluding union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the order to the COMPANY to accept back the striking workers pending resolution of the issue involving the legality of the strike.

ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE VS. TORRES 210 SCRA 565GR. NO 100158 JUNE 29, 1992 FACTS: The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a dead lock and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE. Union declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the College and public respondent Sec. of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Instead of returning to work, the union filed a motion for reconsideration of the return to work order. The college sent individual letters to the striking employees requiring them to return to work. In response union presented demands, the most important of which is the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were rejected. Sec. of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to work order and sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation meetings were held but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any return to work order should be unconditional. The College manifested to respondent Sec. that the union continued to defy his return to work order. The College sent termination letters to individual strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The union moved for the enforcement of there turn to work order before the Sec.

The Sec. issued an order directing reinstatement of striking union members and holding union officers responsible for the violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly terminated. Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the return to work order. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with the return to work order of Sec. of Labor, reinstated. HELD: Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August 1990) Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied). Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work. This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity.After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.

Meralco vs Sec. of Labor G.R. No. 127598 January 27, 1999 Facts: In this petition for certiorari, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) seeks to annul the orders of the Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, wherein the Secretary required MERALCO and its rank and file union the Meralco Workers Association (MEWA) to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for the remainder of the parties' 1992-1997 CBA cycle, and to incorporate in this new CBA the Secretary's dispositions on the disputed economic and noneconomic issues. Held: We find, based on our consideration of the parties' positions and the evidence on record, that the Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence, particularly with respect to the wage award. The Secretary of Labor apparently also acted arbitrarily and even whimsically in considering a number of legal points; even the Solicitor General himself considered that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion on at least three major points: (a) on the signing bonus issue; (b) on the inclusion of confidential employees in the rank and file bargaining unit, and (c) in mandating a union security "closed-shop" regime in the bargaining unit.

G.R. No. 140518 December 16, 2004 MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and THE MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL, respondents. Facts: On November 11, 1996, the Union filed a petition for a certification election so that it may be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the Hotels employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. The petition was dismissed by the Departmen t of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on January 15, 1997. After a few months, however, on August 25, 1997, the Union sent a letter to the Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. In a letter dated September 11, 1997, the Hotels Human Resources Department Manager, Mary Anne Mangalindan, wrote to the Union stating that the Hotel

cannot recognize it as the employees bargaining agent since its petition for certification election had been earlier dismiss ed by the DOLE. On that same day, the Hotel received a letter from the Union stating that they were not giving the Hotel a notice to bargain, but that they were merely asking for the Hotel to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Union for its members only and not for all the rank and file employees of the Hotel. The Union staged a strike against the Hotel. The Hotel claims that the strike was illegal and it had to dismiss some employees for their participation in the allegedly illegal concerted activity. The Union, on the other hand, accused the Hotel of illegally dismissing the workers. What is pertinent to this case, however, is the Order issued by the then Secretary of Labor and Employment Cresenciano B. Trajano assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The Secretary ten issued a return to work order. The Union received the aforesaid Order on April 16, 1998 and its members reported for work the next day, April 17, 1998. The Hotel, however, refused to accept the returning workers and instead filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Secretarys Order. Acting Secretary of Labor Jose M. Espaol, issued the disputed Order, which modified the earlier one issued by Secretary Trajano. Instead of an actual return to work, Acting Secretary Espaol directed that the strikers be reinstated only in the payroll. Held: It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Indeed, this Court has always recognized the "great breadth of discretion" by the Secretary once he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute. However, payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement is a departure from the rule in these cases and there must be showing of special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable, as in the UST case aforementioned, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. None appears to have been established in this case. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g), the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. Time and again, this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.

Immaculate Conception vs Sec. of Labor G.R. No. 151379 January 14, 2005 Issue: The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether or not the Secretary of Labor, after assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an employer and the certified bargaining agent of a group of employees in the workplace, may legally order said employer to reinstate employees terminated by the employer even if those terminated employees are not part of the bargaining unit. Held: This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITYs contention. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confessor , this Court declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. This is in keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution,14 which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code.15 However, as expressed in PAL v. National Labor Relations Commission,16 this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. This provision states: (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest.

Injunctions and Appeals Articles 218 (e), 264 labor Code G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondent. Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for temporary restraining order and reinstatement. The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal. Issue: Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions? Held: In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party; . . ." (Emphasis Ours) Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows: Sec. 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. xxx xxx xxx The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. 7 (Emphasis Ours) From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."