Interpretation (logic) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia For other uses, see Interpretation (disambiguation).

An interpretation is an assignment of meaning to the symbols of a formal languag e. Many formal languages used in mathematics, logic, and theoretical computer sc ience are defined in solely syntactic terms, and as such do not have any meaning until they are given some interpretation. The general study of interpretations of formal languages is called formal semantics. The most commonly studied formal logics are propositional logic, predicate logic and their modal analogs, and for these there are standard ways of presenting an interpretation. In these contexts an interpretation is a function that provides the extension of symbols and strings of symbols of an object language. For exam ple, an interpretation function could take the predicate T (for "tall") and assi gn it the extension {a} (for "Abraham Lincoln"). Note that all our interpretatio n does is assign the extension {a} to the non-logical constant T, and does not m ake a claim about whether T is to stand for tall and 'a' for Abraham Lincoln. No r does logical interpretation have anything to say about logical connectives lik e 'and', 'or' and 'not'. Though we may take these symbols to stand for certain t hings or concepts, this is not determined by the interpretation function. An interpretation often (but not always) provides a way to determine the truth v alues of sentences in a language. If a given interpretation assigns the value Tr ue to a sentence or theory, the interpretation is called a model of that sentenc e or theory. Contents [hide] 1 Formal languages 1.1 Example 1.2 Logical constants 2 General properties of truth-functional interpretations 2.1 Logical connectives 3 Interpretation of a theory 4 Interpretations for propositional logic 5 First-order logic 5.1 Formal languages for first-order logic 5.2 Interpretations of a first-order language 5.3 Example of a first-order interpretation 5.4 Non-empty domain requirement 5.5 Interpreting equality 5.6 Many-sorted first-order logic 6 Higher-order predicate logics 7 Non-classical interpretations 8 Intended interpretations 8.1 Example 9 Other concepts of interpretation 10 See also 11 References 12 External links Formal languages[edit] Main article: Formal language A formal language consists of a fixed collection of sentences (also called words or formulas, depending on the context) composed from a fixed set of letters or symbols. The inventory from which these letters are taken is called the alphabet over which the language is defined. The essential feature of a formal language is that its syntax can be defined without reference to interpretation. We can de termine that (P or Q) is a well-formed formula even without knowing whether it i s true or false.

To distinguish the strings of symbols that are in a formal language from arbitra ry strings of symbols, the former are sometimes called well-formed formul? (wffs ). Example[edit] A formal language \mathcal{W} is defined with the alphabet ? = { \triangle, \squ are }. A word is declared to be in \mathcal{W} if it begins with \triangle and i s composed solely of the symbols \triangle and \square. A possible interpretation of \mathcal{W} would assign the decimal digit '1' to \ triangle and '0' to \square. Therefore \triangle \square \triangle would denote 101 under this interpretation of \mathcal{W}. Logical constants[edit] In the specific cases of propositional logic and predicate logic, the formal lan guages considered have alphabets that are divided into two sets: the logical sym bols (logical constants) and the non-logical symbols. The idea behind this termi nology is that logical symbols have the same meaning regardless of the subject m atter being studied, while non-logical symbols change in meaning depending on th e area of investigation. Logical constants are always given the same meaning by every interpretation of t he standard kind, so that only the meanings of the non-logical symbols are chang ed. Logical constants include quantifier symbols ? and ?, symbols for logical co nnectives, parentheses and other grouping symbols, and (in many treatments) the equality symbol =. General properties of truth-functional interpretations[edit] Many of the commonly studied interpretations associate each sentence in a formal language with a single truth value, either True or False. These interpretations are called truth functional; they include the usual interpretations of proposit ional and first-order logic. The sentences that are made true by a particular as signment are said to be satisfied by that assignment. No sentence can be made both true and false by the same interpretation, but it i s possible that the truth value of the same sentence can be different under diff erent interpretations. A sentence is consistent if it is true under at least one interpretation; otherwise it is inconsistent. A sentence ? is said to be logica lly valid if it is satisfied by every interpretation (if ? is satisfied by every interpretation that satisfies ? then ? is said to be a logical consequence of ? ). Logical connectives[edit] Some of the logical symbols of a language (other than quantifiers) are truth-fun ctional connectives that represent truth functions functions that take truth val ues as arguments and return truth values as outputs (in other words, these are o perations on truth values of sentences). The truth-functional connectives enable compound sentences to be built up from s impler sentences. In this way, the truth value of the compound sentence is defin ed as a certain truth function of the truth values of the simpler sentences. The connectives are usually taken to be logical constants, meaning that the meaning of the connectives is always the same, independent of what interpretations are given to the other symbols in a formula. This is how we define logical connectives in propositional logic: ? is True iff ? is False. (? & ?) is True iff ? is True and ? is True.

(? \lor ?) is True iff (? & ?) is True. (? ? ?) is True iff (? is True \lor ? is True). (? \leftrightarrow ?) is True iff (? ? ?) is True and (? ? ?) is True. So under a given interpretation of all the sentence letters ? and ? (i.e., after assigning a truth-value to each sentence letter), we can determine the truth-va lues of all formulas that have them as constituents, as a function of the logica l connectives. The following table shows how this kind of thing looks. The first two columns show the truth-values of the sentence letters as determined by the four possible interpretations. The other columns show the truth-values of formul as built from these sentence letters, with truth-values determined recursively. Logical connectives Interpretation ? ? ? (? & ?) (? \lor ?) (? ? ?) (? \left rightarrow ?) #1 T T F T T T T #2 T F F F T F F #3 F T T F T T F #4 F F T F F T T Now it's easier to see what makes a formula logically valid. Take the formula F: (? \lor ~?). If our interpretation function makes ? True, then ~? is made False by the negation connective. Since the disjunct ? of F is True under that interp retation, F is True. Now the only other possible interpretation of ? makes it Fa lse, and if so, ~? is made True by the negation function. That would make F True again, since one of Fs disjuncts, ~?, would be true under this interpretation. Since these two interpretations for F are the only possible logical interpretati ons, and since F comes out True for both, we say that it is logically valid or t autologous. Interpretation of a theory[edit] Main article: Theory (mathematical logic) An interpretation of a theory is the relationship between a theory and some subj ect matter when there is a many-to-one correspondence between certain elementary statements of the theory, and certain statements related to the subject matter. If every elementary statement in the theory has a correspondent it is called a full interpretation, otherwise it is called a partial interpretation.[1] Interpretations for propositional logic[edit] The formal language for propositional logic consists of formulas built up from p ropositional symbols (also called sentential symbols, sentential variables, and propositional variables) and logical connectives. The only non-logical symbols i n a formal language for propositional logic are the propositional symbols, which are often denoted by capital letters. To make the formal language precise, a sp ecific set of propositional symbols must be fixed. The standard kind of interpretation in this setting is a function that maps each propositional symbol to one of the truth values true and false. This function i s known as a truth assignment or valuation function. In many presentations, it i s literally a truth value that is assigned, but some presentations assign truthb earers instead. For a language with n distinct propositional variables there are 2n distinct pos sible interpretations. For any particular variable a, for example, there are 21= 2 possible interpretations: 1) a is assigned T, or 2) a is assigned F. For the p air a, b there are 22=4 possible interpretations: 1) both are assigned T, 2) bot h are assigned F, 3) a is assigned T and b is assigned F, or 4) a is assigned F and b is assigned T. Given any truth assignment for a set of propositional symbols, there is a unique

extension to an interpretation for all the propositional formulas built up from those variables. This extended interpretation is defined inductively, using the truth-table definitions of the logical connectives discussed above. First-order logic[edit] Unlike propositional logic, where every language is the same apart from a choice of a different set of propositional variables, there are many different first-o rder languages. Each first-order language is defined by a signature. The signatu re consists of a set of non-logical symbols and an identification of each of the se symbols as a constant symbol, a function symbol, or a predicate symbol. In th e case of function and predicate symbols, a natural number arity is also assigne d. The alphabet for the formal language consists of logical constants, the equal ity relation symbol =, all the symbols from the signature, and an additional inf inite set of symbols known as variables. For example, in the language of rings, there are constant symbols 0 and 1, two b inary function symbols + and , and no binary relation symbols. (Here the equality relation is taken as a logical constant.) Again, we might define a first-order language L, as consisting of individual sym bols a, b, and c; predicate symbols F,G, H, I and J; variables x,y,z; no functio n letters; no sentential symbols. Formal languages for first-order logic[edit] Given a signature ?, the corresponding formal language is known as the set of ?formulas. Each ?-formula is built up out of atomic formulas by means of logical connectives; atomic formulas are built from terms using predicate symbols. The f ormal definition of the set of ?-formulas proceeds in the other direction: first , terms are assembled from the constant and function symbols together with the v ariables. Then, terms can be combined into an atomic formula using a predicate s ymbol (relation symbol) from the signature or the special predicate symbol "=" f or equality (see the section "Interpreting equality" below). Finally, the formul as of the language are assembled from atomic formulas using the logical connecti ves and quantifiers. Interpretations of a first-order language[edit] To ascribe meaning to all sentences of a first-order language, the following inf ormation is needed. A domain of discourse[2] D, usually required to be non-empty (see below). For every constant symbol, an element of D as its interpretation. For every n-ary function symbol, an n-ary function from D to D as its interpreta tion (that is, a function Dn ? D). For every n-ary predicate symbol, an n-ary relation on D as its interpretation ( that is, a subset of Dn). An object carrying this information is known as a structure (of signature ?, or ?-structure, or L-structure), or as a "model". The information specified in the interpretation provides enough information to g ive a truth value to any atomic formula, after each of its free variables, if an y, has been replaced by an element of the domain. The truth value of an arbitrar y sentence is then defined inductively using the T-schema, which is a definition of first-order semantics developed by Alfred Tarski. The T-schema interprets th e logical connectives using truth tables, as discussed above. Thus, for example, ? & ? is satisfied if and only if both ? and ? are satisfied. This leaves the issue of how to interpret formulas of the form ? x ?(x) and ? x ?(x). The domain of discourse forms the range for these quantifiers. The idea is that the sentence ? x ?(x) is true under an interpretation exactly when every s

ubstitution instance of ?(x), where x is replaced by some element of the domain, is satisfied. The formula ? x ?(x) is satisfied if there is at least one elemen t d of the domain such that ?(d) is satisfied. Strictly speaking, a substitution instance such as the formula ?(d) mentioned ab ove is not a formula in the original formal language of ?, because d is an eleme nt of the domain. There are two ways of handling this technical issue. The first is to pass to a larger language in which each element of the domain is named by a constant symbol. The second is to add to the interpretation a function that a ssigns each variable to an element of the domain. Then the T-schema can quantify over variations of the original interpretation in which this variable assignmen t function is changed, instead of quantifying over substitution instances. Some authors also admit propositional variables in first-order logic, which must then also be interpreted. A propositional variable can stand on its own as an a tomic formula. The interpretation of a propositional variable is one of the two truth values true and false.[3] Because the first-order interpretations described here are defined in set theory , they do not associate each predicate symbol with a property [4](or relation), but rather with the extension of that property (or relation). In other words, th ese first-order interpretations are extensional [5] not intensional. Example of a first-order interpretation[edit] An example of interpretation \mathcal{I} of the language L described above is as follows. Domain: A chess set Individual constants: a: The white King b: The black Queen c: The white King's p awn F(x): x is a piece G(x): x is a pawn H(x): x is black I(x): x is white J(x, y): x can capture y In the interpretation \mathcal{I} of L: the following are true sentences: F(a), G(c), H(b), I(a) J(b, c), the following are false sentences: J(a, c), G(a). Non-empty domain requirement[edit] As stated above, a first-order interpretation is usually required to specify a n onempty set as the domain of discourse. The reason for this requirement is to gu arantee that equivalences such as (\phi \lor \exists x \psi) \leftrightarrow \exists x (\phi \lor \psi), where x is not a free variable of ?, are logically valid. This equivalence holds in every interpretation with a nonempty domain, but does not always hold when e mpty domains are permitted. For example, the equivalence [\forall y (y = y) \lor \exists x ( x = x)] \equiv \exists x [ \forall y ( y = y ) \lor x = x] fails in any structure with an empty domain. Thus the proof theory of first-orde r logic becomes more complicated when empty structures are permitted. However, t he gain in allowing them is negligible, as both the intended interpretations and the interesting interpretations of the theories people study have non-empty dom ains.[6][7] Empty relations do not cause any problem for first-order interpretations, becaus e there is no similar notion of passing a relation symbol across a logical conne ctive, enlarging its scope in the process. Thus it is acceptable for relation sy

mbols to be interpreted as being identically false. However, the interpretation of a function symbol must always assign a well-defined and total function to the symbol. Interpreting equality[edit] The equality relation is often treated specially in first order logic and other predicate logics. There are two general approaches. The first approach is to treat equality as no different than any other binary re lation. In this case, if an equality symbol is included in the signature, it is usually necessary to add various axioms about equality to axiom systems (for exa mple, the substitution axiom saying that if a = b and R(a) holds then R(b) holds as well). This approach to equality is most useful when studying signatures tha t do not include the equality relation, such as the signature for set theory or the signature for second-order arithmetic in which there is only an equality rel ation for numbers, but not an equality relation for set of numbers. The second approach is to treat the equality relation symbol as a logical consta nt that must be interpreted by the real equality relation in any interpretation. An interpretation that interprets equality this way is known as a normal model, so this second approach is the same as only studying interpretations that happe n to be normal models. The advantage of this approach is that the axioms related to equality are automatically satisfied by every normal model, and so they do n ot need to be explicitly included in first-order theories when equality is treat ed this way. This second approach is sometimes called first order logic with equ ality, but many authors adopt it for the general study of first-order logic with out comment. There are a few other reasons to restrict study of first-order logic to normal m odels. First, it is known that any first-order interpretation in which equality is interpreted by an equivalence relation and satisfies the substitution axioms for equality can be cut down to an elementarily equivalent interpretation on a s ubset of the original domain. Thus there is little additional generality in stud ying non-normal models. Second, if non-normal models are considered, then every consistent theory has an infinite model; this affects the statements of results such as the L?wenheim Skolem theorem, which are usually stated under the assumptio n that only normal models are considered. Many-sorted first-order logic[edit] A generalization of first order logic considers languages with more than one sor t of variables. The idea is different sorts of variables represent different typ es of objects. Every sort of variable can be quantified; thus an interpretation for a many-sorted language has a separate domain for each of the sorts of variab les to range over (there is an infinite collection of variables of each of the d ifferent sorts). Function and relation symbols, in addition to having arities, a re specified so that each of their arguments must come from a certain sort. One example of many-sorted logic is for planar Euclidean geometry. There are two sorts; points and lines. There is an equality relation symbol for points, an eq uality relation symbol for lines, and a binary incidence relation E which takes one point variable and one line variable. The intended interpretation of this la nguage has the point variables range over all points on the Euclidean plane, the line variable range over all lines on the plane, and the incidence relation E(p ,l) holds if and only if point p is on line l. Higher-order predicate logics[edit] A formal language for higher-order predicate logic looks much the same as a form al language for first-order logic. The difference is that there are now many dif ferent types of variables. Some variables correspond to elements of the domain,

as in first-order logic. Other variables correspond to objects of higher type: s ubsets of the domain, functions from the domain, functions that take a subset of the domain and return a function from the domain to subsets of the domain, etc. All of these types of variables can be quantified. There are two kinds of interpretations commonly employed for higher-order logic. Full semantics require that, once the domain of discourse is satisfied, the hig her-order variables range over all possible elements of the correct type (all su bsets of the domain, all functions from the domain to itself, etc.). Thus the sp ecification of a full interpretation is the same as the specification of a first -order interpretation. Henkin semantics, which are essentially multi-sorted firs t-order semantics, require the interpretation to specify a separate domain for e ach type of higher-order variable to range over. Thus an interpretation in Henki n semantics includes a domain D, a collection of subsets of D, a collection of f unctions from D to D, etc. The relationship between these two semantics is an im portant topic in higher order logic. Non-classical interpretations[edit] The interpretations of propositional logic and predicate logic described above a re not the only possible interpretations. In particular, there are other types o f interpretations that are used in the study of non-classical logic (such as int uitionistic logic), and in the study of modal logic. Interpretations used to study non-classical logic include topological models, Bo olean valued models, and Kripke models. Modal logic is also studied using Kripke models. Intended interpretations[edit] Many formal languages are associated with a particular interpretation that is us ed to motivate them. For example, the first-order signature for set theory inclu des only one binary relation, ?, which is intended to represent set membership, and the domain of discourse in a first-order theory of the natural numbers is in tended be the set of natural numbers. The intended interpretation is called the standard model (a term introduced by A braham Robinson in 1960).[8] In the context of Peano arithmetic, it consists of the natural numbers with their ordinary arithmetical operations. All models that are isomorphic to the one just given are also called standard; these models all satisfy the Peano axioms. There are also non-standard models of the Peano axiom s, which contain elements not correlated with any natural number. While the intended interpretation can have no explicit indication in the syntact the author's intention re ical rules - since these rules must be strictly formal specting interpretation naturally affects his choice of the formation and transf ormation rules of the syntactical system. For example, he chooses primitive sign s in such a way that certain concepts can be expressed; he chooses sentential fo rmulas in such a way that their counterparts in the intended interpretation can appear as meaningful declarative sentences; his choice of primitive sentences mu st meet the requirement that these primitive sentences come out as true sentence s in the interpretation; his rules of inference must be such that if by one of t hese rules the sentence \mathcal{I}_j is directly derivable from a sentence \mat hcal{I}_i, then \mathcal{I}_i \to \mathcal{I}_j turns out to be a true sentence (under the customary interpretation of ? as meaning implication). These requirem ents ensure that all provable sentences also come out to be true.[9] Most formal systems have many more models than they were intended to have (the e xistence of non-standard models is an example). When we speak about 'models' in empirical sciences, we mean, if we want reality to be a model of our science, to

speak about an intended model. A model in the empirical sciences is an intended factually-true descriptive interpretation (or in other contexts: a non-intended arbitrary interpretation used to clarify such an intended factually-true descri ptive interpretation.) All models are interpretations that have the same domain of discourse as the intended one, but other assignments for non-logical constant s.[10] Example[edit] Given a simple formal system (we shall call this one \mathcal{FS'}) whose alphab et ? consists only of three symbols { \blacksquare, \bigstar, \blacklozenge } an d whose formation rule for formulas is: 'Any string of symbols of \mathcal{FS'} which is at least 6 symbols long, and wh ich is not infinitely long, is a formula of \mathcal{FS'}. Nothing else is a for mula of \mathcal{FS'}.' The single axiom schema of \mathcal{FS'} is: " \blacksquare \bigstar * \blacklozenge \blacksquare * " (where " * " is a metas yntactic variable standing for a finite string of " \blacksquare "s ) A formal proof can be constructed as follows: (1) \blacksquare \bigstar \blacksquare \blacklozenge \blacksquare \blacksquare (2) \blacksquare \bigstar \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacklozenge \blacksquare \ blacksquare \blacksquare (3) \blacksquare \bigstar \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacklozenge \ blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare In this example the theorem produced " \blacksquare \bigstar \blacksquare \black square \blacksquare \blacklozenge \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacks quare " can be interpreted as meaning "One plus three equals four." A different interpretation would be to read it backwards as "Four minus three equals one."[1 1] Other concepts of interpretation[edit] There are other uses of the term "interpretation" that are commonly used, which do not refer to the assignment of meanings to formal languages. In model theory, a structure A is said to interpret a structure B if there is a definable subset D of A, and definable relations and functions on D, such that B is isomorphic to the structure with domain D and these functions and relations. In some settings, it is not the domain D that is used, but rather D modulo an e quivalence relation definable in A. For additional information, see Interpretati on (model theory). A theory T is said to interpret another theory S if there is a finite extension by definitions T? of T such that S is contained in T?.