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Referncias Reis, B. E. (1999). Thomas Ogden's Phenomenological Turn. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 9(3), 371-393. <!--Outras informaes: Link permanente para este registro (Permalink): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=pph&AN=PD.009.0371A&lang=pt-br&site=ehost-live&scope=site Fim da citao-->

Thomas Ogden's Phenomenological Turn Bruce E. Reis, PHD, Candidate in the New York University Postdoctoral Program in Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. He is in private practice in New York City.; 5 Patchin Place New York, NY 10011 The author situates the development of Ogden's clinical theory over the past 20 years within a philosophic scheme. Ogden (1986, 1989), in using Hegel to deconstruct the Cartesian objectivist assumptions of classical psychoanalysis, goes beyond Hegel to create in Subjects of Analysis (1994) a new synthesis that is similar to aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This regrounding allows for the introduction of the analyst's prereflective and sensuous experience through reverie in the cocreation of an intersubjective third. The author illustrates how Ogden's solution to the problem of alterity transcends the debate over one-person versus two-person psychologies by producing a truly dialectical, postclassical psychoanalytic theory of intersubjectivity that is neither a one- nor a two-person psychology. Introduction The Editors Psychoanalysis, like most intellectual disciplines, has a tendency toward self-referential insularity. And psychoanalytic ideas are grounded in everyday clinical work, generated in efforts to understand patients and ourselves with patients, and tested for their utility in the analytic process. Hence, psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians are often unmindful of the ways in which the problems and concepts we struggle with are also being addressed in neighboring disciplines, like philosophy, literary theory, and social criticism. Very often ideas from these other areas have been
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either intentionally appropriated or, sometimes, unconsciously absorbed into psychoanalytic discourse. What we rarely appreciate is the way in which these issues have a life of their own in the conceptual worlds of our neighbors, who grapple with them, test them in the crucible of their own methodologies, and come up with new conceptual strategies. With the turn in psychoanalytic thought toward two-person, or relational, perspectives, intersubjectivity has become a major psychoanalytic concern. But there are many different ways to conceptualize intersubjectivity, and different avenues of approach have been opened up by different analytic authors. Reis does us a service here by setting psychoanalytic grapplings with intersubjectivity in juxtaposition with intersubjectivity as it developed in 19th- and 20th-century philosophy. By recontextualizing analytic approaches within philosophic debates, Reis makes it possible for us to grasp, in a fresh way, some of the consequences of our differences and imagine new avenues for future developments. We are also pleased to provide commentaries on Reis's paper by Benjamin and by Stolorow, Orange, and Atwood, who have been major contributors to psychoanalytic thought in this area. Their responses and Reis's reply move us toward a finer understanding of the varieties of intersubjectivities and their implications. Models of intersubjectivity, whether they arise out of self psychology (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992) or object relations (Benjamin, 1995), have suffered the limitation of being insidiously defined by comparison to and inclusion of the assumptions of a one-person model. Take, for example, Stolorow's intersubjective theory. Although seeking to transcend the older isolated-mind paradigm (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992, p. 7) in positing an analytic field coconstituted in a dyad, Stolorow (1997) defaults to a model of reciprocally interacting subjective worlds of patient and analyst (p. 861). But, the idea of reciprocally interacting subjective worlds suggests separate worldsthat is, continues to imply an a priori assumption of isolated minds. Thus, Stolorow's conception of the relational subject and, by extension, intersubjectivity can go, as I will show, only so far as its Hegelian foundation despite stated wishes to transcend the Cartesian limitations of a classical paradigm. In addition to Stolorow and Benjamin, other relational theorists, (e.g., Spezzano, notably Ogden) have used Hegel as a philosophical platform for their psychoanalytic models. Each may be said to be limited in this same way by this foundation. In this paper, I wish to show how Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is a better fit with a relational conception of subjectivity. Merleau-Ponty's innovative concepts (e.g., the body subject) allow subjectivity to be understood as more than just limited to mind, as is the consequence of both Cartesianism and Hegelianism. But this is more than simply a philosophical treatment; it is also an examination of clinical importance. For, as long as relational models of subjectivity are based in Hegel, they are confined to a narrow conception of subjectivity as mindand nothing more. This restriction delimits whole areas of clinical phenomena, unwittingly throwing out any sensation or intuition that is not rational. Merleau-Ponty suggests a broader notion of subjectivity, one that I will show is a better underpinning for a relational psychoanalysis, as it allows the analyst access to already existing levels of relatedness and subjectivity excluded by Hegelianism.
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I believe that Ogden (1979, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1994) has developed a clinical intersubjective theory that transcends the foundational problems noted earlier. In using a different conception of subjectivity, one very close to Merleau-Ponty's, he assumes the presence of an already existing intersubjective world that one does not have to develop into out of solipsism but that is always and already present and from which one is inseparable. Clinically embedded thus, the world is nothing but the field of one's experience, and one is but a certain perspective of it, or, to borrow a phrase from Merleau-Ponty (1945), the analyst's subjectivity assumes a form of inherence in the world (p. 464). Ogden's (1994)Subjects of Analysis radically subverts the Hegelian scheme of separate subjects who mutually regulate or recognize one another in a world separate from themselvesa scheme that has long been dominant in relational conceptions of intersubjectivity. For Ogden, after Winnicott, the analyst and the analysand are linked in the intersubjective analytic third through which they are constituted as subjects: There is no analyst, no analysand, no analysis in the absence of the third (p. 93). With the introduction of a third subject, Ogden's is neither a one-person nor a two-person psychology. Yet his reinterpretation does not mean the denial of the subjective. Rather, the difference of focus between Ogden's model and Stolorow or Benjamin's intersubjective model is on the subjective as an inseparable facet of an embracing structurethe third. Subjects of Analysis (Ogden, 1994) is a landmark volume in the development of postclassical psychoanalytic theory. Concerned with the concept of the subject, the author charts, with a fresh reading, this idea's development from Freudian through object-relational into intersubjectivist usage. I assert that Subjects of Analysis represents Ogden's attempt to solve the philosophic problem of alterity in a manner very much akin to the solution proposed by Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenology. It should be noted at the outset that, whereas the influence of Hegel is explicitly noted by Ogden via citation in his work, nowhere is Merleau-Ponty mentioned. Thus, what I have termed Ogden's phenomenological turn may be rightly criticized as being specific to my own reading of his theoretical development. Indeed, Ogden may rightly be said to remain further in the Hegelian dialectic than I acknowledge. Still, I believe that my reading of his thought, if not true to its precise letter, is true to its spirit, direction, and eventual intent. Object Relations and the Problem of Alterity Despite his emphasis on drives, Freud was prone to mentalize bodily experiencing and to separate mind from the external world and from others via the construct of mental representation. Classical psychoanalysis has essentially espoused a Cartesian conception of the mind. Cartesian ontology and epistemology form a dualist conception that splits off the mind from the body, radically severing knowing from sociohistorical conditions of knowing. Rational reflection is equated with being (I think, therefore I am) to the exclusion of sensuous experience, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity.

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The problem of alter (other) minds stands as a difficulty created by Cartesian dualism. Arising from Descartes's bifurcation of people into two distinct parts, mind and body, a philosophical problem was created in one's ability to recognize other minds. Because of this strict dualism and our own lack of direct sensory contact with other minds, we cannot infer from the mere presence of the body of the other any conclusion that a mind is housed within. The problem of alterityknown also as the problem of other minds, the problem of other selves, the problem of other egos, and the problem of othersboils down to this: How can I know the presence of other people? How can I see a person's very otherness if it makes that person other to me? If other minds are outside or independent of my own, how can I recognize them when I can make sense of only what is in my mind, and recognizing the other will reduce the other to someone I constitute? Or, as Husserl (cited in Yeo, 1992) put it, How can my ego, within his peculiar ownness, constitute under the name !experience of something other," precisely something other? (p. 39). The pitfall in this frame-of-reference problem was labeled the imperialism of the same and the I by Levinas (1957, p. 55), who asserted that, in assimilating the other into my own preexisting schemata, the other becomes a theme and an object for me. That person fits under a concept already, or dissolves into relations. It falls into the network of a priori ideas, which I bring to bear to capture it (Levinas, 1957, p. 50). For Levinas, the other's differences are lost in its assimilation gaining entry into my world only at the price of surrendering such difference or otherness as does not fit into my !network of a priori ideas" (Yeo, 1992, p. 39). From Descartes to Kant and through Husserl, individual consciousness has for the most part been taken as the privileged starting point for knowledge (Johnson, 1990). The result has been devastating for a philosophy of otherness and has been marked by numerous attempts to break out of the prison of subjectivity in order to make contact with something objective such as the real world or other minds (Madison, 1990). The central position to be defeated became solipsism, and the status of the other was reduced to an epistemological question. The careful reader will note, however, that it is in the very nature of the question of the problem of other minds that difficulties begin. If subjectivity is reduced to mind, or constituting consciousness, then the existence of any subjectivity other than one's own is simply not assertable, as Husserl observed. Solipsism is thus the price one pays for reducing subjectivity to mind (Langer, 1989, p. 98). Cavell (1988) has noted that Freud, like Descartes, construed the mind as solitary and selfcontained. As illustrated in the following passage, Freud (1915) thus encountered the problem of other minds: Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind: that other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behavior intelligible to us the assumption of a
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consciousness in them [our fellow men] rests upon an inference and cannot share the immediate certainty which we have of our own consciousness [p. 169]. It may be only slight hyperbole to state that the entire project of object relations is concerned with taking up the problem of other minds in the psychoanalytic arena and in transforming a one-person psychology into a two-person psychology (Gill, 1983; Ghent, 1989). For, as Ogden (1994) has observed, The confrontation with alterity will not let us rest (p. 3). It is this confrontation that has constituted the shift from the treatment of objects as the target of (one's own) drive discharge to an alternative model that privileges relations with other people (see Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). Yet object relations theory, as the name belies, has failed to fully realize the goals of a two-person model (Benjamin, 1995). Conceptual remnants of a one-person psychology pervade the twoperson object-relational view, keeping it a relationship between subject and object. The analyst's function as a transitional or subjective object, container, or self object subordinates the subjectivity of the analyst to the patient's manner of relating to him as object. Even when the use of countertransference experience has been more expressive (e.g., Bollas, 1987) and has introduced the subjectivity of the analyst, object-relations approaches (e.g., Winnicott, 1947) have tended to focus on the dynamic the patient creates in the analyst as he would in any other person. In this view, the subjectivity of the analyst is treated as the site for the creation of countertransference phenomena. Or, to put it another way, the dynamic is subjective for the analyst but not personal in the sense that Hoffman (1983), for instance, has meant. Hegel and Relational Theory Hegel's masterservant paradigm has been used by numerous object relational theorists (Ogden, 1986, 1989; Benjamin, 1988; Modell, 1993; Spezzano, 1996) to help explain the embeddedness of the subject in its relation to the other. Modell (1993) has gone so far as to state: I doubt whether our present psychology of intersubjectivity could have developed without Hegel Hegel can justifiably be termed the first intersubjective or relational psychologist (pp. 98-99). Long before Winnicott's (1969) work on object use and object relating, Hegel (1807) posited that, from an early stage of human development, the self is conscious of objects. Specifically, the self relates to objects through desire, using objects for its own gratification, in order to satisfy its bodily needs. The self takes great pleasure in its mastery of the object worlddevouring, incorporating, and appropriating objects (Lavine, 1989). For Hegel, this mode, known as self-consciousness, exemplifies the subject's negation of objects as the subject attempts to overcome them, destroy them, or incorporate them to cancel them out of existence. Although the external world cannot be said not to exist in this mode, it has much less of the character of an independent reality: It is recognized as being only an aspect of self-consciousness, a product of abstraction unable to exist by itself (Soll, 1969, p. 11). Self-consciousness then proceeds to act upon the external world in an attempt to remove its external character by attempting to take possession of it. When encountering another self-consciousness, the mode is just the sameto master it, like an
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object, to negate the other. However, the other who is encountered has the same wish to dominate and negate. The two enter what Hegel termed the life-and-death struggle, to negate the other (yet the other must not be negated completely, because the winner of the struggle depends on the other's presence: I require, in order to become conscious of my being a self, that another self recognize me as a self, look at me as a self [Lavine, 1989, p. 221]). Benjamin (1995) has referred to the inherent paradox that accompanies this recognitionthat at the very moment of realizing our own independent will, we are dependent upon another to recognize it (p. 37). Release from this condition is achieved by way of recognition (by the other) of one's self as a separate person. The result is two separate subjects, sometimes taking the other as object but each dependent on the other for mutual recognition. Hegel's conception is that one cannot become conscious of being a self, except through a mirroring function of another self (Kojeve, 1969). Hegel saw the subject not as isolated but as embedded in the intersubjective matrix of culture. Thus, his argument is in complete opposition to Descartes, whose Cogito argument established the existence of the self in solitary reflection (Lavine, 1989, p. 221). Hegel affirmed instead that we cannot adequately conceptualize the individual apart from a community, and, even further, [that] the individual does not have an immediate relation to the self but relates to self only as mediated by the other (Muller, 1996, p. 64). Hegel's Model as a Grounding for Relational Psychoanalysis, and Some Associated Problems The problem of alterity has occupied philosophers for centuries, but contemporary psychoanalysts have only recently taken on this issue of far-ranging consequence (e.g., Grotstein, 1997; Laplanche, 1997). Notable is the work of Benjamin (1988, 1995, 1997), whose findings have paralleled those of infant researchers (e.g., Stern, Beebe, Trevarthen) with a Hegelian scheme in asserting that we are fundamentally social beings (1988, p. 17) and who contrasted this position with a Freudian monism. Benjamin has relied on the use of the masterservant paradigm in exploration of the themes of domination and intersubjectivity in gender relations in psychoanalysis and in society at large. She describes the subject's struggle to eradicate difference from his world and the eventual mutual recognition by the partners in the struggle, whereby each comes to fully see the other as different from (and yet the same as) one's self. It is through this recognition of the other as another subject, Benjamin asserts, that each of us experiences the inter-relatedness, or relational quality, of our existence. This is a fragile condition, however, all the time threatened by one or the other partner's attempt to eradicate the other's difference through domination. The Hegelian model philosophically grounds the psychoanalytic conception of a relationally constituted subject and, as Benjamin has shown, is in great agreement with object-relations theories such as those of Winnicott. However, it is not free of limitations. Benjamin (1988) and
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other relational theorists (e.g., Mitchell, 1993) have found the mirroring metaphor problematic for its not taking into account the unique subjectivity of the other. Although self-consciousness moves in her model from a condition of solipsism to a relational position, the recognition of the other as a separate yet related other as an end point in itself is insufficient. Interdependence, established through identification with the other, is not yet intersubjectivity. For Hegel, subjectivity remains equated with the conscious subject in competition with the other. By contrast, the model I want to introduce here treats intersubjectivity as such an elemental and primary condition that competition would already represent a differentiation of subject from object. Thus, Hegel's scheme may serve as a basis for a theory of already internalized object relations, but it fails to speak to a level of innate intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1989, p. 694), which has continued at a pre-object relatedness (Kumin, 1996)a level that, due to increased attention from infant researchers is assuming greater importance in psychoanalytic thinking of therapeutic action (e.g., Stern et al., 1998). Another philosophic paradigm is needed to ground these infant research findingsone that may allow new dimensions of already existing levels of relatedness to open. I will show how the work of Merleau-Ponty (1942) speaks to this area of subjectivity and provides a different grounding for an intersubjective psychoanalysis. Whereas Hegel begins with the struggle to eradicate difference, Merleau-Ponty starts with the a priori acceptance of difference. In the Hegelian model, the subject begins apart from the world; in Merleau-Ponty's model, the subject is already and always a part of that world. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the subject does not so much arrive at intersubjectivity as begin there. Through an examination of the theoretical and clinical contributions of Thomas Ogden, I will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty's idea of primordial intersubjectivity is used to inform a postclassical psychoanalytic theory of intersubjectivity. A Change of Subject We have seen how equating subjectivity with constituting consciousness results in the constant struggle to escape solipsism and be recognized by the other. When the phenomenologists took up the problem of alterity, their solution was to shift the conceptualization of subjectivity itself. Merleau-Ponty revised our conception of the subject, freeing the term from its Cartesian moorings in rationality, thought, self-reflection, and personal experience. In doing this, Merleau-Ponty deconstructed the tradition within Western philosophy of placing consciousness at the center of subjectivity. Instead, Merleau-Ponty proposed the essential qualities of subjectivity to be prepersonal and preconscious. For Merleau-Ponty, we may thus reflect on our conscious process to arrive at greater clarity about ourselves, but subjectivity also includes dimensions of experiencing (e.g., the sensual) that we cannot penetrate through ordinary thinking or ordinary reflection (Kwant, 1963). Thomas Ogden's Phenomenological Turn Ogden's (1994) rereading of Freud may be seen to represent a shift in emphasis parallel to the shift from Descartes to Merleau-Ponty. The Freudian subject, for Ogden, is neither coincident with
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the conscious, thinking, speaking self nor located !behind the repression barrier" in !the unconscious" (p. 7). In resituating the Freudian psychoanalytic subject, Ogden, like MerleauPonty, stresses its prepersonal and, one might say preconscious, essence. Ogden's disassociation of the subject from consciousness is crucial (Mitchell, 1993, p. 33) and the beginning of a process of decentering the psychoanalytic subject leading to its ultimate location in intersubjective space. We may say that his relocation of the subject did not begin in Subjects of Analysis but rather developed through his earlier works. In Ogden's earlier works, we see his reliance, like the reliance of other relational theorists, on the Hegelian paradigm. Over the course of his work, Ogden's emphasis changes to what may be seen as a position more closely aligned with that of the phenomenologists. In The Matrix of the MindOgden (1986), first takes up the issue of presubjective experience in examining Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Ogden's approach at this time remains rather linear (before his phenomenological turn), as he appears to privilege higher levels of development in referring to the sense of self at this level as object as it is not yet a reflective subject. The presubjective experience of the paranoid-schizoid position is clearly pathologized in favor of the eventual birth of the self-reflective subject of the depressive position. In a statement grounded as much in Hegel as in Winnicott, Ogden posits the waning solipsism of the infant as a consequence of the infant's reflective, conscious knowing of the other: At the moment that the infant becomes capable of experiencing himself as the interpreter of his perceptions, the infant as subject is born. When the infant becomes an interpreting subject, he can for the first time project that state of mind [italics added] into his sense of the other and consider the possibility that other people experience feelings and thoughts in much the same way [pp. 72-73]. In his next contribution, Ogden (1989) slowly begins to move away from privileging the experience generated in the depressive position. He does this by first suspending the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions within the Hegelian dialectic so that each mode of generating experience creates, preserves, and negates the other. This subverts an assumption of developmental progression but does not yet completely do away with the previously mentioned bias toward the knowing subject of the depressive position because experience in the paranoid-schizoid mode continues to result in a sense of entrapment in a world of things-in-themselves wherein one does not experience oneself as the author of one's own thoughts and feelings (1989, p. 78). We shall see how, in his later move toward building an intersubjective model, Ogden would seem to reverse his earlier bias which was in favor of the subject of the depressive position by maintaining that the experience of oneself as the (sole) author of one's own thoughts and feelings ignores the intersubjective context for these events. In the same contribution, Ogden (1989) continues to expand his conception of states of being by adding an earlier, sensory-dominated mode of generating experience. The autistic-contiguous
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position as described is a nonreflective (presymbolic) and perceptually based (sensorydominated) form of subjectivity that for Ogden represents the most primitive edge of experience. It is important to note that Ogden (1989) distinguishes between an autistic-contiguous mode of generating experience in the world and a condition of pathological autism wherein the effort is to maintain a perfectly insulated closed system (p. 59). The latter conception, more characteristic of Mahler's (1968) normally autistic infant, may be seen to represent Cartesianism in one of its many forms (Cavell, 1988). The development of Ogden's shift is fascinating. In revising the Kleinian developmental stages into dialectical positions at which all levels of experiencing are always present to varying degrees, he at once deprivileges and depathologizes, opening the possibility for the introduction and later elaboration of a prereflective, bodily based subject of experience. The move is away from the (over) valuing of the (self-)conscious subject and further into a domain of experiencing that will later represent the project of Subjects of Analysis. In Subjects, Ogden (1994) again takes up the work of Klein and credits the introduction of the concept of projective identification with serving as the ontological grounding for the creation of the subject in intersubjectivity: Klein's concept of projective identification, as elaborated by Bion, H. Rosenfeld, and others, presents a conceptualization of the subject interpersonally decentered from its exclusive locus within the individual; instead, the subject is conceived of as arising in a dialectic (a dialogue) of self and other (p. 47). According to Ogden, this important theoretical advance opened the way for Winnicott's subsequent transformation of the psychoanalytic subject as always decentered from itself and always to some degree arising in the context of intersubjectivity (p. 59). By way of illustration, Ogden revisits Winnicott's treatment of the early mirroring relationship between mother and infant: What does the baby see when he or she looks at the mother's face? I am suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. In other words, the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks like is related to what she sees there (Winnicott, 1967, p. 112). In analyzing this passage, Ogden draws our attention to the fact that Winnicott is not merely referring to the absence of the mother as a separate object and not merely describing the mother as a narcissistic extension of the infant, which are principle dangers associated with the Hegelian struggle discussed earlier. Neither is the mother strictly functioning solely as a mirror. Winnicott's intent, as read by Ogden (1994), is far more complex than that (p. 52). As Ogden points out, Winnicott states that what the mother looks like to the infant !is related to," not the same as, what the mother sees in the infant. Mirroring, then, is not a relationship of identity; it is a relationship of relative sameness and therefore of relative difference (pp. 52-53, italics added). Ogden holds that this process occurs before the infant's awareness of the difference between self and object. It is in this primary setting that the infant's observations of himself (as other to himself) in the mother's reflection of him generates the rudiments of the experience of self consciousness (!self reflection"), that is, the awareness of observable me-ness (p. 53).
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Ogden's reading of Winnicott represents a substantial advance. Here he moves beyond an objectrelational interpretation to concentrate not on a mirroring relationship of identity or identification but on the simultaneous experience of sameness and difference that marks the intersubjective moment described by Winnicott. However, I believe an even more radical reading of Winnicott may be obtained through Merleau-Ponty. In considering Winnicott's well-quoted observation that there is no such thing as a baby (separate from maternal provision), I believe Winnicott suggests that the infant is born into a social world. This different reading gives primacy to the social context of the infant's experience before the dawn of the experience of what Ogden termed me-ness, emphasizing, as Winnicott (1952) himself put it, that the centre of gravity of the being does not start off in the individual. It is in the total set-up (p. 99). Master-Servant and the Subjugating Third If the relational theorists used Hegel's paradigm to transcend Freud's (i.e., Descartes) monism, one may say Ogden uses Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to transcend Hegel's dualism. Having regrounded the psychoanalytic subject from an earlier struggle for recognition to a new normative paradigm, Ogden's coup de grace is in finding a new role for Hegel's masterslave dynamic, formerly the basis for a relational intersubjectivity. Ogden's concept of projective identification parallels the difficulty Hegel encountered in positing self-consciousness as an epistemic position (counterpoising projective identification with the analytic third) as a process involving the negation of, or failure to recognize the subjectivity of, the other. For Ogden (1994), the operation of projective identification similarly involves the negation of separate subjectivity (p. 100). In projective identification, the projector takes the role of Hegel's master; the recipient of the projection (the servant) is subjugated via a negation of himself by surrendering to the subjectivity of the projector. In both Hegel's masterservant and Ogden's projectorrecipient setups, the participants are willing parties who enter into an unconscious intersubjective !alliance" in order to escape the solipsism of their own separate psychological existences (p. 105). Following Hegel's paradigm, Ogden states that release from this subjugating condition is achieved by way of recognition. This recognition amounts to a giving back of the subjectivity of the recipient (servant), leading Ogden (1994) to relationally posit that the degree of pathology associated with a projective identification is a reflection of the degree of inability/unwillingness of the participants to release one another from the subjugation of the !third" by means of an act of recognition of the unique and separate individuality of the other and of oneself (pp. 105-106). Merleau-Ponty Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), a prominent French existential phenomenologist, is among the lesser known Continental philosophers. I suspect that a major reason for his position is the deliberate vagueness of his prose style, which has resulted in his phenomenology being known as a philosophy of ambiguity. His essential ambiguity is to be found (i.e., recreated) in the experience of reading Merleau-Ponty, which, like reading Subjects of Analysis, draws one into a seemlessly interwoven mixture of form and content, as each author's unique and creative voice
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resonates intersubjectively with the reader's own. After presenting some of the major points of Merleau-Ponty's intersubjective theory, I will show how Ogden, in using Hegel to deconstruct the Cartesian objectivist assumptions of classical psychoanalysis, goes beyond Hegel to create in Subjects of Analysis (1994) a new synthesis that is similar to aspects of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological intersubjectivity. Like Winnicott, Merleau-Ponty (1945) thinks inaccurate the notion that we come to recognize other egos by comparing them with our own experiences of consciousness and instead asserts that the actual order of events is the reverse. He too turns to the experience of the infant to illustrate: A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my teeth and pretend to bite it (p. 352). For Merleau-Ponty, the baby is aware that the activity of biting, and more generally of bodily activities is the same, whoever engages in them (Hammond, Howarth, and Keat, 1991). This awareness occurs before the child sees its reflection in a mirror or develops a sense of its own individual bodily acts, and so it cannot be said to occur through analogy. Biting says Merleau-Ponty (1945), has immediately, for it, an intersubjective significance (p. 352). The baby is aware of a plurality of subjects in what Ogden termed a relationship of relative sameness and therefore of relative difference before being aware of individual subjects. Intersubjective experience precedes personal experience and is, as in the preceding example, rooted in bodily experiencing. For Merleau-Ponty, bodily perception is our primordial experience of or in the world, and so the world first appears to us by way of perception. Primordial perception is not conscious reflection (i.e., thinking) but the immediacy of prereflective experience mediated by the relation of the body to the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the subject is embodied. The body subject, MerleauPonty's fundamental discovery, represents his victory over Cartesian dualism (Kwant, 1963). The body subject is not a subject by virtue of the fact that there is a mind inhabiting a body; rather, Merleau-Ponty's recasting of the body transcends the materialism of Descartes, with the body losing its quality as a thing, transformed into itself qua subject. It is difficult to discuss MerleauPonty's concept of the body subject without invoking dualistic terminology. For instance, the subject is not situated in the body, because this implies the subject is other than the body. Rather, the body which is the subject of perception, and it is at that mode of existence, at a preconscious level, constituting a dialogue with the world. This mode of being has some interesting implications. The body in its perception of the world is preconscious, not a conscious, reflective subject. Prereflective being remains impersonal or prepersonal, as there is no I on the nonreflective level. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty (1945) has referred to existence at this level as an anonymous subjectivity (p. 348), a term reminiscent of the private or true self described by object-relational theorists (Winnicott, 1960; Khan, 1963). Recall also that Winnicott (1960) asserted the true self to come from the aliveness of the bodytissues and the working of body functions it means little more than the summation of sensorimotor aliveness (pp. 148-149). For Merleau-Ponty, as for Winnicott's psyche-soma (1949), this preconscious body subject is attuned to the world in a manner that the conscious subject is not.

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Returning to the issue of the primacy of the intersubjective condition, the child, according to Merleau-Ponty, does not experience itself as an individual first and then notice that others are similar. On the contrary, the temporal development is from the social to the personal (Hammond et al., 1991). Says Merleau-Ponty (1945), The perception of other people and the intersubjective world is problematical only for adults. The child lives in a world which he unhesitatingly believes accessible to all around him. He has no awareness of himself or of others as private subjectivities (p. 355). Chessick (1992) has remarked on the correspondence between Merleau-Ponty's scheme and Stern's (1985) infant observations illustrating that the infant is never in an autistic condition but displays from the beginning of life a core relatedness and apparent separation of its own body from its relations with others. Merleau-Ponty's ingenious solution to the problem of other minds results from his questioning the premises of the problem itself. In a critique of Hegel's life-and-death struggle for recognition, Merleau-Ponty (1945) declares, For the struggle ever to begin, and for each consciousness to be capable of suspecting the alien presences which it negates, all must necessarily have some common ground and be mindful of their peaceful coexistence in the world of childhood (p. 355). For Merleau-Ponty, the existence of others is a given. The very supposition of entering into a lifeand-death struggle with another person presumes a more basic awareness of being similar and sharing a common world, and subjectivity emerges from this prepersonal experience of similarity, or communality. This is in contradistinction to traditional solutions to the problems of solipsism through analogy or through the struggle for recognition in that Merleau-Ponty (1945) gives primacy to the social context of being: Our relationship to the social is, like our relationship to the world, deeper than any express perception or any judgement. It is as false to place ourselves in society as an object among other objects, as it is to place society within ourselves as an object of thought, and in both cases the mistake lies in treating the social as an object. We must return to the social with which we are in contact by the mere fact of existing, and which we carry about inseparably with us before any objectification [p. 362]. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty the social is not a dimension of my existence but rather a dimension of existence from which, to use his phraseology, I am given. Says Merleau-Ponty (1945): I find myself already situated and involved in a physical and social worldI am given to myself, which means that this situation is never hidden from me, it is never round about me an alien necessity, and I am never in effect enclosed in it like an object in a box. My freedom, the fundamental power which I enjoy of being the subject of all my experiences, is not distinct from my insertion into the world [p. 360]. Later, I illustrate how Ogden's intersubjective analytic third parallels Merleau-Ponty's conception of the embeddedness of the prereflective subject in the social world and how Ogden clinically works from within this phenomenological frame.
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Language, an Intimate Grammar The other example given by Merleau-Ponty for the primacy of the intersubjective is that of language. When adults are engaged in dialogue, he claims, the use of language is a shared activity in which my perspective and that of the other slide into each other as we coexist across a shared world. From this experience, thoughts may emerge with joint, not personal, authorship: In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator [Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 354]. Ogden's kinship with Merleau-Ponty in their position on language is clear in his description of the intersubjective project of his own volume: You, the reader, must allow me to occupy you, your thoughts, your mind, since I have no voice with which to speak other than yours. If you are to read this book, you must allow yourself to think my thoughts while I must allow myself to become your thoughts and in that moment neither of us will be able to lay claim to the thought as our exclusive creation [1994, p. 1]. Ogden's use of the example of reading Ogden is itself in accord with Merleau-Ponty's later development of the theme of alterity, in which reading becomes a metaphor for the experience of the other. The distinction made by Merleau-Ponty in The Experience of Others (1951-1952) between fertile and stereotypic language is further developed in his The Prose of the World (1969) as the dialectic tension between sedimented language and speech. Sedimented language represents those a priori ideas or institutional use(s) of language that threaten an assimilation of the subject (or the text) into its own preformed categories. Sedimented language, however, is a necessary grounding for communication. For instance, to read Ogden, the words and phrases he uses must resonate in the reader with thoughts that were the reader's to begin with. Ogden (1997) has proposed a parallel to Merleau-Ponty's sedimented language in describing patient's or analyst's language as lifeless, stale, prepackaged, dead, or formulaic. Such uses represent, according to Ogden, an imitation of analysis and a failure of imagination. Merleau-Ponty (1969) contrasts sedimented language to speech, the operation through which a certain arrangement of already available signs and significations alters and then transfigures each of them, so that in the end a new signification is secreted (p. 13). Speech, then, depends on the use of sedimented language, and the very danger of assimilation into the same (solipsism) provides the horizon for its transcendence. The book, says Merleau-Ponty, in concert with Ogden, makes use of everything I have contributed in order to carry me beyond it (p. 11). For MerleauPonty, this is a circular dialectic in which sedimented language itself makes the appearance of new meaning possible by way of a rearrangement of the old or institutional in a creative newness.

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Ogden has a parallel to Merleau-Ponty's transformative function of speech. In a discussion of effects created through language, Ogden (1997) writes of meanings or feelings arising that lie beyond what is being said (p. 17). This concept implies a transcendence of institutionalized meanings: Language is at its most powerful when it disturbs, not by arriving at insights/understandings, but by creating possibilities: billows or ripples of the stream of tendency (Emerson, 1841, p. 312). The analyst's language makes ripples in the stream of tendency in an effort to help analyst and analysand to break out of the circle of the eddy in which they are caught. The analytic pair never fully succeeds in this endeavor, but struggles in and through language to overcome itself (its own circling tendencies) [p. 12]. Thus, Ogden also creates a dialectical circle that, like Merleau-Ponty's, may be thought of as a hermeneutic circle. Neither author perceives this dialectical circle as a problem to be solved as much as a practical problem to be liveda task, as Heidegger (1962) put it, to keep the circle open and not to collapse it into solipsism, thereby excluding the other (Yeo, 1992). Entre Deux: Ogden's Intersubjective Analytic Third One can detect the theoretical forerunner of Ogden's analytic third in his earlier writings on the transferencecountertransference matrix. As a matrix, Ogden's conception is essentially a Hegelian one that, like other relationally oriented approaches, emphasizes two partners' mutual influence on an evolving, dynamic process occurring between themrather than a static notion of a classical theory that locates the transference solely in the patient and countertransference solely in the analyst. Ogden's intersubjective analytic third arises from a tradition of European psychoanalysis that had for some time considered concepts of a mutually created third to the psychoanalytic dyad (e.g., Green's, 1975, analytic object; Winnicott's, 1951, third area of intermediate experiencing). For Ogden, the third may be said to represent an attempt to solve the problem of object relationalism by moving past the subjectobject dualism of that approach. In advancing psychoanalytic theory past the point where one can no longer simply speak of the analyst and the analysand as separate subjects who take one another as objects (1994, p. 62), Ogden attempts a theory of intersubjectivity freed from modernist moorings. Grotstein (1995), remarking on Ogden's mysterious third area, parallels it with Bion's dreamwork alpha as the intermediate domain where the respective preconsciousnesses of the two intersubjective partners interact (p. 324). As such, the intersubjective third area developed in analytic space bears relation to Merleau-Ponty's prepersonal, preconscious area of shared similarity, described earlier. How can one penetrate this preconscious realm of being? As noted by Merleau-Ponty, reflection will help in self-understanding, but subjectivity will not open to thinking. Ogden proposes a way into the third area via the analyst's use of reverie (Bion, 1962) as a third. Ogden's idea of reverie uses the analyst's own subjectivity as the horizon for the appearance of the other. Here again,
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what I am calling Ogden's phenomenological turn is very much in keeping with Merleau-Ponty's (1969) thought: That everything which exists for me should be mine, and not qualify as a being for me except on condition of being framed in my field, does not prevent the appearance of the other on the contrary, it makes that appearance possible (p. 138). In Ogden's rich case illustrations, we witness the dialectical flow of subjectivity and intersubjectivity experienced by the analyst as his awareness lights upon objects in his office (e.g., an envelope and its stamp) as he anxiously fantasizes about collecting his car at the garage at the end of the day. Reverie as illustrated by Ogden (1996) clinically is something quite different from thinking about one's patient or being receptive to the patient (e.g., in a manner of free-floating attention). Included instead in Ogden's (1994) definition is a motley collection of psychological states that seem to reflect the analyst's narcissistic self absorption, obsessional rumination, daydreaming, sexual fantasying, and so on (p. 74). His use of what are at times barely perceptible (p. 73) mental experiences, or bodily sensations and body-related fantasies, are the principle medium (p. 84) through which the analytic third is plumbed. Opening onto these preconscious, sensuous experiences, says Ogden, provides the analyst access to a level of existence at being-insensation (p. 174). The analyst's reverie represents symbolic and protosymbolic (sensationbased) forms given to the unarticulated (and often not yet felt) experience of the analysand as they are taking form in the intersubjectivity of the analytic pair (i.e., in the analytic third) (p. 82). Here again, Ogden's clinical use of the body is highly consistent with Merleau-Ponty's (1945) phenomenology of the body as a third term (pp. 101, 117). Neither subject nor object for Merleau-Ponty, the body is conceived as the milieu in which opposites like interiority and exteriority, as well as subjectivity and objectivity, intersect. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is never reducible to the differences it simultaneously joins and separates, as it is always entre deux (Taylor, 1987). I think we see in Ogden's unique uses of reverie and the body not so much his use of his subjectivity qua container in the Bionic sense suggested by Mitchell (1997) but as milieu in Merleau-Ponty's (1942) senseas a medium for the appearance of the world from which he is not separated. One might contrast this experience with Benjamin's (1988) intersubjective theory, based in Hegel, in which all fantasy is the negation of the real other (p. 57). From my perspective, Ogden's use of reverie is very much in agreement with the phenomenological attitude of Husserl (1900), as both have as their goal a revelatory openness (Adams, 1995) to preconscious awareness. Notably, Ogden's phenomenological turn does not result in a naive empathizing with the patient at the expense of the patient's nonconscious experiencesjust the opposite. The similarity in Ogden's description of the preconscious, sensation-based subjective experience of reverie to the primacy given to perception in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is striking, as Ogden, like Merleau-Ponty, finds his analytic freedom in the ways in which he is inextricably given to himself by the physical and interpersonal world. Ogden's work is, as Mitchell (1997) rightly notes, profoundly interactive, yet in a Winnicottian sense it is paradoxically thus that we see the very private dimensions of a private man. In turn, it follows that Ogden's expression of his
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subjectivity in technique shows exquisite emotional presence and reactivity that, for extended periods of time, [are] largely silent (Mitchell, 1997, p. 153). For Ogden, analysis takes place in the oscillation between reverie and interpretation, between the creativeness of intersubjectivity and the subjugation of projective identification, between states of aliveness and deadness and conditions of privacy and communication. It is the ambiguity of that oscillation (the oscillation of that ambiguity) that is the space of the analytic third. Perhaps he leads us as psychoanalysts beyond asking whether a theory is a one-person or two-person psychology (throughout this paper, I've shown how even two-person psychologies can maintain the other as object). The answer to that question doesn't seem as important or germane as it once did. Perhaps we should instead be asking: How does this psychology address the issue of alterity? I think Ogden's answer is an elegant one that allows him to open clinically onto already existing levels of subjective and shared experience. To the degree that he has been successful, Ogden has provided us with radically new ways of viewing psychoanalytic subjects. References 1 Adams , W. (1995), Revelatory openness wedded with the clarity of unknowing: Psychoanalytic evenly suspended attention, the phenomenological attitude, and meditative awareness. Psychoanal. Contemp. Thought, 18 :463-494. (PCT.018.0463A)
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