Xenophibia and The Europian Union

Xenophobia and the European Union Author(s): Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy Source: Comparative Politics, Vol.
32, No. 4 (Jul., 2000), pp. 419-436 Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422387 . Accessed: 04/05/2013 17:07
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Xenophobiaand the EuropeanUnion

Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy
As the Soviet Union disintegratedin 1991, representativesfrom the twelve nationstates of the European Community gathered in Maastricht in the Netherlands to negotiate the Treaty on the EuropeanUnion. This treaty promised to deepen economic and political integration;its preamble resolved "to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen."l While all twelve nations ratified the treaty, some did so only with great difficulty. The French and Danish were deeply divided. The formerbarely approvedtheir referendum(by 50.7 percent), and the latter required a second one after the first failed. The British House of Commons delayed its final vote until the Danes approvedratification,while founding member Germanywas the last to ratify the treaty due to a constitutionalchallenge that the federal constitutionalcourt did not dismiss until October 1993. The unexpecteddifficulty in garneringadequate support suggested that the resolve to create "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"lay more with the draftersof the treaty than with the peoples themselves.2 In the decade preceding the MaastrichtTreaty "crisis" and in the years since, increasing supportfor nationalistparties across Europe has also been accompanied and antiforeignerthemes in the political arena. by the resurgenceof antiimmigrant The National Front (FN) in France was the strongest and most visible of these groups, but very few countriesin western Europeescaped the rise of nationalistpolitics. Nor were these sentiments limited to active supporters of the extreme right. Whereas supportfor the FN and the GermanRepublikaneraveragedapproximately 10 percent of the electorate in the early 1990s, opinion polls revealed that between three and four of every ten respondents sympathized with their negative views of immigrantsor foreigners.3 These two phenomena,tenuous supportfor Europeanintegrationand rising xenophobia, suggest a common wariness towardsexternal changes that threatenthe perceived integrityof the nation. For the most part, currentliteratureon supportfor the EuropeanUnion has emphasized cost-benefit argumentsin explaining variance in public opinion. Other than a brief nod at national traditions,these argumentshave largely disregardedthe influence of such motivations as an inclination to preserve national integrity or a fear of foreign influences. Such motivations seem likely to predispose individuals towards a particularevaluation of European integration in additionto considerationsof economic self-interest.Xenophobic attitudesare possi419
Comparative Politics
July 2000
bly relatedto popularsupportfor Europeanintegration,and their relationshipcan be explained in terms of political culture theory. Cost-benefit theories miss important cultural influences on public opinion about the European Union and integration because they rely too heavily on objective maximizationof self-interestas the primary determinantof political behavior.This omission can be addressedby Eckstein's culturalisttheory of change to explain popularsupportfor integrationand an empirical analysis to demonstratethe relationshipbetween attitudestowardforeigners and popularevaluationsof Europeanintegration.
Theories of Popular Support for the European Union Renewed scholarly interest in popular support for European integration since the MaastrichtTreatyhas been accompaniedby the trend to explain public opinion by the costs and benefits of EuropeanUnion membership.This approach appears to have replaced Inglehart'spostmaterialistand cognitive mobilization theories as the predominantexplanationof variance in public opinion within and between member countries and has been advanced in numerous articles debating the finer points of cost-benefit analysis in supportof integration.4 In one of the more influential articles, Eichenbergand Dalton argue that various national and internationaleconomic conditions and political events, including inflation, intra-European Communitytrade, and national referendaon EC issues, combine to influence popularsupport.5 They extend the model of economic voting to the level underthe assumptionthat the EC is primarilyan economic orgasupranational nization and citizens will partially credit it for the performance of their national
economies.
This emphasis on the effects of the economic conditions and interactions of nation-stateson popular support for integrationhas been challenged. New theories include as essential components of their analyses the direct benefits individuals receive from EU membershipand not just indirectbenefits as reflected by national economic conditions such as low inflation and high intra-EU trade. Research has found that income, education,and occupationplay significant roles in shaping public opinion towards European integration, with higher support among individuals with more educationand greatersocioeconomic status. According to this argument, the potential economic benefits of EU membershipare greaterfor these individuals than for poorer,less educated,lower class individualsand explain their propensityto view integrationmore favorably.Another key argumentproposes that individuals' perceptions of the benefits of membership strongly influence their support. Gabel and Whitten indicate that subjective evaluationsof both personal and national economic conditionsare more influentialfactors in supportof integrationthan the actual conditionsof the nationaleconomy.6
420
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy While the majority of studies of popular support of integration advances these explanations,other theories have been formulated.Fraserand Nelsen arguethat religious affiliation affects individuals' attitudes toward integration;Roman Catholics and OrthodoxChristiansdemonstrategreater supportthan Protestants.They speculate thatthe "international" characterof the RomanCatholic and Orthodoxtraditions fosters greater openness to European integrationamong their followers, while the historical links of many Protestantdenominationsto particularnation-statescreate greaterwariness towardthe integrationprocess.7Deflem and Pampel argue that persistent national differences in supportof integrationover time and when controlled for sociodemographic and ideological variables "suggest that both favorable and unfavorableorientations toward the supranationalEuropean Community emanate from national concerns."8Hence support for integration,whether positive or negative, arises from individualsevaluatingintegrationfrom a nationalviewpoint. The religious affiliation and nationalidentity theories are set apartfrom the costbenefit theories by the implicationthat underlyingvalues and beliefs dispose people towardcertain attitudesabout integrationand that economic considerationsdo not solely mold public opinion. The emphasis on economic cost-benefit explanationsis since economic concerns have long been the focus of the European understandable, Community.However,this emphasis has overshadowedboth the study and the significance of other influences on popularsupport.In particular,culturalfactors have been largely ignored despite the great diversity among the EU's fifteen nation-state membersand their numerousnationalitiesand ways of life. One possible factor is attitudestowards foreigners, especially whether xenophobia, or fear of foreigners,negatively influences support for integration.The EU has not only increasedthe interactionamong Europeannation-states,but has also multiplied the points of contact between individualsof differingnationaland social backgrounds. Logically, the more an individualfears foreigners,the less likely he or she will support integration.The foundation of this hypothesis lies in political culture theory and in Eckstein'stheory of political change.
Political Culture and Political Transformation Although political culturetheoristsdo not reject the premise that individualsattempt to maximize their interests by weighing the costs and benefits of certain actions, they refuse to accept it as the only significant determinant of political behavior. Almond characterizesthis theoretical reliance on self-interest maximization as an avoidanceof the complexity involved in explaininghumanbehavior,political or otherwise.9 Political culture theory emphasizes the influential role of values, dispositions, and beliefs on political behavior. Values and beliefs dispose an individual towardone conclusion or anotherprior to conscious deliberation,thus preventinga
421
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completely objective gauging of a situation'spros and cons. Eckstein identifies values and beliefs as "mediatingorientations," or the learnedmethods of cognition and evaluationthat dispose individualsto respondin a patternedmannerto similar types of situations.10According to the underlying premise of political culture theory, actions patternedby individual-specific orientationscharacterizepolitical behavior. The variabilityof such orientationscontributesto a significant range of responses to the same situation.Understanding an individual'sactions and attitudesrequiresmore than an assessment of what serves his or her best interests. Mediating orientations must also be considered. Cultureconsists of those widely sharedmediating orientationsthat incline members of a group or society to display similar attitudes and actions in a given situation.11lVerbadescribes political cultureas "the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions" that "forms an important link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals in reaction to those As a frameworkof values and beliefs, culture simplifies the process of events."'l2 decision making by providingpoints of reference from which to comprehend,evaluate, and react to one's environment.Both nonpoliticalexperienceswith family,peers, and education and interaction with political processes socialize individuals into a political culture.'3 particular Because people are taught to think and behave like their predecessors and are socialized with particularorientationsto the political environment,patternsof political behavior will remain relatively continuous. However, political change is indisputable. In this century alone Europeancolonialism gave way to many new states, Nazi totalitarianismand Soviet Communism rose and fell, and the scope of civil rights in the United States was expanded. Such phenomenahave temptedmany cultural theorists to resort to what Eckstein calls "improvised,post hoc accounts of political change."'4He offers a response to the critique that political culture arguments fail to account adequately for either institutional or behavioral political change. Eckstein's Theory of Political Change Eckstein assumes two general categories of change in mediating orientations.The first results from situational or "natural" or "artificial"change. change, and the second is caused by political transformation Situationalchange evokes one of three responses from members of the affected culture: patternmaintenanceor the attemptto preserve basic culturalpatternsthrough adaptationto persistentlyincongruoussituations,the developmentof a more flexible culture to accommodatesituationalchanges more easily, and culturaldiscontinuity. The last response may occur when circumstancesso severely deviate from the norm that the culture can not adapt and loses its ability to provide structurefor society. While government authority may survive, political behavior alters as individuals to the new situation.'5 struggle to form orientationsappropriate
422
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy creates an artifiUnlike spontaneoussituationalchange, political transformation cial situation of culturaltension because it results from a conscious effort to enact change. It is the "use of political power and artifice to engineer radically changed social and political structures,...to set society and polity on new courses toward unprecedentedobjectives."16 Using revolution as an illustration,Eckstein questions if such political engineering can successfully transformpolitical and cultural patterns. Revolutionarieswho command a great deal of power and control often have little trouble in disruptingtraditionalpolitical structuresand perhaps even in establishing new ones. However,they quickly confrontthe difficulties of reorientingpeople to act "properly"in their newly constructed society. The more entrenchedthe cultureis, the less successful reorientation is likely to be. Insteadof prerevolutionary political behavior guided by revolutionaryideals, prior orientationsmay distort the new culture toward the former culture, exhibiting a type of pattern-maintenance. Hence political transformation often degeneratesinto the mere translationof former culturalpatternsto fit the effects of the attemptat political engineering.To establish and preserve order in the new polity, Eckstein posits that revolutionariesmust rely on despotismor legalism as a substitutefor the frameworkof sharedorientations.17 While situational changes frequentlychallenge existing frameworksof political has occurredmuch more rarely.It presents a difficulture, political transformation cult task, and its success is dubious from the outset. One is hardly surprisedto see revolution as the most common mode of transformation,since zealous ideologues are the most likely to employ drastic methods of change and to attemptto replace entire systems. In this respect, the politics of East CentralEurope and Russia since 1989 fit into Eckstein's model ratherwell, from the attempted imposition of new political institutionsand processes to the popularresistance to change arising from system. mediatingorientationsdeveloped for a totalitarian On the other side of the European Integration as Political Transformation European continent, where stability is the rule rather than the exception, the European Union embodies a new, post-cold-war type of political transformation. Like a revolution, integration has been driven by the energies of a political elite seeking artificially to alter and institutionalizeeconomic, political, and social relations among a collection of peoples. Such reorientationis perhapseven more formidable for integrationiststhan for revolutionaries.When faced with a resistantpopulace, democraticallyminded political engineers find themselves subject to restraints often ignored by revolutionaries,such as having to persuaderatherthan compel the while simultaneously people to supportchange. Attemptingpolitical transformation maintainingdemocraticstructuresis also likely to encountergreaterresistancesince the pretransformation culture is more intact. Such modernization will most likely occur incrementally, at least at the outset, as the political architectsseek to accustom membersof society to the idea of change.
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Incrementalchange has characterized Europeanintegrationfor most of its history. Until the mid 1980s, when the Single EuropeanAct was adopted, economic issues dominated the agenda, and "integration" meant facilitation of trade and joint economic venturesamong members.Only recentlyhas the integrationprocess accelerated and assumed an increasinglypolitical character.The MaastrichtTreatyprovides excellent evidence of the applicabilityof the culturalistperspectiveto the examination of popularsupportfor Europeanintegration.The treaty'sresolve to "creat[e]an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe"and such unmistakablypolitical goals as the developmentof a common foreign and security policy and cooperation on mattersof internalsecurity (justice and home affairs) indicate a clear determination to alterthe political patternswithin and among membersof the EU. These goals supportthe critical assumptionthat the transitionfrom the EuropeanCommunityto the European Union imbued the integration process with a definitively political character. While the treatyitself certified that Europeanintegrationhad become a matterof political as well as economic change, the natureof the ratificationprocess suggests an elite-drivenattemptto change political structuresand relationships.The ambivalence of the Danish and Frenchtowardsthe treaty,as well as the difficulties in ratifythat the proposedpolitical transing it in Britainand Germany,clearly demonstrated formationderivedfrom the ambitionsof integrationpractitioners(the Eurocrats)and the political elite. The popular resistance displayed during the ratification process suggests that supportfor economic integrationdid not translateas easily as expected into support for political integration.It lends furthercredence to the assertion that cost-benefit theories have limited explanatorypower and that other factorsmust also be consideredto understand supportfor Europeanintegration. While some may dispute the primarynatureof the EU (economic versus political), I assume that political change has become an essential component of integrationist goals. Consequently, the study of popularsupportfor the EU must account for reactions to the culturalpressuresof political transformation, pressuresthat require individualsto alterorientationsto accommodatenew political and social patterns.
Xenophobia and Popular Support for Integration Popular support for European integration is the collective public approval of the attemptto create a more unified association among the nation-statesof the European Union. Popularsupportreflects a basic and very direct reaction to change and can help observers gauge the natureand level of resistance to political transformation. Hostile attitudestowardchange may be shaped by an orientationtowardshigh cultural fixity or the commitmentto preserve distinctivepatternsof cognition and evaluation. Alternatively,positive support for an institution of change such as the EU
424
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy may reveal a disposition to view basic cultural patterns as flexible or perhaps immune to that particularchange. Integrationis an instance of political transformation, and the examinationof popularsupportshould seek to identify culturalorientations thatmay influence individualresponsesto it. One orientationthat may potentially influence attitudestowardEuropeanintegration is the way individuals view foreigners in their society. As further integration increases the flow of peoples across national borders and the influence of foreign policymakers on domestic politics, the perception of foreigners will likely have a greater effect on support.To examine the effects of this orientationon support for integration,a specific and measurableattitudehas been chosen: xenophobia. Xenophobiais only one of many attitudesregardingforeignersand representsone of the extremelynegative views. This extremitymakes it easier to identify and measure because it providesa very distinct feeling about foreigners.Its literal definition from the Greek is the fear (phobos) of the strange or foreign (xenos). Its common use has come to signify the expression of mistrust,fear, and/orhatredof foreigners of culture.'18Foreigners linked to an identificationof the nation as the representative are seen as carriersof a differentculture with the potential to threatenthe integrity of one's own nation. The assumptionthat the nation embodies culture comes from a belief that the nation is the arenain which critical values and beliefs are transmitted to developing members. Since each cultureconsists of a unique mix of orientations, foreigners inevitablythreatento alter the domestic culture throughthe introduction of new orientations. Because membershipin a nation is often equatedwith an ethnic heritage, cultures may appearrelatively fixed and distinct in characterfrom each other.This national culturalidentity contributesto the xenophobicperceptionof stark,irreconcilabledifat the heartof xenophobiafinds ferences between culturalgroups.The "strangeness" its source in the apparentdisparity between nations and their associated cultures. Strangenesscreates fear not only because the foreign culture is unknown, but also because contact with it threatensto alter the known and make it strangeas well. For xenophobic individualsthe establishmentof the nation-stateprovides visible protection from the corrupting influences of other cultures by politically distinguishing their culture from surroundingones. It alleviates xenophobia to a certain extent by assuringsovereigntyover the arenain which cultureis expressedand transmitted. If equating nation with culture disposes an individual towards wariness of foreigners, then it likely also disposes him or her to suspect political change that seeks to integratenation-statesand hence increase interactionwith foreigners.An opposing viewpoint might hold culture as transcending nationality, where a larger or smaller group than the nation might share mediating orientations that give it a unique culture. Furthermore,individualsmay identify with more than one cultural "group" as they discover that they share common orientations with a variety of groups. Hence individualsmay place themselves in a national (for example, French,
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Danish, Irish) culture, as well as a supranational(for example, European,Islamic, Communist) culture that has orientations distinct from ethnonational origin. This self-identification in a wider context of culture seems less likely to cause people to perceive foreigners as threateningtheir culture since they have created consonance among several groups of mediating orientations. Because it perceives political to cultural integrity,a supranational view of culture sugchange as nonthreatening both a smaller likelihood of and a gests xenophobia greaterpossibility of supportfor Europeanintegration. If xenophobic individualsperceive the inviolability of the nation and hence culture to be protected by a political institution, they are less likely to exhibit visible xenophobia.While they may still fear the foreign as representedby other people or institutions, the security provided by the nation-state mitigates the necessity of expressing that fear. Should the sovereignty of the nation-statebe threatened,active xenophobiamay rise in response to the perceived danger to the nation and culture. Europeanintegrationcould present such a threat if seen as an attemptto subsume nation-statesinto a larger entity that forces individuals from multiple nations with conflicting cultures into close proximity. Hence the expression of xenophobia in member states of the EuropeanUnion may representa response to integrationas a form of political transformation threateningthe sovereigntyof the nation-state. If an expression of xenophobic attitudes is partially a reaction to the political changes representedby Europeanintegration,then individuals displaying a fear of foreignerswould be less likely to supportthe process of integrationand the institution of the EU. Alternately,those individualswho do not express xenophobiawould be more likely to supportintegrationor at least have a more positive opinion of it. Therefore,popularsupportfor Europeanintegrationwill decrease as the expression of xenophobicattitudesincreases.
Data Measurement While issues of nationalidentityhave been more prominentin explainingsupportfor in some EU membersthan in others,xenophobiais potentiallya Europeanintegration cross-national factorin understanding variancein popularsupport. Althoughcitizens of some countriesmay generallybe more suspiciousof foreigners,the existence of xenophobic individualsin every EU memberis very likely.Forthis reasonand for the sake of comparison, we includethe twelve EU membersas of 1994 in the followinganalysis. To assess the relationshipbetween supportfor Europeanintegrationand xenophobia empirically,we use data from the public opinion survey Euro-barometer41.1. The survey was conducted in member countries of the EU subsequentto the 1994 Europeanparliamentelections and contains questions pertinent,not only to support for Europeanintegration,but also to perceptionsof foreigners.19 Accuratelymeasur426
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy ing xenophobiaand supportfor integrationrequiredthe constructionof two indices from several variablesin orderto addressdifferentaspects of each concept. Selecting Variables and Creating Indices Determining popular support for a political process such as European integration presents a challenge because Europeanintegrationalmost certainlyholds differentmeanings for differentpeople. Some may equate it directly with the activities of the EuropeanUnion, while others may take a broaderview that includes interactionwith nonmemberEuropeancountries. The definition of supportfor Europeanintegrationin this article involves not only a general affirmationof integration,but also a positive assessment of the EU as its institutionalrepresentative. To increase accuracyof measurement,three variables were selected to assess attitudestowardintegration. The first variable,whether one is for or against efforts to unify western Europe, measuressupportfor the idea of integrationon a four point scale: very much for, for to some extent, against to some extent, and very much against. The other two variables assess supportfor the institutionof integrationthrougha normativeevaluation of EU membershipas either good, bad, or neither and for a reaction of either very sorry, indifferent,or relieved to the hypothetical"scrapping"of the EU. Responses of good and very sorry are coded as highly supportive of integration; bad and relieved representnegative attitudes;and neither and indifferentare viewed as neutral reactions.20 For inclusion within a single index, the variableswere coded in the same direction, with integration-supporting responses receiving higher scores and The combination of these three varilower ones.21 integration-opposingresponses ables provides greater detail in the analysis of supportfor integrationthan a single variablewould, and it partiallycorrects for variance in respondentinterpretation of survey questionsby addressingthe concept from severalangles. The supportfor integrationindex was createdusing the factor analysis method. It extractedonly one factor with an Eigenvaluegreaterthan 1 (2.180), explaining 72.6 percent of the combined variance of the three variables. High factor loadings for each variableindicate that the extractedfactor is closely relatedto all three.22 From the natureof the three variables,this factor is assumed to be the level of supportfor Europeanintegration. The distributionof factor scores suggested a naturaldivision into quintiles. Each category measuresa progressivelyhigher level of supportfor integration.In creating the index as a measurementof supportwithin the EU, the data was weighted so that each nation-state's population was accurately represented relative to the others. When evaluatingdata for a single country,however,the weight variableis not used. Table 1 lists the percentage of each country'spopulation within each quintile, displaying some ratherwide variationsin support. For example, nearly 40 percent of Denmark'spopulation is in the lowest category of support,while almost 35 percent of Luxembourg's populationexpresses the highest level of supportfor integration.
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Table 1 Supportfor EuropeanIntegrationin EU Members, 1994

forIntegration Support (%) 2 3 4
20. 7 20.7 f8.6
7 Iisth
20.2 7.9
,
Count
WeitdAveragc
Low
20.0 20.8
France Belgium Netherlands ;G0nany Italy 'Luxembourg Denmark Ireland .UnitedKingdom <Greece Spain < Portuas
SOURCE: Eorfmte
15.7 12.1 25,4 7.3 10.8 38.4 7.7 29.6 12.0 16.4 19.1
25.8 14.9 22.2 17.6 12.9 11.6 15.1 23.1 17.2 23.8 33.0
15.5s 25.3 26.0 14.3 17.9 14.7 14.9 21,5 22.0 21.2 23.9 23.4
10.5 25.1
N 12,800
1,000
21.4 27.1 19.4 27.3 27.3 170 25.5 12.0 19.2 17.8 8.2
11.8 19.9 18.7 29.9 34.3 181 30.2 13.3 30.5 18.1 16.3
1,003 1,005 2,134 1,067 502

1,0(X)0
1,000 1.383 1,002 1,000 1lOO)
41.1. June-Uy 1994,
NOTES:Countries listedin order of theiraccession tthe EC. Eachrowtv totals 100%"Weighted fromdataweighting calculated eachcountr by its average" total the of Union population. percentage European
Operationalizing xenophobia presents an equally difficult problem because it must be measuredindirectly.Not only is xenophobiaan abstractterm, but it has such negative social connotations that few people can honestly assess their tendencies towardit. Asking individualsto place themselves on a ten point scale of fear of foreigners would likely producemuch lower levels of xenophobiathan actually exist. To counteract this problem seven variables were used to gauge a general attitude towardsforeigners. The first variablemeasuredpopularopinion concerningthe numberof foreigners in the country.Respondentswere asked if they felt there are too many foreigners, a lot but not too many, or not many foreignersliving in the country.A response of too many implies that the respondentfelt there were more foreignersthan there ought to be and that this situation presents a problem. This response is classified as more xenophobic than either a lot, not too many, or not a lot. A second question asked whetheror not immigrantsand/orpolitical asylum seekers were a big problemin the respondent'scountry;the former response is coded as more xenophobic. These two variables provide cursory evidence of xenophobia by revealing general attitudes aboutthe presence of foreignersin one's country. The remaining five questions examined more specific attitudes concerning foreigners. Respondents were asked whether they tended to agree or disagree with statements that blamed foreigners for causing or being a part of particularsocial problems. The five issues examined were exploitation of social welfare, increased unemployment,delinquencyand violence, problems as neighbors, and unsuccessful marriagesto foreigners.Xenophobia is indicatedby agreementwith statementsthat These variablesprovide a more compreforeigners caused any of these problems.23
428
Sara De Masterand Michael K. Le Roy hensive measure of xenophobia by addressing perceptions of the specific ways in which the presence of foreignersharmssociety. The xenophobia index was also created using factor analysis. Variables were recoded in the same direction to measure increasing expressions of xenophobia. Factoranalysis extractedone factor with an Eigenvaluegreaterthan 1 (3.45), which explains 49.3 percent of the combined varianceof the seven variables.While not as high as the supportfor integrationfactor,this factor is stronglyrelatedto these seven
variables.24
Because cross-tabulation will be the main form of statisticalanalysis used and the supportfor integrationindex contains five categories, factor scores derivedfrom this analysis were coded into a three point scale of xenophobia. This method makes cross-tabulations easier to interpret, although it sacrifices some detail. For the exploratorypurposes of this article, however, such a constructionis not inappropriate. Each of the three categories in the scale of xenophobiaconsists of a thirdof the total sample, again permittinga comparisonof individual EU member percentages with the weighted average. Similar to supportfor integration,Table 2 reveals some notable cross-nationalvariation;Irelandand Luxembourgdemonstratesignificantly lower than averagexenophobia,while Belgium exhibits fairly high xenophobia. Table 2 Expressionsof Xenophobiain EU Members, 1994
Country
'WebighedAverab
e
i
France dBelgium 'Nethertlands Germany Italy Luxembourg Denmark Ireland United Kingdom Greece Spain Portual
L,ow 33 3 278 169 37.9 27.6 30.1 663 36.7 74.7 40.5 16.3 55.8 55.6
Xenophobia L,evet(4%) Medium 32.4 28.7 29.5 33.7 33.0 37.5 25.3 31.9 19.5 34.3 36.3 28.9 30.1
Htigh 34 3 43.5 53.5i

28.4
39.4 32.4 8.4 314 58 25.2 47.4 15.3 14,3
N l2 299 1000 1.003 ,005 2 134 .1,067 502 t,00 1,001 1,383 1.(02 1000 1,00)
SOURCE: Eurobaroneter 41 1. June-Julyv 1994. NOTES: Each rowv totals 100%. Weighted averagel calctlated fromll data weighting each country by its percentage of the total EU population.
of the two indices makes it possible Analysis and Interpretation Cross-tabulation to determine if the percentage of individuals supporting European integration decreases as the level of xenophobia increases. We chose to control for xenophobia when examining stated opinions on integrationand the EU to determine if attitudes regardingforeignersmight indicatesupportor oppositionto Europeanintegration. Table 3 demonstratesa relatively strong negative relationshipbetween levels of
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xenophobia and support for integration. For the total sample (the twelve member countries of the EU), respondentswho indicatedhigher xenophobic tendencies also expressed less supportfor the EuropeanUnion than more tolerantrespondents.The percentageof individualsin the lowest category of supportincreases as xenophobia increases, while percentages in the two highest categories of supportdecrease with increasingxenophobia.Thus, expressions of xenophobiacorrelatewith popularsupport for the integrationof Europe. Table 3j Supportfor EuropeanIntegrationControlledfor Xenophobia, 1994 (in percentages)
Supportfor Intevration Low 2 3
4
High
Low 12. i1 ;" 17.6 187 23.6 28X0
Xenophobia Medium 18.3 22.4 20.3 19.8 19.3
High 2.3 22.1 17.1 18.1 13.5
aTotal Kle 5d;e T Sample t 20.0 -0.1X97 20.7 18.6 ; 20 20.2 : nin12800 t
41 June-July1994. SOURCE: Eoiometer NOTES: Columnstotal 100%. Correlation coefficient is significant,p < 0.001. Weightvariableemployedin datacorrelation.
While the hypothesizedrelationshipbetween xenophobiaand supportfor integration holds true for the populationof the EU as a whole, the premise of the culturalist argument requires that the relationship be examined within a narrower context. Although the nation is not the sole purveyorof mediating orientations,xenophobes are likely to perceive it as the most importantarena for the transmissionof culture. Controllingfor countrywhen analyzingthe relationshipbetween supportfor integration and xenophobia allows us to determinewhetherthe correlationremains strong within each of the twelve member-states. To account for demographicvariablesthat may influence cross-national differences in correlation, a multiple-classification analysis was conducted. This analysis controlled for the demographicvariables of education, gender, age, occupation, and social class. Its results indicated minimal effects on the relationshipin most countries. Only France, Germany,the U.K., and the Netherlands experienced a change greater than 0.02 in eta values, the largest being 0.06 for France.Consequently,we proceed with an analysis of the relationship that controls for country. Table 4 displays the percentage of individuals in each country who expressed high supportfor Europeanintegration,controlled for their expressions of xenophobia. For example, 30.9 percent of the French in the low xenophobia category expressed high support for integration; 19.2 percent in the medium category had high supportfor integration;and only 8.7 percent expressing high xenophobia also had high support for integration.When compared to the 17.9 percent of the total French sample in the highest category of support for integration,these percentages
430
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy reveal a negative correlationbetween expressions of xenophobia and high support for integration.The Kendall'sTaucof -0.292 confirms the strengthof this relationship for France. Table 4 High Level of Supportfor Integrationin IndividualEU Members, Controlledfor Expressionsof Xenophobia
Gt
; 0tt
Twin
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S;pl
'
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8."".T^
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"
20.4 s 42X6 urg < no y 30.5 N.arlads - 27.0 - 19.6 Portgal a .18 'Belgium 21.3 ins *Itay 36.8 i 4:d < 32.5 nt L 19. ,3 ' 33.7 :r e 5ythe . 80193
tuxe
UK
101 19.7 17,0 17,7 13.0 11.1 12.S 29.0

2t3.6
21.6 29.1 .3 i, 4.1 Eurometer -Jy 1994. SOURCE: Jle, TES:CounIr ised in o of the s of coation (nKls c P entas ae r fom fin I ote "suppot l in ixn r senting r ave hihest spport foritgraiion. hi' t by a weiC Y a calia tXi of toal p O.(0. xcp ait f populaion Al colaion conc sic are paratheses,where p >0.05.
. 5.7 ? 13.3 11.9 X 34.3 - ,.'6 ; .235 , t11.9 18..7 13.0 - 19.9 -0.221 1.5 16.3 1. 0150 8.9 .1.8 : -0.137 17.0 8.1 6.117 24.6 , 0,15 99 302 22 -0072 18.1 1 13.1 (.:02) 30$ ` (.003) 303,i 2 7 J; SW 9T , >?.4/
N 1000 1 3 1 2,134 1,067 502
7-hf
rt
1' ? LO lj38
1,002
i I W
T sppo EU fr S
The cross-tabulations in Table4 reveal a fairly sharpdivision of the countriesinto three groups-strong, moderate/weak,and insignificant-according to the strength of their relationships between xenophobia and support for integration. The first group shows correlationcoefficients strongerthan that of the total sample (-0.197); in fact, Kendall'sTaucexceeds -0.200 for all five countries.The second group consists of five states in which xenophobiaand supportfor integrationare more weakly related than in the total sample but the relationships are still significant. Finally, Denmarkand Greece demonstrateinsignificant correlationsbetween the two measures. In all cases except Spain, Denmark,and Greece, Table4 demonstratesthat, as the expressionof xenophobiaincreases from low to high, the percentageof individuals indicatinghigh supportfor integrationdecreases. Spain's significant correlation, while not evidenced by the percentagesin this highest category of support,is borne out in the other categories,where the percentagedisplaying low supportincreases as xenophobiaincreases. Of the five membersof the first group (France,the U.K., Luxembourg,Germany, and the Netherlands),four have foreign populations that constitute five percent or more of the total population.25 The exception is the United Kingdom, where the foreign populationin 1995 was only 3.4 percent.Lincoln Quillian arguesthat prejudice towards foreigners is based not only on reactions to individual characteristicsand relations with foreigners, but also on perceptions by the dominant national group
431
July 2000
that a subordinateor external group threatenstheir prerogatives.26 If foreigners are to and nation a different culture the perceived carry representsculture,then a sizable within the a to surface fears that the nation is foreign population countrymay bring undersiege. Hence decreasing supportfor integrationas the expression of xenophobia increases in this group of countriesmight demonstratethat xenophobic individuals perceive Europeanintegrationas a threatto the integrityof the nation and hence to the dominantculture,just as they perceive foreignersas a threat. Portugal,Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Irelandcomprise the second group, characterized by moderateto weak relationshipsbetween xenophobiaand supportfor integration. Identificationof common characteristicsamong these countries that might explain their weaker correlationsrequires examinationof other possible influences of support. Cost-benefit theories of maximizing economic self-interest offer one such possibility. With the exception of Belgium, these countriesrepresentthe "poor relatives"of the EU, all on its geographic and economic periphery.They therefore receive sizable aid from the EU, and their citizens are more likely to consider economic benefits when evaluatingEuropeanintegration.Indeed,people in these countries and their governmentleaders may continue to perceive the EU primarilyas an economic institution;hence the idea of Europeanintegrationas political transformation would be less salient in these countries than in the wealthier members of the EuropeanUnion. Belgium's anomalous appearancein this group suggests that anotherfactor may influence the relationshipbetween xenophobia and support for integrationin these countries. Fraser and Nelsen's conclusions that those who come from Catholic or Greek Orthodoxtraditionsare more likely to supportintegrationthan Protestantsor secular individuals may come into play here. All five of the countries displaying moderateto weak relationshipsbetween xenophobia and supportfor integrationare traditionallyRoman Catholic. In Ireland,which has the lowest correlationof these five countries,the large percentageexpressing low xenophobictendencies (74.7 percent) suggests that the ecumenical natureof Catholicism may not only contributeto as Fraserand Nelsen contend,but also dispose its adherents greaterinternationalism, to be more open towardsforeigners.27 As anothermediatingorientation,the religious factormeshes well with the culturalisttheory'sexplanationof supportfor integration as colored by an individual'sculture,in the sense of a collection of mediating orientations. The last two countries, with insignificant relationships,are far apartnot only in geography but in many other characteristics as well. Denmark is wealthy and Protestantand exhibits levels of xenophobia on par with the Europeanaverage. It also has the highest percentageof respondentsin the lowest category of supportfor integration (39.1%). The general isolationism of the Danish people seems to be groundedin a much deeper orientationof independencethanjust the perceptionthat the nation embodies culture; it is hesitant to join either a political or an economic
432
Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy union. Greece, in contrast, is second only to Luxembourgin the percentage of its populationthat expresses the highest supportfor integration(30.4 percent).It is one of the EU's "poorrelations"and is Orthodox,but it also demonstrateshigh xenophobia (55.3 percent in the highly xenophobiccategory). For the Greeks, economic selfinterest offers a strong explanationof the high level of popular support for integration into wealthywestern Europe. Areas for Further Research The bivariateanalysis has shown that in a majority of EU member countries a significant and relatively strong relationship exists between the level of xenophobiaand supportfor Europeanintegration.One consideration that may improve the measurementof xenophobia and its relationshipwith support for integration is the construction of an index that targets more specific types of foreigners.Large portions of the foreign populationsin Europeancountries are non-European;respondents have pictured these groups when asked questions about foreigners.There has been much discussion about a Europeanidentity,and it is probable that xenophobic individuals in EU countries would be less fearful of In a future index of xenophobia, variEuropeanforeigners than non-Europeans.28 ables specific to Europeanforeigners may improve the validity of the relationship between xenophobiaand supportfor integration. The analysis offered here provides initial evidence of a relationship between xenophobia and Europeanintegration.The apparentinfluence of religion and costbenefit economic evaluationsnecessitates that futureresearchaccount for these factors througha multivariate variables.The next analysis controlling for representative step in determiningthe legitimacy of xenophobia and other culturalfactors on support for integrationis to test the relationshipin conjunction with other influential factors. This test would determinewhether culturalargumentsor cost-benefit theories are strongerin explaining variance in support for Europeanintegration.While beyond the scope of this article, such a test would certainly deepen our understanding of the importance of xenophobia among the factors shaping support for Europeanintegration.
Conclusion Despite the many conflicts between nations and nation-statesin this century,even up to the present day, observers of the European Union lean toward explanations of popular support for Europeanintegrationin terms of economic costs and benefits. By contrast,the theory of political cultureoutlined in this paperarguesthat individuals also evaluate political transformations such as Europeanintegrationthroughthe lens of particularorientations,one of which is their perception of the relationship between cultureand nation.The disposition to perceive foreignersand foreign insti433
Compurative Politics
July 2000
tutions as threateningto one's culture appearsto influence how Europeansrespond to integration.Those who identify themselves with a particularnation-state as the embodimentof their culture instinctivelyfend off foreignersas threatsto the group. Consequently,those who fear foreignerswill almost certainly feel an aversion to an organizationthat infringesupon theirestablishedculturalgroup,the nation-state. Statistically,the correlationof xenophobiawith supportfor Europeanintegration varies across the twelve members of the EU. For those countries where xenophobia does not have a strongrelationshipwith supportfor integration,other factors such as religion and economic developmentmay play an importantrole. Their effects on the relationship need to be explored, and the explanations need to be compared. Regardlessof which theory explains the most variancein supportfor integration,the strengthof xenophobiain France,the United Kingdom, Germany,Luxembourg,and the Netherlandshas dismaying implications for proponentsof integration.It signifies that garneringsupportfor Europeanintegrationis not a matterof merely soothing the economic qualms of individualEuropeans.The perceptionof irreconcilable nationaldifferencesplays a significant role in shapingpublic opinion, and the failure to recognize and addressthe issue of xenophobiamay threatenthe political transformation of the EuropeanUnion. With the movementto integratefurtherparts of eastern and southernEurope,the potential for xenophobia is even greater.Increasedimmigrationhas already frightened many Europeans into a more nationalist stance, as observed by increasingly vocal nationalist parties. To ignore this phenomenon for the more economic, rationally based explanationsof popularsupportreveals a disregardboth for the impact of the increasinglypolitical natureof Europeanintegrationon popularperceptionsof the EU and for the ability of fear to influence individuals'reactionto change. NOTES
The authorswish to acknowledge the assistance of LymanAs Kellstedtand Alex Bolyanatz in the developmentof this article. 1. "Preambleto the Treatyon the EuropeanUnion (The Maastricht Treaty),"in Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb, eds., The European Union: Readings on the Theoryand Practice of European Integration(Boulder:Lynne Reinner,1996), p. 66. 2. David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, The Emerging European Union (White Plains: Longman, 1996), pp. 8 1-83. 3. Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman, "Racism in Contemporary Western Europe: An Overview," in Alec G. Hargreaves and Jeremy Leaman, eds., Racisms Ethnicity and Politics in Europe(Brookfield: EdwardElgar, 1995), pp. 9-10. Contemporary 4. Christopher Anderson, "Economic Uncertainty and European Solidarity Revisited: Trends in Public Support for EuropeanIntegration," in Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, eds., The State of the 3: Buildinga EuropeanPolity? (Boulder:Lynne Reinner,1995), p. 114. EuropeanUnion, Volume 5. Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Europeansand the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Supportfor EuropeanIntegration,'InternationalOrganization,47 (1993).
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Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy

6. Christopher J. Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert, "Economic Benefits and Support for Membershipin the E.U.: A Cross-NationalAnalysis,"Journal of Public Policy, 15 (1996), 241; Matthew Gabel and Harvey D. Palmer, "UnderstandingVariationin Public Support for European Integration," EuropeanJournal of Political Research,27 (1995), 7-8; MatthewGabel and Guy D. Whitten,"Economic Political Behavior, 19 Conditions, Economic Perceptionsand Public Supportfor EuropeanIntegration," (1997), 92. 7. Cleveland R. Fraser and Brent F. Nelsen, "Religion and Public Attitudes toward the European Union," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco,August 1996, pp. 2-6. 8. Mathieu Deflem and Fred C. Pampel, "The Myth of Postnational Identity: PopularSupport for EuropeanUnification,"Social Forces, 75 (1), 138. 9. GabrielA. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Politicaul Science (London: Sage, 1990), p. 134. 10. HarryEckstein, "A Culturalist in HarryEckstein, RegardingPolitics: Theory of Political Change,"' Essays on Political Theory,Stability,and Change (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1992), p. 267. 11. In examinations of culture as a social phenomenon, the emphasis is naturally placed upon the mediatingorientationsthe group shares. However,even within the group individualsmay exhibit different behaviorsbecause of the sources of socializationthat create orientationsparticular to subgroups. 12. Sidney Verba,"Conclusion:ComparativePolitical Culture,"in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Cultureand Political Development(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1965), p. 516. 13. Almond,p. 144. 14. Eckstein,p. 271. 15. Ibid. pp. 271-77. 16. Ibid., p. 278. 17. Ibid. pp. 278-80. 18. For the sake of simplicity and because of the literal definition of xenophobia,the term "fear"will be used to express the variety of negative feelings toward strangers,with the understanding that it may representmore thanjust apprehensionon the partof the xenophobe. 19. Karlheinz Reif and Eric Marlier,Euro-barometer 41.1: Post-EuropeanElection, June-July 1994 (Ann Arbor: Inter-UniversityConsortium for Political and Social Research, 1996). Current members Austria,Finland,and Sweden were not included in the survey because they joined the EuropeanUnion in 1995. 20. To reduce missing percentages, responses of don't know or missing were recoded based on the responses given to other questions regardingthe EU. Hence answers supporting(or not supporting)integration in the other variables led to the recoding of the missing into supportingor nonsupportingcategories. The remainingmissing percentageswere replacedwith the mean duringthe factor analysis procedure used to constructthe supportfor integrationindex. 21. Same directioncoding was also necessary to conduct a reliabilityanalysis of these three variables. This analysis producedan alpha score of 0.81 (standardizeditem alpha 0.82), indicatingthat the scale createdfrom these items is very reliable in measuringsupportfor integration. 22. The three variablescomposing the supportfor Europeanintegrationindex have the following loadings on the first principalcomponentin factoranalysis:reactionto scrappingthe EU, 0.874; evaluationof country'smembershipin the EU, 0.868; supportfor unificationof Europe,0.841. 23. Missing percentageswere recoded similarlyto those for the integrationquestions. If possible, they were recoded based on responses to the other xenophobiaquestions. Otherwise,they were recoded to the mean duringthe factoranalysis thatproducedthe xenophobiaindex. 24. The reliabilityanalysis conductedfor these seven variablesproducedan alpha value of 0.84 (standardizeditem alpha score = 0.85), indicatinganothervery reliable scale. The seven variablescomposing the xenophobiaindex have the following loadings on the first principalcomponent in factor analysis: per-
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ception of numberof foreigners,0.749; foreigners'exploitation of welfare, 0.749; immigrationproblem, 0.714; foreigners as cause of delinquency,0.698; foreigners'responsibilityfor increased unemployment, 0.681; foreignersas problemneighbors,0.662; badly ending marriageswith foreigners,0.636. 25. WorldBank, World DevelopmentIndicators, 1998 (Washington,D.C.:WorldBank, 1998), p. 354. 26. Lincoln Quillian, "Prejudiceas a Response to Perceived GroupThreat:PopulationComposition andAnti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudicein Europe," AmericanSociological Review,60 (1995), 586. 27. Ibid., pp. 2, 6. 28. Some examples are Deflem and Pampel; Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of InternationalAffairs,68 (1992); and Chris Shore, "Transcending the Nation-State?The EuropeanUnity;" Journal of Historical Sociology, 9 (1996). EuropeanCommissionand the (Re)-Discovery of Europe,"
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Xenophibia and The Europian Union

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Xenophobia and the European Union Author(s): Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy Source: Comparative Politics, Vol.

Xenophobiaand the EuropeanUnion

Table 1 Supportfor EuropeanIntegrationin EU Members, 1994

1,003 1,005 2,134 1,067 502

1,000 1.383 1,002 1,000 1lOO)

41.1. June-Uy 1994,

Htigh 34 3 43.5 53.5i

39.4 32.4 8.4 314 58 25.2 47.4 15.3 14,3

Low 12. i1 ;" 17.6 187 23.6 28X0

Xenophobia Medium 18.3 22.4 20.3 19.8 19.3

High 2.3 22.1 17.1 18.1 13.5

101 19.7 17,0 17,7 13.0 11.1 12.S 29.0

N 1000 1 3 1 2,134 1,067 502

Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy

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