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Commentary on Dillenburger and Keenan

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The Observational Analysis of Behavior


Franois Tonneau
CEIC - University of Guadalajara

Dillenburger and Keenans use of non-experimental methods represents a significant departure from the scientific orthodoxy of behavior analysis. However, field studies cannot be by-passed if behavior analysis is to provide serious accounts of natural phenomena such as bereavement. Here I explore some theoretical implications of a non-experimental approach to behavior.

No one can develop a serious explanation of a natural phenomenon (such as bereavement) without knowing where, when, and how this phenomenon occurs; and knowing where, when, and how a natural phenomenon occurs requires detailed observations in natural settings (e.g., Durham, 1991). Yet Dillenburger and Keenans use of non-experimental methods represents a notable exception to the scientific orthodoxy of behavior analysis, which places an unusually strong emphasis on experimentation to the detriment of field studies. Instead of developing observational methods along with experimental ones (e.g., Verplanck, 1970), behavior analysis has promoted a form of hermeneutics known as interpretation, which consists in speculating on daily-life phenomena without ever gathering actual observational data, assessing their reliability, and using them as benchmarks to evaluate well-specified behavioral theories. Such hermeneutics have been especially prominent when dealing with complex human behavior. The book Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), for example, contains dozens of anecdotes but not a single graph. According to Skinner himself (Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 207, p. 274), interpretation is neither science nor philosophy. By such standards (which relegate astronomy, paleontology, and the genetics of natural populations to a no mans land of non-science and non-philosophy), behavior analysts have no other
Correspondence concerning this commentary should be sent to the author at Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones en Comportamiento, Universidad de Guadalajara, 12 de Diciembre 204, Col. Chapalita, CP 45030, Guadalajara - Jalisco, MEXICO. Email: ftonneau@udgserv.cencar.udg.mx

choices than experimentation in tightly controlled settings or anecdotes. Unsurprisingly, in a discipline that fails to acknowledge the value of field studies and imposes an unfounded dichotomy between experiment and observation, observational rigor flounders and the interpretations drawn from mere anecdotes are poor science indeed (see Verplanck, 1984). For similar reasons, a number of poorly integrated frameworks and poorly formulated hypotheses escape scrutiny. I found three examples of such debatable conceptions in Dillenburger and Keenans theoretical statements on behavior. Contingencies Dillenburger and Keenan state that in behavior analysis, an explanation of behavior is found in the contingencies to which the individual is exposed. As Staddon (1988, p. 454) pointed out, if by contingency one means anything that could occur in evolution or in the life history of an organism and that could be causally relevant to its behavior, then this general statement is surely correct. But the term contingency here is confusing because of its many conflicting meanings, technical or otherwise. Skinners (1948) account of superstitious behavior and his subsequent remarks on the temporal conditions for reinforcement (e.g., 1986, p. 232) suggest that by contingency between response and consequence he actually meant contiguity between response and consequence. By contrast, and consistent with standard statistical usage, Rescorla (1967) invoked contingency to describe more molar probabilistic

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relations among stimuli, and this usage later filtered into the operant literature (e.g., Gibbon, Berryman, & Thompson, 1974). Other authors then opposed contiguity to contingency (e.g., Bloomfield, 1972), even though Skinner (1948) actually implied the former by the latter. Of course Skinner (1948) cannot be faulted for this semantic patchwork, but current behavior analysts can be faulted for invoking the jargon of contingencies against such a confused background. In any case, a contingency should presumably be some sort of relation and therefore include at least two events. But then, why should the explanation of behavior necessarily involve contingencies? An unconditional response, for instance, is a product not of a contingency but of a stimulus; and whatever a stimulus is, it is certainly not a contingency. Hence it is not true that an explanation in terms of antecedents and consequences amounts to an explanation in terms of contingencies. If a general statement about behavior is needed, let us speak simply of environmental and behavioral conditions and leave it at that. Conversely, when dealing with the explanation of a particular behavioral event, the nature of the relevant conditions should be specified fully and clearly; these conditions may or may not involve contingencies in any technical meaning of this term. Phylogeny-Derived Behavior Following Skinner (1969), Dillenburger and Keenan partition behavior into that derived from phylogeny and that submitted to ontogenetic influences (apparently equated with operant reinforcement). They state that some of the behaviors typical of bereavement, such as crying, may be phylogenetic in origin, and suggest that although crying might occur initially without reinforcement, ontogenetic influences might contribute to its eventual frequency. However, these attributions of behavior to phylogeny ignore the hierarchical integration of ontogenetic and evolutionary variables. The fact that behavior can occur without reinforcing consequences should not lead us to conclude that it is phylogenetic in origin. The unconditional

crying that is a response [emphasis mine] to loss and separation, for example, is as ontogenetic a response as any response can be. More generally, unreinforced behavior should not be relegated to phylogeny but instead studied in terms of its non-operant, and possibly non-obvious (Gottlieb, 1997), ontogenetic determinants. In all cases, operant or otherwise, what is phylogenetic in origin is not the resulting behavioral change but the set of relations holding among developmental variables and behavior, a set of relations that is itself part of the organisms reaction norm (e.g., Schlichting & Pigliucci, 1998). Obviously, this reaction norm must derive from phylogeny through natural selection, genetic drift, and other evolutionary processes. Such issues are far from purely philosophical or semantic. In their article, for example, Dillenburger and Keenan suggest that repeated exposure to discriminative stimuli can prevent extinction of grieving behavior. But why should repeated exposure to discriminative stimuli have this effect? The interesting phenomenon to which Dillenburger and Keenan refer may involve sensitization, which has indeed been suspected to affect the reinforcing and discriminative functions of stimuli (McSweeney, Hinson, & Cannon, 1996). Should we relegate sensitization to phylogeny and stop studying the relevant ontogenetic variables, on the ground that they involve stimulus frequencies instead of reinforcement contingencies? Misunderstandings of Evolutionary Biology Integrating behavior analysis and evolutionary biology is necessary if the former is to achieve broad scientific credibility, but (aside from the dichotomies discussed above) the necessary integration has not been facilitated by the over-extension of reinforcement as an all-purpose behavioral process and debatable analogies between operant reinforcement and natural selection (see Tonneau & Sokolowski, 2000, 2001). Skinners remark to the effect that reflexes and other innate patterns of behavior evolve because they increase the chances of survival of the species (1953, p. 90; quoted by Dillenburger and Keenan) reflects another misunderstanding of evolution-

Commentary on Dillenburger and Keenan

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ary theory, a misunderstanding which was rather common before the publication of Adaptation and Natural Selection (Williams, 1966) but should have disappeared thereafter. Whatever the fate of current controversies on group selection might be (Sober & Wilson, 1998), the survival of the species is irrelevant to natural selection in the standard Darwinian sense. Finally, although Dillenburger and Keenan casually allude to the adaptiveness of unconditional crying, whether a phenotypic trait is actually adaptive or not is a complex issue, to be decided not on the basis of personal intuitions but (again) through detailed, experimental and non-experimental analyses (Rose & Lauder, 1996). Observations

observational studies maintain a one-way view of the field as a mere source of data to be illuminated by laboratory-based principles. In the fully developed version of behavior analysis that Dillenburger and Keenans efforts anticipate, the relations between experimentally established principles and field data will probably involve multiple paths from observation to experiment and vice versa. Eventually, comparative and field studies might appear as fundamental to behavior analysis as they are to evolutionary biology (e.g., Harvey & Pagel, 1991). Meanwhile, I applaud Dillenburger and Keenans first step toward a non-experimental analysis of behavior, and hope that their efforts will inspire other behavior analysts to stop interpreting and actually look. References

What of Dillenburger and Keenans own nonexperimental analysis of behavior? Some readers will perhaps object to the use of questionnaires and point out that Dillenburger and Keenan have merely observed question marks instead of the behavior of their subjects. Admittedly, a questionnaire merely records behavioral products; but so do cumulative recorders, to which behavior analysts traditionally have had few objections. And even though the behaviors of answering a question and rating a scale are presumably distinct from the grieving behaviors that are the central focus of Dillenburger and Keenans article, they are still behaviors to be explained. As Dillenburger and Keenan themselves realize, the present study is perfectible; but I believe that its limitations are of little importance as compared to its promises for the future of behavior analysis. Through their use of non-experimental methods, Dillenburger and Keenan have moved behavior analysis into the complex realm of naturalistic observation. However necessary, this move brings with it further challenges, such as the development of better measurement and sampling methods, and the justification and proper use of inferential statistics (Wang, 1993). Although behavior analysts are becoming increasingly and rightly suspicious of the non-science and non-philosophy of interpretation (Hayes, 2001), the full impact of observational methods will be detained if those who engage in

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