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Climax of the Syrian Wars

The battle of Raphia, 217 BC
ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 22, 217 (ALL DATES ARE BC) PTOLEMY IV PHILOPATER, LIKELY AT THE INSISTENCE OF HIS GENERALS, RESOLVED TO BRING ANTIOCHUS III TO BATTLE. THE TWO ARMIES HAD BEEN CAMPED OPPOSITE EACH OTHER FOR ALMOST FIVE DAYS AND THE BOTCHED ATTEMPT ON PTOLEMYS LIFE BY THEODOTUS, HIS ERSTWHILE GOVERNOR OF COELE SYRIA NOW IN SELEUCID SERVICE, WAS A PRODUCT OF THIS PROCRASTINATION (POLYBIUS 5. 82.1; 81.1-6 ALL REFERENCES TO THIS AUTHOR UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED). TWO DAYS PREVIOUS, ANTIOCHUS HAD CLOSED THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO CAMPS FROM 1.8 KILOMETRES TO A LITTLE LESS THAN ONE KILOMETRE. AS A RESULT THERE WERE FREQUENT STRUGGLES AT THE WATERING-PLACES AS WELL AS INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SKIRMISHES IN THE SPACE BETWEEN THE CAMPS (5.80.5-7). By Michael Park Ptolemy, who had force-marched his army through the waterless region from Pelusium to the spot he was bound for (5.80.2-3) some nine kilometres southwest of Raphia (near to modern Dikla, Egypt) in five days a distance of near 180 kilometres at 36 kilometres per day had chosen his ground with a clear purpose. The Ptolemaic army, unlike the Seleucid, had not fought a major set-piece engagement in a generation with much of its work in the intervening years having been carried out by mercenaries. At the head of this largely untried host, Ptolemys general staff chose to adopt a largely defensive strategy and block the Jiradi Pass. The chosen ground, inside the eastern end of the pass, was some four and a half kilometres in width. Sea dunes guarded the northwestern side whilst desert dunes from the Sinai and limestone knolls hemmed the southeast. To the southwest, the wells of Sheik-Zuwayid would provide water as would the sea dune wells. Although much preparation and drill had been invested in the Lagid (Ptolemaic) force (see below), there remained the fact that its reliability was open to question and so the narrower field of the pass would be to its advantage. In the wider world, Ptolemy and his generals almost certainly encouraged the revolt and dynastic pretensions of Achaeus Antiochus satrap of Asia Minor in the Seleucid rear (5.42.7; 57.2; 66.3; 67.1). On this battlefield, they would settle for stopping Antiochus in his tracks. His dispositions would reflect this strategy. Antiochus had never really expected Ptolemy to fight indeed he was encouraged in that belief (5.66.6-8). Having arrived the same night as Ptolemy, his surprise at the size of the army that had taken the field against him is evidenced by both his cautious final advance from Gaza and his movement into the pass a few days after his arrival. Reports of the army advancing

Bust of Antiochus III the Great (242-187 BC), now in the Louvre, Paris. from Pelusium and a lack of concise information regarding its whereabouts likely occasioned the former. As for the latter, Polybius (5.80.4-6) says this was to remove to more advantageous ground and to inspire confidence in his troops. Antiochus, finding himself outnumbered in phalanx infantry and roughly even in cavalry, had no desire to encourage Ptolemy from his defensive posture. Advancing into the more
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restricted field of the pass he would inspire confidence in his troops by accepting battle on the more advantageous ground where he would not have to stretch the lines of his phalanx to match Ptolemys. Given Ptolemys intentions, Antiochus was compelled to adopt a more aggressive posture. Not that he would likely have chosen otherwise. With Achaeus having assumed the diadem at Sardis, Antiochus could ill afford to wait. Having advanced into the pass he could now deploy his line to match Ptolemys with his experienced phalanx holding the centre of the field. With a combined arms assault from a stacked right wing, Antiochus hoped to blast the Ptolemaic left flank from its position, crush its left wing infantry and force Ptolemy back into the waterless region hed recently crossed. Antiochus, controlling the water of Raphia and Sheik-Zuwayid, would thus have a natural border and free himself to deal with Achaeus.

The Syrian Wars

The fourth Syrian War in sixty years would be decided by the greatest clash of arms since the battle of Ipsus in 301. Great armies would fight and kill yet again to press the claims of rival kings over the possession of Coele Syria. The one, Ptolemy, absorbed in unworthy intrigues and senseless and continuous drunkenness, who treated the branches of government with equal indifference (5.34.10); the other, Antiochus, young and aggressive scion of the Seleucid house with an empire to set in order, if not reclaim. The conflict was the latest manifestation of a long running sore of Hellenistic politics, whose roots lay in the events of the Diadoch Wars. Coele Syria was unjustly occupied by Ptolemy (Diod.18.73.2) after Triparadeisos (320) and again after the battle of Gaza in 312. Later, as his allies fought at Ipsus in 301, Ptolemy Soters contribution to the grand alliance of kings against Antigonus Monophthalmus was to reoccupy Coele-Syria. In the aftermath Seleucus, a key member of the alliance, marched into Syria where in accordance with the terms of the agreement, he endeavoured to appropriate Coele Syria. Ptolemy refused to give it up,
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claiming that his allies were giving him no part of the conquered territory, even though he had been a partner in the war. Seleucus, on the basis of friendship, decided he would not for the present interfere, but would consider later how best to deal with friends who chose to encroach (Diod. 21.5). In the decades following, successive monarchs engaged in repeated attempts to establish lasting control of the strategic region, resulting in what are termed the Syrian Wars. The third and most recent of these, lasting from 246 to 241, saw Ptolemy III Euergetes march as far as Babylon. After its settlement, Ptolemy was left in control of Coele Syria and the ports of Syria. Amongst these latter was the city of Seleuceia-in Pieria the capital, and so to speak, the very inner shrine of the kings realm (5.58.4). Antiochus III, within a year of his accession, was embroiled in a rebellion in Media and the upper satrapies. This, plus the determined resistance of Ptolemys general Theodotus, forestalled his attempt (221) on Seleuceia and Coele Syria (5.43-46.5). Within two years (219), though, Antiochus was back. Advised to reclaim Seleuceia before any other action was taken (5.58.4-8) he did exactly that and might, for the moment have been satisfied, but for the arrival of a letter from Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting him to come thither with all speed. At this Antiochus abandoned his expedition against Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance and set about claiming Coele Syria (5.61.6). Ptolemys senior advisor, Sosibius, and co-minister Agathocles immediately set in play the only game in town attempting by embassies to try to retard the advance of Antiochus: pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained about Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight (5.63.2-3). The diplomatic delaying tactics involving Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Aetolia are illuminating in as much as they illustrate the entire 84 years of dispute. The real purpose though, was delay and time to make their preparations for war (5.63.5-6). And preparations there most certainly were.

The Raphia campaign

Taking the court to Memphis, Sosibius and his co-conspirator, Agathocles, received the ongoing embassies from Antiochus with every mark of courtesy and kindness. What Antiochus ambassadors or those sent by Sosibius (5.66.9) signally did not receive was any knowledge of what was transpiring at Alexandria. Here the two ministers of the crown had collected the mercenaries whom they had on service in towns outside Egypt. As well, they had dispatched officers to recruit foreign soldiers and were collecting provisions both for the troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in. The recruiting did not stop at soldiers: the Ptolemaic army required seasoned officers and these too, came from Greece. Echecrates of Thessaly, Phoxidas of Melita, Cnopias of Allaria and Socrates of Boeotia all came to Alexandria and all, importantly, had seen service under Demetrius II and Antigonus Doson. They were swiftly put in charge of the training of the army (5.63.7-14). As the interminable embassies travelled back and forth, Antiochus interested himself with the odd siege and eventually agreed to a four month truce over the winter of 219/18 (5.66.12). Meanwhile the Lagid army trained apace. The soldiers were divided by age and nationality, after which they were assigned to divisions and armed taking no account of what they had borne before (5.64.1). Here the Greek mercenaries were armed as phalangites and, under Phoxidas and Andromachus, drilled with the phalanx as one unit on the same ground (see Ancient Warfare I.1 Alexandrias Colourful Funeral Stelae). Here also Echectrates splendidly trained the Greek mercenary cavalry and Polycrates the cleruchic cavalry (that which was obtained from Libya or enlisted in the country 5.65.5) and the guard. Convinced that Ptolemy would not leave Egypt to fight, Antiochus left his winter quarters in Seleuceia (218) and stormed the Porphyrion Pass. Subsequent resistance aside from Sidon was sporadic and typified by the desertion of Ptolemys commanders (Theodotus had earlier given over Tyre and Ptolemais). After consolidating his

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Bust of Ptolemy IV Philopater (Father loving, 244-205 BC), now in the Louvre, Paris.

hold on Coele Syria Antiochus retired to Ptolemais for the winter. In the following spring of 217 Ptolemy finally mobilized his retrained army and ventured to make a contest of the province. Antiochus, informed of his approach, gathered his army and marched for Raphia where he would deal with friends who chose to encroach.

Deployment for battle

Marching out from camp and forming into line, the phalanx divisions of Sosibius and Andromachus filled the centre of the field; around these troops the rest of the army would be arrayed. The near 20,000 Egyptians under Sosibius held the right of this block. The Greco-Macedonian phalanx of 25,000 stood to their left. Both these formations adopted a depth of 24 ranks allowing the deployment of the rest of the infantry thus plugging the pass,

whilst allowing some room for the cavalry to maneuver. To the immediate right of the Egyptian phalanx Phoxidas led the 8,000 mercenary Greek phalangites into position sixteen deep. Alongside the Greeks the Gauls and Thracians, 6,000 of them, took their station under Dionysius. Rounding out the right was the Greek mercenary cavalry under Echecrates who commanded the right wing. To his front was posted a 33 strong elephant corps. Next to the Greco-Macedonian phalanx Ptolemy arranged the 3,000 Libyans armed and trained in the Macedonian fashion and these were abutted by Socrates 2,000 sarissa-armed peltasts. Anchoring the Lagid infantry on the far left were the phalanx infantry elite: the 3,000 guard troops of the royal agema (basilikon agema) under Eurylochus. These last three divisions were also arrayed sixteen deep. The extremity of the Ptolemaic left wing was held by Polycrates and the cleruchic cavalry: 2,300 strong along with Ptolemy himself and his cavalry guard of 700 (5.82.3-7). Forty of Ptolemys elephants guarded this wing and 3,000 Cretans stood behind them and alongside the cavalry they would support. The Lagid battle line ran slightly northwest to southeast, from the ancient road near to the sea dunes to somewhat south of the modern El-Arish-Rafa road, occupying the available ground afforded by the pass. Antiochus phalanx, at the regular depth of sixteen (18.30.1), was deployed opposite Ptolemys in the centre of the field. The phalanx of GrecoMacedonians, almost 20,000 in number under Nicarchus and Theodotus Hermiolius, stood opposite Ptolemys virgin native phalanx. To its right, under Theodotus, the Aetolian who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver shields (5.79.4-5). These elite Syrian troops, the argyraspides, likely formed

8,000 of this corps and the remaining 2,000, the nature of whom can really only be guessed at, may well have been hypaspists (peltasts). To the left of the phalanx was Antiochus make do infantry of the defensive left wing. Abutting the phalanx were 10,000 Arabs, likely javelin men, at a similar depth to the phalanx. Alongside these were 5,000 light armed Medes, Cissians and Carmanians and they were joined by 3,000 Agrianians, Thracians and Persians with 1,500 Lydian and Kardouchoi (Cardaces, likely modern Kurds) javelin men at the end. Themison, with 2,000 cavalry, commanded the wing and 33 elephants stood across its front (5.82.11-13). The Seleucid right wing, which would lead the offensive, Antiochus would command in person. Alongside the argyraspides, he posted the 5,000 mercenary thureophoroi from Greece under the command of Hippolochus (cf 5.84.9). These troops would confront Ptolemys infantry agema and his peltasts: their role would be crucial to the battle plan. Byttacus, with 5,000 light troops (Daae, Carmanians and Cilicians) under his command, provided both extra width for the infantry line as well as support for the sixty elephants posted in front of the wing. Alongside these lights stood 2,500 Cretans and Antipaters 2,000 strong cavalry corps rounded out the main line. The royal ile (regiment) and cavalry agema, of 1,000 each and which he would lead, Antiochus placed at an angle to his main line. This angle, given his attacking posture, was near certainly echeloned rearwards in deep column and would be somewhat difficult to discern from the Ptolemaic lines (5.82.8-10). Both kings rode the lines with their officers and, in the case of Ptolemy, his sister Arsinoe addressing words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends. Neither having been on the throne long enough to point to any glorious or famous achievement of his own instead reminded them of the glory of their ancestors, and the great deeds performed by them. These words were directed particularly to the officers and men of the phalanx on both sides for it was these that they both rested their strongest hopes on (5.83.1-6). This
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Carlos de la Rocha

done, both returned to their chosen stations opposite each other on the north-western side of the field.

Battle begins

Antiochus signaled for the attack to begin and the elephants lumbered off at the run with Byttacus light infantry following in support. Across the field Ptolemy ordered his own elephants forward. Polycrates cavalry, along with the Cretans, began an advance left and forward behind them. Immediately matters went astray as only some few of Ptolemys elephants came to close quarters with the foe. These few, very likely Indian rather than African given they were towered, engaged fiercely as they butted heads and swung tusks at and into each other. In the towers atop the elephants, amid the arrows and missiles from the light armed, the soldiers maintained a brilliant fight lunging at and striking each other with sarissae. Too few to make any appreciable difference, Ptolemys elephants were forced back and onto their own lines. Here, as Polycrates advanced, elephants
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careered back onto his troops throwing horse, rider and Cretans into panic As the Seleucid elephants gained the ascendancy Antipaters cavalry corps, launched at the Ptolemaic left close behind them, charged into the dust covered melee. Antiochus, skirting the outer edge of the elephants, led his column at the charge whilst the Greek thureophoroi, on the other side of the elephants, advanced toward the Lagid elite units of foot at the double. Echecrates, away on the Ptolemaic right wing, waited first to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the two armies (5.85.1). Looking towards the north-west he can have made out little of what was unfolding. Heat haze combined with over three and a half kilometres of intervening distance obscured all detail other than the immense cloud of dust that was now the Ptolemaic left: a cloud that appeared to be moving, inexorably, rearwards. Beyond the light troops of his own wing and the phalanx of Greeks, the Egyptian phalanx, flanking their Macedonian counterparts,

stood with sarissae raised and waited. Across the sand and dust, flashes could be made out as the enemys shields caught the sun: the Seleucid infantry were drawing shields from their shoulders. Leading his royal ile and the cavalry agema at the gallop, Antiochus swung out and around the elephant battle. Polycrates cavalry rent by elephants retreating onto and through his position was now a mass of terrified and rearing horses. Ptolemys Cretans, increasingly confined by the cavalry they were to assist and taking any opening for retreat available to them, added to the escalating disarray. At this point Antiochus, appearing from behind the cloud and noise that was the elephant disaster to Polycrates front, drove violently into the latters defenceless flank (5.84.8). Troop after troop of Seleucid cavalry charged into Polycrates men who, unable to cope with the elephants and the flank attack, died as spears drove into both horse and rider. Under impossible pressure Ptolemys left wing cavalry gave ground falling back and

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onto its own infantry. The confusion and dislocation amongst the Ptolemaic cavalry eventually turned to rout. Antiochus, envisioning a crushing victory as Polycrates cavalry eventually fled, pressed the rout and the pursuit. His object, more likely than not, was Ptolemy himself who, along with what remained of his cavalry guard, had used the dust and din of the tumult to circle back and away towards the safety of his phalanx which was unengaged (5.85.7).

Charge of the Lagid wing

Opposite Echecrates position the trumpeting of the Seleucid elephants quickly drowned whatever sounds drifted across from the Ptolemaic left wing. Looking forward Echecrates saw the dust coming his way and, worse, that the elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach the hostile elephants (5.85.1) and had either remained stationary or began to back away. The disaster of the left now portended for the right and Echectrates could wait no longer. In a move that was doubtless planned, Echecrates sent a rider to Phoxidas ordering an advance and for Phoxidas himself to charge the part of the enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries along with the Gauls. Then, ordering the Thracian infantry (the division behind the elephants) to follow him, he led them and the mercenary cavalry out to the right off the field and around the limestone ridge so as to get outside the elephant scrimmage and out of view of the Seleucid cavalry behind its elephants. The Greeks lowered their sarissae and set off at the charge. The Gauls, as the Greeks stepped off, advanced into and around the elephants to engage the Seleucid light troops advancing in support of them (5.85.1-3). On the Ptolemaic left, the infantry agema was in the ineluctable process of disintegration. Panicked elephants, showing no respect for man or sarissa, trampled the former and splintered the latter. Phalangites, not already crushed, were thrown into in a state of utter terror as fleeing elephants caught protruding sarissae skittling their wielders and any near to them. To their right, the elephants having already thrown

their ranks also into confusion (5.84.9), Ptolemys peltasts also came under attack. Antiochus Greek mercenaries assaulted the Lagid phalangites as they struggled for cohesion. Gaps in the peltasts ranks the inevitable result of their own elephants falling back into them opened invitingly. Into these gaps streamed the Seleucid Greeks whilst the agema shattered and lacking any formation broke and gave way (5.84.7). Byttacus men, meanwhile, were taking targets of opportunity with impunity from the peltasts flank as well as the remnants the Ptolemaic left wing. Ptolemy, sheltered by his phalanx, was watching the disintegration of his entire left wing. Whilst his phalanx was still intact in the centre of the field, both it and his camp might well be overrun shortly. To his right his Greek phalanx, along with the right wing infantry, had advanced to the charge. Urged on by his officers, Ptolemy came around the right flank of his Egyptian phalanx and riding along its front showing himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men. At this Andromachus and Sosibius gave orders for sarissae to be couched and for the 45,000 strong backbone of the army to follow the right wing and advance upon the enemy phalanx. (5.85.9) Antiochus Greek mercenaries, shoving sarissae aside with their thureoi, attacked Ptolemys disorganised phalangites with spear and sword in hand to hand combat. With the Lagid infantry agema largely destroyed, its corps of peltasts was now in danger of being cut to pieces. As casualties mounted alarmingly the peltasts gave ground. Stepping over and around the dead or dying, the Greeks stabbed and hacked at Ptolemys peltasts pushing them backwards, with ever increasing ease, until they were driven out of the line (5.84.9). Ptolemys camp, being close to the battle line like that of Antiochus (cf 5.80.6), now presented a strategic obstacle. Antiochus troops could not execute a turn to their left in an attempt to roll up Ptolemys line as they would be exposed on their right sides to any missile fire or defenders sallying

from the camp including the survivors of the peltasts and infantry agema. The Seleucid cavalry of the left, advancing in concert with their elephants, were taken completely by surprise in their flank and rear by Echectrates assault column appearing from around the limestone knolls. The mercenary cavalry charged into Themisons troops and quickly drove them from their ground (5.85.3) across and onto their light troops. The Seleucid lights the Persians, Cardaces, Lydians and Agrianians found themselves corralled by the cavalry they were ostensibly supporting. Order quickly turned to shambles as Echectrates Thracian troops, having loosed javelins, created mayhem with their romphaia pole weapons with a blade some seventy or more centimetres long. Horses and riders fell indiscriminately as the blades were swung and thrust.

Seleucid collapse

The Seleucid phalanx, having watched their elephants and light troops move off, readied for the advance. As they were about to step off the Arab tribal levies, protecting their left flank, were taken in a vicious assault by Phoxidas and his Greek phalangites. The Arabs, light javelin men, failed to withstand the initial charge and those not immediately run through or crushed in the contact, began to look for any method of escape. As the cavalry fled the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians, taken frontally by the Gauls, also came under attack from Echectrates Thracians. Ptolemys phalanx brigades, advancing at the double, left behind the carnage of their left wing and closed on their Seleucid counterparts. In the initial collision the picked Syrian troops stood their ground for a time. Alongside them the Greco-Macedonian phalanx came under severe pressure. The lights of the Seleucid left wing, led by their defeated cavalry, were falling back towards and behind them in the direction of the camp and, eventually, Raphia. Echectrates did not bother with a headlong pursuit but drove across into what remained of the light infantry. The Thracians and Gauls followed and carnage was wrought by Galatian swords and Thracian romphaia. As their light infantry fled the field the
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Seleucid Greco-Macedonian phalanx found itself denuded of support and under flank attack. With Ptolemys Egyptians driving them back they buckled and fled. The argyraspides, aware of the imminent danger of envelopment, also retreated towards camp. Now Echectrates pursued killing large numbers of the enemy [] by means of his cavalry and mercenaries on his right wing (5.86.1). On the far side of the field Antiochus, confident that the success of his Greek mercenaries inside of his cavalry and elephants was reflected across the line, continued his pursuit. At the warning of one of his older officers he called a halt to collect his forces and assess the state of battle. Looking back across the field to his centre he realised that the cloud of dust raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp. Antiochus and his cavalry returned to the field at the full gallop to find his whole line in full retreat and his campaign in tatters (5.85.13). Antiochus had lost some 10,000 infantry and 300 cavalry killed as well as 4,000 men taken prisoner. He retired to Raphia with such of his men as had fled in compact bodies. Ptolemy, seemingly taken aback by the victory (5.87.3), retired to his own camp and there spent the night having lost 1,500 infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry. These, almost to a man, fell during the debacle on the left of his line. Whilst Polybius says that sixteen of his elephants were killed, and most of the others captured, it is difficult to see an army in flight capturing some fifty elephants (5.86.3-6). Ptolemy, having buried his dead and despoiled the enemys, marched on Raphia the next day. Antiochus, like Antigonus Monophthalmus at Paraetecene, had decamped before sunrise and found refuge at Gaza (5.86.4).

all interest in matters of interstate relations resuming his habitual effeminacy and corruption of his manner of life (5.87.3) one suspects. The military victory, though quite emphatic, would not settle the issue. Antiochus returned to his kingdom and busied himself disposing of Achaeus. His loss here actually facilitated the stabilising of his own kingdom and his following campaign to restore the upper satrapies. Ptolemy took little active part in interstate politics again. The evidence (Egypt coining less in silver and eventually ceasing such) suggests economic trouble and an inability to pay for mercenaries on a continuing basis. The lasting result, for Egypt, was the sudden spike in nationalism brought on by the training of Egyptian troops for the battle. Taken with their success at Raphia they refused any longer to receive orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on the ground that they were quite able to maintain their indepen-

dence. When they did the Ptolemies would lose Upper Egypt for decades. The struggle for Coele Syria, too, did not end at Raphia. Antiochus would take it back after the battle of Panion in 200. Thirty two years later the interminable dispute would have an end when the final arbiter of all the Hellenistic kingdoms, Rome, in the form of Gaius Popilius Laenas literally drew a circle around it (29.27.1-9). n Michael Park trained as a teacher in English, history and science back in the seventies. When not working at his day job, he pursues his real interests: decent red wine and collecting classics and works on ancient history as well as writing. Income not already disposed of supports something of a mini Library of Congress on the subject. He would like to thank Christopher Webber and Paul McDonnel-Staff for the answers to some questions. They should not be blamed for how those answers were utilised.

Further reading:

Aftermath

The towns and cities came over to Ptolemy and within three months hed re-established control over the region. Before concluding a one year truce with Antiochus Ptolemy, in a display of pharaonic propaganda, made a show invasion of Phoenicia. He then returned to Egypt and, according to Polybius, lost
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- Polybius (Shuckburgh translation) is the literary source for Antiochus invasion and the campaign (5.58-71 and 79-87). The trilingual Raphia Inscription provides confirmation of dating and the period of the campaign. Polybius battle narrative, though, is very Diodorus-like and suffers from summarising and cherry picking. As J.P. Mahaffy wrote his description, as we have it, is incoherent. Thus, for example, one has to work out the probabilities of troop placement from the garbled 82.10 and I have placed the medium infantry (Greeks) alongside the phalanx with Byttacus lights supporting the elephants. Modern works are not plentiful outside of general treatises. The exhaustive and exhausting to find Raphia, 217 BCE, Revisited by E Galili (Scripta Classica Israelica, 3, 1976-77) is a treasure trove and well worth the tracking down. Bar Kochva, Seleucid Army Organisation and the Great Campaigns provides a shorter analysis. - J.P. Mahaffey, The Army of Ptolemy at Raphia. Hermathena 13 (1898), 140-5 provides some discussion of the textual problems. - G.T. Griffiths, The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World. Chicago 1975 (reprint) deals with both armies - mainly from the mercenary point of view and Bevan The House of Ptolemy (Chicago 1985, reprint) chapter VII for a general overview. - F. Walbank, Historical Commentary on Polybius. I (Oxford 1957), 585-616 and III (Oxford 1979), 773-4. For the possibility of Indian elephants in Ptolemys array see M. Charles, Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.845, The Classical Quarterly 57.1 (2007), 306-311 .

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