Remedial Law) Case Survey of Justice Mendoza Ponentes) Made 2002) by Ateneo) 29 Pages

REMEDIAL LAW JUSTICE MENDOZA CASE DIGESTS ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPER AT ION S 2002
JURISDICTION
MTC JURISDICTION FRANCEL REALTY v. CA 22 Jan. 1996 Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the !". #n its complaint, P alleged that R failed to pa$ monthl$ amorti%ations despite demands to update his pa$ments and to vacate the premises. !he !" dismissed the complaint for lac& of 'urisdiction, holding that the case was cogni%able b$ the ()*R+. Issu : ,oes the !" have 'urisdiction over the complaint-
! "#: .o. /hile generall$ spea&ing an action for unlawful detainer falls within the original and e0clusive 'urisdiction of the !", this case is a not simpl$ an unlawful detainer case. !his case involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.,. .o. 912, which controvers$ is e0clusivel$ cogni%able b$ the ()*R+. !he ()*R+ has 'urisdiction not onl$ over complaints of bu$ers against subdivision developers but also over actions filed b$ developers for the unpaid price of the lots or units. $DA. DE CRUZ v. CA 3 ar. 1999 Facts: P filed an unlawful detainer case against , with the over the disputed land. Issu : /as the was raised!". , claimed ownership
!" ousted of its 'urisdiction, considering the 4uestion of ownership
! "#: .o. 5fter the enactment of +.P. 129, the inferior courts now retain 'urisdiction over an e'ectment case even if the 4uestion of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the e0press 4ualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved onl$ for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. RTC JURISDICTION $INZONS%C!ATO v. NATI$IDAD 2 Jun. 1991 Facts: P, a revenue officer, wrote the "ommissioner of the +#R to reconsider her decision to transfer him to another revenue district. /ith his letter unacted upon, P filed with the R!" a complaint for #n'unction against the "ommissioner. Issu : ,oes the R!" have 'urisdiction to entertain P6s complaint! "#: .o. *nder the law, an$ emplo$ee who 4uestions the validit$ of his transfer should appeal to the "ivil 7ervice "ommission. !he R!" 'udge should dismiss the action for failure of P to e0haust administrative remedies. REPUBLIC v. CA 89 :ct. 1996 Facts: P owned several hectares of land which the government too& pursuant to the "omprehensive 5grarian Reform )aw ;R.5. .o. 6612<. 5 dispute on the proper valuation of P6s land was brought before the Provincial 5grarian Reform 5d'udicator ;P5R5,< who sustained the initial valuation made b$ the )and +an& of the Philippines. P filed a Petition for Just "ompensation in the R!", sitting as a special 5grarian "ourt. !he R!" dismissed its petition on the ground that P should have appealed to the ,epartment of 5grarian Reform 5d'udication +oard ;,5R5+<, before recourse to it could be had. 1
Issu : /as the dismissal proper! "#: .o. *nder =12 of R.5. 6612, the 7pecial 5grarian "ourts, which are the Regional !rial "ourts, are given original and e0clusive 'urisdiction over >all petitions for the determination of 'ust compensation of 'ust compensation to landowners.? @urthermore, the ,5R is an administrative agenc$ which cannot be granted 'urisdiction over cases of eminent domain. !he valuation of propert$ in eminent domain is essentiall$ a 'udicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies. NATIONAL STEEL v. CA 2 @eb. 1999 Facts: P filed a complaint against ,. P, however, failed to pa$ the correct amount of doc&et fees. Issu : 7hould the complaint be dismissed! "#: .o. 5lthough the pa$ment of the proper doc&et fees is a 'urisdictional re4uirement, the R!" ma$ allow P in an action to pa$ the same within a reasonable time before the e0piration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementar$ period. #f P fails to compl$ with this re4uirement, , should timel$ raise the issue of 'urisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. #n the latter case, the balance between the appropriate doc&et fees and the amount actuall$ paid b$ P will be considered a lien on an$ award he ma$ obtain in his favor.
SUMMARY PROCEDURE
ODSIGUE $. CA 288 7"R5 626 ;1993< Facts& P, as coAowner and assignee of sub'ect land, sent a demand letter to , to vacate premises. !he letter was delivered b$ the baranga$ captain who, in a sworn affidavit, stated that he tried to deliver the letter to , but , refused to receive it. P brought a suit for unlawful detainer. , said that the 'urisdictional re4uirement of formal demand was not complied with because the affidavit of the baranga$ captain had no evidentiar$ weight absent an$ hearing. !he !", R!" and "5 decided in favor of P. Issu & /hether 'urisdictional re4uirements were properl$ complied with. ! "#& Bes. !he affidavit b$ P stated that demand letters were personall$ handed to , but , refused to receive them. !he affidavit is entitled to great respect absent an$thing to the contrar$. !he Rules on 7ummar$ Procedure provide for the submission b$ parties of affidavits and position papers and en'oins courts to hold hearings onl$ where it is necessar$ to do so to clarif$ factual matters.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
APPEAL OBUGAN $. PEOPLE 233 7"R5 268 ;1991< Facts& P was accused in two criminal cases of violation of R5 6321, ,angerous ,rugs 5ct. P was found guilt$. 13 da$s after promulgation of decision, P filed a motion for reconsideration. 5fterwards, P also filed an urgent motion for new trial on the ground of newl$ discovered evidence. !he motion for reconsideration was denied but the motion for new trial was granted. !he 'udge however affirmed his decision after trial de novo.
Issu & /hether the 11Ada$ period to appeal should be counted from the date of promulgation of the original decision sub'ect of the motion for new trial, deducting the time the motion was pending, or from the time a new 'udgment was rendered. ! "#& !he period to appeal should be counted from the time of the rendition of the new 'udgment. !he mere grant of the motion for new trial operates to vacate the original 'udgment. !he original 'udgment is set aside and the case is reversed to its original status before 'udgment. MOS'UERA $. PANGANIBAN 21C 7"R5 328 ;1996< Facts& 5, +, ", ,, D, @ were initiall$ charged with frustrated homicide before the Provincial Prosecutor. 5fter the preliminar$ investigation, it was changed to less serious ph$sical in'uries. 7ubse4uentl$, the former information was reinstated b$ the R!" upon motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor. 5ppellants contended that because the direction and control of criminal prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, a motion for reconsideration which the private prosecutor filed without the conformit$ b$ the public prosecutor, was a nullit$ and did not prevent the order of dismissal from becoming final. Issu & /hether the action b$ the trial court was proper. ! "#& Bes. Private respondent through prosecutor has the right to intervene as he had neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to do so. !he right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has alwa$s been recogni%ed, the onl$ limitation being that the$ cannot appeal an$ adverse ruling if to do so should place the accused in double 'eopard$. Dver$ court has the power and the dut$ to review and amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timel$ called to an$ error or defect therein. #n the present case, the motion for reconsideration was timel$ filed b$ the private prosecutor who, as alread$ discussed, has the legal personalit$ to do so. ARRESTS PEOPLE $. NAZARENO 269 7"R5 216 ;1996< Facts& 5 and + were found guilt$ of the murder of E. +oth claimed that their arrests without warrant were illegal and 'ustif$ the nullification of the proceedings of the trial court. Issu & /hether the arrest was unlawful due to the fact that it was done without a warrant. ! "#& .o. @rom the records presented, it was shown that 5 and + waived ob'ections based on the alleged irregularit$ of their arrest, considering that the$ pleaded not guilt$ to the charges against them and participated in the trial. 5n$ defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when the$ voluntaril$ submitted to the 'urisdiction of the court. #f ob'ections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid 'udgment rendered after a trial, free from error. DEAT! PENALTY PEOPLE $. REDULOSA 211 7"R5 229 ;1996<
Facts& 5 and + were accused of &idnapping for ransom and murder and were sentenced to death. !he case was brought to the 7upreme "ourt on automatic review. 5 then filed an F*rgent otion to /ithdraw 5ppeal.F Issu & /hether the action was proper. ! "#& Bes. !he action was proper onl$ because of the decision of 5 to continue his case as an appealed case. (owever, as appellant had the right to continue with his case as an appealed one, so does he have a right G sub'ect to the approval of this "ourt G to terminate the appeal b$ withdrawing it. !he death penalt$ imposed was automaticall$ reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of 5rt. ###, =19 ;1< of the "onstitution, which too& effect on @ebruar$ 2, 19C2. /hile this case was brought to the "ourt for automatic review as re4uired b$ Rule 122, =9 of the Rules of "ourt, the case ceased to be in this "ourt b$ virtue of such Rule. INFORMATION OFFICE OF T!E PRO$INCIAL PROSECUTOR $. CA 83C 7"R5 213 ;2999< Facts& !he provincial prosecutor filed with the R!" an information charging 5, +, ", , and ten other individuals with murder and multiple frustrated homicide which was based on a 'oint affidavit b$ individuals claiming to be members of the .ew PeopleHs 5rm$. 5, +, " and , challenges the information filed on the ground that in accusing them of murder and multiple frustrated murder, the provincial prosecutor disregarded the political motivation which made the crime committed rebellion. !he R!" denied the motion and ruled that the power to determine what crime to charge on the basis of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public prosecutor. !he "5, however, while agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the prosecutor to have gravel$ abused his discretion in charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground that the evidence adduced showed that the crime committed was rebellion. Issu & /hether the prosecution, even before the start of the trial, can be ordered to change the information which it had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminar$ investigation shows that the crime committed was not murder with multiple frustrated murder but rebellion. ! "#& .o. #t was improper of the "5 to consider the record of the preliminar$ investigation as basis for the finding that the provincial prosecutor guilt$ of grave abuse of discretion when such record was not presented before the R!" and therefore, was not part of the records of the case. #t is the public prosecutors who should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. (ence, a municipal 'udge has no legal authorit$ to determine the character of the crime but onl$ to determine whether or not the evidence presented supported prima facie the allegation of facts contained in the complaint. (e has no legal authorit$ to determine the character of the crime and his declaration upon that point can onl$ be regarded as an e0pression of opinion in no wise binding on the court. JUDGMENTS PALU%AY $ CA 298 7"R5 81C ;199C< Facts& 5 was charged with frustrated homicide. (e was however found guilt$ b$ the R!" 'udge of serious ph$sical in'uries. !he R!" 'udge found that 5 had no motive to do harm and that in all probabilit$, 5 accidentall$ pressed the trigger. Issu & /hether the basis for the 'udgeHs decision would render the decision null and void.
! "#& .o. /ithin the issues made out b$ the parties, a court can find out what it thin&s happened. 5 'udge is free to decide on the basis of probabilit$. (e can ma&e his assessment of the truthfulness of the testimonies aided b$ his own &nowledge and e0perience. POWERS OF T!E OMBUDSMAN LASTIMOSA $. $AS'UEZ 238 7"R5 392 ;1991< Facts& E filed a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authorit$ and grave misconduct against 5, ma$or of 7anta @e. !he cases were filed at the office of the :mbudsmanAIisa$as. !he :mbudsman directed that 5 be charged with attempted rape in the R!". !he case was assigned to P, a provincial prosecutor. P after preliminar$ investigation onl$ filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. !he :mbudsman cited P for contempt and suspended P for si0 months. Issu & ;a< /hether or not the :ffice of the :mbudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist in the prosecution. ;b< /hether or not the :mbudsman has the power to cite for contempt and whether the suspension was valid. ! "#& ;a< Bes. !he ombudsman is authori%ed to call on prosecutors for assistance. 7ec 81 of the :mbudsman 5ct allows designation of investigators and prosecutors. /hen a prosecutor is deputi%ed he is under the supervision and control of the :mbudsman. (e is sub'ect to the power of the :mbudsman to direct, review, reverse or modif$ his decision. ;b< Bes. !he :mbudsman 5ct gives the office the power to >punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of "ourt and under the same procedure and with the same penalties.? !he preventive suspension is 'ustified to the end that the proper prosecution of the same ma$ not be hampered. ALMONTE $. $AS'UEZ 233 7"R5 2C6 ;1991< Facts& !he :mbudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum and orders re4uiring 5, an accountant and +, a record custodian, to produce all documents in connection with his investigation of an anon$mous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the Dconomic #ntelligence and #nvestigation +ureau had been illegall$ disbursed. 5 and + claimed that militar$ and diplomatic secrets will be disclosed b$ the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the D##+. Issu & /hether the :mbudsmanHs act was proper although the complaint in this case was unsigned and unverified. ! "#& Bes. !he "onstitution e0pressl$ en'oins the :mbudsman to act on an$ complaint filed Fin an form or mannerF concerning official acts or omissions. )i&ewise, =26 ;2< of R5 6229 provides that the :ffice of the :mbudsman shall receive complaints from an$ source in whatever form concerning an official act or omission. !he general investigation in the :mbudsmanHs office is precisel$ for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hast$, malicious and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the 7tate from useless and e0pensive trials. ORDERS WAS!INGTON DISTILLERS( INC $ CA 269 7"R5 C21 Facts& R!" 'udge E, to search the premises of E "ompan$, issued a search warrant. 5 "ompan$ filed a motion to 4uash the search warrant on the grounds that the R!" had
no 'urisdiction to issue a search warrant and there was no probable cause for issuing the search warrant. R!" 'udge B, who had been designated assisting 'udge, granted the motion. :n appeal, the "5 ruled that an assisting R!" 'udge does not have the authorit$ to 4uash the search warrant issued b$ another R!" 'udge acting in his capacit$ as e0ecutive 'udge. Issu & /hether a 'udge ma$ revo&e the orders of another 'udge. ! "#& Bes. 5 'udge ma$ revo&e the orders of another 'udge in a litigation subse4uentl$ assigned to him. !he fact that a 'udge was the e0ecutive 'udge is not material, because 'urisdiction is vested in the court, not in him as e0ecutive 'udge. 5pplications for search warrant are made to the e0ecutive 'udge onl$ for administrative purposes. (ence, an assisting 'udge was competent to resolve the motion see&ing to 4uash the search warrant. PRELIMINARY IN$ESTIGATION GOZOS $ TAC%AN 899 7"R5 261 ;199C< Facts& 5, +, ", , and D were accused of &illing E. !he prosecutor, after conducting a preliminar$ investigation, filed an information charging the five with murder. !he R!" 'udge, however, conducted his own preliminar$ investigation and decided to issue a warrant of arrest onl$ for 5. Issu & /hether the 'udgeHs action was proper! "#& .o. !he Rules of "ourt specificall$ enumerates the persons authori%ed to conduct preliminar$ investigations, and an R!" 'udge is not one of those authori%ed to do so. !o 'ustif$ his orders, the 'udge invo&ed 5rticle ### section 2 of the "onstitution. (owever, this provision should be distinguished from a preliminar$ investigation. !he determination of probable cause for the issuance of such orders of arrest is vested in the courts, but the conduct of preliminar$ investigations is entrusted to the e0ecutive branch, with the e0ception of inferior court 'udges. ORDER OF TRIAL PEOPLE $ ROMULO GUTIERREZ 892 7"R5 638 ;1999< Facts& 5 was charged with murder. (e initiall$ pleaded Fnot guilt$F but later moved for modification of the order of trial. !he R!" denied 5Hs motion for a modification of the order of trial. Issu & /hether the R!" 'udgeHs action was proper! "#& Bes. !he Rules of "ourt does not re4uire a change in the order of trial but onl$ allows it in the discretion of the court. !his can be seen on the use of the permissive Fma$.F #n this case, there was no basis for reversing the order of trial as the burden was on the prosecution to prove that it was the accused who committed the act. U)*ust C+)v,ct,+) PEOPLE $. DRILON 288 7"R5 1 ;1993< Facts& 5 and + were convicted of murder and two counts of frustrated murder for the &illing of E and wounding his wife and son. 5 appealed and the "5 ac4uitted 5 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspirac$ between 5 and +. 5 now filed a claim under R5 2899 sec 8 which provides for the pa$ment of compensation to >an$ person who was un'ustl$ accused, convicted, imprisoned but subse4uentl$ released b$
virtue of a 'udgment of ac4uittal. #t was denied because there was basis for finding him probabl$ guilt$. Issu & /hether or not under R5 2899, the mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime that he was subse4uentl$ ac4uitted of is alread$ un'ust in itself as re4uired b$ law. ! "#& .o. /hat the law re4uires is that the claimant must be un'ustl$ accused and convicted. !o sa$ that an accused has been un'ustl$ convicted has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than of his innocence. !he fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is ac4uitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was un'ust. C+u)t -%A..,#av,ts OLI$AS $S. OMBUDSMAN 289 7"R5 2C8 ;1993< Facts& P retired from the 5@P. 7hortl$ thereafter, anon$mous letters were sent to the P"JJ charging him with violations of 5ntiAJraft and "orrupt Practices 5ct and *ne0plained /ealth 5ct. P was informed b$ +P# that a free%e order had been issued covering his current and savings account. !he letters were referred to the .ew 5rmed @orces of the Philippines 5ntiAJraft +oard that the P"JJ had created. Issu & /hether P ma$ be compelled to file a counter affidavit notwithstanding the fact that no complaint or affidavit has been filed against him. ! "#& .o. #t is incumbent upon the P"JJ as complainant to reduce the evidence it has into affidavits before the respondent should be re4uired to e0plain. #t must be noted that the general power of investigation of the P"JJ consists of 2 stages, criminal investigation and preliminar$ investigation
CI$IL PROCEDURE
PAYMENT OF DOC/ET FEES NATIONAL STEEL v. CA 2 @eb. 1999 Facts: #n a complaint filed b$ P against ,, P sought the e0ecution in his favor of a deed of assignment of shares of stoc&. !he doc&et fees paid b$ P, however, were not based on the value of the shares of stoc& sought to be recovered. Issu : ,id P pa$ the right amount of doc&et fees! "#: .o. !his is an action for the recover$ of personal propert$, the main purpose of which is to regain the ownership and possession of the said shares of stoc&. 5ccordingl$, P should pa$ doc&et fees based on the value of the shares of stoc& and the amount of damages he see&s to recover. *nder Rule 131, =2;a< as it stood at the time of the filing of the complaint, doc&et fees for ordinar$ civil actions should be based on the total sum claimed, e0clusive of interest, or the stated value of the propert$ in litigation. ORDER OF DEFAULT $ILLAREAL v. CA 12 7ept. 199C Facts: P et al filed a otion to lift an order of default. !he motion alleged that P et al were residents of the *7 which local newspapers do not reach and that the$ did not &now about the case filed against them until wellAmeaning friends informed them about
the matter. !he motion also alleged that P et al have absolutel$ no &nowledge, much less an$ hand, in the incident falsel$ imputed to them Issu : ,id the motion to lift an order of default follow the re4uirements in Rule 1C, =8! "#: .o. *nder Rule 1C, =8, a motion to lift an order of default must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mista&e, or e0cusable neglect which caused his failure to answer. !he motion must show that the defendant has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained b$ having the order of default set aside. :therwise, and if the motion is not accompanied b$ affidavits of merits, it ma$ be properl$ denied. !he allegation that P et al >have absolutel$ no &nowledge, much less an$ hand, in the incident falsel$ imputed to them? does not meet this re4uirement. 7uch allegation is a conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing a meritorious defense. PETITION FOR RELIEF TENEBRO v. CA 2 Jul$ 1992 Facts: , filed a petition for relief from 'udgment. #n his petition, , claimed he was deprived of due process. !he court rendered a decision, not onl$ on the issue of due process, but also on the merits of the case. Issu : ,id the court err in considering the merits of the case in a petition for relief from 'udgment! "#: .o. 5 petition for relief from 'udgment is an e4uitable remed$ that is allowed onl$ in e0ceptional cases because, as a rule, a final 'udgment should not be disturbed where a part$ could have appealed or availed himself of another remed$. 5ccordingl$, a court ma$ validl$ consider the e4uities of a case in order to determine whether there is a compelling reason for setting aside the decision. !hat is wh$ Rule 8C, =8 provides that a petition for relief from 'udgment must be accompanied b$ an affidavit of merit containing the facts constituting the petitioner6s good and substantial cause of action or defense. COUNTERCLAIM FRANCEL REALTY v. CA 22 Jan. 1996 Facts: P, a subdivision developer, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against R in the !". !he !" correctl$ dismissed the complaint for lac& of 'urisdictionK nonetheless, it awarded R6s counterclaim for damages. Issu : "an the !" ma&e such an award!" cannot grant R6s
! "#: .o. 7ince it has no 'urisdiction over the case, the counterclaim for damages. FLETC!ER C!ALLENGE v. CA 29 5pril 199C
Facts: P filed a complaint against ,. , filed an answer with counterclaim. )ater P filed a pleading in which the$ as&ed for the dismissal of the complaint that the$ had filed and for the dismissal of the counterclaim filed against them on the ground that, being an ancillar$ remed$, a compulsor$ counterclaim cannot stand b$ itself. !he R!" dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim. Issu : /as the dismissal of the counterclaim valid under the circumstances-
! "#: Bes. !he rule is that the counterclaim ma$ not be dismissed if defendant ob'ects, unless it can be independentl$ considered b$ the court. (ere, however, , made no ob'ection and so the R!" validl$ dismissed the same. 5t an$ rate, , are without a remed$ because under Rule 12, =2, the dismissal of the counterclaim is without pre'udice to its filing as a separate action. INJUNCTION OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. $ CA 819 7"R5 333 ;1999< Facts& )essor E filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees 5, +, " and , for failure to pa$ the increased rent which the R!" granted. E then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of e0ecution specificall$ against 5 and D enterprise ;a priv$ to the contract of lease between E and 5<. D enterprise filed an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminar$ in'unction which the R!" granted. :n appeal, the "5 declared the writ of in'unction as null and void. Issu & /hether the "5 committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring as null and void the writ of preliminar$ in'unction. ! "#& .o. !he order granting a writ of preliminar$ in'unction is an interlocutor$ orderK as such, it cannot b$ itself be sub'ect of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. !he proper remed$ of a part$ aggrieved b$ such an order is to bring an ordinar$ appeal from an adverse 'udgment in the main case, citing thereon the grounds for assailing the interlocutor$ order. (owever, the part$ concerned ma$ file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patentl$ erroneous and appeal would not afford ade4uate and e0peditious relief. #n the present case, the R!" issued a writ of preliminar$ in'unction en'oining the e0ecution of the 'udgment, in spite of the fact that the right of D to occup$ the leased premises has been declared b$ final 'udgment to be ine0istent. (aving no clear legal right, DHs plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. EJECTMENT LUCIO SAN ANDRES $. CA 6 ,ec. 1996 @acts: P, before filing an e'ectment suit against ,, sent the latter a letter, demanding that a formal contract of lease between P and , must be e0ecuted immediatel$ otherwise , would be considered intruders of the propert$ from which he can be ousted. 5 suit for e'ectment was later filed. !he case reached the "5 which dismissed the complaint. !he "5 held that no demand to vacate had been made b$ P before bringing the e'ectment suit. #ssue: /as the e'ectment suit preceded b$ a proper demand to vacate(eld: .o. 5n action for e'ectment is sub'ect to the re4uirement of Rule 29 = 2 of the Rules of "ourt concerning the need for a demand to be made before the lessee ma$ be considered a deforicant, unlawfull$ withholding possession from the owner of the land. !he demand must be either to pa$ the rents or to compl$ with the terms of the contract, as the case ma$ be. +ut the letter of P ma&es neither demand on ,. #nstead, the letter demands the e0ecution of a new lease contract on the theor$ that the old lease agreement had been terminated. (owever, the old agreement was not, in fact, terminated. OROCAM ENTERPRISES INC. $. CA 819 7"R5 333 ;1999< Facts& )essor E filed a case of unlawful detainer against lessees 5, +, " and , for failure to pa$ the increased rent which the R!" granted. E then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of e0ecution specificall$ against 5 and D enterprise. D enterprise
opposed the motion on the ground that it was never impleaded nor included as part defendant in the e'ectment case. Issu & /hether 'udgment in an e'ectment suit is binding not onl$ upon defendants in the suit but also against those not made part$ thereto. ! "#& Bes. 5 'udgment in an e'ectment suit is binding not onl$ upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if the$ are: a< trespassers, s4uatters or agents of the defendant fraudulentl$ occup$ing the propert$ to frustrate the 'udgmentK b< guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendantK c< transferees pendente liteK d< sub lesseeK e< coAlesseeK or f< members of the famil$, relatives and other privies of the defendant. #n this case, D enterprise admitted that it was the actual occupant of the leased premises and has been authori%ed b$ 5 to pa$ the rents for and in its behalf. LIMPO $ CA 888 7"R5 122 ;2999< Facts& !he R!" 'udge issued a writ of e0ecution lev$ing 2 parcels of land owned b$ E. 7ubse4uentl$, a writ of possession was issued e0 parte commanding the sheriff to place B in possession of the properties after E was unable to redeem them. E contended that she was never furnished a cop$ of BHs petition for issuance of a writ of possession, nor given a notice of the hearing. (ence, the court did not ac4uire 'urisdiction over her and had no authorit$ to issue a writ of possession. Issu & /hether a writ of possession ma$ be issued of e0 parte. ! "#& Bes. /hat was filed, as a petition for issuance of writ of possession, was in substance merel$ a motion, as B actuall$ sought 'ust the e0ecution of the final decision rendered in her favor. 7uch motion could be made e0 parte. GARNIS!MENT P!ILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. $ CA 826 7"R5 1C ;2999< Facts& / charged ( with attempted parricide. ( and / entered into a compromise agreement with respect to the civil aspect of the case. *pon failure to compl$ with his obligations, a .otice of Jarnishment was issued b$ another R!" branch to "ompan$ E, (Hs emplo$er. !he notice of Jarnishment remained partiall$ unsatisfied as evidenced b$ the two chec&s paid b$ "ompan$ E. Issu & /hether / can validl$ see& to obtain satisfaction of the writ of e0ecution against "ompan$ E, (Hs emplo$er. ! "#& .o. Jarnishment proceedings are the means b$ which the 'udgment creditor see&s to sub'ect to his claim the propert$ of the 'udgment debtor in the hands of a third person. 7uch proceeding must be had in the trial court that has 'urisdiction over the suit in which the 'udgment creditor prevailed. PARTIES SANTIAGO LAND DE$. $. CA 262 7"R5 29 ;1992< Facts& P, as assignee of the mortgagor, filed action against the mortgagee , to enforce an alleged right to redeem. Pending this action, , sold the propert$ to E. "onse4uentl$, E filed a motion to intervene. P opposed the motion stating that EHs interest was a mere e0pectanc$. !rial court allowed the intervention. Issu & /hether the action of the court was proper.
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! "#& .o. /hile , ma$ have legal interest in the sub'ect matter of the litigation, its interest as transferee pendente lite is different from that of an intervenor. , asserts that the rules are interchangeable and that it is erroneous to insist on the application of Rule 8 =29 solel$. !he purpose of Rule 12 =2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a part$ to protect his interest and the court incidentall$ to settle all conflicting claims. !he purpose of Rule 8 =29 is to provide for the substitution of the transferee pendente lite precisel$ because he is not a stranger but a successorAinA interest of the transferor, who is a part$ to the action. 5s proper part$, a transfereeHs title to the propert$ is sub'ect to the incidents and results of the pending litigation and is in no better position than the vendor in whose shoes he now stands. SAMANIEGO $ AGUILA 883 7"R5 38C ;2999< Facts& !he :ffice of the President granted the e0emption from the coverage of the F:peration )and !ransfer ProgramF the land owned b$ E. :n appeal, the "5 dismissed the petition 4uestioning the decision of the :ffice for failure to implead the :ffice of the President, as the$ should be considered as indispensable parties. Issu & /hether the :ffice of the President should be considered as an indispensable part$ and must therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules. ! "#& .o. 5n indispensable part$ is a part$ in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action without that part$ being impleaded. #ndispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controvers$ that a final decree would necessaril$ affect their rights, or that the court cannot proceed without their presence. F#nterestsF within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directl$ in issue and to be affected b$ the decree as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the 4uestion involved. :n the other hand, a nominal or pro forma part$ is one who is 'oined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such part$ has an$ real interest on the sub'ect matter or because an$ relief is demanded, but merel$ because the technical rules of pleadings re4uire the presence of such part$ on the record. #n the case at bar, the failure to implead the :ffice of the President does not warrant the dismissal of the case as such is considered as a pro forma part$. INTER$ENTION LIMPO $ CA 888 7"R5 122 ;2999< Facts& #n a case 4uestioning the legalit$ of a writ of possession issued e0 parte, spouses ( and / filed a motion for leave to intervene as the new owners of the parcel of land being litigated upon as such land was foreclosed and sold to the spouses as the highest bidder. !he motion was filed onl$ after the appeal in this case had been submitted for resolution. Issu & /hether the intervention is proper at the late stage of this case. ! "#& .o. #ntervention ma$ be granted onl$ its allowance will not undul$ dela$ or pre'udice the rights of the original parties to a case. Jenerall$, it will be allowed Fbefore rendition of 'udgment b$ the trial court.F 5fter trial and decision in the case, intervention can no longer be permitted. "ertainl$ it cannot be allowed on appeal without undul$ dela$ing the disposition of the case and pre'udicing the interest of the parties. MISJOINDER0NONJOINDER !EIRS OF ASUNCION $. GER$ACIO 893 7"R5 822 ;1999<
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Facts& 5 case for the recover$ of possession of a parcel of land was filed against E. 5lthough E in his petition to the 7" failed to implead B and L as private respondents, B and L filed a otion with )eave to @ile "omment andMor #ntervention, presented arguments in support of the 4uestioned orders, and specificall$ referred to themselves as private respondents. Issu & /hether failure to implead is a ground for dismissal of an action. ! "#& .o. !he Rules provides that the mis'oinderMnon 'oinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action and that parties ma$ simpl$ be dropped or added b$ order of the court, either on motion of the parties or on its own initiative. #n the present case, it was upon the initiative of B and L that for all intents and purposes the$ have been 'oined as respondents. PRETRIAL BEMBO $. CA 219 7"R5 393 ;1991< Facts& !he R!" declared , in default for failure to appear in pretrial conference. !he "5 reversed the decision finding that notice to reAset pretrial was not given to parties, but onl$ to the counsels who were informed that a FhearingF was scheduled. Issu & /hether notice was sufficient. ! "#& Bes. !he discretion and authorit$ of the respondent court to declare private respondent in default after it failed to appear at the pretrial is clear from =2 of Rule 29 and the "5, without a clear showing of grave abuse of this discretion, should not have annulled the default order. oreover, the sufficienc$ of the written notice of pretrial is irrelevant where the evidence shows that the counsel and the parties actuall$ &new of the pretrial. "ounsel of , admitted that a cop$ of the order resetting the pretrial conference had been served on him and that he notified , of this date. .or was the notice given defective for referring to a FhearingF rather than to a pretrial. 5 hearing as &nown to the law is not confined to a trial but embraces the several stages of a litigation. #t does not preclude pretrial. P!ILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC. $ CA 826 7"R5 1C ;2999< Facts& E filed a complaint for damages against "ompan$ B. +$ wa$ of a counterclaim, "ompan$ B pra$ed for moral and e0emplar$ damages and attorne$Hs fees. !he R!" then re4uired the parties to submit their preAtrial briefs and scheduled the preAtrial conference. "ounsel 5, on behalf of EHs counsel, "ounsel +, file an F*rgent otion for Resetting F of the preAtrial conference on the ground that "ounsel + was on sic& leave. "ompan$ B was declared as in default on the ground that no medical certificate had been attached to the motion. !he court allowed E to present her evidence e0Aparte. Issu & /hether "ompan$ B should be declared as in default for their failure to file their preAtrial briefs at least three da$s before the preAtrial conference. ! "#& .o. #n deciding whether to grant or den$ a motion for postponement of preAtrial, the court must ta&e into account the following factors: a< the reason for the postponement, and b< the merits of the case of the movant. #n this case, there is no showing that "ompan$ E, in as&ing for the resetting of the preAtrial conference, sought merel$ to cause un'ustifiable dela$ in the proceedings. 5lso, the presence of another law$er from counselHs law firm during the scheduled preAtrial conference negates an$ suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on the part of the petitioners. CAUSE OF ACTION MERALCO $. CA
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221 7"R5 312 ;1992< Facts& , supplies P with electricit$. *pon billing, P refused to pa$ until , informs P of the basis for the purchase power ad'ustment costs. , sent a notice of disconnection to P for failure to pa$ the bill. P sought to en'oin , from disconnecting electric suppl$. , claimed that the trial court had no 'urisdiction, and that the +ureau of Dnerg$ was the proper forum. !he trial court dismissed the case. Issu & /hether dismissal was proper. ! "#& .o. Jurisdiction is determined b$ the allegations in the complaint. P was not invo&ing the 'urisdiction of the +oard of Dnerg$ to Fregulate and fi0 the power rates to be charged b$ electric companies,F but the regular courtHs power to ad'udicate cases involving violations of rights which are legall$ demandable and enforceable. /hat P demanded from , was onl$ the basis upon which the latter had computed the purchased power ad'ustmentNit is not a matter that in an$ wa$ pertains to +:DHs supervision, control, or 'urisdiction to regulate and fi0 power rates . . . P!ILSEC $. CA 223 7"R5 192 ;1992< Facts& 5 "o., a foreign corporation, with B, a nonAresident, undertoo& the obligation of E, @ilipino, to + "o. @or breach of contract, 5 "o. sued + "o., a domestic corporation, before a *7 court. /hile this was pending, + "o. filed a case before R!" a&ati for sum of mone$ for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminar$ attachment against 5 "o., where it reiterated its counterclaims. 5 "o. sought the dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, and that the litigation before the *7 court was proper forum. !he trial court and the "5 dismissed the action for lac& of 'urisdiction. Issu & /hether action b$ lower courts was proper. ! "#& .o. !he trial courtHs refusal to ta&e cogni%ance of the case was 'ustifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens. @irst, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16 = 1, which does not include forum non conveniens. !he propriet$ of dismissing a case based on this principle re4uires a factual determinationK hence, it is more properl$ considered a matter of defense. /hile it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming 'urisdiction on this ground, it should do so onl$ after Fvital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstancesF re4uire the courtHs desistance. #n this case, the trial court abstained from ta&ing 'urisdiction solel$ on the basis of the pleadings filed b$ 5 "o. in connection with the motion to dismiss. #t failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs ;+ "o.< is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants ;E< is a @ilipino, and that it was the e0tinguishment of the latterHs debt which was the ob'ect of the transaction under litigation. !he trial court arbitraril$ dismissed the case even after finding that E was not a part$ in the *.7. case. #t was error for the "5 and the trial court to hold that 'urisdiction over 5 "o. and B could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served b$ e0traterritorial service. Rule 13 = 12 on e0traterritorial service provides that service of summons on a nonAresident defendant ma$ be effected out of the Philippines b$ leave of "ourt where, among others, Fthe propert$ of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.F COMETA $. CA 891 7"R5 319 ;1999< Facts& P filed an information for @alsification of Public ,ocument against ,. !he case was eventuall$ dismissed. @ollowing the dismissal of the criminal case, , filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against P. P moved for its dismissal for supposed failure to state a cause of action and failure to implead indispensable parties. PHs motion was denied. Issu & /hether the denial of the motion was proper.
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! "#& Bes. !he pivotal consideration to determine the proper statement of cause of action is whether the facts pleaded and the substantive law entitle plaintiff to a 'udgment. 5 complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations ma$ be vague and indefinite, for, in such case, the recourse of the defendant is to file for a motion for a bill of particulars. Pleadings should be liberall$ construed. 5 court, dealing with a motion to dismiss an action for malicious prosecution, has onl$ to determine whether the allegations of the complaint, assuming them to be true, entitle the plaintiff to a 'udgment. WRIT OF POSSESSION $ACA $. CA 283 7"R5 136 ;1993< Facts& @or the failure of ( and / to pa$ their mortgage obligation to the +an&, the mortgage was e0tra'udiciall$ foreclosed and the propert$ was sold to the +an& as highest bidder. !he oneA$ear redemption period e0pired. 5 new !"! was issued to the +an& after cancellation of !"! in the name of the spouses. (owever despite demands, the$ refused to turn over possession. !he spouses filed a separate action to annul the mortgage. !he writ was eventuall$ issued ordering spouses to turn over possession to the +an&. Issu & /hether issuance of the writ of possession was proper. ! "#& Bes. !he pendenc$ of a separate civil suit 4uestioning the validit$ of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the propert$ has been consolidated in the mortgagee. ,eferments of issuance of the writ are 'ustified onl$ under e4uitable circumstances where the obligation ceased to be ministerial. $ENUE GESMUNDO $. JRB REALTY 283 7"R5 118;1993< Facts& P and , entered into a lease contract where the parties stipulated that Fthe venue for all suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or an$ cause between the lessor and the lessee, and persons claiming under each, being the courts of appropriate 'urisdiction in Pasa$ "it$.F P filed a suit for damages because , terminated the lease. , moved to dismiss on the ground that the venue was improperl$ laid in the R!" of a&ati, contrar$ to the terms of their contract. Issu & /hether venue was proper. ! "#& .o. 7tipulations limiting venue are valid and binding between contracting parties. #t is clear from the partiesH contract that the$ intended to limit the venue of all suits between the lessor and the lessee, and those between parties claiming under them, regardless of their residence. !his means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided b$ in Rule 3, = 2;b<. !he terms can not be construed to merel$ provide an additional forum because the parties made it plain that in no other place ma$ the$ bring suit against each other. WRIT OF ATTAC!MENT O1ATE $. ABROGAR 231 7"R5 619;1991< Facts& +$ virtue of an action against ,, P succeeded in having a writ of attachment issued over the propert$ of ,. Records showed that there was no prior service of summons and complaint. !he deput$ sheriff alread$ served , notices of garnishment and sought their implementation. , claimed that 'urisdiction was not properl$ ac4uired.
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Issu & /hether issuance of writ of attachment was proper. ! "#& .o. 5 writ of preliminar$ attachment ma$ issue even before summons is served upon the defendant. (owever, it has been ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until 'urisdiction over his person is eventuall$ obtained. !herefore it is re4uired that when the proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneousl$ made. !he Rules do not re4uire that issuance of the writ be &ept a secret until it can be enforced. :therwise in no case ma$ the service of summons on , precede the lev$ on attachment. !o the contrar$, Rule 12 = 18 allows the defendant to move to discharge the attachment even before an$ attachment is actuall$ levied upon. 7ince the attachment was invalid, an$ e0amination of the propert$ attached thereof is also invalid. SUMMONS LITTON MILLS v. CA 11 a$ 1996 Facts: P filed a complaint against , "orp. for specific performance. ,6s counsel move to dismiss the case and 4uash the summons on the ground that , was a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and as such, was be$ond the reach of the local courts. ,6s counsel contended that the fact of ,6s doing business must first be proved before summons can be served in accordance with Rule 13, = 13. Issu : ust the fact that a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines be proved first before summons can be served! "#: .o. 5 court need not go be$ond the allegations in the complaint to determine whether or not a defendant foreign corporation is doing business for the purpose of Rule 13, =13. !he allegation that , ordered soccer 'erse$s from P and for this purpose , caused the opening of an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of P is a sufficient allegation that , was doing business in the Philippines. $ALMONTE $. CA 212 7"R5 92 ;1996< Facts& ( and / are foreign residents, but ( maintains a law office in the Philippines as member of the Philippine bar. B filed for a complaint for partition of real propert$ and accounting of rentals against ( and /. B sent summons to the office of ( who received it onl$ insofar as ( was concerned. ( maintained that he had no authorit$ to accept the summons on behalf of /. ( filed an 5nswer with "ounterclaim. / did not file an 5nswer. R!" refused to declare / in default because summons was not properl$ served. Issu & /hether service of summons was proper as to /. ! "#& .o. / is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 13 =12. 7uch service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either ;1< b$ personal serviceK ;2< b$ publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court ma$ order, in which case a cop$ of the summons and order of the court should be sent b$ registered mail to the last &nown address of the defendantK or ;8< in an$ other manner which the court ma$ deem sufficient. 7ervice under the third mode in this case is not proper because li&e the first two, it must be made outside the Philippines. !he service to ( cannot be considered a valid service of summons on / because it was not made upon the order of the court. !A!N $. CA 266 7"R5 182 ;1992<
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Facts& P sued , for alleged breach of a ,eed of 5ssignment. #n PHs complaint, he alleged that , was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. 7ervice of summons was made to the ,!#. , moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not ac4uire 'urisdiction over case since , was not doing business so the service to ,!# was improper. !he trial court deferred resolution of motion to dismiss. Issu & /hether summons was properl$ served. ! "#& Bes. @or purposes of having summons served on a foreign corporation in accordance with Rule 13 =13, it is sufficient that it be alleged in the complaint that the foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines. 5 determination that the foreign corporation is doing business is onl$ tentative and is made onl$ for the purpose of enabling the local court to ac4uire 'urisdiction over the foreign corporation. !his determination does not foreclose a contrar$ finding should evidence necessitate it. MACAPAGAL $. CA 221 7"R5 391 ;1992< Facts& , issued a chec& to P. !he chec& was dishonored upon presentation. P sued , for damages. 7ummons was served at the law office of the counsel of ,. , claimed that the service was improper. !hus, 'urisdiction was not ac4uired over him. !rial proceeded where P won. Issu & /hether service of summons proper. ! "#& Bes. !he ob'ect of summons is to inform the defendant in an action commenced against him directing him to answer the complaint within the reglementar$ period and giving notice that failure to answer shall result in 'udgment b$ default. 5lthough , now claims that he did not authori%e counsel or the latterHs law office to receive the summons for him, the fact remains that the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed b$ the same law office in his behalf. Petitioner did not ta&e action against the law$ers for their unauthori%ed representation until after C $ears and onl$ because the "5 stated that ,Hs failure to file an administrative complaint against the law$ers showed that he did not feel genuinel$ aggrieved b$ the actions of the law firm. PREJUDICIAL 'UESTION APA $. FERNANDEZ 232 7"R5 199 ;1991< Facts& P filed case for s4uatting against 5, + and ". 5, + and " moved to suspend their arraignment based on the pendenc$ of a civil case among the same parties regarding ownership of the sub'ect land. #n the civil case, 5, + and " sought to nullif$ the partition and cancel the !"! in PHs name. P argued that the issue was onl$ ph$sical possession, so the issue of ownership in the civil case was not a pre'udicial 4uestion. Issu & /hether the civil action 'ustified suspension of criminal proceedings. ! "#& Bes. P claimed the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. :wnership is thus the pivotal 4uestion. 7ince this is the 4uestion in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must be suspended in the meantime. 7urel$, if 5, + and " are coAowners of the lot in 4uestion, the$ cannot be found guilt$ of s4uatting because the$ are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are P and his famil$. CONTEMPT PACIFIC BAN/ING v. CA 18 :ct. 1991 Facts: !he R!" rendered a decision in favor of 5 and issued a writ of e0ecution against +. + filed a petition for certiorari with the 7" and the 7" issued a temporar$ restraining
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order ordering respondents to cease and desist from enforcing andMor implementing such writ of e0ecution >until further orders from this "ourt.? Dventuall$ the 7" dismissed the petition. @our da$s thereafter, respondents tried to enforce the writ of e0ecution. Issu : 7hould the 7" cite the respondents for contempt of court! "#: Bes. !he respondents &new that there was an e0isting !R: issued b$ the 7". /hile the petition, in which the !R: was issued, had been dismissed b$ the 7", the fact was that it was not $et final and e0ecutor$ and the !R: had not $et been lifted at the time respondents tried to enforce the lower court6s writ of e0ecution. !he !R: was e0pressl$ made >effective until further orders from this "ourt,? which means that it was not automaticall$ lifted upon the dismissal of the main case. (owever, there is no basis for holding the "ler& of "ourt guilt$ of wrongdoing in certif$ing that , failed to file a record on appeal, since this was a matter of record. SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DE$2T CORP. $. UNION BAN/ 883 7"R5 338 ;2999< Facts& Judge 5 denied the otion for Partial 7ummar$ Judgment with respect to the collection suit filed b$ P. Judge + replaced Judge 5. P, through new counsel, filed an e0Aparte otion to Resolve otion for Partial 7ummar$ Judgment. Judge + granted the motion. P moved for e0ecution of Judge +Hs order which has become final. Judge 5 was reAassigned to the case. (e denied the motion for e0ecution citing as basis his earlier order den$ing motion for summar$ 'udgment. Issu & 1. /hether Judge 5 acted without or in e0cess of 'urisdiction. 2. /hether the case was proper for summar$ 'udgment. ! "#& 1. Bes. 5 trial court cannotNapart from reconsidering its decision, granting new trial or allowing a relief from 'udgmentNreview much less set aside a decision on the merits. 7uch power pertains e0clusivel$ to the appellate courts. Judge +Hs resolution granted all reliefs pra$ed for b$ P in the collection suit. #t disposed of all issues and constitutes a 'udgment on merits. Judge 5Hs order den$ing motion for summar$ 'udgment is an interlocutor$ order that did not finall$ dispose of the case. 5n interlocutor$ order is alwa$s under the control of court and ma$ be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at an$ time before final 'udgment. #t is immaterial that the 'udge who e0ercises such powers is different from the one who issued the rescinded or amended order. Judge + had authorit$ to review prior interlocutor$ orders of the court as he did when, in response to a new motion b$ P, he granted motion for summar$ 'udgment even though previousl$ denied b$ Judge 5. 2. Bes. *nder rule 81 == 1 and 8, a summar$ 'udgment is proper where, upon motion filed after the issues had been 'oined and on the basis of the pleadings and papers filed, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as to an$ material fact e0cept as to amount of damages. 5 genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. /hile the records show that no hearing was conducted b$ 'udge + before he resolved the motion for summar$ 'udgment, in proceedings for summar$ 'udgment, the court is merel$ e0pected to act chiefl$ on the basis of what is in the records of the case. !he hearing contemplated in the rules is not de rigueur as its purpose is merel$ to determine whether the issues are genuine or not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up in the pleadings. EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS REPUBLIC $. TACLOBAN CITY ICE PLANT 21C 7"R5 131 ;1996< Facts& !he P"JJ resolved that !"#P substantiall$ proved ownership of Price ansion. !his resolution was affirmed when the Republic brought the se4uestration case of Price
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ansion before the 7andiganba$an. "onse4uentl$, the 7andiganba$an declared that Price ansion be removed from the list of FillAgotten wealth.F !hereafter however, *+" filed a otion for #ntervention claiming that Price ansion was sold to it b$ !"#P. 7andiganba$an refused to resolve the motion stating that it has alread$ lost 'urisdiction over the case when it declared that Price ansion was not illAgotten wealth. Issu & /hether action b$ 7andiganba$an was proper. ! "#& .o. #t behooved the 7andiganba$an to conduct a hearing to determine the truth of *+"Hs claim. @or whether the Price ansion had been ac4uired b$ the *+" is a 4uestion that was not decided in the 7andiganba$anHs final order declaring it to be not to be se4uestered. !he Rules provide that as to the effect of court 'udgments or final orders in an$ other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, is that deemed to have been ad'udged in a former 'udgment which appears upon its face to have been so ad'udged, or which was actuall$ and necessaril$ included therein or necessar$ thereto. SUPPLEMENTAL0AMENDED PLEADING SUPERCLEAN SER$ICES $. CA 21C 7"R5 261 ;1996< Facts& P won as lowest bidder to provide cleaning services for ,. , refused to enforce the contract between them. P filed for mandamus. (owever, a $ear passed without the petition being resolved such that P, in view of supervening events, sought a change in the relief pra$ed. !hrough a 7upplemental "omplaint, P claimed damages for lost profit. , argued that the action was prohibited as it was tantamount to a change in cause of action which was pre'udicial to ,Hs interests. Issu & /hether 7upplemental "omplaint should be allowed. ! "#& Bes. !he soAcalled 7upplemental "omplaint b$ P should simpl$ be treated as embod$ing amendments to the original complaint or P ma$ be re4uired to file an amended complaint. !he change in the relief sought was necessitated b$ a supervening event which rendered the first relief sought impossible of attainment. !here will be no unfairness or surprise to private respondent, because after all , will have a right to file an amended answer and present evidence in a support thereof. CONSOLIDATION ALLIED BAN/ING CORP. $. CA 219 7"R5 821 ;1996< Facts& P and , are parties to a bac&AtoAbac& loan transaction. P filed a case for collection against , for his failure to compl$ with obligations. (owever, on a separate civil action, , filed a case for accounting against P to determine the amount of his obligation. "ase for accounting was dismissed on the basis of litis pendentia. Issu & /hether dismissal was proper. ! "#& .o. )itis pendentia merel$ re4uires that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action. ,ismissal is allowed if one of the actions would be the better vehicle to ventilate the issues between the parties. #n this case, there are countervailing considerations which ma&e dismissal of ,Hs suit ine4uitable. !he fact that one case was alread$ partl$ tried should not 'ustif$ the refusal of the trial 'udge to consolidate the cases because the evidence alread$ submitted b$ the plaintiffs in the first case could be submitted as part of the evidence in the second case, without further need of reta&ing the testimonies of the witnesses, in view of the fact that both cases involve the same parties, the same sub'ect matter and the same issues. !he rules of consolidation should be liberall$ construed.
1C
MOTION TO DISMISS !A!N $. CA 266 7"R5 182 ;1992< Facts& P sued , for alleged breach of a ,eed of 5ssignment. #n PHs complaint, he alleged that , was a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. 7ervice of summons was made to the ,!#. , moved to dismiss the case claiming that the trial court did not ac4uire 'urisdiction over case since , was not doing business so the service to ,!# was improper. !he trial court deferred resolution of motion to dismiss. Issu & /hether action b$ trial court was proper. ! "#& Bes. Rule 16, =8 authori%es courts to defer the resolution of a motion to dismiss until after the trial if the ground on which the motion is based does not appear to be indubitable. !he records dealt with factual issues which were not clear as to whether some allegations correspond to the proof. !he trial court properl$ deferred resolution of the motion to dismiss and thus avoided prematurel$ deciding a 4uestion which re4uires a factual basis, with the same result if it had denied the motion and conditionall$ assumed 'urisdiction. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL REYES $. CA 6 @eb. 1992 Facts& , was charged for falsification of deeds of sale of 3 parcels of land. , pleaded not guilt$. Prosecution proceeded to present evidence and soon rested its case. Presentation of evidence b$ defense was reAset for 6 times. , was absent for 8 times. ,Hs counsel was absent 1 times. ,ue to these absences, , was deemed to have waived right to present evidence. !rial court found , guilt$. , hired new counsel who filed otion for .ew !rial before the "5. Issu & /hether otion for .ew !rial should prosper.
! "#& Bes. #t was counselHs absences more than ,Hs which appear to be the cause for the defenseHs failure to present its evidence. Oeeping in mind that this case involves personal libert$, the negligence of counsel was certainl$ so gross that it should not be allowed to pre'udice petitionerHs constitutional right to be heard. MODES OF DISCO$ERY DELA TORRE ET AL $. PEPSI 29C 7"R5 868 ;199C< Facts& P, et. al, holders of 839 Pepsi crowns, tried to claim pri%es from , who refused to deliver. !rial court consolidated the C complaints for specific performance and damages. P claimed right to litigate in forma pauperis. /ritten interrogatories were sent to P to determine status as pauper litigants. !rial court suspended proceedings until documents on status of P were completed. P did not serve their answers. !rial court dismissed case for failure to ma&e discover$. "5 affirmed. Issu & /hether dismissal was proper. ! "#& .o. Jenerall$, orders of the court do not affect ongoing process of discover$ between parties, unless the same e0pressl$ so provides. (owever, the interrogatories were on ancillar$ matters, not directl$ related to the main issues in the suit. !he failure to answer b$ P was due to misapprehension of scope of trial courtHs order which suspended proceedings until documents were completed. !he dismissal was a drastic sanction for an e0cusable mista&e.
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FORUM S!OPPING DE DIOS v. CA 19 June 1992 Facts: !he "5 denied a motion for e0tension of time within which to file a petition for certiorari for violation of "ircular .o. 2CA91, because the certification against forum shopping was e0ecuted not b$ the petitioner himself but b$ petitioner6s counsel. Issu : ,oes the re4uirement of "ircular .o. 2CA91 for a certification against forum shopping appl$ to petitioner6s motion for e0tension! "#: .o. *nder this circular, such certification is re4uired in ever$ petition filed with the 7" or the "5. :bviousl$, a motion for e0tension is not the petition spo&en of in this provision. /hile such certification ma$ be attached to a motion for e0tension and, in such a case, ma$ be considered as compliance with the rules even if none is attached to the petition subse4uentl$ filed, the reverse does not follow. E3ECUTI$E SECRETARY $. GORDON 29C 7"R5 286 ;199C< Facts& , was apprehensive of his removal as 7+ 5 "hair due to the change of administration. , filed a petition for prohibition to prevent his ouster, sa$ing that he had a fi0ed term. (is appointment was eventuall$ cancelled b$ the President. #nstead of pressing for his otion for !emporar$ Restraining :rder, he filed a .otice of /ithdrawal of Petition. , then filed a case in R!" :longapo. P filed a case for forum shopping and contempt against , based on Rule 2 = 1 of the Rules. !he 7" granted the .otice of /ithdrawal without pre'udice to the contempt petition. Issu & /hether P was guilt$ of forum shopping. ! "#& .o. @orum shopping consists filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, simultaneousl$ or successivel$, to obtain a favorable 'udgment. #n this case, no adverse decision was rendered against , b$ the 7" for which he thought proper to institute second action at the R!". !his is a situation where the part$ reali%es his mista&e because the court in which he brought his case had no 'urisdiction. (owever, , should have at least apologi%ed to the 7" and e0plained the need to reAfile without awaiting the resolution on their .otice of /ithdrawal of Petition. +ut, the purpose of citing one in contempt is preservative more than punitive, so the 7" overloo&ed the lapse. MELO $. CA 81C 7"R5 93 ;1999< Facts& , mortgaged a parcel of land to P to secure a loan. ,ue to failure of , to pa$, the mortgage was e0traA'udiciall$ foreclosed and P was the highest bidder. P filed a Petition for D0AParte #ssuance of a /rit of Possession. 5s counterApetition, , filed a complaint for in'unction against P. P moved to dismiss ,Hs action based on forum shopping and failure of private respondent to attach a certification of nonAforum shopping to the complaint. , amended complaint b$ including the certification. Issu s& 1. /hether ,Hs action was tantamount to forum shopping. 2. /hether there was substantial compliance with the rule re4uiring submission of certification of nonAforum shopping together with initiator$ pleadings.
! "#& 1. .o. !he petition for D0AParte #ssuance of a /rit of Possession that P filed involved a different cause of action from the complaint for in'unction filed b$ ,. P sought possession of the sub'ect propert$, whereas , sought to en'oin them from consolidating title over the same. PHs action is founded on 5ct .o. 8181, 7ec. 2, which gives the purchaser at a public auction the right to have possession of the propert$ sold to him
29
during the redemption period even if eventuall$ the$ do not succeed in consolidating their title to it. ,Hs action is based on R5 882, 7ec. 2C, which gives a mortgagor the right to redeem the propert$ sold at foreclosure sale within one $ear thereof. , can oppose PHs action to obtain possession of the propert$ while tr$ing to prevent them from consolidating title in a separate case. !he decision in one is not conclusive of the other. 2. .o. !he re4uirement to file a certificate of nonAforum shopping is mandator$. @ailure to compl$ with this re4uirement cannot be e0cused b$ the fact that P is not guilt$ of forum shopping. :therwise, we would have an absurd situation where the parties themselves would be the 'udge of whether their actions constitute a violation of the rule. "ompliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the avoidance of forum shopping itself. .or can subse4uent compliance with the re4uirement e0cuse a part$Hs failure to compl$ in the first instance. *nless condoned b$ the "ourt due to compelling reasons, nonAcompliance is ine0cusable. !hus, there is a difference in the treatmentNin terms of imposable sanctionsNbetween failure to compl$ with the certification re4uirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. !he former is merel$ a cause for the dismissal, without pre'udice, of the complaint or initiator$ pleading, while the latter is a ground for summar$ dismissal thereof and constitutes direct contempt. APPEALS IDANG v. CA 13 Jul. 1993 Facts& #n an action for recover$ of possession of land, the R!" rendered a 'udgment in favor of P. :n review, however, the "5 reversed the decision. P did not appeal but instead, brought an e'ectment case against R. Issu : /as filing an e'ectment case against R the proper remed$! "#: .o. !he validit$ of the "5 decision cannot be collaterall$ attac&ed. P should have appealed from that decision but he did not. .either did he bring an action for the annulment of the 'udgment against him. COCO%C!EMICAL v. CA 19 .ov. 1996 Facts: P filed a complaint against ,. !he case was dismissed. P6s counsel filed a notice of appeal which stated that it was being filed on behalf of /. @or this reason, as / was not a part$ to the case, , moved to dismiss the appeal. P6s counsel opposed the dismissal of the appeal and e0plained that the error was due to inadvertence. !he R!" dismissed the appeal. Issu : /as the dismissal proper! "#: .o. #t is obvious that the error was due to inadvertence on the part of P6s counsel. 5lthough counsel was negligent in failing to discover the errors before signing the notice, his negligence should be considered e0cusable considering that the title of the case and its number as well as the name of the court were correctl$ stated in the caption of the notice of appeal and no pre'udice would be caused b$ the allowance of the appeal, while real pre'udice would be caused to P b$ its disallowance. DE DIOS v. CA 19 Jun. 1992 Facts: P6s motion for reconsideration of a decision of the ,epartment of 5grarian Reform 5d'udication +oard ;,5R5+< was denied in a resolution received b$ P on Jul$ 81. :n 5ugust 9. P moved for an e0tension of 11 da$s, until 5ugust 23, within which >to file a petition for certiorari in the "5. :n 5ugust 28, P filed his petition, denominated as >one for review b$ wa$ of appeal b$ certiorari.? #n a resolution, however, the "5 denied
21
the motion for e0tension on the ground that the >petition for certiorari? which P intended to file was not the proper remed$. Issu : /as the "5 correct in den$ing the motion for e0tension on this ground! "#: .o. !he "5 was rather hast$ in concluding that P was going to file a petition for certiorari solel$ on the basis of P6s allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. #t should have reserved 'udgment on the matter until it had actuall$ received the petition especiall$ considering that P6s motion for e0tension was filed well within the reglementar$ period for filing a petition for review. 5s it turned out, what P actuall$ filed was a petition for review which complies with all the re4uirements for such petition. $ILLAREAL v. CA 12 7ept. 199C Facts: :n 5pril 29, , filed a otion for Reconsideration of a decision. :n 5ugust 19, the R!" issued an order den$ing said otion. :n 5ugust 16, a photocop$ of the said order was served. :n 5ugust 21, , received the duplicate original cop$ of the order. :n the same day, , filed a notice of appeal. !he R!" denied due course to ,6s appeal, holding that it was filed out of time. Issu : @rom which date should the period for filing an appeal be counted: from 5ugust 16, or from 5ugust 21! "#: 5ugust 21. #t cannot be from 5ugust 16, when , was given a mere photocop$ of the court6s order. 7uch cop$ lac&s assurance of its genuineness, considering that photocopies can easil$ be tampered with, for the purpose of enabling , to determine whether or not to appeal and, if the$ do so, what issues to raise on appeal. !he R!", therefore, should have given due course to ,6s appeal. PACIFIC v. CONCORDIA 29 .ov. 199C Facts: 5 'udgment was rendered b$ the R!" ordering , to pa$ damages to P. , filed a notice of appeal. 7ubse4uentl$, however, the decision was modified b$ the R!" with respect to the award of damages and the amounts thereof. , did not appeal the modified decision. Issu : 7hould , have filed another notice of appeal when the original decision, from which it had appealed, was modified! "#: .o. , did not have to file another notice of appeal, having given notice of its intention to appeal the original decision. !o be sure, the modified decision substantiall$ amended the original decision. +ut ,6s failure to appeal from the modified decision did not render its prior appeal from the original decision ineffective. +oth decisions ordered , to pa$ damages to P although in different amounts. #t is also undisputed that , seasonabl$ appealed from the original 'udgment. ABELLERA $. CA 826 7"R5 3C1 ;2999< Facts& P won an unlawful detainer case against ,. :n appeal, the R!" held 2 >clarificator$? hearings wherein the parties presented additional evidence. !he R!" reversed the !" ruling. P argued that the R!" committed an error when it conducted a trial de novo, which should not have been done. Issu & /hether the R!"6s decision should be set aside because it conducted a trial de novo. ! "#& .o. #ndeed, although the R!" should decide cases on appeal on the basis solel$ of the record of the proceedings in the !" and other courts of e4ual ran&, nonetheless,
22
the principle of estoppel ma$ bar a part$ from 4uestioning the reception of additional evidence. P is estopped from claiming that the R!" acted in e0cess of 'urisdiction as she herself participated in the trial de novo and she 4uestioned the court6s authorit$ onl$ after the R!" ruled against her. APPEAL4PAYMENT OF DOC/ET FEE AYALA LAND( INC. $. CARPO 831 7"R5 129 ;2999< Facts& P brought action to 4uiet title against ,. P won. , appealed. "5 dismissed the appeal since, as per computation, , was P1.99 short of the correct amount of the re4uired doc&et fee. Issu & /hether the "5 erred. ! "#& Bes. Rule 31 = 3 must be read in relation to Rule 19 = 1;c< such that despite the 'urisdictional nature of the rule on pa$ment of doc&et fee, the appellate court still has discretion to rela0 the rule in meritorious cases. /ith the e0ception of = 1;b< which refers to failure to file notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed b$ the Rules, the grounds enumerated in Rule 19 = 1 are merel$ director$ ;Fma$F<. @ailure to pa$ the re4uired doc&et fees ma$ be e0cused where appellant was read$ and willing to pa$ the correct amount from the start, but was unable to do so due to the error of an officer of the court, i.e., the cler& of court, in computing the correct amount. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MERALCO $. CA 221 7"R5 312 ;1992< Facts& P did not assign the trial court order dismissing its complaint which had become final and e0ecutor$ as error in its brief before the "5. , thus argues that that in itself became final. , also argues that the order became final because the motion see&ing reconsideration was filed the da$ after the e0piration of the e0tension was granted. Issu & /hether the order of the trial court became final and e0ecutor$. ! "#& .o. !he 5pril 89 order did not become final because, although the motion see&ing its reconsideration was filed a da$ after the e0piration of the e0tension, the last da$, June 28, fell on a 7unda$. 5ccordingl$, the motion for reconsideration could be filed the ne0t da$. 5 'udgment becomes final and e0ecutor$ b$ operation of law, not b$ 'udicial declaration. !he 7eptember 12 order of the trial court, declaring its 5pril 89 decision final and e0ecutor$, has no effect because in fact P filed a timel$ motion for reconsideration. !he timel$ filing of the motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of the trial court from attaining finalit$. REPUBLIC v. CA 9 Jul. 199C Facts: J ;for Jovernment< filed a motion see&ing reconsideration of the decision of the R!". !he motion did not have attached to it proof that a cop$ thereof had been served on the adverse part$, ,. (owever, a cop$ of the motion was sent to ,6s counsel the da$ after the motion had been filed. !he R!" denied the motion for giving been filed without proof that a cop$ thereof had been served on the adverse part$. !he "5 upheld the R!" decision. Issu : 7hould the motion for reconsideration be allowed! "#: Bes. "onsidering the 4uestion raised in the appeal of J and the amount involved in this case, the "5 should have considered the subse4uent service of the motion for
28
reconsideration to be a substantial compliance with the re4uirement in Rule 11, =6. !he demands of substantial 'ustice were satisfied b$ the actual receipt of said motion. #ndeed, as much as possible, cases should be determined on the merits, rather than on technicalit$ or some procedural imperfections. L,t,s P )# )t,a CO/ALIONG S!IPPING LINES( INC $. AMIN 269 7"R5 122 ;1996< Facts& P filed a complaint for damages with pra$er for writ of preliminar$ attachment against 5 and +. !he case was filed in "ebu. R, as insurer of 5, filed a case against P before the R!" of a&ati. P filed a motion to dismiss the a&ati case due to pendenc$ of the "ebu case. Issu & /hether or not there is litis pendentia. ! "#& Bes. 5ll the re4uisites for litis pendentia are present. @or litis pendentia to be a ground for dismissal of an action, the following re4uisites must be present: 1. identit$ of parties 2. identit$ of rights asserted and identit$ of relief pra$ed for 8. the 'udgment that ma$ be rendered in the pending case would later on amount to res 'udicata. !he fact that the position of the parties was reversed does not negate the identit$ of the parties for the purpose of litis pendentia. CERTIORARI REPUBLIC $. CA 5 TRADERS ROYAL BAN/ 822 7"R5 C1 ;2999< Facts& !he trial court dismissed the Republic6s complaint for collection of sum of mone$. Republic filed its notice of appeal 12 da$s be$ond the 11Ada$ reglementar$ period. !he appeal was dismissed and Republic6s motion for reconsideration was denied. #nstead of appealing under Rule 31, Republic filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 61, 69 da$s after receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Issu & /hether the petition should be allowed to prosper. ! "#& .o. !he proper remed$ was to appeal b$ filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 31. 5pparentl$, the Republic resorted to special civil action for certiorari because it had failed to ta&e an appeal on time. +ut this special civil action cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal that has been lost. !here is no showing in this case of an$ e0traordinar$ circumstance that ma$ 'ustif$ a deviation from the rule on timel$ filing of appeals. 5n$one see&ing e0emption from this rule has the burden of proving that e0ceptionall$ meritorious instances e0ist. !he doctrine that rules of technicalit$ must $ield to the broader interest of substantial 'ustice cannot be invo&ed here. !he failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementar$ period is not a mere technicalit$. #t raises a 'urisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of 'urisdiction over the appeal. CERTIORARI TREATED AS PETITION FOR RE$IEW DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES INC. $. CA 26C 7"R5 192 ;1992< Facts& P filed an action for sum of mone$ against , in R!" Pasig. R!" rendered a decision ordering , to pa$. , filed a notice of appeal. )ater on however , moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the 'udgment was alread$ satisfied. P however filed with the R!" a motion for the e0ecution of 'udgment. #t alleged that no mone$ had actuall$ been remitted to it. , filed a motion for certiorari with the "5 which
23
was dismissed. Petition for certiorari with the 7" was filed. P urges that petition for certiorari be dismissed outright because what P should have done is a petition for review under Rule 31 and that certiorari should not lie because there was no grave abuse of discretion. Issu & /hether or not the petition should be dismissed. ! "#& !he 7", in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of "ourt and in the interest of 'ustice, ma$ decide to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 31, especiall$ if it has been filed within the reglementar$ period for the same. TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER ALJEM6S CORPORATION $. CA arch 2C, 2991 Facts& P sued , for the pa$ment of his share in their 'oint venture. !he case was referred to a commissioner. P complained that the commissioner did not observe the mandator$ re4uirements of the Rules. P contended that instead of merel$ interviewing the parties, the commissioner should have subpoenaed witnesses who could enlighten her under oath and she should have conducted a hearing. Issu & /hether the commissioner committed an error b$ merel$ basing her report on her interview of the parties. ! "#& Bes. Rule 82 == 8 and 1 of the Rules clearl$ indicate the necessit$ for a formal hearing and the swearing of witnessesK otherwise, the commissioner cannot determine factual 4uestions that arise in the course of the e0amination of the accounts. @or this purpose, the witnesses must necessaril$ be sworn in and offered for crossAe0amination. !his would not be possible if the commissioner merel$ interviews the parties. /hat = 8 authori%es to be limited is the scope of the proceedings before the commissioner, but not the modalit$ thereof. !he re4uirement for the commissioner to hold a hearing is clear, for this is the essence of due process.
E$IDENCE
RIG!T TO PRESENT E$IDENCE TENEBRO v. CA 2 Jul. 1992 Facts: ,uring trial, , and his counsel were alwa$s absent. !he R!" allowed P to present its evidence e0 parte. !he R!" rendered a decision in favor of P which later became final and e0ecutor$. , filed a petition for relief from 'udgment. , contends that his failure to appear at the hearing of the case was a ground for considering him to have waived the right to crossAe0amine P6s witnesses, but not his right to present evidence. Issu : #s ,6s contention meritorious! "#: .o. , waived not onl$ the right to crossAe0amine P6s witnesses but also his right to present evidence as a necessar$ conse4uence of his repeated failure to appear at the hearings of his case. , could not be found at his given address and utterl$ neglected to let the court and his counsel &now of his whereabouts. ADMISSION OF GENUINENESS ENGR. MERCADO v. CA 12 Jul. 1993
21
Facts: 5, charged with estafa, did not 4uestion the genuineness of his signature on the receipt given to the witness. (e did not den$ the claim of witnesses, made in his presence, that he signed the receipt himself. Issu & #s 5 deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the signature! "#: Bes. !he 7" upheld the R!"6s finding that 5 did not 4uestion the genuineness of the signature on the receipt. /hat 5 was 4uestioning was not the signature itself but a mar&ing that appeared on top of the signature, which he alleged was onl$ superimposed on the receipt. BEST E$IDENCE RULE DE GUZMAN v. CA 2 5ug. 1996 Facts: !he R!" admitted D0hibit " in evidence although it is a mere photocop$ of the letter sent b$ P to R. (owever, the cause of the unavailabilit$ of the original letter was without bad faith on R6s part and the due e0ecution of the same was proven during trial. Issu : "ould D0hibit " be admitted in evidence! "#: Bes. #t appearing that the e0ecution and the loss of the original document have been dul$ proven, the introduction in evidence of a photocop$ thereof was proper. #t is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destro$ed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its e0ecution and loss or destruction, or unavailabilit$, its contents ma$ be proved b$ a cop$ or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or b$ recollection of witness. WITNESSES0E3PERT WITNESS PEOPLE $. BAID 886 7"R5 616 ;2999< Facts& 5 was found guilt$ of the crime of rape against I, a mental patient diagnosed as having schi%ophrenia. !he prosecution presented I as a witness. 5 argued that I6s testimon$ should not have been given credence since I is a schi%ophrenic. 5 also 4uestioned on appeal the 4ualifications I6s attending ps$chiatrist who was presented b$ the prosecution as an e0pert witness. Issu s& ;1< /hether I should be dis4ualified as a witness. ;2< /hether 5 could 4uestion the 4ualifications of an e0pert witness on appeal. ! "#& ;1< .o. .otwithstanding her mental illness, I showed that she was 4ualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of ma&ing &nown her perception to others. !hought she ma$ have e0hibited emotions inconsistent with that of a rape victim during her testimon$, her behavior was such as could be e0pected from a person suffering from schi%ophrenia. :therwise, she was candid, straightforward, and coherent, and it has been settled that a person should not be dis4ualified on the basis of mental handicap alone. ;2< .o. 5 did not raise an$ ob'ections to the e0pert witness6 4ualifications in the trial court and he even crossAe0amined her. :b'ections not timel$ raised are deemed waived ;Rule 182 = 86<. !he fact that the ps$chiatrist was hired b$ I6s famil$ to give e0pert testimon$ did not b$ that fact alone ma&e her a biased witness. !he problem of credibilit$ of the e0pert witness and the evaluation of his testimon$ is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of discretion. PEOPLE $. GONZALES 882 7"R5 199 ;2999<
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Facts& 5 was convicted of &idnapping with attempted rape. !he prosecution presented complainant I as a witness. 5 argued that I6s testimon$ should not have been given credence. Issu & /hether I6s testimon$ was worth$ of credence. ! "#& .o. 5ccording to I, several persons saw her after escaping from 5 but none of these people was ever presented to testif$ and corroborate I6s testimon$. /hile the testimon$ of 1 witness ma$ be sufficient to support a finding of guilt, this onl$ applies if said testimon$ is credible. #n this case, the 7" did not find I6s testimon$ concerning her detention sufficientl$ credible ;she did not run when 5 was opening the door of his house, she did not shout for help when her house was 'ust ne0t door, she did not go home but instead went to school to attend classes after allegedl$ escaping from 5, etc.< FORMAL OFFER OF E$IDENCE ONG C!IA $. REPUBLIC 82C 7"R5 239 ;2999< Facts& R!" admitted P to Philippine citi%enship. "5 reversed and denied P6s application for naturali%ation, ta&ing into account the 7olicitor Jeneral6s contentions. P argued that the "5 erred in considering documents that had merel$ been anne0ed b$ the 7tate in its appellant6s brief. P contended that since the 7tate failed to present and formall$ offer these documents as evidence, the$ should not have been considered b$ the court. Issu & /hether the rule on formal offer of evidence should be followed. ! "#& .o. Rule 182 = 83 states that the rule shall not appl$ to naturali%ation proceedings. !he rule on formal offer of evidence is clearl$ not applicable in this case involving a petition for naturali%ation. #t was also not practicable and convenient to appl$ the Rules of "ourt b$ analog$ in this case. P cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to ob'ect to the documents6 authenticit$. (e could have included his ob'ections, as he in fact did, in the brief he filed with the "5. OBJECTIONS TO E$IDENCE MACASIRAY $ PEOPLE 291 7"R5 113 ;199C< Facts& !he prosecution, in the course of the trial, introduced in evidence an e0tra'udicial confession e0ecuted b$ 5 in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated + and ". 5lso presented in evidence was the transcript of stenographic notes ta&en during the preliminar$ investigation of the case. !he defense ob'ected to its admissibilit$ on the ground that the$ were given without the assistance of counsel. :n appeal, the "5 ruled on the admissibilit$ of the evidence presented as there was a waiver made in the ob'ection to the admissibilit$ of the documents. Issu & /hether there was a waiver in the ob'ection to the admissibilit$ of the documents, either b$ failing to ob'ect to their introduction during trial or b$ using them in evidence. ! "#& .o. :b'ection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formall$ offered. 5lso, a part$ is not deemed to have waived ob'ection to admissibilit$ of documents b$ his failure to ob'ect to the same when the$ were mar&ed, identified, and then introduced during the trial G ob'ection to documentar$ evidence must be made at the time it is formall$ offered, not earlier. :b'ections to admissibilit$ of documents ma$ be raised during trial and the court ma$ rule on them then, but, if this is not done, the part$ should ma&e the ob'ections when the documentar$ evidence is formall$ offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other part$.
22
CREDIBILITY PEOPLE $. REYES 232 7"R5 263 ;1991< Facts& 5 and + are husband and wife who are accused of illegal recruitment. + was convicted although 5 remains at large. E testified that he and five others went to 5 and +6s house to see& emplo$ment abroad and paid certain sums therefore. + now contends that she has nothing to do with her husband6s activities. Issu & /hether or not the testimonies should be given credence. ! "#& 5n accused can be convicted on the strength of the testimon$ of a single witness, if such testimon$ is credible and positive and produces a conviction be$ond reasonable doubt. /hen the issue is the credibilit$ of witnesses, appellate courts will generall$ not disturb the findings of the trial court unless certain facts and circumstances might have been overloo&ed, misunderstood or misapplied. !his is because the trial court heard the testimon$ itself.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
!ABEAS CORPUS DA$ID v. CA 16 .ov. 1991 Facts: " was born out of an adulterous relationship between P and R. :ne da$, R too& " and refused to give bac& the child to P. P filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of ". Issu : "an the 4uestion of custod$ of a minor child born out of an illegitimate relationship be decided in a habeas corpus case! "#: Bes. Rule 192, =1 of the Rules of "ourt provides that >the writ of habeas corpus shall e0tend to all cases of illegal confinement of his libert$, or b$ which the rightful custod$ of an$ person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.? #t is indeed true that the determination of the right to the custod$ of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. #t does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in an$ other situation. CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN T!E CI$IL REGISTRY REPUBLIC v. CA 11 ar. 1996 Facts: P filed a petition for the adoption of . . with pra$er for the correction of the minor6s first name > idael? to > ichael?. !he 7olicitor Jeneral opposed the petition, arguing that the correction could not be granted because the petition was basicall$ for adoption, not the correction of an entr$ in the civil registr$ under Rule 19C of the Rules of "ourt. 7ignificantl$, the notice and publication re4uirements of Rule 19C were not complied with. !he R!" dismissed the opposition of the 7olicitor Jeneral on the ground that Rule 19C does not appl$ in this case. Issu : ,oes Rule 19C appl$ in this case! "#: Bes. !his case falls under letter >;o<? in Rule 19C, =2, referring to >changes of name.? #ndeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this court that Rule 19C, implementing 5rt. 312 of the "ivil "ode, covers >those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearl$ misspelled. *nder Rule 19C, the local civil registrar
2C
must be impleaded in the case and a notice of the petition for correction of entr$ must be published. 7ince these re4uirements were not complied with, the R!" had, so far as the correction of entr$ was concerned, no 'urisdiction. $ENUE OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE MALOLES III $. P!ILLIPS 823 7"R5 122 ;2999< Facts& ,e 7antos filed a petition for probate of his will ;anteAmortem probate< before the R!" of a&ati +ranch 61. (is will was allowed. ,e 7antos died subse4uentl$. ,, the designated e0ecutri0 of the will, filed a petition for issuance of letters testamentar$ with +ranch 61, a&ati R!". P, the testator6s nephew, contended that +ranch 61 could not lawfull$ act upon the petition for letters testamentar$ since the probate proceedings in +ranch 61 did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will. Issu & /hether R!" a&ati +ranch 61 could grant the petition for letters testamentar$.
! "#& Bes. #n cases for probate of wills, the authorit$ of the court is limited to ascertaining the e0trinsic validit$ of the will. 5fter the allowance of ,e 7antos6 will, there was nothing else for +ranch 61 to do e0cept to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 28 = 12. #t was error for the 'udge to sa$ that +ranch 61 of R!" a&ati, having begun the probate proceedings, it continues and shall continue to e0ercise said 'urisdiction to the e0clusion of all others. 5lthough Rule 28 = 1 applies in so far as the venue of the petition for probate of the will, it does not bar other branches of the same court from ta&ing cogni%ance of the settlement of estate of the testator after his death.
29

Remedial Law) Case Survey of Justice Mendoza Ponentes) Made 2002) by Ateneo) 29 Pages

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REMEDIAL LAW JUSTICE MENDOZA CASE DIGESTS ATENEO CENTRAL BAR OPER AT ION S 2002

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