Tail Strike Avoidance

Tail strike, which occurs when an airplane tail contacts the runway during takeoff or landing, is an event that can be encountered by virtually all transport airplane designs. Some models in the Boeing commercial airplane fleet experience tail strike more often than others and, almost without exception, the cause is elusive to the flight crew. In order to better understand this occurrence, Douglas roducts Division examined a number of recent tail strike events.
n an effort to help operators avoid tail strike and the resulting damage, Douglas roducts Division !D D" conducted an evaluation of the circumstances surrounding this event, including weather, wind, weight, speed, and control input. D D also conducted flight crew interviews and reviewed flight recorder data during its examination of recent tail strike events. The results provided the following two conclusions#

The fre$uency of tail strike is higher for some models on takeoff, and for other models on landing. The overall incident rate varies from one model to another as well as over time. %or example, one model experienced a high incident rate upon entry into service, followed by a reduced rate and then an increased rate about six years after initial entry into service. &ver the years, Boeing has taken a number of actions to reduce the rate of tail strike, including training, information, and system changes. Specific activities have included a tail strike avoidance video, a %light &perations 'eview article, operations manual and technical bulletins, and airline presentations by Boeing instructor pilots. System changes included installation of tail skids on stretched models, revisions of automatic speed brake deployment logic to reduce pitchup on landing, and installation of a trailing edge flap seal to reduce airplane noseup attitude on approach and landing. Though tail strike occurs in both daylight and darkness, and in both good and bad weather, the amount of flight crew experience with the model of airplane flown is a more significant factor. (hile tail strike may occur to

pilots with abundant flight time in a model, most occur to pilots who are transitioning from one airplane model to another and have fewer than )** hours of flight time in the new model. Incidents are greatest among pilots during their first heavy+weight operations in the new model, especially when the weather is marginal. The D D examination revealed eight risk factors, one or more of which precede a tail strike# mistrimmed stabili,er- rotation at improper speed- excessive rotation rate- improper use of the flight director- unstabili,ed approach- holding off in the flare- mishandling of crosswinds- and over+rotation during go+around. .dditional factors may exist that were not revealed by the D D examination, but each of the eight wasshown to play a significant role in tail strike. /ost importantly, the examination showed that each is under the direct control of the flight crew, and therefore can be avoided with proper understanding and training. The risk factors were found to occur in two categories# ). Takeoff risk factors. 0. 1anding risk factors. Takeoff Risk Factors .ny one of these four takeoff risk factors may precede a tail strike#

/istrimmed stabili,er. 'otation at improper speed. 2xcessive rotation rate. Improper use of the flight director.

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. mistrimmed stabili,er occurring during takeoff is not common but is an experience shared at least once by almost every flight crew. It usually results from using erroneous data, the wrong weights, or an incorrect center of gravity !45". Sometimes the information presented to the flight crew is accurate, but it is entered incorrectly either to the flight management system !%/S" or to the stabili,er itself. In any case, the stabili,er is set in the wrong position. The flight crew can become aware of the error and correct the condition by challenging the reasonableness of the load sheet numbers. . flight crew that has made a few takeoffs in a given weight range knows roughly where the 45 usually resides and approximately where the trim should be set. Boeing suggests testing the load sheet numbers against past experience to be sure that the numbers are reasonable. . stabili,er mistrimmed nosedown can present several problems, but tail strike usually is not one of them. 6owever, a stabili,er mistrimmed noseup can place the tail at risk. This is because the yoke re$uires less pull force to initiate airplane rotation during takeoff, and the pilot flying ! %" may be surprised at how rapidly the nose comes up. (ith the Boeing+recommended rotation rate between 0.*

and 7.* degrees per second !dps", depending on the model, and a normal liftoff attitude, liftoff usually occurs about four seconds after the nose starts to rise. !These figures are fairly standard for all commercial airplanes- exact values are contained in the operations and8or flight+crew training manuals for each model." 6owever, with the stabili,er mistrimmed noseup, the airplane can rotate 9 dps or more. (ith the nose rising very rapidly, the airplane does not have enough time to change its flight path before exceeding the critical attitude. Tail strike can then occur within two or three seconds of the time rotation is initiated. If the stabili,er is substantially mistrimmed noseup, the airplane may even try to fly from the runway without control input from the %. Before reaching : r, and possibly as early as approaching :), the nose begins to ride light on the runway. Two or three light bounces may occur before the nose suddenly goes into the air. . faster+than+normal rotation usually follows and, when the airplane passes through the normal liftoff attitude, it lacks sufficient speed to fly and so stays on the runway. ;nless the % actively intercedes, the nose keeps coming up until the tail strike occurs, either immediately before or after liftoff.
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This situation can result in a tail strike and is usually caused by one of two reasons# rotation is begun early because of some unusual situation, or the airplane is rotated at a :r that has been computed incorrectly and is too low for the weight and flap setting. .n example of an unusual situation discovered during the D D examination was a twin=et going out at close to the maximum allowable weight. In order to make second segment climb, the crew had selected a lower+than+usual flap setting. The lower flap setting generates : speeds somewhat higher than normal and reduces tail clearance during rotation. In addition, the example situation was a runway length+limited takeoff. The % began to lighten the nose as the airplane approached :), which is an understandable impulse when ground speed is high and the end of the runway is near. The nose came off the runway at : ) and, with a rather aggressive rotation, the tail brushed the runway =ust after the airplane became airborne. .n error in :r speed recently resulted in a tri=et tail strike. The load sheet numbers were accurate, but somehow the takeoff weight was entered into the %/S )**,*** lb lower than it should have been. The resulting : r was )0 knots indicated air speed !kias" slow. (hen the airplane passed through a nominal >+ deg liftoff attitude, a lack of sufficient speed prevented takeoff. 'otation was allowed to continue, with takeoff and tail strike occurring at about )) deg. :erification that the load sheet numbers were correctly entered may have prevented this incident.
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%light crews operating an airplane model that is new to them, especially when transitioning from unpowered flight controls to ones with hydraulic assistance, are

most vulnerable to using excessive rotation rate. The amount of control input re$uired to achieve the proper rotation rate varies from one model to another. (hen transitioning to a new model, flight crews may not consciously reali,e that it will not respond to pitch input in exactly the same way. .s simulators reproduce airplane responses with remarkable fidelity, simulator training can help flight crews learn the appropriate response. . concentrated period of takeoff practice allows students to develop a sure sense of how the new airplane feels and responds to pitch inputs. &n some models, this is particularly important when the 45 is loaded toward its aft limits, because an airplane in this condition is more sensitive in pitch, especially during takeoff. . normal amount of noseup elevator in an aft 45 condition is likely to cause the nose to lift off the runway more rapidly and put the tail at risk.
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.s shown in figure ), the flight director !%D" is designed to provide accurate pitch guidance only after the airplane is airborne, nominally passing through 79 ft !)*.@ m". (ith the proper rotation rate, the airplane reaches 79 ft with the desired pitch attitude of about )9 deg and a speed of : 0 A )* !:0 A )9 on some models". 6owever, an aggressive rotation into the pitch bar at takeoff is not appropriate and may rotate the tail onto the ground. Landing Risk Factors .ny one of these four landing risk factors may precede a tail strike#

;nstabili,ed approach. 6olding off in the flare. /ishandling of crosswinds. &ver+rotation during go+around.

. tail strike on landing tends to cause more serious damage than the same event during takeoff and is more expensive and time consuming to repair. In the worst case, the tail can strike the runway before the landing gear touches down, thus absorbing large amounts of energy for which it is not designed. The aft pressure bulkhead is often damaged as a result.
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.n unstabili,ed approach !figure 0" appears in one form or another in virtually every landing tail strike event. (hen an airplane turns on to final approach with excessive airspeed, excessive altitude, or both, the situation may not be under the control of the flight crew. The most common cause of this scenario is the se$uencing of traffic in the terminal area as determined by air traffic control. Digital flight recorder data show that flight crews who continue through an unstabili,ed condition below 9** ft will likely never get the approach stabili,ed. (hen the airplane arrives in the flare, it invariably has either excessive or insufficient airspeed, and $uite often is also long on the runway. The result is a

tendency toward large power and pitch corrections in the flare, often culminating in a vigorous noseup pull at touchdown and tail strike shortly thereafter. If the nose is coming up rapidly when touchdown occurs and the ground spoilers deploy, the spoilers themselves add an additional noseup pitching force. .lso, if the airplane is slow, pulling up the nose in the flare does not materially reduce the sink rate and in fact may increase it. . firm touchdown on the main gear is often preferable to a soft touchdown with the nose rising rapidly.
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The second most common cause of a landing tail strike is a long flare to a drop+in touchdown, a condition often precipitated by a desire to achieve an extremely smooth landing. . very soft touchdown is not essential, nor even desired, particularly if the runway is wet. Trimming the stabili,er in the flare may contribute to a tail strike. The % may easily lose the feel of the elevator while the trim is running- too much trim can raise the nose, even when this reaction is not desired. The pitchup can cause a balloon, followed either by dropping in or pitching over and landing flat. %light crews should trim the airplane in the approach, but not in the flare itself, and avoid Bs$ueakers,B as they waste runway and may predispose the airplane to a tail strike.
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. crosswind approach and landing contains many elements that may increase the risk of tail strike, particularly in the presence of gusty conditions !figure 7". (ind directions near C* deg to the runway heading are often strong at pattern altitude, and with little headwind component, the airplane flies the final approach with a rapid rate of closure on the runway. To stay on the glidepath at that high groundspeed !figure D", descent rates of @** to C** ft !0)D to 0@D m" per minute may be re$uired. 2ngine power is likely to be well back, approaching idle in some cases, to avoid accelerating the airplane. If the airplane is placed in a forward slip attitude to compensate for the wind effects, this cross+control maneuver reduces lift, increases drag, and may increase the rate of descent. If the airplane then descends into a turbulent surface layer, particularly if the wind is shifting toward the tail, the stage is set for tail strike. The combined effects of high closure rate, shifting winds with the potential for a $uartering tail wind, the sudden drop in wind velocity commonly found below )** ft !7) m", and turbulence can make the timing of the flare very difficult. The % can best handle the situation by exercising active control of the sink rate and making sure that additional thrust is available if needed. %light crews should clearly understand the criteria for initiating a go+around and plan to use this time+ honored avoidance maneuver when needed.
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5o+arounds initiated very late in the approach, such as during flare or after a bounce, are a common cause of tail strike. (hen the go+around mode is initiated,

the %D immediately commands a go+around pitch attitude. If the % abruptly rotates into the command bars, tail strike can occur before a change to the flight path is possible. Both pitch attitude and thrust are re$uired for go+around, so if the engines are =ust spooling up when the % vigorously pulls the nose up, the thrust may not yet be ade$uate to support the effort. The nose comes up, and the tail goes down. . contributing factor may be a strong desire of the flight crew to avoid wheel contact after initiating a late go+around, when the airplane is still over the runway. In general, the concern is not warranted because a brief contact with the tires during a late go+around does not produce adverse conse$uences. .irframe manufacturers have executed literally hundreds of late go+arounds during autoland certification programs with do,ens of runway contacts, and no problem has ever resulted. The airplane simply flies away from the touchdown. Summary .n examination of recent tail strike events, which included consideration of weather conditions, flight recorder information, and interviews with flight crews, showed that eight factors contribute to tail strike. . significant factor that appears to be common is the lack of flight crew experience with the model being flown. The examination concluded that flight crews can take a variety of steps to prevent tail strike, including challenging the reasonableness and accuracy of takeoff numbers, being very aware of pitch attitude when flying on or =ust above the runway, and obtaining flight simulator training to become more familiar with how various airplane models respond to pitch inputs. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Pitch attitude versus bank angle 'unway contact by the tail or wing is a function of pitch attitude and bank angle. Strut compression occurs during a hard landing or during a vigorous takeoff rotation, increasing the possibility of contact with the runway. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Unstabilized Approach .n unstabili,ed approach is the biggest single cause of tail strike. %light crews try to set all the approach variables++on centerline, on approach path, on speed, and in the final landing configuration++by the time the airplane descends through ),*** ft !7*9 m" above ground level !.51". This is not always possible. If by the time the airplane descends through 9** ft !)90 m" .51 with these approach variables not stabili,ed, a go+around should be considered. %or more information concerning go+arounds, see .pproach and 1anding .ccidents, a report issued by the .pproach and 1anding .ccident 'eduction Task %orce of the %light Safety %oundation. It is available by calling the Eerry 1ederer .viation Safety 1ibrary at !@*7" @7C+F@**, ext. )*7. ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Approach and Landing .n inability to remain on the glide slope is a cause of tail strike.

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lide slope indicator During takeoff, the %D pitch bar is rotated well above the hori,on !roughly A)9 deg" to provide the flight crew with a clear view of the attitude instrument. If the % maintains the nominal rotation rate, then all the numbers come together at 79 ft and the %D provides precise pitch guidance thereafter. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Tail Strike Avoidance Training !ideo %light crew training programs can help operators greatly reduce the fre$uency of tail strike by emphasi,ing pitch attitude when the airplane is near the ground. Boeing and Douglas roducts Division have assisted in this effort by distributing tail strike training videos to all operators in recent years. .dditional copies of these videos may be obtained at the following addresses# Boeing models#Boeing 4ommercial .irplane 5roup.ttn# 4ustomer Services and /aterial Support !4S/S" . &. Box 7@*@, /4 7F+F9Seattle, (ashington C>)0D+ 00*@, ;S. hone !0*F" FF0+@)D7%ax !0*F" FF0+@)D9Douglas models#Douglas roducts Division.ttn# %light &perations4ustomer Service7>99 1akewood Blvd., /4 D*CD+**0F1ong Beach, 4alifornia C*>DF+***), ;S. hone# !9F0" 9C7+ )0DC%.?# !9F0" 9C7+7D@)
Pete "ernardin 4hief ilot, 4ustomer Services Flight #perations Douglas roducts Division