STUIlIA I'HILOLOGICA IIlJlJlJHICA

Monograph Series
IVa
- --
ALAYAVIJNANA
On the Origi n and the Early Development
of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy
Part I : Text
Lambert Schmithausen
Tokyo' The International Institute ror Buddhist Studies 1987
ALA YAVHJNANA
On the Origin and the Earl y Development
of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy
Part I : Text
Lambert Schmithausen
TOKYO
The International Insti tute for Buddhist Studies
1987
1. 1
1. Introductory. pnpgrammati c and methodologi ca l remarks
1.1 As is well known , one of the s pecific features of the
philosopby of the Yogacara school is the theory that in
addition to the traditional si x kinds of mind, viz . the five
sense-perceptions and non-sensory cognition (manoviJ'Mna) , there
are two new, more or less subl iminal forms , viz. kl.i{lt a- manas and
cHayavijnana. The former is a continuous , subtle notion or feeling
of III , whereas the
Chinese rendering
2
ce ptacle" , may, in a
latter, in accordance with the frequent
1
i. e. "store mind" , "connaissance-re-
preliminar y way, be characterized as the
container or store-house of t he latent residues or Impressions of
previous actions (kal'man) and mind processes, or, following the
usual
3
Tibetan trans lation kun gzi man! paT' lies pa ("fundamental
mi nd " , "Grunderkennen,,4), as the basi c layer of mind processes or
even the very basic constituent of the .... hol e l i ving being , 5 It
s hould be kept in mi nd that (at l east in the !lorthodox" Yogacara
school) alayavi j ii.ana is strictly per son-bound, each living being
hav.ing its own al ayavijiiana.
The present. essay , though also including a fe .... remarks on the
origin of klifJta-manas (see 7.IA.2.2), i s primarily concerned
.... ith the problem of the origin and development of a 1 a y a v i-
j ii. ana. Yet, my treatment of this matter is not exhaus tive
either. I have rather confined myself to dealing .... ith the problem
of the origin of alayavijfiana in a rather 1 i mit e d sense
(see 1.4), and to an attempt to deduce , from my starting-point
and the data available i n the oldest mate r ia.ls, certai n crucial
aspects of the ear 1 y development of thi s concept.
In accordance .... i th the limited scope of the present essay, I
feel it justified to confine myself , as for pre v i 0 u s
res ear c h ~ to a s hort s y s t c mat i c outline of the
essential aspects of .... hat it has contributed to t he question of
the formation of t he concept of alayavijfiana ( 1. 3) . Though I
admit t hat a full c c ~ n t of t he history of researc h on alayavi.-
I. 2 - 2 -
j fiana would be useful. it would take much more tillle than I can
afford , and anyway it should , in vie\<" of the fa ct that most
pertinent works are in Japanese , be written by a Japanese scholar .
Nevertheless, apart from specific references i n the notes, a few
r e c e n t tbeories on the origin of alayavijfiana will be
discussed in detail in 7, because t hey advocate solutions
considerably differing from mine, a nd because I s hould scar cel y be
j ustified in setting up a t heory of Illy Olm if I did not give my
reasons for not adopti ng one or t he other of those already set
forth .
1.2 As for the question of the 0 rig i n of the concept of
alayavijnana, the solution presented in this essay must
remain a h y pot h e tic a lone. In view of the fact that
even basic problems of the literary histQry of the older Yoga cara
text s. esp. of the Yoga carabhUmi, are still unsolved or controver-
sial and si nce some early materials are known only from fragments
- and there may have been others no longer extant i n explicit
quotations -, statements on the early history of Yogacara thought
are almost inevitabl y, at least for the time being. bound t o be
hypothetical. But I think Sugur0
6
is right in emphashi ng that .... e
have no c hoice but to try to reconstruct the historical develop-
ment of Yogacara thought if we want to re-enact it, as it were, as
a dynamic, living process , and not merely take stock of t he
petrified (and oft en incoherent) results. Besides, even prelimi-
oary observations i n terms of a history of ideas may, if handled
with caution, on their part be helpful in resolving problems of
literary history . But what I consider essent ial is that, even if
we can not (or cannot yet ?). in our hypotheses on matters of t he
history of ideas (as well as of the literary history) of uncertain
pe ri ods li ke early Yogacara, reach c e r t a i n t y, we are none
the less clearly called upon to proceed from mere p 0
, ,
i-
b i 1 i t
Y
or non-commi t tal p 1 u
,
i b i 1 i
t Y
to
p r 0 b

b i 1 i t y;
i.e . we should try to find out criteria
which permi t
u,
to s ingle out. from among the at times consider-
- 3 -
1 3 0- 1. 3 .1
able number of p 0 s sib I e explana tions, the one .... hich is
(or a t least t hose fe.... which ar e) pro b a b 1 ej and it is
precisely thi s that I intend to do in the present essay .
1. 3.0
Modern scholars have tri ed to explai n the introduction of
alayavijftana by pointi ng out that in certain s y s t e-
m t i c 1
( 1. 3. 1 ) and x e get i ca l
( 1. 3. 2)
cont exts
7
the assumption of this concept h.d become inevitable or
at l east useful , and t hey ha ve a l so dralffl a ttention to ce rtain
related notions - occurdng eit her i n the canonical texts
8
or i n
the dogma ti c elaborations of some of the traditional schools (
1. 3. 4 ), or even i n t he earliest Yogacara sources themselves
9
(
1. 3.5) -, .... hi ch may be r egarded as more or less close precur sors
or starting-points of alayavijftana. Some schol ars, though not
denying the importance of the systematical and hi s tori cal back-
ground , hav e expressed the opinion that the main motive for t he
i ntroduction of t he concept of alayavijftana has t o be sought in a
(direct) y 0 g ice x per i e n e e of a subliminal layer of
. d 10
ml. n .
1.3. 1
Ther e are several s y S t e mat i ca l co n
t ext s in connection .... ith ... hich the i ntroduction of
alayavijftana is regarded to have been helpful if not indi s pens-
a ble. In a system that reject s - as mos t Buddhis t schools unambigu-
ously do - the existence of Sel f (atman) as a s ubstantial , i . e .
permane nt and unchangeable nucl eus of the individual. a non-
eternal but continuous element of personality like alayavijftana
appears to be r equired or a t least convenient. Accordingl y. modern
scholars mos t frequentl y adduce, i n connect ion .... ith the i ntroduc-
tion of alayavijnana, i ssues centeri ng, more or l ess, a round t he
problem of the co n tin u i t y 0 f per .s 0 n ali t y. 11
In these contexts as ..... ell as in sOllie others, alayavijflana i s i n
fa ct employed by the Yogacaras themsel ves, and i n most of these
cont exts they have tried to s ho ..... the indi s pensa bili ty of alayavi-
jnana by mouldi ng them into proof s of its exi stence . What
1. 3 . [
- 4 -
f ollows is only a preliminary li st of s uch i ssues: 12
1) the issue of a continuous and homogeneous "s ubject" or J more
precisel y, i ndividual substratum, of 8aJ?1sara t 3 and. i n a
sense, even of the process of liberationj ' 4
2) the issue of a conne cting link between karman and its r e-
s ult
15
,
J) the issue of a connecti ng link betwecn the last moment. of
mind before and the first one after unconscious states like
nirodha- aamapattij l 6
4) the issue of an enti ty s uitable f or receivi ng I mpressions
(oosand) and support i ng t he Seeds (bija) J or bei ng itself the
Seed , of future effects; 17
Thi s las t is involved not only in the phenomena of memory
and r ecollection 18 but al so in the preceding issues of
karman and its fruition
19
and of
th'
reappearance of
consciousness af ter periods of interruption,
20
and it i s
-
involved even i n th,
issue of th, substratum of sal!lsara
and liberati on, if s al)lsara is understood a s rebirth due
t o karman and to 0 e f i 1 em e n t s21 (kl.el1a) liable
t ft ' d f 1 t 22 and 'f the ore-emerge even a er pe r lO s 0 a ency, ""-
process of liberation is taken as the origina tion and
gro .... th of wholesome factor s
23
or at least as the abandon-
ment even of 1 ate n t Defilement s . 24
In all these cases, the situation a ppear s to have come to
a critical point on account of the r eject ion of the
Sarvasti vada doctrine of the existence of the past and
the f uture (which had allowed to derive later fruition
d ire c t 1 Y from the past deed, 25 the r e-emerging
26
consciousness directly from its past antecede nt , or
recollection directly from the past 3wareness
27
and from
the past object
28
) or on account of t he r ejection of
hypostatized entities like Possession (prapti) (due t o
whi ch a non-saint is fettered by Defilement s even while
they do not actually occur
29
) . Some school s, e s pecially
- 30 - - 31
the Sautran t ikas and perhaps al so the MahiSas akas,
5)
- 5 -
1. 31
had tried to solve these problems by a ssuming dormant
f orces or Seeds (bija) as gap-bridger s, but t he Yogacaras
pointed out that in a traditional Buddhist system (i..e.
without alayavijiiana) both the impression (or reinforce-
ment) and the preservation of these Seeds involve serious
difficulties .
t he issue of a primary a nd homogeneous
notion or feeling of 'f' or Clinging to
objective
Self- 32
,
basis of the
6) t he issue of a principle whic h - after death, and in accord-
ance with, or a s the result of, the Maturation (vipdka)33 of
previous karman - takes possession, or becomes the basis, of
a new existence
34
and which, uninterruptedly continuing until
death as the homogeneous basic layer of this existence,35
guarantees that throughout a given life-span a living being
is affiliated to one and t he sallie ..... av or form of exis t ence
( gati/yoni) or cosmic level (dhtit u , 36 a guarantee
that holds even in the absence of other suitable factorsjJ7
7) the issue of mind as t he principle of life, whi ch throughout
a given life-span continuously pervades
38
and "appropriates"
(uptidtina) corporeal matter, 39 esp. in unconscious states ""here
the ordinary vijnanas are absent.
40
T .... o more issues i n whi ch alayavijnana figure s appear to be
closely connected .... ith the preceding one:
8) t he issue or- mind (vijnana) entering the womb and coalescing
.... ith proto-embryonic matter at t he moment of
Linking up (pl'atisandhi ) a new existence as a human being
(or womb-born animal),4
1
and
9) the issue that in the process of death the body is said to
gro .... cold part by part , due to a gradual .... ithdrawi ng of mind
(vijnana). 4
2
There is s till another issue involving alayavijftana which be-
l ongs to this "somat icl! context , viz. ,
10) the issue of ce rtai n corporeal experiences the occurrence of
..... hi ch is said to be hardly explicable except if alayavijnana
is accepted,43 including the issue of pleasant corporeal
1.3.2 - 6 -
sensations in states of deep concentration.
44
Another issue which would seem to point to the existence of
alayavijiiana is
11 ) that the perception of objects is said to be always accompa-
nied by- a perception of the surrounding world (bhdjana) and
of one's own corporeal basis
Finally, alayavijiiana figures, in some sources - but, as far as
1 can see, never in formal proofs of its existence -,
12) as the basic principle of Pollution
12) as the seat or sum of Badness (daU?fhuLya),47 and
as constituting, or having the nature of, ultimate unsatisfac-
toriness or the Truth of Suffering
kha-sat ya) . 4
8
, . 3. 2
Apart from these systematical problems, e x e get i -
ca l reasons,
had a decisive impact on
too, are occasionally surmised to have
the introduction of alayavijii.ana,49 and
at any rate it .... as i n fact used by the Yogacaras themselves for
solving sueh difficulties as
50
the question of ho .... to interpret
1) the dependence of vijiuina on sa1pakaraa
51
and of bhava on
upcidana
52
in the twelve-membered pratitya8amutpada formula;
2 ) the mutual dependence of vijiiiina and ndmarupa which was set
forth in the and, according to a passage
of the Yogacarabhumi
1
54
also indicated by the Nagarasutraj55
J ) the statement of the Dharmadinnasutra, etc . ,56 that in niT'o-
dhaaamapatti mind (vijiiiina) has not departed from the body ; 57
4 ) the statement of the mutual support and concomitance of
life(-force) (ayus), [bodily] heat and mind (vi-
iMna);58
5) the canonical concept of the Nourislunent "mind" (vijiiiiniiha-
raJ. 59
One may al so add:
6) the exegesis of the canonical reference to mind entering the
womb at the moment of conception,60
"'hich has already been listed a s a systematical context . 61
- 7 -
1. 33-1. 34.2
1.3.3 It. is important to make it clear that although most of
these systematical and exegetical context s may render the
introduction of ala, avijiiana pIa u sib 1 e 1 they cannot eo
ipso be a cknowledged to have i n f act led to, or even merely
contributed to, this event . It is equally possible, nay, even
highly probable J that J even though the real moti ve( 5) will be
inc. 1 u d e d amo ng these contexts, yet in many of them alaya-
vijiiana was rather found convenient and made use of only a f t-
e r it had been introduced for some 0 the r reason.
1.3.4
tions:
As for historical starting-points and pre cur S 0 r s
of alayavijiiana, previous research has made two sugges-
1 .. 3. 4.1 On the one hand, it has , in accordance with the exegeti-
- - 62
cal tradition of the Yogacaras t hemselves, pointed to
the vijii5.rw. of the canonical pratityasaJmJ.tpdda formula,63 which
is occasionally taught to t>.nter the womb at the moment of concep-
tion and to keep, by its presence, the embryo and the child
growing,64 and which may be identified with t he vijii5.na which,
along with life-span or life-force (dyus) and bodily heat (u{lman).
maintains the body alive
65
and ",ithdraws from it at the moment of
death.
66
1.3. 4.2 On the other hand, Abhidharmic concepts like mUlavijii5.na,
""QsaJ!Istirika- akandha and bhavatiga- vijiitina 67 ascribed to
various traditional schools have been acknowledged as Sravakayanist
forerunners of alaya.vijiiana not only by mode r n scholars but also
by the Yogacaras themselves, partly as early as in the MahayanasalJl-
graha .
68
The existence of such concepts may, to be sure, have
increased, on the part of the Yogacaras, the r eadiness to intro-
duce a related concept . However. the historical relations of the
earliest Yogacara literature to these schools still pose unresolved
problems.
69
Thus , one cannot exclude the possibility t hat those
Sravakayanist concepts, as also, almos t certainly,7
o
a few canoni-
1.3.5
- 8 -
cal passages like AN 11 131 (using the term ' citaya,)7
1
or the
72 were adduced only afterwards for the sake of
averting the reproach of innovativeness.
73
1. 3.5
However no such possibility is there with r egard to the
above-mentioned vijnana of the pratityasamutpdda formula
nor with regard to another set of related notions, namely Seeds
(bija),74 Badness {dauft:huLya),75 or Hind- containing-all-Seeds
vijnanam), 7
6
Hind which is [the re sult of the] Matu-
ration [ of previous karman (and delight in worldly eXistence
77
)]
(vipdka-vijriana) , 78 [Result-of-JMaturation containing all Seeds
(sal' vabija/(o 79 Mind appropriating the gross elements of
the sense-faculti es (*intil'iya- mahdbhutopddatr vijiidnam) , 80 or Hind
under the sway of Clinging (sopcida1Ull[l vijrianam) . 8 1 Mos t of these
notions, t oo, have, in the Yogacara sources, been expressly identi-
fied or connected with, or at least de fact o used as quasi-synonyres
of, alayavijnana, 82 but they are, besides, clearly recognizable as
key-terms of, or as closel y associated with, one or the other of
the systema tical context s in which alayavijfiana came to play a
centra], role (see 1. 3 .1 ) . ,",'hat i s more: they do occur, already
in the old est Yogacara source and even in its earliest ,
pre-alayavijnani c layers (see 1.6). precisely in such contexts
where one would expect alayavijfiana, onl y that it is just not
mentioned or mentioned in such a way that it is clearly addition-
al .
83
The significance of these notions fo r the theory of alayavi-
jfiana is thus beyond doubt. The question is J however, whether
they, or at least one or the other of them, were - and if so: in
which way they were d ire c t 1 y influential on the
v e r y i n t rod u c t ion of alayavijfiana , or whether
instead they influenced the fur the r d eve lop men t
of this concept, being, as it were, the l oose end s of s peculation
which came to be i ntegrated into alayavijfiana after its introduc:-
tion for some o t he r reason, upon which t hey too were de-
veloped in terms concurri ng with the innovation . However this may
be, it is clear that for a comprehensive understanding of the
- 9 -
1.4
genesis and early development of alayavijiiana in its .... ider con-
text, a careful i nvestigation of each of these concepts a nd the
motives due to .... hich they came up, as well as a precise determina-
tion of t beir relation to ilayavijiiana, is indispensable .
The notion of bijaa a nd thei r role as a precursor of alayavi-
jiiana has al r eady been di scussed by seve ral scholars,84 but a
comprehens ive and perceptive description and histor ical evaluation
of the considerably diverging bija theories met with in the Yo-
85
gacarabhumi has, to my kno .... ledge, not yet been published. Recent -
ly. attention has been focussed on vijrUina in the cont ext of
pl'atitYQaamutpdda
86
and on the notions of 80pcidcinwp vijiiQ.nam and
upadtina,87 yielding val uable information on these aspects of t he
background of the formation of the alayavijfiana theory . On t he
other hand , a similar investigation into the not ions of vipdka and
vipakavijiitina {cp o 3. 12} as well as into the concept. of Badness
(dawffhtltya)88 is. as far a s I know. still a desideratum.
1.4 It is thus obvious that for a comprehensive reconstruction
of the genesis of the alayavijfiana theory an exhaustive
investigation of all t hes e noti ons i ncl uding, of course, a
re-eval uation of previous research - is i ndispensable; and it is
no less obvious that this holds good also f or the Sravakayanist
prec ur sors of alayavijfiana as .... ell as for all those systemati cal
and exeget i cal context s in whi c h it carne t o playa part . However,
such an effort is defi nitely beyond the scope of the present
study. To be sure . when t.racing t.he original meaning( s) or con-
notat.ion( s) of the term 'alayav ijfiana' and the original c haract er
of the entity it denotes , and especially when discussing the early
developme nt of bot.h the term and the concept. of alayavijfiana. 1
shall have t o take into a ccount , though admitt edly in a prelimi-
nary way, at least. those related concepts and context s whi ch
appear to fores hadow alayavijfiana within the Yogacara tradition
itself . But
.,
fOl' t he question of the 0 r i g i n of alayavi-
...
I shall lighten t as k Jnana. my by narrowi ng it down to the ques-
tion of its v e r y b i r t b, Le,
to the s p e c i f i c
I. 5
- 10 -
question of ... hy and in which context a.layavijnana as ape c u 1-
i a r t Y P
the ord i na ry
e of vijiuina. J
forms
89
of the
cleariy distinguished from at l east
six tradi ti onal vijnanas, and also
expressly ca lle d 'a 1 a y a v i j fi a n a', was firs t intro-
duced. Taken i n this way , the question does not conce rn the origin
of the mere expression 'alayavijfiana' if at all it was used at an
earlier stage, as some scholars believe,9
o
in a sense not referring
t o a peculiar type of mind different from the traditional six
vijnanaa; nor does it concern the origin of any other vijridna.
distinguished from the ordinary six but not (yet) called 'alayavi-
jfiana'; for even as a c l ose precursor of alayavijfiana - not to
mention distant forerunners - this other vijriO.na could s till have
been introduced for reasons different from those which led to its
transformation into alayavijiiana or to its merely receiving the
name ,alayavijnana' .
1.5 As the probl em of the origin of alayavijiiana in the st rict
s ense of 1.4 is bound to t he t e r m 'alayavijnana', it
seems admissible to approach it by starti ng from
p as sag e s i n which this term actually occurs.
t ext
One possible procedure would be to s tart f r om such pa ssages
which e x pre s sly s tate are a son why alayavijiiana
has to be adopted, i. e. from the proof s the Yogacara s give
for t he existence of alayavijiiana, a f i r st set of whic h is
presented in the P"l'oof PJ)J"ticn 9 1 of the alayavijnana treatise in
the beginning of the viniScayasalJlgrahal)i92 (henceforward: VinSg
olay. Treatise ), and another one (which, among other things, in
view of its greater complexity and sys tematizat ion is obviously
- - 93
somewhat later) in the first c hapter of the Mahayanasa!J1graha .
These proofs no doubt yield valuable information about the system-
a ti cal and exegetical f unctions alayavijnana had acquired a t
t hat s tag e of development . But it s hould be borne in mind
that such sets of formal proofs are usually established only
aft era gi ve n theory has been advanced,94 and that they may,
but nee d n o t n e c e 5 5 a r i I y, include the or iginal
- II -
1. 6 .1
motive (s) . 95 At any rate , si ngling out the original motive(s)
would require additional evidence , to be obtained by a meticulous
investigation into t he doctrino-historical presuppositions of all
the systematical and exegetical cont ext s involved in the various
proof s - a task which would , once again , exceed the limits of this
study.
I therefore prefe r to approach the problem by scrut i nizing the
o c c ur r e nee s of (the term) 'alayavijfiana' in the e a r-
l ie s t pertinent Yoga cara source .
To be s ure, later works could scarcely be neglec ted in a
definitive treatment of the problem, at l east. if they may be
expected to contain older materials or remi niscences of an ol de r
s tage in the hi story of alayavijfiana, for we cannot exclude a
priori t hat the original motive(s) for i ntroducing the notion,
while lacking in t he ear li e s t pertinent source (deliber-
ately or by accident), is (or are) nevertheless preserved in some
later work . However, this is l ess proba ble, and as a fir s t s t ep it
would thus seem natur al to start from the earlies t , or least
earliest available, source .
1.6. 1 In most contributions to the question of the origin of
alayavijiiana as well as elsewhere, .... hat i s assert ed or
presupposed t o be t he earliest Yogacar a source, at l east the
earliest source in which alayavi j fiana is f ound, i s the
canasutra (esp . its Vth chapter) ,9
6
the (Mahayana- )Abhidharmas utra
sometimes being lis ted a s the next earliest t ext,97 i n its t urn
followed by the Sastras, espec ially the YogacarabhUmi,98 the Hsien-
yang-sheng-chiao_lun,99 the works of uMaitreya II (viz. Hahayanas u-
traIankara, Hadhyantav ibhaga and Dharmadharmatavibhaga), the Maha-
and t he Abhidharmasamuccaya,100 and the works of
101
Vas ubandhu. Yet , such a view, .... hich appea rs to be, partly at
leas t, due to the prejudice that,
S
- 102
expected to precede a s tras, i s ,
astray.
i n princi ple , Sutras can be
I thi nk, bound to lead us
1. 6.2-1. 6.4
- 12 -
1. 6. 2 Thus the
A b hid h arm a s U t r a 103 is not quoted
or mentioned in the Yoga carabhiimi nor in any other text
before t he HahayanaS31)1graha and the Abhidharmasamuccaya. 104 From
the doctrinal point of view, i t
105
clearly represent s an advanced
stage of devel opme nt quite close to that of the HahayanasaJ!lgraha
itself.
106
Therefore, it is probably not much older t han the
lat ter. Anyway, it seems t o be later than the Sa!]ldhinirmocanas u-
tra.
107
1.6.3 The S a 1)1 d h i n i r moe a n a s u t r a, in its turn,
i s, to be sure, quoted, and even .... holly i ncorporat ed, in
- - - 108
the Section of t he Yogacarabhumi. But , as I
have tried to s ho'" i n an earlier pape r
i o9
and as has been
11 0
demonst rated i ndependently by Sh. Suguro and come to be accepted
by several Japanese scholars, lll it does not seem to be known
11 2
to, or presupposed by, at leas t 1Il0St. of t he B a B i e
See t ion ( SaptadaSabhumika, 11
3
*_* ),1 1
4
nor, as far as I
know, the 11 5 The seems rather
t o pres uppose
BaBic Section
some of t he peculiar concepts and doct rines of the
- - - 116
of the Yogacarabhumi .
1.6.4
One of these concepts is alayavijfiana. Usually, t he new
kind of vi,inana distinguished from the ordinar y six is,
i n t hose. chapte r s of the Sal)ldhinirmocana sutra h
11 7
w e re occurs,
lId
1 :.3- "-- lB ' 118
ca e uuanav1.Jnana . ut one passage it is stated to be
also called 'alayavijfiana' . This looks like
'"
"inclusi vi stic"
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t he Sutra's own concept with an
a 1 r
,
a d y e x i s t i n
g
concept of a nother, someho .... related
but perhaps a l so rivalling group. In any case, it wo uld seem
i mprobabl e that one singl e new concept should have been given
two ne .... names right f r om the outset . Besides, i n t he case of
the opposite assumption, viz. that the Yogacarabhijmi borrowed
alayavijfiana from the Sal]ldhinirmocanasutra, one .... ould hardly be
able to explain the fact that the Basic Section of t he Yogacarabhu-
mi consistently uses 'alayavijfiana
'
, i.e. t he term which is margin-
- 13 - l.6.5-1.6.6
al in the hut nowhere the main term 'adana vi-
jiiiina ' 119 which is found only in the ViniScayasalJ'lgrahaI).l. . its
occurrences being, however, limited, even there , to quotations
from the SalJldhinirmocanasutra . 120 Therefore, the SalJldhinirmocanasu-
tra, at least the portions concerned with the new kind of vij"iitina
distinguished from the ordinary six, was most probably composed
before the ViniScayaS3l!1grahal)i but a{ter the Basic Section of the
- - - 121
Yogacarabhurni.
1. 6. 5
Such a view presupposes, however, that the Y 0 g a -
c a
, a
b h m i i, a c o m p i 1 a t i o n consisting
of several ( 0' at least two) heterogeneous ( 0' at any rate
chronologically di stinct ) 1 a y
122
e ,
,
and i, not,
"'
A. Hu-
kri l 23
assumes, an entirely coherent work executed, and planned in
advance to the last detail, by one single author. Indeed, the
latter possibility appears to me highly improbable, 124 all the
more since the present i nvestigation will show that the ilayavi-
jnana theory of (at least a part of) t.he initial portion of the
125
ViniscayasaJJlgrahal)i is not., as Mukai asserts, a full treat.ment.
of this concept in complete harmony with the brief stat.ements on
the matter in the Basic Section, but involves rather a concept of
alayavijftana which is altogether different from, nay incompatible
with , that of the Basic Section.
126
Moreover, it would be quite
strange, upon Mukai's presuppositions, that in the Samahita
of the Basic Section (see 2.1 ) the presence of alayavijii.ana in
niroodhasama.patti is expressly
in a sub seq u e n t
taught to be
chapter (viz.
indispensable, whereas
the Sravakabhumi) no
mention is made of it when this same state is defi ned 2.3 +
n. 156). I therefore continue to
sis" as t.he most pro b a b 1 e
prefer the
127
one .
"compilation hypothe-
1.6. 6
For the present investigation it does not matter whether,
as N. Hakamaya stresses,128 _A san g a was the compiler
of the Yogacarabhumi or at least involved in the compilation
process (and, if he was , in which way ). What matters is that the
\.6 7-\.7 - 14 -
compilation r ests on materials that are heterogeneous t o a cer tain
extent (heterogenei ty being pres umably due to difference of not
onl y t ime hut also ambi ence , etc . ), and that it took place i n more
t han one step. In the present context, it may he sufficient to
distingui sh, roughly , three mai n layers: 129
I) portions - probably the oldest l ayer(s) - not contai ni ng any
r ef e r ence to alayavijnana: part s of the Basic Section , esp. the
and the Bodhisattvabhumi, and the
2) the rest of the Basic Section, with s poradic occurrences of
alayavijnana but no reference to the
3) the containing a detailed treatment of
alayavijfiana and the s ame time quoting and making use of the

1.6. 7
This disti nc tion of layers does no t imply tha teach
laye r is homogeneous i n itself. Nor does it mean that
later layers may not al so include some fairly old materials; for
it is obvious t ha t the e . g . , contains a I-
s 0 such material s a s precede or at leas t alt oge t her ignore the
(pertinent parts of the) 130 o r t he alayavi-
jnana theory. 13
1
Nor does i t exclude that the earlier layers may
contain sporadi c addit i ons by the (or a) later compiler or r edac-
tor; for a few passages of the Basic Section. a ct ually s how
i solated occurrences of concept s not found except in the
dhinirmocana materials of the ViniScayasal!lgrahaJ)l.. 132 But apart
from these very few exceptions it is the Basic Section. of t he
YogacarabhUmi that s hould, in our case, be regarded as the earlies t
source, and it i s therefore t he pertinent passages in thi s t ext
t hat should be investiga ted firs t.
1.7 What i s, in my opinion, requi r ed in order to proceed from
mere plausibili ty t o historical certai nty or at l east well-
f ounded probability is t o check each passage or context that
be s upposed t o have given bi rth to alayavi j fiana ( in the sense of
1.4) agains t the f ollowing criteria:
- l5 -
1. 8- 1.9
11) Either the systematical/dogmatical or exegetical situation
must be shown to have clearly reached a stage at .... hic h the
introduction of a ne .... type of vijnana became i n e v ita b I e,
or there must be unambi guous evidence for direct psychological or
mystical experience of such a new type of vijnanaj
(2) The specific quality or fun ction of this new type of vijnana
must render fully plausible the choice of the term 'a I a y a vi-
jnana I.
1.8 In this connection , it should be borne in mind that there is
no unanimous tradition as to the literal meaning of the term
,alayavi jfiana'. There is no explicit explanation of its literal
meaning in the YogacarabhUmi 133 but only an implicit one (see
6.2.2.d) .... hich is, ho .... ever, hardly original ( 6 .2. 3, esp. a) . The
ol dest available explanation,1
34
at least the oldest explicit
explanation, is rather t he one that is found in the
- 135
nasutra. Other important early sources explaining the term
'alayavijiiana' are: Abhidharmasutra, 1
3
6 Mahayanasal]lgraha,137 and
Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhi,1
3
8 Pratityasamutpadavyakhya ( Pratitya-
samutpadadivibhanganirdesa) 139 and 140 The
explana tions, however, diverge considerably, probably due to doc-
trinal development s, 1
4
1 but also to the very ambiguity of the word
'dlaya' wbich, though preferably used in the sense of "Clinging"
or "that to which one clings " in the canonical texts, 14
2
was
variously concretized by the Abhidharmikas 143 and may, on top of
that, have been used by the Yogacaras in any meaning current in
ordi nary Sanskrit . 144
1.9 It cannot of cour se be ruled out a pr>ior>i that an
investigation on the lines of the c riteria stipulated in
1.7 might have a negative result in the case of all the
occurrences of alayavijftana in the Basic Sel!tion of the Yogacara-
bhumi . In that event , it .... ould be reasonable to a ssume, .... ith
Suguro,145 that the notion of alayavijftana was formed out side the
YogacarabhUmi (or the materials incorporated in its Basic Section)
1.9 - 16 -
and taken over by it as a ready concept already alj ena ted from its
original meaning and context, or at least that this original
context was , for some reason or by accident, not included in the
materials compiled. In order to discover the original meaning and
context of alayavijilana one would , in this case, depend on infer-
ence 0 1'. at best, on scrutiniz ing l ater sources in the hope of
finding the origi nal meaning and cont ext of alayavijnana still pre-
served, by some lucky chance J in one or the other of them. Yet,
the result would, in any case, be more doubtful t han if a passage
satisfying the requirement s of
1.7 could be found in the Basic
Section itself.
It is t he aim of the s ubsequent part of this paper to sho,", that
at l east 0 n e such passage does in fact exist - a passage, by
the .... ay. ....hich so far seems to have escaped the attention of
scholars. or at l east has not been recognized in its full signifi-
cance .
The fact that thi s passage can be shown to act.ually satisfy
bot.h the requirements stipulated i n 1. 7 and thus permits to
derive from it. a hypothesis on the origin (in the st.rict sense of
1. 4)' and earl y development of the alayavijnana theory does
not eo ipso excl ude that other passages or contexts - even
from t. he Basic Section of the YogacarabhUmi. not to mention lat.er
sources - might also satisfy these requirement s and could there-
fore likewise claim to explain t.he origin of alayavijnana. Theore-
tically speaking, alayavijiiana may have been introduced in order
to cover s eve r a 1 functions from the very beginning. Yet .
for the time being 1 have to confine myself t o present i ng a
preliminary exami nation of the other pe r tinent passages from the
Basic Section only ( 6). An evaluation of later sources, which
of cour se may cont.ain additional cont.ext.s of alayavijiiana satisfy-
i ng the requirements of 1. 7, is beyond the scope of this paper
(for an exception see 7 . 3) . Their evidential strength would in
any case be inferior to that of passages from the Baeic Section,
except if it could be sho .... n beyond doubt that they constitute or
at any rate faithf ully represent material s of at least the same
- 17 - 1. 9
antiquity as those contained in the latter, the onU8 probandi
being incumbent on him ~ o advocates such a thesis.
2. 1-2.2
- 18 -
2. Introduction and original meaning of ilayavijnana
2.1 The passage which I take to represent the star ting-point of
tbe alayavijiiana theory - and which appears not to have
received so far the attention it deserves - is found in the Sama-
- - - - - 146
hita h u m i ~ of the BaBic Section of the Yogacarabhumi:
"When [a person] has entered [Absorption into] Cessation
(nirodha(samapattiJ), his mind and mental [factors] have
ceased; how, then, is i t that [his] mind (vijritina) has not
withdrawn from [his] body? - [Answer: No problem;] for [in]
his [case] a lay a vi j nan a has not ceased [to
be present] in the material sense-facul ties, which are unim-
paired: [alayavijnana] which comprises (/possesses I has re-
ce ived ) 147 the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of) mind
(pravrtt iviJ"nana) , so that they are bound to re-arise in
future (i.e " after emerging from absorption) ."
2. 2 To be sure, this passage (which I shall henceforward call
Initial. Passage) does not expressly introduce alayavijiiana
as a new concept, and therefor e does not look l i ke a spontaneous
verbalization of its discovery, jot ted down, as it were, imme-
diately after the idea of alayavijfiana had been conceived for the
first time. Rather the passage gives the impression of an adapta-
tion of this discovery to the forms of a dogmatic discussion or
catechizing. But it cannot simply be taken for granted that a
spontane ous, non-formalized verbalization of the discovery of ala-
yavijfiana was ever - so to speak - officially promulgated; and
even if this were t he case, the spontaneous ve rbalization does not
seem to have been preserved as such but only in the formalized
guise of the present passage, which is thus the only available
starting-point for investigation and at any rate in this sense the
InitiaL Passage .
- 19 -
2. 3 At any rate, it is obvious that my Initial. Passage .... hich
.... as moulded into a formal proof of alayavijiiana in the VinSg
(Hay . Ttoeatise (see 1.5),'48 satisfies the first of the two
r equirements sti pulated in 1.7, viz . it contains a cogent motive
for t he introduction of a new type of vijiitina different f rom t he
For it virtual ly refers to a passage six t r aditional vijiitinas,
f r om a canonical Sutra 149 where the diffe r'ence
Absorpti on into the Cessation of Notions (or:
bet .... een death and
Ideations l 5
0
) and
Sensations is said to be based
on t he fact that i n the latte r state , in contrast to death,
life-for ce (tiyus) is not yet exhausted, bodily heat is
not yet extinguished, the sense-faculties are uni mpai r ed, and
vijiiiina has not withdrawn from the body . That this Sutra passage
makes t he assumption of some vijiitina in almost
151
inevitable is also documented by the fa ct that according to
Vasubandhu
l 52
it is on thi s same passage that Va sumitra, 1
53
in a
lost work called Pariprccha , based his thesis t hat i n niJ'Odha-
samapaUi mind (citta) continues to exist .
154
But , accordi ng to
the Abhidharma of the "orthodox" 155 in
all kinds of mind (citta/vijiitina) and mental fac-
tors (caitta) - i.e , the s ix traditional kinds of viJ"'ridna and
t hei r associates - a r e interrupted, and precisely the same vie ....
- - 156
had also been adopted by the earliest Yogacaras . Thus, the only
.... ay out of the diffic ulty .... as t o declare the vijiidna which has not
.... ithdra .... n f r om the body in niJ'OdhasamQpatti to be an 0 the r,
subliminal type of vl,jiiO.na, .... hic h, as sense-perception i s excluded
from all meditative absor ption, could either be determi ned as an
u nus u a 1 for m of manovijiitina
l 57
or more convincingl/
58
and t his is how the Yogacaras decided or quite soon came to
decide as an e n t i r e l y n e .... kind of vijiitina
completely different from the
ordinary six. 159
2. 4 Yet one may raise the question .... hy the Sarvasti vadins did
not fee l the same need . The answer is simple enough: because
. - 160 ( -
their vernon of the Sut r a passage as also that of the Pali
24
- 20 -
161
school ) did not contain the crucial reference to vijiidna (vijria-
1Ja1!I casya kdydd anapakrantaJ?l bhavati
162
) but only mentioned life-
for ce, bodily heat and sense-faculties. To be s ure , this version
of t he Sarvastivadins (and Theravadins) may be authentic in vie .....
of the origi nal character of ni1"odhasamapatti as a kind of mysti-
cal a nt icipation of NirvaQa_after_death,16
3
which would seem to
impl y the cessation also of vijiicina.
164
But it does not harmonize
whh the prec eding paragraph of the Sutraj for according to all
versions known to me, t hi s preceding paragraph proclaimS life-
force, bodily heat and v i j Ii a n a to be the principles of
life , whic h by withdrawing from the body render it a corpse. l 65
Thus , if J in the subsequent paragraph of the Sutra, the words
'vijridnwr cfisya kiiyad anapakrantaJ!1 bhavati I in the ve r sion o ~ o w
ed by the Yogacarabhi'imi (and by Vasumitra: see 2.3) - which is
1 f
-1 -. -. 166 . f'
al mos t certai n y that 0 t he Mu asarvast1vad1ns - are 1n a ct
an addition, they were almost certainly motivated by the intention
of harmonizing this paragraph of t he Sutra with the preceding one .
To be sure, even the preceding paragraph of the Sutra, as a
general
heat and
statement that life depends on life-force, bodily
v i j n dna, might have been found t o imp 1 y
continuous presence of (subtle) vijnana even in unconscious
167
stateSi but the assumption of some kind of vijiuina in nit'odha-
samapatti was, on t he basis of this passage, far less imperative
than on the basis of an e x pre s s statement as is found in
the Mulasarvastivada version of the Sutra. Thus, it was only for
the followers of the Mulasarvastivada t r adition (or of traditions
with similar versions, if there were any) that the problem arose
that even in the state of nirodhasamapatti where all ordinary
vijMnas were absent some other form of vijiUina was nevertheless
required, although there are passages 168 which show that t he
Yogacaras do not seem to have become awa r e of this problem right
from the outset but only after pertinent dogmatic speculation had
deepened, and even t hen perhaps not all of them at the same
. 169
t1me.
2.5 In order to solve the problem, the Yogacaras, accordi ng to
my Passage ( 2.1) , seem to have rec urred to the
theory, sometimes a scribed to "certai n Sautrantikas
l1
, 17
0
that (t he
body and) the material s ense- faculties (rlipindriya ) on the one
hand and mind (citta, viJ'ridna ) on
Seeds (biJ'Ql as well as the Seeds
whi ch i s al so found transmit tl!d i n
the other contain t heir o'ol'll
of each other. 17 1 Thi s theory
- - - 172
the Yogacarabhumi appears,
to be sur e , to have been developed in the context of the different
problem of how mind can r e - a r i sea f t e r unconsc ious
(acittaka) states, l 72
a
and cor poreal matter after existence i n t he
i mmat e rial s phere (arlipyadhatu). 172b But, since one of these uncon-
scious states is nirodha- Bamapatti, it impli ed t he vi ew that i n
thi s s tat e the Seeds of mind continue to exist i n the material
sense-faculties . It is this aspec t of the theory t hat was recurred
to by the Initia1. Passage , l 73 a s i s confirmed by the explicit
addition of the attribute "mate r i al" (rupin) to t he sens e -facul-
t ies - an attribute which i s missing in the Sutra passage the text
refers to'74 as al so by the reference to the Seeds of the
pravrttivijnanas and thei r late r reappearance (which is n ot
c alled for by the q ue s t io n !). Ye t, the different pr oblem
posed by the Sut ra pa ssage to which the Initial. Pa88age alludes
( vi z . t hat vijnana mu st not have withdrawn from the body, i . e .
mu st be pre se n tin nirodhasamapatti) could not be solved
by me rely referring to the presence of the See d s of mind in
nirodhasamapatti . At least if the wording of the Sutra was taken
serious ly. it rather could be solved only if the See d s of
lIIind, which according to t he above-mentioned bija t he ory continue
to exist in the state of n.irodhasamapatti, we r e understood as or
developed i nto a s pecial f orm of min d pro per , into a
vijii.cina on its own, and this is precisely what the Yogacaras have
done .
175
.
2.6 It is in the light of t he connec t ion of the Passage
with the above-me ntioned bija t he ory ( 2. 5) that I have,
in 2. 1, translated the locative rupiv not
2.7- 2. 8
- 22 -
a s an absolute one ( "for [ in] his [case ] - hi s material sense-
facul ties being unimpaired - alayavijnana has not ceased " ) but
as a t rue loc ative, t a king the text to mean t hat alayavijiia-
na, compri sing the Seeds of the ordinary forms of mind , c ontinues
to e xi s t i n the material sense-faculties whi c h (or : s ince t hey)
are [ s till] unimpaired , I 76 as do t he Seeds thems elves in the
above-menti oned bija theory .
2.7 If thi s interpretation, supported by both the Ti betan 177 and
the Chinese 178 translation, is accepted . i t become s obvious
that the Initial. Passage also me et s the s econd requirement of
1. 7, i . e . it renders the choice of the t e r m 'alayavijfiana'
plausible. f or in it, thi s term would be most appropriate if taken
to mean Uthe (or. if the term is new. perhaps better: a) (form of]
mind (that is c haracterized by] s tic kin g [in the material
sense-faculti es ] ". in t he sense of b e i n g hid d n in
them
179
_ a meaning ",hich moreover would contrast perfectly with
the term ' praurttiuijrkina ' . i.e . mind as it comes f orth or mani-
fests itself i n a [ cognitive] a c t.
2. 8 Thi s interpretati on of the
be confirmed , at any r ate
term 'aIayavi jaana' would
in s ubstance, 180 by what
seem to
appears
to be t he oldes t extant explana ti on. or at l east expli cit explana-
tion, of its literal meaning (see 1. 8) , vi::. SalJldh V. 3,181
.... here .... e read that t he uijiitino. taught in t he preceding paragraph
of the t ext , viz . Mind-containing-all-Seeds cittam) ,
"is al so called 'alayavijiiana', because it sticks to and di ssolves
into or hi des
' 82
in t he body , 183 in the sense of s haring its
desti ny, 84 ( i.e . becoming closely united ... ith it)" . Similarly.
accordi ng to the t hird explanation of the term in the Pancaskandha-
ka , alayavijnana i s called '.ilayavijnana' because it s t icks to. or
hides in, t he body (*kayatayanatam updddya)18
5
.
- 23 - 2 9
2.9 In view of the precedi ng obser vations, and provided I am
right in taking the InitiaZ Passage to represent the s itua-
tion wh ich gave birth to alayavi j iiana (in t he s tri ct sense : s ee
1.4), my earlier explanati on of t he original
lalayavijnana I a s "mind {t he fun c t i o n
i ng to (i . e. a p pro p ria t ion of)
meaning of the term
of which i s ] cling-
[the body],,1 86 will
need correction. That explanati on wa s based on a less probable
interpretation of Sal!ldh V.J. on the r elated term '6danavijritina '
used i n t he on the quasi-synonymity of
'aZaya I and 'upadana I taught in Y 26/ 18, and on the fac t t hat, in
t he Yogacarabhlimi, one of the cent r al funct i ons of alayavijiia na is
to appropr i a te and keep appropriated t he corporeal basis of one's
personal existence (i.e . t he body incl udi ng t he material sense-fac-
1
18)) ( -. -a ) 188 T b h
u tl.es a r ayopa ana . 0 e sur e, t e present context ,
t hough not s u g g est i n g s uch an explanation, would not be
incompa tible with .it eithe r , bec ause t he r eason why viJ"nana must
not from t he body in nil'odha8amdpatti. is of cour se t he
fact t hat cor por eal matter has to be kept a p pr o p r ia te d
(updtta) by mind in order to r emain an intac t, li ving body i nstead
of rotting like a cor pse.
189
As one may safely presuppose that the
early Yogacaras were famil i ar with the canonical meaning of
'!iZaya ' (see 1. 8) , one might be inclined to ass ume that t he
ambiguous term ' a l ayavi j na na ' was chosen deliberatel y in order to
include the nuance tha t the "hidden" vijiidna conti nuing to exist
during nil'odhaBamapatti fun ctions at the same time a s the vijnana
t hat appropriates, or keeps appropriated, corporeal matter .
19o
But
I doubt t hat 'dl.aya ', in the t r aditional meaning of "cl i nging" J
i s, e xcept for l ate text s, 1
9
1 a ctually used in t his "biologi cal"
sense. Both the Mahayanasa.pgraha, 192 the Vibha!ia
193
and the Pali
comme ntaries 194 point to "cli nging" in a ps ychol ogical , s p i r -
i t u a I I y n eg a t i v e sense, a s does also a definit ion
f ound in t he Srutamayi Bhumib of the Yogaca rabhlimi , according to
whi ch dtaya means l onging f or t he past, eager l y l ooki ng forward
to the future, and c linging to the pres ent .
195
Thus, 'dZaya'i n
t he traditional sense seems to cor r espond to ' upadana ' not i n the
2 .1 0 - 24 -
meaning of biological appr opr iation
196
but i n the sense of s pi ritu-
ally negative Clingi ng, i.e. of chandal'aga .
197
But pr ecisely this
l atter aspect would seem to be practically excl uded in the cont ext
of nirodhasanuipatti wh ich , in additi on to being unconscious) is
acces s ible to Noble Ones (dl'yaj more precisel y : anagdmins) and
Sai nts (arhat) 001y1 98 (and wa s, originally, a kind of my stical
anticipation of final NirvaQ8,1
99
as being s imilar to which it i s
'00
<\ualified eve n in some later ) . Therefor e, i n my Initial.
Passage, provided that it act ual ly represents the situation in
.. hi ch alayavijfiana
.. ,
born (in t he strict sense of \. 4) , the
term ' al ayavijiiana t as such a l most certainly does not include the
nuance of biological appropriation nor that of spir itually nega-
tive Clinging.
2.10
Yet , like other semantically related concepts
201
'al.aya'
(in typically Buddhi st usage) .. as empl oyed not only as an
ac t ion-noun but , as has
l ocative or pas s i
already been indicated in 1.8, al so
v e / 0 b j e c t i v e meaning,202
in a
i.e.
in t he sense of "that .. hich is cl ung to" , "that to which one
taken, by t he commentators and exegetes, to designate
either salllsa ric existence as a whol e, or the objects of scns uali-
ty,20
3
or the upddiina- 8kandhaa,2
0
4 i.e . the constituents of person-
ality to which one cli ngs because (or even in the very sense t hat )
one believes t hem to be one ' s Self or ooe ' s
As will be shown in detail later on ( 3 . 11. 2-4) , t here are,
in the YogacarabhUmi , passages where t he [ basis-of- ] pe r sonal-exist-
ence (iitmabMva) , the [Result-of-)Maturat i on cont ai ning all Seeds
(8arvabf:j(ak)o or even the Seed s (biJa) are expressl y
stated to be the objective basis of the notion of ' [' or of t he
belief i n Self, and even equated with ataya i n the passive sense .
One might, therefore, assume that t he Initial, Passage, by choosing
t he term 'alayavijfiana' J lIIay have i nte nded to sugges t that .... hat
has to be underst ood as the ultimate objective basis of the notion
or feeling of and a ttachment to Ego i s not t he basis-of-personal-
existence (atmabhava) in t he traditional sense but r ather the new
kind of viJiidna .
- 25 -
2 .1 0
But the re i s no proof that t his ... as what did in fact happen.
On the contrary, there are rather telling clues agains t such a
possibility: If the term ' alayavijnana' had , from the outset, been
intended to expr ess, or at l ea s t t o sugges t , the new vijridna.'s
being the object of Clinging to Ego, one would expect the earliest
explanations of the term to make thi s meaning explicit. Yet , this
is not the case, neither in the explanation of the
sut r a ( 2. 8) nor i n the - implicit - "etymol ogy" s uppli ed by the
Basic Section of t he Yogacarabhumi ( f or which see 6 . 2. 2.d) , the
oldest available source interpretating 'alayavijnana ' a s "mind
that i s clung to ( as SeL!] " being the MahayanasaJtIgr aha (see
3. 11. 8 ) . Apart f r om this ( whi ch r egards the t e r m 'alayavijna-
nal ) , even the i de a t hat alayavij iiana i s the objective basi s
of a (spontaneous) notion or feeli ng of Ego (in al l ordinary
people ) is not explic itly sta ted befor e the ViniScayasal'[lgrahaQI
(see 3.11. 5- 7) . It t hus appear s t hat this idea arose only some
time aft e r the i ntroduction of uayavijiiana, probabl y only
after this conce pt had undergone an important change (see
3. 11.5) . Thus, t he term lalayavi j nana
l
can , i n the InitiaL Passage ,
hardly be i ntended f or the m a i n pur pos e of indi cating t hat
the ne .... viJiitina is "that which is clung to a s Sel f" .
At best, by coining the te r m ' al ayav ijnana' , the Initial.
Passage may have intended to sugges t , a s a sec 0 n da r y
II U a n c e , that the ne .... kind of vijiitina. was a par t 0 f
the basis- of-pe r sonal-exi s t e nce (atmabhava) ... hich is clung to as
Self by ordi nary people (cp. 3.11.2 and 4) . But at any rate such
a nuance wa s , i n case it bad i n fac t been intended, not c rucial to
the specific context of t he pas sage , and wa s hence not made
e xpli ci t and developed except later on. I t is thus equally possible,
if not even pr obable, t hat such a nuance .... a s, originally, not
i ntended but came to be evoked afterwards automatically due to the
predominant use of 'alaya I i n Buddhist texts, especially .... hen t he
cl ose connection of alayavijnana .... ith nirodhasamapatti or similar
states ( 3 .1-3) had weakened . Such a subseque nt a ssociation of
the term ' alayavijnana ' with the typically Buddhist meaning of
2.11 - 26 -
' citaya I may have started in the prose expl ana tion of t he Pa-
ramarthagathas, where 'alayavijiiana' may mean "vijiitina stuck to
[as ( the primary element of?) one ' s basis-of-personal-exi s tence)"
(see 6. 7.2 [lo b and a.b] and 7. 18. 2.2 .1 ); and thi s association
may have even been one of the factors which decisively contributed
to some of t he fundamental modifi cations of the co n c e p t of
alaya vi ji'1iina .
2.11 Another nuance to be cons idered as possibly i ntended al-
ready in the InitiaL Passage by the t e rm ' alaya (vi jii.ana)'
regards the relation of the new kind of mind to See d s , s ince
s uch a relation is in fact expressed by the text itself when it
declares alayavijiiana to be possessed of I or to comprise (-pal'i -
grhita) , the Seeds of the pravrttivijnanas, And although an express
explanation of ' aIayavi jii.ana ' in the sense of "mind that is the
abode or receptacle of Seeds" i s not unambiguous ly documented
206
before Va subandhu the Kosakara ,207 one of t he implicit "etymolo-
gies " of alaya(vijiiana ) in the Basic Sect ion of the Yogacarabhu-
mi (see 6. 2,2,d) refer s to its being fur nished ( - upagata) vith
Seeds. Actually , in a passage of the Savitarkadi-Bhumi t he expres-
something W is contained ( - pal' igrhita) in sion t hat the Seed of
something el se (y)208
is equivale nt to t he expression that 1. is
"approached by" or furni shed with (-upagata) the Seed of x,2
0
9 and
't""
upaga a 1. S, 1.n 1.ts turn , a quas1. - synonym 0 a,,'J..na. esl. es,
the Seeds (bija) are sometimes qualified as sticking
in mind, 21t and , (san )nivi{l 'ta ' i s another quas i-synonym of
' atina '.210 Thus, t he possibility that in the Initial Pas sage
'alayavi jiiana I may mean "mind to (or: in) whic h [the Seeds ]
stick") would seem t o dese r ve considerati on .
Yet, though, as an e x e get e , one might be able to
jus tify such a use of the term 'alayavijii.ana' a p 0 s t e r i -
o r i J it is hardly conceivabl e how anybody could have c 0 i n
e d precisely this term f or no more than des ignating the function
of containing or compri si ng Seeds . For in contrast to related
expr essions like ' sanni vi{l t a '. ' upagata I and ' pal'i grhita' , t he
- 27 -
2. 12
terms 'aLaya ' or 'aLina' a r e n eve r used} in the Yogacarabhu-
mi, in connection .... ith Seeds . Thus, if the ne .... viJoii5na vas to be
named after its function of compri si ng Seeds, one might have
called it ' bij avijnana ' or the like, .... hereas the choi ce of the
term I alaya.vijii!na' .... ould remain unintelligible if viewed from
this angle only. Therefore , the as pect of bei ng stuck to by Seeds,
too, can at best be r egarded a s a secondary nuance, incidentally
alluded to by a term which was pr imarily coined to signalize the
new vijiicina ' s s ticking, and lying hi dden, in the material sense-
faculties .
Thi s is further confirmed by the fac t that the Sat(ldhinir-
mocanasiitra explains the te rm 0 n 1 y in the latter sense and
does not even mention the possibility of i nt erpreting 'a1.aya ' as
being stuck t o by Seeds, although I do not see any reason why it
might have concealed such an interpretation if it had known it.
Even in the Mahayanasaf[1graha - a text in which being furnished
with Seeds is no doubt the central aspect of alayavijiiana (see
5. 12.2) - , an explanation of 'alayav i j nana' in the sense of "mind
stuck to by Seeds
l1
i s not found. One may argue that this explana-
tion may have been deliberately i g n or e d by- the author of
the Mahayanasafllgraha because he felt it to imply too much of a
d iff ere n c e between Seeds on the one hand a nd alayavijiia-
na on the othe r , whic h may not have fitted in with hi s view. But
suc h a difference does not appear t o obtain in the InitiaL Passage
eithe r (see 2. 13. 1). Thus , in t he latter, too, the connotation
"mind s tuck to by Seeds " would seem to be fairl y i mprobable ,
though T admit that no definiti ve judgement i s possible since the
Initial. Passage may just as well have not yet been awa r e of the
conceptual di stinc tions the matter itself does, to be s ure, i n-
volve .
2. 12 Yet - provided that t he preceding inte rpretation of the
original meaning of 'alayavijnana' i s correct - i s it not.
rat her
- - 212
surprising that the Yogacaras, t hough demonst rably famil-
iar with the tradi tional Buddhist use of t.he word ' ii.1.aya', never-
2.12 - 28 -
theless, in the term 'cilayavijiiana'. resorted instead to
t he basic meaning the verb ci- li- has in standard Sanskrit, the
tradit.ional Buddhist sense being, at best, a subordinate nuance?
Is it possible that , though the t e r m 'alaya-' was, to be sure,
taken from Buddhist tradition, yet the mea n i n g ! at least
the primary meaning, rather reflects an influence from some other,
non-Buddhist tradition? I cannot resist the impression that one
should consider, in this case, the possibility of an impact -
though perhaps merely an atmospheric one and a deliberately alien-
21"
ated one ,) at that - from the side of the brahmanical Sankhya
system which was already flourishi ng at the time of the compila-
tion of the Yogacarabhumi (as is testified by the r eference to
in Y 119, 2) and had, moreover, a conceptual pattern
which could easily be adapted for solving the nirodhasamapat-
ti problem.
A typical idea of the Sankhya system i s the contrast between
latency and manifestation, between the disappearance and emergence
of physical as well as psychic phenomena, and among the t e rms
e:>'llressing disappearance t here are also the verb 1.i- and the nouns
'1.aya' and 'pra1.aya ,.214 Thus, the choi ce of the term 'a 1 a y a -
vij iiana' for the I ate n t continuity of mind during nirodha-
samapatti may have been stimulated by Sankhya termi nology.
The more so since in calling the actual, IIforthcoming" forms
of mind 'p r a v r t t i - vijiiana' - which appears to be another
newly coined expression my InitiaL Passage seems to be in-
fluenced by the Sankhya term
v r
t t i designating prec ise-
ly the ,ame phenomena, viz. the f u n c t i 0 n
,
of the subtle
faculty of perception-and- cognition, the buddhi (or citta,
if I may include the terminology of the Sailkhyistic Yogasutras) ,
which in its turn is the counterpart of alayavijiiana (whic h was,
by the way, quite soon taken to be the citta catexochen) . 21
5
Viewed from this angle, it would seem that the formation of
the terms talayavijiiana t and tpravrttivijiiana' was stimulated by
the Sankhya notions of buddhi and buddhiJ)l;'tti, the specific San-
khya term ' buddhi ' being, of course, replaced by a Buddhist equi-
- 29 - 2 . 13
val ent , vi z . ' vijiUina r. But since a Buddhist system could not
a ccept the substantialist pr esuppositions of the Sankhya concept
of buddhilcitta and its functions but r ather had to take t he
latent and the manifest aspect of mi nd as two f orms of mind , each
existing on its own, the buddhi - vfttis had to be cha nged into
vrtti- or , by way of a s light aliena tion, into pravrtti- v i -
j nan a sand buddhi/vijiidna had t o be expressly qualified
as that f orm of mind which is lat ent (laya- ) or - replacing the
Sankhya term by a Buddhi st one and at the s ame time more cl osely
adapting it to the context
material sens e-faculties .
l ying hidden i n (d- Laya- ) the
The probabil i ty of Sankhya influe nce in the ca se of alaya-
v'ijfiana i s increased by the fact that the int roduction of the
second kind of mind pec uliar to the Yogacaras, viz . manas in the
sense of a continuous notion or feeling of Ego (for which s ee
7. I A.2 .2) , appear s on its part also to have received at lea s t an
additional stimulus fr om the side of the Sailkhya system, 21 6 where
the "not i on of Ego" (ahal?lkara) i s established as an entity on its
owo , placed , similar to the new manaa of the Yogacaras , between
the buddhi (somehow correspondi ng to alayavijnana) and maMa which,
as the organ that gathers and. coordi nates sense- data and a s t he
faculty of t hought , corresponds to the manovijiitina of the Yogaca-
ras .
2.13
After havi ng tried to fix - on t he basis of my Initial
Passage - the or iginal meaning of the t e r m , alaya-
vij nana' , 1 s hall now a ttempt to establish its original n a -
ture and
pres upposition
pro per ti e s , once again starting from the
that my Initial Paasage has , i n princi ple , faithful-
ly preserved the original con text of the introduc tion of alaya-
vijfiana . Thi s means that we should not all too readily s uppl ement
the informat i on we c an get out of the present passage by what we
merely know from other presumably lat er descriptions or
definitions of the concept . But it will be legitimate to t ake
i nto account , with due caution, "pre-alayavijfiana
ll
materials and
2.131-2 . 132
- 30 -
see if - as in the case of the bija theory mentioned in 2.5 -
they are presupposed by the InitiaL Passage.
2. 13. 1
The InitiaL Passage is unambiguous in associating alaya-
vijnana with See d s (biJa), more precisely: with the
Seeds of the forthcoming or manifest for ms of mind (pl'avrtti- viiiiii-
na). The term by which the InitiaL Passage expresses the relation
between a l ayavijnana and Seeds, viz . - pal'igrhita, is however too
ambiguous to allow us to determine the pr ecise nature of this
relation . At least as far as I can see (cp. n. 147), it admits of
being understood not only i n the sense that alayavijnana possesses
or con t a ins the Seeds, implying that it is, itself.
something more, but al so in t he sense that alayavijnana merel y
com p r i s e s them, being hardly anything else but their sum
or totality.21
7
I n other words : There does not seem to exist, i n
the InitiaL Passage, any reliable clue for assuming that it did
anything else but hypostatize the Seeds of mi nd lying hidden i n
corpor eal matter to a new form of mind proper (see 2.5), this
new form of mind hardly, or, at best, but dimly, acquiring as yet
an essence of its own, not to speak of the character of a
veritable vijiiiina (see 5). Nor does the passage offer a reliable
hint as to whether alayavijfiana also contains o the r Seeds
than those of the pravrttivijnanas - a question wh i ch is, however,
not relevant to t he context of the InitiaL Pas8age and may,
therefore , have come to be considered only afterwards (cp . 3. 13).
2. 13. 2
An important point of the alayavi jnana concept of my
InitiaL Passage is that alayavijnana is conceived of as
s t i c k i n g 0 r h i d i n g i n t h e mat e
,.
i a 1
s e n s e - f a c u 1 tie s In view of the specific bija theory
which seems to have provided the basis for the alayavi jnana idea
(see 2.5), this conception can be regar ded as directly (though
not unambiguously) e x pre sse d
Initial. Pa8sage (see 2.6) and as
term 'alayavijnana' (see 2 . 7) .
by the wor ding of the
s u g g est e d by the
- 31 -
2.1 3. 3- 2. 13.6
2.13. 3 A further property of alayavijiiana. which i s no t ex-
pr essly stated in the Initial Passage but inevitably
i mp lied by alayavijilana I S presence in nil'odhasamapatti and also
i ndicated by its name (see 2 . n, is its being s ub tIe
(swk?ma)21 8 or sub 1 i min a 1
2.13.4
Moreover, as has a l ready been hinted at ( 2.9) , the
context of t he Sutra sentence , which i s quoted in the
Initial. Passage and due to which the introduction of alayavijiiana
became imperative ( 2. 3) , imp 1 i e s that a layavijiiana - as
the vijiUina which, by not withdrawing from the body, keeps it
alive and prevents the person wh o has entered nil'odhaBamapatti
from dyi ng - performs, i nth iss tat eat 1 e a 5 t ,
the f unction of b iologi cal a p pr o p ria t ion (upidana) ,
..... hi ch is actually ascribed to it in the first t .... o chapt ers of the
Bas i c Section (see 3 . 5) .
2.13. 5
The r e is no statement, in the Initia1. Passage, as t o the
moral character of alayavijiiana. To be sur e, the r e may
hardly be any reasonable alternative to its being qual ified (as it
act ually i s in other passages of the Basic Section (see 3.3 .1.4)
a s I' f al li ng under [ the category of Re sult - of-]Hat urat ion [ of pre-
vious ka rman]" ( vipakaswrgrhita) - .... hich implies its being moral-
ly neutral (avyakrta) but the issue may well have become
thematic only after the i ntroduction of alayavijiiana (cp.
3.3.{ .4 and 3. 12) . Yet, if the term 'alayavij nana' had c ontain_-
ed, from the outset, t he nuance of the new vijiiiina. being (pa rt of)
what i s clung to as Self (see 2. t o), this would imply that
already in t he I nitial, Passage alayavi j iiana .... a s probably regard-
ed a s part of the basis-of-personal-existence (titmabhtiva) in so
far as it is [Result-of-]Maturation (vipaKa) and the object of the
not ion of Self and of the feeling of identity (see 3.11.2).
2.13. 6
In the Initia1. Passage , alayaviji'iana is taught to be
present, and to prevent death, in nil"odhasamtipatti, but
the passage does
" 0 t
tell us anything about its occurrence
out sid e nil"odhasamapatti . I t may .... ell be that alayavij aana
2.13 7
- 32 -
was, ini tial ly, conce ived of a s a ki nd of "gap-bridger", but
hardly in such a way that i ts occurrence in ordinary states had
been denied. It is more probable that t hi s question had, at f irst,
simply not yet become a conscious issue; and had it become a
conscious issue already in the initial phase, probably alaya-
vijnan.a WQuid have been taken to be present i n ordi nary stat.es
alSOj f or it appear s that i n t he specific bija theory on the basis
of which t he notion of alayavijnana seems t o have been modelled i n
the 11litia1. Pa8sage (see 2.5) the Seeds of mi nd lying hidden i n
the material sense-facult ies were conceived of as a continuous
series, present - at least t hroughout existence in t he common,
mate r ial ..... arid - even when the mental seri es, t oo, i s function-
ing .
219
The possibility that alayavijiiana was conceived of as a
conti nuous entity al r eady in the Initial Passage would almost turn
i nto certainty in the - t o be sure unlikely - case t ha t the term
'alayavi jiiana' was, already in this passage J ac tually intended to
inc lude t he nuance of "mind which is clung to [ as Self]" ( 2.10 ),
because Clingi ng to Self can hardly take plac e in the state of
nil'odhasamapatti 220 but must refer r ather to ordinary s tates of
.
mind, and preferably t o ordina ry persons at that.
2.13.7
Like almost t he whole of the Yogacarabhlimi 221 and even
many part s of othe r early Yogacara texts , 222 t he Initial.
Passage does n ot show any trace of idea l ism or
s piritualism, but on the contrary plainly cont radicts such a
positition, si nce a, already poi nted out ( 2.1 32) the
se n s e - f a cu I tie s ar e not only not taught t o be
me r e images ina I a y a v i j ii. .i n a but, on t he contrary,
,
1 a y a v i j i\ a n
,
i, expressly taught to stick i n t h e
m a t e r i a 1
,
e
n ,
e -
f a cuI t i e
,
. Besides, our pas-
sage only mentions , as arisi ng from Seeds in alayavijiiana, the
pravrttivijiianas , but not t he material sense-faculties or the body
or even t he external world. And even if it did, this would not eo
ipso imply t hei r being nothi ng but mind or mental images . 223
Rathe r we have to take i nto account the view that m at e ria 1
- 33 -
2.1 3.)
thi ngs may 0 rig ina t e fro CD min d , just as in the
bija theory presupposed by our passage (see 2. 5), and that this
fact does by no mear..s jeopardize their materiality and involve
thei r ideality, no more than the complementary the sis of the
afore-mentioned bija theory, viz. that mind may, i n c ertain situa-
tions , originate from matter, i s intended to imply materialism.
Thus, the origin of the alayaviji'iana theory does n ot seem to
have any material connection
v i j ri apt i m 6 t rat d
with
224
the origin of the doct rine of
nor do, as far as I can see,
t he Yogacar abhUmi passages where alayavijnana occur s show any
significant relation to H a hay a n a .225
3.0.1-3.0.2 - 34 -
3. Development of ilayavijnana to the basic constituent of a
living being
3. 0. 1
Afte r having presented and discussed i n 2 what I consi d-
er to be the passage represent i ng , in princi ple at least,
the ori ginal context of the introduction of ilayavijiiana, I shall
now try to show, on the basis of the earl iest how the
newly i ntroduced concept was subseque ntly developed . To be sur e,
this reconst ruction of t he early developments of the concept of
al ayavijiiana i s, once again, a h y po t h e tic a lone , t he
more so si nce it presupposes an at least partly h y pot h e t -
i c al chr onology of t he pe r tinent sources and takes a s i ts
s tarting point a passage only h Y pot h e t i c a I 1 y i ni-
t ia1. But, apart from t he fact that I hope to have demonstrated
the p ro b a b i Ii t Y of t he two hypotheses on whi ch my
r econstruct i on is based : if 1 shoul d succeed in showi ng that t he
major s ubseque nt developments can be reconstructed i n a consistent
and uns t rai ned way on t he basis of these hypotheses , this would be
i n its t urn a further proof that t hey are correct . At any r ate,
some of the obse r vations to be made in the course of reconstruc t-
ing the subseque nt development s of the alayavijnana concept may be
worthwhile i n t he ir own right and will probabl y r emai n valid even
i f futur e research were to show t hat the line of development
proposed by me needs correction.
3.0. 2
In the present paragraph, t s hall descri be what one might
call the straight or linear devel opment of i l ayavijiiana
- its developme nt from what appears to have been, primarily, a
"gap-bridger" into the very basis of personal exi:stence and,
fi nally, even of all phenomena - , whereas the devel opment of its
negative (es pec ially s pirit ually negat ive) aspect s and the specif-
ic problems of its viJ"nana nature will be t r eat ed i n separate
chapters (viz; . 4 and 5, respectivel y) . In all cases, I mainly
confine myself to the early period (Basic Section. of the Yogacara-
bhumi , Sarpd.hinirmocanasutra and Vini scayasaJIIgraha1J.I ) I wit h occa-
- 35 - 3 1-3.2. 1
sional but s hort excursions i nto later developments (especially at
the end of ch. 5, [ viz. 5.loff.], but cpo also 3 .11. 8,
3. 12, 6-7, 3. 13.5ff., and 4 8. 5-6) .
3. 1 Whatever one may cons ider to be already implied, or not yet
implied, by the InitiaL Passage, other passages of the Basic
Section of the Yogacarabhumi make it certain that it ",as at any
r ate r ealized quite soon t hat the new concept of alayavijnana did
not only soLve the problem of nil"odha8amapatti but was applicable
to other situations as well, and that it was, moreover, well
suited for the purpose of tying up and at the s ame time further
developing several loose ends of previous speculation.
3.2.1 To begin with, it was sel f-evident that t he same diffi-
culty as in nil"odhasamapatti - viz . that without the
presence of some kind of viJ'nana to appropriate, Le. keep l i v e ~
cor por eal matter the person entering this state would die
obtains no less in the case of t he ot her state of unconscious
absorption, vi z. "absorption into [the state of] an unconscious
[being]1I (asaJ'!1J"nisamapatti). The ref ore, although t here was in this
case, in contrast to nil"odhasamapatti, no Sut r a passage express-
ly stating t he presence of a viinana, the Similarity of the
si tua ti on from the systematical point of view st r ongly suggested
that in t he case of aSaJ'!1jiiisamapatti, too, it was the presence of
a I a y a v i j nan a that prevented death. Indeed, this conc lu-
sion is actually documented in a paragraph of the Proof POl"tion
226
of the VinSg a1.ay. Ttoeatise (see 1. 5), where the existence of
alayavijiiana is proved by pointing out that otherwise unconscious
absorption, expressly specified as nirodha- and a s a ~ J" n i -
samiipatti, would not be possible,22
7
the Sutra passage that in
nil"odhasamapatti viJ"iiiina has not left the body being quoted here
- in an unspecific form lacking the express reference to nil"odha-
samapatti - merely as scr iptural evidence
i n g the (dogmatic) a rgument .
corrobo r at-
32.2-3. 3. 0 - 36 -
3. 2.2
The fact that the extension of alayavijiiana from nil'odha-
to QsCll!l.inisamapatti has been documented, in the preced i ng
paragraph, only from the ViniscayasalJlgrahal)i does not mean that
this step, in spite of being all too obvious, was taken compara-
tively late. Rather it shows that the Proof Portion includes
fairly old elements.
228
For not only for this step hut even for
what liQuId seem to be a further one, viz. the explicit extension
of the presence of alayavijiiana to other comparable states, there
is clear proof already in the Basic Section of the Yogacarabhumi.
l" or the Sacittika-and-Aci ttiki Bhumil)229 teaches that alayavijnana
is present in five of the six unconscious states, i.e. not only in
nirodha- and QSClIpjiiieamapatti but also in an existence as a n un-
conscious [heavenly] being (aswpjilika, the cosmic pendant to aSaJ!1"""
jiiisamQpatti) as well as i n deep sleep and deep swoon,23
0
and that
it is only missing in the state of Extinction where no "posses-
sions " (i . e. skandhas) remain (nirlJ.padhUe{lo nirval;UldhatlJ.';).
3. 3. 0
Ot her states for which at least f a i n t n e s s of
consciousness wa s regarded
rebirth - more precisely:
to be typical are the mome nt of
of Linking up (pratisandhi) a
new existence, which in the case of human beings and "higher"
animals means; at the moment of conception - and the moment of
d eat h . 23
f
According to the this faint conscious-
ness was a manovijiidna,2
3
2 and originally this appears to have
been the view of the Yogacaras , too.
233
It is even reported to
have been advocated by later r epresentatives of this school. 234
Yet, it would seem t hat alayavijiiana - like bhavaliga- viniidJ;Ul in
Theravada dogmatics
235
- was bette r cal culated to explain these
two states also . In fact , in late Yogacara sources the view is
expressed that at t he moment of conception as well as at that of
death there is no manovijnana but onll
36
alayaviji\ana. 237 In the
Basic Section of the Yogacarabhlimi , however , there is no mention
of alayavijiiana i n connection with the moment of death or process
of dying (apart, of course, from the fact that its presence in
nirodhasamapatti p r e v

n t
,
death), but it does occur in
- 37 -
13 3 1.1-3 3 1.1
context of rebirth/ conception, though even here it is not so
. uch the psychological aspect but rather the b i 0 log i cal
function of mind which appears to have entailed its introduction.
].]. 1. 1
Thi s biological function of mind (vijnana) at the moment
of conception is already expressed Oy
th'
canonical
s tat ement
238
that if vi jiiiina did not enter
th'
mother's womb.
... ..::-:::l'upa (largely z mind and matter) would not. be able to coalesce
139 239a
I ,or t he father's semen and the mother' 5 blood
r"iJ.i ch have aIIalgamated there) woul d not. be able to coal esce [with
aind] or / and coagulate, so as to become the proto-embryo (katata).
5ioilar formulations can be found in the VastusarpgrahaQi
240
and
-::b.e Basic Sectio11
241
of the Yogacarabhumi. But in one passage of
141 . - 143
the 3asic Section as well as in later Yogacara sour ces a nd
in later quotations of the canonical statement
244
t he phrase-
is slight l y changed to the effect that it is now min d
:'':j>id"na) that is stated to c oalesce with, or merge i nto (812.0/""
the mixture of semen and blood ,
3.3.1 .2 It is evident that this uijiUina merging i nto the initial
stage of corporeal matter was almost predestinated to be
- and, in the Manobhumi of the Basic Section ,245 i n fa ct .... as -
U;!'ntified with alayavijfiana, "mi nd [ characterized by] sticki ng in
ma terial sense-faculties]". The more so since, similar to ala-
ya" ijnana present in nil'odhasamapatti, .... hich is , in the Initial
stated to comprise the Seeds (bija) of the pravfttivijfia-
!!.as ( 2,13. 1), mind at
.7.:ontain all See d s
into seme n- cum-blood it
the moment of conception too is taught to
(sal"vabija (ka)) . 246 Moreover, by merging
causes the next moment
247
of this series
.:o f material f actors to be furni s hed .... ith the sense of touch (kJi-
248 i.e. to be a sensitive, livi ng organism; and the
.7.:oal escing of proto-embryonic matter and mind - .... hich means that
become so closely united as to share each other's destiny
_ has the effect that mind prevents em-
bryonic matter from putrefying,2
5
0 which in its t urn means nothing
t han that the vijiiiina ari Si ng at the moment of conception
3 3 1. 3- 3.3. 1.4
- 38 -
initia tes biological a p pro p ria t io n (
) 251
,
whi c h wa s also implied a s an essential function of alaya";ijiiana in
nil"Odhasamcipatti (see 2 . 13.4). Finally, the merging of vijiidl1O.
into semen-cuM-blood at the mome nt of conception should also
include the aspect - typical of alayavijnana in nil'odhasantlpatti
of hid i n g there J s i nee the term sarp-mwrch- , whe n predi cated
of vijmna, suggests also t he nua nce of IIfainting!!.252
Yet , it would seem that in spite of these agreements the
context of enterjng the womb at t he mome nt of conception
entails, at the same timc , a slight shi f t of meaning of the term
'alayavijilana'; for i n contra st to the Initial. Passage ( 2. 1),
where the 5 tat e of being hid den in the material
sen s e f a c u 1 tie s appea r s to be t he pr edomi nant aspect,
in the context of mind enter ing the at the moment of
conception .... hat i s i n the foreground is rather t he act 0 r
pro c C s s of merging int o, or of becoming c l osely u nit -
e d .... ith, the germinal state of the bod}' as a whole, and it
seems to be to t his context that the explanation of the term
'alayav ijnana
l
in the (see 2. 8) refers.
253
3. 3.1. 4
Finally, it may have been in the context of its (expli-
cit) identifi cation .... ith the vijnana ariSing at the
moment of conception t hat alayavijnana came to be expressly regard-
ed as "falling under [ the category of what is a result of the]
Maturation [ of previous karman (and Delight in worldly exist-
ence) ]254" (vip<ikasaJ!Igrhita). For at l east in an analysis of
pl"atityasamutp<ida, found both in the Basic Section and in the
255 the vijiiiina .... hic h i s produced at t he time of
Linking up (pl"atisandhipha1.avijiiiina) in the very first moment of
the ne .... existence i s expressly taught to be [Res ult-of-]Maturati on
(vip<ika) , 256 as in Theravada Abhidharma
257
but contrar y to t.he
and even to at least one ( pre- or a t any rate
non-alayavijnanic) passage of the ViniScayasaJ}lgrahaT}L 259 At any
rate 1 in the passage of the Manobhumi of t he Basic Section where
it has express ly taken the place of mind Dlergi ng with semen-cum-
- 39 - 33.2.1
blood at
qualified
t he moment of conception, alayavijnana 1s explicitly
as belonging to the category of [Res ult-of-] Matura-
t
. 260
1. on .
3.3.2.1 As has already been s t ated ( 3. 3. 0), in the Basi c
Section. of t he Yogacar abhumi alayavijiiana ha s not yet
been i nt r oduced into the context of the moment of death or proce ss
of dying . As far as the p s y c hoI 0 g i ca l aspect is
concerned, the Basic Section. says, on the one hand , that one may
die eithe r in a
(avyakrta) state

man , at l east
good (kutlal.a) or a had (akutla ta ) or a neutral
of mi nd
261
( wh ich i s also the doctrine of the
On the
if he
othe r hand , it i s said t bat i n a dying
person,263 there arises
is an ordinary
self-love {dtmasnehaL followed by welcoming or desiring a [new]
basis-of-personal-existence (atmabhtivdbhinandanci
264
) , 265 and this
would seem to entail that mind at t he moment of death is al .... ays
de f i 1 e d (kLi'ta) .266 In both passages , t he dying person
may, before actually dying, lapse into a state of faint
i ndistinct (avispa{l'ta) consciousness (SClJ!Ij'iid) 267 which in t he
fir st i s taught to be morally ne utral (avya/q'ta)268 a nd i n the
second may well include a kind of half-conscious continuation of
desi re f or a new bas i s -of - personal-exis tence, 269 although one has
to admit that the text of the ogacarabhiimi does n o t e x -
p lie i t 1 Y say so . 27
0
In a pre- or non-a1ayavijnanic piece
of t he an altogether different vi e .... is advocat-
ed, according to .... hich mind at the moment of deat h i s, as in
Theravada,27
1
ex c 1 u s i ve l y ( Re s ult-of-]Maturation (vipa-
ka) and t herefore morally neutral and not obst ructed (by Defile-
ment s ] (anivr tavyaKfta) . 272 And even in those porti ons of the
ViniScayasarpgrahaQI which make use of alayavijnana it is only in
the s p e cia 1 ca se of the A r hat who is going to ente r
the s tate of Extinction .... here no "possess ions" (i . e . skandhas)
remai n t hat , in one passage,2
73
mi nd
at the moment of death i s unambiguously implied to be nothing but
a 1 a y a v i j a a n a because the Arhat dies i n the s tate of
n i rod h a 8 a map a t t i where only alayavijnana i s l eft.
3. 3. 2. 2 - 40 -
In the case of ordinary per sons, however , t he presence of mano-
V1.Jnana at death seems to be expli ci.t l y stated even in one of the
nalayavijnanic
H
portions of t he Viniscayasalllgraha"I. 274
3. 3. 2.2 Once again , it is rather under the b i 0 log i c al
aspect t hat a layavij iiana appears to have, in a genera l
way, come to be introduced into the cont ext of dea t h . To be sur e ,
the mere fact that at t he moment of death mind (uijiiiina) i s said
t o abando n the bod y (or t he
personal existence) it had kept appropriated
cor poreal basis of
t hroughout lif e
275
may be taken to s uggest t hat thi s function s hould have been
ascribed to al ayavijiiana at leas t a s soon as the latter had ex-
pressly become identified wi t h t he vijnana i nitiating t he ap-
propriation of the (germinal s tate of t he) body at t he mome nt of
co n c e p t i 0 n But there wa s n 0 C o m p u I s i o n t o
do so as l ong as the presence of a not h e r kind of vijnana
at t he moment of death was not called .i nto ques tion (cp .
3. 3. 2. 1) a nd a s long as bi ol ogical appropriation had not e x -
pre s s ly become the e x c 1 u s i v e fun c tion of a laya-
vij nana (an exclus i veness whi ch appear s diffi c ult to prove for t he
i nit ial period and woul d pres uppose the continuity of a l ayavijnana
(see 2. 13. 6. It: i s rather asp e c i f i c as pect of thi s
biol ogical fun ction of vijnana at death t hat may have favoured
its attribution to alayavi jnana: viz . the fact that, at least in
t he case of gradual death (kramacyuti) , 276 viiiiiina was cons idered
to abandon t he body i n s t e p s , s t arti ng - in a ccordance
with one l s karman and s ignali zing, by t he direction of its move-
ment, t he direction of r ebirth - eithe r from t he upper or from the
lower part of t he body, the withdrawal of viiiidna being i ndicated
by a corresponding disappearance of bodily heat . 277 It is obvious
that such a process l ends itself t o bei ng explai ned in t e nns of a
" somati c l! vijiiiina which was , l i ke alayavijli.ana, regarded a s s tick-
ing i n, or pervading, the body and could easily be imagined to
withdraw from it, s t e p b y S t e p, in t he process of
dying . Ye t , even in t his context the Basic Section
278
does not
i ntroduce .ilayavijilana but me r ely uses the i n s pee i fie
- 4 1 - 3 4. 1
t.erm ' vijiiiina '. as do also the sources wbich advocate
a similar view279 and do not seem to have fe lt any difficulty
eithe r , the gr adual withdrawal of mind and di s appearance of bodily
heat being explained by a gradual s hrinking of the sense of toucb
(kayendriya) . 280 It i s only i n t he Proof Portion of t.he VinSg
aZay. 1l>eatise that t he body ' s becoming gr adually cold in t he
process of dying is explained to be due to a gradual withdrawal of
a 1 a y a vij na na as t he subject of biological appropriation .
281
Under these circums tances , it would seem doubtful tha t the fact
that alayavijii.ana came to be empl oyed i n the context of the
biological a spect of mi nd in the process of dying fur ther contribu-
ted t o expressly r egarding it as a co n ti n u 0 u s entity of
which biological approp r iation is the e x c Iu s i v e funct i on
(let alone t he possi bili ty that i t might have been i n t hi s context
that ilayavi jiiana was fi r st conceived ) ; i t would appear mor e
likel y that alayavijii.ana wa s rather r ecurred t o for a better
explanation of t he biological functions of vijiidna at death only
aft e r it had already c 1 ear I y come to be conceived of
a s the continuous and exclusive sub ject of biological appropria-
ti on , as seems to be t he ca s e already in some passages of the
Basic Section (see 3.5) .
3.4.1 To be sure, alayavij ii. ana may well have been conceived of
as continuous from the outset, but in t he absence of a n
explicit statement to this effect in the InitiaL Passage we cannot
be sur e of this (see 2 . 13. 6). Even the fac t t ha t alayavijfiana
is, in ot be r passages , decl ared to oCCU[' not only i n nil"odhasama-
but also in other states where consciousness is lacking or
i s faint ( 3. 1-2 and 3. 3 .1 ) does not necessarily imply its
cont inuity, a s is s hown by the counter-evidence of
... hleh, t hough functioning in al l kinds of gaps,282 is yet regarded
t.-:! be int e rrupted as soon as conscious mind processes arise.
283
But in contrast to alayavijiiana , has nothing to
with Seeds (bija) , which do not f igure i n t he Theravada s ystem.
The refore, it may not be unreasonabl e to s uppose t hat t. he idea of
- 42 -
the continuity of alayavijiiana somehow de rives from its associa-
tion .. i th Seeds; ho .. precisel y, is, however , a question wh ich t
can ans wer only i n a rather speculative way ( 3.4. 2-3) .
3.4.2 One possibility is that the idea of t he continuity of
alayavijiiana may have been provoked, or at any rate r e-
inforc ed , by t he fact t hat it came to be identified .. ith. or to
supersede . II Min d - co n t a i n i n g - a I 1 - See d s "
(sarva.biJa(ka )rp vijiidnam}284 si nce in an ol der version of the
( material s compi l ed in t he) first two chapt er s of the Basic
Sectior. ! see 6.1 and 6 . 3) the latter appears to have fulfilled
functions in t wo cont exts .. ith ... hi ch alayavijiiana had already
been . could easily come to be, a ssociated: viz . as the basis in
the sense of Seed (bijaJJraya)28
5
of sense percepti ons and mano-
vij.,jr;'256 and as the vijiidna merging i nto semen-cum-blood at the
.o.ent of conce ption.
287
Now, it appea r s that Mi nd-conta ining-all-
See.:i ,S i s something like the mind series (vijnanasantana) i n s 0
fa, as it contains all Seed s: not yet c onceived of as a new
kind cof mind i n its own right but at best on t he point of
developi ng in this dir ection (see 7. 3. 6. 3. 3) . If t his is cor -
rect, - being, i n substance, ident ical
.. ith the mind ser ies - .. ould be largely ( i.e. apart from s tates
like which may s imply have not been envisaged)
co n ti n u 0 u s . Thus, .. hen alayavijiiana came to supersede
Mind-contai ning-all-Seeds, it s hould , in addition to incorporati ng
the Seeds conta ined in mind, have a lso inherited t he approximative
cont inuity of Mind-containing-a l l-Seeds, and have at the same t ime
s uppleme nted it so as t o reach complete continuity i n so far as
a l ayavijnana itsel f was conceived of as being present i n pr ec i sely
those occasional unconscious states where t he ordinary mind series
... as i nt errupted .
3.4. 3
Yet , it appears Hkewi se possibl e t hat alayavijna.na was
conceived as being cont inuous even before i t came to take
the place of Mi nd-containi ng-all-Seeds . As alrcady s ugges t ed in
2.1 3. 6, the Seeds of mind s ti cki ng in t he material sense-faculties
- 43 - 3 5
_ by hypostatizing .... hich into a new kind of uijiUina. the concept of
alayavijiiana appears to have a r isen ( 2. 5) - seem to have been
conside r ed a more or less conti nuous series, which means that even
from t he very outset alayavi j iiana, too, may have been conceived as
being continuous, at least by tendency. Whe ther this .... as t he case
or not, continuity may, at any r ate, have come i n oc been
reinforced by the fact that, just as the Seeds of mind contained
in corporeal m a t t e c , so also the Seeds of mi nd contai ned
i n the m i n d s e c i e s (vijnanasantana ) - .... hich, apart from
s poradic interruptions as i n nirodhaaamii.patti, definitely form a
continuous flow - could, with the same right, be hypostatized
288
and even declared to be a sublilllinal f orm of mind in their own
right; oc , since there is no r eason to assume
t " 0
such new
ki nds of mi nd wit h identical f unct i ons, t hey could simply
be
-
d d e d to a 1 a y a v i j nan

. The latte r would thus
have come to comprise b 0 t h sets of Seeds, t hereby virtually
becoming identical with the beginningless and conti nuous series of
Seeds (biJoa- santana- pl'abandho 289 sticking in the ba-
sis-of-personal-existence as a 290 and it would likewise
naturally have come to s upersede the less elaborate concept of
Mi nd-containing-all-Seeds (see 3. 4. 2).
3.5 In view of the precedi ng cons iderati ons it would seem legi-
timate to understand a layavijilana in the first three chap-
ters of t he Basic Section,29
1
even in the absence of an express
statement t o that effect, as a co n tin u 0 u s entity which ,
as the result of the Maturation (vipdka) of previous karman.
enters the mot her I 5 womb at the moment of conception a nd me r ges
into selllen-cum-blood, appropr ia ting (upadGitr) it so as to con-
st itute it as a liring organ i sm, and keeping it appropriated
t h r 0 ugh 0 u t
which, compr ising
t h r 0 ugh 0 u t
of every
tion (manovijri6na) .
I i f e, even in unconscious s tates, and
all Seeds (sarvabijaka) ,
functions
1 i f e as the basis in the sense of Seed
kind
292
of sense-perception and mental cogni-
3. 6-3 . ).2 - 44 -
3. 6 This is, at any rate , the unequivocal poSH:lon of the (basic
layer of)
2
93 the Proof Portion of the VinSg atay. Tl'eatise,
where the picture is, moreover, completed by the information that
step by step - abandons the body at the time
of death cannot be anything else but the vijriiina which had,
throughout life, kept it appropriated, i.e. alayavijiiana (see
3. 3. 2.2).
3. 7. 1 In the Pr>oof Portion (especially its basic layer) , biolog-
ical appropriation, i.e. being the principle of life stick-
ing in, and pervading, the body, is clearly the predominant
function of alayavijnana . The " somatic " character of alayavijiJ.ana
is, in the Proof Portion, moreover manifest in the idea that the
existence of alayavijiiana is evident from (i.e. - as ] understand
it - that its presence in the body reveals itself through) mani-
fold (or: diffuse ?) corporeal experience (kiiyiko or
experiences of the body [ari sing] in the bodl
94
(kaye kayanu-
as they occur in meditative absorption or in ordinary
states of concent rated reflection,2
95
where a functioning of sense-
perception (including tactile experience) is excluded .
296
3.1.2
special case of such corporeal experiences due to alaya-
vijnana appears to be touched upon in the Hsien-yang-s heng-
chiao_lun.
297
This text states that - in contrast to joy (p l' i -
t i) which is men t a I pleasure based on "forthcoming" mind
(pl"avrttiviJ'nana, in this case manoviJ'nana) the pleasant
[ corporeal] sensation (8 u k h a) e xperienced in the first or
second dhyana is an agreeable feeling cons isting in a furthering
of the bod y (a-Sl"aya) , a sense of bodily well-being, based on
(and somehow manifested by) .i I a y a vijnana. This probabli
98
means that in the first and second dhyana alayavijnana, sticking
in the body, suffuses the latter with E a s e (p1"aS1"abdhi)299 ,
whjch had come to replace the Badness - of which
alayaviji'iana had consisted before - when the basis-of-personal-
existence (i.e . the body , or body-and-mind) was transmuted at the
time of attaining dhyana .
300
- 45 -
3. 8.1-3. 8.2
1..8.1 Taking alayav ijiiana
.,
a C 0 n t i n u
o u , entity (
:;.5) inevitably implies that apart from unconscious
!toAtes like nirodhasamapatti - one has to assume t he
,
i m u
1 -
t

n e 0
u ,
occur rence of at l east two vijMnas : one or the
~ t h e r of t he ordina r y vijiidnas. and alayavijiiana . But this was
tr"bLeomatic since there is explicit evidence showi ng that the
rre-alayavijnanic materials of t he Yogacarabhumi
3o
] share t he view
~ f .... st Abhidharma school s
302
t hat in one and t he same st r eam-of-
;:-e r sonal.i ty several uijritinas cannot arise simulta neously. 303 To
~ s ure, alayavijiiana i s, in the Basic Section, hardly anything
Nt See d 5 (bija) hypostati:.ed i nto anew J subliminal ki nd
~ f mind, and t here is no objection t o the simul taneous occurrence
... ( the mind series (viJ"nanasantana) and an ( uninterrupted )3
0
4
nries of Seeds accompanying it, 305 lihi ch means that in t he case
~ f alayavijnana simultane ity Iii th one or t he othe r of t he actual
:.:iiritinae may . at that stage, have been felt to be i noffens i ve .
l"et , in so far as Seeds had been hypostatized into a new kind of
:: i J" 1'1 a n: a , t he principle of non-simultan eity of vijiitinae came
to be at leas t formally violated whe n .ilayavijiiana lias
a ssumed to be conti nuous . A more or less distinct awareness of
t his dif fic ulty, and a shrinking back f r om open confli ct wit h t he
afor e-menti oned principle .. may well account for the fact t hat, i n
t he Basic Section, a n explicit stat ement i s lacking not only for
the si multaneity of alayavijiiana and " fort hcoming" vijnanaB but
e\'en for t he conti nui ty of alayavijiiana, if one disregards one
Wlambiguous but stlll indirect r eference i n the commentary on the
- -- 30 6(
Parama rthagathas which I tend to assign to the latest layer of
the Basic Section)3
0
7.
3.8. 1
The situation has, however, c ha nged in the Proof Portion
of the VinSg ti1.ay. TreatiBe . To be s ure, i n the basic
material (i.e . "'hat I have called layer Al and A2 in 9 . 2) the
conti nuity of alayavijiiana is, even here , not expressly stated,
but it i s unequivocally presupposed by alayavij iiana being con-
trasted "'ith t he non-continuous pr avrttiviji'i.anas. 308 But, in con-
tradistinction to the Basic Section, in the f'1ooof POl'tiOl1 t he
3. 8.3-3.9.1 - 46 -
i nevitable corollary of continuity, vi:.. the s i m u 1 ta n e-
i t y of alayavijaiina and pravtttivij iianas, is not only take n f or
granted
309
but _ in t he subsidiary material (layer 81 and B2 in
9. 2) - explicitly rea 1 i z ed and d e fen d e d , 310
3. 8. 3
The a rguments adduced for this purpose - I disregard t he
third one (layer 82) whic h i s still more advanced (see
9) try to vindicate s imult a ne ity by pointing out that even
simultane ous occurrence of several pravrttivijnanas has t o be
accept ed, 3
11
From the point of view of the pre- or non-alayavijna-
oic material s of the Yogacarabhumi, t his amount s to exorcizing t he
devil by Beel zebub. But a simil ar t heory of simul taneous occurr ence
not only of a continuous subliminal f orm of mi nd with actual
vijniinas but
-
given the neces sa ry condi tions - also of s e v -
e r a 1 a c t u a 1 u i j 11 ti n a s (occasionally even of all
t he six kinds of them) is , a s i s well-known, categori cal ly affirm-
ed in the Vth c hapter of the As t hi s text
appears to stem from a somewhat different mil ieu ,3
1
3 it is more
likely t o have introduced s uch a basically different pattern t han
the Proof Portion, or it may even have i nherited or adapted it,
for the vie .... that i n one stream-of-personali ty several vi j nanaa
may occur simultaneously is i n fact documented to have been
advocated by the (or ce rtain ?) M a ha s a g h i k a s3
1
4, 3 15
The close relation bet .... een t he pertinent passages of the FToof
Portion and t he is , at any rate, evident from
t he r eference, i n both texts, to the peculiar notion of a n
a ppercepti ve manoviJ'nana simultaneous ly acc ompanying (sahtinuc(l)"Q)
sense-perception. 316
3.9.1
c h a p
l ooks
(cittQ1]7
ki nd of
Prov ided that .... e disregard the
all diversi ty at t he end of
Mahayanist s urmounting of
the text 317 the V th
,
t e
,
o f t h e S a IjI d h i n i
,
mo c anas u t r a
like a first attempt at redrawing t he theory of mind
mana
vijiitinam) 318
by making the recently introduced new
mind contai ni ng all Seeds
(sarva bija(ka )3
1
9
which i s ,
in V, for t he first time expres sly taught to be sub tIe
- 47 -
3.9. 2. 1
i. e. s ubliminal) 320 and con tin u 0 U 5
321
- its
;: n t r al e 0 nee pt. The text does not even ment i on t he
s pe e i a 1 problem of mind in nil"Odhasamapatti (whi c h acc ord-
ill! to my hypothesis .... a s t he sta r ting point f or introduci ng the
c..:' ncept of alayavijnana and is, in the Yogacarabhumi , t he mo s t
frequent cont ext of the concept' s occurre nce ) 322. Rather SaT[ldh V
foc usses on the fun dam e n tal proce s ses of r e -
i r t hand per c e p t i o n l e o g nit ion . Now since
t bese are exactly t he s ame as thos e wher e alayavijaana figu r es i n
fir st t wo BhUmis of the Basic Sect ion of the YogacarabhUmi , 3
2
3
t be (nuclear portion of the ) Vth chapter of t he
t r a may have even been written with the very intention of supersed-
i ng the corres ponding portions of the Basi c Section
324
( a nd it wa s
s uperseded, i n its turn , by
i n a sense,
: r eatis6 (see
al s o by t he
5.5. 2)) . In
the way, by the Pravr tti Portion and ,
Nivrtti Por tion of the VinSg a! ay.
fa ct , the de vel-
or modifies t he s tatement s of the Basic Sect iol1 i n s everal
r egard s :
3.9.2. 1 In i t s t r eatment of r e b i r t h ( or Li nking up) , the
Sutra
325
specifi es that in whi chever cond ition living
e nt e r upon a new pe rsonal ( es p. corpor eal ) existence (atma-
326 the fact that Mind-containing-all-Seed s (ea1"vabi jakmp
i s reproduced a s the r esult of karmi c Maturati on (vi - pac- ),
. erges (sa.p-mUl"ch- ) , 327 grows and thri ves, 328 is de pendent on two
kinds of upadana . These two kinds of upaddna - one of which is
I bi ol ogi cal appropriation of) corporeal mat ter - will be di scus sed
lat e r (see 4.4). What is, however , relevant to the pres ent
jiscuss ion i s the fact that the SilJfIdhi ni rmocanas utra doe s not
. erely deal with r ebirth a s a man etc . - ,,(hich involves the
::ijiitina ' s ent ering t he mothe r' S womb and j ts coalescence with
proto-embryonic matt e r - or even other f orms of rebirth in world-
sphe r es where too there i s corporeal matter , 329 but e xpres sly
i ncludes the possibility of being r eborn in t he i m mat e r i -
a 1 world-s phe re (a1"upyadhatu). 33
o
3 9.2.2-3.9.2 3
- 48 -
3 ~ 9 2 2 Th is case is, to be sur e, explicitl y touched upon in a
pre-alayavijiianic analysis of pl'atityasamutpada in the
Savitarkadi - bhumi and VastusalJlgrahaQr33 I and briefly referred to
even in the Manobhiimi. 332 But th i s reference in the l atter text
belongs to a stratum .... here what contains all Seeds is the [ basi s-
of - Jpersonal-exi stence (atmabhaua ) , and nat alayavijiiana, and is
thus ent i rely disconnect ed with the reference t o alayavijii.ana ; f or
the latter only occurs i n a cont ext concerni ng rebirth as a
w a m b - b 0 r n living bei ng
333
a fac t whi ch i s highly
significant since accepting the presence of ilayavijiiana in arupya-
dhatu ( i.e. i n the world-s phe re c haracterized by 1. a c k of
matter, espec ially 0 f co r p 0 r e a 1. mat t e r ) inevita-
bly implies t hat alayavijfiana has to t ran S c en d its
original character of mind s ti c kin g 0 r h ~ din gin
cor p 0 rea 1 matte r ( 2. 13.2), which i s a l so the
r at ionale of its name ( 2. 7 ). To be sur c, s uch a consequence was
inevitable after alayavijfiana had incorporat ed also t he Seeds (of
mind) contained i n min d ( 3.4 . 3) and take n the place of
Mi nd-containing-all- Seeds (sa.rvabij a.kGJ!1 vijiitinam). But it appear s
t haC t hi s consequence ..... as not realized or even s hunned in the
Basic Section and e ven i n the Proof Port ion .
3.9.2. 3
Even i n the Sal[ldhinirmocana passage under discussion,
all that has happened is that Hind-containi ng-all-Seeds,
expressly identified , in the next paragraph (Sal[ldh V. 3), ..... ith
alayavi jnana , is explic i tly s tated t o be the central
element unde rgoing rebirt h (i.e . the " subject" of saJ]lsara)
in c 1 u din g rebirt h in arwpyadhatu . But t he above-mentioned
con seq u e n c e. obvious though it i s, is not drawn ,
for in SaJ]ldh V. 3 the term 'alayavijn.ana ' is still explained t o
Ilean "mind t hat s ti cks or hides i n t h e bod y J in t he
sense of sharing its destiny" ( 2. 8 ) - a meani ng whic h, t hough
obviously referring to the sit uation not of nirodhasamapatti but
of conception ( 3. 3. 1. 3), yet unmistakably pre serves the c l ose
rel ati on of alayavi j fiana to corporeal matter.
- 49 -
3 9.2 . 4- 3.9. 2. 5
3.9. 2.4 Certainly, thi s explanation of the term 'alayavijnana
'
may have been simpl y taken over, .... ithout change and
al ong wi t h t he term it self (see 1. 6 . 4 ), from t he Yogacarabhumi
mili eu . But t his is ha rdly possibl e in t he case of t he term by
whi ch the SaqKihininnocana sut r a usually designates the ney. sublim-
inal kind of mind, viz. I Ii d a 11 a v i j n a 11 a I. This term
the cannot have borro .... ed from the ogacarabhu-
mi (see 1. 6 . 4 ); it .... i11 rather have been newly coined by the
Sut r a itself I probably for t he
what it consider ed to be the
and/ or f or t he sake of set ting
of the Yogacarabhumi. 334
sake of a clearer expr ess i on of
mai n fun ction( s) of thi s vijfuina
itself off agains t t he t ermi nology
3. 9. 2.5
As Y. Sasaki has s ho",'n I 335 the primary meaning of the
term ' adanavijiklna ' seems to refer to t he function of
t a k in gp o sse s s io n of a ne .... body or ( bas i s-of-per-
sonal-}existence a t the moment of Linking up (pl'atieandhi)33
6
a function .... hi ch is expressed by ' parigl'aha , 337 or 'upcidtina , 338 I
but al so by 'adana ' , both i n canoni ca1
339
and in Yogacara texts .
340
To be sure , ' adana ' in ' adanavijnana 'may,
Iu d e to other ki nds of " taki ng", too,34
1
in addition, a 1 -
especially to biol og-
ical appropria tion designated by t he related t erm 'upiidana ' ( but,
a s far as I c an see, neve r by s imple 'a.dana , )34
2
,343 and t hi s
connotation is expressl y confirmed by l ater sources like the
Mahayanasalflgraha344 and pe rhaps also impli ed in the Sa1(ldhinirmoca-
nas utra ' s o .... n explana ti on of the term ' cidanavijnana ' . 34 5 But "tak-
i ng possession" is certai nly the primary function refer red t o by
the term 'adtinavijiidna ' , 346 and thi s fun ct i on i s distingui s hed
from biological appropriation in a t .... ofold manner: On t he one
hand .. "taking possession" s peci fi cally ref e r s to t he i nit ial moment
of an existence,347 ... he l eas biologic al appropriation, al t hough it
may , t o be s ure , inc lude the i nitial phase and t hus overlap with
"ta k.ing possession", 348 mainly , and sometimes perha ps even excl u-
sively, 349 refe r s to k e e pin g corporeal matter appropri ated
t h r 0 ugh 0 uti i f e 00 t he other hand - and thi s is
more important - "taking possession" i s appl icable to exi stence i n
3.9.2 . 6-3 9 3 - 50 -
the i m mat e ria 1 world-sphere
as well 350
,
where biological appropriation - referring, as it does , to corpore-
al matter - does not , of course, occur.
351
3.9. 2.6 Thus, one would expect the term 'iidanavijnana ' to i o-
elude (and perha ps even to have deliberately been chosen
to replace alayavijflana for the purpose of including) the case of
rebirth in the irnmateria.l world-sphere. Yet, the explanation of
iidanavijiiiina given by the Sutra itself
352
refers its function to
t he bod y
onl y . This means that even the Vth chapter of the
in spite of expressly touching upon the case
of rebirth in arupyadhtitu, nevertheles s appears to have not yet
fully recognized, whatever may be the reason,353 the consequence
that alayavijiiana/adanaviJ"nana cannot always, and hence ca n -
not e sse n t i a 1 I Y , be conceived of as sticking in the
body . Yet, it is clear that, in vie.., of the express mention, in
Satpdh V.2-3, of the immaterial world-sphere in connection with
mi nd - explicitly identified with alayavijiiana - taking and main-
taining possession of all kinds of personal existence, it could
have been but a small step to realize that alayavijiiana was not
essentially dependent on the body but could exist as a kind of
basis-of-personal-existence on its own.
3.9.3
The development of such a view would seem to have been
further favoured by the new outline of p s y c hoI 0 -
g y of a theory of cognitive and perceptive processes, which the
Vth chapter of the present s . For this outl ine
differs from that of the Ba8ic Section not only by explicitly
stating the conti nuity of the subliminal vijnana containing all
Seeds and its simultaneity with t he supraliminal, ordinary forms
of mind
354
and by even admitting the simultaneous occurrence of
several of these ordinary forms of mind , but also by describing
subliminal mind as the bas i s of the ordinary perceptions and
cognitions, and this not merely (as in the Basic Section) in the
sense of being their Seed but also, and even primarily J 354a as a
kind of simultaneous sub s t rat u m or fundamental layer J
- 51 -
3. 10 . 1-3. 10 3
on the basis (saJ?Initfl'itya pl"ati{lthaya) of which, given the neces-
sary conditions (viz. intact sense-faculty and a corresponding
object)3 sense-perceptions and cognitions arise like waves on the
surface of a river or like images reflected in a mirror.
35S
3.10.1
Portion
This substratum function of alayavijnana is expressly
distinguished from its Seed
of t he VinSg (Hay. 'l'Peatise
356
function in the Pravrtti
and put on a par with the
function of simultaneous basis (sahabhu-at1'l'aya) the material sense-
faculties have with regard to sense-perceptions (though it is at
the same time qualified as
only with regard to manaa
357
obtaining, in a d ire c t form,
and manovi,jiidna, whereas with refer-
enee to sense- perceptions alayavijnana is said to function as a
s upport only indirectly by way of appropriating the material
sense_faculties).358
3.10. 2
The Pravrtti Portion also repeatedly touches upon the
presence of alayavijiiana i n tbe immaterial ,,-,orld-sphere
(drupyadhdtu).359 But although mentioning, in passing, .ii1ayavijiia-
nats function of biological appr opriation,3
60
the Pravrtti Portion,
in contradi sti nction to the Sal]ldhi nirmocanasiitra, does not, at
least not eXPlicitly,361 refer to, l et alone define, alayavijiiana
as sticking or hidi ng in the body or in the material sense-facul-
ties. Therefore, it would seem that in the Pravftti POl'tion
362
alayavijnana has, a t least de facto, transcended its original
feature of essentially being bound, and sOllehow subordinate, to
corpor eal matter-, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental
constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter
363
a nd
eventually even superseding the l atter in its funct.ion of basis[-
of-personal-existence]
3.10. 3 This development of alayavijiiana to a basic constituent
of personality, t f not to the most fundamental one , wa s,
to be sure , called forth already by the equation of alayavijiiana
with Mind-containing-all-Seeds vijnanam) (cp. n.
428), was foreshadowed in a few passages of the Basic Section (see
3. 11.1 - 52-
6.5.4 and 6.7 . 4.2), and is fairly palpable in the
nasutra ( 3.9. 3) and in the Pravrtti Portion ( 3 .10 . 1-2). There
is , however, as far as I can see, only one passage in the
Yogacarabhumi (and in its Basic Section at that)3
6
4 which explicit-
ly documents the stage where alayavijiiana had become < h e
basis(-of-personal-existence) cat e x 0 c h en , ousting the
body from this position; but this passage - .... hich also tdes to
reinterpret the t e r m 'alayavijfiana
'
accordingly (see 6 . 2. 2.
d) - can be shown to be a secondary addition to the text (see
6 . 2.3-4), and at any rate it r epresents (or anticipates?) the
position of some .... hat later sources.
365
This position becomes par-
ticularly manifest 'When alayavijiiana - not the Six Senses (fjaq.aya-
tana)366 _ i s taught to be the basic entity constituting a living
being (mau'LaJr! sattva- dravYQl/1) . 367 I t wa s, of course, reinforced
by the introduction of the mind-only doctrine whi ch reduced corpo-
real matter to a mere "representation" in mind .
3.11. 1
It appears that it was only i n connection with this
emancipation of alayavijiiana from corporeal matter and
development i nto a basic constituent-of-personali ty on its
Olffl, finally even superseding corporeal matter in its function of
basis [-of-personal-existence] (atjraya) , that t he idea was formed
that alayavijiiana, though because of its unsatisfactori ness (see
4. 1.4) it is not , of course
J
r eally Self (atman) , is nevertheless
the ultimate or deepest 0 b j e c t i v e bas i s to .... hich
the not i 0 0
feeling of identity
o f E go or Self (ahaJ!1kara, etc .) , the
(asmimdna) and self-love (atma- sneha, etc.)
refe r. To be sur e, it cannot be excl uded that frOIll the very outset
alayavijfiana had somehow been conceived of as (part of) t he object
of Cli nging to Self (see 2. 10 and 2.13.5). But there is no
e x p 1 i ci t statement to this effect in the Basic. Section of
the Yogacarabhiimi. On the ot he r hand, there a r e a coupl e of
(almost certainly pre-alayavijiianic) passages conce rning the ob-
ject of t he notion of 'I', etc., .... hich obviously paved t he way for
alayavijiiana to take over this function . too.
- S3 -
3. 11. 2-3 11. 3
3.11. 2 A passage of t he Ma nobhtimi
368
states t hat with regard to
t he bas i s- of- personal-existence (ritmabhciva) 3
6
9 , in spite
of its being, as the Noble Ones know, ul timately unsatisfactor y37o
l and t herefore n ot Sel f), immature (i.e.. ordi nary) peopl e form
t he notion of 'I' or 'mine ' or '[t his ] I am '. This woul d ha r dly
seem t o go beyond canoni cal statements
3
? 1 if atmabhciua is taken t o
mean t he totality of the psycho-physical constituents of personal i -
t y, i. e. t he five skandhas . 372 The surroundi ng passages J 373 ho ... -
ever , poi nt to a furthe r development by taking titmabluiva in t he
nilr ro ..... er sense of const i tuents of personal existence i n so fa r
,;, nly as t hey a r e the r esul t of karmic Mat u rat io n (or,
m", r e precisely, in so far as t hey are, though al so caused by
ka rman . p r i m a r i 1 y the res ult of d e l i g h t i n
"'or dl y existence (prapancdbhirati) )374 , and this is a restriction
.::onfi r med by the Sr avakabhumi inter preti ng titmabhdva as t he Six
Senses ({!' a4dyatana) - viz . the five materi al sense-fa culti es ( plus
: heir gross s upport, i . e. the body?) a nd mind
375
- whi ch (or : in
s.:" far as t hey?) have arisen f rom [ the process of karllic ] Matura-
tion.
376
Besides , t his dtmabhdva is , in t he pe r tinent passages of
:he Hanobhumi, specified a s "containing all Seeds " (8orvabija-
;"-= 1
377
or the Seeds of all [ poss i bl e bases-of - Jpersona l -exi s t e nce
or - bijopagata
379
) .
3.11. 3
- --380 ( 1
In the Parama r thagathas, t he Result-of - Mat uration
which c.o ntains all Seeds (sorvabiJo vipakatzl and i s the
of the notion of Sel f, is character ized as shapeless
and invi sibl e (or: incommunicable [ to othe r s ) 3
81
(onidar-
and he nce accessible to personal experienc.e only (pratydtma-
and stated to
i n ternal
be imagi ned , by i mmature people, to be
Self (antaratman) . This means t hat the
=. .:- tion of " [ Result-of - ] Hatur ation cont ai ning all Seeds " (sarvabiJ'o
.":.:::-<a'; ) can n ot inc lude the visi ble bod y Yet, if orupin
not understood i n its tec hnical meaning of "immaterial" but
=-.. in t he more original sense of " .... ithout visible s hape
tl
,
:.:.er e- .... ould be no obstacle to interpreti ng " [ Res ult-of- )Maturation
:.:-::taini ng all Seeds" i n a .... ay .... hich coincides with, or at l ea st
- 54-
c omes close to, t he citmabhdva of t he Hanobhtimi (see 3 .1 1. 2) ,
that i s to say, to i nte rpreting it a s the Six Sens es (l1atjdyat ana)
a ri sen from Maturati on, provided t hat this is unde rstood to com-
prise the five invi sible sense-faculties but n ot their gross
s upport .
beginning
a s i. s fairl y probabl e in
- .382 h
of the Ma nobhuml t e
view of t he fa c t that i n the
Six Senses are,
like t he Seed s (biJa). li sted amo ng the s p e c i f i c objects
of man 0 vijr;aYUl, wh ich means that they are not accessible to
t he exte rnal s eDses .
3.11. 4
With t hi s concepti on of the objective ba s i s of the noti on
of
'I'
and feeling of identity (asmimana) , alayavijnana
"
conceived
"
the Initiat Pas8age would fit
i, only
"
a
p a r t of the Seeds (viz . those sticking in t he material
sense-faculties:
".
2. 5). I,
'0
far, however ,
"
alayavij nana
"
the s e Seeds h y p 0
,
t a t i
,
e d into a ,ew kind of
v i j n ii n a (ib . ), it would a 1
,
a form part of t he somewhat
vague mental component conta ined i n t he Six Senses
After coming to be regarded as comprising all Seeds and as
being continuous , it may have come to cover t he whole vijiilina
component. and all Seeds, but even so it still wa s only a par t
of the objective basis of the noti on of '[' , s ide by s ide with the
material sense-facult i es. Yet, already the pre-al ayavijnanic mat e -
rial s of the Basic Section appear to contain at least two starting-
point s for the development of t he vi ew t hat alayavijnana
a 1 0 n e is t he ultimate objective basis of the notion of 'I'
and of t he fe eling of identity:
3.11. 4. 1 On the one hand , t he " [Result-of- ]Maturation containing
all Seed9" (sa1"vabijo vipaka.,). stat ed in the Paramar-
t hagathas (see 3 .11. 3) to be regarded a s t he i nner Sel f
man), is, in the BhtimiQ,383 identified
with Min d -containing-all-Seeds . This would seem to correspond
to a t raditi on according t o which only mind (and mental factors)
but not mate rial entities are the res ult of Maturati on (vipaka),38
4
and would i mply that min d a Ion e is the objective basis
- 55 - 311.42
"f the notion of 'I ' , in accordance, perhaps, with an old tradi-
ti on accordi ng to which mind (citta. vi jnana) - which is, besides,
like the sGl'vabijo vipcikal). of PC 28-29, sometimes qualified as
"shapeless and invisible/ i ncommunicable" (al'uPY anidGl'ilianam)3
8
5
_ is the foremost object of the not ion of ' 1,. 3
8
6 In addition, i n
the recei ved ver sion of t he BhumiQ,
SQl"vabijaktlJ!l vijirJ.nam has, in its t urn, come to be superseded by
alayavijiiana (see 6 . 1. 3 and 6 . 8) . Again, in the Paramartha-
gathas we find the notion of Itwhat i s stuck or clung to" (nivltilia-
naJ?I krtam) by ordinary people although it is Sufferi ng
i . e . ultimately unsatisfactory),3
8
7 and this is obViously3
88
equi-
valent to the aQl'vabijako which i s the objective basis of
the notion of 'I' (see 3. 11. 3). Now what is Significant is that
this noti on of "what is stuck to " - trans posed, to be s ure, to the
context of taking possession of a new existence (atmabhdva- parigl'a-
ha)3
8
9 _ is identified with alayavijnana
390
i n the commentary on
t he verse s i n question .
3. 11. 4. 2 On the other hand, in the Hanobhumi of the Basic Sec-
tion
391
the objective basis of t he wrong notion of Ego
a nd of the feeling of identity (aamimdna-
figure alllong the equivalents of Seeds (bija- paI'ytiya) .
To be s ur e, this equivalence was probably meant to indicate that
the bas i s - 0 f - per son a 1 - e xis ten c e (tilll'a-
ya. titmabhdva) containing all Seeds it is ",hich i s the objective
basis of t he notion of ' 1' a nd of the feeling of identity (as l ong
as "'e presuppose that Seeds a r e not entities on t heir own and that
the r efor e the
t h i n g its elf may be called the Seed of
i n s 0 far
as i t is capable of producing t he
an effect
latter)39
2

Yet , the wording of
t he passage might have
when the series of
lent itself
to a different interpretation
Seeds was,
somehow or other, hypostatized, as in t he case of cilayavijnana
(especially after it had come to comprise all Seeds )j the more
so since the list of equivalents includes 'a 1. a y a ' ( in t he
traditional sense of [atmabhtiva as) "what i s clung t O
Il
)393, which
to a reader familiar wi th al ayavij iiana may easily have suggested
31 1 5-3.11.7 - 56 -
the idea that the equivalents, includ i ng "objective bas is of the
notion of 'I'" and "objective basis of the feeling of identity",
refer to alaya v i j nan a .
3. 11 .5
Yet , in spite of these favourable circumstances alaya-
vijfiana is, as was stated above, no .... here in the BaBic
Section explicitly stated to be the objecti ve bas is of the notion
of 'I', etc. To my mind, the f'eason for this somewhat astoni shi ng
fact is that in the Basic Section, despite nascent stages of the
kind (see 3. 10.3), alayaviji'iana has not yet fully emancipated
itself from its original charac ter of sticking in, and thus
essentially being dependent on,
only after (at least de facto)
corporeal matter. It is, rather ,
s uperseding
its function of being (the primary component
corporeal matter in
of) the basis-of-per-
sonal- existence that alayavijnana appears to have come to be
explicitly regarded as the ultimate objective Basis of the notion
of 'I', etc .
3.11. 6
Significantly enough, the Vth chapte r of the Sartldhinirmo-
canasutra is , as in the question of the emancipation of
.ilayavijiiana from corporeal matter , at best a half- way house in
this question , too . For it says that the Buddha has not so far
proclaimed the continuous, subliminal form of mind (dddnavijiiiina,
i . e. alayavijiiana:
imagine (rna haiva
see 1 . 6 . 4) 1 est
it to
the immature should
be Self (dtman). 394
Thi s passage, though stati ng the p 0 s sib j 1 i t Y that
ordinary people mig h t imagine dddnavijiiii:na as their Sclf. at
the same time imp 1 i e s that they nor mal 1 y do
not . It does not therefore document the idea that alayavi-
jiiana is the objective basis of the notion of ' I' in the sense of
the o T din a r y , s p 0 n tan e 0 u s unreflected, nOI\-
speculative notion of 'I '; nay, it may even be taken to indi.cate
that such an idea had not yet developed.
395
3.11. 7 On the other hand, in the Pl'avrtti Portion of the VinSg
dl.ay. Treati8e, where alayavijiiana is clear ly conceived
of as essentially independent of corporeal matter and appear s to
- 57 -
311. 8- 3. l 2. 1
have, at any rate de facto, superseded the l atter as the fundame n-
tal constituent of personality , it is expressly stated to be the
object of a spontaneous and largely continuous notion of Ego
a h ~ k a ~ a ) and feeling of identity (asmimana).39
6
3.11.8
On the basis of this concepti on , the term 'alayavijilana I
CQuld , wh en its original meaning of "mind sticking in
[corporeal matter]" was found to be no longer adequate , ea.sily be
explained, in the sense of the traditional Buddhist use of 'aLaya',
as "mind which is cl ung to [as Self ] "; the more so since the
typically Buddhist use of 'aLaya ' may even have been one of the
fact ors which favoured the transformation of the concept of alaya-
vijiiana (cp. 2.\0 and 3.11.4.2) . Yet, although an explanation
of alayavijiiana as "mind clung to [ as Self] II would appear perfect-
ly suitable already for the Pr>avftti Portion, it is, neverthe-
less, not documented before the Hahayanasaipgraha
397
(where, in
view of the mind-only position, the predominance of alayavijii.ana
over corporeal matter i s still more obvious, and where, according-
ly, the original meaning of the term, presupposing a dependence of
alayavijiiana on corporeal matter, may have appeared especially
inCbppropriate) .
3.12 A probl em with which (as will have become manifest in
3.11.2) the issue of the objective basis of the notion of
I I I is closely connected and whi ch appears to have undergone a
similar development in so far as it refers to alayavijiiana, is the
question of what is [the result of] Mat u rat ion (vipdka)
of previous karman (and delight in worldly existence )39
8
; how-
ever, the f ollowing remarks (as also those of 3. 13) cannot but
be exceptionally preliminary.
3.12.1 As was stated above ( 3. 11. 2-3), in some pre-alayavi-
jiianic materials of the Basic Section it is the p s y -
c h a - p h Y sic a 1 basis or nucleus of personal existence
that is the rE'.s ult of Mat uration (vipdka(ja))399 containing all
Seeds. Within the framework of this vie ... (of which the Seed theory
3.12.2.1
- 58 -
presupposed by the Initial. Pas sage, viz. that corporeal matter
and mind conta in. their own and each other' s Seed, could be taken
to be a kind of conc r etization or elaboration), alayavijnana, when
i ntroduced, could only be r egarded as a par t of the Re sul t-of-
Maturation, viz . as (a part of) the Seeds and (a part of) the
mental component (see 3 .11.4). This may be i ndicated by the fact
t hat a.layavij"ana is, i n its de f act o definit ion i n t he begi nning
of t he Basic Section, 4
0 0
characterized as "(" 0 m p r i sed
in [the ca t egory of Re s ult-of-]Mat uration [ of karman, etc .]"
(vipdkasCII?'fP.'hita) , an expression whi ch at l east s u g g est s
that it is n ot yet consider ed to be the ('I n 1 y e ntity to be
r egarded a s uipd'ka,4
0i
as it came to be later on. Once again,
cir cums tances whi ch could have favoured this {' hange can be poi nted
out even in pre-alayavij"ani c material s:
3.12. 2.1
One text to be mentioned i n thi s connec tion is a pas-
sage of the Viniscayas a![lgraha,,I
402
which unmistakably
presupposes the usual view that t he mi nd series is "one-layered"
and which is thus, at least in substance, pre-alayavi jnani c .
According to thi s text, it i s, fir s tly, ce rtain s tates of mind
( cit ta) that a.re stated to be "[Re sult-of - ]Maturation" and e\'en
c alled II [Result - of - ]Maturat i on contal ning all Seeds" (sarvabijako
vi z . mind at t he mome nt of dea th, the s tate of mi nd iilllae-
diately f ollo .... ing upon the fir st moment of mi nd whi c. h has the
fun cti on of linking up [ a new existence ] (pratisandhi) , and all
later s t ates of mind whi ch are ''unaltered,,4
0
3 (*pra1qotiatha) , i. e .
neither good (kudal.a) nor defiled nor neutral-but-active
(*ad'bhi$aIfIskd'Pam avyd1qotam? ) but rather neutral and not obstruct-
ed [by Defilements] (anivrtauya"Krta) . 404 All ot her states of mi nd
( good, bad or neutral ones) are qualified as "ari si.ng from [the
Res ult-of- ]Maturation (vipdkaja) . 405 Secondly, the t ext includes,
into the category of
sation
vipdka, the
vedana ) 406
neither-painful-nor-pleasant sen-
associated with the s tates of
mi nd that are [Result -of - ]Mat uration (or at l east with t he f i r s t
two of them) . 4
0
7 Once agai n, all the other sensa ti ons _ especially
- 59 -
3. 12.2 . 2-3 12.4. 1
agreeable and disagreeable ones - have to be classified not as
vipdka but as vipakaja .
408
The text does n ot mention corpore-
a1 entities, which are, here, obviously regarded as
fall ing under the cat egory of [Result_of_]Mat uration.
409
not
3. 12. 2. 2 On this latter point, the text appears to agree with
the Bhumib of the Basic Sec-
tion \oo'hich equates the [Result-of-JMaturati on containing all Seeds
(aarvabijako with Min d _containing_all_Seeds,4
10
which, according to the Hanobhumi,4
11
merges with semen-cum-blood
at the moment of conception . Besides, another passage in the
Manobhumi 412 comes close
4 13
to the above-quoted text by stating
that neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation, which is the natural
state during the e m b r yon i c phase (garbhavasthayam), is
the only one to fall under the category of "[Result-of-]Ma-
turation" (vipaka) , in the sense of the p rim a r y result of
Haturation, all other sensations being qualified as either "[ second-
arily] arising from [the primary Result-of-]Maturation" (vipcikaja)
or "being conditi oned by [contact with] objects" (vi/layapratyaya) .
3.12.3
Such passages, suggesting as they do a narrowing down of
vipiika to min d and sensation in so far as they are,
j ust as at the moment of and immediately after conception, the
direct and p rim a r y Result-of-Maturation (which in its turn
contains the See d s of all further, indirect or secondary
effects), ought to have led almost inevitably to a change in the
concept of a I a y a v i j Ii a n a for when the latter came to
supersede Hind-containing-all-Seeds and take the place of mind at
the moment of conception, it (as well as the sensation associated
"'ith it: see 5.9) was bound to become, like Hind-containing-all-
Seeds, the o n 1 y entity to be called 'vipcika ' in the strict
sense of t he p rim a r y Result-of-raturation.
3.12.4. 1
Yet , as stated above ( 3. 12 . I ). the passages in the
beginning of the BasiC! SeC!tion where alayavijiiana has
.:>ccupied the position of Mind-containing-all-Seeds , do not docu-
ment s uch a development, suggesting rather that alayavijiiana i s
3.12.4.2-3 12 5 - 60 -
only one among several entities falling under the categor y of
vipdka . As anothe r entity to fall under thi s category , one may, to
be sur e, e nvisage neither-pai nf ul-nor- pl easant sensation (see
3.12.2)j but the main reason i s, to my mind , t hat alayavijnana was
s till f elt to be essentially bound to, and i n a sense dependent on
and subordinate t o, cor poreal matter or t he material sense-facul-
ti es, whic h i n this line of tradition appear to have been regarded
as forming pa r t of vipaka (see 3. 12.1).414
3.12. 4.2
Eve n the Proof Portion of the VinSg atay. 'l'1'eatise 415
does not go beyond stating t hat amo ng the six tradition-
al f orms of mi nd there is no vari ety .... hi ch can be subsumed unde r
the category of [Res ult-of-]Maturation (and
that therefor e f or thi s rol e alayavijfiana has to be assumed) - a
statement .... hic h does not impl y that the ma terial
e . g., are e xc luded fr om the category of vipdka, nay, it may even
be taken t o suggest the opposite .
3.12. 5
To be sure, the tendency to conceive of alayavij r'iana as
the p r im a r y Resul t-of -Ma turation (and hence not
to conceive of it any longer as s ubordinate to corporeal matter)
,
seems to have s tarted al ready in two of the later occurrences of
alayaviji\ana in the Basic Sectionj 416 but it is, once again, in
the Pravrtti Portion that thi s tendency appea r s to have, a t any
rate de facto, fully asserted itself . Whe n di scussing t he influ-
ence the Itfor thcoming
U
f orms of mind (pravrttivijool1a) exert on
alayavijiiana, the Pl"avrtti Portion s tates that they may also
s tamp alayavijiiana .... ith an Impr ession (vasanci) .... hich [does not,
ot herwise t han t he f i r st kind of Impres sion discussed in t he text,
lead t o furthe r occur rences of pravrttivijnanas in this life but
i ns t e ad] causes alayav i j na na itself to t ake possession (par>igraha)
i n futur e {i.e . after deat h} of ( the Result-of-]Maturat ion ( vipa-
ka) .417 Since this passage i s meant to elaborate on t he pr eceding
statement t ha t pr>Qvrttivijricinas also conditi on aIayavijfiana by
causing it to receive the Seeds f 0 r i t
,
[ o wn
J
f u t u r e r e pr o d u c t ion (abhinirvrtti) ,
41 8
i t .... ould
- 61 - 3. 12. 6-3. 12.7
seem that in the Pravrtti Portion rebirth is, as in the Tri!(lsi-
ka,4
1
9 understood in terms of a reproduction or new ar rangement of
alayavijr'iana as the 0 n 1 y P ri m a r y Result-of-Maturati on
(vipaka) . 4
20
3. 12.6
This does not, however , mean that mental factors like
sensation are entirely excluded from this category; for
in the Pravrtti Portion a l so the mental factors
(caitasika dhal'ma1z) a ss 0 cia ted wit hal a y a v i -
j ii a n a (see 5. 2 a nd 5. 9) are expressly cha r acterized as
falling under the category of I [Result-of-]Maturati on I ( vipaKa- '
Out of t hese , sen sat ion (vedana) associat-
ed with alayavijiiana, which is always neither-painful - nor -pleasant,
is confi rmed by the Sacit tikabhumi-viniScaya
422
and a passage of
the Hs i en_yang_sht'; ng_chiao_lun
423
to be viptika in express contra-
distinction to other sensations . But it is, as far as I can see ,
only in t he Abhidharmasamuccaya
424
that the category of viptika is
e x p 1 i cit I y defined as consisti ng of alayavijiiana and its
mental associa tes 0 n I y, all othe r dharmas being r elegated to
the category of "[secondarily] arising from [the primary Re-
sult-of - ]Maturation" (vipaKa- J"a) "
3.12.7
ka- J"a,
The commentary on this Abhidharmasamuccaya passage ex-
pressl y includes,
the materia
among t he dharmas qualified as vipa-
1 sen s e - f a c u I tie s 425
,
and this would seem to mean that they, too, have to be regarded as
a r ising from Seeds in alayavijnana (see 3. 13.4ff. ). This does
not necessari ly mean t hat they have no real existence outside mind
(see 2. t 3.7). But it goes without saying that within the
framework of the "mind-only" theory as devel oped in the Mahaya-
nasa!(lgraha corpor eal matter , being nothing but a mental repre-
sentation, necessarily derives from (al aya)vijiiana and thus cannot
but lose its function of an equa l component of what is the (prima-
ry) Re s ult-of-Mat uration, thus leaving this position (and accord-
ingly the role of being t he ultimate objective basis of t he notion
of I I I: see 3. 1 l. 2 and 3. 11 .8) to alayavijfiana alone. Indeed ,
3 131-3.1 3. 2
- 62 -
in t he Mahayanasal!lgraha, alayavijiiana is i n fact often called
' vipaka- vijrUina ' ,4
26
most probably i n the sense (or at least Io'ith
the nuance of) "mind .... hic h is [the 0 n 1 y p rim a r y
Result-of- ]Maturation".
3.13. 1
In t he preceding paragraph I have s uggested that c lassi-
fying t he material sense-faculties not as forming part of
t he primary Result-of-Maturation (vipika) but onl y as secondari-
ly arisi ng from it (vipdkaja) implies that they are r egarded as
arising from Seeds comprised or contained i n a l ayavijnana. Yet,
s uch a vie .... , involving as it does a genetic depe nde nce of t he
material sense-faculties (or even of cor por eal matter as a whole)
on alayavijflana , is, signifi cant l y e nough , not explicitly stated
anywhere in the Basic Section of t he Yoga carabhiimi .
427
It is
rather, i n spiCe of alayavijiiana being termed as "containing a11
Seeds" (sarvabijaka) 4
28
, 0 n 1 y the "f 0 r t h com i n g II
for m s 0 f min d (pl"avrttivijiUina.) , 429 i. e. sense percep-
tions and manoviJ,;ana., 43
0
and, occasionally, t he mental f ac t ors
(caitasika accompanying them,431 t hat are explicitly432
stated to arise from their Seeds compr ised in alayavijn.ana {or
from aIayavijiiana as thei r Seed) 433. The same hol ds good for t he
P't'oof POl'tion
434
a nd, s ubstantially J 435 pr obably436 a l so for t he
Vth chapter of the and even f or t he Pl'aurt -
ti POl'tion.
438
Even in the beginning of t he Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-
l un,439 it i s only the other u i j nan a s (including t he new
maMs) and me n t a I factor s (caitasika t hat are
stated to arise from Seeds in alayavijiiana (or from alayavijriana
as t heir Seed), whereas the mate ria l se n s e - f a c u 1 -
tie s are only c haracterized as bei ng a p pro p ria ted
(upcitta) by alayavijiiana .
440
3. 13. 2
This is, however, fairly astoni s hing i n view of the fact
that already in some parts of the Basic Section of t he
Yogacarabhiimi mind is unequi vocally taught to contai n the Seeds
not only of cor p 0 rea 1 matter
441
but, occasi onally, even
of i nternal

n d ext e r n 1 matter .
442
What is more, even
- 63 - 31 3. 3
in the t heory of Seeds ""hi ch 1 take to be presupposed by the
In.itial. Passage (see 2.5) mind is asserted to contain also the
Seeds of the material sense_faculties.
443
3.13. 3 Yet, it is precisely the connection of the origin of
alayavijiiana with this theory of Seeds that provides a
satisfactory explanation of the st riking time-lag till it came to
be conceived of also as containing the Seeds of the material
sense-faculties. For the Initial. Passage s uggests that 31aya-
vijnana .... as, originally, nothing but a hypostasis of the Seeds of
lIIind s ticki ng in the material sense-fa culties (see 2.5-6) . Thi s
means t hat , even though the sense-faculti es .... e re dependent on
alayavijiiana b i 0 log i cally i.e . were in need of
being appropriated by it in order to be protected against decay
(cp . 2.13.4) J yet o n t 0 l og i ca lly alayavijiiana
J
sticking i n t hem and thus requiri ng them as its suppo r t, .... as
rather in its turn depende nt on
J
and subordinate to. the ma t erial
sense-faculties (cp . 2.1 3 . 7), and could not eaSily be considered
to be their cause; the more so since it .... as. originally, conceived
of as a hypostasis of the Seeds of min d (cp. 2.5) , not of
corporeal matter. And even whe n , later on, alayavijnana came t o
incorporate" all Seeds" (i.e. also those .... hich were contained
i n the mind series : cp o 3.4.2-3), the principle that underlay
the original hypostasis, viz. t hat the See d s 0 f min d
may be regarded as a special for m 0 f min d proper, may
still have continued to operate and , at the same time, r etarded
the inclusion of the Seeds of the material sense-faculties (let
alone of other matter ) si nce an analogous application of this
principl e to t he See d s 0 f mat t e r would rather have
involved viewing them as a special for m 0 f mat t e rand
n ot as included in alaya v i j nan a . Therefore, it would
seem t hat alayavijiiana could come to incorporate also the Seeds of
the material sense-faculties or even of other material enti ties
only after this "principle of hypostasis " and the connection of
alayavijiiana with the specific theory of Seeds from .... hich it
started had falle n into oblivion.
3 13 4-3136
- 64 -
3.13. 4 This appears to have happened in the Nivrtti Portion
",here alayavijnana is taught to be t he cause not only of
the Uforthcoming" forms of mind (pl'av{'ttivijiidna) but also of the
[material) sense-faculties al ong with t he ir gross bases
a nd even of the surrounding world (bhdjana- Lo-
ka) .444 This does not necessarily mean that corporeal matter or
even the surrounding .... orld were viewed a s arising from alaya-
vijilana containing thei r Seed i n the sense of a kind of a natural
faculty to produce t hem (as mi nd and mat t e r would seem
to arise f r om mind according to t he bija theory presupposed by my
Initial. Passage) j and still l ess need this mean t hat they are
merely mental images in alayavijitana : i t is more likely t hat the
idea is that they are the {indi r ect or by-)effect of k arm i c
Impressions stored 1n aIayavijnana (see 10. 3. t. 3) .
3.13.5
Likewi se, in a passage of the Abhidharmasamuccaya
44 5
ac-
cording to which alayavijnana is both the Seed of the
"forthcOIlIing" forms of mind (cak{lurvijnana, etc. ) a nd of the
sen s e - f a cuI tie s etc.), it would seem that
what is primarily i ntended is karmic Impressions, since t he text
distinguishes between two ki nds of alayavijnana Seeds): a
( freshly] accumulated one (upacita, from which cak{lua, etc . , will
arise in [a] future [ existence]) 446 , and one which is of the
nature of {Result-of- ]Maturation (vaipa7<.ya, from which the present
cak{lus, etc . , have ari sen)447.448 The sense-o b j e c t s are, in
this passage, not derived from Seeds but stated to arise under
t he influence of the sense_faculties,449 whic h would, i n vie .... of
the fact t hat the sense-faculties, in their turn, originate from
alayavij iiana, amount to an .i n d ire c t origina tion of the
sense- 0 b j e c t s, too , from ilayavijnana.
3.1 3. 6
I n other passages of the Abhidharmasammucaya,45
0
3:1aya-
vijiiana is said to be t he Seed of, or to be impregna ted
wi th t he Impression( s) of J (a 1 1) akandhas, dhatus and ayata-
nas . Li kewise, in a passage of the wh ich
appears to be an addition by the compile r himself , 45
1
alayavijnana
is expr essly stated to contai n the Seeds of all d h a r -
mas .
452
- 65 - 31 3 7- 3.1 3 8
3.13. 7
Suc h formulations appear to come fairly close to those
current in sources like and Abhidhanmasu-
tra whe r e alayavijnanr. i s, more or le ss consis tently , i ntegrated
into the "m i nd-only" system. In these sources, the question wheth-
er al ayavi ji'iana also comprises the Seeds of material dharmas or
not has , of cour se, practical ly become irrelevant because mate r i al
dharmas have been r educed to mental "representations" of w"bi c h
alayavijn.ana is or contains the Seeds anyway, and of which it is,
i n the sense of the Vth chapter of the Saqldhinirmocana s utra and
the Pl"avrtti PoPtion, a l so t he basis in t he sense of being thei r
fundamental s upport (cp. 3. 9. 3 and 3. 10) . Thus, i n the Ahhidhar-
masutra and in the Mahayanasalllgraha. al ayavijnana is the Seed-
bas is or cause and the suppor t not only of personal existence but
of all dharmas, of the whole world as it appears to a gi ven
living being.
453
3.13. 8 Quite under s tandably, at this stage of development, t he
original meaning of the term 'alayavijnana' - "mind stick-
i ng or lying hidden [ i n the s ense-faculties ]" - must have
been found i nappropria te , s ince t he fundamental entity whic h alaya-
vijiiana had bec ome can ha rdly be taken to stick in what is nothing
but a mental repres entation proceeding from it. Accord ingly. it
wa s reinterpr eted, es pec ial l y i n the sense of "mi nd to ",hich [all
( polluted) dharmas ] stick [as its ef f ects]" , or "mind .... hi ch sticks
[to all (polluted) dharmas [as t heir cause]". 454
4 . 1.1- 4.1.2 - 66 -
4. Development of the negative aspects of alayavijnana
4. 1. 1
In the passage from which I started ( 2 .1 ) ,
had the po, i t i v e function of keeping a perSilD
ali v e in the sta te of nirodhasamapatti (see 2. 13. 4), and i.o
other pa ssages of the Basic Section and of the
Qi i t is more or less clearly implied that alayavijnana plays this
positive role throughout life ( 3.5-6). Yet, in Bud d hi s t
tradi tion, life is ultimately u n sat i s f a c t 0 r y (dt0-
kha), not onl y because in it pain (dulJkha in the narrower sense I
prevails,455 but a l so, in a more fundamental sense, because th,"
constituents 9f a living being are impermanent (anitya) and sub--
ject to change 456 and change is us ually for
the worse .
457
It is in this sense that the canonical texts state
t hat "in short , the five constituents- oC-personality to whic h one
clings are unsatisfactoryl1 . 458
4.1. 2
[n the early Yogacara sources, this statement is usually
explai ned as expressing unsatisfactoriness i n so far as it
essentially inheres in conditioned e nti ties as s uch
khatd). 4 59 But this their essenti ally inherent unsatisfactoriness
is, according to the Yogacaras, not, or not primarily, based on
their mere impermanence, lest even the s upramundane but imperma-
nent mental states like liberating insight should be unsatisfac-
tory. 460 It is, at l east as far as condit ioned e ntiti es are
constitutive of a l iving being, based r ather on their
stricke n with Bad n e s s (dau?'thulya) 461 - a concept which,
i n this context, denotes I ) evilness or wickedness
462
as well as
2a) unwieldiness,46
3
stiffness
464
or lack of controllability, 465
and 2b) uneasiness
466
or unsafeness, 4
6
7 sometimes sensibl e but
often more or less subliminal, and anY"'ay continuous ly permeating
the whole basi s- of- existence (of ordinary persons), 468 so t hat it
consti tutes, especia.lly in view of the latter nuance, viz. s ub-
limi nal uneasiness, a kind of i nt rinsic unsatisfactor iness or
"Suffering" . Accordingly, t he Manobhumi of the Basic Section of
- 6) -
4 1.3-41.4
the Yogacarabhumi alludes to the above-quoted canonical passage by
stating that "the Tathagatas have designated the whole
bas i 5 [-of-personal-existence] as Suffering (i.e. as unsatis-
factory) in the sense of unsatisfactoriness essential to condi tion-
ed factors as such because [the whole basis]
is stricken with, or essentially characterized by,
n e S 5 " 469
Bad -
4.1. 3
Badness is J to be sure, originally47
0
net
Seeds (bija), for in the
side by side with,47
1
or
identical with, or comprised in,
mentioned Yogacarabhilmi it is sometimes
even in opposition to,472 the l atter. But at least in so far as
Badness , too , is concei ved of as a more or less 1 ate n t or
subliminal Quality characterizing, permeating (- al'lugata), infest-
ing (-upagata) , or s tic kin gin etc.), the
basis(-of-personal-existence)473 or the series (of personality)474
or the Six Senses or body (kaya ) and mind (cit-
ta)47
6
, it is someho .... anal ogous to Seeds, the more so since it i s
sometimes expressly co n t r a s ted .... ith actual occurrences
of Defilements
477
or said to be the c a use of [ac tual]
Defilements
478
or Suffering
479
. Being, thus, in a sense s i m i _
I a r to Seeds,480 Badness (or at least some of its aspects)
could easily come to be explained to co n sis t i n
See d s . Such a view is in fact unambiguously expressed in t he
Manobhumi of the BaBic Seotion
481
where the term t Badness t
(dau{lthuZ.ya) is said to denote both the Seeds of Defilements
482
bijani, representing latent wi c kedness involving
uneasiness) as also the Seeds of [what is the result of karmic]
Maturation (vipakapak{lya1;i bijiini, representing unwieldiness and
lack of controll ability involving uneasiness) and the Seeds of
other neutral factors, all these Seeds, sticking in the basis-of-
personal-existence, being responsible for the latter being unsatis-
factory in the sense of
4. 1.4 Once conceived of as Seeds, Badness sticking in the basis-
of-personal-existence, or in body and mind, .... as - at least
as far as it was the Seed of men t a I factors like Defile-
4.2 - 68 -
ment s or of Suffering in the sense of unsatis fa ct or y sens ati ons -
bound to be incorporated, sooner or late r , in alayaviji'iana , in
analogy to t he (other) Seeds of mi nd and mental fa ctors ( 3. 13)
sticking in corporeal matter ( 2.5) and mind ( 3.4. 2-3) . Thi s
mea ns tbat .ilayaviji'iana , by incorporating Badness, became a hypo-
stasi s not only of Seeds but al so of the subliminal e sse n -
t i a 1 u n sat i s f act 0 r i n e s s
which i s constituted by this Badne ss . This stage of deve l opment i s
documented in the prose comme ntary on the Paramarthagathas
484
... hich forms part of the (Ci ntamayi Bhiimit,t of the) Basic SectioP1.
485
It would also appear to be presupposed when t he Nivftti Port ioP1
486
of the ViP1Sg iilay. 1'l'eati88 s tates that alayavijnana, on a ccount
of containi ng or compri sing all Seeds, is (*- 8vabhdva) t he Truth
of Sufferi ng ;4
8
7 for this would seem to mean that
al ayav i j iia na, by compri s ing Badness, is Suffe ring in the
sense of 8ClJ!18kara-dW,lkhatii {of which only the Noble Ones (iirya)
are a .... are),4
88
both by way of being i ts elf un sat is -
f act 0 r y because of conSisti ng of or being a hypos tasis of
Badness taken as une asiness, a s al so by .... ay of being a ki nd of
r in c i pie o f u n sa t i s f ac t 0 r i n e s s con-
s tituti ng the uneasiness of the .... hole personality in .... hi ch it
sticks . Later on, t hi s affiliation of a l a yaviji'iana to
.... as reinforced by a layaviji'iana' s becoming associated .... ith
neither-painful- nor-pl easan t sensation (adu;khiisukha vedand: see
5. 9), 489 for was not only taken to be general -
ly inherent to all mundane dharmas, but had al so bee n s p e -
c i f i c a I I Y attributed t o neither-painful-nor-pleasant sen-
sation and what ever i s associated or akin to it .
49o
4. Z By incorporating Badness (dau{l'(:huZ.ya) and becoming a kind
of principle of e ssential u n sa t i s f a c t 0 r i -
n e s s (8a1J1skal'a- duQkhatii) , alayavijnana ass umed an o n t 0 -
logically or existentia ll y ne gati. ve
character due t o .... hich it became something prima rily to be got
of. 49 1 This negative charact er .... as, moreove r , enlarged by
rid
a
- 69 - 4. 3-4 . 3. 1
s p i r i t u a 1 aspect; for i n $0 far as alayavijii.ana is,
already in the Basic Section, understood to compri se the Seeds of
all kinds of mental dharmas including morally e viI (akuAala)
ones,492 it ..... a s bound to incorporate Badness not only under its
aspect of subliminal uneasiness but a 1 S 0 in the sense of
latent IV i eke d n e s s, of Badness affiliated to Defile-
ments (kleapak/JYCUfl daU?fftu1.yam), 493 because this aspect, too,
had , in the Manobhumi of the Basic Section, 494 come to be explain-
ed as the See d s (biJ'a) of the Defilements . Since Badness,
especially i n the sense of latent wickedness or Seeds of Defile-
ment s, is often regarded to be constitutive of the state of being
under the sway, or of being favourable to the arising, of Cankers
lsasl"ava),495 alayavij i\ana, by incorporating Badness in the sense
of latent wickedness, came to acquire, or reveal, even an aspect
of s P i r i t U a 1 negativity ... hich, if stressed, was liable
to entail its developing to a kind of p r inc i pIe
source of PoIlu t ion (see 4.7), which, sticking in, and
permeating, the constituents of personality, constitutes their
spiritual impurity.
4.3 Such a development would seem to have been favoured by the
fact that, s ince "being under the sway of, or favourable to,
Can k e r s " (sasl"Qva) is almost equivalent to, and often predi-
cated side by side .... ith, tfbeing under the sway of, or favourable
t o, eli n gin g " (Bopadana),49
6
alayavijilana, by incorporat-
ing Badness in the sense of latent wickedness, came close to the
nation of sop a dan Q - v i j dna "
4. 3. 1 The term 'sopdddna- viJ"nana' occurs already in the canon-
ical texts of the (Hula-)Sarvastivadins
497
and seems to
something like viJ"'M.na still clinging (emotionally and intel-
lo!ctually) to the other constituents of personal existence and
thus tending to being reborn. In
tar e d with a (fertile) see d
this sense,
(b
) 498
1-Ja "
it is com -
In the
!"raha"r of the Yogacarabhtimi, however , it is interpreted as
.: >:! n t a i n i n g the See d s of Defilements (kl-ella- bija)
43 . 2 - 70 -
and thereby fostering future r ebirth .
499
Thus, an identification
of aoptidana.- vijiidna, defined in this way . with alayavijitana com-
prising all Seeds including Badness in the sense of Seeds of
Defilements, was natural.
4.3.2 However, it may have been additionally reinforced in a
concrete way by an interpretation of vijnana as Nour-
ishment (aJuira) as documented by another passage of the Vastu-
sa:pgrahaQI. 500 I n thi s passage , vijiiiina is, on the one hand , a
Nourishment securi ng the subsistence of
reborn sthitaye) Sol
l iving beings already
by appropriating (i.e .
updddna i n the biological sense) the gross el ements of the sense-
fac ulties (*indriyamahabhut opaddtr) and thus securing the subsist-
ence of corporeal matter and the cont inuance of life , which is,
according t o the Sutra (see 2. 3 + n. 149), characterized by the
fact that vijnana does not withdraw from the body . So2 On the
other hand, vijnana , i n so far as it is Bopciddna by being under
the sway of karman and Defilements , is also a Nouri s hment helping
living beings cravi ng for rebirth al'lugrahdya)5
0
3
to take possession of anot her existence in the future .
504
In the
light of the passage referred to in 4. 3. 1,5
0
5 the Bopadanatva of
sopadlina- vijiidna c ould easily be taken to be due to the fac t that
the res pec tive viiriiina contains the See d s (bija) of Defile-
ments (HaAa) and, by analogy, the
r esidues (vasanli) of karman .
506
Now,
Imp re s s ion s or
as was shown in 4.2, the
Seeds of Defilements came, sooner or later , to be understood as
being comprised in a 1 a y a v i j it a n a . Similarly. uayavi-
jiiana also incorporated the Impressions of karman, perhaps by
taking t he pl a ce of Mind-contai ning-all-Seeds (aaT'vabijakQl[l vi jM-
nam). provided that I am right i n a ssuming that the latter is tbe
successor to the vijiiiina of the PT'atityaBamutpdda A1101.ysis. the
mai n func tion of which wa s to receive and pass on the Impressions
of good and bad sQl[IskdT'aa (see 7.3 . 6.3). It would therefore
appear natural that alayavijiiana came to be regarded as fulfilling
not only the first function of vijniina as Nouri shment, viz.
biologi cal appropriation of cor poreal matter (which it had taken
- 71 - 441-442.1
over more or less from the outset (see 2.13.4)), but also its
second function, viz. that of sopadana- vijnanaj the more so since
the traditional Buddhist meaning of 'al aya' was practically synony-
mous with ' upddana
'
in t he sense of Clingi ng,
4.4. , There is not yet any clue even to an approximation of
alayaviji'iana to sopadlina- viJ'nana in t he Basic Section of
the Yogacarabhumi. Here as well as in t he Proof POl"tion
S07
of the
VinSg d1.ay , Treatise, 'upQdana I is, in connection with alayavijiia-
na, used only in the sense of "biological appropriation" (see
3. 5 and 3 . 6) , i.e. of functioning as a principle of 1 if e
The earliest source showing traces of a connection of the newly
introduced subliminal viJ'nana with sopadana- vijiidna is the Vth
chapter of the Sal\ldhi nirmocanasutra . To be s ure , in t his text,
too, the subliminal vijnana has also the function of appropriating
corporeal matter ( 3. 9 .2. 5). But as the new name 'doonavijiiii-
na I suggests, wh at is emphasized is, apart from its function as a
subst ratum of perceptive and cognitive processes, its role as the
principle undergoing r ebirth, or taking (and maintaining) posses-
s ion ((upa-)dddna) of a new existence (see 3. 9.2. 4-6).
4. 4.2 According to SalJldh V.2,5
08
the "reincarnation" (i.e. the
taking possession of a new existence) and the subsequent
thriving of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (BarvabijakaJ!l cittam) - ex-
pressly identified, at Sal\ldh V.3, with adanavijnana and alayavijna-
na - is based on a two f old u P Ii d dna I) upddcina of
(or: consisting in) the [SUbtle] material sense-faculties together
.... ith their {gross ) bases
509
( *sddhilrrhtina- ru.pindriya) ,and 2) updda-
... .a of (or: consisting in) the Impression of the diversity of
I ,:proliferous involvement in)5
10
the everyday usage of phenome-
' 11
and conceptions (*nimitta-ndma- vika1.pa- vyavahara- pra-

4.4. 2. ,
It is obvious that the first type of upadana refers t o
biological appropriation, of which t he material sens e-
fac ulties and t heir bases are the o b j e c t it making no
4.4.2. 2-4. 4.3 - 72 -
difference .... hether 'uptioona' is taken as an action noun (and the
compound as a or in the passive/ objective sense of
"that .... hich is appropriated,,5
1
3 ( and the .... hole expression as a
rupaka compound) .
4. 4 .2. 2 The second type of upddana, on the other hand, would
seem to represent, in the form of an Impression (or
residue, habit e nergy) J the spiritually negative upadana
514
lead-
ing to rebirth, i . e . Clinging to mundane existence, concreti zed,
in this passage, not so much i n the sense of Clinging to a new
(basis of) personal existence or to objects of sensualitySl S but
rather i n the Mahayana sense of Clinging to the divers! fied world
as such, by taking it to be real .
If the second type of upaddna is unders tood in thi s way , the
Impression can n ot be the o b j e c t of uptidana but would
r ather be ide n tic a 1 with it, and one will have to
explain
5 ion
prapaiica- vasanoptidana either as
of ] eli n gin g5
t6
whi ch
"[ the Impres -
consists i n t he Impres-
sion of 5prapaiica", or a s "the Impression of "prapanca which is
that 0 n ace 0 u n t 0 f w hie h [ a new existence ] i s
\ a ken p 0 sse s s ion 0 f,,5
1
7,
4.4.3 Starting from this interpreta tion, 518 one might think tha t
the residue of spiritually negative updddna is responsi ble
for t a kin gpo sse s s ion of t he new exi s tence, 519
whereas biological appropriation (at l east also) secures its
co n tin u a n c e Such a distinction ,,'ould imply t ha t when
one i s reborn in the iirupyad1uitlA. an uptidana securing continuance
i s not required s ince in this case there are, a s the text st ates,
not two kinds of upadana
520
but _ so one will have to undel'-
s tand
521
_ only the second type, viz. vasanopadiina, because corpo-
real matter does not exist in that world-sphere .
Yet, one may consider the poss ibility that i n the case of
the second upadiina the term 'upaddna ' i nclude s still another s hade
of meaning, for it may al so allude to t he fac t that the praparica-
Vasana not only causes Mind-containi ng-all-Seeds (Le. ddiinavijiki-
- 73 - 45 I
na "" alayavijiiana) to take possession (upadana) of a new exist-
enee but is also J
con t a i ned
t h r 0 ugh 0 U t
(
.. ) 522 .
sannt.U1..?fa 1.0
the new existence, itself
this Mind. No .... this func-
tion of contai ning Seeds or receiving a nd retaining Impressions
(as also the function of being infested with karmic Impressions)
is often expressed by the term ' par i fJ 1" a h a ',523 .... hich in
its turn alternates with 'upaoona ' (and 'adana') in the sense of
"taking possession (of a new existence)".524 It would thus not
seem unreasonable to argue that in the present passage the expres-
sion lo prapanca- vGsanopa.dcirza ' is also intended to evoke the idea
that Mind-contai ning-al l -Seeds is infested by, or contains, the
"prapancavasana before and at the moment of rebirth as well as
throughout the new existence. In the latte r case, i . e. if 'upada-
tza' (al so) means "cont.aining!! or "retaining!!, the apl'apranca- vaeana
WQuId, just as in the case of the first upiidana (see 4.4.2 . 1),
be the 0 b j e c t of upadtina . 525 Such a us e of upadtina in the
sense of containing or retaining Seeds or Impressions (or in the
sense of Seeds or Impressions as that which i s contained in
( alaya)vijnana)526 is in fact documented i n later sources,527 but
unambiguous occurrences in reliable early texts
528
seem to be
missing; it may hence be ques tionable to assume s uch a connotation
of 'upiidana' i n the case of the SalJldhinirmocanasut ra, t he more so
in view of the fa ct that it is
cana sutra-vyakhyana nQr by the
not corroborated by
- - 529

the SalJldhinirmo-
4. 5. ,
In the Pr>avrtti POl'tion
53o
of the Vi nSg aLay. Tnatise,
vhich has taken over the tvofold upQdQno. of SalJldh V.2,53
1
the connection of the *nimitta-nama- vika1.pa- vyavahal'a- pl'apanca- va-
Bana of the Sallldhi nirmocanasutra with spiritually negative Cling-
ing is suppurted by the fact that it is r e named into ' pal'ikalpita-
avabMvabhinivda- vasana ' . 532 Actually, Sticking to the Imagined
Character [ of reali ty ) (pal'ikalpitaavabhavabhinivda) , or its Im-
pression, is, in othe r parts of the SalJldhinirmocanas utra
533
and
the ViniScayasarpgrahalJI534 , expressly sta ted to be the decisive
cause of POllution (8aJ!1klel1a) or r ebirth, and would therefore seem
4.5.2-4.6 - 74 -
to be equivalent to spiritually negative updaana in its actual and
latent form, respectively . 535
4.5. 2 On the other hand , updddna (hence also the parikaLpi-
included in it) is, in the Pra-
vrtti Portion of the VinSg dray . Treatise, expressly taught to be
the 0 b j e c t (al.ambana) of alayaviji'iana (see 5. 6 . 3 . 2) , and
this would seem to imply that this vasand is viewed as continu-
ing to exist throughout the new existence . Thus, here too it would
not seem impossible that this vcisami may be called 'upaddna' not
only in the sense of that on a ccount of whi c h this existence was
taken possession of but also in the sense of something which is
contained or incorporated (pal'igrhita) in alayavijii.ana . This ambi-
gui ty would seem to be confirmed by the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-
lun
536
which expressly states that t he beginningless (*anadilcili-
ka) Impression of diversity/ diversification (*pl'apancavQsand') is
both the homogeneous cause (hetupratyaya)537 of the alayavijiiana
of a given existence and - together wi th the material sense
facult ies and their bases - the 0 b j e c t of alayavijfiana' s
f unc tion of appropriating/ containing ( up a dan a ).53
8
4.6 Apart from t his connection with s piritually evil Clinging in
the form of Impression (vasana) , alayavijiiana has, in the
FPavrtti Portion., come t o be associated with Clinging for yet
another reason as well : viz. because it is, in this text , express-
ly conceived of as the o b j e c t i v e bas i s of t he
not ion o f
I ' In the only the
f ear had been voiced that immature people mig h tim a -
gin e adanavijfj.QM to be Self (atman.) if it had been taught to
them ( 3.11.6); in the Pravrtti Portion, however, alayavijiiana
is conceived of as the object of a continuous, spontaneous notion
of 'I' (ahaJpkal'a) and feeling of ident ity (a8mimana) ( 3 .11.7),
and though t he text does not yet make this explicit, it may thus
be interpreted, in t he sense of the typi cally Buddhist meaning of
'ataya ' , as "mind whi ch is clung to [as Self)" ( 3.11. 8 ).
- 75 -
4.7.1
Now, one raight think that being the object of t he .... rong
notion of 'I I i s merely accidental or extraneous to t he entl ty
concerned. But both in Abhidharma
539
a s well a s in early Yogacara
texts
S40
we find the idea - not implausible at leas t a s far as the
constituents of one' 5 own personality are concerned - that being
the objective basis of a Defilement , and espec ially of the notions
of 'I' and 'mine' , impinges on the nat u r e of t he enti ty
conce rned; in other words : to be the object of t he notions of 'I'
and 'mine I implies being sQsl'ava
54 1
and 8opadana. i . e . being, if
not of the nature of Cankers
542
(a81'QVa, i.e. Defilements) and
Cl i nging (upadana) , then at least connected with them,543 or
under their sway,544 or permeated by Badness affiliat-
ed to them
545
and thus, normally,54
6
fav ourabl e to their aris-
ing.
547
Thus, by being the object of the notion of '1' , alayavijna-
na it s e lf would become , or turn out to be, under the sway
of or favourable to Canke r s (sasrava) aDd Clinging (sopadana) ,
i.e. spiritually evil.
Thi s is , however, not expressly stated in the
Portion, where the spiritual ly negative a s pec t of .i'layavijnana
remains e ntirely marginal.
4. 7. ,
The si tuation is altoge ther different in the Nivrtti Por-
tion of the VinSg alay. Treatise . In this text , the spirit-
ually negative aspect of uayavijnana has become pre d 0 m i -
nan t . Alayavijiiana is expresslyS4
8
taught to be a) the Truth
of Suffe ring (du.;kha- satya) of the present life , Le. the con-
tainer or hypostasis of Badness in the sense of uneas iness con-
stituting (see
4.1.4 ), h) the cause of the
Truth of Suffering in the ne xt life , i.e . the cause, by way of
recei ving and passing on karmic Impressions, of a new alayavijiiana
which
is the result of karmic Maturation (see
3.12.5), and
0 )
the cause of the Truth of t he Or igin [of Suffering] (samudaya-
satya) in the present life, L e . the cause of Defilements (kleiia)
(and karman ) on a ccount of i t s comprising Badness (daul/ t hulya ) in
the sense of latent wickedness .
4.7.2-4.7.3 - 76 -
4.7. 2 What is more , at least in the second half of t he Nivrtti
Por>tion it becomes clear that this its functioning as a
principle of Pollution (*sQrva- Ba1!lk1.e.a-lma,Q) 549 i s clea.rly regard-
ed to be e sse n t i a 1 to alayavijnana. 550 Alayavijfiana is
conceived to be e sse n t i all y permeated (*- anugata) by
Badness (dau?thuLya) ,551 nay, even by Badness in the sense of
latent w i eke d n e S 5 for it is expressly stated to be -
by nature - the cause of the arising-and-continuance (pravrtti) of
Defilements (kLe.a),55
2
Or, as another passage of the first chap-
ter of the puts it, all Seeds incorporated
in alayavijiiana are included in the lmpression(s ) of Sticking to
the Imagined Character [of reality] (parikatpitasvabhdvabhiniveaa-
vaaana) .... hich. in its turn, is called ' Omnipresent Bad-
n e s s ' Accordingly, alayavijfiana
is , in the Nivrtti Portion. regarded to be e sse n t i a I I Y
the s .... ay of. or favourable to , Clinging (sopadana).554 both
under
in the sense of c linging (upadana) to the present basis-of-person-
aI-existence [as to one's Ego or Mine) and in the sense of taking
possession (upci"dana) of further existence.
555
It is not thel'efor e
uQexpected that the slightly later but closely r elated Hsien-yang-
sheng_chiao_lun
556
expressly identifies alayavijfiana with the can-
onical Bopddana- vijiuina.
4.7. 3
now
Such an exposition of the nat.ur e and function of alaya-
vijfiana strongly suggests that. the term 'alayavijiiana' is
p rim a r i 1 y understood in the sense of the typically
Buddhist. use of 'dLaya' as Clinging. viz. as "vijiuina to .... hich
one clings [as one's Self]". Since in the Nivrtti Portion itself
there is no reference to alayavijiiana as the object of the notion
of '1,557 and in vie .... of its equation .... ith sopadana- vijiuina, one
may even envi sage interpr eting the term by recurring to the
sub j e c t i ve meaning of 'aZaya', i . e . as "vijMna .... hich
is [under t he sway of] Clinging" or "vijiuina which [contains, or
consists of. t he Seeds of] Clinging", although there is no ex-
plicit. confirmation of such an i nterpretation of the term 'alaya-
vijnana', neither in the Nivrtti POl"tion nor, as far as I know,
-77-
4 8.1-4. 8. 2
in any ot her Yogacara source. Nevertheless, it would seem that the
freque ncy of the s ubj ective meaning "[ spi ritually negative] Cling-
i ng" in the Buddhist use of t he Ioo'ord 'ti1.aya I may have even been
one of t he r easons, if not the main r eason, f or the considerable
change the concept of alayav i jnana has undergone i n t he Nivrtti
Portion .
4.8. 1
One would not expect al ayavij ilana, conceived in this way J
to contain t he Seeds of supramundane (tokottal'a) J pure
(an.israva) dharmas, i n contrast to the sartJabijakaJ!l vijiidnam of
t he Basic Section which is said t o incl ude, if a per son is
desti ned f of' Ni r vaQa , the Seeds of (one of) t he t hree kinds of
Enli ghtenment (bodhi).55
8
Even t he ~ o Section of the VinSg
akly. Treatise, ..... hen it demons trates the exi stence of alayavijiia-
na by poi nt i ng out t ha t. as far as the or di nary six vijna.nas are
conce r ned, a s tate of mind which follows upon a hete r ogeneous
state of mind c annot have t he latter for its Seed (bija ) , adduces,
as one i ns tance of such a heter ogeneous sequence, the ca se that a
pure (arnisl'ava ) or s upramundane (1. okottal'a) state of mind follows
upon a n i mpure (sasrava) or mundane (1.aukika) one, 559 and thllS
obvious l y pres upposes the view t hat alayavijiiana i s or contains
the Seed( s) of pure or supramundane dharmas, too . I t would)
boweve r , appear questionable to uphold such a position f or a text
like t he Nivrtti Portion whe r e alayaviji'iana i s r egarded t o be ,
essentially, a kind of princ iple of Pollution .
4. 8. 2 In fac t, it appears that i n the basic material of the
Nivrtti POl'tion (see 10. 1 and I I ) no s uch purificatory
function of alayaviji'iana wa s assumed . In thi s materi al, it is only
stated t hat alaya-vijnana , the r oot of Polluti on, is brought t o an
end by means of the cultivation of whole some factors (*kuaaLa- dhap-
ma- bhavand). in the sense t ha t the cul tivation of a prepa r a tory
contemplation leads to t he supramundane i ns ight into (the f our
Noble) Trutll (s) or True Reali ty, 560 the repea t ed c ultivation of
which entai l s, in its t urn , the cessation of alayaviji'iana.
561
I t
s eems. t hat the text did n ot, originally J treat t he ques tion of
- 78 -
the 5 e e d s of the wholesome factors leading up to s upramun-
dane i nsight .
4. 8. 3 It is onl y in an intercalated
562
paragraph of the Nivrt -
ti Portion that this problem is treated. According to
this paragraph, alayavijnana, i n spite of being the r oot of all
Pollution, nevert heless also incorporates the Seeds of the basi c
wholesome dharmas (kuAal.a.mUla) [indirectly] conducive to libera-
tion (mok90bhdgiya) and of t hose [directly] leading up to penetra-
tion [ into Truth] (nirvedhabhagiya) . 563 To be sure, these prepara-
t.ory wholesome dharmas the m s e 1 v e s are hardly pure or
s upramundane .
564
But since their continuous cultivation (bhavand)
eventual ly leads to sup"amundane insight,5
6
5 t hey 0 p p 0 s e
the continuation of sa'll sara, and in so far as alayavijnana con-
tains t he i r Seeds, it. is at any rate not the cause of
dharmas that are poIlu t i vein the sense of entangling a
person in Suffering.
566
4.8. 4
But, as was stated above ( 4 . 8. 1), such a wholesome
function or aspect of alayavijiiana is not easily recon-
ciled with its general character, in the Nivrtti Portion, as
a principle of Pollution
567
wh ich is expressly taught to be the
cause of the originati on-and-conti nuance (pravrtti) of Defilements
(kte6a) and of the non-or igination (apravrtti) of the Pa th (marga,
i . e . of supramundane insight).568 Accordingly, in the
gr ahaQI passage to which a I 1 Seeds contained in alayavijnana
are included in Omnipresent Badness (sa.1'tlatragwp J 569
the supramundane dharmas a r e said to arise not from a Seed (bija)
in the sense of, or deriving from, an Impression (vQsana) stored
up i n alayaviji'iana and thus comprised in daul1thutya. but from a
tlSeedl! consisting in True Reality [ "worki ng" as ] the objective
condit.ion [of supramundane insight )
ja) . 57
0
Thus, in contrast to the extant form of the Niv"{'tti Portion
(including the intercalated paragraph [ see 4. 8 . 3] ), according to
which the preparatory wholesome dharma s originate from Seeds con-
tained in alayaviji'iana and lead in the end to supramundane insight
- 79 - 4.85
(though there is n 0 e x pre s s statement to the effect that
they or their Seeds become the See d of this insight) I the
last-mentioned passage is unambiguous in stating that supramundane
dharmas can n () t have a mundane principle as their homogeneous
cause , but can only be d ire c t 1 Y derived from the
sup ram u n dan e reality which reveals itself in supramun-
dane liberating insight and is, by way of a metaphor of the
metaphor , expressly called the "Seed" of (the latter and hence of
all) supramundane dharmas.
Yet, if the "Seed" of supramundane insight is True Reality
(tathatci) , one might ask why, since tathatii. is always present,
supr amundane insight does not arise at any and every moment in
all living beings. The answer of the text i, that there are
obst r uctions which prevent tathata from becoming the
object (and thus the "Seed" ) of insight.
57!
And it may he for
dispelli ng these obstructions that preparatory practice
i,
re-
qui red . But the text does not say anything of the sort, and t his
silence - deliberate or not - is significant; for, even if the
mundane factors dispelling obstructions are not the direct cause
of supramundane i.nsight, they would still pave the way for its
arising. Their function would thus, i n any case, be contrary to
the pollutive effect of aIayavijnana, and it would be difficult to
derive them from Seeds incorporated in the latter and, according-
ly, forming part of Badness .
4.8. 5 It may be under the impression of this difficulty that in
the M a hay a n a s a g r a h a as is well-
known.
572
another solution is propounded. This text, on the one
hand, presupposes that supramundane like any other mental
factor. has to arise from a Seed (bija) in the ordinary psycho-
logical sense, i . e . from a Seed deriving from an Impression
(VGBana).573 On the other hand , it i s expressly admitted that, in
view of the essentially pollutive character of alayavijnana, s upra-
mundane insight can not emerge from a Seed ina I a y a -
v i j Ii ii. n a , 574 and the same is also taken for granted in the
case. of the mundane factors leading up to supramundane insight. It
4. 8.6 - 80-
is thus only from t he Supramundane Sphere itself that supramundane
insight and the wholesome factors leading up to it can, for the
first time, enter the mental series of a living being, though, in
contrast to the theory described in 4. 8 .4, they cannot be
engendered by the Supramundane Sphe r e directly but only by m e -
diati.on of a See d deri ving from an Impres-
5 i on (vdsana) left by an act u a 1 0 C cur r e n ee of
supram un dane insight Yet so far no such supra-
mundane insight has ever arisen in the mental series of an
ordi nary living being.
575
It has only arisen in the mental series
of the Noble Ones (dl'ya) , especially the Buddhas . The Impression
which .... ill afterwards become the Seed of the first supramundane
insight of a living being must thus go back to the s upramundane
i nsight or gnosis (bodhi) of the Bud d ha s ,576 which for
this purpose has to be, somehow, transferred by them to the mental
se ries of ordinary living beings. Thi s i s done by means of the
proclamation of the Buddhi st (especially the Mahayana) Doc-
t r i n e Thi s Doctrine is nothing else but a verbaliza-
tion of supramundane insight into True Reality577 and creates , in
mental series of the 1istener, an Impr ession - t he Impression
of Li stening (l!IrutavQsand) - which, like the Doctrine itself, 578
is t e rmed an "outflow of True Reali ty completely freed from
(accidental] Impurities" (euvi IJuddha- dharmadhdtu-nil}yanda). 579
This Impression, though occurring side by side with alayavijnana,
or even commixed with it like milk with water,5S
o
yet does n ot
form p a
opposed to
r t of it, but is rather a heterogeneous element
alayavijnana .
58 1
Though still mundane in itself, this
Impression is neve rtheless, 0 11 a ccount of its s upramundane origin,
capable of becoming the Seed or cause of the factors leadi ng up to
supramundane insight and finally of s upramundane insight itself.
S82
4.8. 6
Tn later texts, this relation of being based on alayavijna-
na without forming part of i t is even used to establish
the existence
dharmas in the
- . 584
vatarasutra,
of a p rim 0
mental series of
r d i a I Seed of supramundane
living beings.
583
tn the Lanka-
as is well-known, even alayaviji'iana its elf ,
- 81 -
49
being identified with tathagatagarbha , is , or comprises, the cause
of supramundane purification - a position whi ch is, to be sure,
irreconcilable wi th that of the Nivrtti Portion but is not entire-
ly inexplicable if we start from the concept of a1ayavijnana we
found in the Basic Section or in the Proof Portion ( 4. 8.1 ).5
8
5
4.9 As was shown in 4.7, in the Nivrtti Portion and related
materials alayavijilana is e sse n t i a I I y connected
with Badness (dau?thutya), especially in the sense of latent
..... ickedness ( = Seeds of Defilement s), and with spiritually evil
Clingi ng
the text
abandoned
the sense
(upadana) . This fact,
expressly states, the
all Clinging and have
of latent wickedness) ,
however, inevitably entails, as
consequence that persons who have
become free from a ll Badness (in
i.e . A r hat s, Pratyekabud-
dhas, Bodhisattvas no longer liable to turning back (avaivartika
or avivQrtaniya) and Tathagatas, have to be regarded, when still
alive, to be nevertheless devoid of alayavijflana
586
(just as they
are considered to be devoid of aopcidana- vijnana )5
8
7. Thus 1 i n
nirodhaaamapatti , such persons are, just as in
devoid of both pravrttivijnanas and
n a ,588 and this obviousl y means: of
vijiuina.
589
For although according to one
a lay a v i j n a -
eve r y kind of
passage
590
the l'rans-
muted Bas is[-of-existence] - which has, in the
Arhat , etc., come to entirely replace alayavijnana and the Badness
with which .it is bound up or of which it consists -
is characterized by free control (*va .1in?) over good and neutral
dharmas,59
1
this free control is, in contrast to its evil counter-
part , viz. Badness , not hypostatized in the text into a form of
mind on its own .
The fact, however, that, in the case of the nirodhasamapat-
=:: of Arhats, etc., no kind of vijiuina appears to be left implies
that the Nivrtti Portion altogether 0 v e rio 0 k s, in this
.:: ase , the statement of the Dharmadinnasutra that in nir-odhasama-
::":;.:ti mind has not withdrawn from t.he body. At any rate, one is
in stating that in this text, at least in the case of
4 1o-4 . 1o. l - 82 -
the Arhat,
function of
etc . , a 1 a y a v i j nan a has los t its
guaranteeing in nirodhasa.mapatti the presence of mind
and thus the biological a p pro p ria t ion of corpor eal
matter and the continuation of 1 i f e But i f alayavijnana is
not required for t his purpose in the case of t he Arhat , etc . , it
... ould appear to be dispensable in other cases, too. Since the text
does not offer or i ndicate any o t h e r soluti on of the
problem, it vould seem that its author simply was not conscious of
this consequence. In other .... ords : By interpr eting alayavijiiana in
terms of the typically Buddhist meaning of ' <itaya', viz. spiritual-
ly evil Cli nging, and by consi stently bringing the conce pt of
alayavijnana as close a s possible to the notion of sopdddno.-vijiid-
na, the author of the Nivrtti Portion came - obviously wit h -
out not i c i n g i t to seriously jeopardize the very
purpose of alayavijnana for the sake of which it had been int ro-
duced in the fi r st place, i.e . to be present, and to guarantee t he
biological appropriation of corporeal mat ter , even in ni1'odhasa.ma-
patti. In or der t o fulfil this purpose , ilayavijiiana had to be
r egarded as co n tin u i n g to exist even in A r hat s
etc., and as being absent in 11 i l' U pad his e fI a - nirvdJ;Ul
o n 1 y , Le. in the state after the death of an Arhat, etc . , as
is in fact expressly stated in the Sacittiki/ Acittika Bhiimil} of
t he Basic Section of the YogacarabhUmi.
592
4.10 It appears that the difficulty involved in the concept of
alayavijiiana as set for t h in t he Nivrtti POl'tion did not
remai n hidden to t he Yogacaras themselves . At any rate, in other
chapte r s of the ViniScayasatpgrahal'j.'i , t .... o theories can be found
which create the i mpression of being attempts at solving the
problem, or at least de facto succeed in doing so .
4.10.1
One of the se theories is presented i n the Sacittika
Bhumib of the In this chapter
.... hich in structure and detail has many points in common .... ith the
Pravrtti POl"tion. and t he Nivrtti Portion - , the deci sive role i n
establishing or mai ntaining Pollution (8aJ!1kteSa) is no longer
- 83 -
410. 2
attributed to alayavijflana but has
man a s 593 whi ch, as
the new
'mine' 594 is
been entirely transferred to
a subtle notion of ! I I and
,
eliminated
e sse n t i all y d e f i 1 e d
in the Arhat .
595
Alayavijnana is thus
and altogether
no longer re-
quired as the principle of Pollution , and would be free to resume
i ts old function of biological appropriation even in Arhats. But
the text does not expr essly say so. It merely stresses, in this
context, that alayavijfiana is not directl y associated (- saJ!TPl'a-
yukta) with any Defilements (kLe6a), 596 but it does not offer a
revised theory of alayavijiiana I 5 relation to Badne ss
(daU?fhul.ya) or to the 5 e e d 5 of Defilements the essen-
t i a 1 connection with which had implied its absence in Arhats,
etc , It may be on account of this inexpli ci tness with regard to
the nature and function of alayavijiiana that the solution of the
Saci ttikabhumi-viniscaya does not seem to have s ucceeded in super-
s eding the Nivrtti Portion, t he influence of which , clearly pres-
ent in the and the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-
lun
598
, is st ill palpabl e in Vasubandhu's
4.10.2
The reconsideration of the crucial problem of alayavijiia-
na' s relation to Badness which one misses in the Sacit-
tikabhumi-viniscaya is, however , presupposed in the Sopadhika/ Niru-
padhika BhumiJ:! of the Thi s text states that ,
when an Arhat enters he first stops "forth-
coming" mind (prQvrtti- viJ'nana) by becoming abso rbed in ni1'odhasa-
mapatti , and that
the r e u p 0 n
alayavijiiana abandons the
[corporeal] basis(-of-existence} [and , in its also ceases to
exist],600 Thi s means that according to t hi s text the Arhat is
still furnished with an alayavijiiana, which keeps his body alive
even in ni1'odhasamdpatti, and the withdrawal or cessation of whi ch
means enteri ng into i , e, death , The reason
why this passage can a ccept the continuance of alayavijiiana even
in Arhats s eems to be that it
(daU{;'thulya) whi ch differs from
presupposes
t hat of the
a concept of Badness
Nivrtti Port ion in an
important respect , In the Nivrtti Portion the notion of Badness
appears to be c 0 - ext en s i v e with latent w i e ke d _
4.10.2 - 84 -
n e s s , i. e. Seeds of
601
o e f i 1 e m en t s . In fact, i n a
few passages of t he Yogacarabhumi , the aspect of uneasi ness ap-
pear s to be a ki nd of by-effect of , or at least c l osely connec ted
with, Badness in the sens e of latent wi ckedne ss .
602
On the other
the Sopadhika- nirupadhika-bhumi-viniscaya recurs to a di s-
ti nction, already made i n t he Manobhiimi of t he Basi c Section ,6
0
3
between two k i n d s o f B ad n e s s, viz . Badness
affiliated to Defilement s invol vi ng
latent wickedness, and Badness affiliated to [what i s Resul t--
of- )Maturation daU{lfhuLyam) not involving wicked-
ness but only uneasi ness, and considers, in accordance with some
other passages ,6
0
4 t he latter kind, viz. . to
continue to e xist. eve n in t he Arhat .
60s
Thus, it is only a part or
special a spect of al ayavi j nana that is. in a latent fo r m, charac-
terized by upadana or (itaya in the s piritually evil sense and
thus responsi ble for Polluti on and is t he r efore by necessity
enti r ely eliminated .... hen Arhat s hi p is attained, whereas a nothe r
part or aspect of alayavijiiana is spiritually neutral and fit f or
functioning as the principle of biological a ppropriation even in
an Arhat.
606
This l atte r aspect, as is well_known, 60
7
later Yogaca-
ras like HSUan_tsang
608
prefer to call ' vipiika- uijnana ' only ,
r eserving the term 'al ayavijiiana' , in accordance with t he Nivrt ti
Portion, to the Upollutive" aspect which ceases with the attain-
ment of Arhatship.
- 85 - \ ,1-5,'
5. Alayavijnana as a veritable vijnana
5. 1 My Initial. Passage st arted from t he canonical s tatement
t ha t i n nil'odhasamcipatti mind (vijnana) has not wi t hdralo'n
from the body ( 2 .1 ), and from thi s it drew the concl us ion that,
in view of the absence of the ordinary, conscious f orms of mi nd ,
there must in nil'odhasamapatti, some other - by necessity
s ubliminal - kind of vijnana ( 2 . 3) . The InitiaL Passage s eems
to have tried to es t abl ish s uch a vijoona by hypostatizing the
Seeds (bija) of mind st i cking i n the materi al sense-faculties to
a kind of mind (viJ"nana) on it s own , called 'alayavijiiana
'
(
2.5). I t is t hus obvious that already in t he context of the ve r y
first int r oduction of alayavij iiana - provided that I have spotted
it correc tly - the v i j nan a nature of a1aya-
viji'iana, i . e. the fact that it is some g e n u i n e
k ind of mi nd (vijiltina) , is of fundamenta l importance .
Howeve r , t his vijYiii.n.a nature of a layavij nana turns out to
be by no means unproblematic as soon as one tries to justify it i n
a more concrete way.
5.2 In view of the close connection of the pertinent parts of
the Yogacarabhiimi with the Abhidharmic traditi on, it is not
surpri si ng that .ilayavijiiana, in order to deserve being qualified
as a genuine vijnana, came to be expected to satisfy the Abhidhar-
mi c d e fi n i t ion of a vijnana .
Thi s definition, whi ch i n substance can be traced back to
the canonical texts, takes vijnana as that which performs the
f
.. 609 1 . 1 h h ' h k
act 0 or, more exp y, as t at 10' mae s
k n o wn (vijiiapti) , i.e . peI'ceivcs
o b j e c t atambana) . 610
or cognizes (upatabdhi),
a n
Besides, every kind or state of mind (citta :;: vijnana) is,
in Abhidha rmi c theory, consi dered to be associated wi th (SClJ!1-
;!"-::.yukta) mind-like or
, 'k - dh -h) 611
;o:::.t(lSt. a apma..
men tal
Some of these
f act 0 r S
mental factors
(caitta,:z or
(es pecially
53
- 86 -
the good and evil ones) occur only more or less sporadi cally , but
others are r egarded as 0 m nip re s e n t (sQl"vat l"aga ), i. e .
as accompanying every s tate of mind without exception. In the
- - - 612
Yogacarabhumi , five mental factors are a ccepted a s omnipresent:
I ) [focussing of ) attention (manasJuil"a), 2) contact (spal' sJa) , 613
3) sensation or f eeling (vedand) J 4) ideati on (sW!ljna) , 6 14 and
5) volitional impulse or drive (cetand) .
5. 3 It is obvious that both t he above-mentioned definition of
vijiitina and the vie .... that every viJ'rUina is by necessity
accompanied by at l east five mental f ac t or s including attention
and volitional i mpulse a r e based on a purely actualistic concept
of IJijnana . Thus, if t he vij'Mna nat ure of alayavi jnana is vi ndi -
cated by the assumption t hat i t, too, mus t: s atis fy these c rit eria
viz. cognize an obj ect and be associated with at least the
omnipresent me ntal fa ctor s
61S
t hi s would s eem to be hardly
compatible with its presence in an unconscious state nirodha-
salTuipatti, in essential connect i on with whi ch, however, the con-
ce pt of alayavi jnana appear s to have been introduced for the fir s t
time . For the state of nirodhasamapatti is traditionally taken to
be charact erized by the a b se n c e of all mental activity6t 6
and is - under its full name
- expressly stat ed too be
sens ati on (vedana) .
6t
7 But

wit h 0 u t ideation (sClJ!!.iiia) a nd
precisely these two are among the
omnipresent mental fa ctor s on the presence of whi c h t he vijnarra
nature of a layavijnana would, from the Abhidharmic point of view,
be depende nt . If, on t he other hand , the consequence that a1ayavi-
jnana must cognize an object and be associated with mental fac t o r s
i s rejected, it would seem difficult, at least from the Abhidharmic
point of view, t o es t ablish it as a ve ritable vijiidna, as it,
howeve r, would have to be if t he Sutra, referred t o i n the Initial
Passage is to be taken seriously .
- 87 - 5.4-5.4.2.1
5.4 In the Basic Section of the YogacarabhUmi, there is no
indication that the afore-mentioned implications of the vi-
jiidna nature of alayavijiiana had already become a conscious issue,
and the same is true of the Vth chapter of the Sa!JIdhinirmo-
canasutra and of the layer A (see 9) of the Proof Portion of the
VinSg alay. Tro eat ise. Yet , there are a couple of passages which
may be taken to anticipate certain aspects of this development:
5. 4. 1 On the one hand , there is a passage in the Basic Sec-
tion
6t 8
which may be taken to imply that .uayavijfiana is
associated with neither-painful-nor-pl easant (aduQkhii8ukha) sensa-
tion (cp . 6. 5.2). Since in this passage ilayavijiiana figures as
(the primary?) res ult of karmic Maturation (cp. 6.5.4), it would
seem that it had come to be connected with such a sensation
because it had taken the position of mind i n the embryonic state
( probably identical with Mind-containing-all-Seeds (sa1"vabija"kaJrl
vijnanam)6
1
9) , which is, in pre-iilayavijf\anic materials of the
Basic Section, stated to be "established" (p1"ati?thita)620-, as
a rule (p1"akrtya) , in neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation.
621
5. 4.2
On the other hand , the Pr>oof P01"tion refers to a cor po-
real experience (kQyiko 'nubhava';) , or experiences of the
body arising in the bodi
22
(kaye kayanubhavaJ;!), both in and
outside meditative absorption, wh ich have to be ascribed to alaya-
vijnana (cp.
371 ) .
This
somehow, per c
,
i v e s
whi c h it sticks, or causes
becoming sensible .
would seem
o r s e n
it to be
to mean
S
, S
sensed
that alayavijnana,
the body in
along with its own
5. 4.2. 1
Perhaps this idea is somehow connected with the fact
that alayavijnana came to incorporate Badness (dau?thu-
l.ya: see 4.1.4) - especially, of course, Badnes s sticking in the
body - and, occasionally, also its counterpart Ease
see n. 47). NOW, Badness in the sense of subliminal uneasines s
cons titutes a kind of Suffering see 4.1.2), and
Suffering is , in spite of its s ubtleness, somehow f e I t
especially in connection with neither- painful-nor-pleasant sensa-
this
... " : v_.
5.4. 2. 2-5 5.1 - 88 -
ticn vedarur) where it is not overlain with acute
1
. 624
p easur e or
5.4. 2. 2
Thus, it may be t hat, by assuming that a layavijiiana
experiences the Bad n e s s s ti c k-
i n g i n the b o d y ) - thi s Badness being something of
which a layavijiiana itself is cons titutive -, t he passage antic i -
pates, in an indistinct fashion , the idea that al ayavij iiana
per c eiv es t h e b o d y a nd i s, at the same time,
associated wi th neither-painful-nor-pl easant s en sat i o n.
5.4. 2. 3 A pa ssage of the Hsien-yang- s heng-chiao-lun (see 3.7 .
2) seems t o suggest t ha t in stat e s of meditative absorp-
tion, when bodily uneasiness i s r eplaced by corpor eal ease, alaya-
vi jiiana i s associated with , or at least res ponsible for,
pIe a s a n t s ens ation. But due to the negative developme nt
of the concept of alayavijnana deli neated in 4, this idea does
not appear to have st ruck roots .
5. 5. 1
Though somebow vaguely r el ated t o the problem of the
vijiidna. nature of alayavijnana , the stat ement s di scus sed
i n the preceding paragraph (5.4) do not yet seem to proceed from a
cl ear-cut awa r eness of this problem. Such an awareness a ppear s to
be documented for the fi rst time in t he VIIIth chapter of the
Sarpdhi nirmocanas utra, wb ere the new subliminal kind of vijnana is
explicitly unde r s tood as a veritable vijiiana in the sense. of
co g nit ion o f a n o b j e c t (see 5. 6 . I) . I t is
worth noting i n t hi s connect i on that Sal[ld h VIn a ppears t o have
made use of the defini ti on of vi j iidna a s (mere) making known (i.e.
perception/ cognition) of an object (*r:iLambana- vijnapti( - mdtpa
also in the context of the ques ti on of whe t her the i mages vizualiz-
ed i n meditative concentration (Sal[ldh VIII . 7) - and a nalogous l y
also t he contents of eve r yday experiences (Sal[ldh VItI. S) - are
different from mi nd or not .
625
Since the t heory of vij iiaptimatT'atd
is also alluded t o in the s ubsequent part of t he pa ragraph of
SalJlClh VIII whi ch present s the sublimi nal f orm of mind as a n actu<.J.l
pe r cept ion (or "representation") of an obj ect (see n . 628a)' it
- 89 -
5.5.2-5 6.1
may even be that the fir s t attempt to conceive of the subliminal
v iJiicina as a pe rception (or "representation" ) of a n object was
motivated not so much by t he ordinary Abhidharma definition of
vijiiQna as vi j Ii apt i, Le . cognition of an object , but
rather by its specifically Yogacara ideali st r einterpretation.
i.e. by the doctrine of V i j Ii apt i mat pat a (which is.
by the way, quite obv i ous ly the motive of conceiving of alayavijni-
na as a cognition of an object also at MSg 11. 13 (see 5.12 .1 +
n. 698.
5.5.2
This assumption would also explain the fact that t he
does n 0
problem whether alayavi j i'iana
j,
0'
;,
not
tal f act 0 r 5 Thi s que s ti on
rai s ed and discussed (see 5 . 9) in the
t yet touch upon the
associated Io'ith m e
n -
is, however , explicitly
Pl'avrtti Por tion {of the
VinSg alay. 'I'T'eatise . Thi s t ext does not seem to advocate the
standpoi nt of vi jiiaptimatrata (see 10. 3 . L) a nd may hence be
regarded rather a s an attempt to revisE' and systematize the theory
of a layaviji'lana , or the theory of mind (citt a. manas . vi jnana)626
with alayavijnana a s its central concept. by establishing alayavi-
jfiana as the fundamental layer of personality and by consistently
taking it a s a veri table vijiiiina in the Abhidharma sense,626a
though perhaps it may havE' been additionally encouraged to thi s
step by the VIlIth chapter of the
5.6. 1
As was stated in 5.5. the first t ext to document an
awareness of t.he iss ue that in orde r to be a veritable
vijlitina the new, subliminal kind of mind must cog n i z e or
percei ve an o b j e c t is the VIIIth c hapter of t he S a III -
d h i n i r m 0 ca n a s u t r a, were tidiinavijiitina (i.e. ala-
yavi jnana:
not fully
see 3.9. 2. 3) i s c haracterbed as an
conscious?} steady628 perception
"unconscious (or :
(or "representa-
tion
H
)628a of t he Receptacl e (Le . of
( ltasQl[lvidita- s thi l"a- bhajana- vijriapti) ,,
62
9.
the surrounding world )
5.6.2-5 .6. 3.2
- 90 -
5. 6.2 In one paragr aph of the Proof P 0 r t ion (vi::. .
layer 8. 2: see 9). ordi nary perceptions and cognitions
are stated to be i nevi tabl y accompanied not only by a perception
of the surrounding world (bhajana- vijiiapti) but also from
a. notion of I I ' to be ascribed to manoa: see 9) by a percepti on
of the basis (al!ll'aya-vijiiapti)6
3
o whi ch will , in this connection,
ref er to a conti nuous perception of one ' s own cor p 0 rea 1
bas is_of_existence
631
and doubtl ess indicate another cognitive
function of alayavijnana.
631a
5.6. 3
In the Portio n, the cogni t i ve
function of a l ayavijnana i s descr ibed i n a way which is
close to that of the P'fooof Portion but not identical with it and
at any rate mo r e elabor ate.
632
According to t he Pravrtti Portion, too, iilayavijfiana per-
ceives two objects, one "outside" (bahil"dhd) and one "in'Ward-
ly" (adhydtmam) : 633
5. 6. 3.1 On t he one hand, alayavijnana is, on the lines of Sal'(ldh
VIII, stated to perceive , in an unint errupt ed (and indis-
tinct, or not clearl y delimited?) form,6
34
t he Re ceptacl e (1. e .
the sur rounding 'World) (aparicchinna1il'a- bhdjana-vijiiapt i ) . 635
5. 6. 3. 2 On the other hand, alayavijiiana perceives, a s i n t he
Proof Portion, also the corpor eal basis-of-personal-
existence, but thi s perception is, i n the Pravrtti Portion, only
a part of a mo r e complex percepti on dedved from Sallldh V. 2 where
Hind-containing-all-Seeds ( = alayavij iiana ) wa s stated to reincar-
nate on the basis of a two f old u P ci d Ii n a (see
4.4.2) . 111 the f'r'avrtti POl't ion , this twofold uptidcina is made
i nto an 0 b j e c t of alayavijihina I s cog nit i v e fun c-
tion, .... hich means that alayavijiiana is taken to perceive or
cog niz e both the [ SUbtle] matte r of the [material ]
sen s e - f a c u 1 tie S along with its [gross ] basis a s
a 1 S 0 the Im p r es s i on (vaaarni) of emotionally involv-
ed conceptual proliferation, s peci fi ed, i n this text , a s Sticki ng
to the Imagined Cha racter [of reality] (pal'ika1.pita-avabJuivabhi -
' . ) 636
see 4.5.1.
- 91 - 5. 6. 3. 3-5.6 . 3 5
5.6. 3. 3
The percepti on of the surrounding world is, moreover,
stated to be based on (i.e . to be , so to speak, a second-
ary or by-effect of) alayavijnana i n so far as it has t he lI upadana
inwardly,,6
37
( i , e . primarily, in this connect i on , the corporeal
basis of personal exi s tence) fol' its object. and thi s is illustrat-
ed by the flame of a lamp whi ch, though functioning "i nwardly" on
the basis of (*upddaya!) wi ck and fat, 638 automatically emits
light "outside",639 i . e . illumines the surrounding s pace.
5.6. 3. 4 The
nd
eternal but
homogeneous
1
" f 643
, e.
object. perceived by
640
does not change .
alayavijiiina is always preseot
Thus , alayavij iiana , though not.
641
a continuous series of moment s , continues as a
percepti on
642
(*ekarasa- uijnaptita;) throughout
5.6.3.5 On the other hand, the object of alayavijiiana differs
according t o t he world sphere where one is reborn .
a) One passage (based on SalJldh V. 2)644 states tbat i n t he im-
materi al wor ld- sphere (arupyadhatu) the upadana perce i ved by alaya-
djiiana is confined t o t he Impressi on (vd'santi) j 645 in the ar1i.pya-
dhd'tu a perception of the corpor eal basis-of-existence is , of
cour se, i mpossible since wh o is rebor n in this s phe r e is devoid of
mate r ial cons tituents .
=1 In anot her paragraph,646 the Praur tti Portion declares that the
which is t he object (d'lambana) of alayavij nana is
limited ("'paritta) in t be kamadhd'tu. large (ltmahadgat a ) in the
i nfinite i n the and vijnanQnantYQya-
:;CTA, subtle ( "'s1i.k?ma) in the akiiicanyayat ana, and ext remely sub-
tle ("'ati - suk/ilma ) i n the naivasGJ!IjiUiMs(l1J1ifidyatana . Thi s makes
s ense in the firs t t .... o case s s ince it can be r eferred to the
fac t that the bod i e s
s u ll in the kcimadhat}48 but
of living beings are comparatively
large in the r1i.padhd'tu.
649
But it
is not so easy to understand wha t the author had in mi nd i n the
case of the s tages of t he d'r1i.pyadhd'tu , since there is, in t his
650
s rhere, no body at all. Thus - provided t hat the passage does
pre suppos e a divergent view on corporeal matter in the arJi.pya-
5.6. 4.1- 5.7
- 92 -
dluitu,65
1
the upddana in this sphere can only be the I m -
pre s s ion (vasana) . YetI in this case , too, the use of the
attribute "infinite" a'nd the dLstinction between "sub-
tle" and "extremely subtle" do not make sense unless they are
taken to refer, indirect ly, to a dissimilarity of t he a ct u a 1
(immaterial) dharmas which arise from the Impression in the
various stage s of the arupyadhatu .
652
5.6. 4.1
More or less the same view on the twofold cogni tive
fun ction of alayaviji'iana as in t he Pravrtti POf'tion is
indicated i n t he Sac itt i k a B hum i i} of the ViniS-
cayasa!l1grahal)l; according to this text, alayavijiiana "always [per-
ceives], as its object, on the one hand the upadana, and on the
other the s urrounding .... orld one and the same (or: uniform)
[throughout Ufe] - without clearly di sce rning (or delimiting?)
it,,653 .
5.6. 4.2 Similarly, in the begi nning
she n g - chi a 0 - 1 u
of the
654
n ,
H s i e n - y a n g -
alayavijnana is
stated to appropriate and per c e i v e , on the one hand,
the [ subtle ] material sense-faculties and their [gross] bases as
well as the Impression(s) of [salJlsaric] diversity/ diversification
(pT'apanca- vaswui) , and to support and perceive , on t he other hand,
the Receptacl e (: s urrounding world) outside .
655
5.7 As was indicated above ( 5. 3)' the admission t hat a s a
uiincino. alayavijii.,ina, too, had to be conceived of as actual-
ly cog n i z i n g a n o b j e c t
easily compatible with its presence in
does not appear to be
u n co n sci 0 u s
states like niT'odhasamiipatti . Thi s seems to hold good particular-
l y in the case of the pertinent par agraph of the Proof POT'tion;
for in this paragraph, what must be the cognitive functions of
alayavijnana a continuous perception of the s urrounding
world and of the [ corporeal] basis [of personal existence ] : see
5.6.2 ) is presented as a matter-of-fact e x per i e n c e
(upaLabhyant e !).6
5
6 Since such an experience can hardly be imagin-
- 93 -
5. B-5. B. I
ed not to cont radi ct the unconscious character of nirodhasamapatti,
it would seem t hat in this passage the specific connection of
alayavijiiana wi th nil'odhaaamapatti had)
of, as appear s to be the case in some
probably, been l ost sight
657
ot her texts, too . Yet,
1II0St of these texts, or at any rate the majority of the sources
concerned, have r emained conscious of the su b 1 i min a 1 or
f a i n t na t ur e of alayavijiiana, and try to harmoniz e the
cognitive function of alayavij fiana with its faintness by expressly
specifying either this cogn1tl.Ve function
658
or the object cog-
. ed
659
f 11 "( id"t )660 "d" "
nl.Z a s un- or not u y conSC10US aawrn' 1. a J 1." l.stl.nct
or not clearly
(apal'icchin.na,

delimited
661
etc . ;
or di fficult to cognize or determine
etc .
662
), or subtle (su-
A particularly illuminating illustration of the matter is
given by *Prthivlbandhu:
664
"As a glow-worm flying by day, t hough not [ totally] l acking
lwninosity, yet does not shi ne as brightly as the light of the
sun, etc . , so alayavijnana
J
when perceiving i nwardly that which
is appropriated (upddana) "' J perceives it [but] in an i ndi s-
tinct or subtle or faint way, and when perceiving the surround-
ing world (bhajana1.oka) outside , perceives it in an indistinct
or subtle or faint way . . . 10 .
5.8. While it is comparatively easy to account for the mere f act
that alayavijn.ana came to be conceived of as a cognition of
an object (see 5 .2-3), I am so far unable to give a definitive
a nswer to the question why the object of alayavijiiana was con-
cretbed precisely in the way described in 5. 6, viz . as the
s urrounding world, corporeal matter, and the Impression(s) of
sal]lsaric diversity/ diversification or of Sticking to t he Imagined
Character [of r eality]. All I can do is to offer some rather
unsatisfactory hypothetical remarks.
665
S.B.l
One possibility one may be tempted to take into consider-
ation is that t he object of alayavijiiana was derived from
a reinterpretation of the term 'alayavijiiana') by way of taking it
5.8.2
- 94 -
as a genitive with 'iHaya' indicating the object of
'vijnana '. Since 'araya' may also mean "receptacle", 'alaya,-vijna-
na' might have been taken to mean !lcognition of the Receptacle",
i.e. of the surrounding world (bhdjana( - l..oka)). 666 Likewise, if
'a"Laya I was understood i n the sense
the or atmabhavQ (contai ning
have supplied the (and the
of "what one clings to " , i.e.
all Seeds). 667 this might
Seeds) as another object of
alayavijnana, as would also have resulted, even more specifically,
if the term 'adana- vijnana ' had, in a similar way. been i nterpret-
ed as "cognition o f the adana (i n the sense of the twofold
updddna of Sallldh V. 2)". But as far as I can see there is not the
slightest hint in the sour ces that such an i nterpretation of the
term(s) was ever thought of.
668
Moreover, oddly enough, the
nirmocanasutra
J
which pr efers ' ci d ci n a - vijiiiina I, presents, as
the object of the subliminal viJoiidna
J
only the surr ounding world,
whi ch could be derived only from 'a I a y a -vijiiana', whereas
the corporeal basis and the Impression(s) , which would more easily
be derived from I ci d ci n a viJonana I , figure as object of
the s ubliminal vijiiiina onl y i n the Yogacarabhumi , wh ich prefers
I a 1 a y a vijiiana'.
5.8. 2 Another possibility
"
that the object of alayavijiiana
was, 0> may be indicated by the Proof (see 5.7 ) ,
de rived from a mat t e r - 0 f - f a
,
t e x p e r i e n
,
e
- i.eo a kind of steady background awareness of one's body (cp.
also 504 o2r) and of the surrounding world (cp . also 7. 4 ) -,
which was found suitable for attribution to alayavijnana. While
not altogether excludi...ng such a possibility as a contributory
factor, I should stilt find it strange that the occurrence of s uch
exper iences should have been enti r ely overlooked or del iberately
ignored before the introduction of alayavijii.ina . Besides , it may
be difficult to explain, on the basis of a matter-ai-fact experi-
ence, the idea that alayavijiiana also cognizes the I mp res -
s ion (s) (vasanci) of salJlsaric
Sticking to the Imagined Character
diver sity/diversifi cat ion
[ of reality].
or of
- 95 -
5.8. 3-5. 8.4
5. B. 3
A third possibili ty of explanation is to start from theo-
retical considerations: If alayavijnana . being a !)ijiidna.
had to operate as a perception or cognition of some object, it
W'ould not seem unnatural if this function .... as considered to be
direct ed towards the very object alayavijnana .... as already acknowl-
edged to a p pro p ria t e i. e. towards the body and the
materi.al sense-faculties . This principle could be extended to the
Impression (vasana)
V
.>" 669
.2, as
if this too was regarded, in line .... ith Saljldh
Such an extension will seem more plausible if
attention is paid to the special case of the world-sphere of
immateriality (arupyadhatu) .... here the corporeal basis of one' s
existence is lacking,67
0
which .... ould mean that, the vasana apart,
alayavijiiana is .... ithout upci:dana and. object. 671 As for the percep-
tion of the s urrounding .... orld, it may bave been found difficult to
conceive of the perception of the corporeal basis in isolation :
since the corpor eal basis always exists, and is appropriated,
.... i t h i na c e r t a ins u r r 0 u n din g, its percep-
tion, too , is naturally conceived of as automatically i nvolving a
perception of t ha t surrounding, too,672; JUSt as the flame of a
lamp. though arising "inwardly" on the basis (upaddya ) of "ick and-
fat, automatically illumines the surrounding s pace.
673
5.B.4 It s hould however be noted that, $0 far as the cognitive
function of the subliminal vijiidna is concerned, the Saf\l-
Jhinirmocanasut ra , which has
?ravrtti Portion,6
7
4 mentions
i ng .... or ld (bhajana- viJ'napt i)
obviously been made use of by the
only a
but is
perception of the
t a cit on a
surround-
per -
c e p t ion of the corporeal basis or of the twofold up&Uina,
the latter being merely c haracterized as that on the basis of
'Io"h ich (*upci:daya: see n. SoB) the reincarnation, etc., of the
.subliminal) Hind containing all Seeds (saruabijakap cittam) takes
r lace.675 Unl ess the charaterization of alayavijiiana's cognitive
iunction in SaJildh VIII is, for whatever reason, incomplete, this
'Io' ,:- uld mean that in explaini ng .... hy the object of alayaviji'iana/ adana-
was concretized as it was we have to start not from the
of the corporeal basis or of the t .... ofold upci:dana but
5.8 . 5 - 96 -
from the perception of the surrounding world. In this case, the
cognit i ve function of alayavijuana may have been conceived of on
the analogy of the ordinary, i. e. extroverted J sense-faculties or
perceptions: As, e . g . } eyesight, hidden in the eye, generates a
perception of visible things out side but not of the eye itself, or
as visual perception, being based on the sense-faculty of sight ,
perceives things outside but not its basis , so alayavijnana/ adana-
viiiUina, hidden in the body it appropriates , perceives its sur-
roundi ng but not tbe body. Yet. if one thinks of the sense of
touch and tactile perception, which apprehend touch allover and
even .... ithin the body J one can easily see why the Viniscayasa![lgra-
hal).I has added, to the perception of the surrounding world, a
perception of alayaviji'iana I S o ..... n corporeal basis - an addition
which may, however, also have been motivated or reinforced by the
(possibly earlier) idea of bodUy experiences to be ascribed to
alayavijnana (s ee 5. 4 . 2) . 6
7
6
In this connection it may be worth stating that the
w 0 r din g of the simile by ..... hich the PJ'avrtti Portion illus-
trates alayavijitina's perception of the surrounding world ..... ould
seem to fit the (presumabl e) initial situation (documented by
Sarpdh VIII.37) when it says t hat the flame of a lamp, a r i s -
i n g "inwardly", pro d u c e s
sid e 11. 677 Yet, the simile may just
the sense of the vie ..... of the PT'avrtti
1 i g h t II 0 U t -
as well be interpr eted in
Portion, if one presup-
poses that the flame of a lamp or candle in fact illumines not
only the surroundi ngs but also its o ..... n basis, viz. wick and fat .
678
5. 8.5
However, it may well be that even this latter hypothesis
( 5. 8 .4) at best helps to explain ho ..... the statement of
Sarpdh VIII may have been understood and adapted by the ViniS-
cayasarpgrahal).:l. In view of the v i J' ri apt i mat l' a t a
background of Sal[ldh VIII (see 5. 5. 1), one has to consider the
possibility that in establishing cidrinaviiilina as bhdJana- vijfiap-
ti Sarpdh VIII did not at all start from the traditional, realist
view of perception but from some other idea , e.g . from the idea
that dddnavijnana in the epistemological context, viz. iidtil1O.vijiiii-
- 97 - 5 9
na viewed as a i.e. as a representation or
image, must be as fun dam e n tal as it is in the context
of psychological analysis (Sarpdh V.4-5 : see 3 . 9.3). and it may
have been for t his reason that cidtinavijna.na ... as taken to be
a "steady representation of bhajana[loka)", i.e. of the "surround-
ing .... orld" as the recept acle and footing or 5 u p P 0 r t (pada.
of living beings . This explanation .... ould. by the
way , also be appli cable if vijnaptimatl'ata is left out of account .
5.9 As was indicated i n 5.5, it is only in t he Pl"avrtti
Portion of the VinSg citay. Treatise that the viJ'iUina nature
of alayavijiiana is systematically developed also in the sense that
it is realized to involve association (sCUJlProayoga) .... i t h men-
tal f act 0 r s . The text accepts this consequence without
restriction, and accordingly as c ribes to alayavijnana all the five
mental factors which are said to be omnipresent i. e.
associated with eve r y state of mind without exception: V"iz.
contact (spal'lia), sensation (vedana, expressly specifi ed, i n t he
ca se of alayavijiiana, as neither-painful-nor-pleasant )679, idea-
tion (sa1!1J'na), volitional impul se (cetana) , and (focussing of)
attention (manaskal'a) . 680 Though t he assumption of these factors
does not seem unreasonable if the cognitive function of alayavijiia-
na - viz. "making known" (vijriapti), i.e . cognizing or perceiv-
ing, an object - i:; taken ser i ously, at least some of them do not
easily fit i ts subliminal character . And they would seem al most
incompa tible with the presence of alayavijnana in nirodhaaamdpatti
where all mental activities (occasionally defined as 8G.f!!Jna and
vedana
681
or, in the (Mula-)Sarvast ivada tradition, as 8Q1)1jna and
!!etana:
682
but certai nly also including manaskal'a) are sa.id to have
ceased.
683
The Portion, though not mentioning nil'odhasama-
?atti and perhaps no longer concerned with its s pecial problems,
is neve r theless aware of the subliminal cha-racter of alayavijnana
and tries to do justice to it by declaring the mental factors
associated with .i..layavijii.ana to be s ub tIe on
account of being hard to observe even for sagacious .... orldly
'.i ,). 10- ). 1..1.. . '1.
- 98 -
684
people. But although this solution may be acceptable as far as
neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensation is conce rned (the more so
since there are antecedents in the older materials (see 5. 4)),
it may seem problematic in the case of essentially
actualistic factors like ideation (sW'!IJ'na) , volitional impulse
(cetand) or (focussing of) at tent ion (manaskal'a) . Accordingly ,
even closely related texts like the Sacittika Bhu.mil;l of the
ViniScayasaqtgrahaQI
685
and the beginning of the Hsien-yang-sheng-
chiao_lun
686
confine themselves to letting alayavi j nana be associ-
ated with neither-pa.inful-nor-pleasant sensation but do not
mention its association with the other omnipresent factors.
5. 10 In contrast to the Pr>av ftt i P01' t ion and its bold accept-
ance of the consequences ens uing, in the Abhidharmic per-
spective, from taking alayavijJi.ana as a veritable the
majority of the older post-Yogacar a bhiimi sources
687
appear , for
whatever reasons, to have had considerable reserves in t he matter.
A detailed account would by far exceed the limi ts of the present
study, but even a tentative Sketch, incomplete and preliminary
though it i s, will not perhaps be found entirely superfluous .
5.1 1. 1 In t he Yogacara wo rks ascri bed to " M a i t r e y a -
( nat h a ) " ( viz . Madhyanta-
vibhaga and Dharmadharmatavibhaga ), the term 'alayavijnana' i s, as
is well_known ,688 never used. Thi s cannot be accounted for by the
assumption that the context did not offer any opportunity to
mention it; for the "Maitreya texts" occasi onally make us e of mor e
or less equival ent concept s
689
some of which are expressly i denti-
fied with alayavijnana already by the earliest commentator.
69o
In
fac t , some of these concept s make it diffic ult to be lieve that the
author did not yet know of al ayavijnana, but c reate rather the
impression that he deliberate ly avoided it.
5. 11.2 An especially illumi nating example is found in the Dhar-
. - 691
madharmatavibhaga:
"Due to beginningless ignorance of tathata [there is] fal se
- 99 -
5. 11. 3
imagination ( abhutaparikatpa) that contains all Seeds (sarvabi-
jaka) and is the cause of the appearance of the dichotomy [ of
gpanya and gpanaka ] which does not really exist (asad- dvaya-pra-
khyana-kciraJ;IG) J and there is another [series of false imagina-
tion] (cp . DhDhVV l'gyud g2Qn) based on t ,hat (first kind of
false imagination]
"
This passage explicitly distinguishes between two l ayers of abhu-
taparikatpa, one of them being conceived of as the support of the
other and as containing all Seeds (sQrovabijaka). This looks like
a deliberate attempt to introduce a subliminal form of mind with-
out calling it 'alayavijilana' (with which it is , hOI'lever, express-
ly identified in Vasubandhu's commentary )69
2
, 693
5.11.3 The motives for such a reserve can only be surmised. One
might consider the possibility that the author of the
"Haitreya texts" did not like the Abhidharmic consequences ensuing
from the vijiuina nature of alayavijiiana. But i n this case he
should not have used, probably in a similar sense, the notion of
pT'Qtyayavijnana (HAV J. 9a)694 either. Therefore, it is more prob-
able that, i n view of his decidedly Mahayana (and non-Abhidharma)
attitude, such implications meant little to him, and that his
reserves against the concept of alayavijiiana have some other
r eason: e . g. the fact that it did not occur in t he professedly
lotahayana chapters of the Yogacarabhiimi (vi:. Bodhisattvabhumi and
BodhisattvabhumiviniScaya, of ... hich he appears to have made ample
use)695, but only in more traditional parts. Or the author of the
texts" may still have been aware of the specific connec-
tion of alayavijfiana with nil'odhasamiipatti {whi ch appears to be
almost entirely ignored in these texts!)696 or with biological
appropriation (which hardly suits the spiritualist or ientation of
'-he ontology of the "Mai treya texts " according to which all
phenomena, especially all material phenomena, are nothing but
illusory manifestations of mi nd (vijnana) or false imagination

5 . 12. 1-5.12.2 - 100 -
5.1 2.1 In contrast to this, the Abhidharma el ement is much
stronger in what is generally regarded as t he main works
of A s an g a viz . the
(which claims to be based on the
M a hay a n a s a g r a h a
(Mahayana-)Abhidharmasutra) and,
of cour se, the A b hid h arm a S a u c cay a tn the
latter text, alayavijn.ana, though not occurring very often, yet
figures as a well-established element of the Yogacara tradition.
In the Mahayanasaqlgraha, it is more central and even constitutes
the subject-matter of one of t he two largest chapters of the text
(viz . MSg I). All the more striking is it that throughout this
lengthy treatment of a layavijnana there is no attempt to interpret
it, on the lines of the actualist Abhidharma notion of viJ'Mna, as
a perception or cognition of an
with men t a I f act 0 r S
o b j e c t and as associated
It is only i n a passage of
another chapter that alayavijnana is - in the context of LI i -
j nap tim Ii t l' a t Ii (see 5 . 5. I )! - described as a cogni-
tion or representation of an object or of objects (*al'thavijiiap-
ti),698 but even here this idea is presented as a kind of
sup p 0 sit ion which the author himself need not have
shared.
699
There is no reference at a l l, in the Mahayanasarpgraha,
to alayavijnana being associated with mental factors. In the
Abhidharmasamuccaya, to be sure , the latter aspect is once hinted
at,7
00
but without any further specification. On the other hand,
the Abhidharmasamuccaya does not contain, as far as I can see, any
reference at all to alayavijnana as actually cognizing an object .
5.12.2 In the
- - 70 1
and also though, due to
fe ..... er occurrences, less
masamuccaya,7
02
alayavijnana is
conspicuous ly - i n the Abhidhar-
con t a i n e r or even
primarily
h ypostas
conce ived
i s7
0
3 of
of
.,
a
See d s
(btja) . This funct ion of alayavijnana is, of cour se, extremely
important in a mind- only system in ..... hich even the content of
perceptions and cognitions cannot be derived from an external
world but only from a mental source . On t he other hand , i n spite
of the systematical development of mind-only ontology and spiritu-
al practice in chapte r s II a nd III of t he Mahayanasarpgraha,
- 101 - 5. 123-5.12.4
alayavij"ana still has, in the Ist chapter ""hich is specifically
dedicated to it, also preserved its function of b i 0 log i -
ca l a p pro p ria t ion
704
of keeping the corporeal
basis-of-personal-existence alive.
5.1 2. 3 Since both Mahayanasalllgraha and Abhidharmasamuccaya con-
tain several references to ni-l' 0 d has a m ci pat -
t i
70 5
and to the presence of alayav i jnana in this state.
706
one
may surmise that at least one reason for the striking re serve , in
these text s. agai nst a n act ua list explication of alayavijiiana ..... as
the feeli ng that an actual cognit ive func tion of alayavijnana, as
..... ell as its being associated with mental factors like ideation
(aa.tpjiid) or volitional impulse ( ceta71ciL is hardly compatible
with the unconscious , inactive character of t his state. Act ually.
one passage of the HahiyanasalJlgrahal07 - though probably forming
part of a l ater addition
108
- expressly states that in 71il'odhasama-
patti n 0 0 b j e c t or mode [ of its apprehension]
(a'"kcil'a) i s e.x per i e nee d , and that this fact excludes
the presence, in this state, of ma.71ovijrilina but not of
alayavijii.ana, the latter being, as the
explains, essentially characterized by [the funct ion of merely]
appropr iating the corpor eal basis of one's existence [but
not by the function of actually perceiving or cogni:z.ing anythi ng
in any manner].
5.12.4 On the othe r hand , the occurrences of nil'odhasamapatti in
the alayavijiiana chapter of the Mah.iyanasalJlgraha a r e, or
bel ong to, text porti ons which appear. from the compositional
point of vie ......
710
to be intrusive and thus may not have formed
part of the original draft of this chapter but may have been added
- probably by the author himself
ll1
- under t he i ncreaSi ng impact
of the Yogacarabhumi ambience. If this is true,7
12
the tendency to
concentrate on the Seed aspect of alayavijnana and the conspicuous
reserve against taking alayavijiiana as an actual cognition should
not, in the Hahayanasatpgraha (and thus perhaps al so in the Abhi-
dharmasamuccaya)7
1
3, be due, at l east not prima.rily, to an a ..... are-
ness of the incompatibility of such a concept of alayavijnana ..... i th
- t02 - 5. 13.1-5.13.2
its presence in rzi1"Odhasamapatti . It will , in this case, more
likely have to be explained otherwise : e.g. as being rooted in the
pertinent features of the specific Mahayana background of the
Mah.iyanasalJlgraha, viz . the a.layaviji'iana concept of the Abhidharma-
sut r a ( which seems to s tress the causal or Seed function of
alayaviji'iana)7
1
4 and the tendency of the "Maitreya texts" to
conceive, though without using the t e rm 'alayavijiiana I (see
5.11 ), Seeds
715
or the causal aspec t of mind as a layer on its
) 16
own.
5. 13. 1
from
A similar pictur e as from the Mahayanasaljlgraha and the
Abhidharmasamuccaya is, a s far as I can see, also gained
Vas u ban d h u
,
com men tar i e s on the
early Yogacara as well as from the T r i s v a b h a -
van i r de s a. I have not systematically perused the Maha-
yanasalJlgraha-bhaHa,7 17 but at least in t he other works of this
group718 alayavijiiana is usually referred to only as supporting or
containing, or consisting of, Seeds (bija) or Impressions (vQsa-
rzd').7
1
9 As far as I can see, there is no mention of alayaviji'ia-
na as being ass('Icia ted with men tal f act 0 r 5, and it
is only in one passage of the 720 that
a l ayavijnana seems721 to be stated to consist not only of Seeds
but also of [a repr esentation or image of] 0 b j e c t s , viz .
the Foundation or Receptacle (prati/'it;hd, i.e . the surrounding
world), t he body (deha), and the [objects-of-Jenjoyment (bhoga) .
5. 13. 2 It would seem that the view expressed in the l atter
passage is significantly different from t hat of the Pl"a-
vrtti Portion ( 5.6.3):
Firstly, it does not include [a cognition of] Impressions or
Seeds but adds bhoga, which appears to mean the sense_objects.
722
Secondly, i n contrast to the Pravrtti Portion according to
which alayavijiiana is a cog nit ion (vijriapti) whi ch
has the surrounding .... orl d, etc . J for its 0 b j e c t (d1.am-
banal, 723 the pas sage would seem to imply
that alayavijiiana i s the surroundi ng world, etc . I. e.: taken as
- 103 - 5.1 4.1
a veritable vijritina, alayavijii,ana is , a ccording to t his passage .
not a cog ni t io n o f a n object but a viJifO.na
a p pea r i n g a s an o j e c t ~ viz. the s urrounding world.
etc . , without involving any real dichotomy of an apprehending
vijnana and an object that is apprehended.
724
Thi s view is, in contrast to that of the Pravrtti Port ion
(see 10. 3. 1. 4), essentia lly "i deali s t" or Uspiritualist" . It
seems to start from an ( initially non-alayavijnani c) pattern of
par allel sets of objective or "material
U
appearances on t he one
hand, and sub jective or "immaterial" ones on t he othe r .
725
The
precise character and mutual relation of these two sets appears to
have been somewhat vague at fir st . Later on, t he objec tive set i s
sometimes taken to be compri sed in t he pravrttivij iianas, 726 some-
times (as in the above-menti oned Madhyantavi bhagabha Ha passage)7
2
7
understood to be included i n alayavijriana , and fi nally s pl it up
i nto two sets , 7
2
8 vi:::. an objective image i n the pravrttivijnanas
and a prototype of t his image i n .ilayavijiiana (see 5 .1 7 + n .
769) . 729 A detailed treatment of t his development is, howeve r,
beyond t he limit s of the present study.
5. 14. 1
A markedly different pos ition i s met with in the perti-
nent works of Va s u ban d hut h e K 0 S a k a -
I' a
730
. In contrast to the texts discuss ed i n 5. 11-1 3, the
author of these works i s f ully awa re of , and cons i stently a c -
c e p t 5
t he Abhidharmic r e quirement of ascribing, even to
alayavijiiana, a cog n i. t i v e fun c t ion
in order to
be a v1..Jnana at all, alayavijiiana
J
like any ot her vi jnana, must
have an ob jec t (dtambana) and a [ s pecific] mod e [ of a pprehending
this object ] (dkara).73
t
But i n those of his works whic h advocate
ilayavijiiana but not mind-only ( vi z . Karmas iddhi , Pratityas amutpa-
da-vyakhya and Pancaskandhaka) , Va subandhu refrains, i n t he case
o f alayavijaana , f r om going i nto detail s : al a yavi j iia na , t o be
sur e, does have an objec t and a mode of apprehending it, but its
obj ect and mode _of_apprehens i on
b e , 73
2
di s tin c t 1 y
are n ot
a see r t a
or c an n ot
n ed or .1<:'-
5.14. 2-5.15.1 - 104 -
f in e d
To t he objection that
this does not solve the problem beca use one cannot under s t a nd If how
somet hing can be a vijnana and yet be thus" , i .e. not have a
clearly determined object and II\Ode-of-apprehens i on, Vasubandhu a n-
Slo'ers by merely ref e rring to t he fact that " t he other theoreti-
cians ..... ho admit the existence of [some f orm of] mi nd (vijnana) i n
s t ates like nirodhasamapatti .... ill have the same diffi culty". 734
Vasubandhu does not, i n the afor e-mentioned .... orks,
mention , or even rai se the problem of . an association of alayavi-
jaana with men tal f a c t 0 r s , pr obably becaus e thi s
would have provoked his own a r guments (with which he had cha r ged
the opponent t s view of the presence of a manovijnana in ni'f'odha-
samdpatti)735 to be t urned against himself .
5.14. 2
It is only in t he T r i III S i k a:
736
( wbich in all
essential issues follows the Yogacara standpoint) t hat
Vasubandhu abandons hi s reserves and whol e-heartedly adopt s, .... ith
regard to both t he object of alayavijiiana and its association with
mental f actors, the pos i tion of t he P'f'avrtti taking
a l ayavi jiiana to cogni ze, in an unconscious or not fully conscious
way. t he Abode (i.e. the s urrounding world) a nd t he upadi ('"
updddna: see ) . 6 . 3 . 2),737 and to be associated with the f ive
omnipresent mental factors (see 5. 9) , 738
5. 15.1
It may be inter esting to note that S t h ira mat i
in hi s commentary on the TriJtlsika i nterprets the line on
the cognitive fun ction of alayavijiiana (see 5, 14 . 2) in a diffe r-
ent way.739 To be s ure, he int r oduces the li ne by [virtually]
quoting the wordi ng of the pe rtinent sent ence of the Pl'avrtti
POl'tion
740
according to loIhi c h bot h the surrounding world
and the t4pcidana, viz . corpor eal matter and the I mpress ion of
Sticking
n i 'Z. e d
to the Imagined
(- vijiiapti )
Character [ of reality L are
b / 4
1
al ayavijiiana . But in
C 0
g -
hi s OWIl
explanation of t he line Sthiramati construes ' vijiiapti ' only with
' athana ' , not with ' t4ptidi '. 742 This means t hat he takes the
cog nit i v e func tion of uayavijilana to he co n fin e d
- 105 - 5 15.2
to an - indist inct
743
- perception of the arrangement (Bannivet1a)
of the s ur r 0 u n din g w 0 r 1 d .744 The upiidana, on the
other hand , iS
J
according to Sthiramati's interpretation, n ot
perceived: corporeal matter is merely appro-
p ria ted by alayavijiiana,745 and Impressions (vaBanii) are
merely con t a i ned in it; 746 there is no direct and
concrete awareness of the act of appropriation
747
nor of Impres-
s i ons .
748
This explanation would seem to correspond
J
in substance, to
the situation met with in the Be sides, it
s hould be noted that Sthi ramati's explanation of Tr 3ab does not,
at least as far as the body and the sense-faculties ar e concerned,
show any trace of mind-only (i.e . "idealism" or spiritualism) but
rather , as a matter of course, makes us e of a pre- idealist concept
(viz. biological appropriation).75
0
5.15.2
Another remarkable feature of Sthiramati' s commentary on
Tr 3ab i s t hat he i ncl udes, into what is appropriated,
not only corporeal matter but al so the
of pe r sonality 751 which would
men t a I constituents
seem to include the pr a-
(veisanei) vfttivijiianas. The reason may be that , since Impress i ons
are. in Sthiramati I s own explanation, not taken to be an
o b j e c t of ( the function of) upiideina,
7
52 it is only by
i ncluding the mental consti tuents that alayavijiiana' s function of
appropria tion is furnished with an object even in the world-sphere
of immateriality (dl'upya- dhiitu) . 753 At the same time, by i nclud-
i ng naman i n the object of appropriation. Sthiramati restor es the
origi na l comprehensiveness of the pattern of appropriati ng factors
and appropriated ones. For originally mind and mental factors a s

whole
mat t e r
taken over by
had been taken to appropriate cor p 0 rea 1
But when the function of appropriation came to be
a I a y a v i j nan a the ordinary forms of
mind and mental factors dropped out of the pattern, so to speak.
By including ruiman, Le. t he ordinary for ms of mi nd and mental
factors, i n the 0 b j e c t of appropriation, Sthiramat i reinte-
grates them into t he pattern. But it should be noted that this
5. 15 3-5. 15. 3.2 - 106 -
procedure involves an ext ens ion of the notion of upidtino.
beyond the sense of b i 0 log i cal appropriation to a kind
of II e xis ten t i a 1 " appropriation which comes close to
the notion of taking - or, in the present context, mai ntaining -
possession of all constituents of personal existence (i.e . to
upaaana i n t he sense of parigraha)754.
5. 15. 3
It be interesting to check sys t ematically what
Sthiramati has to say on the object of alayavijiiana in
his othe r works,755 but I have t o confine myself to a fewobserva-
tions based on an entirely preliminary collection of materials.
5.1 5. 3.1 On the one hand, i n his com m e n tar yo n the
Pan cas k and h a k a (whi ch seems to be earlier
than the Tril\lsika_bha.ua)756 Sthiramati , pointing out that alaya-
vijiiana has both the s urrounding world a nd
u pad Ii n a (v iz . corporeal matter and the
the two f 0 I d
I mpression of Sti ck-
n ot naman!) for [of reality] but ing
its
to the Imagined Character
objec t,757 cl osely f ollows the PTavrtti Portion ( 5.6.3.1-3).
5.1 5.3. 2
On the other hand , in the e 0 m m n t a r y 0 n
h e M a h a
-
-
I a III k a Sthi- t y a n a s u t a r a
ramati's position appears to be c l ose to that of his own explana-
tion of T. 3ab; for there are , in this work , several passages
which mention 0 n 1 yon e object to be cognized by alayavijna-
na, viz . the sur r 0 u n din g 10' 0 rId. 758 This seems t o
hold good also f or * A s v a b h a val s 759
Both texts. moreover. not only adduce Trilll Sika 3ab in support of
their view that alayavijnana cognizes the surrounding lo'orld
760
but
also quote VilJ1satika 9
76 1
in order to prove that the so-called
material sense-faculties are in reality nothing but the See d s
of the respective perceptions.
762
Thi s may s uggest that also the
intention t o harmonize t he statements of TrilJl!ika and Virpsatika
s hould be taken i nto considerat ion as a possible motive for
confining the cognitive function of alayavijilana to (manifesting
an image of) the surrounding world.
- 107 - 5.15.3 . 3-5.17
5.1 5.3.3 Again,
k a ,
i n the Mad h Y ant i v i b h i g a - t i -
fairly consistent in Sthiramati seems to be
having alayavijii.ana cognize both tho surrounding world (or ob-
jects ) a n d tho "living being" (sattva) or tho bod y along
with tho [material]
,
0
n ,
o - f a c u 1 t i
e ,
763
At tho
same time, he explicitly speci fies that making known or cognizing
something has to be understood in the idealist sense of a p -
pea r i n gas something (- prati- , - nir- or _a_bhasa_(ta)) . 764
See d s or Impressions do n ot, i n the Madhyantavibhilgati-
kil, form part of the objects or contents of alayavijnana.
765
5.16 In contrast to Stbiramati I s view on the object of a l aya-
vijnana. which seems to va r y in accordance with t he (exe-
getical traditions of the) texts commented upon, H s ti a n -
t san g s Siddhi ( 1itIllIlUl ) is fairli
65a
consistent in includ-
ing, among t he objects cognbed by ilayavijnina and forming its
"image part" ( mit ), not only the surrounding world and corporeal
matter but a 1 s 0 the See d s (of the impure dharmasl . 766
But in connection with the problem of sahabhu- a6raya Hstian_tsang
767
quotes an opinion 768 according to which the material sense-facul-
ties are. in line with the nothing but Seeds, and whi ch
may therefore imply a similar view of the object of alayavijnana
as Sthiramati' sand " Asvabhava' s commentaries on t he Mahayanasu-
tralarpkara ( 5.1 5. 3.2) , t hough such a vieW' does not seem to be
expressly mentioned in the Siddhi.
5. 11 It thus seems that in the late phase of the development of
t he Yogacara school proper in India , due to Vasubandhu ' s
TrilJl sika, the idea of the cognitive function of a1ayavijiiana had,
by and large , asserted itself, and that interest switched over to
more specific problems connected with this issue: e . g .
the question of what precisely is the relation between t he objec-
tive image in alayavijiiana and the objective image in the ordinary
perceptions and cognitions; 769 of how to in an idealist
sense, biological appropriation of c orporeal matter by alayavijiia-
5 .1 )
- 108 -
na; 770 to which degree the images of the surrounding worl d in t he
alayavij i'ianas of different (classes of) living beings a r e simi-
l a r ; 771 whether the alayavijnana of one livi ng being contains a l so
an image of the (invisible) material sense-faculties of 0 the r
l iving beings; 772 or whet he r t here is a causal r e l ation between
t he images i n t he al ayavijnanas of different Hvi ng bei ngs, analo-
gous to t hat bet ween t he image i n the a.l ayavijnana and the images
in the pr avrttivij ii anas of one and t he same living being.
773
A
detailed discussion of these issues is, howeve r , quite beyond t he
scope of the pr esent study .
- 109 -
6. 0
6. Evaluation of the other occurrences of alayavijnana in the
Basic Section of the Yogacarabhijmi
6. 0 In the preceding chapters, I have tried to descri be the
ori gin of alayavijliana (in the limi ted sense of t. 4 ) and
some of the developments it underwe nt , es pecially in the earliest
sources, by s tarting fr om what I have called my Initial. Pas 8age
(see 2. 1) , since this pass age fully satisfies the c riteria
stipulated in 1.7. As has already been s tated ( 1. 9), the
latter f a ct does not a priori exclude that there may be other
pertinent passages or context s whi ch a Iso s atisfy these
criteria, only that a compr ehens ive investigation would by far
exceed the limits of this study. All that I can do, for the time
being , is to present apr eli min a r y i nvest igati on into
t he pe r tinent pass ages of t he
i.e. t hose passages of the
oldest source (s e e 1. 5 and 1. 6),
Bas i c Sec t i on of the
Y 0 g a c a r a b hum i where the term talaya vij liana' is me t
with . In examining these pass ages with a view to the applicability
,of the cr iteria of t. 7, I shall not entirely ignore the questi on
whether a certain systemat i c context may prove , on c l oser
i nspection, to pos e problems whi ch may have favoured or even
required the i ntroduction of somet hing like alayavijii.ana , or are
i n f a c t regarded to have done so by I ate r sources; but
my main aim will be to fi nd out whether t he passage its elf
contains any unequivocal indi cation in this direct i on . Besides , I
shall, if pos sible, add observations on compositional history and
relative chronology .
Apart fr om the Initial. Passage ( 2.1) , the occurrences of
talayavijnana ' i n the Basic Secti on known to me a r e the following :
(Q Y 4 ,7i
G Y 6,5f. 7,6f. '=' 7,22f. 8, 14f.
@ Y 11 ,9.
0
V 11
, 4f.
()) Y 24,4f.
6. 1.1-6 .1.2 - 110 -
ffi
Y 109,13-15
5 Y 192,8
6 Sacitt iki/ Acittika BhUmib (see App . I ), 5
r::;l@comm. ad PG 33- 34 (see App. II ; SrBhW 177, 14f . )
ad PO 37 (sec App. II; SrBhW 177,22J
6.1. 1 y 4, 5ff. runs as follows:
katamat I ya rupaprativijnap-
tih
774
/
katamaQ I
a) sahabhur aArayah /
s) samanantara a4rayab /
f.'\ r y) sQl"vabijakaJ!! dAl"ayopd'ddt r vipalcQ8llJ!1grhitam d1.aya -
L bijti4raya? I
ffi katamat I . . .
B} mana, katamat I .. .
l) sarvabijakaJ!! vijiidnap katamat I pUl'vakaT[l pl'apanca1"at i -
he tum upadaya ya, 8Ql'vabiJ'ako vipaK.o nil"vrtta, I
In the ca s e of the othe r sense-perceptions ( Y 6,5f . , etc.),Gy
appears in a shorter form:
@ bija.4rayas tad eva Bar'vabijakam til.ayavijiilinam.
The same wor ding i s found , .... ith an i nsignifi cant variant, also i n
the case of mano(vijnana ) ( y 11,9f. ):
@ pUl'vavad eva. sal'vabijakam dtayavi,inanam.
Y is, in the case of the other sense-pe r cept ions, r epresent-
ed merel y by the reference
purvavad (Y 6,8 , etc . ) ,
and not r epresented at all i n the case of
6.1 .2 1. I n t hese passages , alayavijiiana is unequi vocally intro-
duced in t he context of the ques ti on of what is t he
bijeiaraya, i. e . the basis in the sense of Seed ,775 of vi s ual
perception (8) 1 the othe r sense-perceptions <@), and mano-
(vijna.na) (@). Alayavijaana is able to perform this function
because it is qualified as "c ontaining all Seeds1! (sal'vabijaka ) .
- 1 II -
6. 1. 2
Yet, ] do not fi nd that t he pas sage satisfies t he criteria of
1. 7.
As for the c ri t e ri on of the plausi bility of the t e r m ,
'dlaya-' can , to be sur e, be u n d e r s too d as Ilreceptac1e
[ of Seeds ]" or as "that ",here [ the Seeds ] stick or lie hidden" ,
provided that we concede that t he idea that alayavijnana i s t he
Seed(s) and the notion that it co n t a ins Seeds (which is
anyway suggested by its being qualified as sal"vabiJ"a k a )776 are
not mutually exclusive.
777
But it would be less easy to explai n
why it was precisely the te rm 'dLaya' (and not rather the key-term
' bija ') that .... as c h 0 se n to express this function, and why
thi s meaning is so scanti1y778 documented before Vasubandhu .
779
Even if these diff iculti es are disregarded, one would s till
be faced with t he fact t hat t he text does not disclose any
rea so n ","hy t he function of storing Seeds made the introduc-
tion of an entirely new kind of uijnana inevitable . This cannot be
accounted for by the ass umption that such i nevit.ability might. have
been r egarded as self-evident; for in many other passages the
Yogacarabhumi does not find any difficulty in havi ng Seeds be
contained e ither in the psycho-physical basis of personal exist-
ence (dtmabhliva) as a whole (Le . i n corporeal matter or the
material sense-faculti es and i n mind, at l east a s far a s they are
vipaka)780 or i n the mind series (citta- or vijnana- santati) . 78 t
To be sure,
as a Seed, or of
not only in the
argume nts f or rest ricting t he function of acti ng
contai ni ng Seeds, to alayavijnana are presented
- - 782
but a lready i n t he Proof
Por tion of the VinSg dlay. 'i'l'eatise when it pr oves the exi s tence
of alayavijnana by pointing out that t he ordinary vijiiiinas cannot
be the Seeds of each ot her (i.e. that the preceding moment cannot
be the Seed of the foll owi ng one) because of t he f r equent inhomo-
of subsequent moments of mi nd , and because their series is
sometimes i nterrupted f or a l ong time .
783
Yet, t he pre sen t
passage does n o t indicate s uc h argume nt s
784
which may. in the
absence of evidence to t he cont rary, as well have been e xcogitated
only aft e r alayavij i1ana had , for some o t he r reason,
6.1.2
- 112 -
already been introduced, the more so since at least for the second
problem (interruption of the mental series) a different solution
was available (see 2.5).785
2.a)Besides 'sa:rvabijaka', the qualification also that alaya-
viji'iana is "subsumed under [the category of] vipaka" appears to be
closely connected with the context of 8 since in the explanato-
ry part @y) too mind containing all Seeds is defined as the
[result of] Mat u rat ion (vipaka) containing all Seeds.
Now, this would seem to presuppose that the sa1"vabijo vipakt0 of
the Paramarthagathal),786 which appears to be more or less identi-
cal with the "basis-of-personal-existence (atmabhava) containing
all Seeds" of the Manobhumi, 787 had come to be identified with
Mind-containing-all-Seeds (sa1"vabijakaJ{1 vijnanam). taught. in the
h
788
Vastusaljlgra al)l., to "approach
lt
or "follow", or "be under the
sway of" ( _upaga),789 [the Impressions of] karman and k l e ~ a s and
to settle down, at the moment of conception or Linking up (p1"ati -
sandhi), in tuima1"upa . Thi s identification may, however , have led
to a quandary. To be sure , as long as atmabMva qualified as
vipaka is regarded as containing all Seeds, there will be. no gap;
for vipiika elements will be available throughout life s ince atma-
bMva includes corporeal elements that are vipa"ka (es pecially the
material sense-faculties). Likewise, as long as the mind series as
a whole is taken to contain all Seeds and as long as sal'vabijakczrr!
vijnanam i, nothing but this mind series
.,
a whole under this
specific aspect,
790
there would provided that we disregard
special cases like ni1"odhasamapatti again be no gap, since
receiving and passing on I mpressions or Seeds would not necessari-
ly be restr i cted to such states of mind as are -vipaka . As soon,
however, as the result of Maturation (vipaka) containing all Seeds
is con fin e d to min d - or as soon as Mind-containing-
all-Seeds is (expressly) conceived of as being VipaKG 0 n I y ,
the situation becomes difficult because the mind series, though
vipcika at the moment of conception, aoes not r emain so throughout
life but is rather interspersed with good, bad and other non-vipa-
ka phases. It would therefore not appear impossible that a restric-
- 113 - 6 .1.2
tive "combination
ll
, as found in 0
y
, of the two main views on
.... hat contains Seeds involved a situation that made the introduc-
tion of a new kind of vijiiiina necessary or at least helpful.
b) Even the choice of t he name 'alayavijnana ' .... ould, in this
case, not be inexplicable. For, since the result-of-Maturation
(vipaka) or basis-of-personal-existence (dtmabhciva) containing all
Seeds is expressly stated to be the object of the notion of Eg0
791
and is besides equated with ci1.aya in the sense of u .... hat is c.lung
to",79
2
it .... ould not seem impos sible that the new kind of mind
which took its place .... as called 'alaya-vijiiana' in the sense of
"mind which i s clung to [as Ego]".
c) Ye t, if this had been the original meaning of the term
'alayavijnana' , one .... ould - since it is fully in accordance with
the predominant Buddhist use of 'a1.aya' and not at a ll in conflict
.. ,ith later doctrinal developments - expect it to have been unani-
mously retained by the Yogacara tradition, and it .... ould be very
jifficult to explain the fact that it is not documented in the
.:oldest sources (like Sa1i1dh V.3) but- only in the Mahayanasal}lgraha
and later texts dra .... ing upon the latter (and only as an alterna-
tive meaning at that).793
d) And as regards the systematical problem sketched in a, it
nas to be stressed once more that the text it se lf
j oe s not contain any
t'ffect that such a problem .... as realized
s tat e men t to the
at all 794 or even felt to
,
render the introduction of a ne .... kind of vijiiiina inevitable. But
surely such a lack of any explicit statement of, or clear hint at,
a reason why a new kind of vijiidna, called ' alayavijiiana ' , had
t... be introduced at all, is best explained if .... e assume that
uayavijnana .... as not newly invented in the present passage but was
rathe r made use of after
~ e e n est a b lis h e d b e f 0
i t had aIr e a d y
r e 795 because it was
,
~ t l t con v e n i e n t or because it had already come to be
ass.1ciated with the issue of contai ning or compri sing Seeds and/ or
with the issue of being the result of karmic Maturation.
6.1.3
- 114 -
3. Such an assumption would seem to be supported by the
qualification of alayavijnana as appropriating the body or corpore-
a1
796
basis [of personal existence] (d41'ayopooatr). Thi s attribute
does not supply an explanation for the choice of the term 'alayavi-
jnana',797 nor does it indicate a cogent motive for the introduc-
tion of a new kind of vijfuina at least as far as the present
passage is concerned; for the function of biological appropriation
has, in contrast to contai ni ng all Seeds, hardly any direct
connection with the systematic context of the present passage,
viz. t he determi nat ion of the bijdaraya of visual perception, etc .
The attribute .... ould therefore seem to 'Presuppose
that alayavijii.ana had already come to play a role in a d i f -
ferent systemati c context, and it may even signalize that
0, or at least a part of it, was taken over from that context.
This presumption is s uppor ted by the fact that the same characteri-
zation of .ilayavijii.ana as in Q is also found in 0 where all
attributes fit the context (see 6. 3.2 and 6.3.4).
6. 1.3
The impression that alayavijiiana was introduced into the
present passage only later - and, in view of the preceding
considerations ,798 probably as an already established concept - is
corrobor ated by closer
shows that the term
t ext u a 1 a n a I y sis , which
a 1 a y a -vijiiana
'
, as well as the attrib-
utes I and 'uipdkasaJ!Igrhita', o rig ina 1 I y
did not for m par t of the material compiled in this
portion of the YogacarabhUmi. My argument runs as follows:
1. Paragraph G of the text quoted in 6 . 1. 1 identifies the
three of as (0), manas (a), and sar-
vabijakam vipdkasaJ?1grhitam atayavijnanam (y). respec-
tively. In 0. these notions are defined, in their turn. but in
the case of the last item (y) the concept to be defined does not
occur in the same form as in G but only as saT' v a b i J' a -
k a 1?7 v i j it a n am . Even if it were conceded that, in view
of the length of this item, it would be understandable enough that
it is repeated, in 0, in an abridged form, one would still
expect thi s abridgment to consist in the bare use of the terminus
- 115 -
6.1.3
technicus a 1 a y a -vijnana', without attributes. And even if,
in the abridged version too, one or the other of the attributes
may wel l have been the terminus technicus 'alayavijnana'
ought to have been maintai ned at any rate, and ought not t o have
been mutilated into the uns pecific ' vijiidna ' as i s, however , the
ca se in (Vy .
2 . The fa ct that the third definiendum is given in 0 as 'sar-
vabijakarp vijiiiinam' would, however, be unobjectionable if it was
t h is notion, and n ot h i n g m 0 r e, that the
had in CDr (;: 0) originally been identified as; in
other words : if the words viptika8aJ[1grhitam ata-
ya- ' in 0 -and 'a"l.aya-' in @ a nd @ - are I ate r
ad d i t ion s
3. 'SarvabijakaJf1 vijiitinam ' does i n f a ct occur as a kind of termi-
nus technicus in a few other passages , both of the Va s tusartlgraha-
Qi
799
and of the Basic Sec.tion .
8 00
As for its occurrence at Y
24,4f. ( . (1)), see 6. 3. 3.
4. By assuming that in 0 the
originally, identified as the
of visual perception was,
sarvabiJ'akaJ[l vijiidnam only , yet
anothe r i ncongruence of the present text would vanish: viz . the
s trange fact t hat what is to be defined by@y, Vi Z.()Y ,. Q I
already enumerates even more character istic features of alayavij na-
na than the definition presented in @Y; f or in the latter not
only ' sarvabijaka ' , but al so 'vipaka' would be tautological, and
the only addit ional informati on Gy woul d supply does not r efer
to the nature or funct ion of alayavijii.ana itself but only to its
c a u se, whereas the extant version OfGy = 0 contai ns, i n
additional i nformation about alayavijiiana i t -
S el f.
Thus the as sumption appear s justified that an earlier ve r -
s ion of t he material on which t he present portion of t he Yogaca-
rabhumi is based did n o t contain 'a: lay a jnana' but only
' sapvabijakaJf1 vijiitinam' , and that the words 'alkayoptidatr viptika-
saTf1g:rhUam d1.aya-' i n 0. as well as 'd1.aya-' in @ and @,
were added lat e r .
6.1.4 - 116 -
To be sure, argument 4 will be valid only for the attrib-
utes I and 'vipakasaJ'!1grhita I , but the other a rgu-
ments hold good for 'dtaya- ' J too . It may well be that at first
only 'dZaya- ' was added and that t he addition of I
and ' viprikasaJ'!1fTfhita I took place only thereafter,801 r egarded as
necessary because, perhaps, alayavijliana was still a fairly nel{
concept which CQuid not be presupposed to be well-known and was
felt, by t he (or: a) compiler or by a redactor I to require, at i ts
first occurr ence in the text , some explication, supplied by him
not by an explanati on of its literal meaning but by a kind of
802
defi niti on of its principal functions and aspects, presumabl y
taken over from Q) (see 6 .1. 2. 3) .
6.1. 4
It is not easy to decide whether the reference to alaya-
vijiiana and its attributes was added before
1
at, or after
the compilation of (t his part of) the Basic Section of the
'iogacarabhliml. At any rate, t he addition of ' dZaya-' , at least,
must pr ecede the compilation of the Vi niScayasaqlgraha" I, i n t he
very beginning of whic h t he eal"tJabijakam ci't.ayavijiidnam of G i s
expressl y referred to.
803
What is mo r e, it is a lmost cert.ain that
t he introduc tion of alayavijiiana into the present material is also
presupposed by the Vth cha pter of the SaqJdhinirmocanasutra (see
3. 9 . 1 + n. 324 ) . On the other band, we have no such clue with
regard to the attributes and
which are not quot ed i n t he ViniscayasarpgrahaQI and do not figure
in the pertinent paragraphs of the Saqldhinirmocana ( viz. V . 4-5) .
This may (but of course need not) be taken as s upporting the
possibili ty (see 6 . 1 . 3) that these at tributes were added only
later on . Even so, their addition cannot have been a particularly
late event since it seems to be motivated by the fact that
alayavijiiana could not yet be presupposed t o be well-known (see
6. 1. 3). Besi des, nei ther biological appropriation nor being com-
prised i n the categor y of vipdka would, from my point of view,
invohe markedly later developments of t he alayavij iia na concept.
804
At any rate, both attributes mus t have been added before 0 (see
6.2. 1) received its pr esent form, si nce in vi ew of the sequence
- 117 -
6 . 2.1-6.2.2
of the attributes and 'uipdka8aJ{1grhita 'it is 0
and not CD on which G is based (see 6.2 . 2) . But if I am right
i n pres uming that these attributes we r e first int r oduced in CD
(see 6. 3. 4) and only afterwards made use of also i n Q because
s uc h a characterization of alayavijiiana was regarded to be re-
qui r ed at what is, f r om the point of view of t he f inal arrangement
of t he compilation, the very first occurrence of this term in the
Yogacarabhumi (see 6. 1. 3 [ end ] ), it would seem fairly i m -
pro b a b 1 e that they formed par t of 8 b e for e the
compilation of this pa r t of the Basic Section , and they ought
rathe r to have been introduced only somewhat later.
6. 2. 1
0
Y 11, 3- 8:
evabhtivaQ katamaQ I yac mano uijnanam /
G ci t t a '!I
katamat I yat 8aruabij 0 p a g a t a m
b h ti u 0 p a gat a m ti r a y a b h Ii v a a -
n n i <v i>
f amBoS uptidtitr
vipdka8lV!lgrhitam titaya-
vijridnam I
man a katamat /
0) yat api vijritinaktiytinam
8) kl.ilHaJfI ca mana yon nitYaJn
eamprayuktam I
o v i J' Ii ii. " a F[f katamat / yad ti1.ambanavijiiaptau pratyu-
pasthitam /
6.2. 2 The close relation between 0 and 0s obvious, and it
is undoubtedly a genetic one . The ques tion is whether G
is an abr idgement of 0 , or rather 0 a remodeling and expansion
of 0. I for one do not perceive a ny good reason for, but do
perceive evidence agai nst, choosing t he former poss ibil ity.
a) i n 0 can hardly be an abridged equiva-
lent of uptidtitr' in
o because it imparts substantially less information. For in @
' upddatr ' al one will have to convey the same idea as 'tiS1"ayopti-
dtitr' in (V, vi%. . t hat alayavijiiana fulfills t he function of
6.2 . 2 - 118 -
biological appropriation of the
contrast to this, the expressions
806
body or corporeal matter. In
'arayabhavopagatam' and
bJuivQsannivi?tam' can hardly be taken in this or a similar sense,
i.e. as IlIoo'hat has approached (- upagata, i . e . appr opriated), and
has entered into, or stick s in the thing consist-
ing in the [corporeal] basis(-of-existence)", for in this case
'bhiiva' would, to say the least, be redundant ,
Bo
7 One wi ll rather
have to take - ' bhdvQ I in the function of an abstract suffix, and
this is what the ,(,ib. and the Chin. translation act ually do.
According to Tib., 808 I means "what has changed
into the s tate of (Le.: has become , or even simply: is) the
basis!! (gnas kyi diios P01' g Y u l' p a ), according to Chin., 809
"what is followed or accompanied by (i.e. furnished with) the
nature of basis!! ( fttltttP1f5l ), whi le 'dll'rayabhdvasannivi?fa I is
interpreted in Tib . as "remaining in, or adhering to, the state of
(or: continuing to exist as ) the basi s" (gnas kyi diios por gnas
po.), in Chin . as "sticking to the na ture of basi s" ( fttllff fttllt1 ) .
If t hese interpretations are s ubstantially correc t ,one will have
to understand the two attributes as st ressing the fact that
a 1 a y a v i j i\ a n a i s t h b a s i s - 0 f -
P

r -
s 0 n a 1 - . x i s t

n C

the us. of two attributes
being p r h a p s intended to distingui s h between the aspect
that it has , at the moment of Linki ng up (p1'atisandhi) , b -
8 10
the basis of given existence, and the aspect that it C 0 m a
t i k t this function throughout life.
8 11
It is hard to s C S 0
imagine that such an important idea should have been entirely
dropped in the hypothetical abridgement of 0. On the other hand,
the matter becomes fully plausi ble if we regard (3)as a later
remodeling and extension of motivated by the fact that it was
no longer (as at the time when G was composed ) the body but
rather alayavijfiana that was considered to be the fundamental
basis of personal existence (see 3.10) . From this point of view,
the expr ession 'aAroayopadatr I, presupposi ng the older view, turn-
ed out to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, in G) the two elements of
t hi s compound were separated, and the former el ement, vi z . 'dA1'a-
- 11 9 -
6.2. 2
ya-' , ..... as supplemented by a new piece of text , to t he effect of
divesting the body of the role of basis-of-existence and emphati-
cally attributing it to alayavijnana . The desir e to s tress the ne .....
vie..... may a l so suffi c i ently account f or t he f act that it i s
express ed by t 0 attr ibutes . Perhaps i t a l so favoured the
r eplacement of 'sarvabijakam' by 'aal'vabij 0 p a 9 a tam ' ( "re-
sorted to by , i. e. furni shed .... i t h, all Seeds!!), 812 ..... hich may - but
I am not quite sure a bout thi s be taken as more clearly
expressing the idea tha t alayavij fiana i s a full-fl edged entity on
its o ..... n co n t a i n i n g or s up par tin g Seeds, and
not me rely a vague hypostasis of Seeds sticking in the body or i n
the material sense-facul ties .
b) Yet , this is hardly the ""hole truth. On r econs idering the
matter , one might not feel fully convinced by the motive suggest-
ed, in a, for the replacement of ' sarvabijakam' by ' saruabijopaga-
tam ' , since at l east f ormally already ' sal'vabijakam ' would, as
a bahuvrihi, suggest a difference bet ..... een the Seeds and alayavijna-
na as their owner (see 6. 1.2 and n. 428) . Besides, one might ask
..... hy the author of 0 f ound it so important t o coin two
expr essions f or the fun c tion of alayavijiiana (or even to
di s tinguis h between two a s pects of it ) s ince even if he had wished
to emphasize t hi s function, an expressi on like
..... ould have been sufficient .
c) One lIIight consider the possibility of solvi ng t he latter
problem by unde r stand ing at l east one of the two expr essions as a
with i ts prior member in the i ns trumental (Le .
bhtivena 'J i n the predicative sense of Tn this ca se,
one would have to r ender 'dlJl"ayabhdvopagata ' by "which is taken
[by people ] as the basis [ of their pe r sonal existence ] (! , or
as "what is stuck to [by people] as the
basis [ of their personal existence ] " . Actually, to one of the
explanations of the Yogacarabhtimivyakhya
f e r s to ilayavijnana being taken as
d t man 814 But it
re-
i,
hardly justifiable to understand i n the s-ens e of titman.
Beside s, I doubt that such an analysis of t he compounds 'tilJl'ayabh6-
6.2.2
- 120 -
vopagata ' and is grammatically (or at l eas t
idiomatically) admissible. At least, I coul d not find any example
for such a use, whereas the use at l east of 'u.pagata' and related
8' 5
forms with the accusative of an abstr act, both s eparately and
8, 6
i n compounds, is well documented . Thus, it i s probably not
possible to differentiate the two attributes by taking one of them
to mean "taken, or st uck to, a s the basi s " . a nd we a r e rather
l e ft with the fact that both expr essions are more or less 5ynooy-
mous .
d) Act uall y. not only the use of the t..,o quas i-synonymous
expr essions but also the subs t itution of 'sal'vabijopagata ' for
'sQl"vabijaka ' becomes fully intelligi ble if we consider another
central f eat ure of the passage , vi z. the fact t hat t he modifica-
tions i ntroduced by 0 a 1 so. and perhaps mai nly serve the
purpose of supplementing the characterizat ion of alayaviji'i.ana by
n et y m ol 0 g i cal n elements, Le . by including, i nto t he
charact e r i zati on of alayavij i'iana i n 0 , an indication of the
lit era 1 mea n i n g of t he t e r m This is not only
confirmed by one of t he explana tions of the Yogacarabhumivyakhya
817
but al so st r ongly suggested by the fact that ' u p a ga t a
occurs as a quasi-synonym of a t tin a already at MN 1
65 or I 233. and al so i n the Mahaniddesa (p. 38) .... he r e it 1s f ound
i n a li st of c l osely related expr essions whic h also i nclude
, n i v i h a ' . Thus, the main reason for repl acing ' sal'vabi-
jaka' by 'sa'l'vabij 0 p a gat a " as .... ell as fo r t he some .... hat
repetitive and unusual expressions 'a6rayabhav 0 p a gat a '
and 'aarayabhciva 8 ann i -v i Fa ' , is to indicate e t Y -
mol 0 g i e s of t he term 'ala yavij nana
'
, which would, a ccord-
i ng t o this passage, have to be Wl derstood as "mind w h e r e
all Seeds s tic k 11, 8 18 or "mind .... h i c h s t ic k s (Le.
has come to s tick a nd ke eps st i cki ng?) to t he state of bei ng the
basis [ of a given existence ]". 8 19 Though '-upagata ' .... as good f or
bringing out bot h the passive and the a ctive meani ng of 'ti.1.aya ' .
i n t he case of the active meani ng the nuance of " sticking" .... as
additionally and perhaps mor e apt l y expr essed by the quasi- s ynonym
- 121 - 6. 2.3
'sannivi?ta ' which, on the other hand, does not seem to be applica-
ble in a passive sense .
6. 2.3 Apart from the fact, that (2) is, as I have just tried to
demonstrate, a remodeling of CD and therefore 1 ate r
to it, and apart from the fact that this remodeling involves an
advanced s tage in the theory of alayavijiiana and in that of the
basis-of-personal-existence, there are also more or less independ-
ent reasons for denying its claim to be representative of the
original context of the introduction of alayavijiiana:
a) As for the explanations of the 1 i t era I meaning of
the t e r m 'alayavijiiana' indicated in CD (see 6 .2.2.d),
they do not give the impression of representing the original
meaning. For apart from the fact that two (or even three)
different interpretations are indicated, these explanations do
not, to my mind, really render plausible why alayavijnana was just
called
, ii I a y a vijiiana', as I have already pointed out (
6 .1 . 2.1) with regard to the aspect of being furnished with Seeds.
The second (and third) explanation(s) are anyhow too artificial to
represent the original meaning. And even :if they too are taken
into account , one may still ask why the new vijiidrla was not rather
called I or the like . Thus it appears that the
explanations of the literal meaning of the term ' alayavijiiana'
indicated by (2) hardly represent the original meaning. Rather
they are sec 0 n dar y attempts to (re-linterpret a g i v -
e n term the original meaning of which had either been forgotten
or - more probably - was felt inappropr iate in view of the change
the concept had undergone in the meantime, viz . because it had
developed, from a somewhat vague hypostasis of Seeds, sticking or
lying hidden in corporeal matter, to an entity on its own which
could actually be conceived of to co n t a i n Seeds and which
had, to a certain extent, disengaged itself from the body and even
superseded it in its function as the basis of pe r sonal existence.
b) The
pres sed onl y
fact that biol ogical appropriation is,
by the word ' upadtitr ' J wit h 0 u t
in 0, ex-
an 0 b -
6.2 3 - 122 -
j e c t of this function being pointed out , can be explai ned,
accordi ng to 6. 2. 2.a, as due to a devel opment of the concept of
"basis of personal existence" which l ed the a,uthor of 0 to split
t he compound ' (Ul'ayopciciatr ' (i n 0), and to refer I J by
means of i nserting a new piece of text, to al ayavijilana. This
procedure left 'uptidtitr' without its objective comple ment, and
t he author of(3)either forgot , or regarded it as unnecessary. to
make good the loss, t he res ult being a certain incompleteness and
lack of precision, whic h would be rather unsatisfactory e x -
c e p t .if we suppose that the object of the appropriative
fun ction of alayaviji'iana, and thus, of course, alayavijnana it-
self, too J could, when (3)was composed, be presuppos ed to be so
'W ell - k n ow n as to need no express mention. Thi s argument
'Would, of course, also 'Work if the dependence ofG on GiS l eft
out af accaunt .
c ) The systematical cantext af CD is a differentia ting
i nterpretation of t he terns 'cit ta', 'manas ' and 'vijiUina' (see
6 . 2 .1 ). This set of concepts is of ten understood in the s ense of
quasi_synonyms,820 but occasianally the need of a differentiating
interpretation - typical of Abhidharmic a nd commcntat orial exege-
sis - is f elt , and the terms are then r eferr ed to different
aspects, states or functions af (the t raditional kinds of) mind ,
e . g . 'aitta ' to future,
f
. d 821 Of
moments 0
'manae I to past. and ' vijnana' to pr esent
course, a differentiating explanation of
citta. manas and vijiitina would have acqui.red a more binding chal'-
acter if it could have been r efe rred t o s ubstantially different
entities . But it is highly improbable that this was a s ufficient
motive for s uch a revolutionary step as was the introd uction of a
ne.... kind of mind like alayavijiiana , nor would it explain the
peculia r charact er and functions of alayavijiiana or the choice of
the name ,alayavijiiana'. Things would seem to have developed
rather the other way round: aft e r alayavij ii ana had been
introduced, it wa s quite natur ally made use of i n the context of a
differentiating interpretation of t he terms ' citta' . 'manas ' and
' vijiiona '.
- 123 - 6.2.3
An i solated identification of citta - in the sense of "what
is piled up of . . . , or filled or overspread with .. . " *0-.
upa_Jcita)822 - with alayaviji\ana or odiinavijiitina is documented in
t he Vth chapter of the Saltldhinirmocanasut ra
823
(which treats of
proficiency in the secret point s of citta, manas and vijnana!) .
A full-fledged differentiating expl anation , referring ' citta ' to
alayavijiiana, 'manas' to t he new manas, i.e. t he conception of
Ego as another new kind of mi nd, and ' vijiitina ' to t he tradition-
al ki nds of mind , is found in the Sacittika BhumiQ of the
ViniscayasalP&rahaijI. 824 The present passage, viz. Y It, 3ff . ,
would, in its extant form, seem to be even later since its
presentation of t he Defilement s of the new manas s hows features of
post-Yogacarabhumi developments (see n. 943). And even if this
parti cula," part of the defi ni tion of manas is regarded as a l ater
interpolation (see lb. ), the mere fact that the passage would even
then still refer to t he new, continuous manGS - and in a form at
that whic h hard l y makes sense except if the concept is pres upposed
to be a1.ready k n ow n (see ib . ) - renders it improbable that
it is Significantly earlier than the compilation of t he Vi ni scaya-
At any rate, it will be later than V. This would
well fit in I,"ith the rather advanced concept of alayavijnana
i nvolved in 0.
One may , however , consider the possibility that any kind
of reference to t he new manas, and perhaps also the remodeli ng of
t he characterization of alayaviji'iana, are due to a later hand (or
later hands), and t hat originally the
with the pre se n t moments of
text had i dentified vijiidna.
(the traditional kinds of)
mind, i n so far as they are act ual ly engaged (ppatyupasthita!) i n
cogniz i ng an object, manas - in the traditional way - with the
immediately precedi ng pas t moments (Le . Geo), and citta
with alayavijiiana since it is an accumulat ion of, or filled/ over-
spread with, t he Seeds whic h vir tual ly embody t he f u t u r e
fOrDlS of these same forms of mind. Such a pattern, entirely
1
.. ld l' 825
hypothetica though 1t 1S, wou agree, at east 1n st ructur e,
wi th what is implicit i n Sallldh V and may even be older (but of
6.24 - 124 -
course nee d not be so, especially if it wa s already combined
.... ith the remodeling of the characterization of .ilayaviji'i.ana, and
in view of what will be pointed out in 6 .2.4) , and it would be
closely connected with the Abhidharma pattern of differentiating
dtta, manaa and vijiiQna by referring them to different t e m _
p 0 r a 1 states.
826
Later on, the new manas would have been
add e d because a later redactor or compiler may have felt the
need to harmonize this pattern .... ith the different one of the
Sacittikabhumiviniscaya.
827
6. 2. 4 Ho .... ever the textual history of Y 11, 4-8 ( Le. the differ-
e ntiating definition of citta, manas and vijiiana) is con-
strued
J
it would seem that the whole passage is
h e t e r 0 g e n e 0 U s tot h e co n t ext it is actual-
ly found in and may thus well ~ a comparatively late addit ion.
a) The surrounding context , understood i n an unbiased way,
clearly refers to the traditi onal man 0 v i j Ii a n a o n -
1 y dealing with it in a pattern c l osely parall el to that of
the preceding treatment of the five sense-perceptions. The objects
(al.ambana, viz. a] I dharma s, particularly imperceptible dhar-
mas). assoc iated mental factors (sahaya) and fun ctions lkar>man)
enumerated at Y 11 , llff. , are in t heir overwhelming majority
t y p
i c a 1 of , or in any case compatible ..... ith,
828
man 0 -
v i j n ii n a The s ame i,
true of the way in ..... hi ch the item
"basis" (alll'aya) i,
treated ( Y 11 ,9f.): it only lists manaa as
samanantaY'a.l'aya and alayavi j iiana as bijafJl'aya because the se t ..... o
are required not only for sense-perception but al so fer manovijiiii-
na . On the other hand , a sahabhu- a.l'aya i s not indicated in the
present passage because in traditional Abhidharma manovijliana has
829 h 1 - -. ( . h f
none. Teater Yogacara v ~ w that manas ~ n t e s ense 0 a ne ...
kind of vi jiidna ) is the sahabhu.- afJl'aya of manovijnana
830
is obvi-
ously still unknown to the present passage.
b ) If , on the other hand , Y 11 , 4-8 were an integral part of
the text , the specifi cations of basis (a.l'aya ) , object (al.ambana) ,
e tc. , ought to suit not only manovijiitina but a 1 I the three
kinds of mind in whi ch, a ccording to Y 11 , 4-8, (the stage of)
- 125 - 6.2.4
manas itself (svabhava) consists . Yet , specifications fitting ala-
yavijiiana and (kLi{l t a- )manas .... ould at best be hid den among
those fitting manovijiiii:n.a. In the case of Hbasi s " the
specification of the "immediately preceding basis" as man a s
.... ould hardly be applicable to manas as a kind of mind on its o .... n
nor to alayavijnana if the definition of Y 11 ,6 Go in 6 .2.1 )
is presupposed according to .... hich ma7laS is the moment, of the
six [traditional] kinds of mind , that has ceased immediately
before. And I for one .... ould hes itate to presuppose, for t he
Yogacarabhumi ,
sense-of-Seed
the idea
is also
that alayavijiiana as the
regarded as its own
basis-in-the-
83 1
Finally, if the manaa to be specified in terms of etc.,
had actually i ncluded , from the outset, all the different kinds of
mind contained in Y 11 ,4- 8 , it would also have included the
t r a d i t ion a 1 manas, Le. the immediately preceding mo-
ment of any of the six tradi tional forms of mind (viz .
man.ovijiUina and sen s e - p er c e p t ion s ), and this
.... ould imply that under the heading of alJl"G.ya the text would have
to mention also the bases of the sense-perceptions, including the
sense-faculties as their simultaneous bases, but this is not the
case .
c) Thus , t he incoherence of the text as it stands can hardly
be denied: The specification, at Y 11 ,4-8, of avabhdva, i. e . of
.... hat ma7laa itself is, does not fit in with the specification of
its ajl"aya, etc . , and appears to have supplanted the original
tex.t which must have consisted in a definition of ( the avabhdva
of) man 0 v i j n. a n a on the lines of the defi nitions of
cak{lul"vi jrlana , etc., at Y 4,5, etc . ;
*manovijiidnalJ1 katamat / ya mana- al!:r>aya dhal"ma- pr>ativijiiap-
;83
2
d) Such will at l east have been the wording of the source
material used by the compiler of (this part of) the Basic Section
of the YogacarabhiimL The question is whether it was r etained in
the original .... ording of the YogacarabhUmi - perhaps with a sente nce
like 'svabhdva? (or *mana'; katamat) / *yan manovijiid-
6.2. 4 - 126 -
nam / ' placed in front of it -, or whether already t he compiler of
the HanobhUmi remodelled the treatment of the suabhdva of manas/ma-
nOlJijrftina i nto a differentiat ing explanati on of the terms ' citta '.
'manae ' and 'vijnana I ( perhaps motivated by the desi r e of proper-
ly i ntegrati ng alayavijnana i nto the vijnana theory by having it
fi gure not only as t he of the vijrid"nae but also a s
o n e 0 f the m J i . e . under the headi ng of euabhciva) . The
l atter alternative would seem to presuppose that. alayavijiiana as
t he had already been introduced before the compilation ,
a nd at least i n this case, one ,",ould suppose Y 11, 4-8 to have had
t he f orm suggested at the end of 6 . 2 . 3. cj at a ny rate, ex-
cept if, as is very unlikely (see 6 .1.4). the whole of (2) (on
which 0 is based) is taken to precede the compilation of t h is
part of the Yogacarabhumi. the r ecast of the characteri:tat i on of
uayaviji1ana i n 0 will have to be regarded as a later addition,
as holds certainly good for the inser tion of t he new monas at
Y 11.6f . (vi:t . Gil in 6 . 2. 1) . But it is equally well possible
t hat the e n t ire remodelling of the treatment of t he
BuabhalJa of manas/manovijiidna i nto a differentiati ng i nterpr eta-
tion of 'citta ', 'manas' and ' vijiidna was carried out only later,
perhaps even after the compilat i on of the VinHcayasalllgrahaQ-i and
under its influence . Actually. this latter possibility seems to be
supported by the ViniScayasalllgrahal) i itselfj for i n discussing the
question why the Basic Section, even though all "internal "
and "external" dharmas are entities on t heir mm, establishes
sol ely the vi j nan a 8 to be such Le.
makes them predominant and t he othe r element s s ubordinate to t hem,
the VjnHcayasalllgrahaQl refe r s to t he vijfitinas by t he expression
"the six dhtitU8 which are vijiidnal! (*{lag 833 a nd
this can only mean the five sense-perceptions and mane- v i -
j nan a ( not fflanas) . This would seem t.o presuppose that at the
t.ime of the compilation of (this part of) t he VinHcayasaJll8rahaQi
what wa s defi ned i n t. he beginning of the- Hanobtlllmi was still the
svabhtiva of man 0 V i j nan a and not yet citta, manas
and vijridna . At any rate: this ViniScayasalllgrahaQI passage con-
- 127 -
6. 3.1
firms that the topic of the initial portion of t he Hanobhumi of
the BasiC! Section as a whole was clearly felt to be marl 0 v i -
j it a rl a not citta
J
marlas and vijiiiina in a sense i ncluding
alayavijfiana and the new marlas .
6. 3.1 Y 24, 1_10:
834
1. Text:
o tatra sQJ!1T'aktayor matapitros tiVl"iivQsthagat e r>age
mucyate / tadarlte
836
cava-
<aukra-
837
> /
dvayol" api ca tau matul" eVa yonau
miribhutau ba<d>dhva <,>
tadyatha itibhavam <,>
[
yatl"a tat sal"vabijakaJ!l arayopa-
(2) datr
839
/
(9 kathClJ!1 <I> tena
Baha tadvipar>yastatambana
840
< ' >nta-
rabhavo rlir>udhyate . tannil"odhasamakatClJ!1 ca tasyaiva sar-
vabijasya vijiitinasya samapthyat
841

mahabhutavyatimi'l"O < ' >nyas tatsabhaga;
jayat e /842 tasydJr! cavasthayiilp
vijiiQnaJ?I. baddha; 843 pl"atiBQndhil" ity ucyate I sa casau
kalalavQsthti /
2. Translation:
o "When in the parents who [have become more and
more] impassioned [whil e making love] sexual passion
reaches the [most] vehement state, finally viscid semen
is discharged , and i n the end [of this process] inevita-
bly [a drop of fluid] comes forth in both of them,
[viz.] a drop of semen [in the father] and [a drop of ]
blood [in the mother]. two drops of both of them,
[vi:: . the drop] of semen and [the drop] of blood J get
mixed in the mother I s womb and form a film, havi ng
become one single lump, just like boiled milk when
cooling down [forms a film].
6.3.2 - 128 -
Into this [congealing mixture of blood and semen]
merges
Seeds,
that a 1
compri sed
a y a -
in [the
v i j fi a n a contai ning all
category of ' Result-of-]Matu-
ration' and appropriating the basis [of personal exist-
ence] .
~ How does it merge ? Together with that lump of semen
and blood which has formed a film, the [being of the]
intermediate state, which has that [blood-andsemenJ for
( h h]
844 .
its object t cug ~ a wrong way, ceas es to enst.
Simultaneously with i ts
845
cessation, there arises, by
virtue of that same min d co n t a i n i n g
all See d s
another lump of semen and blood,
Io'hich is similar to the [preceding one but] is mixed
with the gross elements of the subtle sense-faculties -
which are different from the [gross elements that con-
stitute blood-and-semen as such J846 - and is [al ready J
furnished with [one] sense_faculty847 (and i s thus a
1 i v i D g body). At this stage one speaks of mind
being [re-]established [in a new basis- of-existence],
and of Linking up having taken place . Thi s i s the state
of kat-at-a.t!
6. 3. 2 The characterization of alayavijnana inC]) i s substantial-
1y848 identical with that in Q, but the context is
different s ince the present passage deals with rei n ca r -
nat ion , more pr ecisely with Linking up ( pl"atisandhi ) a new
existence as a living being born from a womb (J'araYUJ"a) , 849 this
reincarnati on being initiated) accordi ng to (]), by a 1 a y a -
vijnana me r g in g into ( sa'l'mul' eeh -
pro toe m b r yon i c mat t e r at the moment of concep-
tion. It is in the context of this passage that U i seems t o see
the ori gin of alayavi j iiana.
850
To be sure , the term ' alayavijiiana' in the sense of "mind
[ characterized by coming to] stick to or in, or hide i n , [proto-
embryoni c matter]" (see 3. 3.1.2-3) would s uit the s i tuation of
reincarnation perfec tly ... ell and thus meet the second requirement
- 129 -
6.3.2
of 1. 7 (though even in t his case the choi ce of pr ecisely this
t erm would perhaps not be as plausible as in t he InitiaL Passage
where it co n t r a s t s with t he term ' ppavrtti- vijnana ').
But t he present passage docs not seem to offe r anything in
t e rms of the first c riterion, viz . that in the systemat i c context
conce rned the i ntroduction of a new kind of viJ'nana s hould have
become i nevi table; for i t neither supplies nor even does it
indicate any rea so n why, in the context of r eincarnati on,
t he traditional kinds of mind were not s uffici ent but rather an
entirely new kind of mind was r equi r ed . Al l that t he present
passage does is t o qualify, in 0 , alayavijnalla by precisely the
s ame attributes wh ich had been ascribed to it in 0. To be s ur e,
in t he present case, in contras t t o 0 ,85
1
a I 1 of them a re
cl osel y r elated t o the systematic cont ext, viz . r eincarnation; for
mind at reinc arnati on not only contains the Seeds of the further
development of the present existence 52 {and even of f uture exist-
ences)853 and is, as the result of previous karman (and delight in
wordly exi stence)854, quali fied as vip a k a , 55 but is a l so
essentially bound up with taking possession of the new existence
and e s pecially with a p pro p ria tin g proto-embryonic
matter i n orde r to consti tute and preserve it as a nima t e, i.e . as
a 1 j vi n g 0 r g ani s m . 85
6
Yet , the present passage does
n o t
indicate for what rea so n any of these functions
made the introduction of alayavijnana inevitable .
Even the ( hypothetical ) problem ari si ng from a res trictive
combinati on of the two main views on what contai ns Seeds (vi z. [a]
the psycho-physical basis-of-personal-existence as a wh ol e i o so
far as it i s vip ti k a , and [ b 1 t he min d series ) - a
problem which may be conceived to have rendered the introduction
of a new kind of ui jnana necessary in the context of the bijaSl"a-
ya of perceptions and cognitions i n general (see
6.1.2.2. a ) - can ha rdly be imagi ned to have l ed to di.fficulties i n
t he ca se of t he s p e c .i f ie situation of reincarnat ionj for
mind at the moment of conception had been specified as Result -of-
Maturat ion (vipa""ka) already i n ear lier Yogacara materials ,8
5
7 and
6. 3. 2
- 130 -
I f or one do not see why it had . b y n ee e 5 si t y . to be
conceived of a s an entirely new form of mind and not , e.g., as a
faint va riety of manovijnana .
To be sure , pertinent arguments a r e e xpress ly present ed i n
later sour ces like the Mahaya nasalJlgraha858 and aLready i ndicated
in the Proof Port ion of t he Vi-nEg (Ha y . Treat ise . According to
the l atter t ext, t he vijiitina .",hie h appr opriates the (corporeal)
basis of existence [at the moment of rei ncarnati on , and keeps it
appropriated t hroughout life, ] cannot be any of t he traditional
kinds of mind , because it is t aught to result from pr evious karmi c
for ces, whereas the ordina r y vijnanas ari se from present condi -
tions, sense-fac ulty, object , and attention j859 moreover , it
mus t b. morally neutral and [Result-of-]Maturat ion, but no such
ki nd of viJ'iiiina i, f ound among the traditional ones .
860
On. won-
ders , however , why these diffi culties had not been felt, for such
a long time , by the and Sautra ntikas who , after all ,
do not , i n this case ( in contras t to the problem of mind in
nil"odha8amapatti) , seem to have denied the presuppositions from
which they are derived . Theref ore, these a rgume nts may well have
been excogitat ed only afterwards, i.e. when alayavijiiana had al-
ready been i nt r oduced for some othe r reason .
The more so si nce the early Yogacaras themselve s do not , in
the begi nning, appear to have felt any need to introduce, in t he
context of rei ncarnation, an entirely new kind of vijiidna, a s i s
documented by t he very Manobhumi (to which G) belongs) , in the
beginning of whi ch dying (cyavate) an d b e i n g r eb 0 r n
(upapadyat e: Y ) are listed among .... hat both unbiased reading and
m
t extual history vindi cat e as exclusive funct ions of man 0 v i -
j n ti n a
86 1
cp o also t he de t ailed treatment of pl'atit yaeamutpa-
da in the Savitarkadibhumi of the Bas ic Section
862
where t he
vijriana .... hich arises, at the mome nt of conception, i n the mother ' s
womb, is n ot called 'alayavijiiana' but only ' pl'atisandhi(pha-
ta) -' or ' vipaka- vijnana ' , and not distinguished from the s ix
traditional kinds of mind .
863
- 131 - 6.3.3-6.3.4
As a context in whic h alayavijiiana may have been introduced
for the first time, reincarnation would stand on a par with niro-
dhasamdpatti only if one could produce co n v inc i n g evi -
dence for the i nevitability of the introd,uction of a new kind of
vijiiiina in t his context too, and such evidence would have to come
from a passage from the Basic Section of the Yogacarabhumi . But
not satisfy this condition. Rather, (1) too appears, like
pre sup p 0 s e alayavijiiana as an already establish-
0) doe,
0, to
ed concept, albeit, in view of the qualifications added, perhaps a
not yet well- known one.
6. 3.3 This evaluation of CD tallies with t he fact that, in it
too, the reference to alayavijiiana is probably, as in 0,
intrus i ve to the material which forms its surroundings . On the one
hand, the saruabijakaf!1 d1..ayavijna.nam of G) is, like the
corresponding term in Q, resumed, a few lines later (see G) in
6 . 3. 1), by the expression 'tasyaiua sa 1" v a b i j a s y a
v i j Ii a n a 8 y a ' ,86
4
and not, as one would expect, by
'tasyaiu fi 1.. a y a - vijna.nasya ' - a fact which would, however, be
quite natural if like 0, had or iginally only contai ned the
words ' yatra f:.at 8 a r v a b i J' a k a '!l v i j n Ii n a '!l BaJ!r
mul'cchati' and if 'vipdkasaf!19rhitam d1..aya- ', or at
least 'd1..aya-', 864a is, here too, taken as a later addition (see
6. 1. 3) . This i s further corroborated not only by the fact that
the occurrence of alayavijiiana is in conflict with rebirth being,
in the introductory outline, enumerated among what otherwise con-
. f f . f . . . . 865 b
st1tutes 1 C unct10ns 0 man 0 v J nan a , ut
also by the fact that in the wider context of 0) there is no
further occurrence of the term 'alayavijiiana', instead of which we
find traditional or at any rate less precise terms like ' dtmabM-
VQ
' ,866 'V'J,,;;;;,,,,,,867 d 1 ' b' k .. _- ,868869
an a so sarva af!1 vtJnanam .
6. 3. 4 As for the age of the presumable addition of 'vipdka-
sQ!!19t'hitam dLaya-' or at least '(Haya- ' in
(]D, it would seem to precede the Vth chapter of the
na (see 3. 9 . 1 ns. 324 and 327) in the pertinent part of which
- 132 -
in this case also the aspects of biological appropriation
87o
and
being t he result of [karmic ] Maturation
S71
are referred to . Si nce
in the case of CD all the qualifications of alayavijnana fit the
context, it ...... ill not perhaps be unreasonable to suppose that
and if not even belonging to
the older were at any rate i ntroduced he re for the first
time, and only afterwards extended to 0 because .Lt was fel t that
alayavijnana, as a concept which had not yet s truck firm roots,
needed a kind of definition at its first occurrence in t he text
( see 6. 1.3-4 ). This does not, however, mean that if not in G
then at any rate in their possible insertion, or the introduc-
tion of alayavi ji'iana itself I must n c c e s s a r i 1 y ha\'e
pr eceded the compilation of (this part of) t he Basic Seotion of
the YogacarabhUmi .
6.4. 1
6.4. 2
Y 109,13-15:
872
eVam avyakrta dhaPman aVa-
hanti, tadyatha alayaviJ"riQ.-
nom/
"In the same way , neutral factors [may] entail good , bad
a nd neutral factors: vi::. (I as e . g . ) alayavijnana,
which contains the Seeds of good, bad and neutral fac-
[entails these factors]."
0. on the one hand, starts from the assumption that
alayavijnana is morally neutral (avyakrta ), which does not
necessarily imply - but is, in its turn, implied by - alayavi-
jii.ana ' s being in the category of) '[Result-of-]Matu-
ration' (viptika) . On the other hand, CD expressly characteri::es
.ilayavijii.ana as containing the Seeds of good, bad and neutral
dharmas, wh ich is a kind of differentiated equivalent to " contain-
ing all Seeds" (sQ1'vabijaka) in CD and CD.
As for a justification for the choice of the term ' a 1 a -
y a viji'iana', the situation in CD is simil ar to that in (2) (see
6.1 .2, especially 1) . But, in contrast to Q, G may be taken
- 133 -
to indicate a rea son why a neW' kind of vijnana had to be
introduced in the systematic context of Seeds; for the statement
that neutral .u.ayavijiiana entails good, bad and neutral factors
because it contains their Seeds may in fact presuppose the argu-
ment - similar to that of the FPoof Portion of the VinSg dZay.
Treatise
873
_ that crassly contradi ctory dharmas (like good and
bad states of mind) cannot be the Seed of each other and that
therefore an additional, neutral state of mind is required as the
Seed of, e.g. , a good state of mind immediately following upon a
bad one .
Yet, CD does not
express s uch an argument hut at
best pre 5 u p P 0 s e s it. But even this much is by no means
certain, for G may J on the cont rary J have been the s tar t -
i n gpo i n t from which this argument was developed only
later . In fact, 0 could just as well be explained as an attempt
to a p ply, to the present context of alJahakahetu (Le. of
good, bad or neutral dharmas entailing or favouri ng (cinukuLya: Y
109,1) the ari sing of similar, homogeneous factors), the concept
of alayavijnana aft e r it had already been established,
because alayavijnana, being compr ised in what is Result-of-Matura-
tion and thus morally neutral, was compat ible with all ki nds
of dharmas and thus suited to contain their See d s
act. in a sense, as a homogeneous cause of all of them.
and to
6.4. 3
A,
in (2) -0), in Gtoo
the impressi on that alayavijii.,i-
na
"
an extraneous el ement
"
s upported by textual evi-
dence. Two facts arouse s uspicion with regard to its forming an
integral part of its surroundings:
a) The other instances of avcihaka- hetu consist in good, bad
and neutral fact ors entailing
,
i m i 1 a r factors of a
h i g h e r i n
t e n
,
i t
Y
or quality. In the case of
0 ,
however, we are not conce rned with intensification but with
a c t u a 1 i
,
a t i 0 n To be sure, it
"
not unreasonable to
combi ne both kinds of causality under the common aspect of "being
favourable II (anukuLya), but nevertheless the difference is cons pic-
ucus .
6. 5. 1
- 134 -
b) After having dealt with good factor s entailing other good
fact ors of higher intensi ty or quality) the t ext. introduces the
treatment of bad factor s by t he particle tat h Ii ("likewise"),
whereas e v (l m is used .... ithin
always874 i n
the t r eat ment of good or
correspondence with yatha bad factors , mostly but
evam .. . ).
not
(yath<i ... , Now, one would expect the t r eatment of
neut ral dharmas to be int r oduced by anothe r tat h Ii, but what
is used in the beginning of 0 is e v am . 'iet , the expected
tat h a. f 0 1 l ow s aft e r 0 as an i ntroductor y pa r ti-
cle to t he treatment of neut ral dharmas as ent ail i ng othe r neutral
dharmas of a higher i ntensity or quality, Le. to a treatment
whi ch is, from the point of vi ew of t he type of causality it deals
with, closely parallel to the treatment of the good a nd the bad
factors. Thus J the pa r agraph on tivtihaka- hetu would present J not
only from the point of view of content but a1so from the poi nt of
vi ew of styl e, a pe rfectly harmoni ous structure if G were
omitted ( i. e . regarded as an i nsertion):
6.5. 1
ku4ata kamapratisCUf1yuktan kuaakin
dharman avahanti I
evam . ..
yatha . . . . evam . ..
tat h a aku&1ki ( Y
m
) dharma dharmiin
civahanti I
[evam avycikrta dhal"T1ki1) etc. ( :: G)]
tat h ti avyakrta dharma avyaKrtcin dharman civa-
hanti I
Y 192 ,6-9:
karma
yat a) pWJ.yam,
s) tridhycinavedaniyCUf1 co.ninjyam I
karma yad I
karma
CD { yat a) sarvatrcitayavijMnavaipakyCUf1 karma.
s) caturthtio oa dhycincid urdhvam aninjyam I
- 135 -
6.5.2-6.5.3
"0 'Karman entailing pleasant experience ' is CA) merito-
rious as well as 5) immovable karman to be
experienced in the t hree [lower] dhyanas .
o 'Karman entailing painful experience ' is demerito-
rious karman.
8 'Karman entailing neither pleasant nor painful ex-
perience' is 0.) the karman which matures to [a new]
alayavijnana, in every [kind of ] existence . and B) immova-
ble karman [to be experienced i n existences] from the
fourth dhyana onward ."
6.5. 2 In CD. aIayaviji'tana is unambiguously qualified as [Re-
sult-of-]Maturation (vipaka) of karman . Moreover , in the
context of G I 0 would seem to imply that alayavijn.ana is
associated with neither-pleasant-nor-painful sensation - or at any
rate n n t associated with pleasant or painful sensation -
si nce it is the result of karman conducive - or not conducive - to
such sensation. But I for one cannot detect, in this passage, any
indication of the 1 i t era 1 mea n i n g of the term
'aJ.ayavijiiana' nor of a reason why- the introduction of a new
kind of vijikina should have become i n e v ita b 1 e in the
context of the problem of karman and its' Maturation (vipaka ). I
thus do not see any alternative to the assumption that , in @
too , alayavijiiana is not introduced as an entirely new concept but
rather are a d y one mad e use 0 f .
6. 5.3
The present passage does not s eem t o contain any formal
indication that the reference to alayavijiiana is an addi-
tion. Yet , at the ris k of straining the forbearance of my readers,
I have to a ssert that it i s a later element, at least from the
point of view of the history of ideas . Actually the text itself
.. ould seem to be, from a systematical point of view, slightly
unsati sfactory when it defines karman entailing pleasant or pain-
ful experience as that whi ch i s merit orious or demeritoriousj for
if one lists , a s the present passage does , karman resulting in a
new alayavijiiana separately J one would, strictly speaking, have to
=l.u ali f y meritori ous and deme ritorious karman in 0 and
65 4 - 136 -
G since , as the preceding paragraph of the text
875
confirms,
S 0 m e meritorious and demeritorious karman does n ot entail
plea sant or painful e x per i e n e e but a new (basis-of-per-
sonal-)existence, .... hi ch means (or at lea st includes) alayavijnana.
One might consi der explaining the absence of s uch a qualifi cation
in G and 0 as due to laxness or brevity. Yet , in the present
case, the origi nal, IIpre-alayavijiianicll explanation of the pattern
has actually been preserved i n the Abhidharmasamuccaya
876
a s well
as in sources
877
( provided that we disregard the use of
instead of
8IJ.khavedaniyaJ]l karma :;: good karman [to be experienced i n]
the kamadhdtu and the first thre e dhyanas ;
karma = karma;
karma good karman [to be exper i -
enced ] beyond the third dhyana.
This does n ot, of course, mean that t he Abhidharmasamuccaya
as a .... hole i s earlier than the Basic Section of the Yogac arabhu-
mi (see 1. 6 .1 + n. 100), but it corroborates the s uspi cion that
0, too, ha's - though , from the f ormal point of vie .... , in a more
s kilful way than 8-0 - been added t o earlier materia ls ,,.:h ich
did n o t yet contain ilayavijnana .
6.5. 4
from the doctrinal point of vie .... , it would seem that the
i ntroduction of the additional category of karman mat urat-
ing in alayavijnana into an older pattern di stributi ng the differ-
ent moral s pec i es of karman accor ding to t he diffe r ent experiences
they a re conducive to, s ignali:. es that the present passage
s tresses the distinction between two kinds of karman: one kind has
the function of e ntaili ng (d- kip-), in a corresponding world-
s phere (dhdtu) or .... ay- of-exi s tence (gati)J a ne .... ( basis- of-per son-
al-)existence (janman , 879 atmabhava
88o
) j the other kind of karman
supplements (paripUrGlIati) t his existence by special pleasant o r
unpleasant featur es.
B8 l
Sometimes, only the effect of t he first
kind of ka r ma n, i.e .
s uch , is qualified to be
the ne.... (basis-of-personal-)existence as
vip d k a . 882 This appears to be the
case also in t he paragraph immediately preceding the passage under
- 137
6. 6.1-6. 6.2
discussion, viz. Y 192,4_6, 88
3
where meritorious, derner itarlous
and immova ble karman are - once again in contrast to an older
pattern
884
dist i ngui s hed in terms of whether they mature to
(- v a i p a k y a ) a new existence (sugati, etc:. ) or are mere-
ly conducive to [cor responding] experiences (- vedaniya) supplement-
ing these exi s tences.
In the present passage , ho .... eve r , the effect of the first
function of karman , viz . of entailing as its vipaka in
the stricter sense, a new (basis-of-personal-) existence (citmabhci-
va), is specified a s a 1 a y a v i j nan a This would s eem
to mean that in this passage alayavijiiana has, at l east a s far as
the i ni tial phase of an exi stence is concerned , come to take the
pos ition of atmabhalla as the primary r esult of karmi c Maturation
- an impression whi ch i s supported by the presumable association,
in (}), of alayavijiiana with ne ither-painful-nor-pleasant sensa-
tion wh ich had, in the Manobhumi, been stated to be characteri stic
of pri mary vipaka ( in contrast to what only secondarily arises
from it ( vipakaJa)).885 If this conclusion is cor rect, the im-
pulse contained in the identification, i n (0 and C}), of al ayavi-
ji'iana with sarovaUjakarr viinanam .- which had come to be defined
as vipcika i n a similar sens e
886
- would, in CD, have begun t o
opera te, initiating the process by wnich alayavijfiana became, i n
analogy to sQrovabijakaJ!l vi jiUinam, 887 a more i ndependent entity on
its own and even the fundamental cons tituent of a l iving being (
3.10). Thi s would mean that @ is, at any rate, later, at least
slightly later, than CD
6. 6.1
= SacAcBh 5 (see App. I).
6. 6. 2 This passage r epr esent s, in a generalized form (see
3.2 . 2) , t he same systematic context as my InitiaL Passage
( 2. 1). In contras t to the latter, it doe s n ot, however ,
indicate the exegetical (or any other) problem that led to the
intl'oduction of alayavijfiana in the case of niroodhasamapatti . 0 .
too , would thus have to be r egarded as maki ng use , and expressly
6. 6. 3- 6. 7.2 - 138 -
extending the appli cat i on, of alayavijnana as an already establish-
ed concept.
6. 6. 3 'Though , from t he point of view of the hi story of ideas,
o represents a lat er l ayer t han the rest of the Sacitti-
ka( Acittika Bhumlb which presupposes the traditional vijiidnas on-
ly, I can see no incohel'cnce in it from the compositional point of
view. r therefore prefer to cons ider the Sacittika/ Acittika. Bhlimii}
to have been conceived a s i t stands fr om the outset, at a time
when t he concept of .il ayavij nana had already been introduced but
had not yet fully assert ed itself. The Sac i ttika!Aci ttika Bhumib
may even be regarded to have been written with t he very i n -
ten t ion of making, with the help of the patte rn of conven-
t i onal and ultimate truth, the alayavijiiana theory prevail over
the tradi t ional view without jeopardi zing the lat ter.
6.7.1
Commenta r y on Paramarthagatbas 33- 34
(. @) and 37 ( -=
@),
a) dvitiyatrtiyabhy&[1 (sc. gathabhy&[1 ) dubkha<1!1> 8GJ?lska-
l'adubkhatri- saJ!lgrhitam atayaviiM.namaYaJ!l (sc . dadayati)
<I>
s) tad dhi ( less probably: tad( - ) vi- ) nivdanaJ!l Iqotva
tenopaiti pl'apancitGJ?l bhavi
9
ycimi na evama-
di I
y) ity atmabhavapal'igl'ahGJ?l / ..
( unde rlined parts from PG) .
tasyedanim atayavijiid.nasGJ?lgrhitasya dubkhasya sQ}"absa-
l'UpyaJtl . . . j
For text- cri tical notes, t ranslation and i nterpretat i on see App.
II.
6. 7. 2
1 . a) Both passages are unambiguous in declaring Suffering
in the sense of sGJ?l8kal'adubkhata, i . e . of the ontol ogi-
cal or subl iminal unsatisfactor i nes s es sentially characteri z ing or
continousl y permeating all worldly existence (see 4.1.1-2) , to
consist of (- maya), or be compri sed in (- sGJ?lgrhita) , alayavijiia-
na (see 4 . 1.4) .
- 139 -
6. 7.2
b) Furthermore, @ connects iilayavi ji\ana .... ith nivel1ana,
which is, in its turn, explai ned as "taking possession of a [ new]
(basis of) personal existence " (dtmabhd'vapal"igl'aha); but I for one
find it difficult to dec ide precisely how thi s connection is
conceived by t he text, i.e . whet her {at the moment of Linking up
(pl"atisandhi ilayavijiiana is caused to take possession of a new
bas is of existence ( i.e . body, etc.) or whet her - perhaps more
probably - a new alayavijnana is taken pos sess ion of a s the
( primary element of ?) a ne .... basis of existence ( fo r details see
ns . 1474 a nd 1477(1); cp o also 7. 18.2 . 2.1 ) .
c) Finally J a s y nth e s 1 z i n g
28- 36 in the light of the commentary would
i nt erpretation of PG
5 U g g est that
Sufferi ng , i . e., according to the comm . : alayavijnana
J
.... hich is
the cause of the notion of Ego (ahaf!1kru-a : PG 35), i s identical
wit h [ the Re s ult-of-] Maturati on c ontai ning all Seeds (sal' vabijo
vipdka';: PC 28-29) which is not only the c a u se of the wrong
viCl.' of Self ( PC 31: BvabijeIt .. . jayate atmadal't1anam) but al-
so its 0 b j e c t ( PG 29ab) . From thi s, one may con-
c Iud e that , from the point of view of the commentary, ilaya-
vijnana may not only be the cause but also t he 0 b j e c t of
t he wrong view of Sel f . Yet, it has to be st ressed that the
comme ntary does not seem to contai n an explicit statement to
this effect and does n ot explain the BarlJabijo vipaka'; of PG
28-29 as al ayavijnana (cp. also 3. 11. 4 . 1 and 3. 11. 5) .
2. a) As f or the lite ral meaning of the term 'alayavijnana ' ,
it can hardly become plaus ible on t he basis of the qualifi cation
of alayavij nana as Suffer i ng in t he sense of ( see
l.a) . The use of the term would , however, be reasona ble if one
were ready to accept t he i dea that alayavijliana is the object of
t he notion of Ego (see 1 . c) to be d e l i b era tel y
implied by the text; for in this case the term would fit the
situation very well if taken in the sense of "mind cl ung to [as
Sel f]". 888 But even i f we di sregard t he ge neral difficulties to be
faced if this were taken to be t he original meaning of the term
alayavijiiana ' (see 6 . 1 .2 . 2. c) lit can hardly be in the pr esent
6.7.2 - 140 -
passage that it was introduced for the first time, for it i s not
us ed here with reference to nor in direct connection with the idea
of Clinging to Self.
b) On the other hand, the fact that the term 'alayavijiiana I
occurs. in , in the immediate vicinity of the explana ti on of
the semantically related word in PG 33- 34, might be
taken to suggest that i ts formation was stimulated, preci sely in
thi s context , by the gatha expression and thus may, in
view of the explanat i on, in @Y, of nive.::lana as dtmabhdvaparigr'a-
ha, or iginally have meant something like "vijiidna that. enters upon
or comes to stick to [a new (basis of) personal existence ] " or,
more probably, "vijiiiirza which has become one's abode" or " .... hi ch
is stuck to (as t he (primary element of ?) one's bas i s-of-personal-
existence]" (see also 7. 18.2. 2.1). Even the question why, in
this case , it was just the term
, a 1 a y a vijiiana' (and not,
e . g . } rathe r 'nive.ana-' or ' pal'i gl'aha- vijiitina') that was chosen,
may perhaps be answered by referring to a can 0 n i cal
passage like MN I 233, where what i s the object of nive.ana i n PC
33-34, viz. Suffering, is the object of - Zt"'- (see n. 1444(A)) .
But even so what the occurrence of 'nive6ana ' stimulated under the
influence of canoni cal phra seology may equally well have been not
the first coi ning of the term 'alayavij iiina' but rathe r the
e m p loy men t in the present context, of 'alayavijiiina'
as an already established term, and in a modified sense at that.
889
c) That the latter possibility is much more probable would
seem to be corroborat ed by the fact that the present passage does
n 0 c express or at least i ndicate any mot i v e whi c h may
have rendered the introduction of a new kind of vi,inana i n -
e v j tab Ie , neither in the context of taki ng possession of
a new (basis-of-personal-)existence nor in the context of
duJ;khata, let alone the cont ext of the ob jec tive basis of the
notion of Ego with which alayavijiiana is, in the present passage,
connected, at best, only impl icitly. As for the two latter con-
texts, even later sources do not seem to make us e of them for
proving the necessity of the existence of ilayavijii,ina.
- 141 - 6.7 . 3-6.7 .4
6.7. 3 from the point. of view of text ual compOSl.t.l.on) I f or one
cannot, i n and @, detect any incohere nce or formal
indi cation of their being lat e r additions, though 1 do not exclude
the possibility t hat the explanat ion of ' niveSana ' as 'atmabhdva-
parigraha ' (@'Y) and the r eplacement, i n the interpretati on of
<@a), of t.he older concept of atmabhdva (cp. 25,15f . )
by alayavijiiana may in fa ct I' epresent two success i ve steps in the
exegesis of the Parama rthagat has .
6.7. 4 As f or relative c hronology , some of the Parama r thagathas
expr ess ideas closely r elated to
in t he fir s t
some of t he "pre-alaya-
two Bhumis of the Basic vij nanic
u
mat.e r ials compiled
Section .
89o
The commentary , i nt r oduc ing a l ayavijiia na , would thus
be comparable to the intrusive r eferences to alayavijiiana in
passages like G, 0 , G and Q). Actually , even if we dis r e-
gard t he idea , at bes t imp 1 i e d by the text, t.hat alayavi-
jilana is t.he ult i mat.e objective basis of the notion of Ego (which
s eems to pr e s up p 0 s e a certai n modification of the
original concept of alayavijiiana: see 3.11 )) the doctri nal
posit i ons involved in @/@ would ( at l east from my start ing-
point [ 2 . 1 and 2. 13]) assign t hese passages to a comparat i vely
l ate s tage of development:
1 . The equation of alayav ijnana with
which is hardly s elf-evident - appears to be a seconda ry develop-
ment pr es upposi ng certain r eflections on the origi nal concept of
alayavijnana and even a certain shi ft of emphasis (see 4. 1 ) . It
may even be based on a r einter pr e tation of t he mat er ials of Y
26, 11_19
891
in the light of t he alayavijnana conce pt (and from
s uch a r einterpretation of Y 26, L1ff. the idea also of alayavi-
jiiana as the obj ective bas i s of t he not ion of 'I' ..... ould , sooner or
l ater . have followed almos t a utomati cally) .
2 . I f ' niveSana' i n B bas, as i s
to be unde rst ood in a non-causati ve s ense,
pe rhaps
@'
more pr obable.
would seem t o
i mply that alayavijiiana is s tuck to a s the titmabhdtJa (see n .
1474(C) a nd 6. 7. 2. 1. b and 2. b} . This, howeve r , would mean that
uayavijiiana has - a t leas t as far a s the moment of conception is
6.8.1-6 . 8.2 - 142 -
concerned, but probably for the
become the fundamental constituent
1483 and 1484). This would bring
(see 6 . 2.4) comparatively late
states alayavijiiana to be the basis
whole of a given existence -
of a l iving being (cp. also ns.
@Close to the demonstrably
passage 0 which explicitly
[of personal existence]
ya) and even uses, i n t hi s co n nee t ion t he
expression - san n i v i
meaning of the term
f a in order to indi cate the literal
892
.i 1 a y a vi joana , (see 6. 2.2.d). In
view of this affinity, one may even consider the possibility that
it was precisely which provoked the remodeling of (2) into
o (see 6.2.2.a) . would, in its turn, appear to presup-
pose a similar development as (see 6.5.4).
In view of the preceding considerations, I tend to take
@/@ to represent, apart from 0, the latest stratum of the
alayavijilana theory to be found in the Basic Section of the
Yogacar abhiimi .
6.8.1
Summing up the result of my - admittedly preliminary -
invest igati on into the other occurrences of iilayavijilana
in the Basic Section of the Yogacarabhumi , it would seem that
none of them satisfies, unambiguously, the criteria stipulated in
1.7. Thus, it is improbable that any of them can c l aim to have
preserved the original situation and context of the first introduc-
tion of alayavijiianaj at any rate, if one would attribute, to any
of them, an evidential value superior to t hat of my I nitia1
Passage ( 2.1), one would have to adduce very strong arguments.
6.8. 2
It is also worth noti ng that all occurrences of alayavjjila-
na which pre c e d e my InitiaL Passage in the present
arrangement of the Yogacarabhumi appear to have been ins e r t -
e d into - doubtless older - materials where they were originally
missing, and that their character of being insertions is
ble, in four out of five cases, also from t he compositional point
of view. This fact ""ould seem to suggest that these passages were
added only after t he Initia1 Pas sage had been incorporated. This
does not, of course, necessarily mean that they we r e added by
- 143 -
6.S.3
another
person; it may (but of course need not) have been
the compiler himself (if there was actually only one) who added
(at least some of) them by way of revi si ng the ea rli er parts.
6. 8. 3
This presumption that my InitiaL Passage i s not only
representative of the original context in which the idea
of alayavijiiana was i ntroduced for the first time, but probably
also the first place where this concept had emerged in the process
of the compilation of the Yogacarabhiimi , will receive additional
support if it can be shown that the occurrences of the term
'pravrttivijfiana' too, fit i nto t he picture.
According t o my hypothesis which takes the Ini'tial Passage
as its starting-point, the terms 'alayavijnana' and 'prav.rtti-
vijnana' are the antonymic elements of a coherent conceptual
structure, and thus intrinsically and originally connected .... i th
each ot her. Consequently, one expects the term 'pravrttivijnana' -
as a designation of the traditional forms of mind - to occur only
i n explicit or at least implicit antithesis to 'alayavijnana ' ; and
- if the I7IitwZ Passage wa s 1.n fact the first passage where
alayavijiiana emerged in the process of the compilation of the
Yogacarabhumi - one expects 'pravrttiviji'tana' , too, not to
occur at all in the chapter s which precede this passage in terms
of literary arrangement, except, at best, in later additions.
And i n fact, as far as I can see, the term 'pravrttivijnana'
does not, in the Yogacarabhiimi, occur but i n association with
alayavijoana.
893
Nor does there seem to be any occurre nce at all
of 'prav{'tti vijnana' in the portions of the Yogacarabhumi which,
in terms of the present arrangement of the text I precede the
InitiaZ Passage. That the term 'pravrttivijnana' is, in contrast
to .ilayavijiiana, not even introduced, in these portions, by way of
later addition is easily explained by the fact that, being merely
a new designa tion of the traditional vijiianas, its absence was,
contrary to that of the entirely new concept of alayavijnana,
nowhere felt to be an essential defect.
7 . 0-7 1A . 1
- 144 -
7. Discussion of divergent theories on the origin of ilayavijnana
7.0 After having presented my 0\00'11 view of the origin of alaya-
viji'iana (in the strict sense of 1.4) and some aspects of
its early developments, and after a preliminary evaluation of the
othe r occurrences of a layavijnana in the RaBie Seetion of the
Yogacarabhiimi, ] no .... proceed t o a brief di scuss ion of some impor-
tant attempts, recently published by J apanese scholars, to explain
the origin of alayavijnana in a .... ay that differs from my o\oo'n view.
I apol ogize, beforehand , for any misunderstandings that may have
crept in due to my insufficient familiarity with Japanese, as also
for having - probably - overl ooked other attempts of equal impor-
tance.
1.1A.l
In a paper discussing the formation of the t heory of
alayavijiiana and maMB (in the sense of the "7th vijiiQ-
J'Ill" of the full-fledged Yogacara s ystem, .... hich is usually called
'Defiled Mind' manab , 5h. S u g u r 0 ( 1977) pro-
posed t he hypothesis that the original character of alayaviji'iana
as well as the or iginal meaning of the term 'alayaviji'iana' diffe r -
ed considerably from ho .... it .... as understood later . On t he basis of
the prevailing canonical and Abhidharma use of the term 'a1.aya' i n
the sense of Clinging or even Cli nging to Self {f.tlk , i.e .
atmagraha) 8
9
4 and the fac t that in later Yogacara dogmatics the
t e rm 'alayavijnana' is r eser ved for the "8th vijnaJ'lll" of s piritual-
ly imp e r f e c t persons who have not yet (or at least not
yet completely) abolished Clinging to Self, but is not applicable
to the "8th vijiitiJ'lll " of perfect Saints (Arhats, etc . ), 895 Sugul'o
infers that the original meaning of ' alayaviji'iana
l
must have bee n
close to that of 'atmagl"aha /, 896 i.e. somet hing like I!mind [ con-
s isting in or functioni ng as] Clinging [to Self]". Thus, according
to Suguro alayavijiia.na had, originally, the s ame functi on .... hich
afterwards came to be attributed to the "7th vijiitina" or
manas.
897
The latter, i n its turn - again according t o Suguro -
- 145 -
71A.2-71A.2.1
originally had no connection with Defilements like t he notion of
Self or Clinging to Self but was merely some kind of simultaneous
mana-indriya.
898
Since. in Suguro' s opinion, at that stage of
development (viz. in the Hanobhumi of the Basic Section) the
different vijiidnas were not yet distinguished as different enti-
ties but merely regarded as various modes of one and the same mind
(just as later on in Para;nartha's system), there was a certain
c irculation or mutual adaptability of their functions
) . 899 Thus it could , so easily happen that
later on mana8 took over the function of atmagraha from alayavijna-
na
900
when the latter, in its turn, came to be regarded as the
"central subject of the individual" )9
0
1 - in a
more existential or biol ogical s ense - as is documented by its
qualification, in the Basic Section of the Yogacarabhumi, as
(Result-of-]Haturation (vipaka) , as containing all Seeds (sarvabi-
J'aka) and, especially, as that whi c h appropriates the [corporeal]
basis[-of-personal-existence] and by toe notion
of cidanavijiiana of the Sar)ldhinirmocanasutra .
902
7.1A. 2 In my opinion, the assumption of such a kind of exchange
of r5les is hardly justified.
7.1A. 2.1 As for Suguro's express presupposition that in the
beginning the various kinds of vijfi5na were not yet
conceived of as di stinct entities but merely as modes of one and
the same mind. it may, per hap s , hold good for the very
earliest phase of the alayavijiiana theory, in case in the beginning
alayavijiiana was conceived as a kind of latent: or subliminal
continuation of the mind series in unconscious statesj but it
would seem arbitrary even in the case of most of the alayavijilana
occurrences in the Basic Section. of the Yogacarabhiimi, not to
mention the Sal(ldhinirmocanasutra or the passage in the beginning
of the Hanobhumi
903
with which Suguro starts but which is obvious-
ly a later insertion, probably post-Sar)ldhinirmocana and perhaps
even post-VinHcayasar)lgrahaQI (see 6 . 2.3-4). Apart from this,
the s ubsumption, in this passage. of alayavijnana. manas and tbe
). IA.2 .2
- 146 -
traditiona l fo rms of mind
904
( or at lea s t manovijnana)9
0
5 under
'manas '
-
which may , of course, be used for designati ng mind in
genera1
906
-
doe s n ot necessarily i mply, as Suguro seems to
suggest,9
0
7
the 0 u b s t a n t i a 1 u n i t
Y
- though one on
t he poi nt of disintegrating - of t he items s ubsumed, no more than
does their subsumption under t he category of 'vijrial'lO. I, common
even in lat er sour ces . The cha racterization of alayavijnana a s
"having adopted, and s ticking t 0
3
the state of basis [-of-personal-
existence J" see 6.2.
2) point s rather t o a s tage of devel opment where it had already
come to be conceived of a s the fundamental layer of per sonality
(see 3. 10) . And Suguro's argument
908
that the s ubstantial identi-
ty of t he va r ious vijnana.s in the Manobhumi i s al so proved by t he
fact that dying and be ing r eborn a re fir st
909
enume rated among
... hat is obviously a list of functions of man 0 v i j n an a
but af tentard s attributed to a 1 a y a v i j n a n a, ignores
t he poss ibili ty that thi s disagreement may j ust a s well be explain-
ed as an i ncoherence de riving from textual hi story. In fact the
o n I y passage i n the ext ens ive treatment of death a nd rebirth
.... here alayavij nana comes in
910
ca n, once agCLin, be s ho ... n to be ,
almost certainly, a later addition (see 6.3. 3 and 6 . 8) .
7. lA. Z. 2 a) The problem of t he origin of kl.ista,!"
man a'; woul d ce rtainly r equire a study on its o .... n.
In this pape r , I therefore refrain from discussing Suguro ' s argu-
ments i n detail but confi ne myself to the stat eme nt that ] have
serious reserves against hi s idea of a reint e rpretation , in t he
light of the doctl'ine of mome ntar iness, of manas as samanantal'a-
pl'atyaya i nto a kind of simultaneous mana.- indriyo;9
1
t f or apart
fr om the fact t hat t he passage with .... hi ch Sugul'o s tal't s (viz . Y
II ,6f .) doe s not cont ain t he slightes t indication of s uch an
idea,9
1
2 I have so far not come a cr oss any passage, at least
i n the older texts , whic h would unequivocally corrobor ate it, or
at l ea s t s uggest that the conce pt of samanantal'apr>atyaya someho ....
came t o be felt to involve diffi culties in t he context of the
doc trine of momental'iness .
- 147 - 71'.2.2
b) As agai nst Suguro , I am convinced that
manas - inspite of the fact that the a ttribute is missing
in .... ha t appear to be the oldest perti nent passages
9 13
- wa s from
the ve r y outset essentially associated with , nay almost consisting
of , the noti on or f eeling of 'I' .
( n) In an earlier , rather prelimi nary paper, which was
publi shed in an abridged Japanese ve r si on only, 914 1 tried to
explain the formation of as a consequence of t he
problem of t he occur r ence of a 8 m i m a I'l a even in S a i -
k a s i . e .
traditional view,
est)9
1
S canonical
a s a consequence of the very dynamism of the
f ound already in ce rtain (though not the old-
. 1 - 916
texts, especl.a l y t he K.$emakasutra, that even
in a person wh o has r ealized Truth and eliminated the (specula-
tive) false view t hat the skandhas are Self (satkayadNFi) but is
not yet a perfect Saint
[wi th
(arhat ) , an involuntary concept ion or
t he s kandhas ] (asmimana) 9 17 is not yet feeling of identity
fully eradicat ed .
91 8
In the context of Abhidharma thought, it was,
however, difficult to conceive of an occurrence of asmimana ( no ....
mosUy understood a s a form of co n C e i t )9
1
9 without the
existence of some f orm of the view of Self f or the
l atter was regarded as being pres upposed by all ki nds of mana, and
especially so by asmimana .
920
(e) This difficulty seems to have induced some masters to
assume that asmimana i s, like eradicated by tbe very
first i nsight into Truth (darlfana- heya),921 whlch means that t he
has entirely got rid of it. But since s uch a vie .... was in
open conflict with canonical
tra,9
22
it was rejected by
evidence, e specially the K.$emakasu-
the V a i b h a i k a s who ,
instead, advocated t he view t hat some asmunQna was, i n fact,
eradicabl e only by repeated c ultivation (bhavand- heya)92
3
a nd thus
not f ully elimi nated even in a Yet , thi s does not mean,
for t he Vaibha. !ji kas, that t he re must be actual occurrence of
aSl7limana in a rather thi s is i mpossible because, due to
t he eradication of its basis, viz. satkayati:r{lti, so to speak the
backbone of asmimdna i s broken. 924 What remains t o be cut off i s
thus not the outburst of aamimana but only i ts Possession (prapti) .
71A. 2.2
- 148 -
(y) According to the Sautrantika there
is no objection even to actual occurrences of asmimana :in Saik$as
because Saik$as have to be sure eradicated wrong II i e w s or
th e 0 r i e 5 but not wrong notions or ideas
(saJ!Ijriii- and citta-viparyasQ) including the W'Tong notion or idea
of 'Self' with r eference to what is not Self.
926
In a passage of the Va s t u sa 'I' grit h a I) I of
the Yogacarabhiimi, 927 the occasional occurrence I by inadvertence,
of Qsminrina in Saik$ilS is taught to be due to t he fact t hat,
though they have eradicated along with its propensity
Le . its fertile seed, so to speak), there is still left
in them a kind of aft e r - e f fee t (vQsQmi) of satkaya-
and this vQaana, though incapable of producing satkdyadfqfi
itself, is nevertheless regarded as sufficient to explain the
occasional occurrences of aBmimana .
(E) In other passages of the Yogacarabhlimi , "" e meet with the
idea of an in n ate, spontaneous view of Self (Bahajti
8atktiyadr{lti? ) , considered to occur even in animals and to be
neutral (avyalq-ta),9
2
8 in contrast to the speculative
(pal"i - or vi - katpita) one which is unwhol esome In
view of its spontaneity, thi s innate notion of Ego had, in
contrast to the speculati ve one, to be regarded as being eradica-
ble not by the ve ry first insight into Truth but only by its
repeated cultivation (bhavanti-heya) ,93
0
and therefore as l iable
to occur even in This assumption is corroborated by a
passage from the which, without mak-
ing use of the notions of kti1rtaJ!! mana'; and alayavijiiana 932 but
evoking rat her the older idea of an after-effect ( vasanti) of
satk6yadr{lti
933
and thus perhaps preserving an olde r stage of
development , expressly confirms t he connection of the innate 8at-
k6yadf{lfi with the problem of the occurrence of Qamimana in
and with the
(,) In the Japanese article noted ,
impracticability of co n sis ten t
my
1 Y
idea was that the
associating this
s pontaneous notion or feeling of 'I' with the traditional forms of
- 149 - 7 1A. 2 . 2
mi nd ,934 or .... ith the ne .... ly i nt r oduced u ayaviji'iana,935 left no
othe r way open but t o e s t ablish the spontaneous notion of Ego, on
tho a n a log y of al ayavij i'iana and pe rhaps also under the
"atmos phe ri c " influence of the hypostas is of the notion of
'r'
into an entity on its own (aharikara) i n Sinkhya ( s ee 2 . 12), as
a f orm of mind o n .i t s
ow n 936
prec i sely, a
mental factor ba sed on a form of mi nd on i t s
or , more.
own.
937
(,,) Thi s new f orm of mind was called 'manas ' si nce t hi s t e rm
.... hich moreove r lent itself to being etymologized i n t he sense of
manyana ( " conceiving") occurred in several sets where a ll the
other items had s pecific meanings, especiall y in the s et of the
terms ' citta ', 'manas ' and ' vijMna 'j93
8
to be s ure , t hese latter
terms we r e or iginal ly understood to be synonymous
939
or were at
best taken to refer to different aspec t s, etc . , of mind in
general ,94
0
but already the Salpdhi nirmocanasutra had s tarted to
fill them ,dth sub s tan t i a I 1 Y speci fic meanings by
equating citta with ddanavijMna = a layaviji'iana .
94 1
c) To be s ure, t he problem of the asminl/ina of the Sai-
k$as came to be solved in a more satisfactor y .... ay by the introduc-
tion of kli{1taJ!l Yet, 1 ha ve now some doubt s a s to
t ho dec i s i v e impul se for the introduc tion of manaa
a new f orm of mind did in fact come from this quarter. Start ing
from .... hat has good c hances of being the oldest occurrence of t he
new manas
942
(at l ea s t t he oldes t occurrence that yields a ny
concrete i nforma ti on about it s nature)9
4
3, I now cons.ider another
possi bility to be equally, if not more , probable .
(0) In t he VinSg dLay . Treatise, t he s tat ement that alayavi-
ji'l.ana is al wa ys accompanied by m a 11 a s i s followed by a kind
of " statement of identity" and a definition , or explanation, of
the latter - a fact ... 'hich shows that the concept was quite new and
could not be presupposed to be well-kno .... n . In the "statement of
identityH, manas .... hich always (nityakdLam) accompanies alayavi-
jnana is [di sti nguished fr om t he traditional one by being] charac -
terized, in an etymologizing fas hion , as the one which has the
f orm h:ikal'a) of co n C e i v i n g m a n y a n a) by way
7.1A. 2. 2
of
th'
notion of ' 1 '
identity ( a 8 m i man
is taught to have the
n a , its o b j e c t
- 150 -
( a han Ie a r a) and the feeling of
a ).944 In the definition/ eX"planation, it
form of conce iving alayavi
1 a m
j ii a -
[this] I
(asm-iti) and '[This is
viniscaya,946 manas is
my]
in t he form of
Self , .945
In the Saci ttikabhUmi-
- perhaps because asmmana .... as felt to be
too much of a eaitta to qualify t he na ture of maMS as a eitta
_ defined as having the nature of cont inually conceivi ng 'I'
(aham) or 'Mine' (mama) .
(6) To be s ure, the qualifications of manas as ahlllpluira and
asmimana .... ould well fit in with the explanation proposed above.
But in view of the only s p 0 r a die occurrence of asmimtina
in it .... ould not be easy to explain , from this context,
.... hy t he ne .... manaa consisting in this asmimana (and the s ubtle
notion of ' I' it pres upposes) .... as establis hed as being con-
tin u 0 u s Indeed , if we take into consideration that ,
according to the testimony of the definition/ explanation of the
new manus in the VinSg eiLay . Tr'eatise (see 0), the idea that
alayavijflana i s its ob ject appears 948 to have formed part of t he
concept of thi s manas from the very outset,949 .... e s hould conclude
t hat it .... as rather a d iff ere n t sys tematic context that
gave rise to the idea of manas as a vijiUina on its own , or at
least signi fi cantly contri but ed to its i ntroduc tion. Act ually, the
terms ahankira ' and 'asmimana I may just as .... ell r efer to t he
problem of
th'
o b j e c t of
th'
( innate) notion of '1'
( and
'Hine' ) and of th, fe eling of identity i n g e n e r a 1 ,
i .e. , primarily, in ordinary, W 0 r d I
Y
people (p'{'thagjana) ,
t he asmimana and aahajei BatkayadNti,? of being, at best,
a s pecial case whi c h, to be sur e, may have enha nced the urgency of
the problem.
(Y) As was stated above ( 3. 11. 2) , in t he O1pre-alaya-
vi jiiani c " materials of the Basic Section the object of the notions
of 'I ' (aham iti) and 'Mine' (mameti) - i . e . of satkayadr:rti -
and of the notion 'I am [this ] t (asmUi) i.e . of the feeling
of identity (asmimana) - (o f 0 r din a r y people ) 95
0
is the
- 151 - 7. I A.2.2
basis-of-personal-existence (atmabhava, or [Result-of- ) Ma-
turation (vipaka) , containing all Seeds.
951
Later on - probably
only after having become the fundamental layer of personality and
having replaced, in this function, the body or f!arj.Qyatana
a 1 a y a v i j nan a was bound to be regarded also as the most
fundamental objective basis of the notion of ' I' and of the
feeling of ide ntity (see 3.11.5ff. ). But clearly alayavijnana,
being sub 1 i min a 1 could not, on closer inspection, be
regarded as the object of the 0 r din a r y notion of Eg0
952
and feeling of identity but only of a similarly sub tIe
one. This fact , however, would seem to have rendered an associa-
tion of this notion of Ego and feeling of identity with the
t raditional vijnanas extremely difficult, st ill more difficult
than did the mere ubi qui ty of the innate notion of Ego (sahaja
satkayad:r?t;ib) , as more or les s identical with (or at least
compri sed in) which the potion of ' I' referring to a1ayavijnana
could easily come to be regarded .
953
Therefore, it would seem to
me that it was , above all, on a ccount of their having come to
refer to a 1 a y a v i j n a: n a
.,
their object that the
(spontaneous) notion ( s) of
'1 '
( and
'Mine' ) and the feeling of
identity (asmimana) (of ordinary people) had to he established
.,
a not h e c form of mind o n t
h ,
i c o w n , to be called
'manas ' for th, reasons suggested earlier (b , n)j and t his i,
precisely "'hat is documented in the ViniScayasalJlgrahaI}I passages
adduced above (c, a).
co n tin u i t y of the notion of 'I'
and the feeling of identity which const itute the new manas, the
Sacittikabhumiviniscaya s uggest s that they are conti nuous because
they arise from nothing but their Seed. in alayavijnana,954 i.e.
flow forth spontaneously, being independent of any external cause .
Perhaps it was also the "atmospheric" influence of t he Sankhya
(see b.d that favoured not only the establishment of
the noti on of 'I' as a form of mind on its own but also its
continuity. Anyway, rather than the sporadic feeling of identity
in it is t he ubiquitous occurrence of the idea of 'I' and
71A.2 . 2 - 152 -
the feeling of identity i n ordi n ary 'Mine t and of
people
955
that is more likely to have been generaliz:ed to, or
understood a s a manifestation of, a co n tin U 0 U s subtle
and asmimana.
(c) Yet the newly introduced manae .... as quite soon, viz. in
the Sacit tikabhumi-vinicaya.
956
expl icitly recognized to occur in
Saiksas, too, except when they are actually practising the Supra-
mundane Path, which means: not merely spor adically. rt s
largely conti nuous presence even in Saiksas does, of course,
furnish a satisfactory basis for the sporadic outbursts of man-
i f est asmimQna which these persons a re J according to other
passages J 957 still subject to. Manae could thus come to be regard-
ed as the basic principle of Polluti on (see 4 . 10.1) .
(t) At the same time, the Saci ttikabhu.mi-viniScaya,95
8
in
this treatment of manoa i n a soteriol ogical
distinguishes manas itself (as the citta) from
asmimana as Defilements (kle6a, i . e . caittas)
context, clearly
and
it is associated
with. Naturally, it is, in the soteriological context, these
Defilements of manas that the text is mainly i nteres't ed in, and
it also tries to systematize them by way of a com pIe t e
enumeration, which for our text means the addition of two 1II0re
Defilements, viz . self-l ove (atlllasneha) and Ignorance (avidyd).
The same list of Defilements of manas (s ubs tantially retained
thr oughout t he later Yogacara tradition) is also given in a
paragraph of the Pravrtti Portion of the VinSg dlay . Treatise
959
- a paragraph which i s, by the way, clearl y a kind of supplement
h f d b ( )
960 d h h
to t e passage re e rre to a ove c . o an t us. per aps,
dependent on the Sacittikabhumi-vinHcaya material. The addition
of self-love (atmasneha) may have been stimulated by t he fact
- 961 t.
that in the aem t'!. mana is follo .... ed by aamtti
chanda (something like " inclinat i on to identify 0 . 5 . [ .... ith the
skandhas ]" ), but it may just as well have been taken from the
context of the notion of Ego with reference to the citmabhava or
vipa.7<.a containing all Seeds. 962 The addition of Ignorance (avidya)
may be due to systematic reasons 963 but could also be explained as
stemming, it too, from the context of the notion of Ego.964
- ' 53 - 7lA. 2 3
7.1A. 2. 3 In t his way, t he i ntroduction of manaa as a new kind of
mind pr e 5 u p P 0 S e s to be sur e , the int roduc-
tion of iilayavijiiiina . both as a model case and, probably , because
monas was required as a form of mind performing t he a c t o f
C 1 i n g i n g to alayavij iiana as Self . Thi s does n 0 t at all
mean, hOIo'ever , that manas ha s b 0 r r 0 w e d i t S f u n c
-
t i 0 n , viz . Clinging to Self, f r om ii 1 a y a v i j n
a -
n a For a s far as I c an see the r e is neithe r need nor textual
evidence for, indeed, t here is even counter-evidence agains t,
Suguro's a ssumption that "Mind c linging [to Self ) " wa s the origi-
nal meaning of ,alayavi jiiana' .
a) No n e e d because I hope to have demonstrated that
the passage from the Samahi ta BhlimiQ quoted in 2. 1 furnishe s a
fully s atisfac t ory explanation, meeting the requi.rements s tipulat-
ed in 1.7 , of the introduction of alayavijnana in the s ense of
"mind [ charac terized by] sticking and bei ng hidden in [ the materi-
al sense-faculties]" (see 2.7), a sense .... hic h mo reove r has the
advantage of substantiall y agreeing with .... hat is presumably the
ol dest explicit explanation of the term extant (see 2. 8).
b) N 0 textual
Ci ntamayi Bhiimil)
e v ide
Suguro 965
n c e ,
adduces
because the passage
(viz . PG
33- 34 +
from t he
comm. )9
66
does
have realized
not state nor even imply, a s he hi mself a ppears to
in a later paper, 967 that alayavij nana has its elf
the nature or funct i on of Clinging to Self , but can at best be
interpreted as
of the
i mp lyi ng
notion of Sel f
that alayavijiiana i s the 0 b
(see 6.7). Thi s , ho .... ever, i s a j e c t
quite d iff er e n t aspec t , and one whi ch is, moreover ,
fully r econcilable with the traditional characte r of al ayavij i'iana,
at least as soon as it had become t he ~ r y in the sense of a
kind of fundament a l layer of personality ( s ee 3. I I , especially
3. '1. 7- 8) .
Nor do I find that the fact that the charact erization of
alayavijiiana as "morally neutral a nd not obstruc ted [by Defile-
ments ]" (a1'livrtavyakrta) i s not met with in the oldes t sources
must Signalize a c hange in its natur e; 968 for s ince, as Suguro
).lA.2 3
- 154 -
points out,
alayavi jnana is, al r eady in the Basic
Section. of t he Yogicarabhlimi, characterized as "comprised in [the
category of Res ult-of- ]Maturation" (vipcikasaJ!Igrhita)970 and sin c e
what is vipcika is by necessity subsumed unde r t he (wi der!) category
of avycikrta971 in the sense of anivrtavycikrta,972 I f or one do not
understand h ow the use of t his
wid e r t e r m can indicate a
change
,
0 1 0 n g a
,
t h ,
m 0
r ,
,
p
,
c i f i c
t e r m ( viz. vipaka)
i , ,
ti l l a 1
,
0 u
,
e d
(., it
in f act
i,
in texts like the In my opi ni on,
it wa s merely for the sake of cIa r i fi e a t ion , i.e.
in or de r to expressly distinguish the moral indefiniteness (avyci-
krtatva) of alayavijii.ana from t hat of manas, that the
i ndefi niteness of the former wa s, later on,974 e x p 1 i cit -
1 y ma rked as ani v r t a (though this had always been
i mpli c i t in its vipaka nature) , i n contradistinct ion t o the moral
c ha rac t er of
v y ii k {' t a
manas
975
which had to be determined a s nivr ta -
c) As for
c 0 u n t e r e v ide n c e , it be
n oted t h at t he restri ction of alayavijiiana to non-saints is, to be
s ure, expressed in the Niurtti Portion of the VinEg 6.Lay . Treatise
(see 4. 9), but is not found anywhe r e i n the Basic Section. On
the contrary, t he Sacittika-and-Acittika BhUmil) expressl y states
t h at the only state i n which alayaviji'iana has ceased is Extinction
where n o "possessions" (i.e. s kandhas) remain
"I;1u),976 i.e. the state of the Saint (arhat) aft e r his death.
The f act that i n this way in the ol dest source, in cont r ast with
t h e later system, alayavijnana is not r estricted to non-s a ints
but ,
. , a mat t: e r 0 f c 0 u r s e , taken to exist in
Arhats , too, as long as they are still alive, makes it almost
cer tai n that alayavi jilana had , i n t he begi nning, a nature which
did n 0 <
conflict with the state of an Arhat , as Suguro ' s
hypotheti cal origi nal meaning would, in con trast to mine, certain-
ly do .
- 155 -
7 IB. I- 7 IB. 2
7. 18.1 It was only after the decisive pa r ts of the pr esent study
had already been written down that I discovered that, in
a later paper dealing with the original meaning of the term
,alayavijii.,ina',977 Suguro had proceeded towards an important modi-
f icati on of his vic,,', essentially anticipating, a s far as tbe
original meani ng of 'alayavijnana'
whi ch 1 myself had come to adopt
article, Suguro dis tin g u i
her i ted meaning of ' (Haya ',
is conce r ned J the
i n t he meantime. for
s h e s between the
viz. "Clinging" (fA.
Self" J
flI. )978
- or
position
in this
i n -
espe-
"t hat <0 dally in the sell se of "Clinging to
which one cUngs ,, 979 _, and a
ne .... , 5 pe e i fi e all y
Y ogac ara meaning which the ter m 'a7..aya ' came to adopt i n
(t:t _ ) . 980 Ac-
connec tion with iilayavijfiana, viz: . "sticking in"
cordingl y, he takes 'alayavijiiana ' to mean "the vijiiO.na .... hi ch
s tic k sin [the body]" ( 1tJ,*'-=f<t. t..'C 1, \ 9. )981 - a vie ...
whi c h is l argely (i . e. s ave that I s hould lay mo r e stress on the
nuance of hid i n g or being hidden i n the body) in agreement
with my 0 .,0'0 one, as is also the fact that Sugur o finds t his
or iginal meaning of ' alayavijnana ' corroborated by the explanation
of this ter m in Sarpdhinirmocanasutra V. 3
982
(see 2. 8), though I
do n o t sha r e his opi nion that t his origi nal meaning of
'alayavijiiana' i s not essentially di fferent from that of t he term
'aoonavijiiO.rza I 983
7.18. 2 Yet , in spite of this basic agreement, t ... o point s .... ould
s eem to r equire di scussion . The fir s t point is the
fac t that even in the above- mentioned paper Suguro still sticks ,
to a ce r tain extent , to his former vie .... of an initial phas e i n
whi c h alayavijiiana
c lear - cut concept
still in statu nascendi and not yet a
includes, or is at l east nothing but one
aspect of a n entity .... hich also includes, the aspect of eli n g -
i n g (to Sel f) . The 5 e con d point is the interpretation
and conclusiveness of t he passages from the Basic Section of the
Yogacar abhumi on whic h Sugur o bases his new (and, as already
stated , substantially acceptable) explanation of the original mean-
i ng of the term 'alayavijnana ' .
7 18. 2 . 1. 1- 71 B. 2. 1. 2 - 156 -
7. 18. 2. 1. 1 Suguro seems t o be of t he opinion t hat the desc ription
of death and rebi r t h in the Manobhumi of the Basic
Sectio1l
984
contai ns a kind of alayavij ii.ana theory in statu 11ascen-
di . According to him, t ho purport of thi s passage i, to teach
C 1
j
n g i
n
( to Self)
"
t ho c a u s

, and the (arisi ng
of a ne .... ) body or bas i s-of-personal-existence ( a t rna b h a -
v a
)985
"
the r e
, u 1
t
986
A,
for the relation of Ii 1 a -
y a v i j
-
n a n a to these two aspects, Suguro, declaring that
t he vagueness of t be text does not allo .... of any dec i sion, finds it
reasonable to regard alayavi j"ana as c o\"ering b ot. h sides,987
i. e . to be the vijnana .... hich is clung to a s Self (i .e. t he result )
as well as the vijiiij,na whi ch clings to Self (Le . the cause ), 988
L e . both the object and the s ubject of the function of Clinging
(to Self ) , both aspects bei ng i ncluded in the inherited Buddhist
meani ng of ',zz,aya I 989
7.18. 2.1.2 Yet , there is, in this pi ec e of text, only one single
occurrence of t he term ' ilayavijnana ' , viz . Y 24,
4f .,99
0
and i n this passage alayavi j ii.ana receives the same some-
what s t e reotyped c harac terization as a t Y 4, 7
991
a characte-
rization whi ch , according t o Suguro himself , 99
Z
does not give the
i mpression of a conce pt in statu nascendi but rat her of a kind
of fi r st s ys t ema ti c definition of a n already established concept .
Besides, al ayavijii.ana is, i n t his passage , unambiguously charac-
terized as [ Result-of-]M a t u rat ion (vipaKa) , i . e . r e -
suI t {of karman and Delight i.n .... orldly existence)993, but
n ot a s the c a use in t he sense of [ a state of mind
directly associa ted (saJ!1Pl'ayukta) wit h] the act of e li n g -
i n g ( to Self ) . Mor eover , even t his single occur rence of alayavi-
jnana is, as I have tried to show above,994 palpably heterogeneous
to its s urroundings and appears t o have been inserted - probably
by way of reus1ng the earlier parts duri ng t he process of the
compil ation of the Basic Section
995
- into one of the pieces of
earlier materials of whi c h the bulk of the text is composed . Since
thes e materials never use the term 'alayavijiiana ! but rat her a
numbe r of systematically r elated but less developed (and partly
- 157 - 7.18.2 .1. 3
traditi onal) terms ,996 they are obvi ously "pre- aiayavij iianic
ll
, We
are thus concerned with t wo diff e r ent stratal one of .... hich r epr e-
s ent s a stage of devel opme nt i n whic h the theory of alayavijii.,ina
had already assumed a clear-cut f orm, and another one which
consists of "pre- a layavijii.ani c
ll
materials, but none which s hows
alayavijfiana in statu rtascendi . For this r ea son , the materials of
this piece of text have, a s far as their original meaning i s
conce rned - and .... e are . i n t he present discussi on, not interested
in what they may have meant f or a compi l e r or redactor who was
active a ft e r the concept of alayavijii.,ina had already unde r -
gone s ys tematical definition - , to be i nt erpr eted by th e m -
s e 1 v e 5, and not on the basi s of the tacit presupposition
997
t hat the other concept s with similar s ystemati c function t hese
materials contai n were, fr o m the 0 u t set, conceived
of as quasi-synonyms of, or at l east a s more or less equivalent
to, alayavijnana.
7.18.2.1. 3 The se remarks hold good also f or the passage Y 26, 18f.
(equivalent s of
and
' bija ' , including ' 8atkaya ', 'tilaya '.
'a8mimiiruidhitJthana ,)998 to wh ich Su-
guro refers as evidence for a close connection of the c a u sa 1
aspect of alayavij iiana with Clingi ng to Self, 999 obviously i n the
sense that t he passage points to alayavijnana as directly associat-
ed with, i .e. as the su b j e c t of, t he act of Clinging
to Self .1 000
a) Yet , since 'alaya ' is a t r a d i t ion a 1 concept,
its occurrence does not by any means imply t hat t he passage had,
by itself, anythi ng to do with alaya v i j nan a .
ed with 'satkaya I, which usually means t he five
Be ing equa t-
wpdcLina- skan-
dhas,lOOl 'aLaya ' , too , will have to be unde rstood rather i n t he
sense of the f i
thing to whi ch on,
ve wpad
clings. 1002
a n a - s k and h a 8 as some-
This interpr etat i on fit s in with
ciLaya being, in our passage, also ident ified with up6ddna ( " that
to which one cli ngs
ll
).I003 It would al so be s upported by the
canonical basis f or the quasi-synonymity of '8atkciya ', ' prapanca ',
'cilava ' and 'upddana I, viz . by the fact that t hese t erms, 1004
7. 18. 21.3
- 158 -
a s vella s
the five
1005
5 k and h as J are used
as t he objective complement of expressions meaning "delight ing
. ) 1006
in" (- abhil'ata; -drama. - l"ata.. - saJTl1Tlutl'Lta. And in view of
the preceding sent ence it is additionally corroborated by the fact.
that d"Iaya is, furthermor e, identified with Suf f ering (du,;kha) j
f or t he preceding sente nce had stated that the Tathagat as have
taught that the whole bas i 5 - 0 f e xis ten c e
(sakata isS u f f e r i n g or uns atisfac t ory in
the sense of and had thus alluded to the
last sentence of the canonical explanati on of the Noble Truth of
Suffering. viz . that the f i v e u pad a n a - s k a n -
d h a. 8 are Suffe r ing, thus indicating t hat in this st r atum
1oo8
it i s not yet alayavijii.ana that represent s duJ;kha i n the sense of
but rather the five upcidana- skandhas, or the
basis(-of-personal-existence)
to 'titmabhava' 1009 which had
(al11'aya, a term largely equival ent
been used before
lOIO
) constituted by
t hem, or at l east by that part or a s pect of t hem which is
V
-k 1011
'Lpa a .
b) Besides, as thi s basis-of-existence is taught to be
Suffering on account of being stricken with ( - upagata)
o r h a v i n g the nat u reo f (- svabhQva) Badness
which i n its turn cons i sts of See d s (bi-
. ) 1013 " t b 1 1 L '
Ja , 1. ecomes p aus1b e that ' 6 aya , even i n the tradi-
tional sens e of the five upadtina- skandhas or basis-of-pe r sonal -
existence, can be listed as a quasi - synonym of ' Seed I (bija) :
because, at this stage of development , it is t he psycho-physical
basis-of-existence
, ,
a whole that i, regarded to contain
t he Seeds 1 and may even be called t o b e the
Seed( s) 10 14
i n
'0
far
"
the Seeds are not understood
"
separate
entities 1015
but
r athe r as designations of the fac t t hat the basis-of-person-
aI-existence its e lf is capable of producing its own future
development.
1o t 6
c) Apart from the fact that the passage under discussion
(viz . Y 26,1 8f. ) does not, originally, r ef e r to alayavijiiana at
all, it ... 'ould , even i f it did, only document the aspect of the
- 159 -
7 18. 2 1. 3
result or of the 0 b j e c t of Clinging (d'Laya and
upadana in the sense of satkaya), but hardly serve as pr oof for
the assumption that alayavijaana originally also included an
aspect of c a use in the sense of consisting in, or being
directly associated .... i th, the act of eli n gin g (to
Self). To be sure, being the source both of acute forms of
Suffering and of Defilements, have also a causal aspect . But this
has to be clearly distinguished from sanrwlayasatya proper, viz.
act u a 1 Clinging or Defilements . And what the passage wants
to indicate by equating d1.aya with 8 a t k Ii Y a d r I! t y
Q d h i {> t h Ii )1 a and is certainly not
that it is the basis of the notion of Ego in the sense of being
its "5 U b j e c t "
Such a statement, it is true, would not
be entirely wrong if tiLaya is the titmabhti"VQ because the notion of
Ego would of course arise within or on the basis of this dtmabhtiva.
But there would be no reason for stating tbis for and
Qsmimtina sol ely, because it holds good for al l Defile-
ments and even for good mental factors. Thus , the text
wants rather t o state that tilaya (i.e., according to my interpreta-
tion, the titmabhava) is the 0 b j e c t of the notion of
E
1017
go ,or , more precisely, the objective basis which 8atktiya-
d{'ti erroneously takes as Self or as one's own and to .... hich the
feeling of identity (asmimtina) refers; and this, special instances
apart, does not hold good for all Defilements and is thus
rightly stated .... i th s p e c i f i c reference to satkayat4'liFi
and Qsmimana. This interpretation is confirmed both by the explana-
- - - - -1 018
tion given in the Yogacarabhumi-vyakhya as also by other
instances of 'adhii;'thana I being used in a sense clos e to "ob-
ject". to19 What is more, t he text of the Manobhumi itself had, a
l ittle earlier, expressly taught that the basis-of-personal-exist-
ence (dtmabhtiVa) is conceived of by foolis"h people as 'I' or
'Mine' (corr esponding to satkayadNti) or in the form of "I am
[this ]" (corresponding to Qsmimana) , but is kno .... n by the Noble
. ) 1020
Ones to be Suffer1ng I i.e. that the atmabhava - .... hich
is qualified as containing all See d s in the adjoining
7.1B.2. 1.4 - 160 -
1021
sentences - is (in reality) S u f fer i n g but also the
objective basis of satkayadr'!lFi and
a 8 m i man a
26,1 8f. to mean.
which is precisely the same as what I take Y
7. 1 B. 2. 1. 4 1 . As for the commentary on the Paramarthagathas,
Suguro, i n his paper under discussion, realizes that
alayavijfiana, being comprised in represents the
aspect of result ( . ) only . l 022 But he still a sserts that the
text propounds, in the verses + comme ntary on spiritual practice
(dha:rmacal"ya) , 1023 a kind of central subject or depth layer ("8th
vijnana
ll
)lo2
4
consisting of one single vijnana whic h comprises
bot h the aspect of res u 1 t corresponding
to alayavijnana) and the aspect of c a use (samudaya-
central sub- )
1025
(satya) , corresponding to k1.i{lFaJTI . Thi s
ject comprising both alayavijiiana and kliFaJ!1 is, according
to Suguro, even the subject of practice, which attains liberation
by means of the pl"atipak{la 1026 _ a view which is in accordance
with the fact that Suguro takes the Paramarthagathas to teach t hat
Defiled Mind is non-different from "mind radiant
(i. e. pure) by na ture
n
(pl'a.lq>ti-pl'abhasval'W!'1 cit tam) . 1027
2.a) Yet, as I understand the text, it does not at all
support such an i nterpretation. The pertinent verses + commentary
do not, as Suguro suggests, focus on alayavijfiana and
as two aspects of one and the same (continuous) central
subject but clearly stress quite <he opposite point of view, viz.
<he fact that there is, in reality, n 0
,
u b j e c < neither
of "transmigration" (saJ?'1sal'a) nor of liberati on,
1028
neither a
person nor even a dharma.
1029
And, though using <he same term,
they do not speak of anything akin to the specifi c Yogacara
concept of kti{lFarr mana;, let alone a depth layer of mind of
which manaa and alayavijfiana are only two aspects.
b) To be sure, the commentary on PG 37
1030
mentions al aya-
vij fiana, but by characterizing it as Suffering and equat-
i ng it with the "lake" (aG1'Qs) to be dried up by spiritual
practice the author shows that he is, in this passage, concerned
- 16 1 - 7.IB. 2. 1.4
.... ith alayavijnana not as a central s ubjec t but as a representative
and source of mi se ry , and that he i s not interested in its con-
tinuity but in its eradication .
c) Similarl y PO 38 provided that I understand this
difficult verse correctly - f ocusses upon the false ness and the
ensnaring e ffect of the notion of ' 1,10
3
1 .... hi ch i s taught to r efer
to (wha t is in reali ty nothing but) Suffering Thus,
supposing that .... e are, in vie .... of t he pr eceding verse , act ually
entitl ed to equate, from the point of vie .... of the comme ntary. this
Suffering .... ith alayavijitana although the commentary . this
time, r efrains from expressly doi ng so, .... hat is st r essed i n PC 38
.... ould. once again , not be its funct ion a s a continuous entity i n
the conventional sense of a s e r i e s of let alone
its being an aspect of the subject .... hic h a ttains l iberati on, but
rathl:!;r its negative character : its ultimate u n sa t i s f a c -
to r i n e s s and its n ot being Ego - a point of view .... hic h
is in full agreement .... i th t he ti tIe of the verses , viz. "Stanzas
on Ul timate Reali ty" Ultimate Reality be ing,
in the commentary , express ly defined as "lack of Sel f in the sense
of Person" (pligata-nairatmya) . 1032
d ) Thi s point of vie .... is even radicalized in the subsequent
verses (PO 39-41, on unde r standing the "process" of l iberation
1033
)
the sole and emphatically expressed purport of which is to s ho ....
t hat there is - from the ultimate point of view, of course no
tl subject" which could be liberat ed, n ot even mind
let alone Sel f, and that therefore liberation cannot be unders tood
as a process proper happening to one and t he same
s ubstratum, as a transition of an identi cal s ubject from the s tate
of Pollution into the s tate of Purity. but rather a s are -
p I ace men t of a defiled (state-of- )mind by a n ot h e r
one whic h is pure .
1034
The (unexpressed) reason is, of course, t he
mom e n tar i n e s s of all dharmas, whi ch had
been st ressed i n the initial portion of the Paramarthagathas. 1035
De f i 1 e d mi n d being, from the ulti-
mat e point of vie"" a defiled mom e n t of mind , has t o be
7.1 8.2. 2. 1 - 162 -
regarded as arising and ceasi ng. invariably, together with t'he
Defilements
l036
(i.e. the mental associates - momentary they, too
- which constitute its being defiled). Due to its momentariness,
defiled mind cannot pre-exist nor s urvive the Defilements; it was
thus never free from t hem before, nor can it be f reed from them in
futu re, l 0
37
but rather it is defiled "for ever",
10
3
8
i . e . for the
whole of its existence (which, however, lasts but one moment ) .
Similarly, the pure (mome nt of) mind was not defiled before 1039
(because on accow.t of its momentariness it did not yet exist at
the time when the Defilements were there) and is thus pur e
by n at u r e (prakrtibhds var a) .1040
e) This interpretation of PC 39-41 is, as far as I can s ee ,
the only one which both fits the wording and yields a sequential
argument and is at the s ame time in full harmony with the general
purport of the Paramarthagathas and their comme ntary ; and in
keeping with it, 'kti f/t aJ?l f is clearly nothing but a metrical
equivalent of 'kLi{l1iaf[1 cittam' , which would mean any "defiled
[moment of) mind" in the traditional sense of sense-perception and
especially - manovijiUina.
1041
There is no indication in the
text , nor any need in the argument , for taking 'k1. il}taJ!! mana.;', in
PC 39-41. as r eferring to an aspect of the depth layer of mind
prefiguring the of later Yogacara dogmatics . 1042
Similarly, the pure mind which is "radiant by nature" is any
mom e n t
of supramundane (mano)vijnana in the traditional
sens e but does not involve anything like the prabha8vaJ'aJ?I cittam
of the Tathagatagarbha tradition or Paramartha's amaLavi jiUina.
7. 1B. 2. 2.1
c ussion
1. Another point in Suguro's interpreta.tion of the
Paramarthagathas and their commentary whi ch needs dis-
and this brings me to the second i ssue , viz. the
interpretation of the Yogacarabhumi passages on which Suguro bases
his new explanation of the term lalayavijnana
l
- is hi s interpreta-
tion of the term ' nive.a'ana' and its relation to alayavijnana in
the vicinity of which it occurs i n the commentary on PG
33( - 34) . 1
0
43 Suguro stresses the semantical closeness of 'ni ve.a'p-
na I and 'aLaya', s tating that both of them may mean "dwelling
- 163 -
7. 1B.2. 2. 1
pl ace , residence " ( [i.e ) as .... ell as "clinging to" ( ) a nd
"sticki ng i n" ( ft. ) . 10
44
Now, 'niveSana'is explained, by t he
commentar y itself, as 'dtmabhava- parigraha' which Suguro t akes, i n
t he present context conce rned with the formation of a ( new)
iitmabhdlJa, i.e. with t he r esult (Le . du};lkha(satyaJ) and not with
the cause (i.e . samudaya(satya) ,10
45
to mean "maintenan ce of the
body" C ) . 10
4
6 Hence he concludes t hat ' nivda-
na ' is, i n thjs pas sage, us ed in r;h e sen .se o r "stick LIl& in the
body" ( )1n./7 and that t herefore, 1.n view of t: he
equivalence of ' niveSana I and 'tiLaya ' , 'al ayavijriana' s houl d mean
"vijiitina which st i cks in the body" . J 048
2. Yet, t here are at least tvo problematic issues
involved here.
a ) One is that, as far as I can see , 'dtmabhavapapigpaha ' is
hardl y ever used in the sense of biol ogical appropr iation (imply-
i ng mai ntena nce of t he body) but usuallyl 049 ref e r s to the moment
of Linking up (ppatisandhi) and means lItaking possession of a
[new] (basis of) pe r sonal existence", 1050 t he ter m 'dtmabhdva '
being, in thi s connection, not r estricted to the body but used in
a broader sense incl uding, e.g . an existence i n t he I mmaterial
Sphere (drupya- dhdtu).
10
5
1
b) The second issue is the equivalence of 'nive.dana ' a nd
'dLaya ' . To be s ure , both 'nive6ana ' and 'ciZaya I can mean lI coming
to stick in" ; t he par ticiples and 'dUna I are i n f act
used i n Buddhist text s as quas i-synonyms in the sense of "sticking
\052
to". But the present passage poses problems f rom the syntacti-
cal poi nt of view . For it appears that Suguro equates 'nivedana '
with 'aLaya ' because he regards niveAana. as the (typical)
f u n c t i 0 n 0 f ii 1 a y a v i
iog t hat, in the sentence 'tad dhi
tenopaiti ppaparicitam', the pronoun
j i'i a n a on t he unde r stand-
(or tad(- ) vi- ) krtvci
'tad I . representing al ayavijna-
na, is the
l053
k r -
grammatical sub j e c t of 'ni ve San a '!l
(which i n thi s case i s best taken as a unifi ed verbal
expression) . This assumption is, however, not very probable and
would at any r ate be irr econcilabl e with the verse text, where the
- [65 -
7. 18.2 . 2 . 2
the question of the original meaning of the term, but he draws
attention, in this connection, to a passage from the Sravakabhumi
where net alaya v i j nan a but at least a t a y a occurs in
connection with alil"ayaaannivi{l'ta, i.e. sticking in the basis-of-
existence. The passage specifies one of the five f oremost charac-
teristics of a person not "destined" for Extinction and runs as
follows: \ 057
... pudgaLasyadita sarve-
aaruatha ea sQl"vabuddhail" apraha-
bhavaty anutsadya (Y
t
, Yel dura<nu>gata (Y
c
) pl"a-
/ . . .
Though admitting that the sequence of words, especially the posi-
tion of 'alil"ayasanniui{lt;a', to
5
8 is somewhat strange, I should ,
making a reasonable sense my guideline, propose the followi ng
translation:
"ln the case of a person who by nature will neve r attain
Extinction, ri 1. a y a t
r ?
ci
sticki ng in his basis[-of-
pe r sonal-existence ] from the very beginning,
i,
not at all, by
any means, liable to be abandoned and cannot be eradicated ,
[ not even] with [ the help of] a1l the Buddhas, [since it has]
deeply permeated
1059
[it] (or: permeated [it] for a long time)
[and] sticks [in it ] most firmly, II
Suguro suggests that we understand I as a syno-
1060 .
nym compound, means that the sentence would express the
idea that desire ,. ti1.aya sticks in the basis-of-existence (Le.
in the f}ag.ayatana or even in the body). My own impression is
rather that the expression ' a'Laya- tnl1:za I alludes
(
:-7 ) 1061 f .
al-ayQ1"ama panayCVJI paJa, etc. , re to
to MN I 167 -etc.
people as unable
to understand the salvific Doctrine and thus somehow related to
the of the present passage , At MN I
167, however, I should prefer to understand 'a1.aya' in the "objec-
tive" sense of "what one cli ngs to", i.e . the sense-objects or
sensual pleasures (kamagutuz) and ( one's basis of) personal exist-
ence (atmabhdva), l 062 Thus, in the present passage, too, ' aLaya-
7 . 1B.2.2.2
- 166 -
probably means "desire for objects-of-Clinging [like sensu-
al pleasures or (one's basis of) personal existence]".
This would seem to be confirmed, in substance, by a passage
. . Tlo63 h h' (t -)' t ht t
from the were T aug 0
arise, with regard to neither-painful-nor-pleasant sensations (or
what goes with them) , in the form of "continuous attachment to the
object-of-Clinging cons i sting in (the basis of) personal exist-
ence" t064 (*nityanubaddhQtmabhtivaLaya-sneha). If we understand -
as eh. (. .. miilitJ: ) appears to do - '6.Laya-sneha ' as a synonym
compound, it will not be easy to indicate a reason for the use of
the redundant '(Haya I because 'atmabhava-sneha I (which is actual-
ly met with at Y 18,21) would have sufficed. On the other hand, if
we start from 'a1ayaaneha ' as an expression related to the 'ataya-
pama ' , etc., of MN I 167 and take 'aLaya ' , like Tib . (gzi), in the
"objective" sense, there is good reason to qualify it by 'atmabha-
ua-' because in the present passage desi re for 0 the r objects
of Clinging, viz. sensual pl easures or sense-objects, is not
intended since they have already been dealt .... ith in the preceding
oentenoeo.l065 In ' - -
.. ... ., the ,:,ravakabhumi passage under discussion, how-
ever, 'iitaya'is
sense-objects. too .
n ot
qualified and should therefore include
If this i nterpretation of the Sravakabhtimi passage is cor-
rect , it would, to be sure, document that d e
,
ire
(t:r{lJ;Ui) l o6Sa
may, like Badness
(dau?thuLya) or the Seeds (bi-
J'a) ,
1066
be said stick in the basi s-of- personal-existence,
to
but
it would not prove the same idea for a Lay a .
Although I have thus to disagree ... ith Suguro as regards the
conclusiveness of the Yogacarabhumi passages he adduces in favour
of "vijiiiina sticking in [the body]" as the original meaning of
' aIayavijnana' , I am nevertheless convinced that his view is
substantially correct because it is supported not only by SalJldh
V. 3 but also by my InitiaL Passage from the Samahita Bhumi\) (see
2.1 ) of which, however , Suguro has made no use.
- l 67 -
I 7.2-7 2.2
1 . 2 In an attempt to contribut e to the solution of the problem
of the origin of a1ayavijfiana ( in the wider sense: cp o
I
\. 4),
y.
S a
, a k
. 1067
,
has presented a detailed investigation
of t he not i on of LI. p a d a n a and its relati on to vijiUina,
especially i n the concept of 8 0 pad a n a v i j nan am ,
in older Yogacara literature, in order to c l arify its i mpact on
the formation of the alayavijfiana theory.
7. 2. 1 According to Sasaki, the notion of vijnanam had,
in early (i. e. "pre- alayavijiianic " ) Yogacara t hought (main-
ly represented, in t hi s context , by the VastusaJIIgraha"i and t he
Abhidharmasamuccaya [ in so far as the l atter has preserved some
old materials] ), come
t aining Seeds ( bija);
sion" (adana) 1 068 of
to combine four distinct elements: 1. con-
2. leading to r ebirth or "taking posses-
a new exi stence; 3. appropriating (updda- )
corporeal matte r or t he material sense-faculties; 4. being defiled
Sasaki t hen ventures t he hypothesis that this defil-
ed vijnana contai ning Seeds was, i n view of its function of
taking possession of [a new existence ] (adana) and of biologic al-
ly appropriating [ corporeal matter] (upadana) , called r a d a -
n a
"
i
J
>i a n a L a t e
,
o n it r eceived the name of
a 1 a y a v i j n a n a
,
i n order to st ress the aspec t of
Defil ement, Le . Cli nging ( .. ), i ncluding Clinging to Self, as
Sasaki makes clear by referring to SUguro ' s (earlier ) view that
the or iginal meaning of ' alaya ' (in 'alayavijnana') wa s "Cling-
. S If" ( ) .l
0
7
0
f d d"
lng to e "'JJilM A te r war s, a anav .. Jnana and
alayavijfiana were made use of i n the context of unconscious s t ates
like nil'odhaaamapatti , and it was
only t hen that they
were
t r a n s f o r m e d into a non-defil ed neut ral (anivrta-
vyakrta) entity, s ubliminal a nd different from t he ordinary si x
kinds of v"Jnana , the defiled as pec t being rendered i ndependent
k!
' 1071
as ..
7 .. 2 . 2 I substantiall y agree with Sasaki ' s view i n so far as he,
t oo, r egards the or igin of alayavijiiana, as a kind of
vijna.na different from t he ordi na ry s i x, to be linked up with
7 2 . 2
- 168 -
reflect ions on unconscious states like nirodhasamapatti . But I
doubt if he is right in thinking that the t e r m was already in
existence b e for e , having first been used in an altogether
different meaning, viz. "mind [characterized by the subjective act
of] Clinging" . Such an alleged original meaning of the term is, as
has already been shown in 7 . lA. 2. 3,.. neither necessary nor
supported by any textual evidence and thus, t o say the least ,
handi capped by kaLpanagaurava.
On the contrary , if one follows the evidence of the oldest
sources in chronological sequence (see 1. 6) - as one will, in
the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary, certainly have
to -, one .... i11 have to start from the f ac t that the Basic Section
of the YogacarabhUmi contai ns only instances of alayavijnana being
associated .... ith up&iana in the b i 0 log i c al sense of
a p pro p ria t ion
ties (see 2.13.4, 3. 2,
to be s t ric t 1 Y
of the body or the material sense-facul-
and 4.4.1 ) . This function, ho .... ever, has
distinguished from 8 0 -
pad a n a I!l v i j Ii a n am. For although in the Va s tusat(lgra-
hal).i passage treated in 4. 3
1072
and adduced by Sasaki
1073
both
are declared to be functions of vijnana as Nourishment (ahara),
they are clearly distinguished as two d i ff ere n t func-
tions, and neither expressly nor impli c itly characterized a s mutu-
ally dependent or co-extensive. On the contrary, they are quite
obvious ly not co-extens i ve, because in the Saint (arhat)
vijiiana does still appropriate the body (in the sense of still
keeping it alive) but is no longer 8opddana
1074
because this term
always implies one I s being under the sway of Clinging or Defile-
ments and thus bound to be reborn.
Now, as already pointed out in 7.1A.2.3. c
J
in the Basic
Section of the Yogacarabhumi , the extension of alayavijnana cover s
also the Saint (a1' hat), as long as he is alive, and thus coin-
cides with the extension of upadana in the sense of biological
appropriation.
Thus, it is only the upadana semantically
hardly
equivalent to dtaya (see 2. 9) - .:hich is associated with alaya-
- 169 - 7.3 . 0
vijiiana i n t he oldest pe rtinent laye r of Yogacara literature,
whereas the spirit ually negative ki nd of upadana (as in sopcidrinarp
uijnanam) , whi ch c 0 u 1 d be s ynonymous with iiLaya, i s not
yet connect ed wi th it. This means that sopadaoo1Jl vijiidnam (be i t
direct l y or by mediation of the term 'ridrinavijnana') is ha rdly the
starting-point of the concept of ,il ayavij iiana but rather came to
influence it only at a somewhat later s tage of devel opme nt.
Actually, a kind of first step in thi s direction - mani-
fe sted also by a c hange of terminol ogy ( 'adanavijnana ' ) - can be
f ound i.n t he Saljldhinirmocana sll tra (see 4.4), but a theory of
alayavijfiana in which the word 'sopcidana ' is actually r eferr ed to
alayavijnana and in which the latter, be ing mi ssi ng in Arhats , is
act ua lly co-extensive .... ith 8opaddrlaJ[! vijnanam ( and not .... i th upddd-
na in the biological sens e) is only found in the Nivrtti Port ion
of the VinSg alay. Treatise ( 4.7). Even i n this text , alayavijna-
na is n ot d e f i 1 e d thus not identical .... ith
sopadantUp vijiiiinam in so far as this concept may involve direct
association .... ith actual Clinging.
All evidence thus telling, also from the point of view of
upciddna a nd vijnanam, against the possibility that alaya-
vij nana .... as e ver understood in the sense of a ct ual Clingi ng (to
Self, etc . ), the a ssumption that (kUl}tai[!) originated as
a kind of breaking a .... ay of alayav ijiiana I s defiled aspect does not
r eceive corroboration f rom this side either. What 'can, ho .... ever , be
said i s that in the Saci ttikabhumi-viniScaya ( 4 . 10.1) manas,
afte rwards, Seems t o have taken over t he rol e of alayavijiiana a s a
kind of principle of Pollution .... hich the close associa-
tion of t he latter with 8opcidcilUUl' vijfliinam had entailed in t he
Nivrtti Portion but .... hich confli cted .... ith i t s original funct ion
(see 4. 9).
7.3. 0 Another context .... hi ch has recently been exami ned as to
whether it may have played a decisive role i n the forma-
ti on of the alayavijiiana. theory is the exegesis of the canonical
stat ement that vijiUina and namarupa are m u t u a ll y depend-
73 1
- 170 -
ent .
- - 1075
I n the Hahayanasal!lgraha , thts mutual dependence is in
fact used as a proof f or the existence of alayavijiiana. As the
comparison of vijnana and ndmal'upa ... ith t\W reed bunches mutually
supporting
in mi nd,
each other shows J the canonical source the author
. - H - 1076
at least primarily ) 1-5 the Na4akalapikasutra .
has
Bu<
*Asvabhava's commentary makes us e of passages from other Sutras as
well , one of t hem stemming from the Mahanidanasutra ,10
77
the other
- 1078
from the Nagarasutra.
7.3. , In a recent contribution F. En 0 mot 0
1079
- obviously
realizing the importance of clarifying, in quest of the
origin of alayavi ji'iana, the earliest occurrences of this term in a
given context (cp. 1.5) has tried t o find out if t he
connection between the exegesis of these Sutras or the mutual
dependence of vi jiiGna and ndmaI'upa on the one hand , and alaya-
vijnana on the other, can be traced back to the Yogacarabhumi. The
result is l argely negative. In the exegesis of t he Nagarasutra
1080
- H - 108 1 ( - - -
and the Naqakalapikasutra and also that of the f1ahanidanasu-
1082
tra ) found in the VastusaIpgr ahaQi, alayavijfiana is not even
mentioned , let alone its being explicitly introduced as a means
for solving an exegeti cal or dogmati c diffi culty. The same is true
of an analysis of the twel ve-membered pratityasamutpada found both
i n the Va stusal(lgrahaQi
l083
and in the Savitarkadi-bhumi of the
Basic Section
1084
( henceforward: Pr>atity. Analysis) - a passage
whi ch includes an interpretation
viiiiiina and nQmarupa I 085 and an
of mutual dependence of
. 1086
bunch compa.nson. Nor does
express reference
alayavijaana appear
to t he reed
in another
passage of the Savitarkadi-bhiimi of the Basic Section concern-
ed with the exegesis of the mutual depe ndence of vijiitina and
ndmal"upalo87 and with the exegesi s of the Nagarasutra .
1088
What is
most important is t hat the conte xt of the mutual dependenc e of
vi jl"idna and nQmal"upa does not even figure among the proof s for
the existence of alayavijilana presented in the Pr>oof POI'tion of
the VinSg a!ay. Tr>eatise .
io89
Therefore, Enomot o s urmises that it
wa s only in the that this mutual dependence was ,
for the first t i me. made use of in order to prove the existence of
- 171 -
7 32
1090 The according to Enomoto, even
- \ 09 \
seems to have come i n as late a s *Asvabhava.
To be sure, this does not neces sarily mean that the context
of the mutual dependence of vijfidna and nGma'l'upa did not, even
earli e r , contain starting points which could be devel oped into, or
later on be connected with , alayavijiiana . Enomoto himself points
to the fact that in the P'l'atity. A11aLysia uiirni11a dependi ng
yathdyogam - on naman ( i. e. the immedia tely preced.ing moment of
vijiiana ) and 'I'upa ( 1. e . the corresponding material sense-facul-
ty) , even though ;t is expressly identified with the s ix (ordi-
nary ) kinds of uijritina , is said to arise , on this bas i s, a s
1 0 n

a s 1 i f e 1 a s t s
1092
and he t hi nks t hat such a ,
statement may, in the Mahayanasalll graha, have come to be realized
to i mply the necessi ty of assumi ng alayavi j nana,
10
93 e s pecially
when it came to be understood i n a s t ric t sense, requi ring
application even t o unconsci ous s tates l i ke nirodhaaamapatti .
1094
7.3. 2 According to Y. K a j i yam a howeve r , t he signifi-
c ance of the PTatity . AnaLysis for the origin of t he
alayavij ilana t heory is much greater. In hi s view - provi ded I
understand him correctl y - the exegesis of t he relation between
vijiiiina and namariipa played an i mporta nt if not t he decisive role
in the formation of the concept of alayavijnana, To be more
precise, what he cons iders as a major or even t he main cause of
thi s concept i s the problem of the implicit !' d 0 ub i i n g "
of vijiitina
I'Uiman 1095 according
on account of its being al so included i n
to a canoni cal defi niti on of n&nal'upa : 1096 a
problem that became particularly ac ut e in t he context 9f t he
III u t u a I depende nce of uijiiana and ndmal'upa 1 097 as expos ed in
the and, accordi ng to Ka jiyama, e s p e -
c i a 1 I y in the Nag a r a s u t r a ,
10
9
8
To be s ure ,
Kajiyama is a .... are of the fact that -:l-Asva bhava - whose comme ntary
on HSg J. 36 seems t o be the oldest document we possess for a n
expli c it proof of alayavijnana on the basis of the Nagaras utra
l 099
- is comparatively late;1100 but he expresses the opinion that the
argument may reflect the si tuation of t he origi n of alayavi jnana
733
- 172 -
because it is presented by *Asvabhava in connection with his
interpretation of Asanga I s proofs for the existence of alayavij iia-
U o l
na.
It is in accordance with this view that Kajiyama is inclined
to a somewhat different evaluation of th.e Pratity. Anatysis. To be
sure, he too, though hesitatingly,l102 accepts t.hat the pl'atisan-
dhipha1.a- or vipdka- vijrnina is, in this t ext, not distinguished
from the six ordinary kinds of vijnana., and is thus n ot yet
a 1 a y a vijiiana.
1103
But he finds it somewhat strange that this
vipakavijiiiina. at the moment of conception - which he regards as
sub lim ina l is identified with the ordinary vijna-
na8,
110
4
and h e th ' nk th t 't th f
sal. was er e ore, by way of fusion
with the continuous flow of subconscious Impressi ons (vasana) of
former thoughts and actions, t ran s for m e d into a contin-
uous subliminal entity different from the ordinary vijnanas , and
thus became sa't'vabijakaJr! viJrUinam, i. e. alayavijnana. 11 05
7. 3.3 Even cete'1"is pa't'ibu8, the mere fact t hat textual evi-
dence, at least explic it textual evidence, for a connec-
tion of alayavijnana with the cont e xt of the mutual dependence of
vijnana and nama'1"upa i s not found before the
and, as regards its being speCifically connected with the exegesis
of the Nagarasutra, even not before * Asvabhava, would seem to
render Kajiyama's hypothesis less probable than mine , viz. that
the concept of alayavi jiiana was introduced (in the st.rict sense of
1.4) i n the context of nil'odhasamapatti - an assumption for
which unambiguous textual evidence is available in the earliest
pertinent source (see 2 .1 ). There is no guarantee that * Asvabha-
va, in commenting upon the arguments of the Mahayanasalllgraha . has
always preserved the original meani ng or had r ecourse to ancient
materials only; it is quite usual for Indian commentators to
interpret the basic text in terms of their own ideas or at l east
of the philosophical or dogmatic developments of their own time.
Apart from this, as far as I can see, the context of the
mutual dependence of vijnana and namal"upa does not satisfy the
requirements stipulated i n 1.7 as perfectly as the l1i'1"o-
- l 73 -
)3 4-)3 4 1
dhasa.m5patti cont ext does. [ shall present my arguments, prelim-
inary though they are, i n t he follo .... ing paragraphs ( 7. 3.4 a nd
) 3 5) .
7.3. 4 Fir s t 1 y , l so far fail to s ee, in the context of
the mutual dependence of viJ'iiLina and ndmarupa and pa.rticu-
larly of the "doubling" of vijiiLina, a reason that made the
i ntroduction of a new kind of vijndna as imperative as in the case
of nir odhasamapatti .
7. 3.4.1
1 . To be su r e, in the latter case, too .. the earliest
Yogacaras seem to have simply kept, wit hout a ny sense of
difficulty, to t he doctrine of the Sarvas tivadins who maintained,
equally without a ny difficulty, that nirodhasamapatti is uncon-
scious (acittika) in the s trict sens e that in it all kinds of
mind (citta) and me ntal factors (caitta) temporarily cease to
arise . .l1 06 But their own ver sion of the Dharmadinnasutra (etc . ),
decisively diverging from that of the Sarvas tivadins by expressly
postulating the presence of vijnana in nirodhaaamapatti, soon
forced the Yogacaras to reconsider the matter and to introduce a
new kind of viJri6.na ( 2.3-4)
2. In the case of the mutual dependence of vijnana and
rnimarupa. the though amply discussing
the question .... hy, in the Nagarasutra.. pr atityasamutpcida a s the
pri nciple of origination-and-continuance (pravrtti) tl07 is not
carri ed on beyond vijri6.na 1108, do not seem to have felt substan-
tial difficulties either, at leas t as far as t he problem of
"doubling" of vijikina
ll 09
is concerned . They simply said that in
this context
11 10
nd'mQ1"upa means the four [entities attached ] to
.... hl ch mind persi s ts [in s aJpsara] (vijnanas thiti)l1 t l, i.e . the
r emaini ng skandhas
ll12
ex C e p t vi j Ii a n a
11t 3
. Thus , they
regarded,
eluded in
i n the present
_ t I 14
naman
context , vijnana as not being i n-
3.a. As for the earli est Yogacaras, I have to admit that
the statements on the mutual dependence of vijnana and namarupa i n
the YogacarabhUrni - some of which I do not find to be , in every
regard , clear and coherent - need mo r e car eful investigation. But
- 174 -
I fail to perceive any indication, l et alone explicit statement,
to the effect t hat the IId oubling" of vijiiana. ",as fel t to be an
inevi table consequence of the mutual depe ndence of vijnana and
ntimarupa or, at least, to entail s erious difficulties. For al -
though the pertinent passages do not deny that naman includes, or
even primarily cons i sts of, vijlitina
ll1 5
, at l east sOllie of them de
facto ( though not explicitly) avoid t he di ffi cul ty of a "doubling"
of vijriiina by i nt. er pr eting the mutual dependence of vijnana a nd
ntimal'upa less strictly than the Vaibha.$ikas (",-ho st ress s i multa-
neity) 1116; rat her . similar to ce rtain Saut r antika s
ll17
who denied
causal r elat ions be t .... een s imultaneous entities , II1 8 they distrib-
ute the mutual relation a s a whole, 111 9 or at least the correlates
vijriiina a nd naman, to d iff ere n t phase s of tim e .
b) As for the d e pe n den ceo f v i j n Ii n a 0 n
n a mal" U P a, one passage - closely follo .... i ng the wording of
the
- - - 1120
Hahanidanasutra - merely states t hat vijnana is dependent
on nWnal'upa in t he sens e that it comes to be established in t he
latter . 1121 Thi s statement might seem to imply a "doubling" of
vijnana.
11 22
but i n a more elabor ate exPlanation of the same Sutra
as well as in the closely r elated Pl'atity. the de pendence
of vijriiina on ruimal'upa - expr essly stat ed to obtain from Li nking
up 0 n '" a r d (*ppatisandhim upadaya
l123
) - i s rather stated
to mean t hat vijnana (i.e. the six ordinary kinds of vi jnana )
a rises on the basi s of, respectively, 11 24 t he
s i m u 1 tan e 0 u s material sens e -faculty (: pupa) and t he
immediately pre c e d j n g vijiiO.nc. ( = mana- indriya) identi -
fied with naman .
1125
0) I. t he case of the d
P
d e n c e 0 f n am a -
r U p a o v i j ri
"
n a , there is a ce rtain ambi gui t y as t o
whethe r the latter is taken to be 0) t he vijnana of t he prior
existence whic h. being under the sway of karmic Impressions. is
the caus e (hetu ) of the v1.Jnana at the mome nt of Li nki ng up
(pratisandhi- (phata- )vijiidna) 1126 and thereby of the namarupa of
t he new exi s tence , or S) t he pratisandhi- (phala- )vijiidna i t self,
or y) both of them1127 . In the f ormer case, 1128 viJonana clearly
- 175 -
pr e c e d e s namarupa . But - in contras t to
- i n some
-- - 11 30
Yogacarabhumi passage s even the
7 34 . 2
11 29
later sources
pratisandhi - (pha-
la- )vijiiiina would seem to admit of being understood a s pr e -
c e din g by one 1II0ment, the formati on of ncimarupa, of .... hi ch
it is t he condi tion (pl'atyaya) by way of taking possession of
[ pre-embryonic matter cons i s t i ng in1 s emen-cum- blood. To be s ure,
thi s namal'upa i s , in one pa ssage, stated not t o perish as long as
it is not devoid of vijnana, 11 3
1
but this i s, more probably,
merely a lax formulation wh e re namal'upa means matter in
s 0 far a s it is a p pro p ria te d by mind ,
i . e . I i v i n g co r p 0 r ea 1 matter.
d) In any c ase , the pertinent s t atements of the Yogacara-
bhumi, though occasionally somewhat impreci se, do not , at least
not necessarily, involve a "doubling!! of vijiiiina, l et alone indi-
cate a clear aware ness of unsurmountable difficulti es which might
have rendered the introduction of a ne .... kind of vijnana inevi ta-
ble . Such difficulti es were bound to ari se only under additional
re s tri ctions (e.g. that vijiiiina and namal'upa mu s t be, in a ccord-
ance with the r eed bunch simile, 11 32 s tri ctly simultaneous and
that naman has to include vijMna) , or when unconscious states
like nil'Odhaaamapatti c ame to be taken into consideration in thi s
context (as, however, does not seem to be the case in any of
the pert ine nt YogacarabhUmi pa ssages) .
7.3.4. 2
Even suc h a consideration of unconscious states would
not seem, ho .... ever , to have necessarily ent ailed the
a ssumption of a new kind of vijiiana . To be s ure , if the mutual
dependence of vijiiiina and namal'upa .... as understood i n a very s trict
sens e ,
i .e. as obtai ning a 1 .... a y s 11 33
in it s e n -
t ire t y it would have led to such a cons equence . But it
.... ould t hen likewi se ha"e entailed the exist ence of cor por eal
mat t er i n the case of beings living in the immaterial sphere (aru-
pyadhiitu) , as i s said t o have i n fact been accepted by some
schools or ma ster s like the Sarvas tivada t eacher Buddhadeva 11 34.
The earli est Yogacaras, however, .... ere content wi t h having, in
arupyadhiit u, vijiiiina based on (niiman and) the See d s of
7.3.4.3-7.3.44 -176 -
matter (rupabija) 001y.11
35
So one would have to show what prevent-
ed them from proposing a similar solution, viz.. corporeal matter
being based on the See d 5 of mind / in the case of nirodhasamd-
patti, by resorting, e g ~ to the theory that mind and corporeal
mat ter contained the Seeds of each other ( 2.5).
7. 3.4.3 Yet, one might suspect that the Yogacaras, in their exege-
s is of the mutual dependence of viiNirlO. and nama:rupa,
were forced to subscribe to additional restrictions by specific
elements of the wording of their recension (i.e. the Mulasarvasti-
1136 -
velda version) of the pertinent Sutras . However, as far as I
can see J
- 1-)
kalapika- ,
the Mulasarvastivada version of these Sutras (Na4a-
Nagara- and Mahanidanas utra 1137) 11 38 does not seem to
have contained any element whi ch might ha ve required or suggested
s uch restrictions and at the same time was missing in the version
of
th'
Sarvastivadins. In the
vastivada version
i, even 1
case of
e
, ,
the Nagarasutra,
strict than
th'
the Mulasar-
Sarvastivada
version, because, in contrast to the latter,
11 39
it simply stops
with vi,inana and states that the Bodhisattva's mind returned from
that point
1l40
but, lac kin g as it does the decisive
phrases
express
on the dependence of vi,iYuina on ndinar>upa,
m u t u a 1 dependence.
1141
does not
7.3.4.4
Therefore , my impression is that it was not exegetical
difficulties in the i nt erpretation of the mutual depend-
ence of vi,iiiiina and ruimar>upa that led to the introduction of
alayavijnana ; the latter was rather - enabli ng as it does a more
elegant solution - made use of i n this context only aft e r it
had already come to be int r oduced for some 0 the r reason; and
the various restrictions 1142 on which the conclusiveness of the
proof for the existence of alayavijfiana based on the mutual
dependence of vijiUina and nd"mal'upa rests would seem to have been
introduced somewhat wilfully precisely in order to turn this
dependence into such a proof.
1143
- 177 - 73.5-7 . 3.6.2
7. 3. 5 Sec" n d 1 Y , apa r t from t he fact, discussed in t he
preceding paragraph <7.3. 4), that in t he context of the
mutual dependence of vijnana and ntimarupa the introduction of a
new kind of vijridna does not appear to have been as impe rative as
in the context of nil'odhaaamapatti, it would also seem difficul t
to explain why, if, for all that, such a new kind of vijikina was
i n fact introduced i n the former context , it was called precisely
, a 1 a y a vijnana' . As far as I can see, this name would in thi s
connection make good sense only 'in t he s pee i a 1 context of
vijiitil1ll merging into (6aJ?H11Urch- ) (pre- )embryonic matter, i. e . of
vijnana at t he moment of conception (see 3 . 3. 1. 2-3 and 6.3. 2),
and perhaps also of vijrkina in the early embryonic state, but 1
s hould consider this viiii<ina to be, on account of its faintness,
a problem on its own, 1144 irrespective of whet her the mutual
dependence of vi;iiidna and namarupa was felt to pr ovoke exegetical
difficulties or not .
1145
7.3. 6. 1 In this connection, Kajiyama I s suggestion
l 146
that the
vipalro- or pratisandhiphaLa- vijiidna of the ~ a t i t y AnaL-
ysis may have needed reconsideration is qui te important. But I
doubt t hat the problems whic h he fi nds to be involved in thi s
vipa1cavi;iiiana .... ere also felt by the earliest Yogacal' as to suc h a n
extent as to become. so to speak, the igniting spark which - by
.... ay of fusion of this v ip<ikavijiidna with t he continuous flow of
subconscious I llI pressions (vdsand') or Seeds (bija) - led to its
transformation into a cont inuous sublimi nal entity different from
the ordina ry vijiidnas. Le, into Hi n d - con t a i n i n g-
a I 1 - See d s
Ka jiyama ..... ith
-1>. ) . "47
(sarvabijakarp vijiidnam)
a I a y a v i j nan a
equated, by
7.3. 6. 2
One of my reasons for doubt is that t he (admittedly
preliminary) inquiry into the only passage of the Basic
Section where alayavijnana occur s in the context of Linking up
(pratisandhi) (see 6. 3) does not furnish any clue f or the
assumption that it .... as actually in this context that alayavijiiana
7.3.63-7.3.6.3 . 2
- 178 -
was introduced for the first time, but rather creates the impres-
sion that alayavijiiana was, in this context , only mad e use
o f after it had already been established.
7.3. 6.3
Another reason is that I hold a somewhat different view
as to the nature of Mind-containing-all-Seeds (sarvabija-
kQl!l vijiiiinam) and its relation to alayavijnana:
7. 3.6.3.1 If I see it correctly, the Pratity. Ana1.ysis contains
a somewhat archaic doctrine of Seeds (bija) 1148 accord-
ing to which vijritina - still understood as the [mental series
constituted by successive moments of one or the other
l149
of] the
six ordinary kinds of vijiiana t 150 "approaches" or "follows"
( _upaga_ )115
1
karman,11
5
2 i. e . comes under its sway by being
somehow "impressed" by it so that it becomes the cause
t1 53
or
Seed
l1 54
of the (vipaka- ) vijiidna which is the initial .factor of a
new existence. At t he same t ime, it (or the Seed of the future
vijiidna) 11 55 contains the Seed of future ncima7'upa, and this Seed
of future namar>upa, in its turn, contains the Seed of future
etc.
11 56
This [series of ] vijiidna [moments ] loaded
with Seeds continues until death . 11 57 Thereupon
1t 58
it produces, in
the mother's womb, the viptikavijnana which is the initial factor
of the new existence and develops, step by step, into ndmal'upa,
etc.
1159
7.3.6. 3. 2 The re is no reason to doubt that the v'Cpa-kau'CJnana is
nothing but the first of a whole series consisting of
one or the other of the ordinary six kinds of vijiidna, 1160 which,
while probably continuing as vipcika for a time, .... ill. in due time,
again "follow" or come under the sway of karman (which. to my
mind, implies that it does not preserve the quality of vipdka
throughout life), and accumulate new bijas. According to some
passages of the text, 1161 such bijas as are not actualized in the
new existence conti nue to exist a
,
b
i j a s Thi s seems to
imply that the v i p ci k a v i j n a n a at the moment of
conception i n h e r i
t ,
the Seeds of the hetuvijiidna, at
l east those not yet actualized. and passes them on to the new
- 1)9 - ) 3 6 3 3-).3.6.3.4
existence, i.e. to imply that the vipcikavijiidna too contains
Seeds nay 1 1 Seeds, both t hose whic h, according to which
karman has become effect ive , are going to ac tualize themselves
during the new existence and those which are not going to do so .
7.3. 6. 3. 3
Thi s would mean that it is not too l arge a step from
this theory to t he notion of Mind-contai ning-all-Seeds
(sQrovabi jaka!p vijiianam) , which is considered to rece ive and pass
on the Impressions of karman and Def i lement s
1162
and a t the s ame
time expressly connected with the moment of conce ption
11 63
and
cha r acteri:ted as vipaka
l 164
j the lIlore so si nce there i s, as f ar
a s I can see, no clue suggesting that thi s Hind-containing-all-
Seed s wa s, before being supe r seded by and i ncorporated in alayavi-
joana, conceived as a new kind of vijiilina different from the
ordinary six_ Rathe r , it will , originally, have been nothing but
the se ri es of (ordina ry ) vijiilinas (including di m moments, as i n
the embryonic state) in so f a r as this series was regarded t o
contai n Seeds, 1165 or, more precisely, to take i n and pass on
(kamic Impressions turni ng into the) Seeds (of fut ure existence
and its arrangement)_
7. 3. 6. 3.4 If thi s i nterpr etation of sal'vabijakClJ!l vijiilinam is
correct, the de c isive step in the development is
n 0 t (os Kajiyama seems t o think) the trans ition from the
lJipa"'kauijnana of the Pratity_ Analysis to sa'l'tJabiJ-ak.arr vijiiiinam
but r a the r the transiti on from sa'l'vabijak.arr vijridnam to alayavijna-
na. Howeve r , the perti nent pa ssages of the Basic Section do not
- neither , as has a l ready been poi nted out ( 7.3.6.2), in the
context of Linking up (pratisandhi ) nor in the context of the
bijatJraya of perceptions and cognit i ons (see 6. t ) - appear to
provide a ny unambiguous cl ue which would justify the assumption
that t he latter s tep took place by way of a fir s t c rea -
t ion of the conce pt of alayavi joana j rathe r they tell in
favour of its having only been mad e u se 0 f aft e r it
had already been established. A derivation of a layavijnana from
sal"uabijakaI]1 vi,jiiiinam would thus be less probable than its origin
74
- 180 -
in the nirodhasamapatti context for ..... hich a passage satisfying
both the c riteria of 1 . 7 is available and would in any case
leave the 0'111.18 proobandi with him who advocates the former deriva-
tion. This .... a uld also hold good for the view that sQl"vabi,jakam
vijnanam was already clearly conceived (and not but dimly felt ) as
a neW' type of mind different from the
the introduct ion of alayavijnana was
ordinary
hardly
vijiitinas and tha t
more than gi v ing
sal"uabijakaJ'!! uijridnam a more specific nallle. Besides, even such a
renaming might involve a new motive, which would, once again ,
dissociate the question of the origin of alayavijnana in the
s t ri c t sense of J.4 from that of the origin of sarvabiJ'a-
kaJp vi,fiianam. And, ",hat is more, if, for all that, one would
adhere to a direct derivation of alayavijiiana from sarvabijak.cur
vijnanam, one should still have to explain certai n striking fea-
tures of the early alayavijilana materials whi c h would not s eem to
be easily deducible from such a starting-point: e.g. the fac t that
in my Initiat Passage ( 2.1) .ilayaviji'iana is stated to s tick in
the material sen s e - f a cuI tie s - and not , as would
be equally possible and as one would expect from the context of
mind at the mome nt of conception. in the bod y as a who l e
or" the st range lack of references. in the earliest sources, to
alayavijnana as containing the Seeds of (corporeal ) mat-ter (see
3. 13). whereas sarvabija1<cvr vijno.na.m, as the successor of the
vijrliina of the Pratity. Analysis (see 7 . 3. 6 . 3. 1-3)J will have
from the outset contained the Seeds of corporeal matter (nama-
rap a. q a 4 ayatana) also.
7.4
According to K. Y 0 k 0 yam a
1166
an important motive
for the discovery of alayavijnana was the question of what
i s the subject of saJl1.sara, but its direct and main caus e (iI"tt
11>.00 ) was rather psychological experience ( ,(.-11 ) or psycho-
logical analysis ( ,(', 111)-* ) in the course of y 0 g i cpr a c -
tic. 3-tiOJi!lJIl:tHtQ).
Apart from the difficulty how in this case the precise
n t u r ~ of the interact ion of philosophical or dogmatic speculation
- t 81 -
7.4
on the one hand and direct exper i ence or its psychological anal y-
sis on t he other would have to be determined, t he thesi s that
alayavijii.ana was f irst discove r ed in yogic experience (or i n the
s ubsequent concept ual a nalysis of s uch experience) needs textual
support, whi ch I for one do not find i n the oldest mat erial. It is
only in the Nivrtti Portion. of the VinBg dtay . '1'1'eatise - which
closely a ssociates .i.layavijnana and 8ad.ness (cp.
4. 7 2)
that .e find t he idea that .i1ayavijii,ana is, after
dar6an.amargo. , dir ectly experienced by the mystic a nd then made
into a ki.nd of collecting tank of Badness, ..... ith the aim of
dispelling or dissolving it by means of t he i nsight i nto True
Reality (tathata) . 11 67
Besides, we find, in t he Proof Portion of the VinSg aLay.
'1'1'eatis8, the idea that the existence of alayavijii,ana can be
inferred fr om certain bodily se n sat ion s 11 68 as weI} a s
fr om t he fac t that its cognitive fun c t ion s (cont inuous
perception of the corporeal basis of personal existence and of the
But surrounding worl d) are act ually e x per i e n c e d
11 69
at least the latter argument must be comparatively late since the
passage appears to i mpl y the concept of manas as another new kind
of vijnana .
11 70
Besi des, t he sensations and perceptions referred
to are obviously n ot m y s tic a 1 ex'perience but rather
some kind of background experience .... hich is not t he focus of
attention and therefore usually remains unnoted
11 7l
(cp. 5.8.2) .
I am not sure what kind of intuiti on N. Hakamaya has in mind
when he asserts that t he primary mot ive fo r the i ntroduction of
alayaviji\ana was i n t u i t io n ( ) i nto the cont inuous
flow of mi nd (called a'layavijnana) in its entirety
);117
1a
but since he takes this i ntuition to
be hidden behind ( C1) =-fi'-=t61b t:dl"C pt.: ) 117tb and pri or to ( J:
r;J 1t,: ) ll 71c any theoreti cal motive like the problem of the sub-
ject of salllsara, ll 71d it can ha rdly be (or at l east be based on)
a nything else but a kind of direct yogic or psychological experi-
ence, untrammeled by considerations of theory. Yet, as has already
been stated, there is no evidence for s uch an experience in the
7 4
- 182 -
Basic Section . In fact, Hakamaya bases his view on a passage from
- - 1171e
the
i ntuition) and on Sal[ldh
(which mayor may not involve such an
V. 7
117 1f
(which to my mind does not
contain any unambiguous clue to such experience) .
Therefore, 1 do not think that textual evidence supports the
view that the concept of .ilayavijiiana was derived from direct
yogi c or psychological expe r ience by way of a more or less imme-
diate verbalization and dogmatization of the
contents of such an experience. To be s ure, accordi ng to my own
hypothesis, too , alayavijiiana was derived from a certain yogic
state (v i:.. nil'odhasamapatti). but only i n d ire c t 1 Y
through the medium of add i t ion aId 0 g mat i ca l
and e x e get i cal fa c tor s.1 172
8.0-8.1. 1
8. Supplement I: Reconsi deration of some aspects of the methodo-
logy of exploring the hi story of early Yogacara literature
8.0 As the main target of Hakamaya's most stimulating article
"Methodological note on t he study of Ea rly Viji'iaptimatra
Literature" C" H 1977) is my own article on early Yogacara litera-
ture (viz. S t969), I may be allowed t o discuss a few of the
points rai sed by the article.
8.1. 1
The most se ri ous charge Hakamaya raises agains:t me con-
cenIs my decision to concentrate on the text of the Yoga-
carabhumi itself and leave aside II tradition" , 1173 i.e. t he i nforma-
tion, found i n Paramartha ' s biography of Vasubandhu and late r
sources as well as i n i ntroductory stanzas and in colophons, that
the Yogacarabhurai ( Y) was composed by A san g a or at least
"published" by him on the basis of a n i nstruction received from
the cel estial Bodhi sattva Haitreya.
1174
According to Jiakamaya,
s uc h a leaving aside of "tradition", implying lack of reverence,
is inadmiss ibl e .
11 7S
To be s ure, Hakamaya does not go so far as
Mukai who gives t he impression of advocating t he view that "tradi-
tion" (cri ticaHy sifted, it is true) ll 76 has absolute precedence
ove r textual analysis and that
wit h i n the limit s set by
seems to admit the i ndependence
the latter may only be applied
"tradition
tl

ll 77
Hakamaya rather
of textual analysis, but at t he
same time he advocates a kind of an i ntrinsic
val idi ty, of tlt r adi tion", t o be annulled only in case that a nd
only i n so far as it is co ntr adicted
l178
( by other
evidence, obvious l y including the r es ults of textual analys is). In
the present case, this may weli mean t.hat we are not entitl ed to
call Asanga the author (in the strict sense) of Y (because this
is contradicted by textual analysis) but that we h a v e to
accept that he wa, at l east its com p i 1

,
(because
t h i
,
m
u ,
h
i,
n 0 t at variance .. dth textual analy-
sis).
11 79
801.2 - 0
184
-
8.1. 2 10 cont ras t to this position, my own attitude towards the
historical reliability of "traditions". i.e. l egends,
e t c . . is rat her to be sceptical. Indian tradition t eems with
legends of little or no historical trut h and w-ith fal se ascrip-
tions of texts to f amous or purely mythica l author s t o an extent
that . from the his tor i cal point of vie..... scepticism
s eems to be j ustified
pI e
a s a m atter of p r inc i -
This does not mean that legends. etc . J have no evidential
value at all. They may . on the cont rary , be very val uabl e
document s , e .g. for l earning what , i n a given period or ambience,
a sai nt ly person's secular and s piritua l life was e x pe e ted
to. have been like , i.e . for understanding t he r eligious ide-
a 1 s of s uch a period or ambie nce . For these "t r aditions" were
not composed and transmitted as histori cal documents in
o u ,
sense, but mai nly i n order t o ext 0 I the achievements of a
s aintly person and t o establish hi s vi t a as a m od e 1
0'
ideal, and many an el ement .... i11 ha ve been added bona fide because
one thought t hat s uch a person
l i ved t hus or ac hieved that .
m u s t 0 f c 0 u r 5 e have
Traditions about a text and its a scription to a famous or
mythi cal author .... ill often be motivated by t he .... i s h to increase or
expl ain its authoritativenes s, especially .... he n the r eal author (or
authors) wa s ( or .... ere) not kno .... n .
11 80
Of cour s e, some ascriptions are certainly j us tifi ed, some
legends may contain a kernel of truth, especi ally i f they can be
traced back cl ose enough to the period of the putative author. But
even t he n we can, .... ithout additional , independent evidence, hardly
b,
su r e ( because, e . g . , l egendary el ements may a l ready have
arisen during a person's Ii f etime J or even been c irc ulated on
purpose by him himself ) .
Therefor e, I do i ndeed understand and , in a sense, respect
the r eligious attitude behind Ha kamaya 's pos ition that "traditi on"
c om pel s us to accept that Asanga .... as at l east the compiler
of Y; but as an out sider brought up in scepti cal Wes t ern scholar-
- 185 -
8.1. 3
ship (as well as in the historical vie ..... of things to which scep-
ticism would seem to be integral), I am unfortunately a l together
unable to j (} i fl' him in his position. For me, his view, resting
on the ass u m p t ion that, to this extent, "tradition" i s
reliable , can onl y be a h y pot h e 5 is . The question i s
whether such a hypothesis is h e uri s tic all y useful,
for it may blind one to the possibility that the process of
compilation of Y may, as it in fact appears to, have been more
complicated, involving several stages (cp . 1.6 . 5-7) . I for one
prefer to confine myself to the statement that it is p 0 5 S i -
b 1 e (perhaps even probable) tl 81 that Asanga compiled Y or, as
Hakamaya himself puts it i n a later art i cle,11 82 somehow partici.-
pated in its compilation (i.e. that "tradition" may, i n this case ,
in fact contai n a ke r nel of histori cal truth i n our sense). But
this possibility still needs v e r i f i cat ion and for
the time being I for one cannot exclude the opposite possibility .
A final decision , if at all possible, can i n my opinion be only
reached by further careful and unbiased investigation into t he
structur e, style. terminology (see 8.2) and ideas of the perti-
lt 83
nent texts themselves . Of course, these texts, too, a r e tradi-
tions
11 84
though not i n t he sense of transmitted documents
containing i nformation on some o the r text but only i n the
sense of transmitted document s ass u c h - and may t herefore
have undergone modifi cations after their composition. But as far
as I can see, it is probabl e that , in the case of most- early
Yogacara text s, this did not happen to such an extent that we have
to regard the situation - however complicated it may be - as
altogethe r hopele ss .
8.1 . 3 I do not want the preced ing remarks to be mi sunder stood as
advocating an uncritical , whole-hearted support of modern
Western scholarship or of Western attitudes in general, though
nowadays t hey are being adopted almost everywhere . The disastrous
either already come about or immi nent, of Western
science and technology and t heir application, e.g . nuclear war,
overpopulation, and pollution and devastation of nature , foreseen
8.1. 3
- 186 -
only by a few great minds, are now clear to anybody who is not
blind or biased. Even pure scholarship, dri ven only by the desir e
to know and to understand, is rightly c harged .... ith not having
considered , and still scarcely considering, and even belittling,
t he disastrous consequences of its discoveries . Therefore , even an
Indologist or Buddhoi ogist may come to ask himself ",'hether what he
is doi ng is benefi cial and not baneful.
As for benef it, t here are certainly more vi tal problems t han
f i nding out how, precisely, the Yogacar a system t ook s hape, and
how or by whom a certai n Yogacara text was composed . Yet, unde r -
s tanding the thought s of other human beings and t heir moti ves may
neve r be altogether meaningless . And for U s I
stri cken with
the "hi s torical sense" as we are, understanding will by necessi ty
include knowledge of how and .... hy ideas 0 rig i na t e d and
d eve l op e d and s uch knowl edge, in its turn, can, at
least in the case of t he Yogacara sys tem, hardly be dissociated
from a critical anal ysis of texts .
Yet such a critical anal ysis, though, unlike the dissection
of a nimal s i n ::oology or a nimal tests in medicine .. not doi ng any
physical harm to the ob j ect analyzed, will tend nevertheless to
call into quest ion the consol i dated sys tem of beliefs and e valua-
tions of a full -grown rel igious community, and thus may of f e nd t he
feeli ngs of i t s members or even undermine t hei r sel f-conf i dence .
The Yogacara school (and its Far Eas t e rn s uccessor, the Hosso
school) i s, however, ha r dly a l i vi ng rel igious sys tem anymor e . And
eve n if it were that (and some of it.s el e ments a t least, as e .g.
r everence f or its great ma ster s l ike Asanga , quite cl early still
have rel igious signifi cance even f or several contempor ary Buddhist
groups), one may ask .... hether it c ould jus tly cl aim not to deserve
to be dissected with the razor of critica l research .
For even t hough it is only due t o modern science and tech-
nol ogy that a ruthless ly anthropocentric civilization could con-
st ruct the means that have enabled it to aggravate its destruc tive
activities t o point of i mminent disaster , I am inclined to sub-
scribe t.o the view t hat, in a sense at least, the Fa ll of ma n goes
- 187 -
8.2
back to the neolithic revolution of domesticating animals and
plants. 11 85 The so-called world religions. especially i.nstitution-
alized Chri stianity, 11 86 can hardly be exonerated from the charge
of having, in various ways , paved t he way for the modern attitude
of ruthless exploitation of nature , in ..... hich they have been in
some measur e even actively involved. 'fa say the least, they have
not been able to prevent or s top it . Even Buddhism, at least in
Japan, but i ncreasingly in other Buddhist countries as "ell, does
not seem to have any sigi nificant effect in this regard. Though
Buddhi st tradition has always s tressed non-injury to animals and
even to plants,1187 it has, on the other hand, over-emphasized the
( undeniable) dark aspects of nature - impermanence, s ufferi ng,
greed -, and there
i,
hardly any incentive int rinsic to it to
actively promote the protection of animal s and plants not only
.,
i ndividuals but also
.,
s pecies,
1188
,.y
for t he mere beauty no
less undeniabl y inherent in them.
Therefore, .... hat is , to my mind, required is to recover or
re-integrate the "conservative" attitude of archaic religiosity,
or at least that curr ent of it to .... hich , as e . g . to the North
Ameri can Indians,11 89 t hi s ear this hoI y and essen-
tially to be preserved , along with all its species of animal s a nd
plants, its rivers and mountains . From such a point of view,
religions and religious elements are worthy of respect only i n so
far as they have preserved , or at least are favourable to, t his
attitude. But in so far as t hey have , by dissociating god (or the
absolute), man and salvation from nature, led us away from the
perception of the earth ' s holiness or have even promoted its
exploitation, their self-confidence des e r v e s to be thor-
oughly undermined.
8. 2 Against my attempt to prove the special position a nd chrono-
logical priority of Y ""ith regard to the r emaini ng works of
the ItMaitreya Asanga complex" by showing t hat several key
t e r m s (and doctrines) of the latter ""orks are not (yet) found
in Y, at least not in their technical meaning,11
9
0 Hakamaya
8. 2 - 188 -
ob j ects that I ha\'e wilfully chosen only such terms as were s uit-
able to prove my point, and that there are, on the othe r hand ,
also terms COlli 111 0 n to both Y and t he other works, and that
t hese might call f or a different judgement. 11 91
Of course I admit that the absence of such key terms does
not, by itself, necessari l y i mply c h ron 0 l og i ca l
p rio r i t y. It may al so be due to non-acquaintance with
sources us ing them or to deliberate ignoring. 1192 But i n t he case
of Y the absence of the terms in question seems, on the whole,
1
193
t o be due t o the chronol ogical priority of Y which I tried to
s how, in t he above-me ntioned paper , 11 94 by a comparative eval ua-
tion of related text passages.
Certainly J I do not pretend that my arguments have set tl ed
the matter in ever y regard and once for all , and 1 do not exclude
the possibility that my conclusions might require modification.
But r belive that, by produc ing some s 1 g n 1 fie ant
evidence, I have demonstrated the pro b a b i lit y of my
hypothes i s that Y i s, on the whole, pri or to the other texts of
the "Haitreya Asanga complex
tl
, and I tbink that this hypothesis
can.not be s ublat ed by pointing out t hat I have chosen my key te rms
to my convenience but only by adducing at leas t e qua I 1 Y
S i g n i f i ca n t c 0 u n t e r - e v ide n c e. Nolo', the
mere fact that there are also
does not prove anythiog; for
co m m 0 n terms and doct l' ines
o f c 0 u r s e it is ent i r ely
nat ural that t here should be various terms, even speci f ic terms,
11 95
common to a 1 I texts that belong to one a nd t he s ame school .
What would be conclusi ve evide nce disproving t he priority of Y is,
e.g., text passages in Y that can be shown to presuppose one or
several of the other works of the "Haitreya Asanga complex" ; or
key terms of the later Yogacara school occurring i n Y but missi ng
in one or several of t he ot be r works (provided t hat del ibe r ate
ignoring or othe r r easons for their non-occurrence i n these ,",'orks
11 96
can be excluded) ; or terms explained in Y in a more advanced
way than in anot her text of t he complex . But even such cases,
especially if in confli ct with other evidence, would probably be
- 189 -
8.3
conclusive with regard to the chronological r elation not of the
e nt ire texts but only of the corresponding passages, or , more
precisely, of the materials on which they are based,1197 the more
so as at least some of the remaining works of the complex (e.g.
the Hsien-yang-s heng-chiao-lun and even the Abhidharmasamuccaya)
do not lack compilatory features either. 11 98
To be s ure, common terms may J on principle J even serve to
show, or at least render probable, the ide n tit Y of the
author of several texts, provided that they, or a specific use of
them, can be sho .... n to be peculiar to
has been shown for
the author.
$ankara in
so to speak his
an exemplary way finger-prints , as
by P. Hacker. 1199
But such a method will hardly work in the case
of co m p i 1 a t ion , at least as long as the compiler
did not add much of hi s own. Besides, the method does not work if
one cannot establish contrastive evidence on
the basis of the works of closely related authors (as, e . g . ,
Surdvara and Padmapada in the case of Sankara). This, however.
would be quite out of the question in
literature
1200
if the traditional view
the case of early Yogacara
is accepted
in this complex, hardly any Sastra that is not
that there is,
by Asaitga - be
it direc tly or on the basis of Maitreya's instruction or inspira-
tion -, because no s uffi ciently close contrast material would be
available . In other words: What one might he inclined to regard as
a peculiarity of a si ngle author ( Asailga ) may as well be a
peculiar term or usage or doctrine of a whole g r 0 u p or even
of all early Yogacaras.
8.3 Among the key terms missing in Y is I a b hat a p a -
l' i k alp a ' 1201 Hakamaya questions the truth of this
observation on the basis of the apparent exception, pointed out
and discussed in my paper,1202 of Y
c
713h29 where Hs i.lan-tsang' s
version ( ~ J t , ~ l J ) suggests ' abhutaparikalpa ' whereas the Tibetan
rendering (log pat' yorla au I"t og pa instead of the usual equivalent
of abhutapat'ikalpa , viz. yarl dag pa rna yin po. kun tu t'tog pa) 120
3
poi nts to 'ttmithyapat'ikalpa '. Accord,ing to Hakarnaya the Tibetan
8. 4 - 190 -
rendering does not exclude 'abhutaparikaLpa ' because even in Ye
~ e s sde' s terminol ogy occasional devia tionS f r om the norm can be
found.
1204
But i s it not much more probable that Ye es sde ' s
translation is, as usual, accurate and t hat rather Hs uan-tsang it
is wh o, not perceiving any material difference, rende r ed ' *mithyd-
parikatpa ' by the same equivalent he uses for the familiar term
'abhutapaI'ika1.pa ' ? Surely this is the natural conclusion i n vie ....
of other Y passages , collected by Yokoyama, 120
5
where HsUan-tsa ng ' s
demon str ably
parika1.pa ' but t o other terms l i ke
Of course , it is not altogether
corresponds n ot
simple ' vikaLpa ' or
to 'abhuta-
'parikatpa ' .
imp 0 S 5 i b 1 e t hat, i n
t his case, Hs iian-tsang is, contrary to what is usually the case,
more precise than
imp rob a b 1 e
Ye ses sde J
and the
but t his is ext rem e l y
onus probandi ... ould t herefore be
i ncumbent on him who advocates this l atter position. And even if,
i n the present case, Hsilan-t sang ' S version were in fa ct prec i se
a nd Ye ses sde ' s abe rrant, this one exception in 600 Taisho pages
would hardly impair the observation that the term ' abhiitaparikal-
pa ' is virt ually absent in Y.
8 ~ In order to furthe r s ubstantiate hi s reserves agai nst my
method of attempti ng a cl assification of early Yogacara
liter atur e on the basis of the presence 01' absence of typi cal
terms and doct rines, Hakamaya al so discusses my interpretation of
t he defini tion of gun y a t a in AS 40, 10_ 16 .
1206
I had used
t his definition as a s uppor t for my observation that many pa r ts of
t he Abhidharmasamuccaya do not express or presuppose t he Yogacara
theor y of the non-exi stence of externa l objects or the Mahayana
vie.... of the empti ness or ultimate unreality of dharmas a s
sue h but only t he tradi t ional doct r i ne, sha r ed by most Sravaka-
yanists , of the non- existence of a per manent Self ( atman ) ,
120
7 To
Ha kamaya such an i nterpretation of the passage seems to be entire-
ly unjustifiable. As the matter i s excellently suited for demon-
strating how different attitudes (e.g . with regard to "t raditionll )
entail diffe rent ways of understanding or even obser vation (i.e.
- 191 - 8.4
form different heuristic points of departure), I may be permitted
to restate my view
he has elaborated
in contrast to Hakamaya's interpretation, which
. 1208
in a later art.lcle, confirming that he
considers t he definition of AS to be basi cally in harmony with
that of the BodhisattvabhUmi.
1209
To be sure, the pattern ' yad yat1'a nasti . .. I with ... hich the
passage starts i s common to both texts (as also to several other
early Yogacara works) and is, as is well known,1210 inherited from
the (Skt . version of the) Ciilasuiiiiatasutta. 121 I But nobody can
reasonably deny that the inte rpr etations dif-
fer considerably, at any rate in their wording, but in all
probability also in t heir content (see below) .
As for the Abhidharmasamuccaya, its explanation
that s k and has, tiyatanas and dhatuB (i.e.
clearly says
t he dharmas)
are empty (liunya) in so far as t here does not exist , in or among
them, a permanent, unchangeable
l212
Sel f (titman) or Mine (titmiya,
i . e . a nything which such a Self would permanently p 0 s -
s e s s ).
121
3 Although such an asserti on is altogether tradi-
tional,1214 nay, canonical,I21
5
Hakamaya adds the statement that
o f c 0 u r s e these skandhas, etc., though i t see m s a s
i f they were, provisionally, affirmed, are [in reality) merely
like a lump of foam, etc . . because they have no peculiar or
inherent essence ( @:f{O'J*1f ). 1216 Accordingly, Hakamaya under-
stands the naiT'titmya, which is taught by the text to be "that
( )
1217
which is left over there" Le . in the skandhas, etc . , to
mean the lack of a fixed essence ( ), 1218 i.e . ,
obviously J d h a l' m a nai1'otmya, although the wording of the
text itself suggests that nai1'otmya, contrasting with atman and
titmiya (cp. also the subsequent oppos ition *titmano 'bhtivo nai1'at-
mya8ya ca bhova.,) 1219 J does not mean anything else but tradi tion-
al (i.e. p u d gaL a - ) nai1'otmya .
In my opinion, j t is advisable not to interpret the text in
a Mahayanist sense merely because, guided by the tradition t hat
Asanga was a Mahayana teacher} one e x p e c t s h1m to propound
Mahayana tenets only; surely one should k e e p tot h e
8. 4 - 192 -
wording of tbe text instead, mar k .... hat it actually
says. be astonished if this does not fit in .... ith one I s expecta-
tions, and not too readily interpret it away but keep it i n mind
and find out whether it is isolated or, on the contrary supported
by further evidence.
In the present case, such further evidence is, as I ha ve
shown,I220 in fact available . One additional case is precisely the
explanation AS itself offe rs for the (canonical!) 1221 compa rison,
alluded to by Hakamaya, that the s kandhas are like a lump of foam,
etc. According to AS,1222 this refers to the a b sen ceo f
a S el f , the absence of purity, the fact that they give
little pleasure, and their instability and pithlessness . No doubt,
this interpretation is, again , traditional, for even the fact that
the s kandhas are instable and pithl ess is nothing but the tradi-
tional emphasis on impe rmanence and substancelessness, and does
not nec essarily involve dharmanai plitmya.
To be sure, after the definition of discussed above
AS adds a not her def i ni tion in which three ki nds of
emptiness are di.stinguished and
(parikalpita, etc. )
122
3. Again,
referred to the three evabhdvae
Hakamaya 1224 takes a Mahayanist
interpretation for granted, and moreover states that the three
kinds of emptiness as presented by the text seem to exactly
correspond to the three aspects i nv olved in the canonic al formula
(viz . what is absent, where it is absent, and what remains). But
though such a correspondence appears reasonable one s hould realize ,
once again, that the text itself does not at all e x -
simply j u x tap 0 s e s pre S S such a parallelism but
(yan = *api khatu} 1225 this second defi nition of without
explicitly stating or even indicating any relation of its elements
to those of the canonical formula of the preceding def inition .
Beside s, though the terms of the second definiti On of junyata,
including the three avabhavaa, are no doubt of Mahayana proveni-
ence, one still cannot but noti ce that the text does not make
the Hahayana ontology they suggest e x p 1 i cit by a corre-
sponding explanation.
1226
Nay, in anothe r passage,I227 a similar
8.4
- 193 -
set of terms is unambiguously interpret ed in terms of traditional
d
' . - 1 1228 1 h h h .
P w 9 a " a - M1-l"atmya on Y. a t oug t IS set too 1 5 no
doubt of Mahayana origin , stemming as i t .does from a Mahayana
source I viz . the Mai treya chapter of the Large Praji'iaparamita
( Byams zus kyi l e 'u). 1229
To be sure, in a later passage
1230
of AS the three 8vabhdvas
occur i n the context of interpreting the essencelessness of all
dharmas as taught in Vaipulya , i . e. Mahayana. In s uch passages,
the Mahayana tendency of the author is undeniable. But in other
passages like the one under discussion, any observer .... ho. in an
unbiased .... ay, keeps to what t he text itself e x p 1 i cit 1 y
states cannot but admit that the author , even when using Mahayana
t e r m s does his best to a v 0 i d specifically Mahayana
i n t e r pr e tat ion s, seeming to prefer r ather defini-
tions acceptable t o Sravakayana r eaders too, i.e. definitions
based on doc trinal element s common to both vehicles (for pudgala-
nairatmya is, of course , accepted by Mahayanist s too ) . Thus, i n
spite of the common use of the canonical formula ( .... hich of course
does not pr ove anything because i t was availabl e to any a uthor of
the school), the e x p 1 a nat io n of this formula i n .AS is,
not only in its .... ording but also i n its contents, essentially
different from its decidedly Mahayana interpretation in the Bodhi-
sattvabhlimi. I have to refrain from discus sing, on this occasion,
the question .... hether this difference i s such as to alIa.... the
conclusion that AS and BoBh must have been composed by dif f erent
authors, I 2
3
1 but. anrway it can hardly be used to prove t he
identity of t heir author.
9 . l-9 . 2
- 194 -
9. Supplement II: Preliminary analysis of the Proof Portion
9.1 A closer inspection of the arguments in the Proof Portion of
the VinSg 6.1ay. 1'r'eatiae reveals that they do not all of
them start from the same pres uppositions. Proof v (see n. 630)
clearly seems to presuppose that man a 8 had a lready been
introduced as another ne.... kind of IJijiidna J since it mentions an
(at l east largely) continuous cognition of "I" (aham iti
accompanying eve r y perception or cogni tion of a n objec t ,
which I for one (against Ui 1965. 341) cannot refer to anyt hing
but the ne .... manas (cp . also H 1978, 24f . ). On the other hand ,
proof vii (see 3.2.1 + n. 227) is obviously not aware of maMB
.,
another ne. kind of viJ"iidna (.,
is, by the ....ay, also true of
Y
t
,;
!ohl-6),
1232
for at least as far as is
concerned (cp . n. 220 ) the argument .... ould clearly be i n -
C 0 n C 1 u s i v e if the new manas had already been introduced ;
cpo al so
Uj
1965, 731 j Hakamaya's criti cism ( H
1978, 24f. ) does
not convince me, for the fact that the text is concerned .... ith
proving the existence of alayavijnana , and not of the ne .... manas,
does not alter anything with regard to this inconclusiveness. In
view of the al'chaic character of the argume nt on the one hand
(i . e . the fact that it is fairly c l ose to my Initial Pas sage) and,
on the other, the curious "interc alatedness " of most of the
references - fairly f ew, at that - to the ne .... manas even in t he
PT'avrtti Portion, 12
33
I for one am convinced that especially in
this case the new manns is not taken into account not because it
.... as deliberately ignored but rather because it had not yet been
introduced "'hen proof vii .... as evolved, at any rate in s ubs tance .
And I find it highly probable that the same thing holds good for
the other proofs (except proof v) a s .... ell.
9.2 In a preliminary .... ay, L should di vide the proofs of the
Proof Portion of the VinSg iilay. Treatise into the follo .... -
ing groups:
- 195 -
9.2
AI. Proofs i (upatta) , vi (kayiko vii (acitte samapat-
ti), and viii (cyuti).
These proofs are all concerned ..... ith what one may call the
"somatic" aspect of alayavijiiana: its functio n of appropriat -
ing the body at the moment of conception (La-c) j of keeping
it appr opriated, as a whole ( Ld) and throughout life (i.e),
even in uncons cious absorption (vii); of maki ng its presence
in the body felt by corporeal sensations even in the absence
of tactile sense-perception (vi); and of gradually abandon-
ing the body at death (viii). All these functions are either
already expressed in the Ba8ic Section of the Yogacarabhu-
mi or they are organic devel opments (cp. 3.3. 2.2 and
3. T. 1) keeping to the same conception of alayavijiiana and
not presupposing the Sarpdhinirmocanasutra and its innova-
tions (see 3.8.3ff.).
A2. Proof iv (bija)
This proof is dissociated from the group At by being wedged
in between the other two gr oups, viz . B1 and 82. [ t i s
unrelated to At from t he point of view of content also,
since it is not concerned with the "somatic" aspect of
aJ.ayavijiiana but with its function as the Seed (bija) of
or di nary forms of mind , based on the argument that the
latter cannot be one another I s Seed . From the point of view
of doctrinal development, however, this proof, too, does not
seem to go, substantially, beyond what is already found in
the Basic Section, viz. the neutral (auyakrta) alayavijnaoa
as the Seed or of good, bad and neutral pravrttivi -
jnanas ( 2. 1; 2.1 3.1; 3 . 13.1j 6.1j 6. 4 ) , present even in
the states where the latter are interrupted ( 2.1 ; 3. 2 . 2).
BI. Proofs ii (adi) and iii
These two proofs do not prove the existence of alayavijiiana
but rather the fact that several vijnanas can arise simul-
taneously, and this would seem to pr esuppose the system
of SalJldhinirmocanasutra V (see 3.8. 3) . At any rate, the
present gr oup of proofs is . in this regards, on t he same
9.2
- 196 -
level as Sattldh V and de cisively advanced over t he situat i on
met with i n the Basic Section (see 3.8 .1) .
82. Proof v (karman)
Thi s proof is, fr om t he formal point of view, cl ose to t he
group Bl ) for it too is presented in proof not of the
existence of alayavijnana direc tly but rather of the s imulta-
neity of several vijnanas. But on the other hand it i s
separated from B1 by t he intercalation of A2 ( : proof iv ) .
Moreover, it does not, a s pr oofs ii and iii do, pr ove the
simultane i ty of several vijMnas by referring to (alleged-
ly) ohvious cases in the sphere of pravrttivijii.anas, but
does so rather by pointing out the Simultaneity of expe ri-
ential phenomena of which s ome - viz. the (at least largely)
continuous perception of the s urrounding world and of one ' s
corporeal basis (see 5. 6 . 2) - most pr obably (cp. n. 631a)
have t o be directly referred to alayavijiiana. Proof v would
thus seem to differ from group 81 i n that it could equally
well have been used as a d ire c t proof of the
e xistence of alayavijiiana . Moreover , the concept of alayavi-
jiiana as an a c t u alp e r c e p t io n goes not only
beyond the Basic Section of the Yogacarabhiimi but even
beyond Sal[1dhinirmocanasutra V a nd
l
as regards percepti on of
one IS corporeal basis, even beyond the Sal[1dhini rmocanasutra
as a whole. Hence, and also in vie ..... of the fact that it
obviously pres upposes the new mana8 (see 9 .1) ..... hi ch i s not
yet found in the Sarpdhinirmocanas utra (c p. n. 942). proof v
r epresents rather a stage of development quite c lose t o t he
PPavrtti Port ion.
AI
A2
.t
.2
i
iv
ii iii
vi vii viii
v
- 197 -
10. I
10. Supplement III: Mystical experience
9
elimination of a layavi-
jnana and the question of i n the ilayavijna-
na Treati se in the beginning of the
10.1 In t he Niv"{'tti Portion (see n. 226) of the VinSg
Treatise (see 1. 5). t he process of elimination of alaya-
vijnana is described as fol10w5:
1234
,,@12
35
This alayavijiiana whi e b is thus
l 236
the root of
Pollution s hould be unde r stood to cease through t he cultivation
of the [ spiritually] whol esome f act or s
l 237
BaJ'!'kLdamu-
LasyasydLayavijnanasya
l 238
vinivrttir veditavya yaduta (?)
tadharmabhavanayd ).
@ In the case of ordinary persons who strive for the
s t ability of mind by means of [ a consisting
i n] a contemplat ion t hat has mind (pravrttivijna-
na) for it s object , t hi s cul tivation of wholesome factor s has
the result that [ s uc h a person f inal ly] attains, for the first
time, Full Comprehension of (t he) Truth (s) ca kuaaladhar-
mabhtivand prthagjaruin&p pravrttivijriiindlambanena manasktirel)a
cittaathitYaPt haJ!1 prayuJ"yamandn&p aatyabhiaamaya-
.
@ [But i t does Dot yet immediatel y entail the cessation of
ilayavijnina ; ] f or [a person] wh o has not yet seen Truth
wh o has not yet attained
(*apl'atilabdhacakvua) to [per cei ve] the
t he faculty of
[four Noble]
vision
Truths
( L e . not yet attained cannot ha ve penetrating
i ns ight ("'pl"ati vidh-) i nto ilayavijnana containing all Seeds
[ , much l ess can he eliminate i t ].
@ When, after having cultivated such prac ti ce (*etJal!! pl'ati-
[ t hi s person] has acquir ed guarantee of Salvation
(*aamyaktvaniycimam avakranta) either as a Sravaka or as a
Bodhisat tva and attained penetrati.ng i nsight ('*pl'atividhya )12
39
into the True Essence (dhal'madhdtu) of a l l dharmas , then he
10. J
- 198 -
attains penetrating i nsight (pratividhyati) into alayavijnana,
too.
On this [ occasi on] (?), 124
0
he views
J241
all [ con-
stituents of] Pollution (saJ!!ktda) i n [ their] entirety(?); he
[then] personally pratyatmam) experiences himself t o
be [on the one hand] outwardl y (bahirdhd) f ettered by t he
fetter of objective phenomena (nimitta- bandhana). and [ on the
other' hand] i nwardl y (adhydtmam) by t he fetter of Badness

Si nce alayavij iiana contains ( At s , : is) the element (s}
(dhatu, i. e . Seed(s of all these [various] kinds (?) of
condit i oned factors (saJ'!1skar-a) comprised in [pollutive] proli-
feration
1242
1243 he concent r ates [ them]1 244 in ala-
yavijnana, lumps [them] together , makes [them] one heap ( there ]
(>tekadhyam abhisaTfIk{Jipat!/ ekllf!l purijam ekalp radiJ?f karoti) 1245 ,
@ After having made [them] into one heap ("'ekGIJI
krtvd) , he Transmutes the Basi s pal"iuartayati ( ? by
means of continuous cultivation of
1246
insight which has True
Reality for i ts object (>ttathatdl.ambana(sya(?) .onan(asy(?)Jdse-
vandnvuydd bhdvananvayat) 1247.
@ As soon as t he Bas i s is Transmuted ("'sam::znantaY'aparivrtt e
ddraye (1 1248, a layavijnana can be declared to be [de finit ive-
l y ] abandoned
@ OUe to [ alayavijiiana ) being abandoned , all [ constitue nts
of] Pollution (saI!'kteda) , t oo, can be declared to be abandoned."
8 de Ltar na
l249
kun nas non mon.s pa'i l"tsa ba kun g2i rnam
par des pa de ni 'di 1249 ttal"
12
49 dge ba ' i chos bsgoms
1250
pas rnam
1249
par
l249
tdog par rig par bya ' o //
12
5
oa
G dge ba ' i Ch06 08gom
1251
pa de yari so so ' i skye bo sems
gtzas par> bya ba ' i phyir ' jug pa ' i r>nam pal' ges pa ta dmigs pa ' i
yid to byed pas br>tson par> byed pa ni 1252 / de'i dan. POr' bden pa
mnon par l"tOg8 pa ta ' J'ug par bya ba ' i phyir sgom
t 253
ste /
- 199 -
bden pa ma 12 53a mthan ba bden po mama 'l.a
prts ni kun gti l'tzam par 4ea po sa bon thams cad
par mi nU8 pa ' i phyir PO /1
10 .2
mig rna thob
pa 1254 l't ogs
@ de de ttal" iugs Airi nan thos kyi yan dag pa iiid 8kyon
med pa ta lugs sam I byml chub sems dpa ' i yan dag pa nid 8kyon
med pa ta 2Ug8 te
1255
eho8 thams cad kyi
l256
eh08 kyi dbyirla
l"togs pal' byed pa na I kun 92i f'nam par gee pa yan ptogs par
byed de. I
@ del' kun nas non mons po thams cad la yan dag par ' dUB
par' bUa ( read Lta ?) ziti I de nan gi 80 80'i bdag iiid to. phyi
1'0l. 9yi mtshan rna ' i 'chin ba dan / nan gi (p1O.S nan ten gyi
'chin bas bdag ri id beine par l'tO(}S 1257 pal' byed do II
@ kun gzi rnam pal' Aea pa m:1258 'du byed kyi 1'J1am po
(?}
12
5
8a
apros par bsdus pa de dag 1259 thams cad kyi khama
1260. " h I k ~ ~ 126 1 .
pa y't.11 pa 1.. P y1,1' un (}n l'7llV71 pal' Sea po 1.0 get-g tu
sdud
1262
po dan / gci(} tu BPUna po 1263 dan / gaig tu 80(}8 pal"
byed de /
. gcig tu bSagB1263a nas de b:in iiid la dmigs pa'i 4es pas
(?) 1264 1<un tu bsten
1265
ain goms pal' byas pa 'i rgyus gnG.S
'gyur bar 1265a byed do II
r:;::-, 1266 , .
~ g'I1Qs gyuro ma thag tu 1<un gZ'L rnam pal' 4es
par 1267 brjod pal' bya ste I
pa spans
de spans pa ' i phyil' kun naB
par
1268
bl'jod par bya 'o II
iion IIl?ris pa thamB cad kyan
10. 2 The above passage was discussed by A. 0 s a k i i n an
article entitled "What i s meant by destroying the Al.aya-
viiiiana?II.
126
9 According t o Osaki ' s interpretation, t he perception
of alayavijnana means "not to grasp, not to see, .. . , not to c ling
to the object of cognition outside the Mind II , in the sense of
V i j ii apt i m at r a v a d a 1270 _ a state i n which " the
a 1 a y a v i j ii a n a sees not t he object but the s ubject , t he
alayavijiia.na itself". 1271 And lito destroy the alayavij iia na
10. 3. 1
- 200 -
means to cut off the two types of adherence {grahya, gl'aha-
ka ... ),,;1272 it "does not mean to dest.roy t.he a1ayavijflana it-
self" but only "to destroy the seeds . . . of afflictions and false
knowledge" .
12
73
10.3.1
In the parallel passage MSA XIX.51,1274 inSight into True
Reality is, to be sure, qualified as being free from
(fl'ahya a nd grahaka. But these terms do not occur anywhere in the
VinSg dray. TPeatiae, nor is there, in this text , any mention or
indication of vdiiaptimatl'ata.
1275
1. Ac cording to statement @ of the passage translated in
10.1, preparatory spiritual practice consists i n , or at least
includes , contemplation (manaskcira) having p r a v r t t i v i -
j fi a n a for its object . Preparatory practi ce consisting in
contemplation of mind is described in the VIIIth chapter of the
In this text, contemplation of or concen-
tration on the con t e m pIa tin g
min d itself
( which is, of course, a special form of con sci 0 u s mind,
hence of pravrttivijnana) is taken
Tranquility 1277 which is
or stabilization (sthapana) of mind
to be or to prepare
defined as stability (sthiti )
(citta) .12
7
8 Alternating with
Discernment Tranquility finally r esults i n the compre-
hens i on of True Reality in the form of viiiiaptimiitl'atci, 1279 and in
Sarpdh VnI. 37 . 2
128o
(with which statement @ of the Nivrtti
POY'tion may even be genetically connected) 128 1 thi s comprehension,
too, is called "stability or stable dwelling (*sthiti or *athcina)
[of mind)". It would thus be tempting to interpret the contempla-
tion of pravT;'ttivijiiana and the "stability of mind" in statement
@ as implying the doctrine of vi.Jnaptimatl'ata. But it is a
striking fact that the text nowhere uses this term. Indeed, @
may just as well be interpreted in a different way . For pre para to-
ry practice consisting in contemplati on of mind
h
,- k b h - . 1282 I h
t e r a v a a u m ]. . n t loS text,
is also found in
the contemplation
which has contemplating mind itself for its object realizes the
t ransitoriness, etc., of the latter,128
3
and hence is, to be sure,
- 20 1 - 10 . 3 .1
not Tranquility (6amatha) but rather Discernment (vipa6yarni) , and
its ai m i s the removal of gr oss asmimtina .
1284
But since this
asmimana is the last obstacle to Full Comprehension (abhisamaya)
of the four Noble Tr uths and since this Comprehens ion includes t he
aspect of Tranquilityl 285 ( i. e. stability of mi nd), the s tat ement
of @ that the contemplat ion .... hi ch has pravrttivijnana (i.e . the
contemplating mind itself) f or its objec t i s pr actised for t he
purpose of stability of mind (*citta- sthiti) would not be incompat-
ible with the ( " pre-idealist ") system of the eithe r .
The 1II0re so si nce the aim of t his practice is , in @' e xpress ly
s pecified to be t he attai nment of gat y a b his a maya,
a t r a d i t ion a I term which nobody will , in the absence
of explici t additional evidence t o the contrary, refer t o anything
hut the Full Compr ehension of the f 0 ur N 0 b 1 e T rut h s
(jn fact alluded to in !) or, at best, to ins ight i nt o
unon-analyzed Truth" i.e. tathata,
which i s not necessarily t o be interpreted as vijiiaptimdtrata,
' II 1 ' h - - bh- ' 1286
Stl ess t e Yogacara um1-
2. a) In , the text quoted in 10. 1 mentions the t'oo'O
f e t t e r 5, viz. nimitta- and As this
pair of terms is first met 'oo'ith in the Sal(ldhi nirmocana sut ra but
does not seem to occur in the Basi c Section of the Yogacara-
bhumi, 128
7
it would not seem unreasonable to interpret, in t his
connection, t he term ' nimitta' against t he background of Mahayana
"ontology" , i.e. in the sense that all external phenome na , being
{at l east co- )conditioned by SUb jective concepts (vika'l.pa), are
ultimat ely i '1 1 u s 0 r y. Since may even be take n to be
somehow conne cted with VIII. 37. 3,1 88 one may even be inclin-
ed to understand the term ' l"Iimitta ' as implying t he doctri ne that
phenomena are vijnaptimiitPtl, i. e . nothing but i mag e si n
mi n d ; 1289 the more so si nce thi s view had been alluded to in
the preceding sente nce of the Sut ra .
129o
But once again the latter
presumption, at leas t , is not corroborated by t he wording of
nor by the use of the te rm 'nimitta' i n other part s of t he
Yogacar abhumi.
129 1
And once again , t he idea of objective or exter-
103 1 - 202 -
nal phenomena (or thei.r characteristics) as a f e t t e r
(bandhana) ... ould seem to make good sense even from a traditional,
Sravakayana point of vie ... . For to apprehend, i . e. pay attention
to, the c ha racteristic features (nimitta) of the objects of percep-
tion may cause the intrus ion of unwhol esome psychic s tates, 12
9
2
and
th'
external phenomena are liable to arouse ... rong attitudes like
129"
notion of "mine". .) Thus. when a passage of the Basic
Section states t.hat mind is tied to objective phenomena or to the
specific feature s of object.s (lIigaya- nimitta) by t he fetter of
pe rception/cognition (vijiiapti - bandha) , 1294 this may be under stood
to point to t he danger of distraction
l 295
and of t he arising of
wr ong attitudes or Defilements, which are in fact taught, in the
subsequent sentence of that passage,12
9
6 to t i e the mind - s till
tighter, one may add - to t hese obj ects by t he fetter of Sticking
to t hem (abhinille6a).
b) It is perhaps i n this sense t hat ye t another s tat ement of
t he VinSg if Lay. '/'Peatise admits of being i nterpreted, I297 vi z .
t he statement t hat manovijikina i s said to be based on man a 8
because as l ong as manas has not ceased, it (sc. manoviJonana) i s
not freed from t he f etter of cognition with regard to nimitta8
1298
(Leo from bei ng fette r ed, by cognition, to nimittas) . For belief
in and attachme nt to Ego implies belief i n and attachment to an
e n t it y - exper ienced or imagined, but anyvay a nimitta (in a
br oader sense includi ng a ll data of e xperience, imagi nation
or conceptualization) - with wh ich the Ego is identified. The r e-
fore , as long as manas, consi s ting in or associated with subtl e
Clinging to Ego , does not stop f unctioning, manovijnana i s unabl e
t o entirely transcend attachment to entities , and t his holds good
not only for t he Mahayana way of transcending entities the m -
s e 1 v e s (and hence attachment to them) by pe net r ating into
their essencelessness through a t ran s p h e n 0 men a I
(animitta) and transconceptual e x. per i e n c e
it holds equally good for the traditional, Sravakayana i nsight
into impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and non- ego-ness - an i n-
sight which does n ot , to be s ure, t r anscend, here and now,
- 203 -
10. 3. 1
t he e x per i e nee of enti ties but at any rate entails
overcoming a t t a c h men t to them and the realization of
the e x ee l len c e of NirvaQa-after-death a s a state in
which t heir experience too will be transcended.
1299
3. Even the fact that i n another passage of the VinSg cilay.
Tl'eatise
l 3oo
alayavijnana is stated to be the root (*mala) '"
c a use (skyed par byed pal not only of living beings (sattuato-
ka) including their
but
material sense-faculti es and
even of the ext ern a 1
bodies (*sa-
w 0 r id
(bhcijanaloka) does not necessarily imply that corporeal matter, or
even the external world , is viinaptimcitl"a, Le. nothing but a
mental image; for the statement is equally well explicable by the
fact that alayavijnana . containing all Seeds, contains also the
Seeds of k arm a n .... hich, as is .... ell-known, even accordi ng to
Sarvas tivada Abhidharma 1301 partic ipates in the produc tion or at
least differentiation not only of the bodies of living beings but
also of the exte rnal .... orld . Such an interpretation is, after all,
strongly s upported by a passage from the Abhidharmasamuccaya
l302
.... here both living beings and the external world are taught to be
di fferentiated by karman , viz. by common (sadharal)O.) and peculiar
karman , r espectively.1
3
0
3
4. When the VinSg ciLay. fioeatise states that alayavijnana
operates by means of a twofold object, viz;. and
1304 thi s does not necessarily i mply t bat we
have to follow the i nterpretation of a later a uthor like Vinitade-
va 1305 and to take uiJ'ilapti in the sense of *nirbhcisa/abnasa/prati-
bhiisa (snan ba) or ciKara (rnam pa l, which would in fact mean that
corporeal matter and the external world, a s t he object of alayavi-
jnana, were nothing but mental images in alayavijnana , and would
thus imply viiiiaptimcitl"ata. Instead, it is equally possibl e to
understand uijiiapti i n its t raditional meaning, viz. as the
act of "making kno .... n", of cognizing or perce iving these ob-
jects
1306
.... hich, in the absence of contrary evide nce, are, as a
matter of course, to be taken as really exis ting outside cogni-
tion. In other ..... ords. I should prefer to understand the passage to
10 3 2 - 204 -
mean that- "alayavijiiana operates by means of a twofold object
(or: 1307 from the point of view of object, alayavijiiana operates
in a double way); viz. a s
and as a perception of
a perception of upadana
the e x t e r n ~ world ... ".13
0
8 The more
so since in the case of the concluding resume of the subject
matter
1309
this appears to be the a n I y natural i nterpretati on .
10.3.2
Thus , the text does not express or unambiguously indicate
vijiiaptimatl'atii . Nay, it even seems to take parti cular
care to a v 0 i d such terms and statements as would unequi-
vocally express Mahayana ontology i n g e n era I .
Even i n the expression 'parikaLpita-svabhiivdbhinivda-viisa-
nii',1
3
10 the term
'pa'f'ikaLpita-sv ab hii va '
though generally referring to the Mahayana view that all things as
they appear , and eve n d h arm a s as they a r e conceived, are
merely imagined, can also be interpreted in a traditional (Sravaka-
yana) sense as referring to the imaginary notion of a Self
(
t ) 131 1
a man .
Similarly, tat hat ii13
12
and d h arm a d h a -
t u
t 313
, though, to be sure , mostly used in the Mahayana sense
of True Reality implying d h arm a nai1'atmya, are traditional
terms which even i n Yogacara philosophy do not exclude the aspect
of p u d gaL a nail"atmya, a nd hence may ... if required, also be
understood in this sense . Actually, insight i nto dhal'madhatu is,
in the text, obviously equivalent, among other things, to attain-
ing a vision of the [four Nobl e ] Truth!!: , 13
1
4 and is thus perhaps
to be interpreted in the sense of insight into the "non-analyzed"
(*avyavastfap)ita: see l o . 3. 3.3, a) equivalent of the l atter,
i. e . into nai1'iitmya, which in the case of Sravakas probably1315
means: into p u d gal a nail'atmya. That insight into dharmadhii-
tu is, in our text, intended to be common to both Vehicles is
evident from t he fact that it is expressly connected with acquir-
ing guarantee of Salvation (samyaktvaniyama) as a Sodhisattva 0 r
k
1316 1317
as a 5 r a v a a, And a little bit later the state of
lacking (i.e. having eliminated) alayavijiiana is expressly attri-
buted to Buddhas and to Bodhisattvas not liable to turning back
a s w ell a s to A r hat s and to Pratyekabuddhas.
- 205 - 1033
10. 3.3 1. For this reason, and also as a matter of principle, Io'e
s hould not, to my lIi nd , lightly i nte rpret our text
on the lines of 1 ate r sources and developments . We should
even r efrain from internal over-systematization (which
may easily go beyond what the author or compiler himself Io'as alo'are
of) . We should rather keep to what the text actually says and take
it seriously , and first try to understand, as far as possible,
each passage b y
utmost caution, to
i ts elf
c los ely
or, at most , by resorting, wit h
r e 1 ate d
l 31B
materials.
2. In this sense, we simply have to accept that the text
() declares that, as soon as the p['QCCSS Q( the
Basis is completed (i.e . at the moment of attaining Arhatship),
alayavijiiana its elf is abandoned , and not merely emptied of
unwhol esome Seeds but. preserved in some other form j i.e . ..... e have
to accept that. alayavijiiana is, in the Niv{'tti Portion, e s -
, e
n t i a 1 I y bound up Io'ith , or even nothing but a hypostasis
of, Badness (daulJtchul.ya.) .
1319
The pro b 1 ems that would
seem to arise from such a position
-
e . g . ho ..... , after the extinc-
tion of a1ayavijiiana, physical life can continue at al l (espec:ial-
1y in nil"odhasamO.pa.tti: see 4. 9), or what would then be or
contain the Seed(s) of the pravrttivijiianas - were, so it appears,
simply not envisaged by t he author/compiler.
3. Moreover , the text does not furnish any clue to Osaki ' s
view that alayavijnana is perceived b y its e lf. The text
only states the bare fact t hat alayavijnana is not perceived
before insight into dharmadhdtu (@), Le . dardanamarga, has
been attained, and that thereupon the yogin, after having lumped
together all constituents of Pollution (sQl]lkLe6a) in alayavijna-
na [by realizing (? )
that ] it contai ns the Seeds of all of them
(@), gradually dispells it by means of repeated practice of
insight which has True
j'l'iiinam) () . the text
of i nsight .ilayavijiiana
Reality for
does not
its object (tathat{HambanalJ1
say by w h i c h kin d
is perceived, nor h ow ,
insight which has True Reality for its object sublates
na . .
prec isely,
alayavijii.,i-
103.3
- 206 -
a) As for the first question, viz. by w hi e h kin d
o fin s i g h tal a y a v i j nan a i s
e d (for the first time), it may be to the
attention to the fact that the text. in an earlier
perceiv-
point to call
1320
paragraph,
states that aJayavijnana, containing (or consisting of) all Seeds,
is by nature d U Q k has a t y a in that these Seeds are
Badness in the sense of subliminal unsatisfactoriness
and thus constitute 8Ql[1skal'adu1)khata, i.e. dl.i1)khata in the essen-
tial , ultimate sense .
1321
Alayavijflana would thus necessarily be
included in the content of Full Comprehension (abhisamaya) of
Truth . not so much, to be sure J of non-analyzed Truth (*avya-
vQsth(apJita-satya), Le. dhal'madhcitu or tathatd,1
3
22 as of Truth
analyzed [into four] (*vyavaBth(iip)ita-aatya) , i.e. of the four
Noble Truths , Full Comprehension of whi ch is, according to some
other passages of the ViniScayasalpgrahal}1 , 1
3
23 regarded to be
something like a subsequent analysis of the insight into tathata
or non-analyzed Truth. There is no indication t hat this Full
Comprehension of Truth is not, as usual, an insight associated
with manovijnana.
b) As for the second question, i.e . how insight whi ch
has True Reality for its object sub 1 ate s uayaviji'iana,
one should remember that alayaviji'iana is not
is also the cause of sam u day a a a t
only but
ya
1324
(especial-
ly of the kLel1as) in that it contains (or consists of) all Seeds
also in so far as they are Badness in the sense of latent
w i c ked n e s s; accordingly, uayaviji'iana is, in a sense,
itself part of samudayasatya,1
3
2
5
constituting its deepest layer;
and as such, it is not only (a part of) the content of Full
Comprehension of Truth (or its subsequent analysis) but is also
sub 1 ate d by it (or by its repeated cultivation), more
precisely by insigbt into tathata, i . e. non-anal yzed Truth (*avya-
vasth (ap) ita-satya) , which our text , like some other passages of
the VinicayaSaTIlgrahaQi,1
3
26 seems to regard as that which actual-
ly effects the eradication of Defilements along with their Seeds
(i.e . Badness).
- 207 - 1033
Yet, one may still ask how. pre cis ely. it is that
i nsight into tathatc:i brings about the elimination of Badness or
alayavijiiana . Our text (..@)s u ggests t he idea
that. in t he form of their Seeds, i.e . Badness (dau(f{:huLya) , all
constituents of Pollution are, so to speak, piled up in alayavijna-
na like a heap of fuel , and that insight into True Reality is
somehow a p p lie d to this heap of Badness like fire to the
fuel and finally burns or dis solves it to not hi ng, I 3
2
7 thereby
destroying alayavijiiana whic h is , in most of tbe Nivrtti Portion,
hardly anything othe r than t his heap of Badness.
1328
In t he paral lel passage in the Mahayanasutralankara, 1329
t his "application" of tathatc:ijnana to Badness seems to be even
conceived of as a cog n it i v e act: when non-conce pt uali z-
ing insight i nto r rue Real ity [at t he same time ? ] directl y per-
c e i v e s the "heap of Badness,,1 33
o

it leads to the extinct ion (k(faya) of the latter. Yet, precisel y
how t his idea has to be underst ood and whether it tallies with t he
intention of the VinSg c:iLay. 'J'r>eatise would requi r e f'Urther in-
Vestigation which is beyond t he limits of the present essay .
11.1
- 208 -
11. Supplement IV: Two Remar ks on t he St r ucture of the
Ni vrtti Port ion
11 .1 According to the f i nal resume of t he Nivrtti Portion, 1331
establi s hing alayavijiiana as the root of pollution (sa!!'"""
kleSamula) 133
2
i s to be f ollowed by establishing [its cessation in
terms of] *pr aveSa- p1'ativedha- bhdvana- manaska1'a- vyavasthana ( ' jug
pa dan 1'togs pa daJ.! bsgom pa l 333 dan yid La byed pa rnam par
,
gzag pa; Ats .: < 1I:Ji: ?) .@}..iliI'fW-n::. ). In t he Ti betan t rans-
lation, "manaska1'a i s taken a s t he last element of a four-member-
ed dvandva. Although it appear s that this i nte rpre tation depends
on some specific exegetical tradition of our t e xt , l 334 it would
seelll to pr esuppose a rat her uncommon use of t he term 'ronaskara '
as specifically denoting the consummate stage of bhti-
VGnd'mcirga .
1335
Mor eover, i n contrast to the other terms which can
be located in t he t ext proper of t he Nivrtti Portion in the same
sequence as i n t he r esume , 1336 the t e rm 'manaskli1'Q ' does n ot
occur i n t he text proper at t he point whe r e one would expect it
if it were i n fact i nt ended, by the concludi ng r esume, as a f ourth
step of s pirit ual pr actice, i . e . a ft e r b 11 Ii van Ii .
Rather, bhdvand is i m m e d i ate 1 y f ollowed, i n the text
proper, by the
t i 1337 which

final r esult . viz. Ii S l' a yap a l' i v r t -
i n t he fi nal res ume follows *proveSa- prativedha-
bhdvand--manaskdra a 5 an item o n i t s ow n. On t he other
hand , doe s occur in c l ose connect i on with t he
f i r
,
t item, vi z. *pl'aveSa, the text pointing out that
w i t h t h e aim 0 f e n t e r i n
(or atta i ni ng)
abhisamaya a specific m a n a 8 k Ii l' a i, practised.
1338
In
view of these facts, r prefer n 0 t to follow the Ti betan
r enderi ng of t he expression *pl'aveSa- prativedha- bhiivand- manaakii-
1'a - nor Paramartha's dichotomic i nterpretation
l 339
- , but to take
"'manaskcira a s the final member of a d e t e r min a t i v e
compound > to be connected with each of the
i n t he sense of "contemplation (manas klira )
precedi ng items > i. e .
[ aiming at ] attaini ng
- 209 - 11 .2.1
(pravda) [Full Comprebension of, i.e. penetration i nto, Truth],
contemplation [consisting in] penetration (pl'ati vedha) [ i nto
Truth ] , and contemplation [ consisting i n] repeated cultivati on
(bhavanli) [ of this insight penetrating into Truth]" . This would be
in accordance with the terminology of other parts of t he Yogacara-
bhumi 1340 where the term 'manaskara I, with the corresponding quali-
fications, is actually used with reference to different stages of
tbe who 1 e Path of Liberation . for
question, such a n interpretation of the i tem
the passage here in

bhavana-manaskara implies a t rip art i t e arrangement, cor-
responding
the Path
to the Preparatory Path 8ambhal'a- a nd ?) pl'ayogamal'ga ),
of [first ] Insight and t he Path of
Cultivation (bhavanamal'ga) . Such an arrangement is in Repeated
fact easily verified i n the pertinent part of the text (see
10.1: 0, @,134
1
and (1), r espectively).
11. 2. 1 Yet, .... hat I have called the "pertinent pa.rt of the text"
is only the sec 0 n d portion of what 0 ugh t to
be covered by the items *pl'atiuedha- and ItbhatJana-ma-
Makara. Actually, the treatment of these items only start s .... ith
(5 .b. ) B.2
1342
of the text, whereas the preceding B. 1
1343
does
n ot deal .... ith anything that could be called " contemplati on
(aiming at] attaining [Full Compr ehension of Truth]" , let alone
the other items.
B.I consists of four stat ement s :
The statement that alayavijnana in so far as it contains
the Seeds of the and nirvedhabhagiya- kuAalamulas is not the
cause of pollution ( Y
t
zi 8b4-6);
G) the in t ram u n dan e
l 344
positive ef fects of
these kuSaLamalaa (Y
t
z i 8b6-8)j
an interpretation of the canonical list of the 18 dhdtUB
(taken as Seeds)I345 and the simile (of SAc No. 444)1 346
as referring to ilayavijnana (Y
t
zi 8b8-9a3);
11.2.2- 11. 2. 3 - 2 10 -
o t he sentence de ltar na kun nas non moria pa ' i rtBa ba
kun gsi rnam par pa de ni 'di ].tal' dge ba ' i chos bs goma pas
M1aIIT par Wog par rig par bya ' 0 / /, .... hich 1 s hould r estore to
somethi ng like *evQ1!l (or: tasyai-
vaf!I vinivrtti r vedit avyd yaduta( '?)
(see 10 . 1 G) .
11. 2.2 Among these s tatement s, it is only 0 that can , without
violence I be subsumed under the head ing
vedha- bhdvand-manaakdl'a because it s peaks of the c ult ivation of
It ( spi r i tually] wholesome fac t or s " (ku/Jala-dharma) , which con-
s titutes not only the bhavand- nuirga pr oper ( whe re
rna would mean the supramundane tathatdlambana- jiicina) but, as the
text itself expressly states in the next sentence, 1347 also the
preparatory phase leading to the attainment (prave6a) of the firs t
Full Comprehension of Truth
l 348
(*sd ca prthag-
j andn&]! .. tatprathamata" satytibhisamayapraveMya : see 10 .1
@). t hus s tatement 0 can - if we di s r egard, fo r the time
being, the probl em of what *evam refers to - be connected without
any difficulty with the subsequent di scussi on of *prave/Ja- manaskd-
ra, etc . ( viz. B.2 and C. I ), i n the begi nning of whic h (dge ba ' i
eho8 bagom pa d e yan, i.e. * 8 ci ea ku/J aladharmabhcivand ) it
i s in fact expressl y r e ferred to .
On t he other hand, statement s 8 -8 can hardly be
s ubsumed unde r t he heading
Makara because t hey simpl y d 0 n ot d e a I wit h
act u a l e 0 n t e m p I a t io n (manaakdra), i.e. cultiva-
tion of s piri tually wholesome factors, aim i n gat a t -
t a i n i n g (p l' a v e 6 a penet rat i on into Truth , not t o
mention penetration (prati vedha) itself or its repeated cul tiva-
tion (bhcivana). 1349 They only deal with the See d s of the -
preparatory - s piritually whol esome factor s (0 and , implicitly,
perhaps also and with t heir i n t ram u n dan e ef fects
They are there fore not cove red by the heading *pl'Gve8:a- .
manaekaraj nor, of cour se, by the preceding headi ng
becaus e t hey do not deal .... ith polluti on but (at l e a st cl auses 0
- 211 -
11.2.4
and ) .... ith aspects of purification, and because the item
has already received its concluding resume in
A.5.
13SO
Not being covered by any heading , t he clauses 0-8
are h e t e r 0 g e nco u s elements, and are suspect of
having been added a f t e r the composi tion of t be nuclear text
including the fi na l r esume.
1351
11. 2. 4
This suspicion is confi r med by the cumulative force of
several observations:
1. Tbe doctrine set forth in B. l (esp. G) does not fit
the alayavijiiana conce pt of the rest of the flivrtti Portion (see
4 8) .
2. In contrast to the on the whole consistent and
conti nuous train of t hought in the material confirmed by the final
resume, the logi cal connection between the statements B.l ev and
CB is rather lax, and the transition from G) to 0 appears
a'ltogether abrupt. This intrinsic dispari t y of B. I is
easily accounted for if these statement s a re regarded as a set of
but loosely related supplements.
3. *evam i n the beginning of statement 0 is , on c l oser
inspection. not easily understood a s referring to the preceding
statements of B.I . To begin with, I do not see any logical
connection , cal ling for *evam, to obtain between 0 and the
immediately preceding statement 0. Thus. one .... ill have to ex-
plain *evam by recurring to statement 0 or which seem to
dea l with the same spiritually wholesome factors the cultivation
of which is said, in statement 0. to effect the cessation of
alayavi j fiana . Yet apart from t he fact. that t he mok.?a- and
m 11 1. a 8 of
only one par t of the d h
statement 0 are probably
a m a 8 of statement
which .... ill a Iso
*evam can hardly be
include
construed
sup ram u n dan e i nsight-
with (not to
speak of which as a pure noun without verbal force
would require e1.Jal!1Vidha-. still l ess of alone ), fo r in
this case one .... ould expect it to i m pi e d i a t e I y precede
11.2.4
- 212 -
this expression. Such a position of >tevam is, ho .... ever
1
excluded by
all the versions . Besides, a b h a: van a of wholesome factors
is mentioned neither in 0, .... hich is only concerned with the
See d s of these factors, nor in whi ch does, to be sure,
mention the actual 0 C c ur r e n ee (de b y u n. na) of the
kUSalamu1.aB but is only interested in their i n t ram u n -
dan e by-ef f ects and does not speak of their rep eat
e d cuI t i vat i o n. It might appear a reasonable alterna-
tive to construe *evam in statement 0 with the whole
sen ten c e (i. e . , more strictly, with *vinivrtti; or *vedi-
tavya) and take it to signali ze t hat bee a use 1352 the
wholesome factor s are, as is stated in 0, opposed to the con-
tinuation of sarpsara, their cultivation leads to the cessation of
alayavijiiana. But since the wholesome factor s arise from Seeds
contained i n a 1 a y a v i j nan a , the con c 1 u -
,
i 0 n that their cultivation leads to the des truction of alaya-
.. --
i, t pIa u vl.Jnana n 0
,
i b 1 e except if it were r e -
,
t r i c t e d to alayavij nana i n
,
0 f a r a
,
i t i
,
t h e r 0 0 t 0 f p 011 u t i o n (i. e. if 'fraGf!1k1.e amzl1.as ya
.... ere taken not
"'
a predicative but
"'
a 1 i m i t a t
j
V e
adjunct) . This
i,
no doubt possible, but it
j,
not confirmed by
the s ubsequent part of the text whi ch does n ot in a ny way
restrict the pollutive nature of alayavijnana nor its
eradication at the time of the attainment of Arhatship (cp .
10 . 3. 3.2). Thus , there would seem to be no satisfactory way of
understanding 'freVam in stat ement 0 as r eferring to the preced-
ing clauses
4. On the other hand, there is not the least difficulty if
(8.10-0 are regarded as i ntrusive and if statement (B.l)0
is consequently taken as having, originally, immediately followed
upon A whi ch determine s alayavijnana as the root of all Pollu-
tion, ending with the words : ... kun gzi r>nam par> es pa ni kun
naB non mons pa thams cad kyi l"tsa ba yin pal" bUa bar> bya ' o / /
(i.e . * ... atayavijnana1f1 dra1}f;avyam) . 1353 With
this J statement (B. 1)0 ('freVQ1[1
- 213 -
11. 2.4
aya ) connects easily. *evam belonging to the - logi cally
pre d i cat i v e - apposition a nd re fer r i ng
to the determination of alayaviji'iana as the root of all Poll ut ion
in A.
of the Ni v{'t ti POl"tion in the 5. In the quasi-quotation
1354 statement ( B.1 )0
1 Y
act u -
all y f 0 1 l o w s i m m e d i ate u p 0 n A
statements (B.1)0-8 being entir ely
not, of cour se, necessarily mean that
a b sen t This does
the text of the Yogacara-
bhumi used by the author of Sal[1dhVy actually lacked s t atement s
since he may (and probably will ) have quoted his s.;!ur ce
i n an abbr eviated form.
1355
But even so his ..... ay of quoting the
passage undoubtedly proves t hat he considered statements
to be i nt rusive to the main thread of presentation and t hat
h t oo k statement 0 t 0 link up .1i -
r e c t 1 Y wit h A.
12. 0- 12.1
- 214 -
12. Supplement V: Remark on two quotations from the Nagarasutra
12 .. 0 According to Enomoto
l356
and Kaj iyama, 1
357
in contrast to
the which c learly presupposes the M Ii 1 a -
s a r vas t i v a d a version of the Nagaras utra (see n.
1140). 1
35
8 two other pass ages in Yogacara texts, viz. Y 230. 10ff.
and MSgU ad 1. 36, make use of the Sa r v a. s t i v a d a ver-
sion (see n . 11 39), or at least of a version which, like the
latter, contained an express statement of the mutual dependence of
vijnal1ll and 11imal'upa . Though not denying s uch a possibility in
principle, I yet do not find that the evidence so far adduced is
conclusive.
12 .. 1 As for Y 23o, l off . , it only quotes a part of the sentence
common to both versions, viz. ta8ya mama vijnaruit praty-
udavartate m<ina80fl1, and asks why this "turning back" of the
Bodhisattva' s mind takes place just in the case of vijnana but not
i n the case of the other members . The answer i s : because the
Bodhi sattva perceives that vijnana and nWnal'upa, but not the other
members, are m u t u a 1 I y dependent . 1359 There is, ho .... ever,
no evidence that thi s explanation i s based on a corl'esponding
of the Nagaras ut r a phrase in the wording of tbe version
t he author of this Yogacarabhumi passage had in mind, and not
rather on the more explicit
s ubsequent N a Q a k a lap i
Sarvastivada e x e g e s is
exposition of the matter in the
k (a) s u t r a or , at best. , in the
- 1360
of the Nagarasutra . Actually,
the .... ording of the Yogacarabhumi passage may even indicate that
mutual dependence wa s not e x pre sse d in the version of
the Nagarasutra made use of; for the Yogacarabhumi says that "[the
Sutra ] states that ( the Bodhisattva's mind] turned back from it
(viz. lJijiiO.na) [to ruimal'upa ) because (the Sutra wants to]
s h 0.... or S u g g est 1361 (- swpdarSanataya) that in this one
case there is mutual dependence" . 1362 Provided I am right in
taking ' saJ!dal'Sana ' as " s howing" or "suggesting",1
3
62a it would
- 21 5 -
12.2.1-1 2 .2 . 2
hardly be the right expression if mutual depe ndence had been
e x pre sse d in the ." 0 r d i n g of the Siitra. Besides,
the affiliation of this Yogacarabhtimi passage to the Mulasarvas ti -
vada version i s confirmed by t he fact that it alludes, t owards the
end. to the next sentence of the Sutra by usi ng the word ' par e-
."hic h appear s t o be typical of t,he Mu!asarvast ivada ver-
1364 - . - -
si on. whereas the Sarvast1vada version, at l eas t of the Mahava-
- - 1365
danasutra
J
has
12. 2. 1
*Asvabhava 's commentary ad MSg I. 36 t 366 may be divided
three parts:
8 An interpretation of the phrase ' viJonana- pl"atyaYaJ?! namal"upam I 0
This phrase is, to be s ure, frequently met with i n the
canonical sources, but i n the present case it will, i n view
of t he fact that the basic text 1367 refers t o the m u t u -
a 1 dependence of vijiidna and ruimal"upa and to the
r e e d bun c h s i mil e. ha ve been take n primarily
from the N a Q a k a 1 a p i -sutra. According to *Asva-
bhava. in thi s phras e vijridna whi ch he understands to
operate, by way of a cont inuous sequence of moments
parampal'aya), as the basi s of naman ( = the four immaterial
skandhas) and JOUpa ( ::: proto-embryonic matter (ka1.a-
1.a) 1368) 1369 _ can only mean a 1 a y a vij iiana , since t he
pravrttivijiianas are included in naman .
CD The passage on ."hich Enomot o ba ses hi s vie." that *Asvabhava
presupposes the Sarvastivada (or a s imilar) version of the
Nagarasutra (see 12.202).
o A quotation fr om the M a han ida n a -sutra 1370 ."hi ch too
is asserted to be inexplicable without the existence of alaya-
vijnana .
12. 2. 2 The passage 0, which Enomoto takes to r efe r t o the
Nagarasutra, runs as follows :
12.2.3
- 216 -
Tibetan: 1371
o mom par gee pa tas ni bdag gi (D) yid bz tog na l'nam par
pa tas 'das pa ni ma yin no .2e gan 98/.1118 pa de yan
ku.l1 gei r>nam pal' gee pa yod na ' thad de I
'di l.tll1' de ni LU8 kyi gnas iiid du T'gyun mi ' chad pal' 'J'ug
go 1/
de iiid kyi phyir de min dan 9201.98 kyi rkyen dOl. 98uri8 te I
deB tU8 ta khyab pa ' i phyil' II
Chinese: 1372
o "'.;AlI .
8 Hlillil'!ir.lQt&.
@ Jl,t&l!Idt-t.illi
missing
The original from which both versions can be explained may haH'
looked somethi ng like this:
o .... yad uktaJ?! "tasya mama vt.Jnanat- pl'atyudtilJO.l'tate manasw::.
na viiiiaruit (Sutra : ata,; ) pare!lG (Sa.: paroto ) vyativQl'tc.-
ta" iti, tad api saty al.ayavijiitina upapadyate /
*tathaihi tad (or:
(pra) varta t e /
*ata eVa tasya namarupapratyayatvam uktam I
"'tena (or : tasya) kaya_
1373
(or : atmabhava-
1374
)
ndt ' 375 II
- vyapc. -
12. 2. 3 Enomoto bases his vicw that this passage presupposes a
version of the Nagarasutra
1376
which contained a sentence
expressing the m u t u a 1 dependence of vijikina and namal"upa,
i.e. the 5 a r v it s t j v it d a version or a similar one, on
two reasons . One is that in
0)
the "t urning back" at the membe r
vijikina is accounted for by t he fact that (itlaya) v i j
"
a n a
is, i n its tur n, b
a ,
e d a n t he citmabhciva (Le. n ci m a -
- 217 -
p a )1377.
1
378 The other reason
is that
to Tibetan gsuns has to be taken as pointing
e x p 1 i cit 1 y confirms, according to
12.24-12.2.5
which according
to a Sutra utterance,
Enomoto,1379 that the
Nagarasutra used by *Asvabhava also contained the statement that
viJlidna is depende nt on ndmal'upa ( ' nGmal' upa- pl'atyaYaJ!! vijritinam' ),
which is found in the Sarvastivada ve r sion
1380
but missing in that
of t he Mulasarvastivadins , 1.J
81
12.2. 4 This evaluation is, ho .... ever, based on the Chi nese version
only. For the Tibetan version would seem to presume a
different interpretation of the material. In it, both
bhava61'aya- in and ""ndmal'iipapl'atyaya- in 0 appear to be
rendered not as bahuvrfhis but rather as I.e. the
Tibetan version .... ould seem t o take the passage to mean that the
reason why the Bodhi sattva' s mind "turns back" at the member
vijlidM is the fa ct that vijiitina , which can only be a 1 a -
y a vijnana, operates uninterruptedly not o n the basi s but
rather a s the bas is of the citmabhdva - as its deepest l ayer,
so to s peak , for which no further foundation has to be sought ,
and that it is for this very r eason that the Siitra states that
vijnana is t h e co ndition
that according to the Tibetan version
refer to the dependence of rnimal'iipa on
dependence of vijriiina on namal"upa, and
a I dependence . Taken in this way
course, s upport Enomoto's thesis that
0 f nGmal'upa. This means
the passage would 0 n 1 y
vijii6.na and n 0 t to the
thus n 0 t to m u t
u -
the pas sage does not , of
*Asvabhava used not t he
Hulasarvastivada but the Sarvastivada version of t he Nagarasutra
(or a similar one ) .
12.2. 5 Yet , I admit that Enomoto , though not offe ring any argu-
ment for it. is probably right in dismissing the inter-
pretation s uggested by Tibetan in favour of that of the Chinese
version . To be sure, there is no problem in taking a layavijnana to
t e t he basis of the dtmabhdva. the more so si nce this idea is
expressly stated by *Ptthivfbandhu.
1383
Nor does it appear that in
this case 0 would not fit in with the argument. For if 'tuB '
rende r s ' citmabhQva', CD may be taken to furt her substantiate the
12.2.6 - 218 -
assertion that (alaya)vijnana is the basis (0) 1384 and condi-
tion ( ~ ) of citmabhciva = namarupa
1385
by pointing out its presence
throughout life and in all kinds of existence .
1386
And even if -
as may be more probable - ~ U B stands for 'kaya' , it .... ould not
seem impossible to understand CD as corroborating CB
1387
(and_
t hus @) because the fact that a layavijnana pervades the body is
the presupposition for its being capable of biological appropria-
tion
1388
and because by .... ay of appropriating corporeal matter
alayavijnana .... ould seem to be the basis and condition of the
latter
1389
and, indirectly, also of the mental functions based
thereon.
1390
But in spite of all this, it .... ould be fairly odd if,
as implied in the interpretation suggested by Tibetan, *Asvabhava
really .... ere to have focussed, in his explana tion of MSg 1.36,
only on the dependence of namarupa on vijnana, entirely disregard-
ing t he complementary dependence of vijiiiina on niimarupa; for the
fact remains t hat the basic text refers unambiguously to m u -
t u a 1 dependence.
12. 2.6 Therefore, it may indeed well be that the interpretation
of the Chinese version, follo .... ed by Enomoto , deserves to
be preferred. In it, both *citmabhcivcial'aya- in (f) and *nci'mal'upa-
pl'atyaya- in ~ are understood as bahuvrihis (and in the case of
niimal'upapratyaya- this has the advantage of being in accordance
Idth ho .... the expression is used in the Sutra) . Thi s means that
according t o the Chinese version *Asvabhava states, in , that
the reason .... hy, in the Nagarasutra, the Bodhisattva'S mind " turns
back" at the member vijnana is indeed, as Enomoto assumes , the
fact tha t vijnana - i.e. alayavijnana - continually arises, in
its turn, on the basis of the citmabhtiva ( = ncimal'upa), and that
*Asvabhava states in 0that f or the same reason [the Siitra ]
declares that vijnana i s d e pen den to n ncimal'upa.
In this context, even the sentence 0 . though missing in
the Chinese version . .... ould fit in fairly well, especially if 'tUB'
represents ' kciya ' (or 'ci tmabhdva ' in the sense of "body") and
provided that citmabhciva in (and ndmal'upa in 0) is, in this
connection. understood as 1 i v i n g or animate cor p 0 r e -
- 219 -
12.2 7
a I mat t e r ; 1391 for t he idea that p er v a din g the
body is more or less equivalent to b e i n g bas e don the
(whole living) body is confi r med by va r ious other sour ces . 1392
12.2. 7
Yet, even this interpretation of the t ext does not appear
to impl y, by necessity, Enomoto's conclusion. For @
me r ely presupposes an e x p 1 a nat io n of the "turning
back" of t he Bodhi sattva's mind i n t e r m s o f mutual
depende nce of vijnana and nclmal'Upa. Thi s, however, does not , just
as at Y 23o,llff. (see 12. 1), imply eo ipsa that the Sutra
itself contained ate x t u a I el ement e x pre s s in g
t his mutual dependence . And @' though , to be sur e, referring t o
t he wording of a Sutra, is by no means bound to refer to the
Nag a r a sutra. I t may just
N a 4 a k a I a p i k (a' sutra .
perti nent phrases of this Sutra
as well refer - once agai n - to the
for i n 0, only the first of t he
(vi z. ' viJ'nanapl'atyaYGlfI namaI'upam') ,
which it shares with the Nagarasutra , had been quoted and explain- ,
ed (see 12 . 2. 1). Therefor e, it would seem reasonabJ.e t hat now
( in the complementary phrase (vi z . ' ntimaPupapl'atyaylZf!l vi-
jiicinam') too is adduced in order to conf irm the exegesis (in
OO-@) of the Nagarasutra passage, and expl ained as impl ying
t he existence of alayaviji'i.ina. Even if one follows the Chinese
\'ersi on of 0,1
393
which already contains the idea of alayavijiia-
na b e i n g bas e don ndmal'upa. and if one takes it, in
spite of t he absence of an explicit quotation , as a de facta
explanation of the phr ase vijiUinam', yet nothing
would tell against t he possibil ity t hat in the author , with
the aim of confirming his exegesis of the Nagarasut ra passage ,
refers b a c k
-. 1-)-
to this phrase of the Na4akalapl.kasutra and
to i ts interpretation i n
Thus, even if the i nte r pretation offered by the Chinese
translation is followed, there is no con c Ius i v e evidence
for the assumption that *Asvabhava made use of a version of the
Nagarasutra which, like that of the Sarvastivadins , contained an
express statement of the mut ual dependence of vijiUina and namarupa,
and not rather, as one would expect him to have done , of t hat of
the MUIasarvast ivadins, ",'here s uch a statement is missing.
App.I:Intr.Rem. - 220
Appendix I:The Sacittiki and Acittika Bhumih of the Yogacarabhumi
Introductory remark:
The text of the SacitHka and Acittika Bhumil}, which is the com-
bined 8th and 9th chapter of the Basic Section of the Yogacara-
bhumi, was first edited, on the basis of the Sravakabhumi manu-
script (.SrBh
m
), by A. Wayman in 18K 8 .1 / 1960, pp . (31)-(33) '"
378-376 (reprinted in Wayman 1984. 327f.) As Wayman remarks, SrBh
m
is sometimes very difficult to decipher, and the pertinent folio
is, moreover, damaged on the upper and on the right margin, which
means that the last two or three k ~ r s of each l ine as well as
parts of the first line of the verso are missing (in my text,
these k ~ r s a re underwaved). In addition, SrBh
m
has some faulty
readings and gaps. Hence, understandably enough, Wayman's edition
does not always present a satisfactory text . Therefore, I have
thought it useful to publish

new
addition to SrBh , of the Yogacarabhumi
m
edition, making
manuscript ( y ).
m
use, in
Unfortu-
nately, my photograph of t he pertinent folio of this ms. is not
always distinct either, especiall y on t he
besides, a large gap (left blank in the ms.!)
verso, which shows 1
in 5 of the text.
In my edition, I have refrained from carrying out sandhi
rules if this has not been done by both the mss. (or, in t he case
of lacunae, by the one extant). As for t he punctuation and the
critical apparatus , see remarks on pp . 228 and 234.
Sisl a: Ch.
"
Yc (344c 16-345aI6)
$r
"
SrBh
m (15A7,6-1587,5)
T Y
t
(dzi I82b7-183b8)
Y Y (83'5-b5) .
m
- 221 -
App . I: Text
Text:
O. sacittika acittika ca bhiimiJ; katama I sa dviviidhapi panca-
bhir aka'l'ai'l' veditavya 12. bhWniprajnaptivyavasthanato ' pi . citta-
bhrodntya
3
bhrantivyavasthanato ' pi . utpattyanutpattivyavasthanato
' pi. avasthavyavasthanato ' pi . paramarthavyasthanato 'pi II
t. tat1'lJ bhUmipr>ajiiapti1.lyavas thcinatal}: pancavijnanastu!TPl'ayukta
bhUmiJ;4 savitarka savicara avitarkci Vical'amatl'a ca bhu-
miT' ekantena sacittikd I aVital'ktiy6m '-;;vicaray6Jp bhWnau sa
5
-8a-
mnpattyupapattikam ca sthapayitva
tadanya sacittikaiua bhiimiJ;. sa
6
samapattyupapattikam ni-
rodhasamapattig ca acittika bhUmiJ; II

2. tatl'a cittabhl'antya 1 bhl'antivyalJasthanataJ;: yac catu'l'bhi1'8
vipaJ'yasair vipal'yastarrr cittaJ!1. tad
9
bhrantam ity ucyate I yat
punag catUl'bhir vipaJ'ylisair avipaJ'yastaJ!l. tad abhranta!p ity uC/la-
te I tatro yad cittaJ!l. tad acittam j;ty ucyate,
bhl'a{ltataya < j ) yathli hi 10 tok!!.,. bhavanti vakttirt0 unmattaTfl k{lipta-
cittQl!1 cir{ltva "acitto ' Ya1!1 unmattaJ;1 1 kt;;iptaci.tta.
H
iti I tad anena yad bhl'<intaJ!1 citta1[! . tail. aci tt ikd bhli-
I yat
l 2
pUnaI' abhrantarrr, tat sacittikli II
Sr seems to omi t the but i may be there .
Z Y -vyaJ;.
J om . - bhrdntya- .
4 Y - .; / .
5 om. 8a- .
6 Sr om . sa- ; i n Y it has been insert ed afterward s .
7 Sr om . -bhrdntya-.
8 Sr om. - bhir.
9 Y -da- or -t (indistinct).
,
J 0 Thus Y (cp. Ch. jU ); Sr damaged but possibly !:.atha hi (cp.
T. 'di Hal') .
11 Not very clear in my copy of Sr (beginning of 15B7 J 2) and
obviousl y followed by an additional
12 Y tat.
App .l : Text
- 222 -
3. tatra eittasya utpado
bhavaty anutpado
13
va I tadyathd: indPi yaparibhedat,
gamandt , IOO.nasikaravaikaLyat, apratitambhtit. virodh6.t , prahd:'J(it ,
nirodhdt , utpddac ca
l4
I etadviparyayad utpado iyadhir
2va I tatra ya
lS
sa sacit-
tika I punar sa aeitti-
kti II
4. tatm 'lat!. avastha., sthdpayitw sa-
eittikti bhumil" veditavya 1
18
?aq. I> I 9 tadyathti
aeittika
2
middhavastha, acittika
2
mUrcchavasthti aSQ![1J'na
21
samQpat-
aSal!ljiiikaJ!1, nirodhasamdpattil}. nirupadhi Se?aS ca
t ulJ I punar ?aq. iyam acit;ikd II
5. tatra paramarthavyavasth6nata'; : nirupadhi6e?o
aeittika bhUmi I} I tat kasya I tatra hy niru
23
d _
dhaJp bhavati I tadanyd
2
'sv pravrtt ivijnalUV!' niruddha.r!f
bhavati , vena acittikd bhtlmir ity ucyate; dlayavijivirtaf!! tu ria
bhavati , nacittika bhumir i ey ueya-
te II
yogacdra
25
bhUmau sacittikd bhumih acittika co samciptd
27
II
13 5r om . bhavatyanutpddo.
14 Ch. reasonably supplies (*cittasyanutpddo fbha-
vatiJ), but in 5r, Y and T. no such wo rds are f ound.
15 Y ye o
16 5r vat (?) .
17 an- seems to be mi ssing in Y (i ndistinct).
18 Y - vydl}; Sr - vydl} / .
I 9 Y and 5r -ma.
20 Cp o Wackernagel II,I , p. 134f. ?
21 Y seems to have - jiid- , whereas Sr may r ead - Jna- , but defi -
nitely not - j iii - j cpo Y 78a8 (asamjnlisamapatti) and SrBh
458, 19ff. and 460, 10 - jiii- is 'Only introduced by the
edi tor) .
22 Y
J
and probably also Sr: ya .
23 Sr adds an (il legible) ak$ara.
H Y - nya-.
Beginning of the lacuna i n Y.
26 End of the lacuna in Y.
27 Sr, and probably al so Y:
- 223 -
Appendix II: Paramarthagithi s 28-41 and their to.mentary
Introductory Remark:
This Appendix offers a new edi tion and annotated translation of
that part of the Paramarthagathas and their commentary - both form
part of t he Cintamayi Bhumib of the Basic Section of the Yogacara-
bhumi _ which proved t o be relevant to the present s tudy. T found
t his necessary because A. Wayman's edition and translation of this
text, contained in his "Analysis of the Manuscript!!
in this App . abbreviated as W. ), 167ff . , and reprinted -
without corrections, as far as 1 can see - in IIBuddhist Insight"
(= Wayman 1984), are not entirely satisfactory .1
39
4 Even Suguro ' s
Japanese translation of the pas sage 1395 does not go far beyond
Wayman' s .
The part relevant are verses 28-41 of the Paramarthagathas
and their comme ntary. The material s I use are not only Wayman's
own 1396 Y 1397 and \' 1398) but also Y 1399 whi ch proves
m' t c' m
quite helpful in a considerable number of passages . In a few
h b h
. h' d . 1 . k 1400
cases, owever, ot s ow ent1ca rn1sta es .
As for my translation. I hope it is an improvement on Way-
man ' s, but I admit that it is s till provi sional i n quite a few
cases, as are also my notes. Some of the notes are. to be sure,
rather lengthy, but in order to facilitate fur ther s tudies I have
taken pains to reproduce my understanding and its limits as
precisely as possible, and I have not he sitated to present and
di scuss alternatives when] found the text diffi cult or ambiguous .
Since there is evidence t hat at l east of the Paramartha-
gathas stem from canonical sources while ('ther s seem to have been
regarded as at least paracanonical,1
4
01 and s ince there are a fel,
cases ..mere the commentary obviously ;:or m..;ost probably misinter-
prets the verses (at least from the r.:-i nt of view of tht'i,
original meaning),1
4
02 the author of the c.:-mmentary was
not the aut h 0 r of the ve r ses 'at least not of all .:-f
them) . Rather
1
1403
1er , as
they were compiled - eitber by him or evt'rl t'ar-
a uthoritative utte r ings at the level of !.lIt imat e
App . rI: Intr.Rem. , Add.
- 224 -
truth, from various (canonical or paracanonical) sources or (oral)
traditions. In translati ng a nd interpreting t hem, one should there-
fore not folIo ... ' the commentary all too confidingly, except if one
intends to render them not in their original meaning, 1404 but only
a ccordi ng to how they were understood by the comme ntator . To the
present study , however, both aspects are relevant. In my transla-
tion of the verses, I theref.,re try to understand t hem - as far as
possible by themselves r e ferring to diver ging
interpretations of the comment ator in the notes.
Addendum
1. With regard to the metre of vs. 34- 38 {vs . 28-33 and 39-41 are
ordinary Slokas (pathya, it is a pleasure for me to thank
Dr . Junko Sakamoto-Goto for her most val uable remarks (letters
dated 29th April , 27th May and 31st MaYJ 1987) and f or kindly
permitting me to rephrase them as follows f r om the original German:
Vs. 34 is a sloka with a vaitaliya pada in dj vs. 35 is a
vaitalIya but probably mixed with Sloka (pada a); 36 is
vaitalIya throughout. The presupposition is that some words
of t he text were, originally, not read ( i.e. recited) as
they are found written i n the transmitted text but rather in
line with the allowances of HI prosody .
There are no serious problems in the case of vs , 36,
whi ch is a regular vaitalIya provided that we read ( i.e.
recite) saktll for sakttib at 36a, mahati for mahati at 36b,
and sal'vatragab for sarvatragab at 36d, such metrical vari-
a nts of endings and compositional sandhi being common in HI
( and BHS) verse.
I n vs. 35, the metrical situation is less clear . Pada b
is a regular vaitii:lIya as it stands . P.ida d too becomes a
r egular vaitiUya if - patyaYaJ?l is read f or - pratyaya'!1; the
opening pattern - v ... v (ahalpkiirasu.kha- ) is however
r a r e . 35c .... ould , in order to be scanned as a vaitalIya,
- 225 -
App.II: Add .
requi r e the readings bhoti for bhavati and
( _ v _
for ba1.iina'!1; the latter (gen. pI. is,
ho .... ever, uncommon; but. cp o Apabhralllsa -aha. beside -aha in
nominal and pronominal inflection ( Pi schel 363, 370, 425 ,
etc.) .
35
h probably i n the loka metre , .... ith pari-
( v v)
instead of one long syllable ( - ) , s uch

resolu-
tion
- -->
v v )
in the pada middle being rare but not
i mpossible , particularly at t he beginning of a .... ord .
As f or vs . 34, pada b is definitely in the sloka metre ( a
fact confi rmed by its being taken from an identifiable
canonical source (see n. 1428) where i t occur s in pure Sloka
surroundings [L. S. ] ). 34d is vaitillya, with to
be read a s 34a and c are problematic but can
be taken a s Sloka padas,
tci ..., ... - (i .e. modified
i f at 34c i s read dukhi-
to agree with Bukhita- ) and ... v
taken as a resolution of one long syl lable, and if 34a is
a ccept ed as an ins tance of the cadenc e v - u - .... bich is
however very rare in uneven sloka padas ( but c p o t he Vedic

The metre of vs. 37 and 38 is difficult to i denti fy but
may be an extension or remodelling of vaitaliya or jagati /-
t r iHubh lines. In fact, 37cd (forming one sentence) is most
probably in the jagad metre, requiring ... - v f or naitad (to
be r ead a s na etad , the hiatus being admi ssible i n HI ) a nd
!::! v (like anyato or anyatha ) i nstead of anyatra (which
however can hardly be scanned accordingly ) . 3ab too c an be
scanned as a jagati with the reading puna for punar although
the opening patt ern v ... h very rare; the possibility
cannot be excluded however that this line is a secondarily
enlarged vaitaliya . A similar
be based
ambiguity is found also in 38d
on a tri.gubh pada like sa which may, e.g.,
taamci(j) J'citaa ta janeti ccipi or on a vai taliya pada 1 ike
tasnuij J'iit as taj J'aneti ' pi ( .... i thout sa and with elision of
a- in api), but t hese are merely uncertai n possibilities.
App.l1: Add. - 226 -
2. [t may be difficult to decide to what extent vs. 34-38 are
based on metrically flawless HI (or BHS ) materials or are rather
merely more or less awkward imitations of archaic metres. At any
rate, the sloka pada 34b i s (as j ust noted) defi nitely taken from
a canonical source also preserved in the PUi canon (see n. 1428) .
Though vs. 34a gives the impression of being a kind of connecting
link between vs. 33 and the (demonstrably canoni cal) pada 34b,
the cadence u _ v - in vs . 34a looks a r chaic (cp . the frequency of
this cadence i n uneven sloka padas in the Atthakavagga and Paraya -
na: Oldenherg, Kleine Schriften, 1202 and l204)j it is thus more
probable that the combi nat ion of 34b with 33 r emount s to some
older source. Mrs . Sakamoto--Goto suggests that vs. 35 might be a
transmissional supplement to vs. 36 in view of its metri cal
unsatisfactoriness and of its content which l ooks somewhat dogmat -
ic and less archaic than that of vs. 36 with its elephant simUe .
In fact, the allusion, at 35a , to the " etymology" of citta (see n.
1433) seem to point to a post-canonical source . On the other
hand , 35cd is hardly more dogmatic or advanced than 36cd, and 35b
i s nothing but a metri cal variant of a pada actually attested in
the canon (see n. 143Ja.). Thus, we should perhaps also envisage
the possibility that at least some of the metrical problems are
due to redactional operations by somebody (poss ibly the compiler)
w-ith no goed sense of or no longer familiar with the vait.iliya
metre. VS . 34C, e.g.) would become a perfect vaitallya pada if we
presuppose that (excluding the Aryas!) wa s inserted by a
redactor (or the compiler ) in the place of a less specific word
like For the same reason, at 35c too bdLa7llif!l may have
replaced a less specific wor d fitting the vaituiya metre (e.g.
And even at 35a, cittam may have been secondarily
introduced in place of a word confor ming to the vaitalIya metre
( like mano) 1 because acirzoti evoked the etymology cinotiti cit tam
(see n. t433) . In all these cases, a redactor/ compiler inexperi-
enced in metre could have changed the cadence of the original
vaitallya into the cadence of the more familiar Sloka.
In that case, one would, besides, have to read as
-pal'igatam.
App.II : verses
- 228 -
Sanskrit text of the v e r s e s *
28 . prapancabhiratir hetus
1
tatha karma I
sa:t'vabijo ea tatha 1/
29. 8a:t'vabi;je vipake hi jayate /
pratyatmavedaniyo <'>sau al"upi / /
30 . ka1.paya<n>t/ antar>citmanal]! tal]! ca hal-a /
tathci ea /1
31. svabijcie
5
ca pUl"vcibhycisat I
anukul-cie ea jdyate II
32 . snehas eaiva adhyatmam upaJ'ci yate I
anugl"ahcibhi1.ci?cie
6
ca sneho mamayitap II
* R e m ark: I have not, on the wh ole, noted merel y ortho-
graphi c va riants like 'Pea f or rica. r>vva for l"Va. (?) for
sa. n8a for '?Iaa, nor absence of daQQa at the end of a line.
No r have I noted Wayman's read ings if they are not s upport ed
by any source .
S i g 1 a : Y Y
m
; Sr
= SrBh
W
'
Tib . j Ch .
I . $r faint and seemingly- added afterwards) .
2. $r and Y (?) - yaty .
3 . y
4 . $r (?).
Chinese j W.
5. Sr sa- ( ? ), but T. (ran ) and Ch. ( ) confirm sVa- .
5. Thus Y (cp. Ch. tt ), but Sr (cp . T. 'dod pa,
wi t hout ablative particle ) .
7. Y - hi.
- 229 - App.11: verses
T ran s 1 a t io n oft b eve r s e s
28 . Delight in worldly existence'40S as well as good and evil
deeds are the cause. Haturation
1406
containing all Seeds
1407
a nd [what is ] agreeable and disagreeable are the result. '408
29. The [Result-of- ]Maturation contaunng all Seeds comes to be
looked upon as Self. 1409 This [Result-of-Maturation] is ac-
cessible to personal experience [ only], [for it is] shape-
less
1410
and invisible (/incommunicable). 1411
30. Not only141 2 do ignorant fools imagine this [Result-of-Matu-
ration] t o be [the ir] inner Self , but many [ other false]
views too
1412
arise on the basis of (thi s] view of Self .14
1
3
31. The view of Self arises from apprehending solid things , 1414
from its own Seed, from previous habit, from [bad] com-
panion(s), 1
4
1
5
and from listening {to doctri nes ] which
favour [ t he arising of the view of Self] . 1416
32. Co nditioned by this [view of Self], 1417 there arises, fur-
the rmore, attachme nt to oneself
1418
, and, because one is
eager to benefit [ oneself ] ,1
4
1
9
attachment {to what is ]
outside
1418
[consisting in] claiming (or coveting) [i t ] as
one's own.
App .Il : ver ses
- 230 -
33 . yato bibheti toka tan mohat asau I
purUUo/ krtva t enopai ti II
34. yat tan tad arya I
yena sada batah
9
hi //
35 . aittam
Qcinot i
lo
I
yad cicitaJ?111 bhavati 12 bataruim
II
36 . yatra
panke mahati kUlijal'o 13 yat ha /
tatra
II
37 . tat vinirbhedaya
l1
yani loke /
't d . 18 - bh - k
nat. a agnt.r na Vayur na as aro
viAo?ayed anyatra dhal'macaryaya /1
8. Thus both mss . ! BHSG 8. 78? Or t o be r ead
g . Y - lao
10. $r - ti /.
11 . Both mss . yada but T. de ni kun bstsaga and
Ch. IU" .
12. Sr . - ti I .
13. Y rol.
14 . Sr aamo- ; Ch. liI.at (- hat n
I S. Sr /.
16.
17.
T. kun 1.a apyod par byed.
T. dbyer m e d byed ( "makes
Ch . if ... ( "camifi es i nto" ) .
18 . $r a[sti ]gnil' (ati del e t ed ).
i n disti nguis ha ble"), but
- 231 -
App.]]: verses
33. \ifuat t hese [fooli sh ] peopl e fear, [precisely that it is]
that they attract,I4
20
in [their] delusion .
1421
Having stuck
[t o it]1422 before , I42
3
they1424 faU a prey to conceptual
proliferation {/ worldly exi stence) 1425 thereby. 1426
34. That which
1427
has been stuck to [by them], that the Noble
Ones kno ... to be Suf f eri ng ( i.e. unsatisfactory); 1428 on
account of this [Suffering] , the f ools are always miser-
able, 14
2
9 for it does not cease (or: allow of peace?) even
for a s ingle moment. 1430
35 . [Whe n] mi nd [ is ] befalle n
143 1
with UnevennMs, 143
2
it accu-
mulates l.t 33 such Suffering
143Ja
a s, .... hen having been accumu-
lated , becomes , f or [these ] fools , 1434 t he caus e 0[ 1435 the
notion of Ego. and of pleas ure and pain.
36 . In it all fools remain stuck, as an ele phant [remains s tuck]
in a large mi r e. q 36 And lOith this [Suffering as its object]
del usion i s exceeding [ strong]' [bei ng] omnipresent ,
[i. e.
1437
present ] in every activity. 1438
37. That is the lake whic h e ntails the branc hing off of all
st r eams - of adve r se
l439
st r eams [ t here are] in
thi s world.
1440
Seit he r fir e nor wind nor the sun could dry
it up, I441 but the practice of the Doc trine. 1442
App . II : verses
- 232 -
38 . ' ham asmity
8ukhito va punap2a vyavasyati /
papikaLpo
sa tasmaj jataB
2J
taj janayaty api /1
39. hi sada I
tasya nirmok?o na bhuto na bhavi?yati //
40. na tad utpadyate paAcac chuddham anyat tu jayate /
tac ca purvam kLe Aebhyo muktam ucyate /1
41. yat
25
tad ihatyantac chuddhao/
na ceha Audhyate kaAcit kutaAcid
21
uapi Audhyate
28
II
19. Sr -n.aJ!I /.
20 . Thus both mss.; in Y puna- is added in the l owe r margin.
21. y T. bde
22 .
13 .
Sr, Y - ka,; I; T.
Y --ta';.
24 . 5r
Lta baa bakyed pa (-pita'; ?) .
--
25 . Y tat, but 5r yat (cp . T. gan) .
26 . 5r - ska- .
27 . Y does not seem to have kuta- but is difficult to
read; T. gan Las kyan ni confirms Sr.
28 . 5r -ti.
App. II ; ve r s es
38. [By t hi nking, .... hen one is] pained, "Lam pained - or, on t he
other hand (punaI' ), [by thinking,] .... hen one i s pleased, ['2
am pleased"] -, one c onceiTes 1.U3 as oneself (i.e . as one ' s
Sel f?) r .... hat i s in Dothing but] Suffering. 1444
[This ] .... r ong i dea calls forth a [false ] vie .....
1445
Havi ng
arisen fr om it, it al so engenders it .
1446
39. Defiled mind, LUi' of course (hi) , i s [ s omething] that a r ises
and each time with t he DefHement s .
1449
For i t, liberation fr om the Defilements has [ ther ef ore]
nei t her [already] happened nor will it [ ever ] happen.
40 . [For
1450
i t is] not that this [very s ame defiled mind]
arises afterwards as a pure one , but [rathe r .... hat] arises
[afterward s is ] an 0 the r (mi nd which is pure) .145
1
And [ it is ] this [ othe r mind that , al t hough 1452 it had ) not
[been] defil ed before, 1
453
is called 'liberated' from Defile-
.1.
ment s .
That .... hich
1 ut e 1 y
nat u r e
is defiled is, in thi s ( system], 1454 a b s 0 _
[ defiled]; 1455 [what i s ] pure i s radiant b y
1456
And [ t hUS ( ?) there i s ] , in thi s [ sys tem],
no [pe r son or even dharma which] is purified, nor i s [he/ it ,
a fortiori, ) purified from anything. 14 57
App.II: comm.
- 234 -
T ext 0 f the com men tar y :*
[1.] svaminy asati kGrake vedake va hetupha-
ca sati tatra
pancabhir (]-ll) paridipayati /
*
1.
, .
3 .
A)
B) dvitiyaya (28) /
C) tisrbhi82 (32-11) tatrandtmani hetuphaZe yathdtmadr?tivi-
/ tat punap aZambanataQ phaZataQ hetu-
ta ca paridipayati I
1) tasydZambanam ekaya gathayti (29) I tac ca ppatyatma-
!!!q<!.n}vq.tvam -/. - -
atarkyatvat I r>upa1]d hi tW'kro;Ja
5
sutr>a ukta I anidarSa-
natvac ca I pal'ebhyo <'>ddanaya
6
/
2-3) phaZaJ!I ca dvitiyaya (.12) I bdZd ciSl'ayas. tada-
nya drWtayaQ phataJ!l <I>
Remark: Purely orthographi c variants (see remark on
p . 228) are not noted, likewi se variants in the use of the
dar.uja (occasionally represented by colon or dash in my text )
or deleted ak1,laras (exce pt for special cases). Y
m
is often
fairly indistinct .
In the t ext J
u n d e r 1 i n i n g indicates words
and sentences literally quoted or repeated from the gathas.
Dis co n t in u 0 U s un d e r 1 i n i n g: words of
the gathas r ecurring in a different syntactical construction
or with different endings. U n d e r w a \' i n g
lent s substi tuting gath.i words .
equiva-
In the t ran s 1 a. t ion, only underlining is used .
Sr - BGJ!1 Ii T.
Y T.
Sr -ndbhy&r! .

9 zan d u phyin ai Zog pa = *cdnya- .
ph y i m a gSUffl gyis; Ch. .
4. Sr , Y -ty.
5 .
6 .
Thus both mss.; T gzugs l'nams ni bl'tag tu run ba'o
(",jo tae by"" bais; ch. ( Il!ll! )
Thus Sr: Y illeeible.

ZBe
- 235 - App.Il: comm.
T ran 5 1 a t i o n 0 f the com me n tar y
[1.] [Having] thus [proved that] there is, from the point of
view of ultimate reality , no proprietor nor doer nor feel-
er but only cause(s) and effect(s), [the author / compiler
of the s tanzas no .... ] elucidates, with five stanzas (28-,11),
A) how objections can be refuted, B) how cause and effect
are characterized, I4 5
8
and C) how this ( viz . what is mere-
ly cause and effect) is wrongly conceived of as Self .
A)
B) With the second [stanza] {28} he eludicates how cause and
effect are characte rized. 1458
C) With t hree [ stanzas (29-J .. U he elucidates ] hoW' this [com-
plex of dharmas which a r e merely] cause and effect [but]
not Self is wrongly viewed as Self . This [fact] , to be
more precise he elucidates from tbe point of
view of I ) object, 2) basis, 3) result, and 4) cause .
1 ) The object of tbe [wrong view of Self he elucidates ]
witb one stanza [, where the object of the view of
Self j viz . the Result-of -Maturation containing all Seeds j
is taught to be accessibl e to personal experience only, J
a nd t his access ibility to personal experience [ only ] he
proves by [pointing out] that [the Result-of-Maturation
contai ning all Seeds ] is devoid of .... hat can be .e:rasped by
specul ation (arupin) , 1459 and is i ncommunicable ; f or [its
nature] i s not accessible to speCUlative i nquiry - for
- 1460
what is taught i n the Sutra by l"Upw;ui is speculative
inquiry -, and it is incommunicable because [its nature]
cannot be communicated to others by instruction .
2-3) With the second [stanza he elucidat es ] the
basis
1461
and the result [ of the wrong vie .... of Self]: The
fools are the basis, the other [raIse] views are the
result.
App. II : comm.
- 236 -
4) trtiyayd (3 1) / tatra
hti
8
svabijac ca tadanut1aydj jayatelpariko.t;ita tirt/1i-
pupvdbhyasad iti
9
/ so. co. abhya-
sta
l
a bhavati . ayonit1at1
1
I ceha taI"kayati . tadanukllL<V!' eci-
saddhaP711tlf!112 - ity
-
do?ai? parikaLpitasycitmadaI"SanasyotpattUp dart1ayati /
[II . ] yathci tad
khwp ni<I">vartayati
I5
yathci co. tad
rayor dvayor
l6
bhavati . yathd co.
sya vibandhaya bhavati . tat paricabhir gdthiibhilJ. ( 32-36)
pal"idipital!ll7 /
A) tatra prathamayci gathaya (32) Bamudayam dart1ayati /
- .
B) (33-34) dulJ,kha<p>IS
grhi.tam <I> tad dhi 19 nivdantV!'
tenopaiti prapaneit al!' bhavi$ycimi na bhavi$ycimity evamtidi /
niveSanam ity atmabhavapaM.gt'ahllJ!! / tae eo. sQl"uaJca-
lanu{iaktatvat
2a
apy /
1. Both mss . - {iti , but cp o verse 31d, T. de La than. cig SkYif B
pa ' i bdag t.u Lta ba ni rit por 'dzin. po. dan / . . . ran gi s!:
bon tas byun no, and Ch. fl1:.ftJt m
S. Sr seems to have - hat(sva- )J Y - ha(sva- )j but cp o ver se
and T. (see preceding note).
, .
Thus both mss . j T.
b y u ri ste; Ch.
10. Y adds a deleted ca.
II. Y ayo[Jj71it1.
arion. goms pa L a s 0 g s p a
!l!lI!V1Jzl!!!E1i:
12. Y may also be read vd-; Sr - Lam vd- j see n. 1466.
I]. Sr, Y / .
14. Final damaged in Sr.
15. Sr nivarttayati; Y nival'ttate; 1'. ( ' grub pal' byed pal .aniI
Ch. ( W:1:.1t ... ) confi rm ni!vartayati.
16 . Y om. dvayor.
17 . Y adds a deleted bha .
IS . See n. 1472.
19. W. reads vi- ; t he
di sti nguished in t he
dui and ddhi can
photos. See n. 1473.
hardly
- 237 -
4) With the third [stanza (l.!-) he
[ of the wrong view of Self): The
App . II: comm.
elucidates]
innate 1462
the cause
view of
Self arises from apprehending solid things, and from its
own [ i.e. ] from the [latent] propensity to the
[wrong view of Self] . The speculative
1462
view of Self of
the li on-Buddhists [ari ses ] "from former habit": [ By indi-
cating this cause and the following ones (J ib-c) J he shows
that the speculative view of Self originates on account of
defects of a) basis,146
3
B) reflection and y) object, 1464
in the sens e ( .. . iti) that a) t his [ false ] view of the
non-Buddhists had [previously] been habi tually followed ,
that B) in this [existence? ] one reflects incorr ectly, 1465
and
1466
that y) one hears, from other [ persons ] , a wrong
doctrine which favour s this [false vi ew of Sel f]. 1467
[rr.] Thereafter it is el ucidated with five stanzas how
that view of Self, by [giving rise, in] due sequence r, to
the] 0 rig i 111468 (A), brings about S u f fer _
i n g (8); 1469 ho ..... this Suffering becomes, in its turn
the cause of [ the other ]147
0
t ..... o kinds of Suf-
fering
1471
along with the conception of Ego (e)i and how
it is calculated to obstruct liberation (n).
A) With the first stanza he shows the 0 rig i n
1468
[of Suffer ing] .
8) With the second and tnird [stanza <33-34) he elucidates]
S u f fer i n gU72 [as far as it is ] comprised in un-
satisfactoriness of conditioned factors [as such] and con-
sists in alayavijiiana; for
1473
"having stuck to it, 1
474
they1475 thereby fall a prey to conceptual Proliferation",
[thinking/ desiring] 'I shall be ' , 'I shall not be',
etc.; 1
47
6 "sticking to" means taking possession of a (new]
(basis of) personal exi stence . 1477
That moreover , does not cea se even for a single
moment, because it adheres [to one ] all the time.
1478
App . II: comm. - 238 -
r.) eaturthyii (35) yathci tad anyayor 21
ca bhavati /
0) pancamyii (36) yathii punar vibandhiiya bhavati /
sarzrnohas 2 Ztatra ciidhikah itarabhyiif!! 3 anti-
kat
24
/ sarvatraga? sarvaveditcinugatvcit
25
sarVaCe?ri-
te /
[I I I . ] tasyedcinim (37)
Sarupyap27 dargayitva dargayati
ry<ay?')aiva
29
Il' o,at / srotcitrsi cakl!urridini
panca trayo dhiitava ity evamcidi ni
30
I
tiif!! ca bandhamokl!aparijnayii darayati (38
ff.) !
2 o. $1', y -tvat / j cp o also T. taking the sentence as one but
construing tac ca {ad sensum} vith
tvat.
21. Thus Y; $r T. sdug bsnal gaan griis (no sign of
an abstract s uffix, but s i milarly in 236,9, .... here both
manuscripts have and in 238,4 . where both mss .
have j eh . ( lOpa i n and pleasure ": see
ve r se 35d).
22. eh. fha.At '" >tscvrmohcit?
23. Y - bhylif!1?
24. Thus both IIlSS . and Ch . ); T. (. las Lhag pa 'o)
supplies but need not be taken to oresuppose a
different text.
25 . $1' - gatatvat .
26 . Y but - ta- del eted .
27 . Y saraaarupyGo/ /.
28. Y -e- ( cp. Ch .
2;, See n. 1482 .
30 . Y -di iti (or -di ini) .
- 239 -
App.II: comm.
C) With the fourth [stanza (35) he elucidates] ho ..... [thi s ]
Suffering
l479
is [in its turn] the condition of the other
two forms of suffering
1480
and of the noti on of Ego.
1481
D) With the fifth [ stanza (36) he elucidates ] how [this Suf-
reri ng] 1479 is calculated, furthermore , to obstruct libe-
ration.
"And with this [ Suffering as its object ] , delusion is
exceeding [ strong)". [viz. ] in comparison with [delusion
having] the other two kinds of Suffering [as its object ].
"Omnipr esent
ll
: because it accompanies all sensations.
" Tn every activity": i n good, bad and neutral [activity].
[III .] Now (vi%.. in stanz a 37) he [first1 shows that this Suffer-
ing comprised in alayavijilana is similar to a lake, and
t he n ( - tva) shows how it is dried up; [this drying up is
not achieved by fire, etc., ] for ( that "lake"] dries only
by the practice of the Doctrine . 1482
Among the ( concept s u sed in this verse], the "adverse
st reams " [have to be explained as ] the six sense-faculties
- sense of vision, etc . ,14
8
3 t he five Desti nies, the
thr ee [world-] sphe r es, 1484 etc.
He then (viz. in stanzas 38ff.) shows this practice of t he
Doctrine to consi st i n 148S:-thorough comprehension of A)
bondage and B) liberation .
App . II: comm. - 240 -
A) tatra bandhapar ijriii (38) yad eval]7 par ijiinati duhki:=.-
eVa vyavasyati yo 31 ' gmiti- iitma1WJ!1 vy:;: -
va8yati I sa parika!po samutthiipakas - >
"d +- - 33 t . . k b'- . (
eva Jatas aJJana 0
B) mokf/aparijnd0
34
(39-44) pa-
ridipayati I
(39 : ) sahotpannaniruddhaJf1 hi H eSail;1 kLi$ta'!1 mana'; sadii /
kteSebhyas
37
tasya nirmok{w
38
na bhuto yadQ k'l.eSais sahot -
panrlal?! na 3 9 bhavillyat i yadii tai'; saha niruddhQf!1 < I>
yadii tarhi muktam I tat saJI1dadayati ( 40) - na taG
eva utpadyate . 'nyat 40 tu "iuddhQl[1 mane
jiiyate / pUl' vam muktam ity uC'ya-
te (
etam evarthaJ!l puna'; siidhayati vat kLi?taJ!! tad ihiityantiid
ity anayd giithayd (i!..) < / >
31. Sr su- ; for T. and Ch . see n. 1486
32 . Sr eva / .
33. Y - ta'; / .
34 . Y .- jiiii .
35 . Both ms s . saptabhir, but T. drug and Ch. T-.
36 . Y - bhi .
3 7 Y - bhyaJ).
38. Y - k?a';, 5r - k$a.
39 . Sr om. na.
40. Sr may read - te 'nyat, but Y looks like - te I nyat in the
phot o.
41. Y - tviit .
,
- 241 -
App.II : comm.
A) Thorough comprehension of bon d age ( -7 s t anza 38)
[means ] that one comprehe nds in t he follo ..... i ng manner : [A
per son] .... ho t hi nks about himself: "I am pained(ii or "1 am]
pleased", does so .... ith regard to " .... hat is in reality]
nothing but Sufferi ng.
1486
Thi s .... rong idea calls forth ,
moreo\' er , a {fal se ] vi eW': 1487 having itself ari sen from
t his very same (fa lse ] vi e .... , 1488 it hecomes [ , in its
turn,] its cause.
B) With the remaining six
t489
stanzas (39-44 ), he eluc idates
the thorough compr ehe nsion of 1 i b era t io n
(J9 :) "Defiled mind a ri ses and ceases each time together
... ith the Defile ment s . for it, liberation fr om the Defile-
ment s has [ t he ref ore] not [already] happened", ( vi:.] ... 'hen
it has arisen together ..... ith the De fil ements, 1490 "nor will
it [ ever] happe n" , [ vi :.] ..... hen it has ceased toget her with
these [Defilement s ]. 1491
Then {what is actually meant ] whe n it is called 'hbe-
rated,? t49
2
This he explains [in the ne xt stanza ( 40)];
{It is ] not [that] this very same [defiled mind] arises
aft erwards a s a pure one, but [rather what ] a r ise s [after-
.... ards is] a n ot h er mind [which i s ] pur e. And [it
is ] this [ other mind that] is called 'liberated' 1493 be-
cause
l494
even before it had not been de fil ed.
1495
This
ve ry fac t he proves agai n with the next stanza (.!!J , viz .
"That which is defiled is, in thi s [ system). absolutel y
[defi l ed] . . . ".
Published by The International Institute for Buddhi s t Studies:
5-3-23 Toranomon, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan
~ Lambert Schmithausen 19S7
First published 1987
Printed in Japan by ~ j i Printing Company , Kawasaki
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I SBN 4-906267-20-3
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