DIEGO MARCONI

TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTICS AND THE ARTICULATION PROBLEM

ABSTRACT. David Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics is an attempt at setting up a unied semantic framework that would vindicate both the Fregean and the Kripkean semantic intuitions. I claim that there are three acceptable ways of carrying out such a project, and that Chalmerss theory does not coherently t any of the three patterns. I suggest that the theory may be seen as pointing to the possibility of a double reading for many linguistic expressions (a double reading which, however, is not easily identied with straightforward semantic ambiguity).

1. INTUITIONS AND ATTITUDES

In spite of the Kripkean paradigms1 remarkable success, the Fregean intuitions will not go away. By Fregean intuitions I mean the feeling that certain linguistic phenomena require the kind of semantic treatment that a theory of meaning in the Fregean tradition would provide. Such phenomena, on the other hand, are not easily accommodated within a Kripkean framework. Let me briey recall some of the phenomena in question: Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus differ in cognitive value; a theory of meaning should account for the difference. Lois believes that Superman can y and Lois believes that Clark Kent can y differ in truth value; a theory of meaning should account for the difference (such an account is hard to provide if Superman and Clark Kent are assigned the same semantic value). It is not plausible that the word Pegasus plays no role in our inquiry aiming at establishing that Pegasus does not exist (Quine 1952); a theory of meaning should account for that (if a names only semantic value is its reference, this is hard). Oscar believes that the English sentence Water is drinkable is true; Twin Oscar believes that the Twin-English sentence Water is drinkable is true. Such beliefs underlie patterns of behaviour that are in systematic correspondence with each other. A theory of meaning should account for the similarity (such an account is not easily
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provided if water in English and water in Twin-English have radically different semantic values). So, in David Chalmerss words, There remains an intuition that Hesperus and Phosphorus (or water and H2 O[. . . ]) differ in at least some dimension of their meaning, corresponding to the difference in their cognitive and rational roles (2002c, 8; cf. 2002a, 3). There is an aspect of content (or of meaning) that is not captured by the notion of reference. Of course, the Kripkean (or Millian) intuitions are also here to stay: among others, the intuition that the truth value of Napoleon married Marie-Louise does not depend on any non-trivial property of Napoleon, except his having married Marie-Louise; the intuition that the truth conditions of Napoleon was P are not identical with the truth conditions of The so-and-so was P, were the so-and-so is any descriptive expression; and the intuition that in the sentence If Napoleon had been British he wouldnt have become Emperor of the French the name Napoleon refers to Napoleon, not to some individual more or less closely resembling Napoleon but not identical with him. Thus we have two sets of intuitions, pointing to different semantic theories (or families of theories): the Fregean family and the Kripkean family. Theories in the Fregean family identify an expressions semantic value with a property (usually called sense) that is strictly related with the expressions cognitive content while being distinct from its reference. They account for a number of intuitions, e.g., for the difference in cognitive value between Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Phosphorus, but they run into trouble with several others, such as semantic evaluation in counterfactual circumstances. Kripkean theories, on the other hand, identify semantic value with reference; they are unsatisfactory as accounts of belief ascriptions, differences in cognitive value, empty names, and the explanation of behaviour, though they can successfully deal with counterfactual evaluation, indexicals, and more. In the face of such circumstances, three different attitudes are possible in principle. We can insist that one and only one family of theories is on the right track, and try to accommodate the recalcitrant intuitions: Salmon (1986) was an attempt in this direction from the Kripkean standpoint, while Evans (1982) was in some respects its Fregean analogue. Or, we may search for a radically new theory, that would be free from the limitations of both (in recent years, few have made this attempt, as far as I know). A third option consists in trying to have the best of both worlds, i.e., to preserve the strengths of both approaches by combining them into a unied theory, that would analyse each kind of phenomena pretty much along the lines of the approach that is more successful in dealing with them.

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In the late Seventies and early Eighties, many people came out in favour of the third option: they were the proponents of so-called two factor or dual aspect semantic theories (Field 1977; Loar 1981; McGinn 1982; Block 1986; et al.). All such theories suggested that a linguistic expressions semantic value was twofold: one component was intended to take care of differences of cognitive value and therefore of the connection between content and behaviour, thus playing the role of Fregean sense; the other component was meant to be identical with an expressions objective, externally individuated content. The rst component or factor was characterized as narrow meaning, narrow content, inferential role, functional role, the second was called wide meaning or wide content. The rst component was entirely in the head, the second was not. The rst component of the meaning of water ignored the difference between H2 O and XYZ, the second was essentially about the difference. One crucial point of two-factor theories was that neither semantic factor sufces to determine the other (McGinn 1982, 211; Block 1986, 638 639, 643644). Hadnt both factors been fully independent of each other, the theory would have been only supercially a two-factor theory. For example, Freges theory of (1892) is not to be regarded as a two-factor semantic theory, as sense is supposed to determine denotation. The independence of both factors from each other was essential to the enterprise of two factor semantics, for its main motivation was exactly that no singlefactor theory could account for all the relevant phenomena, directly or indirectly. There was, however, the risk that such independence, though declared, was not really borne out by the theory. Perhaps the two factors had been so designed that one factor could indirectly determine a value for the other factor; a value that might be incompatible with what had been independently assigned to the other factor by the theory. Thus, against (some versions of) two-factor semantics, Jerry Fodor pointed out that a thoughts functional role did determine a propositional content which was bound to have a truth condition; at the same time, another truth condition was determined by that same thoughts causal connections with the world, and the theory ha[d] no mechanism at all for keeping these two assignments consistent (Fodor, 1987, 82; Fodors italics). Indeed, for some thoughts they were bound to be inconsistent. Take my thought that water is wet. which supposedly has the same functional role as my Twin-Earthian twins thought that water is wet. At the same time, my twins thought, being causally connected with XYZ, is determined as being true if and only if XYZ is wet, whereas my own thought is similarly determined as being true iff H2 O is wet (this is the second factor). Now, what about the proposition

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determined by the (common) functional role of our respective thoughts that water is wet? What are its satisfaction conditions? Clearly, they are bound to be inconsistent with either my twins or my own thoughts truth condition as determined by the respective causal connections. Thus, if both factors are not really independent of each other (as Fodor claimed), two-factor semantics may issue in inconsistent assignments.

2. THE ARTICULATION PROBLEM

For people who want to combine two (or more) semantic theories into one, life is not easy. Semantic values must be assigned in such a way that no expression gets more than one value of the same type, unless the expression is to be regarded as ambiguous (i.e., unless it is, intuitively, ambiguous); at the same time, values must be assigned so that each theory can display its full explanatory power, i.e., each expression must be evaluated in conformity with both theories; for it is by assigning semantic values in a certain way that a theory has explanatory efcacy. Let us call this the Articulation Problem. Fodors objection, if sound, showed that the versions of two-factor semantics he examined did not offer a viable solution to the articulation problem: they assigned incompatible values to entities that could not be considered ambiguous (more on this in a while). Let us see how one could think of dealing with the articulation problem in abstracto. We shall think of different semantic theories as different ways of assigning semantic values to expressions of a language.2 Suppose that expressions of a given syntactic category are assigned by a certain semantic theory only values of a certain kind or type:3 for example, suppose that sentences are assigned truth values (and only truth values). Then we shall say that the theory acknowledges only one semantic dimension or semantic property (for expressions of that category). For example, a theory that only assigns truth values to sentences acknowledges only one semantic property P of sentences, namely, truth value. Or a theory may acknowledge more than one property, e.g., two: intension and extension, say. In principle, we want to distinguish three things: (a) the fact that values of a certain kind are assigned, e.g., truth values rather than Fregean senses or Montagovian intensions; (b) how they are assigned, i.e., the form F of the functions that implement the assignment: for example, both the classical and the intuitionistic semantics for the language of propositional logic assign truth values and only truth values to sentences, but they do it differently (based on different interpretations of the sentential connectives); (c) the assignments themselves, i.e., the functions fi (all of which share form F ) that assign the appropriate values to expressions e belonging to

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some syntactic category. In compositional semantic theories, the fi s are partly determined by the syntactic form of e, for each e. A semantic theory species both the kind of semantic values that are assigned and how they are assigned, i.e., both P and F ; the latter may be identied with a family of fI s, Fj = {fj 1 , fj 2 , . . .}. In practice, we shall not need to consider individual fi s or to distinguish between a semantic property P and the particular way that property is assigned by a particular theory. Two semantic properties are different if they assign semantic values of different kinds to expressions of the same syntactic category; two properties are independent if neither property assigns, even indirectly, a value that could be assigned by the other property (for example, in Fregean semantics sense and reference are different, but not independent semantic properties, for the assignment of a sense determines the assignment of a denotation). Now suppose we have two theories that are different in that they acknowledge different semantic properties, P1 and P2 (for expressions of the same category); and suppose we want to combine them into one synthetic theory. In principle, there are three possible ways of doing this (i.e., of dealing with the Articulation Problem). We can say, rst, that the two theories do not really account for the same phenomena in different ways: rather, they account for two disjoint sets of phenomena. In each set, one (and only one) semantic property is involved; each of our two putative theories is the theory of one of the two properties. For an analogy from an entirely different eld, think of the theory of light: there, people sometimes say that we have two theories, the electromagnetic theory and the particle theory: each theory concerns a different property (electromagnetic radiation vs. stream of photons) and each property is involved in a distinct set of phenomena. In semantics, this is the solution that Frege adopted to account for reference in indirect contexts. There are two properties, ordinary reference and indirect reference. Ordinary reference assigns ordinary denotations to expressions in ordinary contexts, whereas indirect reference assigns indirect denotations (i.e., senses) to expressions in indirect contexts. Correspondingly, two different families of functions are involved, with disjoint domains and disjoint ranges: expression in direct context ordinary denotation expression in indirect context indirect denotation Considered as a solution to the Articulation Problem, this is entirely acceptable: every expression is assigned two semantic values, however, no expression is assigned more than one value in the same context, so there is
P2 P1

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no risk that unwanted ambiguities may ensue. Context may be said to play a disambiguating role. Secondly, we can say that we are dealing with a single set of phenomena and a single property, except that it is a complex property: it has two aspects, or components, or factors. The property in question is really a pair of properties, P = {P1 , P2 }; each of P1 and P2 maps entities in a single domain to distinct ranges. This is the solution that was adopted by many proponents of two-factor semantics: every linguistic expression in every context has both a conceptual role (inferential role, narrow meaning, etc.) and a referential role (truth conditions, wide meaning, etc.). expression (in every context) conceptual role truth conditions
P2 P1

In this solution, it is crucial that P1 and P2 are independent properties (not just different): i.e., P1 and P2 never assign entities of the same kind to an expression, nor does (e.g.) P1 assign an entity that determines another entity belonging to the range of P2 . For example, conceptual roles are not truth conditions, nor do they determine truth conditions. Suppose the independence condition is not met: suppose, for example, that P1 determines the assignment to e of a value V that is in the range of P2 .4 Then, either V = P2 (e) or V = P2 (e). In the rst case, P2 is, in a sense, redundant: P1 sufces to assign both semantic values to e. So this is not really a solution to the Articulation Problem, for it is rather a reduction of the second theory to the rst. However, the idea was that the rst theory did not sufce, for it could not deal with some phenomena that were, in turn, accounted for by the second theory. If on the other hand we are in the second case, i.e., V = P2 (e), then e is being regarded as ambiguous: it is assigned two distinct sets of entities of the same kind at the same time (for example, two (sets of) truth conditions). This may or may not be acceptable in itself (perhaps e is ambiguous), but anyway corresponds to a different solution to the Articulation Problem. The third solution simply consists in treating the phenomena as ambiguous. In such an account, only one property P is involved, except that P is not a function (equivalently, it is a function that assigns pairs of values (of the same kind) to the same entity). For example, when we say that the word bank is ambiguous for it means both nancial institution and bordering elevation we are neither saying that there are two semantic properties of bank, each relevant to some of its contexts of occurrence and not to the others, nor that bank has a complex meaning, one aspect of which has to do with nance while the other is connected with rivers; we are saying that the word, as a lexical item considered in isolation, has

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two meanings, i.e., that the meaning-function assigns to bank two entities of the same kind. expression (in every context) {sense1, sense2} Similarly, when we say that the sentence Every boy loves a girl is semantically ambiguous we are saying that it has two logical forms. There may be contexts of use such that one rather than the other form is strongly preferred (i.e., any interpreter in her right mind would read it one way rather than the other), but the sentence in itself has both. Similarly with de dicto-de re ambiguities (The Pope is necessarily a Catholic) and every other bona de ambiguity. Clearly, there is nothing inherently wrong with the third solution: it makes perfect sense to regard certain words and sentences as ambiguous, and a theory that makes them ambiguous is a perfectly decent theory. Fodors objection against two-factor semantics was perceived as potentially devastating because it was aimed at two-factor theories of thoughts, not of language: we have no intuitions about a thought or a content being ambiguous. What on Earth would the content of such a thought be? What sentence would one use to express it? And, worst of all, would it be true or would it be false? (Fodor 1987, 82). Had (two-factor) theories of language been at issue, Fodors objection would have had a different import: he could have claimed that it was highly counterintuitive for a theory to make so many sentences ambiguous by assigning them two distinct and possibly incompatible truth conditions, but he could not have claimed that it just made no sense to do so.5 Of course, attributing ambiguity is all right only if the phenomena we are dealing with (say, linguistic expressions) are ambiguous; in other words, ambiguity should not just be an artefact of the theory. The phenomena that the theory declares to be ambiguous should exhibit the patterns of behaviour that are typical of ambiguous phenomena: they should pass certain tests; perhaps they should come to be perceived as ambiguous by the informed observer.
P

3. CHALMERS S THEORY

A new semantic framework, two-dimensional semantics, has been in the eld for a few years. It comes in several varieties (for a survey, see Chalmers, 2002c), though the most thoroughly worked out is undoubtedly the work of David Chalmers.6 Chalmers is both a Fregean and a Kripkean: he believes that the spirit, if not the letter, of Freges view on the notion of sense can be vindicated (2002a, 6) and that a broadly Fregean account of

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meaning is tenable (2002a, 35); but he also believes that senses should be supplemented by a further semantic value, a subjunctive intension (2002a, 35) which is meant to capture the Kripkean intuitions concerning counterfactual evaluation. Thus, Chalmerss is a dualist semantic framework that aims at accounting for both the Fregean and the Kripkean intuitions by exploiting notions from both the Fregean and the Kripkean family. As such, Chalmerss theory must face the articulation problem. In this paper, I will try to answer the question whether the theory is a viable solution to the problem. I will argue that, in spite of Chalmerss theoretical brilliance, technical ability, and generally sound intuitions, the solution he offers is ultimately unsatisfactory. Chalmerss version of two-dimensional semantics was introduced for the rst time in his book The Conscious Mind (Chalmers 1996, 5665), where it was intended to ground the crucial inference from World W is conceivable to World W is possible. In later writings, Chalmers has radically qualied both the 1996 formulation of the theory and its effectiveness in licensing the inference. I will not elaborate on this, since it is not my purpose to assess the theorys effectiveness in grounding Chalmerss views on consciousness. I want to examine the theory for its own sake, as a semantic theory purporting to account for our semantic intuitions, both Fregean and Kripkean. My presentation of the theory will be based on Chalmerss recent work, particularly on 2002c, 2002b, and 2002a; I will disregard the formulations of (1996) unless they are in substantial agreement with more recent versions of the theory.7 According to the theory, every linguistic expression has two intensions, that can be seen as capturing two dimensions of meaning (2002c, 4): an epistemic intension and a subjunctive intension.8 Subjunctive intensions are familiar objects: they are just the usual functions from possible worlds to (appropriate) extensions. For example, the subjunctive intension of Water is H2 O9 is the constant function that assigns truth to every world; the subjunctive intension of Water is XYZ is the constant function that assigns falsity to every world; and the subjunctive intension of The king of France is a liar is the function that assigns truth or falsity to a world depending on whether whoever is the unique king of France in that world (if there is one) is or is not a liar. Correspondingly, the subjunctive intension of water is the function that assigns to each world W the substance that is water in the actual world (supposedly, H2 O), if W has that substance; and the subjunctive intension of the king of France assigns to each world W the individual who is the king of France in W, if there is one, and some conventional entity or nothing at all otherwise.

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Subjunctive intensions determine an expressions extension in worlds considered as counterfactual, Chalmers says (2002b, 3, 9; 2002c, 5). Consequently, they are involved in the semantic evaluation of statements of such forms as It might have been that S, or If it had been that S, it would have been that T (2002c, 39). The connection is not entirely clear (nor is Chalmers explicit about it). The underlying idea seems to be that, by uttering a statement in the subjunctive mode, we are taking the standpoint of the actual world: from that standpoint we assert something concerning worlds that are counterfactual with respect to our standpoint. For example, in saying Water might have been more nutritious than it is we are saying that there is a counterfactual world where water actual water, H2 O is more nutritious than it happens to be; we are not saying that there is a world where the oceans, lakes and rivers are lled with a different, more nutritious substance. Thus what we mean by water in such contexts depends on what the word picks out in the actual world: an expressions subjunctive intension is what the expression means in such contexts. Chalmers says that In considering a world as counterfactual, empirical facts about the actual world make a difference to how we describe it; in considering a world as actual, they do not (2002b 10). For example, in the evaluation of Water might have been more nutritious than it is it makes a difference that, as a matter of empirical fact, water is H2 O.10 Epistemic intensions are less familiar and harder to dene. Intuitively, an expressions epistemic intension determines its extension in a world considered as actual (1996, 57; 2002b, 8, 2002c, 5, 24). For example, suppose we are in a world where seas, lakes and rivers are lled with XYZ: then water designates XYZ. Or again, suppose we are in a world where the star that is brightest in the evening is the planet Mars: if such is the case, then Hesperus turns out to refer to Mars (1996, 65; equivalent examples in 2002c, 5, 2002a, 8). The immediate Kripkean objection that there are no such worlds (e.g., because water, being H2 O, has that nature in all possible worlds) is taken care of by Chalmers by insisting that the objection depends on a posteriori knowledge: a priori, nothing rules out the possibility that the watery stuff in seas and lakes is XYZ. For all we know a priori, water might be XYZ (1996, 61; 2002a, 89; 2002c,18). Epistemic intensions are said to back a priori truth (1996, 62), and also to govern the cognitive and rational relations among thoughts (1996, 65; cf. 2002b, 2). They back a priori truth in that If one thought implies another thought a priori, the epistemic intension associated with the rst entails the epistemic intension associated with the second [and, presumably, vice-versa] (2002b, 15). They govern cognitive, or rational, relations in that an expressions (or a thoughts) cognitive content is supposed to

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be captured by its epistemic intension: for example, the relations between beliefs, desires and behaviour depend on the involved thoughts epistemic intensions, not on their subjunctive intensions:
Belief states can produce very similar behaviour for apparently systematic reasons, even when the beliefs have very different subjunctive content: witness the behaviour that my twin and I produce when we think about twin water and water respectively, or the similarity between the actions of two people who think I am hungry. A whole dimension of the explanation of behaviour is hard for subjunctive content to explain. (2002b, 34).

In short, the notion of epistemic intension is meant as an explicatum of the dimension of meaning on which Hesperus and Phosphorus (or water and H2O) differ, corresponding to the difference in their cognitive and rational roles (2002c, 4). Formally, a sentences epistemic intension is a function from scenarios to truth values (2002c, 20). For example, Water is XYZ is true at a scenario V if V is an XYZ-scenario. Intuitively, scenarios are maximal epistemic possibilities (2002b, 3, 2002c, 19). An epistemic possibility is a way the world might turn out to be, for all we know a priori (2002c, 18); it is said to be maximal if it is maximally specic. Chalmers goes to some length to make these notions precise. He denes two ways in which scenarios might be understood: as centered possible worlds (i.e., possible worlds marked with a center, which represents the perspective of the speaker within the world (2002b, 5, 2002c, 5)), or as purely epistemic entities that are themselves understood as linguistic constructions, i.e., as equivalence classes of complete sentences in an idealized, purely qualitative language. A sentence S of L is complete if it is epistemically possible and there is no D such that both S&D and S&D are epistemically possible (i.e., S does not leave any possibility open). In the centered-worlds interpretation, an XYZ-scenario is a world centered on a subject surrounded by XYZ (see 2002b, 56). In the purely epistemic interpretation, it is a complete sentence that entails some qualitative description somehow amounting to Oceans, lakes etc. contain XYZ. These alternatives need not concern us here, nor do the details of the construction.11 Under no interpretation do scenarios really remove the inherent vagueness of the idea of epistemic possibility. A statement (or, for that matter, a thought) is said to be epistemically possible when its negation is not epistemically necessary (2002c, 21); and it is epistemically necessary when in some sense, it rationally must be true (ib.). Both notions appear to presuppose some boundary between knowledge of language and factual knowledge, if not a full-edged analytic-synthetic distinction.12 For example, All bachelors are unmarried is said to be epistemically necessary, and Hesperus has never been visible in the evening sky to be

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epistemically impossible (2002c, 21). So, a statement seems to be epistemically necessary if it expresses minimal semantic competence, whereas it is epistemically possible if it does not contradict minimal semantic competence.13 However, semantic competence is notoriously hard to delimit. We are told that Water is H2 O is not epistemically necessary, while Water is watery stuff is (1996, 62). We are likewise told that In any given world, the epistemic intension of water picks out a substance with certain supercial characteristics (e.g., a clear drinkable liquid) (2002b, 3; cf. 2002c, 6); thus Water is a liquid and Water is drinkable should be epistemically necessary. These examples suggest an interpretation of epistemic necessity (and of aprioricity) in terms of Quines humble analyticity (Quine, 1973, 7880): anybody who acquires the word Hesperus also comes to believe that Hesperus is visible in the evening sky; similarly, anybody who acquires the word water comes to believe that water is a drinkable liquid. This would identify epistemic necessity with constitutivity of semantic competence (Marconi 1997, 3031). However, these are fuzzy notions: what about Oceans are mostly water, or Rain is water, or Water is used to cook food? These are truths that a child of four might ignore; still, few would say that the child doesnt know the meaning of water. So the notion of epistemic necessity is vague. In addition to epistemic and subjunctive intensions, Chalmers also denes two-dimensional intensions (2002b, 11, 2002c, 67, 38, 2002a, 23). An expressions two-dimensional intension is intended to capture how its subjunctive intension will vary, depending on which epistemic possibility turns out to be actual (2002a, 23). Formally, in one formulation (2002c, 38), it is dened as a function from scenarios to subjunctive intensions, or equivalently as a mapping from (scenario, world) pairs to extensions. To gure out the value of the two-dimensional intension of a sentence S at scenario V for a world W, Chalmers suggests that we ask the question: If V is actual, then if W had obtained, would it have been the case that S? (2002b, 11; cf. 2002a, 23); or in terms of canonical descriptions, If D1 [= the canonical description of V] is the case, then if D2 [= the canonical description of W] had been the case, would S have been the case? (2002c, 38). For example, take an XYZ-scenario VXYZ, and a possible world W in which the oceans and seas are lled with H2 O: the sentence Water is H2 O is false at (VXYZ , W) for any W, for suppose VXYZ is actual: then water designates XYZ; therefore water is XYZ in all possible worlds including W; consequently, it is not the case that water is H2 O in W (given that VXYZ is actual). By a parallel argument, Water is XYZ is true at (VXYZ , W) for any W. By contrast, at any pair (VH2O , W) Water is H2 O is true.14

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Why would one need such a theory, assigning to each expression both a subjunctive and an epistemic intension (or, synthetically, a twodimensional intension)? Chalmerss answer is simple and straightforward: we need it because meaning, or content is indeed twofold. We cannot get by with just subjunctive content, as people have frequently assumed in recent years (2002b, 14): subjunctive content does not account for the cognitive difference between Hesperus is Phosphorus and Hesperus is Hesperus, for the difference between believing that Superman is across the road and believing that Clark Kent is across the road, for Pierres predicament with Londres and London; and it fares very poorly in the explanation of behaviour (2002b, 1517). To take care of all such cases we need epistemic intension. In general, to account for all relevant phenomena we must assume that a thought (or a sentence) has both an epistemic and a subjunctive intension. Chalmers insists that the two intensions are differentially relevant to different phenomena: for example, epistemic intension must be invoked to explain the informativeness of a thought such as Hesperus is Phosphorus or the compatibility of Pierres two beliefs (2002b, 15), whereas subjunctive intension is needed to correctly determine the truth conditions of counterfactual conditionals (2002b, 10); he also hints at the role of subjunctive content in understanding the success of communication and of collective action (2002b, 22). This, however, does not tell us whether both intensions are also differentially relevant to the interpretation of different linguistic expressions. For example, is Hesperus is Phosphorus only to be interpreted epistemically, or is it to be interpreted both ways? Or perhaps it is to be interpreted epistemically in some cases (e.g., in certain syntactic contexts) and subjunctively in others? Is a one-one correspondence presupposed between sentences, or sentences-in-a-context, and the phenomena that either intension is intended to explain? After all, a semantic theory is, rst and foremost, a device for the interpretation of language; so we need to be told how the theory is to be put to use in the interpretation of real life sentences. Chalmers repeatedly and emphatically rejects the question of which is the content of a thought, or of a linguistic expression (2002b, 14, 2002a, 24, 2002c, 39); the idea is that every expression has both kinds of content, the epistemic and the subjunctive. This seems to entail that any sentence has both an epistemic and a subjunctive reading: are such readings always alive, so to speak, or are they differentially alive? Depending on what? There is little doubt that such questions are crucial to the theorys viability as a semantic theory. As we shall shortly see, Chalmers does have answers

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to such questions, though they are neither perfectly consistent nor entirely convincing.

4. FACING THE ARTICULATION PROBLEM

Sometimes, Chalmers appears to suggest that each intension is relevant to a denite class of syntactic contexts: i.e., a sentence is to be semantically evaluated (read) epistemically, or subjunctively, or two-dimensionally depending on its syntactic form.
A sentence is in no sense ambiguous for having both epistemic intensions and subjunctive intensions; rather, it has a complex semantic value. Different aspects of this semantic value will be relevant to the evaluation of the sentence in different contexts. In epistemic contexts (it is a priori that S; it might turn out that S; if S, then T), the epistemic intension will be most relevant. In subjunctive contexts (it might have been that S; if it had been that S, it would have been that T), the subjunctive intension will be most relevant. In combined epistemic-subjunctive contexts, the two-dimensional intension will be most relevant.15 There is no need to settle the question of which of these, if any, is the meaning or content of an expression. (2002c, 39; see also 2002a, 2123)

Considered as a solution to the Articulation Problem, this is essentially the rst solution: there are three semantic properties, mapping different domains (sets of contexts) to different entities. Property 1 assigns epistemic intensions to (expressions in) epistemic contexts, property 2 assigns subjunctive intensions to subjunctive contexts, and property 3 assigns twodimensional intensions to combined contexts. The domains are disjoint by denition: if a context is both epistemic and subjunctive, it is a combined context. The problem with two-dimensional semantics as a solution of this kind is twofold: on the one hand, it is not clear that Chalmerss taxonomy of contexts is exhaustive; on the other hand, it is doubtful that there is a perfect, one-one correspondence between syntactic structures and intended readings, i.e., that (e.g.) all and only syntactically subjunctive contexts are to be read subjunctively and only subjunctively (i.e., not epistemically). Let us start with the rst difculty. What about (1)? (1) Water is XYZ

This is not classied as either an epistemic or a subjunctive context, and it is certainly not combined. So, which intension is relevant in the case of (1)? If we want to account for both the Fregean and the Kripkean intuitions (as Chalmerss theory would like to), we should not choose, but rather assign it both intensions: for the Kripkean would regard (1) as necessarily

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false, as it turns out to be if it is evaluated on the basis of its subjunctive intension, whereas the Fregean would regard it as only contingently false (so she must have the epistemic intension in mind).16 Chalmerss taxonomy is silent about (1), et pour cause: either choice would be hard to justify for a theory that will not forsake either the Kripkean or the Fregean intuitions. Moreover, even in the case of contexts that are explicitly included in Chalmerss taxonomy the proposed treatment is unconvincing from the standpoint of the intuitions that motivate the theory. Take (2) If water were XYZ, it would have been discovered long ago.

(2), being a counterfactual conditional, is a subjunctive context and ought to be assigned a subjunctive intension. Now, (2), read subjunctively, is trivially true, for its antecedent is false at all possible worlds. In this respect, (2) is on a par with (2 ): (2 ) If water were XYZ, it would never be discovered

This may be all right with some peoples intuitions. However, part of the point of Chalmerss theory seemed to consist in vindicating the intuitions of other people, who feel that (2), if true, is not trivially true (i.e., it is not true just because water cant be XYZ); people who feel that, e.g., there could be arguments for or against (2) or (2 ). Such people are sensitive to Chalmerss cognitive or rational role of the antecedent in both (2) and (2 ), which is meant to be captured by the sentences epistemic intension. To do justice to such intuitions, (2) and (2 ) should be read epistemically, not subjunctively. So, aside from the difculty highlighted by (1), the deep reason why Chalmerss solution cannot be of Type 1 is that the intuitions the theory is supposed to vindicate do not neatly correspond to linguistic contexts: e.g., syntactically subjunctive contexts do not invariably elicit Kripkean intuitions. Contexts cannot be nicely split into epistemic (requiring an epistemic reading), subjunctive (requiring a subjunctive reading), and combined (requiring a two-dimensional reading) without begging the issue against the very intuitions that Chalmerss theory is intended to vindicate. Perhaps Chalmers himself is not entirely at ease with his own characterization of two-dimensional semantics as a type-1 solution, for he does not consistently stick to it throughout his papers. Sometimes, he seems to be leaning towards a type-2 solution,17 particularly when he insists that, independently of context, one complex semantic value is assigned to each linguistic expression:
If ones conception of a proposition is a set of possible worlds (or something similar, such as a structure of intensions), then one could say that S expresses two propositions, an

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epistemic proposition and a subjunctive proposition. But if ones conception of a proposition is more generally of what remains semantically of S once the arbitrary clothing of a given language is stripped away, then one could say that S expresses a complex proposition with a two-dimensional structure. One should not run these two conceptions together: for example, the fact that an utterance of S expresses two propositions in the rst sense in no way entails that the utterance is ambiguous, since ambiguity would involve expressing two propositions in the second sense. (2002a, 25)

Here, Chalmers is stressing that an expressions semantic value is the complex entity consisting of both the epistemic and the subjunctive intension (S expresses a complex proposition with a two-dimensional structure). This is why no ambiguity is involved: if two values were assigned, one might suspect ambiguity, but this is not the way it works. However, charges of ambiguity are not so easily rejected. It will not do to say that, although the word bank expresses two notions (the notion of bordering elevation and the notion of nancial institution), it is not really ambiguous for it really expresses the complex notion {bordering elevation, nancial institution} (whereas ambiguity would involve expressing two such complex notions). Or again, it will not be acceptable to say that the sentence (3) Every boy loves a girl

is not ambiguous by virtue of having two readings or logical forms, (3 ) (3 ) (x)(x is a boy (y)(y is a girl & x loves y)) (y)(y is a girl & (x)(x is a boy x loves y)),

for it really has one complex logical form, namely {(3 ), (3 )} (it would be ambiguous if it had two such complex logical forms). The ambiguity is not avoided simply by regarding two properties, P1 and P2 , as making up one semantic value. What matters is the properties role in semantic evaluation: if an expression is to be evaluated on the basis of both P1 and P2 , and both properties have the same range, then the expression is being regarded as semantically ambiguous even if P1 and P2 are conceived as parts or aspects of one semantic whole (remember Fodors criticism of two-factor theories). Similarly, whether a theory is a type-2 or a type-3 solution to the Articulation Problem does not depend on whether different assignments of semantic values are declared to be packed into a single complex assignment: it depends as we saw on whether the acknowledged semantic properties are independent. Are the two dimensions of meaning that twodimensional semantics acknowledges independent semantic properties? Or

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in other words, are epistemic intensions and subjunctive intensions entities of a different kind? The answer seems to hinge on how epistemic intensions are dened. For subjunctive intensions are functions from possible worlds to the appropriate extensions, whereas epistemic intensions are functions from scenarios to extensions; and scenarios may or may not be (centered) possible worlds. If scenarios are dened as possible worlds, then the conclusion that both intensions are entities of the same kind can hardly be escaped. If, however, they are identied with purely epistemic possibilities one is free to maintain that the two intensions are not entities of the same kind. Under this interpretation, Chalmerss solution to the Articulation Problem would turn out to be a type-2 solution, a form of two-factor semantics. However, we saw (p. 326) that type-2 solutions to the Articulation Problem stand or fall with the actual independence of the semantic factors they identify. A viable type-2 theory must be such that the factors do not assign entities of the same kind (otherwise, the theory turns into a type-3 solution, i.e., an ambiguity-ascribing solution). Now, in the case of Chalmerss theory we have the following problem. Take the sentence (4) Water is necessarily H2 O.

Read subjunctively, (4) is true, for the subjunctive intension of Water is H2 O is true at all worlds. What about the epistemic reading? No doubt, there are scenarios at which Water is H2 O comes out false; therefore, if we take the epistemic truth conditions of (4) to be such that (4) is true (at any scenario) just in case Water is H2 O is veried by every scenario, then (4) is bound to be false. One may say that, given that scenarios are intended to be epistemic possibilities, assigning epistemic truth conditions this way amounts to interpreting the adverb necessarily in (4) in terms of aprioricity (truth in every scenario is just a priori truth).18 However, the point is that, within the context of a type-2 solution, (4) must have an epistemic reading alongside a subjunctive one. It is not surprising that the most natural way of reading (4) epistemically entails that necessarily is read epistemically as well. Notice, however, that water is also assigned its epistemic intension: for otherwise there would not be scenarios at which Water is H2 O is false. Thus, that (4) comes out false on the epistemic reading does not just follow from the epistemic interpretation of necessity. So, if (4) is allowed to receive both readings it will receive conicting truth values. To avoid this conclusion, we must force either reading, e.g., the subjunctive reading, as Chalmers would have it (2002a, 22). However, how can this move be justied, if not from the perspective of a type-1

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solution?19 But we already saw that Chalmerss theory cannot be a type1 solution to the Articulation Problem; not without betraying its original inspiration. So, if every sentence is assigned both an epistemic and a subjunctive intension in all contexts, some sentences will turn out to receive incompatible truth values. The two intensions, though not of the same kind (at least under the epistemic possibility interpretation of scenarios), determine incompatible truth values for many sentences. In a way, this is as it should be: epistemic and subjunctive intensions are meant to yield different truth conditions for the same sentence:
We can say that . . . S has epistemic truth-conditions (showing how Ss truth depends on how the world turns out), and subjunctive truth-conditions (showing how Ss truth varies in counterfactual possibilities) (2002a, 51, cf. 1996, 63).

However, this is enough to rule out Chalmerss theory as a type-2 solution to the Articulation Problem, for in type-2 solutions the assigned semantic values must not interfere with each other.

5. TWO - DIMENSIONAL INTENSION

Let us take stock. We saw that Chalmerss solution cannot be of type 1, in spite of his occasional insistence to that effect. It could be regarded as of type 2, for, strictly, epistemic intensions and subjunctive intensions are not entities of the same kind; however, if it is so regarded so that both the epistemic and the subjunctive intension play a role in the evaluation of every expression then conicting assignments are determined whenever modal expressions are involved, as in (4). It remains that the theory is a type-3 solution, i.e., that it solves the Articulation Problem by making language systematically ambiguous. Before exploring this possibility, however, let us pause to wonder whether another option might be open to us (and to Chalmers): maybe the complex semantic value we need is not just the pairing of the epistemic and the subjunctive intension (as we have assumed), but rather their combination into the entity that is called a twodimensional intension.20 Perhaps Chalmerss theory is a type-2 solution after all, except that the complex semantic value that is assigned is just two-dimensional intension. This would contradict Chalmerss explicit pronouncements to the effect that two-dimensional intension is not relevant to the semantic evaluation of every expression: its full structure will be relevant only in rare cases (2002a, 23), whereas most of the time we need only appeal to a thoughts epistemic and subjunctive intensions (2002b,

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11; the remark can safely be extended to language). Still, let us try, contra Chalmers. Let us start with the problematic (1): (1) Water is XYZ.

The two-dimensional intension of (1) is a function that assigns to a scenario V a function that assigns to a possible world W the value True if whatever is water in V is XYZ in W, and the value False if whatever is water in V is not XYZ in W. Therefore, in an XYZ-scenario (i.e., in a scenario where the oceans, lakes etc. are replete with XYZ) the twodimensional intension of (1) assigns T to all worlds, for water, being XYZ in V, is XYZ in every W; whereas in a non-XYZ-scenario (e.g., in an H2 Oscenario) it assigns F to all worlds, for water, not being XYZ in V, is not XYZ in any W. In other words, in any scenario (1) is either necessarily true or necessarily false. This appears to t the intuitions that the theory is trying to preserve: Water is XYZ might be true (in that case, it would be necessarily true); though as a matter of fact it is false, indeed, necessarily false. The possibility that (1) be true is captured by the a-priori consistency of an XYZ-scenario, whereas its de facto necessary falsity is captured by ours being a non-XYZ-scenario, so that (1) is necessarily false, things being as they are. This is as it should be. Or is it? Is the Fregean happy with an evaluation on which water might be necessarily XYZ? This is not what she had in mind: what she had in mind was that (1), though false, might be true, i.e., that water might be XYZ (though it isnt). As we saw, this is captured by the epistemic reading: there is a scenario that veries (1). On the contrary, the intuition is not captured by the two-dimensional reading, which has no room for the simple possibility of (1). This is due to the fact that, as Chalmers says, two-dimensional intension captures how its subjunctive intension will vary, depending on which epistemic possibility turns out to be actual (2002a, 23). To each epistemic possibility, two-dimensional intension assigns a subjunctive intension which, for sentences like (1), is bound to be either a necessary truth or a necessary falsity. Consequently, evaluation by two-dimensional intension ts the intuition that a sentence like (1) might be necessarily true as well as necessarily false. This is not the Fregean intuition. Let us now look at the equally problematic (2): (2) If water were XYZ, it would have been discovered long ago.

In a non-XYZ-scenario, the two-dimensional intension of (2) determines a function that assigns T to every world W, i.e., the conditional is trivially

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true in all worlds W, independently of whether the nature of water was long manifest in W. In fact, given a non-XYZ-scenario water is not XYZ in any W, so the antecedent of (2) is false in every W and the whole conditional is true everywhere. By contrast, in an XYZ-scenario the two-dimensional intension of (2) determines a function that assigns T or F to a world W, depending on whether it was long ago discovered in W that water is XYZ. For XYZ-worlds, this is obvious. For non-XYZ-worlds (e.g., for worlds where the oceans, lakes etc. are lled with H2 O), one may wonder how it could have been discovered that water (that is, VXYZ-water) is XYZ; nevertheless, there is no inconsistency in supposing that it might have. So, (2) is necessarily and trivially true given a non-XYZ-scenario, whereas it is true of false, depending on W-local discoveries, in worlds relative to an XYZ-scenario; i.e., it is contingent in an XYZ-scenario. This corresponds to the following picture: As it turns out (a posteriori), (2) is necessarily and trivially true (for water cant be XYZ); however, for all we know a priori it might be true, or again it might be false. Such a picture does not seem to t our intuitions of what (2) means. To people who dont take (2) to be trivially true for Kripkean reasons, (2) does not say: Suppose we are in an XYZ-world; then it could (or, it might) have been discovered long ago that water is XYZ. It says that, in such an eventuality, it would have been discovered long ago. It is not surprising that two-dimensional intension does no better than subjunctive intension with (2) (or other similar counterfactual conditionals): the apparatus of two-dimensional semantics is simply not t for dealing with non-trivial readings of counterfactuals. Indeed, by insisting that subjunctive conditionals like (2) are to be read subjunctively (2002c, 39) Chalmers is just biting the bullet: we saw that (2), read subjunctively, is bound to be trivial. Two-dimensional semantics inherits from the Kripkean treatment of natural identities the inability to deal with non-trivial readings of conditionals like (2); in no way can it do justice to Fregean intuitions about their truth conditions. Even two-dimensional intension doesnt really help.
6. IS AMBIGUITY THE ANSWER ?

If evaluation by two-dimensional intension does not manage to make Chalmerss theory into a type-2 solution to the Articulation Problem, it remains that the solution is of type 3. This would amount to taking both intensions as entities of essentially the same kind, as Chalmers himself did in the past and still does occasionally.21 In one of his papers, Chalmers says that the notion of necessity should be recognized as ambiguous: there is an epistemic variety of necessity and

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a subjunctive, or metaphysical variety, with two corresponding means of evaluation in possible worlds (2002d, 4). If the notion of necessity is ambiguous, then it is natural to assume that the notion of possibility is likewise ambiguous, for otherwise the two notions would not be fully interdenable. But if the notions are ambiguous, then the words possible and necessary must also be ambiguous, as such words are taken to express the notions of possibility and necessity, respectively. So It is possible that S and It is necessary that S are both ambiguous. Therefore, It might be that S is also ambiguous, for it is (usually taken to be) synonymous with It is possible that S. It is then natural to conclude that It might have been that S and It might not have been that S are both ambiguous: it would be surprising if the ambiguity of might did not carry over to the latter contexts. This conclusion appears to conict with Chalmerss claim that It might have been that S is to be read subjunctively; however, we saw that such a claim does not quite agree with the intuitions that underlie the theory (this is one reason why Chalmerss solution of the Articulation Problem cannot be considered to be of type 1). Now, it seems that if the modal notions and the modal idioms are ambiguous, then many other expressions are bound to be ambiguous as well. Consider the statement (5) Cats are Martian robots

and suppose we want to say that it is possible in one sense of possible, though not in the other (or equivalently, consider the statement Cats might be Martian robots and suppose we want to say that it is true in one sense of might but false in the other). (5) is possible in one sense, for we can imagine a priori a world or scenario in which the furry, self-moving, meowing objects we call cats are Martian artefacts; it is not possible in the other sense, for, things being as they are (i.e., cats being animals with a certain DNA), there is no possible world in which something would have a different nature and still be a cat. Now suppose that the word cat is not ambiguous in any way: it has one and only one intension, which is a function that assigns to every possible world the species cat (or the individuals in that world that have the same nature as actual cats). If so, then there is no world where cat picks out a Martian robot and not an animal: so there is no room for (5) to be possible in the former, epistemic sense. If on the other hand we take the intension of cat to be a function that assigns to each possible world the furry, selfmoving, meowing beings of that world, then (5) is possible in the epistemic sense, and there is no way we could justiedly declare it to be impossible. In other words, the ambiguity of the modal notions and idioms carries with

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it the ambiguity of many other expressions, including natural-kind words and proper names. As we noticed, there is nothing inherently wrong in regarding natural language (or fragments of it) as systematically ambiguous. It may be that every sentence has both an epistemic and a subjunctive reading, differing in their inferential potential. However, the alleged ambiguity must stand up to test. For example, genuine ambiguities are such that one can imagine (and occasionally nd) a language in which the ambiguity does not materialize. As Saul Kripke says,
We . . . have two methodological considerations that can be used to test any alleged ambiguity. Bank is ambiguous; we would expect the ambiguity to be disambiguated by separate and unrelated words in some other languages. Why should the two separate senses be reproduced in languages unrelated to English? First, then, we can consult our linguistic intuitions, independently of any empirical investigation. Would we be surprised to nd languages that used two separate words for the two alleged senses of the given word? If so, then, to that extent our linguistic intuitions are really intuitions of a unitary concept, rather than of a word that expresses two distinct and unrelated senses. Second, we can ask empirically whether languages are in fact found that contain distinct words expressing the allegedly distinct senses. If no such language is found, once again this is evidence that a unitary account of the word or phrase in question should be sought (Kripke 1979, 19).

I propose to subject Chalmerss theory (interpreted as a type-3 theory) to a slightly modied version of Kripkes test: let us see if we can imagine a language in which the alleged ambiguity would be disambiguated. Consider proper names. We know that every proper name has both an epistemic and a subjunctive intension: for example, the subjunctive intension of a standard token of Hesperus is the constant function that assigns the planet Venus to each world (as Hesperus refers to Venus in the actual world), while its epistemic intension is the function that assigns to each scenario (roughly) the evening star of that scenario, if there is one.22 Actually, that Hesperus and the evening star have the same epistemic intension is not to be taken for granted:
For many or most terms, there may be no description (and certainly no short description) with the same epistemic intension as the term.[. . . ] In these cases, the best one can hope for is a description whose epistemic intension approximates that of the original term: as with justied true belief for knowledge, or the clear drinkable liquid in the oceans and lakes for water, and so on. These descriptions may give one a rough and ready sense of how a terms epistemic intension functions, but they do no more than that (2002a, 22).

To bypass this sort of difculties, let us stipulate that the description the Hesperizer has the same epistemic intension as Hesperus an intension that is roughly approximated by the intension of the evening star. We shall then say that the epistemic intension of Hesperus is the function that assigns to each world the Hesperizer of that world (if there is one).

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We are now treating a proper names double intension as involving ambiguity. Consequently, all sentences in which a proper name occurs are likewise ambiguous. For example, the sentence (6) Napoleon had dark hair

is ambiguous: it expresses two different propositions, it has two distinct sets of truth conditions, etc. Could there be a language in which either proposition would be expressed by a different sentence, so that no ambiguity would occur? Let us try the following, that Ill call Disenglish for disambiguated English. In Disenglish, the proper name Napoleon has no epistemic intension: its one and only intension is the constant function that assigns Napoleon to every possible world. Or in other words, Napoleon is just a rigid designator: whatever descriptive material may be associated with the word Napoleon is not supposed to play any semantic role whatever: emphatically, it does not determine the truth conditions of sentences in which the word Napoleon occurs. On the other hand, Disenglish has another expression, the Napoleonizer, whose (one and only) intension is exactly the epistemic intension that the English name Napoleon is supposed to have. Thus the sentence of Disenglish (6 ) Napoleon had dark hair

only expresses one proposition, i.e., the subjunctive proposition expressed by (6). The epistemic proposition expressed by (6) is expressed in Disenglish by (6 ): (6 ) The Napoleonizer had dark hair

Let us now consider the sentence of Disenglish Napoleon had dark hair, i.e., (6 ). Suppose that a Disenglish-speaking child hears the sentence for the rst time and asks the quite legitimate question Who is Napoleon?, or Whom are you talking about?. It is plausible to suppose that his parents will answer the question by some linguistic characterization that ts Napoleon as closely as their education and patience allows them to provide. Thus the child will associate to the sound Napoleon a certain amount of descriptive material. However, his parents, as competent speakers of Disenglish, will tell him not to pay any special attention to such an association: the word Napoleon the parents will say refers to Napoleon, not to the entity that ts such and such a description. For that entity, Disenglish has another expression, namely the Napoleonizer. The child may feel quite confused. However, his Kripkean parents will have no difculty in helping

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him sort out his confusion: they will tell him that, though Napoleon did as a matter of fact Napoleonize, he might not have Napoleonized (while still being Napoleon); that it is conceivable that the historians discover that Napoleon did not Napoleonize after all, whereas they could never discover that Napoleon was not Napoleon; and the like. In short, they will be able to motivate the existence in Disenglish of two expressions with quite distinct meanings, Napoleon and the Napoleonizer. So, the childs confusion is not the point. The point is, rather, this: as Disenglish speakers learn proper names, in many cases, by associating descriptions with them, just like we do in English, couldnt the epistemic reading arise even with Disenglish sentences such as (6 )? For there is little doubt that it is the steady association of descriptive notions with proper names that motivates the epistemic reading of English sentences in the rst place. Thus the ambiguity will arise in Disenglish exactly as it does in English, and for the same reasons. Against this argument, however, it could be objected that, as we understand the distinction between a description that determines an expressions truth conditions, on the one hand, and a mere reference-xing description on the other hand, there is no reason why we should not attribute the same understanding to speakers of Disenglish.23 Consequently, even though speakers of Disenglish may learn proper names and natural kind words by associating them with certain descriptions, there is no reason why they should not be constantly aware that such descriptions do not give the meaning of the names and words they are associated with. Thus, a competent speaker of Disenglish will never assent to (7): (7) Water is H2 O, but water might not have been H2 O;

he will say that watery stuff might not have been H2 O, but water never. But on the other hand it could be replied if the ambiguity does (supposedly) arise in English in spite of both our awareness of the descriptions double role and the presence of such expressions as the watery stuff, why shouldnt it arise in Disenglish as well? It seems that either there really is no such ambiguity in English (against the hypothesis), or if there is, the norms of Disenglish will not keep it from showing up there as well. Which is exactly the conclusion I think should be drawn from the experiment. Thus, we have not been entirely successful in imagining a language that would not carry the alleged ambiguity. The invited conclusion is that there is no epistemic/subjunctive ambiguity (or, it is not the kind of ambiguity that is sensitive to Kripkes test). Then Chalmerss theory is not a type-3 solution to the Articulation Problem either.

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7. CONCLUSION

We saw that Chalmerss theory cannot be classied as a type-1 solution to the Articulation Problem, for the contention that the several intensions (epistemic, subjunctive, two-dimensional) apply to expressions in systematically different contexts cannot really be sustained: if the intuitions on which the theory is based are to be vindicated, there have to be contexts in which an expression can be read both epistemically and subjunctively. On the other hand, the theory is not really a type-2 solution either, for the several factors of the alleged complex intension that every expression is assigned do interfere (at least in certain cases) in semantic evaluation. So the theory is not a two-factor theory, or anyway not a tenable two-factor theory. Moreover, the theory is not easily regarded as a type-3 solution, i.e., as a theory that treats every linguistic expression as ambiguous, or at any rate, the kind of ambiguity that would turn out to be involved does not behave like standard semantic ambiguity. So it seems that the theory is not a viable solution to the Articulation Problem. However, our discussion of the last case (type 3) can perhaps throw some light on what the theory is really about (and on its considerable merits, if seen from the right viewpoint). The basic intuition is that many sentences, such as Cats might be Martian robots Cats could not be Martian robots Water is necessarily H2 O It is possible that water is XYZ admit of a double reading. The two readings cannot be made to correspond to different syntactic structures (this is why the theory is not a type-1 solution), and they represent different evaluations, issuing in different truth values (therefore the theory is not a type-2 solution, a two-factor theory). A formal apparatus can be developed systematically to yield the two readings: such an apparatus would borrow heavily from Frege to derive one reading and from Kripke to derive the other. However, the interesting point is not so much the formal apparatus as the double reading itself. For if the two readings are really there, and they materialize wherever certain expressions occur (proper names, natural-kind names, the modal idioms) so that they reappear in any language that has such expressions, then the issue between the Fregean theories and the Kripkean theories is, in a sense, settled: either family of theories is simply an attempt at privileging one reading over the other: an attempt that is bound to fail. There may be contexts for which one reading is strongly favoured (Chalmerss theory may

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be seen as an attempt at exploiting this difference among contexts), but no context where one reading is denitely ruled out. There are people who think that Hesperus is Phosphorus and Hesperus is Hesperus are both a priori true (see Chalmers, 2002c, 70), and there are people who think that Water might not have been H2 O is all right as it stands (including Kripke himself, before tutoring his own intuitions). This appears to indicate that both the Kripkean and the Fregean intuitions are extremely resilient: there is little hope that the Fregean will succeed in re-educating the Kripkean, or vice versa. We must learn to live with both accounts. In a way, this is exactly what Chalmers is suggesting. However, the form of his proposal is, I believe, misleading to say the least. To say that many expressions admit of a double reading is not to say that every expression has a complex semantic value, nor is it to say that expressions have different semantic values in different contexts (we saw that both claims can be found in Chalmers). Both formulations betray a yearning for a unied semantic theory that would generate both readings in a clean, consistent fashion. There cannot be any such theory, any more than there could be one for, say, the de dicto/de re double reading: there cannot be a theory that denitely and uniquely assigns the de re reading to certain contexts and the de dicto reading to other contexts, or a theory that assigns one complex {de dicto, de re} reading to every expression independently of context.24 What kind of ambiguity is involved in the double reading? For we saw that it is not an ambiguity of the usual kind, i.e., a straightforward semantic ambiguity: if it were, there could be a disambiguating language. To this question I do not have a denite answer. It may be that Chalmers is on the right track when he suggests that the basic ambiguity concerns the modal notions, possibility and necessity (this would explain why the ambiguity will not go away even in a language that disambiguates the modal idioms: for possibility and necessity would still be involved in the evaluation of non-modal expressions). Or, it may be that the epistemic reading is best interpreted as metasemantic rather than semantic, as Robert Stalnaker has suggested (2001). This, too, would explain why the ambiguity will not go away: for the epistemic reading would then express the possibility that a word (such as Hesperus or water) has a different semantic value than it does have, and this possibility will concern any language that has (the equivalents of) such words. In either case, there would be no room for a unied theory of meaning accounting for both readings at the same time.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to discussions with Paolo Casalegno, Manuel Garcia Carpintero, Chris Gauker, Carlo Penco, Alfredo Paternoster, and Alberto Voltolini. I also greatly beneted from an extended exchange with David Chalmers.

NOTES
1 It would perhaps be more appropriate to label the paradigm Millian; it may be doubted

that Saul Kripke himself is an unqualied Millian. However, David Chalmers refers to Kripkes arguments and the intuitions they rely upon as having a prima facie bearing against the Fregean paradigm (see Chalmers 2002a). My label reects this opposition. 2 For simplicitys sake, we shall suppose that all theories presuppose the same syntactic analysis of the languages they apply to. 3 Two semantic values are of the same type if they belong to the same ontological domain: e.g., if they are functions from the same domain to the same range. 4 More precisely, we are supposing that f (e) = V entails that e is (also) assigned a 1,j value V in the range of the f2 s. 5 In fact, in Fodor and Lepore (1992) the same objection is aimed at two-factor theories of language: What prevents there being and expression that has an inferential role appropriate to the content 4 is a prime but the truth conditions appropriate to the content water is wet? (We assume that no adequate semantics could allow such an expression. What on earth would it mean?) (1992, 170). Fodor and Lepore do not consider the ambiguity option. Clearly, it was far from the intentions of the two-factor theoreticians whose views they are criticizing. 6 The earliest formulation of the two-dimensional picture is usually considered to be found in Stalnaker (1978). Among the early versions, Tichy (1983) is in some respects closest to Chalmerss proposal. Chalmers critically discusses Tichys views in 2002c. 7 Readers who are interested in the discussion leading to the recent formulations of Chalmerss theory are invited to consult Chalmers (2002c), and the unabridged version of the present paper at http://www.lett.unipmn.it/docenti/marconid/personale.htm. 8 In the theorys rst version (1996), they had been called primary and secondary. In 2002c, Chalmers uses 1-intension and 2-intension as generic names or labels for the pre-theoretical entities that supposedly t the two sets of intuitions to be captured by a two-dimensional semantic theory (see 2002c, 6). 9 In Chalmerss presentation, the bearers of semantic properties are sentence tokens, for two reasons. First, Chalmers wants to compare his epistemic intensions with contextual intensions, which are obviously attributed to tokens. Secondly, Chalmers admits that an expressions epistemic intension may vary across its uses (although there may be expressions whose epistemic intension is constant across all its tokens) (2002a, 32). I will disregard the matter, as it does not seem to make a difference for the purposes of this paper. 10 However, with non-rigid expressions it doesnt necessarily work that way. Take the statement The prime minister of Italy might have been taller than he is. By that statement, we are not necessarily saying that Mr. Berlusconi who, as a matter of fact, is the prime minister- might have been taller; we might as well be saying that a different and

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taller man (for example, Mr. Rutelli) might have been prime minister (As is well known, the ambiguity was rst pointed out by Bertrand Russell in (1905); see e.g., Lycan 2000, 4445). But if Chalmerss remark applied in this case, only the rst reading would be admissible. Actually, the real point seems to be essentialism: counterfactual water must be H2 O, whereas the counterfactual prime minister need not be Berlusconi. What makes a difference for subjunctive intension are not just the empirical facts about the actual world, but those facts together with the nature of the expression that is being evaluated. 11 Epistemic intensions for subsentential expressions are dened in slightly different ways depending on how scenarios are understood. If they are understood epistemically, i.e., if they are equivalence classes of epistemically complete sentences in an idealized language (2002c, 25), we proceed as follows. Let D be a canonical description of a scenario V. Two singular terms T1 and T2 are equivalent under V if D implies T1 = T2. Then an individual in V is dened as an equivalence class of singular terms (e.g., Phosphorus is |Phosphorus|D ). The epistemic intension of a general term such as water will pick out a class C in V such that x is in C iff D implies T is water for some T that refers to x (i.e., for some T in the equivalence-class that coincides with x ). 12 Frank Jackson, also a proponent of two-dimensional semantics, does endorse some form of analytic-synthetic distinction (1998, 4546). It doesnt seem to me that Chalmers is equally explicit on the matter. 13 Chalmers himself points out the connection between competence with an expression and the ability to know its extension given sufcient information about the world, which is what knowledge of the epistemic intension is about (2002a, 7). 14 In 2002c, Chalmers also introduces a slightly different denition of twodimensional intension, which, however, appears to run into some problems (for a discussion, see the Appendix in the unabridged version of this paper at http://www.lett.unipmn.it/docenti/marconid/personale.htm.). Here I will be relying upon the denition given above. 15 An example of a combined context is If water is XYZ, then water could not be H O 2 (2002a, 23). 16 I will separately deal with the suggestion that (1) may be assigned a two-dimensional intension (see Section 5). 17 Chalmers himself says that there is no question that [he] intended a type-2 interpretation, and that [he has] no sympathy with type-1 or type-3 interpretations (personal communication). 18 If you think that the sentence [Water is necessarily H O] has an epistemic reading 2 on which it is false, then I am happy to play along, but I note that here any ambiguity will then be entirely due to an ambiguity in necessarily (which can express either epistemic or subjunctive necessity), and will have nothing to do with conicting 2D semantic values per se (D. Chalmers, personal communication). 19 In fact, Chalmerss move to that effect is within a generally type-1 setting: see 2002a, 4346. 20 This has been suggested in discussion by several people, among whom Martine NidaRmelin and Wlodek Rabinowicz. 21 There are two sets of truth conditions associated with any statement (1996, 63); These two sets of truth conditions yield two propositions associated with any statement (ib.); etc. For more recent formulations: There is a robust and natural notion of narrow content such that narrow content has truth conditions of its own (2002b, 2); . . . water is H2 O. In a centered world considered as actual, this is true roughly when the clear,

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drinkable liquid around the center of that world has a certain pattern of chemical structure. In a world considered as counterfactual, it is true when H2 O is H2 O (2002c, 6); water is XYZ is true at the XYZ-world considered as actual, but false at the XYZ-world considered as counterfactual (2002c, 24). All these formulations appear to presuppose that both intensions are functions from possible worlds to extensions. 22 From now on I will make no distinction between scenarios and centered possible worlds. The centered feature will be irrelevant to the examples I will be dealing with. 23 This objection was raised by Paolo Casalegno in discussion. 24 This could be done, of course, but only trivially, as one could dene a (unique) complex logical form for sentences such as Every boy loves a girl (see above, p. 15).

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Quine, W. V. O.: 1973, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Russell, B.: 1905, On Denoting, Mind 14, 479-493. Salmon, N.: 1986, Freges Puzzle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Stalnaker, R.: 1978, Assertion, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics: Pragmatics, Vol. 9, Academic Press, New York, pp. 315-322. Stalnaker, R.: 2001, On Considering a Possible World as Actual, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 141-156. Tichy, P.: 1983, Kripke on Necessity a Posteriori, Philosophical Studies 43, 225-241. Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici Via G. Ferraris 116 I-13100 Vercelli Italy E-mail: diego.marconi@lett.unipmn.it