ONG CHIA v REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 127240.

March, 27, 2000) FACTS: The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others failed to state all his former place of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, Sec. 7 and to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with Sec. 7. ISSUE: Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants brief without having been presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of the Trial Courts decision. RULING: YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied. It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

effects several effects were scattered on the ground among which were several documents; Lieutenant Olves informed Moncados wife that he will carry with them some documents to prove the guilt of her husband. ISSUE: Are the documents obtained without warrant admissible as evidence? RULING: YES. It is a doctrine well established in Philippines, United States, England and Canada that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means that the party has used to obtain it. The Constitution guarantees the inviolability of individual rights in the following terms; 'Will not violate people's right to security of their persons, homes, papers and effects against records and kidnapping arrest, unless probable cause that will be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses who introduced, and with detailed description site that has to register and the people that have to apprehend or things that must be seized.' (Title III, article 1, 3rd paragraph). These constitutional limitations, however, does not go so far as competent evidence exclude documents obtained illegally. The regulation of courts, Rule 123, determines which are admissible and relevant and not classified as incompetent evidence obtained illegally. STONEHILL v DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550) June 19, 1967 FACTS: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO v. EL TRIBUNAL DEL PUEBLO Y JUAN M. LADAW FACTS: In an original application for certiorari , Moncado, charged with the offense of treason, alleges that on 4 April, 1945 he was arrested by members of the CIC of the army of the United States at his residence in San Rafael Street, Manila without a warrant of arrest and was taken to the prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal; a week after his wife accompanied several members of CIC under the command of Lieutenant Olves to their residence in San Rafael and found out that several

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. ISSUE: Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure. RULING: Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunctionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs. PEOPLE v. RUBEN BURGOS FACTS: Burgos is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. Burgos allegedly recruited Masamlok to become an NPA, the police authorities then arrested Burgos and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. ISSUE: Are the alleged NPA-related documents and firearm admissible as evidence? RULING: Under Rule 126, Sec 12: A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. However, at the time of defendants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless

arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have been committed first; it is not enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law. SPOUSES AQUILINO GATMAITAN & LILIA AYTON and SPOUSES EMILIANO DEALING and TEODORA GATMAITAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, (FORMERLY IAC) and SPS. DONATO PASCUAL and ROSITA CRISTOBAL, FACTS: This is a Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court directing petitioner spouses Aquilino Gatmaitan and Lilia Ayton Gatmaitan to reconvey to spouses Donato Pascual and Rosita Cristobal one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 758 embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 175077 and ordering the cancellation of the mortgage annotation on said title. Lot No. 758 located at Baliuag, Bulacan with an area of 623 square meters was originally registered (Original Certificate of Title No. 12765) in the name of the deceased spouses Lorenzo Gatmaitan and Filomena Dela Cruz, parents of petitioner Aquilino Gatmaitan and his sister, Emeteria Gatmaitan. On 2 December 1952, Aquilino and Emeteria, for and in consideration of the sum of P300.00, executed in favor of respondents spouses Donato Pascual and Rosita Cristobal Pascual (Pascual spouses) an extrajudicial partition and sale

with a right to repurchase covering Lot No. 758. Thereafter, the Pascual spouses took possession of the property and introduced improvements thereon. On 4 August 1956, Aquilino and Emeteria again executed an extrajudicial partition adjudicating this time to Aquilino and his wife petitioner Lilia Ayton the whole of Lot No. 758. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 12765 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 155759 was issued in the name of the spouses Aquilino and Lilia Gatmaitan. Sometime in January 1970, the Gatmaitan spouses executed in favor of the Pascual spouses an instrument entitled "Bilihan Tuluyan Ng Lupa" by which they absolutely conveyed to the latter spouses for a stated consideration of P500.00, a one-half portion of Lot No. 758 consisting of about 331.5 square meters. While this instrument was neither notarized nor registered, the Pascual spouses, in accordance with the contract, continued in possession of the subject half of Lot No. 758. Subsequently, on 17 January 1972, the Gatmaitan spouses by an instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan" sold to petitioner spouses Emiliano Dealino and Teodora Gatmaitan ( Dealino spouses), who were neighbors of the Pascual spouses in Sto. Cristo, Baliuag, Bulacan, the whole of Lot No. 758. As a consequence of this sale, TCT No. 155759 was cancelled and TCT No. 157176 was issued in the name of the Dealino spouses. This second sale came to the knowledge of the Pascual spouses sometime in November 1972. Thus, on 8 November 1972, Donato Pascual executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with respect to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 758 which had earlier been sold by the spouses Gatmaitan to him and his wife. On 23 November 1972, the Dealino spouses in an instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan," conveyed back to the Gatmaitan spouses the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 758 which the Gatmaitan spouses had originally sold to the Pascual spouses. The following day, the Gatmaitan spouses executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering this same one- half (1/2) portion in favor of the Dealino spouses allegedly to secure an indebtedness of' P1,000.00. Hence, on 30 April 1973, the Pascual spouses filed a complaint for reconveyance of the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 758 against the spouses Aquilino and Lilia Gatmaitan and the spouses Emiliano and Teodora Dealino. ISSUE: Is the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan admissible as evidence?

RULING: NO. The trial court found that the Dealino spouses were buyers in bad faith in respect of the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 758 earlier sold by the Gatmaitan spouses to the Pascual spouses. The fundamental rule is that the factual conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for cogent and strong reasons. The fact that the Pascual spouses were in possession of the subject property, ought to have put the Dealino spouses on inquiry. Before consenting to the sale themselves, they should have investigated the basis of the possession of the Pascual spouses. Since the Dealino spouses failed to exercise the ordinary care expected from a buyer of real property, they must suffer the consequence of their negligence It is the contention of the Gatmaitan spouses that the second sale should prevail over the earlier one considering that they had repurchased the property for P300.00 from the Pascual spouses before selling the same to the Dealino spouses. It appears that the receipt issued by the Pascual spouses which the Gatmaitan spouses presented in evidence, stated that the repurchase price was not P300.00 as alleged by the Gatmaitan spouses, but P600.00 since the consideration was P500.00 plus the expenses for the preparation of the document amounting to P100.00. Thus, the P300.00 paid by the Gatmaitan spouses to the Pascual spouses was only a partial payment of the whole repurchase price. Having only repaid the amount of P300.00 instead of P600.00, as agreed upon, the Gatmaitan spouses were without any right to repossess the whole of Lot No. 758. This being the case, the sale to the Dealino spouses was valid only insofar as the other half portion is concerned. The "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" is not valid for lack of consideration. The Gatmaitan spouses failed to present any evidence showing that this instrument was later on disregarded by both parties. Mere allegation is not evidence. THE HEIRS OF FELICIDAD CANQUE namely: SURVIVING SPOUSE MARCELINO and children MARIANO, LEONILO, PERFECTA, MEXIQUELA, EMILIO, MARCELINO JR., ALEJANDRO, the Heirs of JESUS and ADRIANO, all surnamed CANQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS THE RURAL BANK OF MATANAO (DAVAO DEL SUR), INC. and/or CONRADO ANTONIO FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Canque and Felicidad Canque were the registered owners of a parcel of land under Original Certificate of Title No. P-(20559)-3409, of the Register

of Deeds of Davao del Sur issued by virtue of Free Patent No. 40336, with an area of 2 hectares, 43 ares, and 58 centares. On May 21, 1976, said spouses sold a portion of the parcel of land to the Iglesia ni Kristo Church to the extent of 750 square meters. A new Transfer of Title No. T-8730 was issued to said spouses by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur. On October 12, 1977, said spouses obtained and eventually paid a loan of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) from defendant bank secured by a real estate mortgage over the parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 with an area of 23,608 square meters. On February 2, 1980, Felicidad Canque passed away. More than a month later, on March 7, 1980, widower Marcelino Canque obtained by himself, another loan with defendant bank in the amount of P25,000.00 with the same conjugal property under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8730 as collateral. The defendant bank allegedly considered this second loan as an extension of the first loan as the real estate mortgage of the first loan had remained uncancelled, despite the earlier payment of the first loan by the said spouses. For failure of Marcelino Canque to pay the second loan, defendant bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and sold the property to itself as the highest bidder in a public sale. On September 9, 1983, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered. On October 18, 1985, defendants executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale. On December 23, 1985, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18357 was issued in the name of defendant bank by the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur. After seven years from the registration of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale, plaintiffs Marcelino Canque and his children offered to redeem the property in question but defendant bank refused. Hence, the complaint filed before the lower court on September 7, 1990. ISSUE: Did the lower court overlook circumstantial evidence that could have changed its decision? RULING: NO. Whether the mortgage which the Canque spouses contracted with private respondent bank was intended by the parties to be a continuing one, a factual issue passed upon sub-silencio by the Court of Appeals, had been threshed out by the trial court on finding that the parties did contemplate a continuing credit arrangement. In this issue, we "defer to the well-

entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance which, if considered, would alter the situation." The lower courts did not overlook any such fact or circumstance. Hence, their factual finding as to the parties' intention in entering into a real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage arrangement is binding. The plaintiff may repurchase the lot.