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Brian Coventry Mrs. Koladin ENG 231 period 10 29 April 2012 A False Sense of Security Unlike other types of public transportation, airplanes cannot be quickly evacuated. If a passenger on a bus becomes a disturbance and threatens to harm other passengers, the driver can simply stop the bus and the passengers can exit. An airplane, however, is an entirely different story. Airplanes cannot be stopped because at their cruising altitude, they are 40,000 feet above the ground. This distance has allowed terrorists in the past to hijack planes and fly them where they want because no one aboard the plane could stop them. In such a secluded environment, airport security clearly needs to be more secure than that of a bus. The trouble with this increased security is that it limits personal privacy. Stories of elderly women being violated by airport officials have been strewn across the news, and travelers are no longer allowed to take liquids aboard planes. Recent improvements in technology have resulted in full body x-ray scanners that take 3d images of passengers entire body which are then analyzed by security personnel. Although the threat of terrorism is still real, the effectiveness of airport security needs to be analyzed and compared with the level of personal privacy invasion that takes place. In order to evaluate airport security, the operation of this security needs to be understood. Airport security is currently run by the Transportation Security Administration

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(TSA) which was established by George W. Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centers (Tyson and Grabianowski). TSAs official website describes its operation as a system of several layers that each work to protect passengers, where every layer by itself is enough to stop a terrorist (Layers of Security). The website explains that it is impossible to bypass every single one, so a terrorist attack is impossible. One of the first layers that a traveler experiences is the ID check that the TSA uses. The TSA wants to know who exactly is going to be on a specific airplane and it does this by requiring identification both online and at the security checkpoint in the airport (Tyson and Grabianowski). The online check allows the government to match the passenger against the NoFly List. This list contains the names of people whom the TSA considers dangerous to air travel, and they are not allowed to fly. The verification at the security checkpoint ensures that only people who actually booked flights are allowed through. The next two layers occur during the security checkpoint; it is here that the passenger and their luggage are checked for prohibited items. In order to check the passengers carry-on items, they are all sent through an x-ray machine that allows a security official to see exactly what is inside the bag. This scanner is similar to the x-ray machines that doctors use, but it uses special filtering techniques to allow the operator to see what each object is made of (Tyson and Grabianowski). In this way, the operator can determine if an object is dangerous based both on its shape, its density, and its composition (Hawley). While the baggage is travelling through the x-ray machine, the passenger must also be scanned to ensure that they are not carrying anything dangerous. In the past, this was

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accomplished through the use of a metal detector. This large archway sends short pulses of electricity that reflect off metal surfaces to determine if the passenger is carrying anything made of metal (Tyson and Grabianowski). This type of detector essentially checks for guns and knives that could be used to gain control of an airplane; but since many of these items can now be made from plastic, a new type of detector was needed. This new detector was the backscatter sensor which bounces x-rays off a travelers body so that the machine can create a 3d map of the person. This machine allows the operator to look for hidden plastic knives or guns that would have passed secretly through the metal detector. The final identification check happens right as passengers are about to board the aircraft. This is where the a Federal Flight Deck Officer checks the travelers boarding pass against the list of people who are on that flight and rejects anyone who should not be there. Since this is the last checkpoint before a person can board the airplane, the officers are trained to use both force and firearms if necessary (Federal Flight Deck Officers). Not only would an unauthorized passenger represent a security risk, they would probably be stealing a paying customers seat. Although the average traveler only notices these three identity checks, there is actually another secret operation going on. This secret operation is the team of Behavior Detection Officers who utilize non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers (Behavior Detection Officers). They look for the subtle signs that nervous terrorists give off to determine who needs to be watched closely.

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Lastly, if all of these measures fail, there are Federal Air Marshals aboard flights who are authorized to carry a gun and make arrests (Tyson and Grabianowski). These officials are dressed to look like regular passengers so that terrorists would be unable to identify them. The only problem with air marshals, however, is that since there are so many flights in the United States every day, air marshals cannot travel on every one. This is why the covert dressing is required so that it would be impossible to know whether a marshal is present. Airport security has been designed retroactively to combat past attacks. Examining these attacks allows the rationale for the different security measures to be understood. Airport security first became an issue in the 1960s when there were an enormous amount of airline hijackings. At that time, passengers were not screened and guns could easily be taken onto airplanes. These attacks led to the installation of metal detectors in airports (Hawley). These metal detectors were clearly necessary because in 1969, there were forty hijacking attempts (Hijacking). The next major change in airport security happened after the 9/11 hijackings where terrorists gained control of four commercial airplanes using simple box cutters. These box cutters were actually allowed through security and the huge national outcry demanded that something needed to be done. The result was the creation of the TSA and the banning of all knives on airplanes (Hawley). The TSA then made security checkpoints more efficient and created the Federal Air Marshal system. A few months after 9/11, a man tried to light a bomb in his shoe in an attempt to bring down the airplane. He was immediately swarmed by angry passengers and never had the

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chance to ignite his shoe (Hawley). This swarming action represented an important increase in airport security since 9/11 because before that time, the government ruled that people should remain calm and comply with the terrorists. But in this new age of suicide terrorism, passenger compliance would no longer work. In response to this attack, the TSA stated that passengers could no longer carry lighters onto an airplane and now had to remove their shoes while stepping through the scanner (Hawley). To further reduce the possibility of hijackings, the cabin doors on all commercial airplanes were also reinforced. The next plot occurred in September of 2009 when three men planned to take a bomb onto an airplane. Their plan was to disguise the bomb as liquids that they intended to drink (Casciani). This operation was shut down before it even made it to the airport, but it led to the banning of all liquids on airplanes other than liquid medicines and breast milk (New Policies for Lighters). Finally, the most recent terrorist plot occurred Christmas day of 2009 when a man tried to detonate plastic explosive hidden in his underwear while onboard an airplane (Mann). Since the explosives had no metal in them, airports had to resort to the full body scanners that are now in place across the United States. One of the most important factors that the TSA has to look at when they do their security screening is the balance between safety and speed. All of these new security measure slow down the security process and 63 percent of travelers said that airport security is becoming more of a hassle (Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, 9). In fact, the post 9/11 security measures reduced the passenger volume at airports by eight percent at the nations fifty

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busiest airports (Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, 28). This shows that the new security measures are actually annoying enough to cause people not to fly. A prime example of where TSAs system falls short is in the case of people who have prostheses. A study by the University of Vienna, Austria showed that all prostheses weighing over 145 grams, including joint replacements, set off the metal detectors at airports (Grohs and Gottsauner-Wolf, 1). Since most prostheses do indeed weigh more than 145 grams, most patients of prosthetic surgery will set off the metal detector, indicating that they are carrying a weapon. To prove that they are not armed, the traveler must then be subjected to a long and difficult process that involves around ten x-rays of the prosthesis (Trimble). Although this type of security is necessary since the limbs could hide explosives, it often does not run smoothly. One of the problems is that the specialized screener has to be found which can take up to half an hour. Then, in the case of the newer prostheses which have electronic components, passengers may not even be cleared after the x-rays and then must try to explain to the TSA agents why they have electronic components on their person (Trimble). For someone with a prosthetic limb, the TSA can be a nightmare. Another area where the TSA could do a better job is in the area of liquids. Although liquids are currently not allowed to pass through security, former head of the Transportation Security Administration Kip Hawley noted that existing scanners could allow passengers to carry on any amount of liquid they want, so long as they put it in the gray bins (Hawley). Allowing liquids through would create more false positives than usual, but Hawley said he drafted documents for a liquid line that would give travelers the ability to bring liquids on the

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plane, at the expense of a little extra time (Hawley). With the amount of anger that passengers express about having to throw away their drinks, it is a surprise the TSA has not implemented this yet. When the TSA was first introduced, staffing appropriations were made based on the total volume of passengers who flew through an airport. The only problem with this method is that many of the largest airports serve primarily as connecting airports which means that few of the travelers actually have to pass through security. The result was that the connecting airports were overstaffed and the destination airports were understaffed (Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, 6). In response to the overstaffing at large airports, congress simply reduced the screener workforce by more than 6,000, to 45,300 instead of moving the screeners from large airports to small airports (Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, 6). After all of this shuffling of TSA agents, most airports ended up understaffed. Understaffing can be a serious issue because it leads to slow-downs in the security process. What makes this worse is that since the airline industry focuses on tight deadlines, sometimes protocol is abandoned in favor of speed. For instance, at an airport in Texas, a conveyor belt jammed and for 90 minutes, hundreds of bags piled up while planes waited to leave (Phillips). The TSA simply did not have enough personnel to scan all of these bags, so their solution was to examine what bags you can and send the rest through unscreened (Phillips). This was clearly a major security issue. Although no one was harmed because of these uncheck bags, it would not be out of a terrorists ability to jam a conveyor belt so that their bomb could pass through unscanned.

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Not only are there not enough officials inside the airports, but there are not enough federal air marshals as well. In fact, federal air marshals protect less than 5 percent of daily U.S. flights, and the numbers are declining (Air Marshals). These people are essentially the police officers of the sky, but if they are not on the same plane as a terrorist, they cannot stop the terrorist. What makes it worse is that these air marshals get paid by the number of flights they take, not the number of miles flown (Air Marshals). This means that the longer flights, the flights terrorists are more likely to hijack, tend to have fewer air marshals. During his time as head of the TSA, Kip Hawley noticed a disturbing trend in the behavior of the x-ray screeners at airports. He noted that Constant positive reinforcement on finding items like lighters had turned our checkpoint operations into an Easter-egg hunt (Hawley). This Easter-Egg hunt progressed to the point that often, during security tests, the security officials would not notice bomb parts if there was a lighter in the same bag. The screeners would get such a rush from finding the lighter that they would completely miss the bomb. While all of these security measures sound like they should be effective, the real question is: Are they? According to Charles Mann of Vanity Fair, a ir marshals have not saved a single life, although one of them did shoot a deranged passenger a few years ago (Mann). So, to this extent, it might not matter that air marshals do not ride on every flight, because so far, they have not actually helped. The Behavior Detection Specialists also fall into this category. Although the government does not release the specifics on what they do, in the last 10 years, there have been 20 known

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full-fledged al-Qaeda operatives who flew on U.S. planes (Mann). Although the job of these specialists makes sense, sorting the terrorists from the millions of people who fly on airplanes simply is not possible. While the government No-Fly List is designed to keep terrorists off planes, Slate writer Andy Bowers found a serious loophole. Here is how the loophole works: First, the terrorist buys a ticket online using a stolen credit card. When they print their boarding pass under the name on the credit card, they also print a fake boarding pass that contains their name. When they arrive at the airport, they give the TSA agent at the security checkpoint the fake boarding pass and the TSA agent allows that person to go through. The reason this works is that the agent does not actually scan the boarding pass, but only compares it to the passengers photo ID. Finally, when the terrorist boards the plane, they hand the flight deck officer the official boarding pass, and since that checkpoint does not require ID, the terrorist can board the plane under a false name. The heart of the loophole lies in the fact that at no point do you have to prove that the person in whose name the ticket was bought is the same person standing at the airport (Bowers). This loophole effectively renders the No-Fly List useless. With all of the security measures in place at the security checkpoints, most passengers would believe that sneaking a weapon through would be impossible. Security technologist Bruce Schneier begs to differ. Schneier dedicates a great deal of his time proving that the TSA can easily be fooled. For instance, if a terrorist needs a knife on a plane Get some steel epoxy glue at a hardware store. It comes in two tubes, one with steel dust and then a hardener. You make the mold by folding a piece of cardboard in two, and then you mix the two tubes

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together. You can use a metal spoon for the handle. It hardens in 15 minutes (Goldberg). Schneier also managed to take two 12 ounce containers full of saline solution through the security checkpoint (Goldberg). The contents of these containers were never verified, so they easily could have contained liquid explosives. Perhaps the biggest flaw noted by Schneier is that most of the airport food service workers never pass through a metal detector (Mann). A terrorists friend could simply acquire one of these jobs and bring the necessary weapons into the airport to take down a plane. Although there are background checks on these jobs, a dedicated terrorist with enough resources would be able to man on the job. In order to improve the current state of TSA, former head Kip Hawley offered a five part plan that could make a difference (Hawley). First, remove the banned item list: this would stop the Easter-egg hunt and allow screeners to focus on the bigger picture. Guns, poisons, and explosives would still be banned, but simple items like lighters and knives would be allowed. Although knives seem dangerous, the new cabin doors along with the response of other passengers would make them useless. Second, allow all liquids: Hawley says that Simple checkpoint signage, a small software update and some traffic management are all that stand between you and bringing all your liquids on every U.S. flight (Hawley). Third, give TSA officers more initiatives: as it stands now, innovations from officers often result in punishment rather than reward. Fourth, eliminate baggage fees: this would stop people from over packing their carry-ons and speed up processing. Finally, randomize security: rather learning to overcome the regularities of the current security system, terrorists would have a much harder time bypassing a completely random checkpoint.

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For these reasons, it is clear that although the TSA had good intensions when they designed their system, it does not actually do its job. All of the improvements to the system made sense when they were implemented, but now, their primary purpose is to provide a false sense of security to passengers while terrorists can still exploit the system. Bruce Schneier noted that Its like saying, Last time the terrorists wore red shirts, so now were going to ban red shirts (Mann). When people complain about the hassle they experience at the security checkpoints, they have a good reason to be angry: They are passing through a system designed to catch the terrorists of yesterday, not the terrorists of tomorrow.

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Works Cited "Air Marshals Cover Only a Few Flights." The Washingtion Times. 16 Aug. 2004. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/aug/16/20040816-0112379757r/?page=1>. "Behavior Detection Officers (BDO)." TSA:. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/bdo/index.shtm>. Blalock, Garrick, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel H. Simon. "The Impact of Post 9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel." Thesis. Cornell University, 2005. Print. Bowers, Andy. "If Slatecould Discover It, the Terrorists Will Too." Slate Magazine. 7 Feb. 2005. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/02/a_danger ous_loophole_in_airport_security.html>. Casciani, Dominic. "Liquid Bomb Plot: What Happened." BBC News. BBC, 09 July 2009. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8242479.stm>. "Federal Flight Deck Officers." TSA. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/programs/ffdo.shtm>. Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Things He Carried." The Atlantic. Nov. 2008. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/the-things-he-carried/7057/1/>. Grohs, Josef G., and Forian Gottsauner-Wolf. "Detection of Orthopaedic Prostheses at Airport Security Checks." Thesis. University of Vienna, Austria, 1997. Print. Hawley, Kip. "Why Airport Security Is Broken - And How To Fix It." The Wall Street Journal. 14 Apr. 2012. Web. 29 Apr. 2012.

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<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577335783535660546.html >. "Hijacking." TheFreeDictionary.com. The Gale Group, 2008. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Hijacking>. "Layers of Security." TSA. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm>. Mann, Charles C. "Smoke Screening." Vanity Fair. 20 Dec. 2011. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112>. "New Policies for Lighters, Electronics, and Breast Milk." TSA:. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/sop/index.shtm>. Phillips, Cheryl, Steve Miletich, and Ken Armstrong. "Airport-security System in U.S. Riddled with Failures." The Seattle Times. The Seattle Times, 13 July 2004. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2001976972_tsa11.html>. Trimble, Tyghe. "The Problem With Prostheses and Airport Security." Fox News. FOX News Network, 23 Nov. 2010. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/11/22/problem-prostheses-airport-security/>. Tyson, Jeff, and Ed Grabianowski. "How Airport Security Works." HowStuffWorks. 20 June 2001. Web. 29 Apr. 2012. <http://science.howstuffworks.com/transport/flight/modern/airport-security.htm>.