|shrI gaNeshAya namaH || || shrIviTThalaM namAmi || The advaita-siddhi is regarded as one of the most important polemical works of advaita.

It is Madhus dana sarasvatI!s "rilliant and successful defense of advaita in response to the o"#ections of the MAdhvas$ the dualists. %hankara states that his doctrine of "rahma#nAna &"rahma#nAnamapi vastutantrameva - "rahma-s tra"hAshhya '.'.() is a *vastu-tantra*$ a doctrine "ased on facts$ as opposed to a *purushha-tantra*$ a doctrine "ased on the knowledge of an an individual. +ne can raise o"#ections against individual opinions "ut facts cannot "e o"#ected to, they can possi"ly "e misunderstood. +ne can possi"ly e-press ignorance of facts "ut not argue against them. %o one may ask. how is it possi"le for the mAdhvas to raise o"#ections against advaita that is "ased on facts/ It is not possi"le. 0hat the MAdhvas$ the dvaitins$ have done is to e-press misunderstandings$ not o"#ections. It is$ therefore$ proper to answer the so-called o"#ections of the mAdhvas "y clearing their misunderstandings of advaita. 1ut it must also "e mentioned that$ in some cases at least$ it appears that the misunderstandings are not genuine misunderstandings "ut misunderstandings introduced on purpose to A) misrepresent advaita first and then$ 1) to try to refute the resulting misrepresentation. Nevertheless$ advaitins should remove all misunderstandings$ whether they "e genuine or otherwise$ and no advaitin has done this "etter than Madhus dana %arasvatI$ the great logician from 1engal. I endeavor here to present some glimpses of the advaita-siddhi!s great treasures$ treasures that are to "e cherished for all time. In a forum like this one$ it is hard$ if not impossi"le$ to do #ustice to such a monumental work as the advaita-siddhi. %o I will endeavor to present only a few discussions with translation$ consulting the e-planations of 1ala"hadra 1haTTAchArya in his advaita-siddhi-vyAkhyA$ of 1rahmAnanda in his 2au3a-"rahmAnandI &laghuchandrikA) commentary on the advaita-siddhi$ and of 4iTThala upAdhyAya in his commentary on the laghu-chandrikA. All these works$ namely the advaita-siddhi$ siddhi-vyAkhyA$ 2au3a-"rahmAnandI$ and also the viTThaleshopAdhyAyI commentary on the 2au3a-"rahmAnandI$ all in the original %anskrit$ have "een edited "y 5andit Anantakrishna %astri and pu"lished "y 5arimal 5u"lications$ 3elhi$ in '677. A few words a"out the authors. Madhus dana sarasvatI is a towering giant among advaitins. An oft 8uoted verse regarding him is. madhus danasarasvatyAH pAraM vetti sarasvatI | pAraM vetti sarasvatyAH madhus danasarasvatI || &+nly) the 2oddess of 9earning$ sarasvatI knows the limits of &knowledge of) Madhus dana sarasvatI. And Madhus dana sarasvatI knows the limits of &knowledge of) 2oddess sarasvatI: He is said to have had three illustrious gurus. He learned mImAMsA from mAdhava sarasvatI$ vedAnta from rAmatIrtha$ and took sannyAsa dI-A from vishveshvara sarasvatI. Apart from the advaita-siddhi which is Madhus dana!s *crest-#ewel*$ he is said to have written numerous other works$ including a lucid commentary on the gItA called g 3hArtha-dIpikA$ and a work called *advaita-ratna-la-ana*$ a refutation of the work *"heda-ratna* "y the logician shankara mishra. Madhus dana demonstrates his a"ility as a master logician in the advaitasiddhi$ which he wrote as a response to the nyAyAm;<ita of the mAdhva e-ponent$ vyAsatIrtha. Madhus dana was so accomplished in navya-nyAya &logic) techni8ues that the following verse is 8uoted a"out him when he visited navadvIpa$ the center for learning in nyAya-shAstra.

navadvIpe samAyAte madhus danavAkpatau | chakampe tarkavAgIshaH kAtaro .a"h d.h gadAdharaH || 0hen Madhus dana$ the master of speech$ came to navadvIpa$ MathurAnAtha tarkavAgIsha &who was the foremost navya naiyAyika during those times) trem"led &with fear) and 2adAdhara &another logician of great repute) "ecame afraid. 1ala"hadra 1haTTAchArya$ the author of siddhi-vyAkhyA$ is said to have a "een a favorite student of Madhus dana. 1rahmAnanda$ the author of gau3a"rahmAnandI &laghu-chandrikA)$ wrote the work as a response to the nyAyAm;<ita-taraN<giNI of the dvaitin &dualist) rAmAchArya. 1rahmAnanda was the student of nArAyaNa tIrtha$ a student of Madhus dana. =inally$ 4iTThalesha upAdhyAya$ a "rAhmaNa of the >onkan region$ has also placed the followers of advaita under his de"t for writing a lucid commentary on the ga 3a-"rahmAnandI. || shrIvishhNave namaH || 4erse ' of the advaita-siddhi ----------------------------mAyAkalpita-mAt;<itA-mukha-m;<ishhA-dvaitaprapa?NchAshrayaH satya-2@Ana-sukhAtmakaH shruti-shikhottha-akhaN3adhIgocharaH | mithyA-"andha-vidh nanena paramAnandaika-tAnAtmakaM mokshhaM prApta iva svayaM vi#ayate vishhNur-vikalpor##hitaH ||' || Translation "ased on siddhivyAkhyA of 1ala"hadra "haTTAchArya and 2au3a-"rahmAnandI &laghu-chandrikA) of 1rahmAnanda 4ishhNu shines supreme$ He who is the su"stratum &"asis) of the world of duality "eginning with the notion of cogniAer &mAt;<i)$ of duality that is false and fa"ricated "y mAyA$ He whose nature is B-istence$ Consciousness$ and 1liss$ He who is realiAed "y the undifferentiated &undivided) direct e-perience arising from the mahAvAkyas of vedAnta$ He who "y shaking off the false "onds &of mAyA) has attained$ as it were$ mokshha wholly consisting of supreme "liss$ and He who "ecomes free from all variety$ manifoldness &vikalpa). &') 1rahmAnanda clearly identifies 4ishhNu with #Iva$ the individual soul$ the pervader. vishhNuH vyApakaM #Ivasvar pam.h | This individual soul &#Iva) attains as it were$ mokshha or li"eration and shines as 4ishhNu$ the supreme 1rahman. 0hat is mokshha and what is "andha &"ondage)/ The vArtikakAra has said. *avidyAstamayo mo-aH sA cha "andha udAh;<itaH* Mokshha is the complete dissolution of avidyA$ and "ondage is that avidyA. 1rahmAnanda interprets *mithyA"andhavidh nanena - vikalpo##hita* as "rahmAtmaikya-a2@Anar pa"andhasya tAd;<ishhAstamayena d;<ishyash nyaH. 1ondage is the ignorance of the identity of 1rahman and Atman &individual self). +nce such ignorance is fully removed$ there is nothing *seen* &as only the seer d;<ik remains). 1ala"hadra interprets shrutishikhottha-akhaN3adhIgocharaH as vedAnta-#anya-akhaN3asA-AtkAravishhaya$ that thing which is the content of the indivisi"le &undifferentiated) direct e-perience arising from the &mahAvAkyas) of vedAnta. viTThaleshopAdhyAya e-plains the whole process descri"ed in the first verse of the advaita-siddhi as follows. vishhNuH &#IvaH) vastutaH satya2@AnasukhAtmako .pi san.h$ mAyAkalpitamAt;<itAmukham;<ishhA-dvaitaprapa?NchAshrayo #AtaH$ mukto .api san.h a2@Anena "addhatvena "hrAnta ityarthaH | tatashcha vastuto "addhasya tattvena "hrAntasya mumu-AsaM"havAt.h sa mumu-u san.h gurumanus;<itaH tataH tadupadishhTa-shruti-shikho-

ttha-akhaN3adhIgocharo .a"h t.h | nishhkAmakarmopAsanAnushhThAnena shraddhaikAgrachittaH san.h AtmAnaM satya2@Anasukhar pa"rahmatvena sA-Atk;<itavAn.h | tatashcha mithyA"andhavidh nanena vikalpo##hitaH mithyA"andhApagamAt.h tatprayuktavikalpena duHkhena rahitaH san.h paramAnandaikatAnAtmakamo-aM prApta iva | avAstavasaM"andha"hramasyaiva satvAt.h mo-ar pasya tatsaM"andhaa"hAvAchcha iva ityuktam.h | Id;<ishaH san.h vi#ayate svaprakAshar potkarshhavAn.h ityarthaH | 4ishhNu &as the #Iva)$ even "eing actually of the nature of ;eality$ Consciousness$ and 1liss$ is the su"stratum of the false world of duality "eginning with the notion of cogniAer that is fa"ricated "y mAyA. Bven though He &the #Iva) is li"erated$ due to "eing "ound "y ignorance$ He is under delusion. &If) He is actually "ound and &really) deluded "y reality$ from that &it follows that) desire for li"eration is impossi"le. &1ut this is not so.) 1eing desirous of li"eration He follows a &worthy) 2uru. =rom the vedAntic teachings of that &2uru)$ He has comprehended the undivided 1rahman. 1y performing actions without desire for fruits thereof and "y performing upAsana &worship and meditation)$ "eing of one-pointed mind and dedicated$ He has directly realiAed the %elf as the 1rahman which is essentially ;eality$ Consciousness$ and 1liss. Thereupon$ "y the removal of the false "onds &of mAyA)$ and "eing freed from the associated sorrow$ &He) has attained mokshha or li"eration which is wholly "liss. 1ecause of the presence of the illusion of "eing related &to duality in the state of "ondage)$ which is not real$ and "ecause of the a"sence of that relation in mokshha$ the &word) *iva*$ as it were$ is stated. 1eing so &li"erated and in His real state)$ He &4ishhNu) shines supreme "y His own "rilliance. &To "e continued) Anand Next, MadhusUdana pays respects to his three Gurus who taught him mImAMsA, vedAnta, and initiated into sannyAsa. shrIrAma-vishveshvara-mAdhavAnAmaikyena sAxAtkR itamAdhavAnAm.h ! sparshena nirdhUtatamora"o#hya$ pAdotthite#hyo .astu namo ra"o#hya$ !! % !! May sa&utations #e to the dust that on contact removes darkness 'ignorance(, the dust o) the )eet o) shrI rAma, shrI vishveshvara, and shrI mAdhava, who have direct&y rea&i*ed the para#rahman 'mAdhava( as identica& with themse&ves. +he )irst occurrence o) ,mAdhava, denotes the Guru, mAdhava, #ut the second stands )or para#rahman, per gau-a-#rahmAnandI mAdhavAnAM para#rahmaNAm.h . #ahu#hirvihitA #udhai$ parArthaM vi"ayante .amitavistR itA ni#andhA$ ! mama tu shrama eshha nUnamAtmaM#haritAM #hAvayituM #havishhyatIha !! . !! Many know&edgea#&e peop&e have composed &engthy works that are exce&&ent and )or the sake o) 'educating( others. /ut this e))ort o) mine wi&& on&y #e )or )u&)i&&ing my own

o#"ective. 0i++ha&esha states here that MadhusUdana has expressed his &ack o) conceit, garvarAhityapradarshana. In the next verse, MadhusUdana #rie)&y states the purpose o) his work. shraddhAdhanena muninA madhusUdanena saN gR ihya shAstranichayaM rachitAtiyatnAt.h ! #odhAya vAdivi"ayAya cha sattvarANAm-advaitasiddhiriyamastu mude #udhAnAm.h !! 1 !! +his advaita-siddhi has #een composed #y the sage MadhusUdana, whose so&e asset is dedication, with great di&igence, a)ter co&&ecting the truths o) the shAstras. May this advaita-siddhi #e use)u& in imparting 'correct( understanding and in gaining victory over disputants 'with opposite views( to those who are too #usy 'to read &engthy works( and may it #e a 'source o)( "oy to the &earned2 $ere, /rahmAnanda sees a &ink #etween ,iyam.h, 'this( in the current verse and the )ina& verse o) the advaita-siddhi3 siddhInAm-ishh+a-naishhkarmya-#rahmagAnAmiyaM chirAt.h ! advaitasiddhiradhunA chaturthI sama"Ayata !! A)ter a &ong &apse o) time since the ,siddhi,s o) ishh+a, naishhkarmya, and #rahma, this advaita-siddhi, the )ourth siddhi, has originated. +he three other siddhi4s #eing re)erred to are the ishh+a-siddhi o) 0imuktAtman, the naishhkarmya-siddhi o) 5ureshvara, and the /rahmasiddhi o) maN-ana mishra. MadhusUdana 3tatrAdvaitasiddherdvaitamithyAtvasiddhipUrvakatvAt.h dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyam.h ! 5ince the esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity is the antecedent o) esta#&ishing the truth o) nondua&ity, on&y the unrea&ity o) dua&ity is to #e esta#&ished )irst. siddhivyAkhyAkAra '#a&a#hadra( 3nanu advaitasiddhAvadvaitasyaiva pratipadanIyatayA tadvihAyAgre dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanaM kriyamANamasaN gatamityata Aha tatreti ! tasyAmadvaitasidhhau dvaitamithyAtvameva prathamamupapAdanIyamityartha$ ! tatra hetu$ advaitasiddherityAdi ! tathAcha dvaitamithyAtve upapAdite .advaitaM sUpapAdamiti dvaitamithyAtvopapAdanamadvaitasiddhyanuguNatvAnnAsaN gatamiti dhyeyam.h ! An o#"ection can #e raised3 In advaita-siddhi, on&y advaita shou&d #e discussed. -iscarding that 'o#"ective( in the #eginning, the esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity that is #eing done is irre&evant. In rep&y, 'MadhusUdana( states tatra, etc. In advaita-siddhi 'esta#&ishing the truth o) non-dua&ity(, the unrea&ity o) dua&ity is to #e esta#&ished )irst6 this is the meaning. +he reason #eing ,advaitasiddhe$,, etc. ie. ,since the esta#&ishing o) nondua&ity is preceded #y esta#&ishing the unrea&ity o) dua&ity., And a&so, when the unrea&ity o) dua&ity

is o) it is

esta#&ished, nondua&ity is easi&y esta#&ished6 #y the esta#&ishing unrea&ity o) dua&ity, the truth o) nondua&ity )o&&ows. +here)ore, is to #e considered that 'such esta#&ishing o) unrea&ity o) dua&ity( not irre&evant.

'+o #e continued( Anand A review o) some concepts and terms )rom nyAya is in order #e)ore we proceed )urther. 7&ease see ,Materia&s )or the study o) Navya Nyaya 8ogic, #y Inga&&s or ,+he Navya-Nyaya doctrine o) negation, #y /ima& 9rishna Mati&a& )or more detai&s. 7rocess o) in)erence3 :very noneterna& entity, according to nyAya, must #e a resu&t o) an instrumenta& cause 'karaNa( and an operation 'vyApAra(. An in)erence 'anumAna(, that is a means to know&edge o) man and hence noneterna&, must have an instrumenta& cause and an operation #y which the cause #rings a#out the in)erence. In the process o) in)erence, the operation is ca&&ed parAmarsha or consideration, and the instrumenta& cause is the know&edge o) invaria#&e concomitance 'vyApti(, a&so ca&&ed pervasion. +his vyApti corresponds very rough&y to &ogica& imp&ication in ;estern &ogic. In the in)erence, ,the mountain possesses )ire #ecause it has smoke,, the instrumenta& cause, karaNa is the know&edge o) the invaria#&e concomitance, ,smoke is the invaria#&e concomitant o) )ire,, vahni-vyApyo dhUma$, ie. where there is smoke there is )ire. +he operation, vyApAra is the consideration 'parAmarsha( that is a know&edge o) the occurrence o) the concomitant in the su#"ect 'pakshha( where the in)erence is #eing made. In the in)erence, ,the mountain possesses )ire #ecause it has smoke,, the parAmarsha wi&& #e o) the )orm, ,the mountain possesses smoke which is an invaria#&e concomitant o) )ire, - parvato vahni-vyApya-dhUmavAn.h In po&emica& treatises and de#ates, an in)erence is stated terse&y #y &isting the in)erence 'conc&usion( )o&&owed #y a sing&e word representing the app&ication o) the consideration and the invaria#&e concomitance. <or examp&e, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, ,the mountain possesses )ire #ecause o) smoke., In every in)erence, there are evident three terms, ca&&ed =( sAdhya or that which is to #e proved, %( the hetu or &inga, the concomitant, and .( the su#"ect or pakshha, that in which the hetu is known to occur. In the in)erence, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, ,the mountain has )ire #ecause o) smoke,, the sAdhya is vahni ')ire(, the hetu is smoke, and the pakshha is parvata 'mountain(. In the standard )orm o) in)erence, the three terms are p&aced as )o&&ows3 pakshha sAdhya-with-possessive-su))ix hetu-in-a#&ative-case <or examp&e, parvato vahnimAn.h dhUmAt.h, ,the mountain has )ire #ecause o) smoke., +he de)inition o) vyApti is very important. It is de)ined #y the

#hAshhA-parichchheda 'o) 0ishvanAtha( as3 vyApti$ sAdhyavadanyasminn-asaM#andha udAhR ita$ ! Invaria#&e concomitance is said to #e the a#sence o) re&ation o) the 'hetu( to anything other than what possesses the sAdhya. $ere the re&ation shou&d #e the same as the re&ation under consideration )or the vyApti. As per this de)inition o) vyApti, smoke is an invaria#&e concomitant o) )ire 'or smoke is ,pervaded, #y )ire( #ecause it is not the case that there is something that has smoke #ut not )ire. $owever, )ire is not an invaria#&e concomitant o) smoke. +here are things such as a red-hot iron rod that has )ire #ut no smoke. 5o )ire is not an invaria#&e concomitant o) smoke. A re&ation #etween two entities is o)ten exp&ained as the superimposition o) one entity on the other. $ere, the entity that is superimposed is ca&&ed the superstratum or Adheya. +he entity on which the Adheya is superimposed is ca&&ed su#stratum or &ocus. 5anskrit names )or ,su#stratum, is AdhAra or Ashraya or adhikaraNa. In the examp&e, #hUta&e gha+o vartate, ,there is a pot on the ground,, the superstratum is the pot 'gha+a(, the ground '#hUta&am.h( is the su#stratum or &ocus, and the re&ation is ,contact,, saMyoga. Another way o) &ooking at re&ations 'saM#andha( is to di))erentiate #etween what Inga&&s ca&&s ,occurrence-exacting, and ,non occurrence exacting, re&ations. Re&ations such as inherence 'samavAya( are a&ways occurrence exacting. samavAya or inherence is the re&ation #etween a who&e and its parts, a genus or c&ass '"Ati( and a particu&ar instance o) the c&ass, etc. >ontact 'saMyoga( can sometimes #e occurrence exacting #ut sometimes not. In re&ation #etween two entities, one o) the entities is an ad"unct or pratiyogin, and the other is a su#"unct or anuyogin. I) a re&ation is such that one entity is a &ocus or su#stratum 'AdhAra( o) the other which must #e the superstratum 'Adheya(, then the AdhAra is the su#"unct or anuyogin. +he Adheya is the ad"unct or pratiyogin. In the examp&e, #hUta&e gha+a$, ,there is a pot on the ground,, gha+a is the pratiyogin whi&e #hUta&am.h is the anuyogin. +wo types o) a#sences 'a#hAva( are distinguished in navya-nyAya. ?ne is ca&&ed anyonya-a#hAva that is essentia&&y a denia& o) identity #etween to entities. +he other is saMsarga-a#hAva or re&ationa& a#sence. $ere, there are three kinds3 =( prAga#hAva, the a#sence o) a thing #e)ore it is #rought into #eing, %( dhvamsA#hAva, the a#sence o) a thing a)ter it is destroyed, and .( atyanta-a#hAva, eterna& a#sence. +he terms pratiyogin and anuyogin are a&so used in the context o) a#sences. ;hen we say ,#hUta&e gha+o nAsti,, ,there is no pot on the ground,, the pratiyogin o) the a#sence is ,gha+a,, pot, and the anuyogin is ,#hUta&am.h,, ground. +he pratiyogin o) this type shou&d #e ca&&ed ,a#hAvIya-pratiyogin, to distinguish it )rom the re&ationa& ad"unct, #ut naiyAyikas o)ten write ,pratiyogin, )or #oth re&ationa& and a#sentia& ad"uncts. 5ome o) the properties that are common&y used in naiyAyika &iterature are those that correspond to the terms sAdhya, hetu, pakshha, adhikaraNa '&ocus(, vishhayin 'know&edge(, vishhaya 'content o) know&edge(, visheshhya '@ua&i)icand(, visheshhaNa '@ua&i)ier(, prakAra 'chie) @ua&i)ier(,

etc. +he a#stract properties or re&ationa& a#stracts o) these are )ormed #y simp&y adding the su))ix, ,tva, or ,tA, to each term. <or examp&e, one may write sAdhyatva to mean ,the property o) #eing a sAdhya, or ,sAdhya-ness,, hetutva or ,the property o) #eing a hetu, or ,hetu-ness,, etc. A sentence o) the )orm, parvato vahnimAn.h, ,the mountain 'parvata( has )ire 'vahni(,, can #e )irst rewritten as parvato vahnyadhikaraNam.h, ,the mountain is a &ocus or su#stratum o) )ire,. +his is then ana&y*ed #y the naiyAyika as )o&&ows3 parvata-nishh+ha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpitA ! +he adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is descri#ed #y vahni. ?r parvata-nishh+ha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nishh+hAdheyatA nirUpitA ! +he adhikaraNatA resident in parvata is descri#ed #y the AdheyatA 'superstratum-ness( resident in )ire. +he most characteristic terms o) navya-nyAya are ,avachchhedaka, '&imitor( and ,avachchhinna, '&imited(. +hese terms are used in the context o) re&ationa& a#stracts or a#stract properties. An entity, such as a pot 'gha+a(, is said to #e @ua&i)ied #y a @ua&i)ier, #ut a re&ationa& a#stract is said to #e &imited #y a &imitor. 8et us take the same sentence, parvato vahnimAn, ,the mountain has )ire., $ere, the mountain is a su#stratum 'adhikaraNa( o) )ire which is the superstratum 'Adheya(. +he adhikaraNatA in parvata is descri#ed #y vahni ')ire(, #ut this adhikaraNatA is said to #e &imited 'avachchhinna( #y parvatatva. 5imi&ar&y, the AdheyatA in vahni ')ire( is said to #e descri#ed #y parvata #ut this AdheyatA is said to #e &imited 'avachchhinna( #y vahnitva or )ire-ness. 5o a navya-naiyAyika wou&d write3 parvata-nishh+ha-adhikaraNatA sA vahni-nirUpita-parvatatvaavachchhinna-adhikaraNatA, vahni-nishh+hAdheyatA sA parvata-nirUpita-vahnitva-avachchhinnAdheyatA ! +he adhikaraNatA in mountain is descri#ed #y )ire and &imited #y parvatatva 'mountain-ness(, and the AdheyatA in )ire is descri#ed #y mountain and &imited #y vahnitva ')ire-ness(. A generic re&ationa& a#stract may a&so #e &imited. In the sentence, ,a stick is the instrumenta& cause o) a pot,, daN-o nimitta-kAraNaM ghatasya, the assertion is not with respect to a speci)ic pot and stick. +he assertion is genera&&y a#out a&& sticks and pots. 5o the naiyAyika writes3 daN-atvaM gha+a-nirUpita-nimitta-kAraNatva-avachchhedakam.h ! 5tick-ness is the &imitor o) instrumenta&-cause-ness descri#ed

#y pot. :ar&ier, MadhusUdana set )orth the o#"ective o) esta#&ishing the unrea&ity 'mithyAtva( o) dua&ity 'dvaita(, or in other words the unrea&ity o) the wor&d '"aganmithyAtva(. A)ter a #rie) digression o) navya-nyAya, we wi&& now &ook at the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( that comes under attack )rom the mAdhva opponent. +his de)inition is the one given #y 7admapAdAchArya in his 7anchapAdikA. advaita-siddhi --------------atha prathamamithyAtva-vichAra$ ! +he opponent critici*es the de)inition o) mithyAtva as )o&&ows3 nanu kimidaM mithyAtvaM sAdhyate, na tAvat.h ,mithyAsha#doanirvachanIyatAvachana, iti panchapAdikAvachanAt.h sadasadanadhikaraNatvarUpamanirvAchyatvam.h, taddhi kiM asatvavishishh+a-sattvA#hAva$, uta sattvAtyantA#hAva-asattva-atyantaa#hAvarUpaM dharmadvayam.h, Ahosvit.h sattvAtyanta-a#hAvavatve sati asattva-atyanta-a#hAvarUpaM vishishh+am.h ! Now, what is this unrea&ity 'mithyAtva( that 'you( want to in)er 'as characteri*ing the wor&d(A +his unrea&ity is #y no means non-de)ina#i&ity as de)ined #y the statement o) the panchapAdikA that the word mithyA 'unrea&( is denoted #y non-de)ina#i&ity, the non-de)ina#i&ity #eing o) the nature o) N?+ #eing the su#stratum 'adhikaraNa( o) either existence or non-existence. ;hat is ,not #eing the su#stratum o) existence or non-existence,A Is it =( the a#sence o) existence @ua&i)ied #y non-existence or %( the pair o) attri#utes o) a. a#so&ute a#sence o) existence and #. a#so&ute a#sence o) non-existence, or .( the property o) the a#so&ute a#sence o) nonexistence during the a#so&ute a#sence o) existence, ie. #eing a common su#stratum o) the attri#utes the a#so&ute a#sence o) existence and the a#so&ute a#sence o) non-existenceA nAdya$, sattvamAtrAdhAre "agatyasattvavishishh+asattva-ana#hyupagamAt, vishishh+a-a#hAva-sAdhane siddha-sAdhanAt.h ! 'Bou( cannot 'c&aim( the )irst 'regarding the wor&d( #ecause the wor&d is the su#stratum o) on&y existence 'sattva( and existence @ua&i)ied #y non-existence is not admitted. And #y proving the a#sence o) existence as @ua&i)ied #y non-existence , 'you commit the )&aw o)( proving what is a&ready esta#&ished 'siddha-sAdhana(. C7&ease see Note = #e&owD na dvitIya$, sattva-asattvayorekA#hAve aparasattva-avashyakatvena vyAghAtAt.h, nirdharmaka#rahmavatsattva-asattva-rAhitye .api sadrUpatvena amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntarAchcha, shuktirUpye a#AdhyatvarUpasattva-vyatirekasya sattvena #AdhyatvarUpa-asattvasya vyatireka-asiddhyA sAdhyavaika&yAchcha ! 'Bou( cannot 'c&aim( the second. /ecause, wherever there is an

a#sence o) one o) existence and nonexistence, there the presence o) the other is necessary6 this &eads to a contradiction. 'A&so(, the wor&d, "ust &ike the /rahman without attri#utes, even #eing without the attri#utes, existence and nonexistence, #y 'its very( nature o) existence, is esta#&ished as N?+ unrea&6 this wou&d &ead to 'the de)ect o)( arthAntara, proving something other than what is to #e proved. In the si&ver-in-nacre 'examp&e o) i&&usion that is o)ten @uoted #y advaitins to show the onto&ogica& status o) the wor&d(, 'we grant that( it 'si&ver-nacre( is without existence whose nature is non-su#&ata#i&ity 'noncontradicted-ness(, '#ut( the a#sence o) nonexistence, whose nature is su#&ati#i&ity 'contradicted-ness(, is N?+ esta#&ished6 this &eads to the de)ectiveness o) 'your( sAdhya, what 'you( seek to prove. C7&ease see Note % #e&owD ata eva na tR itIya$, pUrvavadvyAghAtAt.h, arthAntarAtsAdhyavaika&yAchcha <or the very same reason's( as #e)ore, the third 'a&ternative in de)ining mithyAtva, ie. the common su#stratum o) the attri#utes, a#so&ute a#sence o) existence and the a#so&ute a#sence o) nonexistence( cannot '#e c&aimed( #ecause o) the )a&&acies o) contradiction 'vio&ation o) the &aw o) the exc&uded midd&e(, proving something other than what is intended, and de)ectiveness o) the sAdhya. MadhusUdana now #egins his rep&y thus3 iti chet.h, maivam.h I) this is what you say, it is un"usti)ied. '+o #e continued( Notes ----Note =3 /rahmAnanda points out that the siddha-sAdhana a&&egation made #y the mAdhva in his criticism o) the )irst a&ternative to de)ining sadasadanadhikaraNatva is not technica&&y accurate. $ere is why3 mAdhvamate a&Ikasyaiva-atyanta-a#hAva-svIkAreNokta-vishishh+apratiyogika-a#hAvaprasiddhAvapi matAntare tadaprasiddhirityapi #odhyam.h ! :ven though the a#so&ute a#sence o) an a&Ika ')ictitious entity( is accepted #y mAdhvas and the a#sence o) the @ua&i)ied ad"unct is 'accepted( as examp&ed, in some other system 'mata( it is not examp&ed 'and, there)ore, it is not accepted.( 0i++ha&esha c&ari)ies here that matAntare means naiyAyikAdi mate, among naiyAyikas, etc. +he argument is this. +he )irst a&ternative to sadasadanadhikaraNatva is c&aimed #y the mAdhva as &eading to sidhha-sAdhana, esta#&ishing what is a&ready accepted. /ut this is true on&y in the case o) mAdhva4s system, not in the case o) others such as naiyAyikas who do not accept the negation o) a pure&y )ictitious entity.

<or examp&e, the sentence ,a hare with horns is not in the )orest, is not accepted #y the naiyAyikas #ecause it invo&ves the negation o) a pure&y )ictitious entity, a hare with horns. +he naiyAyikas a#so&ute&y insist that what is #eing negated must #e an examp&ed entity. +he naiyAyikas are extreme rea&ists as much as mAdhvas are. I) any )a&se know&edge creeps into the in)erence process, the naiyAyika )ee&s that the who&e process is suspect. +here)ore, he insists that any and a&& terms that are used in an in)erence must #e on&y examp&ed terms, not unexamp&ed terms, )ictitious terms. In )act, vAtsyAyana makes it c&ear in the nyAya-sUtra-#hAshhya that the conc&usion that is to #e proved must #e possi#&e - saM#havastAvat.h pratiGBa. In any case, the naiyAyika wou&d a&so o#"ect to the )irst a&ternative in de)ining sadasadanadhikaraNatva, "ust as the mAdhva does, #ut )or a di))erent reason. Note %3 $ere, the opponent argues that the wor&d 'with dua&ity( cou&d #e "ust &ike /rahman in that /rahman does not have existence as an attri#ute #ut existence is /rahman. 5o the dua&ity o) the wor&d can a&so #e such that existence is not an attri#ute #ut its very nature. I) the advaitin admits this, he wou&d #e proving something other than what he wishes to prove. /rie) recap3 ;e have seen that mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( can #e de)ined as anirvachanIyatva 'property o) not #eing de)ina#&e(, and this anirvachanIyatva can )urther #e exp&ained as sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not #eing a su#stratum o) either existence or nonexistence. +he opponent &ists three ways in which this sadasadanadhikaraNatva may #e de)ined. $e )inds )au&t with each o) these de)initions. MadhusUdana disagrees and starts his counter-argument. MadhusUdana4s rep&y3 sattva-atyanta-a#hAva-asattva-atyanta-a#hAva-rUpa-dharmadvaya-vivaxAyAM doshhA#hAvAt.h ! nacha vyAhati$ ! In the intended meaning o) ,sadasad-anadhikaraNa, 'not #eing the su#stratum o) existence or nonexistence( as ,the pair o) attri#utes, a#so&ute a#sence o) existence and the a#so&ute a#sence o) nonexistence,, there is N? de)ect. +here is N? contradiction too. ';hyA( sA hi sattvAsattvayo$ parasparaviraharUpatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApakatayA vA, parasparavirahavyApyatayA vA ! +hat 'contradiction cou&d resu&t( on&y i) =( existence and nonexistence mutua&&y negate each other or %( they mutua&&y pervade each other4s a#sence 'one4s a#sence is the invaria#&e concomitant o) the other(, or .( they are mutua&&y pervaded #y each other4s a#sence 'one is the invaria#&e concomitant o) the other4s a#sence(. '753 Reca&& the de)inition o) vyApti in the third part o) this series.( tatra nAdya$, tadanaN gIkArAt.h ! tathAhyatra trikA&A#Adhyatvasattva-vyatireko nAsattvam.h, kintu kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatva-anadhikaraNatvam.h ! tadvyatirekashcha sAdhyatvena vivaxita$ ! +here is no 'presence o) the( )irst condition, #ecause it is not accepted. It is so 'not accepted( #ecause the negation o) existence, that is not su#&ata#&e at any time, past, present,

or )uture, is N?+ nonexistence, #ut 'nonexistence means( N?+ #eing cogni*ed as existing in any su#stratum 'at any time(. +he negation o) that 'nonexistence( is what is intended to #e 'part o)( what is to #e proved. C7&ease see note = and note % #e&owD tathAcha trikA&A#Adhyavi&axaNatve sati kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratIyamAnatvarUpaM sAdhyaM paryavasitam.h ! evaMcha sati na shuktirUpye sAdhyavaika&yamapi ! #AdhyatvarUpAsattvavyatirekasya sAdhyApraveshAt.h ! nApi vyAghAta$, parasparaviraharUpatvaa#hAvAt.h ! +he conc&usion to #e esta#&ished is that whi&e #eing di))erent )rom that which is never su#&ata#&e, it is 'capa#&e o)( #eing cogni*ed as existing in some su#stratum. And this #eing so, there is no de)ect o) the sAdhya4s '#eing a#sent( in si&ver-in-nacre. '+his is( #ecause the negation o) nonexistence which is su#&ata#&e 'a&ways( does not )orm part o) what is to #e esta#&ished 'sAdhya(. ';hat does )orm part o) the sAdhya is the negation o) nonexistence which consists in not #eing cogni*ed in any &ocus or su#stratum at any time(. '+here)ore,( there is no contradiction too 'here( #ecause there is no mutua& negation #etween 'existence and nonexistence(. ata eva na dvitIyo .api, sattvA#hAvavati shuktirUpye vivaxitaasattvavyatirekasya vidyamAnatvena vya#hichArAt.h ! <or this reason, the second condition 'under which contradiction can occur( does not ho&d too. '+here can #e no invaria#&e concomitance o) the a#sence o) existence or nonexistence with the other.( '+he re@uirement )or such concomitance to ho&d is not satis)ied( due to deviation 'vya#hichAra(, since in 'i&&usory things such as( the si&ver-in-nacre, there is the a#sence o) existence, #ut the a#sence o) the nonexistence with the intended de)inition 'as a#ove( is a&so cogni*ed. 'In order )or the concomitance to ho&d, nonexistence wou&d have to #e present when existence is a#sent.( nApi tR itIya$ tasya vyAghAta-aprayo"akatvAt.h, gotva-ashvatvayo$ parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tada#hAvayor-ushh+rAdAvekatra sahopa&aM#hAt.h ! +he third condition does not cause contradiction. '<or examp&e,( cow-ness 'the property o) #eing a cow( and horse-ness 'property o) #eing a horse( are invaria#&e concomitants o) each other4s a#sence 'ie. where cow-ness is present, horse-ness is a#sent and where horse-ness is present, cow-ness is a#sent(. :ven so, the two properties 'o) cow-ness and horse-ness( are N?+ present in the same &ocus such as a came&, etc., and 'the a#sences o) cow-ness and horse-ness are( perceived thus together 'in the same &ocus(. C7&ease see note . #e&owD /a&a#hadra c&ari)ies3 tatashcha sattva-asattvayo$ parasparavirahavyApyatve .api tada#hAvayorekatra prapaENche saM#havAnna vyAhatiriti dhyeyam.$! And there)ore, even though existence and nonexistence are invaria#&e concomitants o) each other4s a#sence, the a#sences

o) #oth >AN occur in the same p&ace, ie. the wor&d and due to 'this( there is N? contradiction. +his is to #e thought o). '+o #e continued( Notes3 -----Note =3 MadhusUdana4s de)inition o) non-existence can a&so #e understood in this way using ;estern-sty&e &ogic. 8et us de)ine a predicate 5 where#y 5'F( means ,F is su#&ated., A&so, &et us say :'t( means the existentia& @uanti)ier ,there is a t,, and U't( means the universa& @uanti)ier ,)or a&& t., 8et G stand )or the negation operator. +hen the de)inition o) existence 'sattva or simp&y sat( is that thing, say F '/rahman( such that3 G ':'t( such that 5'F(, )or time t( ... 'A(

In other words, sattva '/rahman( is that which is N?+ su#&ated at any time. Next, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( N?+ as simp&y negating the expression 'A( a#ove which wou&d "ust #e ':'t( such that 5'F(, )or time t( ... '/( this wou&d mean ,F such that there is a time t when F is su#&ated., I) the advaitins had de)ined nonexistence as '/( a#ove, then the mAdhva opponent wou&d have #een "usti)ied in saying that existence and nonexistence are mutua&&y negations o) each other. Negating existence wou&d #e nonexistence and vice versa. /ut, very signi)icant&y, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( as, where >'F( means ,F is cogni*ed in a &ocus,,3 'U't(3 G >'F(, )or time t( .... '>(

meaning ,)or a&& time t, F is not cogni*ed in a &ocus., +he negation o) HthisH type o) nonexistence is3 ':'t(3 >'F(, )or time t( ... '-(

which means ,there is some time t at which F is cogni*ed in a &ocus., And this is precise&y the negation o) nonexistence that is characteristic o) i&&usions such as si&ver-in-nacre, snake-on-rope, and )ina&&y, the wor&d-on-/rahman i&&usion. +he i&&usory thing is cogni*ed as existing in a &ocus 'su#stratum( sometime 'the period o) i&&usion(. 5o such i&&usory entities >ANN?+ #e said to #e nonexistent in the same way as a )ictitious entity, such as a hare with horns, which is never cogni*ed in any &ocus. A&so, as MadhusUdana says, '-( is not the same as 'A(, and the negation o) 'A( is not the same as the nonexistence '>(. 5o there is N? contradiction i) #oth the negation o) 'A(,

ie. '/(, and the negation o) '>(, ie. '-(, #oth ho&d in the same &ocus. +his exact&y is the conc&usion to #e esta#&ished '/( and '-( #oth characteri*e the wor&d o) dua&ity. +here is a time 'the i&&usion phase( when dua&ity is cogni*ed in a &ocus '/rahman( #y super-imposition 'adhyAsa(. +his esta#&ishes the '-( part o) the conc&usion. And there is a time 'the dawn o) "nAna( when the wor&d o) i&&usion is su#&ated. +his esta#&ishes the '/( part o) the conc&usion. Note %3 /rahmAnanda c&ari)ies that pratIyamAnatvarUpaM means pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h, capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed. 0i++ha&esha comments3 pratIyamAnatvamityatra &a-arthavartmAnatvavivaxaNe pratItishUnyatvakA&e mithyAtva-anupapattestadavivaxAM sphu+ayati +IkAyAM - pratIyamAnatvayogyatvamiti ! +he intended meaning o) ,pratIyamAnatva, that indicates the present tense does not indicate that mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( is not esta#&ished during times when there is no cognition. +o c&ari)y this, '/rahmAnanda writes( ,pratIyamAnatvayogyatvam.h, capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed, in the commentary. Note .3 +his can #e understood in this way. 5uppose >'F( means F is a cow, and $'F( means F is a horse. Now, we have3 >'F( -I G $'F( $'F( -I G >'F( where ,-I, stands )or ,imp&ies,. I) F is a cow then F is not a horse. I) F is a horse then F is not a cow. 5o =( >'F( is an invaria#&e concomitant o) G$'F(, the negation o) $'F(. %( $'F( is an invaria#&e concomitant o) G>'F(, the negation o) >'F(. +his means it not possi#&e to have3 '>'F( AN- $'F(( )or the same entity F. F cannot #e #oth a cow and horse. 5uppose M'F( means F is a came&. +hen the )o&&owing is tena#&e3 M'F( -I G>'F( AN- G$'F( I) F is a came&, it is neither a cow nor a horse. +his is what MadhusUdana is saying here. A)ter re"ecting the c&aim made #y the opponent that the de)initions o) sadasadanadhikaraNatva are )au&ty, MadhusUdana next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is a&so not va&id. MadhusUdana4s rep&y 'continued(3 yachcha - nirdharmakasya #rahmaNa$ sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavatprapaENchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- uktam.h! tanna !

And the 'opponent( said3 Eust as the attri#ute&ess /rahman &acks existence 'as an attri#ute( #ut 'Its( very nature is existence, the very nature o) the wor&d too is existence. +his esta#&ishes that the wor&d is not mithyA 'unrea&(. /y this 'it )o&&ows that you wi&& have( esta#&ished something other 'than what you wanted to( arthAntara. ';e say(3 It is not so. ekenaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau #rahmavat.h prapaENchasya pratyekaM satsva#hAvatAka&pena mAnA#hAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-a#hAva-prasaN gAchcha ! +he understanding o) sat 'existence( as encompassing everything and everywhere is esta#&ished #y ?ne 'princip&e(. '/ut( each and every thing in the wor&d cannot #e proved to #e comprehended as 'pure( existence in the same way as /rahman. And a contingency wou&d arise due to the &ack o) a comprehensive system 'o) understanding, exp&aining, and discussing a &arge num#er o) things and topics.( '+here)ore, the c&aim that we wou&d #e committing the )a&&acy o) arthAntara is not correct.( MadhusUdana is making a crucia& point here regarding what is technica&&y ca&&ed anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. ;hen a property occurs in a num#er o) di))erent things, the naiyAyika wou&d search )or a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then re)er to each o) those things as possessing that common property. <or examp&e, i) a pot is #&ue, a &otus is #&ue, and a c&oth is #&ue, the naiyAyika wou&d make ,#&ue-ness, a common property and say that the pot possesses ,#&ue-ness,, the &otus possesses ,#&ue-ness,, and so on. 5uch a system wherein a num#er o) things are exp&ained using )ewer concepts is said to have the advantage o) ,&Aghava, or &ight-ness as compared to a system where a greater num#er o) concepts are re@uired, in which case a de)ect o) ,gaurava, or heaviness is said to prevai&. +his is direct&y re&ated to the princip&e o) ,?ccam4s ra*or, as used in the ;est. I) I can exp&ain a certain num#er o) things using some hypotheses and you can exp&ain the same things using )ewer hypotheses than mine, then your exp&anation is #etter than mine. In keeping with the princip&e o) ,&Aghava, or &ightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyika-&ogician is a&ways &ooking )or anugata dharma4s or common properties to exp&ain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that "ust as /rahman is #y Its very nature existence, the dua&ity in the wor&d is a&so simi&ar&y #y its very nature existence and hence rea&. MadhusUdana points out two pro#&ems with this c&aim3 =( +here is no comprehension o) the existence o) individua& things in the wor&d as /rahman is. ?ne does not get the idea ,this pot that I see now is eterna&&y existent and is never su#&ated., %( I) the rea&ity o) each and every thing in the wor&d is admitted, then it wou&d take a signi)icant num#er o) ,rea&, entities to exp&ain what is meant #y ,rea&ity., +his theory wou&d #e too heavy, su))er )rom the de)ect o) ,gaurava, #ecause o) the &ack o) a common property or anugata dharma. An exp&anation using a sing&e non-dua& Rea&ity is superior even )rom this strict&y &ogica& viewpoint In the previous part o) the series, we have seen how MadhusUdana re)utes the charge o) arthAntara, ie. proving something other than what he intended to. Next, MadhusUdana shows how mithyAtva can #e rede)ined so that the opponent cannot even dream 'no pun intended2(

o) making the charge o) arthAntara. MadhusUdana a&ternative&y de)ines mithyAtva as the a#so&ute di))erence )rom sattva and the a#so&ute di))erence )rom asattva. It must #e noted that this a&ternative de)inition is not a new de)inition6 it is entire&y e@uiva&ent to the one accepted so )ar, ie. the a#so&ute a#sence o) sattva and the a#so&ute a#sence o) asattva. +he a&ternate de)inition makes use o) mutua& a#sence or anyonya-a#hAva as opposed to atyanta-a#hAva in the )irst de)inition. MadhusUdana3 satpratiyogika-asatpratiyogika#hedadvayaM vA sAdhyam.h ! tathAcha u#hayAtmakatve .anyatarAtmakatve vA, tAdR ig#heda-asaM#havena tA#hyAmarthAntara-anavakAsha$ ! A&ternative&y, 'we may de)ine( the sAdhya 'the unrea&ity o) dua&ity, mithyAtva( to #e the di))erence that has existence as its counterpositive AN- the di))erence that nonexistence as its counter-positive. '5imp&y put, mithyAtva is that which is di))erent )rom existence ANdi))erent )rom nonexistence as we&&.( And there is no scope )or 'charging us with( arthAntara due to this #ecause such di))erence )rom #oth 'existence and nonexistence( or di))erence )rom one o) them is not possi#&e 'according to our other opponents- the &ogicians, the /uddhists, and the view o) 0Achaspati Mishra in the nyAyavArttikatAtparya+IkA(. :xp&anation #y /rahmAnanda and exp&anation o) /rahmAnanda4s exp&anation ----------------------------------------------------------------------#y 0i++ha&esha -------------/rahmAnanda 'in his &aghuchandrikA(3 #hedeti Atyantika#hedetyartha$ ! /y ,#heda, 'di))erence( 'MadhusUdana( means ,a#so&ute di))erence., 0i++ha&esha 'in his vi++ha&eshopAdhyAyI(3 nanu prapaENchasya sadasadu#hayarUpatAmate sad#heda-asad#hedayorapi avachchhedaka#hedena tatra sattvAt.h siddhasAdhanaM ata Aha Atyantiketi ! Now, even as per the view that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&, the di))erence )rom ,sat, and di))erence )rom ,asat, are present there as &imiting di))erences. +his &eads to siddha-sAdhana 'doshha(, esta#&ishing what is a&ready esta#&ished 'since such a view is a&ready he&d #y 0Achaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArttikatAtparya+IkA.( +here)ore, 'in order to re)ute this charge( '/rahmAnanda( says ,'the di))erence( is a#so&ute., ' MadhusUdana uses the word #heda which /rahmAnanda c&ari)ies to #e not di))erence used &oose&y #ut a#so&ute and comp&ete di))erence. ?therwise, the opponent can say that as per the view that ho&ds the wor&d to #e #oth rea& and unrea&, a partia& di))erence )rom rea&ity and a partia& di))erence )rom unrea&ity can #e said to characteri*e the wor&d. And this wou&d &ead to the o#"ection3 ,Bou are proving what has a&ready #een proved.,( /rahmAnanda3

u#hayAtmakatve iti! ,#hramavishhayI#hUta-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+AdirUpeNa prapaENcho .a&Ika$ rUpAntareNa tu satya , iti nyAyape+ikAkAravAchaspatyuktapaxe ityartha$ ! 'MadhusUdana says( ,in 'de)ining the wor&d as having( the nature o) #oth 'sat and asat(., +his means the view o) 0Achaspati Mishra in his nyAyavArtikatAtparya+IkA according to which ,As the wor&d is the o#"ect o) erroneous cognition 'such as si&ver-in-nacre(, due to #eing @ua&i)ied #y the )a&se re&ation, it 'the wor&d( is )a&se. /ut in its other capacity, the wor&d is rea&., 0i++ha&esha exp&ains3 ,#hramavishhayI#hUta-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+AdirUpeNa prapaENcho .a&Ika, iti! idaMra"atamityAdi#hrameshhu satye dharmiNi satyameva hi dR ishyaM ra"atAdikaM a&IkasaM#andhena #hAsate, tatra svarUpata$ satyayorapi-ida Mra"atayor-a&IkasaMsargavishishh+a-rUpeNa-asatyattvaM, In i&&usions such as ,this is si&ver, 'ie. i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre(, a rea& o#"ect such as si&ver appears in the rea& su#"ect '#ut( with a )a&se re&ation. In such a case, even though ,this, and si&ver are rea& in themse&ves, due to #eing @ua&i)ied #y a )a&se re&ation they are unrea&. CIn the i&&usion, ,this is si&ver,, the ,this, and si&ver indicate rea& o#"ects o) cognition. 5i&ver in itse&) is a rea& o#"ect. 5o is the thing indicated #y ,this,. +he )act that I am seeing something which I ca&& ,this, is true. A&so, it is true that I have seen si&ver #e)ore. /ut the mistake I make is in identi)ying ,this, with si&ver when I say ,this is si&ver., 5o 0Achaspati Mishra ho&ds that in an i&&usion, there is a )a&se 'a&Ika( re&ation #etween rea& things that are re&ated #y such a )a&se re&ation. +he re&ata are rea& in themse&ves #ut as re&ata o) the )a&se re&ation, they are unrea&. +he )a&se re&ation in the i&&usion ,this is si&ver, is the re&ation o) identity 'tAdAtmya(. ;e wi&& see next that this view is extended to de)ine the wor&d as #eing #oth rea& and unrea&.D etanmate #rahmaNi prapaENchasya-a&IkasaM#andhena #hrama iti na #hramitavyam.h ! idami ra"atasyeva tatra tattatpadArthAnAM #hramAnAdAyaiva sarvasyApi prapaENchasya-a&Ikatopapatte$ ! '/ut( this view shou&d not #e mistaken as 'ho&ding( that there is a case o) i&&usion due to the )a&se re&ation o) the wor&d with /rahman. <or, "ust as in the case o) 'the i&&usion o)( ,this, and si&ver, the i&&usions o) various things in the wor&d cause the who&e wor&d to #e esta#&ished as unrea&. rUpAntareNeti! idaMtvara"atatvAdinA pramA-vishhayI#hUta-satyasaMsarga-vishishh+arUpeNa vetyartha$! '/y( ,rUpAntareNa tu satya$, 'is meant(3 '/ut( #y the nature o) #eing re&ata o) a rea& re&ation that is the o#"ect o) right know&edge, things denoted #y ,si&ver,, ,this,, etc. 'and the who&e wor&d( 'are rea&(. CpramA is right or va&id know&edge and #hrama is erroneous know&edge or i&&usion. In pramA, a rea& re&ation is cogni*ed among rea& o#"ects and so )ar as pramA is concerned, these o#"ects are a&so rea&. In #hrama, a )a&se re&ation appears to #e existing among o#"ects that are rea& in themse&ves. /ut due to the )a&se re&ation, the rea&ity

o) the re&ata o) the )a&se re&ation is a&so denied. +hus it is that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&, since its o#"ects can #e re&ata o) #oth rea& and )a&se cognitions. +his is the view o) 0Achaspati in his nyAyavArtikatAtparya+IkA.D CNext, /rahmAnanda exp&ains what MadhusUdana means when he says ,anyatarAtmakatve, D /rahmAnanda3 anyatarAtmakatve iti ! #hramavishhayo .api saMsargo deshAntarasthatvAt.h satya iti prapaENcha$ satya eveti paxe, As per the view 'o) the rea&ists, naiyAyikas(, even though the re&ation 'o) identity, )or examp&e in ,this is si&ver,( is the content o) erroneous know&edge, it is rea& #ecause it occurs 'as the content o) va&id know&edge, pramA( in other p&aces. +here)ore, 'a&& things in the wor&d are rea& and( the wor&d is rea&. C+he naiyAyikas who are rea&ists-to-the-core insist that erroneous cognition or i&&usion is rea&&y due some de)ect 'doshha(. ,doshho .apramAyA "anaka$, says 0ishvanAtha in the #hAshhA-parichchheda. ;hen there is an i&&usion ,this is si&ver, with respect to nacre, the memory o) si&ver co&or, the simi&arity o) the co&or #eing seen with si&ver, and other de)ects such as improper &ight, de)ective vision, etc. cause the i&&usion. /ut when rea& si&ver is #eing seen, the same cognition ,this is si&ver, #ecomes a va&id know&edge, pramA. 5o the cognition ,this is si&ver,, though erroneous due to de)ect's( in one p&ace, can #ecome va&id in some other p&ace. $ence, there is no cognition o) the unrea& any time. And the wor&d is rea&.D /rahmAnanda3 GBAnAtiriktarUpeNa-a&Ika eva prapaENcho vika&pavishhaya iti paxe chetyartha$ ! And, as per the view 'o) the vi"nAnavAdi-#auddha4s(, the wor&d is on&y )a&se 'unrea&( #ecause it is a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom consciousness and is a )igment o) imagination. +his is the meaning. CAmong the three views presented so )ar, it is o#vious that a#so&ute di))erence )rom sattva is not possi#&e in the case o) 0Achaspati Mishra4s view in his nyAya text and the view o) the vi"nAnavAdi/uddhists cannot admit an a#so&ute di))erence )rom asattva. +he naiyAyika '&ogician( says the wor&d is rea&, #ut then what MadhusUdana has said is that the wor&d is a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom #oth the rea& 'sattva( and the unrea& 'asattva(. $ence, none o) the three views is identica& to the advaita view. +his means that there can #e no arthAntara in esta#&ishing that the wor&d is a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom sattva and a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom asattva. /rahmAnanda next c&ari)ies that the de)inition given #y MadhusUdana that inc&udes a#so&ute di))erence )rom sattva ru&es out any arthAntara charge made against advaita in the )o&&owing manner. ,5ince 0achaspati4s nyAya text says that the wor&d is #oth rea& and unrea&, this is e@uiva&ent to saying that the wor&d is di))erent )rom the rea& and the unrea&. 5o your de)inition o) the wor&d as #eing di))erent )rom sattva and asattva is not going to prove mithyAtva at a&&. It is going to prove the view o) 0achaspati in his nyAya text which is not the view o) advaita. $ence the arthAntara., D

/rahmAnanda3 anavakAsha iti ! asattvA#hAvasya keva&aprapaENche sattvasya tadupahitaprapaENche svIkAre sattvopahitaprapaENchasya keva&aprapaENche tAdAtmyasattvAnna tatraikAntika$ sad#heda iti #hAva$! +he purport o) 'Madhusudana4s saying( ,anavakAsha, is3 ':ven #y( accepting the a#sence o) asattva in the who&e wor&d which 'a&so( depends on sattva 'since the wor&d is a&so said to #e sat as per 0achaspati in his nyAya text(, the wor&d which thus depends on sattva and this sattva-dependent part is identi)ied in the who&e wor&d, there is N? a#so&ute di))erence )rom sat, 'which is what our de)inition o) sadasadanadhikaraNatva re@uires(. C:ven though ,#oth rea& and unrea&, can #e construed as ,di))erent )rom rea& and di))erent )rom unrea&,, this view does not entai&, )or examp&e, ,a#so&ute&y di))erent )rom rea&, which is what MadhusUdana4s de)inition re@uires. 5o there is no arthAntara whatsoeverD. MadhusUdana set the sAdhya, what is to #e esta#&ished, as the mithyAtva o) dua&ity, the unrea&ity o) dua&ity. In de)ining mithyAtva, one o) the de)initions taken up was the one )rom the panchapAdikA o) 7admapAda. MithyAtva is de)ined here as anirvachanIya, that which cannot #e categori*ed as sat or asat. More speci)ica&&y, this was de)ined to #e sadasadanadhikaraNatva, which was c&ari)ied #y MadhusUdana to #e the a#so&ute a#sence o) sattva and the a#so&ute a#sence o) asattva. +he opponent had raised the o#"ection o) arthAntara against the de)inition o) mithyAtva or sadasadanadhikaraNatva, not #eing a su#stratum o) either existence or non-existence. MadhusUdana re)uted these o#"ections. $e a&so o))ered an a&ternative de)inition o) sadasadanadhikaraNatva, name&y the a#so&ute di))erence )rom existence and the a#so&ute di))erence )rom nonexistence which ru&es out any possi#i&ity o) arthAntara 'proving something other than what is intended(. +he opponent cou&d, however, &eve& another charge against MadhusUdana4s de)inition. /y de)ining sadasadanadhikaraNatva as the di))erence )rom existence and di))erence )rom nonexistence, there is at &east a de)ect o) proving something a part o) which has a&ready #een proved. <or examp&e, i) you seek to prove A AN- /, when you know that one o) the two, say /, is a&ready proved, your proo) wi&& have the de)ect o) partia& siddha-sAdhana, ie. aMshata$ siddha-sAdhana. Bour proo) wi&& #e partia&&y redundant and one o) the worst mistakes a &ogician can commit is #eing redundant2 $ere, the opponent c&aims, the partia& siddha-sAdhana arises )rom the )act that the rea&ists, inc&uding the navya-naiyAyikas and the mAdhvas, a&ready have accepted the wor&d4s a#so&ute di))erence )rom nonexistence, in the sense that the wor&d is a#so&ute&y rea&. 5o the part o) the advaitin4s proo) which esta#&ishes a#so&ute di))erence )rom nonexistence is redundant. /ut, MadhusUdana exp&ains, the sAdhya in this case >ANN?+ #e sp&it into two terms A and /, such that each can #e independent&y proved. ;e $A0: to consider the com#ined di))erence )rom existence and nonexistence. ;hyA /ecause, the hetu, dR ishyatva 'percepti#&ity(, in this case is the hetu )or the >?NEUN>+I?N 'or com#ination( o) a#so&ute di))erence )rom existence AN- a#so&ute di))erence )rom nonexistence. 'Reca&& that the sAdhya is to #e in)erred )rom the invaria#&e concomitance o) the hetu with the sAdhya.(

;ithout )urther ado, &et us hear the unassai&a#&e rep&y o) MadhusUdana3 +ext3 nacha - asattvavyatireka-aMshasya-asad#hedasya cha prapaENche siddhattvena-aMshata$ siddha-sAdhanamiti - vAchyam.h ! ,guNAdikaM guNyAdinA #hinnA#hinnaM samAnAdhikR itatvAt.h, iti #hedA#hedavAdiprayoge tArkikAdyaN gIkR itasya #hinnatvasya siddhAvapi uddeshya-pratItyasiddheryathA na siddha-sAdhanaM, tathA prakR ite .api mi&itapratIteruddeshyatvAnna siddha-sAdhanam.h ! yathA tattvA#hede gha+a$ kuM#ha iti sAmAnAdhikaraNya-pratIteradarshanena mi&itasiddhiruddeshyA, tathA prakR ite .api sattvarahite tuchchhe dR ishyatva-adarshanena mi&itasya tatprayo"akatayA mi&itasiddhiruddeshyeti samAnam.h ! +rans&ation3 'And you( cannot charge that there is the de)ect o) partia& siddha-sAdhana 'aMshata$ siddha-sAdhana( #ecause the part 'o) the proo)( consisting o) 'esta#&ishing( the a#sence o) asattva 'nonexistence( and the di))erence )rom nonexistence 'in the a&ternative de)inition( is a&ready esta#&ished regarding the wor&d. +he 'mAdhvas( ho&d that a @ua&ity and the su#stance that possesses that @ua&ity are di))erent ANnon-di))erent )rom each other. In arguing with the tArkikas 'the naiyAyikas, sAnkhyas, the #hA++as, etc.( who accept the di))erence 'o) a @ua&ity )rom the possessor o) the @ua&ity(, they 'the mAdhvas( say3 ,the @ua&ity and its possessor are di))erent and non-di))erent )rom each other #ecause they can #e cogni*ed to #e re&ated #y a re&ation o) non-di))erence., '5o, they say,( there is no siddha-sAdhana #ecause the intended cognition '>?NEUN>+I?N o) di))erence and nondi))erence o) a @ua&ity and its possessor( is N?+ proved , even though the di))erence 'o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor( is a&ready proved. 5imi&ar&y, in 'our( present case 'o) esta#&ishing a#sence o) sattva ANthe a#sence o) asattva( too, the cognition that is intended 'to #e proved( is >?NEUN>+I?N 'com#ination o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva(. 5o 'we( cannot '#e charged with( siddha-sAdhana 'redundancy in reasoning(. 'Bou may say that the >?NEUN>+I?N o) ours is not "usti)ied. /ut we say, no2( In the case o) identica& things such as a ,pot, and a ,"ar, 'which are terms that stand )or the same thing(, there is no cognition o) di))erence and nondi))erence o) the )orm ,+he pot is the "ar., '+here)ore,( the con"unction o) di))erence and nondi))erence is intended to #e esta#&ished. '+his is your stand.( 5imi&ar&y, in the present case 'ie. o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva(, percepti#i&ity is not 'a characteristic o)( a tota&&y nonexistent thing that &acks existence 'sattva(. '+here)ore,( con"unction 'o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva, or e@uiva&ent&y, di))erence )rom sattva and di))erence )rom asattva( is a prayo"aka 'a necessary )actor( )or dR ishyatva, percepti#i&ity 'which is the hetu( and 'so( the esta#&ishing o) that >?NEUN>+I?N is what is intended. Notes3 0i++ha&esha descri#es that the hetu dR ishyatva is an invaria#&e concomitant 'vyApya( o) u#hayatva ',#oth-ness, or con"unction( o) sad#heda and asad#heda. dR ishyatvasya sad#heda-asad#hedo#hayatva-avachchhinnaM vyApyatvam.h

+he vyApyatva 'invaria#&e concomitance( o) percepti#i&ity 'the hetu in this case( is de&imited 'characteri*ed( #y the con"unction o) di))erence )rom sat and di))erence )rom asat 'or e@uiva&ent&y the a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva, in which case the proper term wou&d #e ,sattva-a#hAva-asattva-a#hAvo#hayatva-avachchhinnaM,(. And as /rahmAnanda exp&ains, such ,u#hayatva, is the prayo"aka in esta#&ishing dR ishyatva3 tatprayo"akatA-iscussion3 -----------$ere the argument runs as )o&&ows3 mAdhva3 ;e may make a charge or partia& siddha-sAdhana against you, the advaitin, #ecause the esta#&ishing o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva has a part, the esta#&ishing o) a#sence o) asattva with regard to the wor&d, that is a&ready esta#&ished #y others. advaitin3 ;e&&, in that case, we can make the same charge against you #ecause your esta#&ishing o) the di))erence and nondi))erence o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor has a part, the esta#&ishing o) di))erence o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor, is a&ready esta#&ished #y others such as the #hA++as, naiyAyikas, sAMkhyas, etc., who admit the di))erence o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor. mAdhva3 Not so. Bou cannot esta#&ish such di))erence and nondi))erence independent&y o) each other. Bou have got to esta#&ish the con"unction o) the two conditions, name&y di))erence and nondi))erence o) a @ua&ity )rom its possessor. +he hetu here is ,samAnAdhikR itatva,, which is exp&ained as #eing capa#&e o) #eing the content o) a cognition o) a re&ation o) nondi))erence in the same su#stratum where there is di))erence. ?r, we can exp&ain the hetu, samAnAdhikR itatva, as #eing capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed as a @ua&i)ier 'visheshhaNa( o) the possessor o) the @ua&ity. In the cognition, ,the pot is #&ue,, 'gha+o nI&a$(, the #&ue co&or o) the pot is cogni*ed as the @ua&i)ier, visheshhaNa o) the pot which is the @ua&i)icand, visheshhya. +he particu&ar instance o) #&ue co&or o) the pot is di))erent and nondi))erent )rom the pot 'a&though the generic character o) #&ue co&or is accepted to #e on&y di))erent )rom the pot.( I) we sp&it the sAdhya into #heda 'di))erence( and a#heda 'nondi))erence(, then we run into the )o&&owing pro#&em. +he sAdhya a#heda in itse&) >ANN?+ #e a necessary )actor 'prayo"aka( o) the 'so&e( hetu. <or examp&e, there is no cognition o) the )orm ,the pot is the "ar,, where the terms ,pot, and ,"ar, are synonyms and the hetu samAnAdhikR itatva is present. +here)ore, even though there is a#heda #etween ,pot, and ,"ar, here, there is no hetu. And in the case o) the 'erroneous( cognition ,the pot is the c&oth,, there is #heda #etween the pot and the c&oth #ut again there is no hetu, samAnAdhikR itatva. +here)ore, we need the con"unction o) #heda and a#heda as the sAdhya so that the sAdhya #ecomes a prayo"aka o) the hetu. /ut, in your 'advaitin4s( case, things are di))erent. Bou c&aim that the wor&d is unrea& 'mithyA( or has the a#sence o) sattva and the a#sence o) asattva 'or the di))erence )rom sattva and the di))erence )rom asattva(, #ecause o) the hetu, dR ishyatva, percepti#i&ity. ';hat is percepti#&e or cogni*a#&e is mithyA.( Now, percepti#i&ity u#hayatva-vishishh+asya dR ishyatvopapAdakatA

is a characteristic o) everything other than /rahman, as per your view. And /rahman is ,sat,. A&& you need to prove is a#sence o) sattva or di))erence )rom sattva with regard to the wor&d. 7roving the a#sence o) asattva 'or di))erence )rom asattva( is redundant. $ence the charge o) partia& siddha-sAdhana. advaitin3 ;hat you say is not "usti)ia#&e. Eust as in your case, the con"unction o) #heda and a#heda is a necessary )actor 'prayo"aka( o) the hetu, so in our case too the con"unction o) a#sence o) sattva and the a#sence o) asattva 'or e@uiva&ent&y the con"unction o) di))erence )rom sattva and the di))erence )rom asattva( is the prayo"aka o) the hetu, dR ishyatva 'percepti#i&ity(. $ere is why. I) we make "ust the a#sence o) sattva the sAdhya, then we run into a pro#&em in the case o) a )ictitious entity 'a chimera(. A )ictitious entity, such as the horn o) a hare, has a#sence o) sattva on&y. /ut here the hetu, dR ishyatva is N?+ present. A )ictitious entity is never perceived. Again, i) we make "ust the a#sence o) asattva the sAdhya, then we run into a pro#&em in the case o) /rahman. $ere, we have a#sence o) asattva, #ut again the hetu, dR ishyatva is N?+ present in /rahman. +here)ore, we need to have the con"unction o) a#sence o) sattva and a#sence o) asattva as the sAdhya in order to make the sAdhya a necessary )actor 'prayo"aka( o) the hetu. +he charge o) siddha-sAdhana against us cannot #e made. Notes3 =( +he thrust o) the argument is that the hetu )or the sAdhya in the mAdhva4s case as we&& as )or the advaitin has to #e a prayo"aka, a necessary )actor o) the hetu. In other words, the hetu must occur exact&y wherever the sAdhya occurs, no more no &ess. +his is more restrictive than the genera& )orm o) vyApti, as may #e reca&&ed )rom the introduction to nyAya in the third part o) this series. ;hen the mountain has the hetu, smoke and we in)er the sAdhya, )ire, the vyApti is &ess restrictive in the sense that we may a&&ow the sAdhya )ire to occur without smoke, a&though the smoke must a&ways #e accompanied #y )ire in order )or the in)erence to #e va&id. /ut in the present discussion, we cannot a&&ow the sAdhya to occur where the hetu is not )ound. +he occurrences o) sAdhya and hetu must exact&y coincide. $ere, the sAdhya )or the advaitin is sad#heda and asad#heda and the hetu is dR ishyatva. /y de)ining a ,tight, )orm o) vyApti, what the advaitin is saying is3 ;hatever is percepti#&e 'cogni*a#&e( is di))erent )rom sat ANdi))erent )rom asat. +he converse a&so ho&ds. ;hatever is di))erent )rom sat AN- di))erent )rom asat is percepti#&e 'cogni*a#&e(. 5ym#o&ica&&y speaking, i) $ is the hetu, and the sAdhya is the &ogica& con"unction 'AN-( o) 5= 'sad-#heda( and 5% 'asad-#heda(, we may write3 $ -I 5= AN- 5% 5= AN- 5% -I $ where ,-I, means ,imp&ies,

%( +he mAdhvas4 view here regarding the #heda-a#heda o) a @ua&ity )rom the possessor o) the @ua&ity is used here #y MadhusUdana as an examp&e on&y. It does not necessari&y mean that MadhusUdana endorses this view o) the mAdhvas in a #roader context, as )or examp&e, with respect to an exegetica& context. Indeed, the mAdhvas seem to come under some heavy attack )rom the 0ishishh+a-advaitins )or not recogni*ing the #heda 'di))erence( #etween dravya and adravya as RAmAnu"a ho&ds. In his )ourth vo&ume tit&ed ,$istory o) Indian 7hi&osophy,, -asgupta out&ines the criticism o) the mAdhvas #y the vishishh+a-advaitin, 7arakA&a Bati in his 0i"ayIndra-parA"aya. 7araka&a Bati points out how severa& texts in the upanishads #ecome a#surd i) the mAdhva position on dravya and adravya is he&d. Another ma"or disagreement #etween the two schoo&s o) 0aishnavism is the Ananda-tAratamya position which is he&d #y the mAdhvas #ut re"ected #y the vishishh+a-advaitins. +he &atter cannot accept 'nor can the advaitins( that there is gradation in /&iss 'Ananda( in the state o) mokshha. +his position is a&so critici*ed #y 7arakA&a Bati on exegetica& grounds as we&&. +here is another vishishh+a-advaitin work named Ananda-tAratamya-khaN-ana that is a&so mentioned #y -asgupta. Neverthe&ess, it must #e noted that the advaitin4s use o) the mAdhva examp&e on ,guNa, and ,guNI, is )or i&&ustration on&y. Any other examp&e wou&d a&so #e )ine. >ontinuing with the series on the advaita-siddhi, we wi&& next study the second de)inition o) mithyAtva that is de)ended #y MadhusUdana 5arasvatI. ?ther artic&es in this series may #e retrieved #y searching )or ,siddhi, in the su#"ect &ine. It is especia&&y use)u& to #e )ami&iar with #asic nyAya termino&ogy as exp&ained in the third and )ourth parts o) the series. ;ithout such )ami&iarity, the discussion #e&ow may not make much sense at a&&2 advaita-siddhi text3 pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h ! A&ternative&y, mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( o) something is that which is the counter-positive or a#sentia& ad"unct 'pratiyogin( o) an a#so&ute negation 'a negation )or a&& three periods o) time, past, present, and )uture( in the very su#stratum where it 'the thing( is cogni*ed. +his is the second de)inition o) mithyAtva that is taken up #y MadhusUdana in his de)ense o) mithyAtva o) dvaita. +his a&ternative de)inition is #ased on shruti statements such as ,neha nAnAsti kiENchana,, as /rahmAnanda says in his gau-a#rahmAnandI, ,neha nAnAstI,tyAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha,. +he second de)inition comes )rom the 0ivaraNAchArya, 7rakAshAtman, the author o) the 7anchapAdikA-vivaraNa. It is important to understand this de)inition and the signi)icance o) the terms invo&ved. As in the case o) the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva, what is a&Ika or a )ictitious entity is N?+ the mithyAtva that is used to descri#e the wor&d. +he mithyAtva o) the wor&d is akin to the i&&usion o) the snake over a rope or si&ver in nacre. Upon rea&i*ing that the snake is i&&usory, one exc&aims ,+he snake is unrea&. +he snake was never there to #egin with, it is not there now, and it wi&& never #e there in the )uture2, +his is the mithyAtva 'unrea&ity( o) the wor&d that is #eing ta&ked

a#out. ?ne important point to remem#er is that the in order )or a thing to #e mithyA or unrea& according to this de)inition, it MU5+ #e cogni*ed or perceived in some sus#tratum. +his is a necessary condition )or something to #e ca&&ed mithyA. ;hat is perceived is ca&&ed mithyA. +hat which can never #e perceived, a chimera such as the horns o) a hare, is N?+ #eing ca&&ed mithyA. Rather it is asat. And /rahman is sat. MithyAtva is di))erent )rom these two, ie. mithyAtva is sadasadvi&axaNa. /rahmAnanda, in his gaU-a#rahmAnandI commentary on the advaita-siddhi there)ore, de)ines the term pratipanna-upAdhi as )o&&ows3 pratipanna$ svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya$ ya upAdhiradhikaraNaM tannishh+ho yastraikA&ikanishhedho .atyanta-a#hAvastatpratiyogitvamityartha$ ! pratipanna means the @ua&i)icand o) the cognition that has the 'thing that is mithyA( as the @ua&i)ier. 5uch a @ua&i)icand that is the su#stratum is ,pratipanna-upAdhi,. +he counter-positive o) the a#so&ute negation or the negation )or a&& periods o) time in the su#stratum 'is ca&&ed mithyA(. +his de)inition ru&es out e@uating what is mithyA with a&Ika, a )ictitious entity. Bet another type o) negation is a&so #eing ru&ed out in the de)inition. ;hat is )ictitious is not perceived anywhere. +he other extreme is the negation that is a&ways empirica&&y perceived. <or examp&e, a pot is N?+ perceived as existing in the threads that make a c&oth. I) the advaitin means #y mithyAtva the )act that a pot is negated in the threads o) a c&oth, he is stating what is a&ready esta#&ished and there)ore open to the o#"ection o) ,siddha-sAdhana doshha,. /ut this is type o) negation is #eing ru&ed out #y the term ,svaprakArakadhIvisheshhya,. In order )or the de)inition o) mithyAtva to app&y to the negation o) the pot in threads o) a c&oth, the pot wi&& have to have #een perceived as existing in the threads o) a c&oth. /ut no such cognition o) a pot in threads o) a c&oth ever occurs. 5o the de)inition o) mithyAtva does not app&y to such o#vious negations. 0i++ha&esha 'who comments on the gau-a-#rahmAnandI( there)ore remarks3 vastutastu svaprakArakatvopAdAnaM tuchchha-ativyAptivAraNAya Actua&&y, the mention o) ,having it as the @ua&i)ier, is )or the purpose o) ru&ing out something that is trivia& ')ictitious entity( and a de)inition that is too wide 'ativyApti(. Another type o) negation or a#sence is a&so #eing ru&ed out #y the insertion o) the term ,traikA&ika, in the de)inition. +his is to counter an o#"ection as )o&&ows. +here is an a#sence o) a thing such as a pot #e)ore it comes into #eing, ca&&ed the prAga#hAva. A)ter the pot is destroyed, there is another type o) a#sence 'a#hAva( ca&&ed ,dhvaMsa-a#hAva., -oes the advaitin mean #y mithyAtva an a#sence that is one o) these typesA ?r does he mean the mutua& negation 'mutua&-a#sence or anyonya-a#hAva or #heda( that is perceived #etween things such as a pot and the pieces o) the pot a)ter it is destroyedA In either case, the advaitin is committing the mistake o) siddha-sAdhana, proving what is a&ready esta#&ished. In order to re"ect this o#"ection, the de)inition o) mithyAtva

has the term ,traikA&ika,. +he negation that is #eing descri#ed in the de)inition is traikA&ika, that ho&ds )or a&& times. In the case o) prAga#hAva, dhvaMsa-a#hAva, and #heda in the a#ove examp&es, there is no a#so&ute negation 'atyanta-a#hAva(, that which ho&ds )or a&& times. +here)ore, /rahmAnanda says3 kapA&adinishh+ha#heda-dhvaMsAdipratiyogitvamAdAya siddha-sAdhanaM syAdatastraikA&iketi ! '+he opponent may( charge us with ,siddha-sAdhana, #y taking the pratiyogitva 'counter-positive-ness( o) the a#hAva 'a#sence( to #e the di))erence or posterior negation 'dhvaMsa-a#hAva( in things such as the pieces o) a pot. '+o counter this we have added the term( ,traikA&ika, in the de)inition. In the next part, we wi&& see how the opponent raises an important o#"ection to this de)inition. A sma&& re@uest. >ou&d you p&ease )rame this argument in Iterms o) propositiona& &ogic ' as you had done #e)ore (A II have read it many times #ut I get &ost as I approach the Iend. I wou&d sure&y appreciate a gist o) this argument Ipresented in )ami&iar terms. +he on&y reason why I did not attempt to )ormu&ate the de)inition in terms o) predicate &ogic is #ecause the &ogica& expressions tend to get ,unwie&dy, @uick&y as the de)inition gets more and more re)ined. +he )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva 'p&ease see ,advaita-siddhi - J,( is re)ined #y the second de)inition. A&& that the )irst de)inition rea&&y says is that mithyA is something that is di))erent )rom the a#so&ute&y rea& /rahman and )rom a )ictitious entity. As per the )irst de)inition, the thing that is mithyA shou&d #e =( cogni*ed in some &ocus 'su#stratum( and %( #e su#&ated 'negated( at some time. +he second de)inition re)ines the )irst #y saying that the thing that is mithyA is =( su#&ated in the very &ocus where it is cogni*ed and %( and it is su#&ated so )or A88 times. At the risk o) #eing uninte&&igi#&e once again, I wi&& attempt to )ormu&ate the second de)inition o) mithyAtva in terms o) predicate &ogic. +o exp&ain the second de)inition in terms o) ;estern-sty&e predicate &ogic, we need to introduce di))erent time )rames o) re)erence. A&so, we need to consider the second de)inition as a re)inement o) the )irst de)inition. +he second de)inition comes )rom the 0ivaraNa on the 7anchapAdikA which contains the )irst de)inition. +he need )or di))erent time )rames arises #ecause o) the )o&&owing. In any case o) i&&usion, there are two time )rames. +he )irst time )rame, say +KA 'time )rame o) avidyA(, is that which ho&ds when the i&&usion is in e))ect. -uring this phase, things are interpreted in terms o) the i&&usion. <or examp&e, consider the i&&usion o) the snake on the rope. ;hen one is under the spe&& o) this i&&usion, heLshe thinks there is a snake. $eLshe may even interpret the movement o) the rope due to wind, etc. as a movement o) the snake2 Note a&so that the second de)inition states that the thing that is mithyA is su#&ated in the same &ocus where it is cogni*ed 'pratipanna-upAdhau( and that it

is su#&ated )or a&& times 'traikA&ikanishhedha(. >&ear&y, it is a#surd to say that the i&&usion is su#&ated )or a&& times -URING the i&&usion phase 'avidyA( itse&). +his is akin to saying a dream is su#&ated during the dream. +he dream is su#&ated on&y upon waking up, not whi&e the dream is sti&& occurring. +here)ore, it is necessary to interpret traikA&ikanishhedha as the su#&ation )or a&& times in a time )rame o) re)erence that is di))erent )rom the time )rame during i&&usion. ;hat is this other time )rameA +he other time )rame is the time )rame that ho&ds A<+:R the i&&usion ends. >a&& this time )rame +KE 'time )rame a)ter dawn o) "nAna(. ?nce the i&&usion ends, the previous time )rame +KA no &onger app&ies. +here is no snake. ?ne exc&aims ,there was no snake there, there is no snake now, and there won4t #e the snake in )uture2, ;hat a#out the events o) the o&d time )rame +KAA +hese get re-interpreted or ,mapped, into events in time )rame +KE. <or examp&e, the movement o) the snake in the i&&usory phase gets re-interpreted as ,it must have #een the wind that caused the rope to move in rea&ity., In other words, the o&d events in time )rame +KA that were in terms o) ,snake, get ,mapped, into events in time )rame +KE in terms o) ,rope,. +his is #ecause there is N? ,snake, in the time )rame +KE. ?ne may say that ,history gets re-written, in time )rame +KE2 In the case o) a dream-i&&usion, the dream events may genera&&y #e thought o) as #eing mapped into ,non-events, or a NU88 event in the waking state. 5ometimes it I5 possi#&e to ,map, dream events into waking-state events. $ave you dreamed o) temp&e #e&&s ringing on&y to wake up and )ind that in rea&ity your a&arm c&ock is ringingA2 3-( $aving de)ined the two time )rames, the second de)inition o) mithyAtva can now #e descri#ed sym#o&ica&&y a&most in the same way as the )irst de)inition. <rom now on, I )o&&ow the notation simi&ar to that in the sixth part o) this series ',advaita-siddhi - J,( with some additiona& notation. 'Note3 5u#&ated and negated mean the same.( 8et us de)ine a predicate 5 where#y 5'F,8,t,+( means ,F is su#&ated in su#stratum 8 )or time t in time )rame +, A&so, &et us say :'t( means the existentia& @uanti)ier ,there is a t,, and U't( means the universa& @uanti)ier ,)or a&& t., 8et G stand )or the negation operator. +hen the de)inition o) existence 'sattva or simp&y sat( according to the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva is that thing, say F '/rahman(, such that3 G ':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+(, )or time t in some time )rame + and )or some su#stratum 8( ................................... 'A( or more concise&y, G ':'+(,:'t in +(, :'8(3 5'F,8,t,+(( ....................... 'A4( /rahman is N?+ something that can #e su#&ated )or some time in some time )rame in some su#stratum.

Next, MadhusUdana de)ines nonexistence 'o) something F( N?+ as simp&y negating the expression 'A( a#ove which wou&d "ust #e ':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+(, )or time t in some time )rame +, and )or some su#stratum 8( ......................................... '/( this wou&d mean ,there is a time t in some time )rame when F is su#&ated in su#stratum 8, stated more concise&y as3 ':'+(,:'t in +(, :'8( 3 5'F,8,t,+(( ............................'/4( 'Note3 +he terms &ocus and su#stratum are used interchangea#&y.( Rather nonexistence 'o) something F( is de)ined as )o&&ows3

'U't(3 G >'F,8,t,+(, )or time t in a&& time )rames, and )or a&& &oci( ........................................... '>( >'F,8,t,+( means ,F is cogni*ed in a &ocus 8 )or time t in time )rame +., 5omething 'F( is nonexistent i) and on&y i) ,)or a&& time t in a&& time )rames, F is not cogni*ed in any &ocus., 5tated more concise&y, 'U'+(,U't in + (,U'8(3 G >'F,8,t,+(( ....................... '>4( +he negation o) HthisH type o) nonexistence is3 ':'t( such that >'F,8,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +, and )or some &ocus 8( ...................................... '-( or more concise&y, ':'+(, :'t in +(, :'8(3 >'F,8,t,+(( .........................'-4( which means ,there is some time t in some time )rame + during which F is cogni*ed in a &ocus., And this is the negation o) nonexistence that is characteristic o) i&&usions such as si&ver-in-nacre, snake-on-rope, and )ina&&y, the wor&d-on-/rahman i&&usion. +he i&&usory thing is cogni*ed as existing in a &ocus 'su#stratum( sometime 'the period o) i&&usion( and in the time )rame +KA. +he )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva is 3 '/( AN- '-(. 'p&ease see advaita-siddhi - J( +here)ore, the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva is written3 ':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +, and )or some &ocus 8( AN':'t(3 >'F,84,t,+(, )or some time t in some time )rame +4, and )or some &ocus 84( ............................................. ':( or more concise&y, ':'+(,:'t in +(, :'8( 3 5'F,8,t,+(( AN':'+4(, :'t in +4(, :'84(3 >'F,84,t,+4(( ..................':4(

Now, what the second de)inition o) the 7anchapAdikA-vivaraNa does is to re)ine the )irst de)inition, make it more precise and &ess am#iguous. A)ter a&&, the )irst de)inition comes )rom the 7anchapAdikA and the second )rom the 0ivaraNa on the 7anchapAdikA. ;hat the second de)inition does is =( )ix the time )rames in ':( a#ove , %( )ix the &oci in ':(, and .( make the condition in the '/( part o) the de)inition stronger #y asserting that the su#&ation ho&ds )or a&& times. +he second de)inition o) mithyAtva may #e written )irst #y )ixing the time )rame in '/( as the time )rame +KE 'time )rame a)ter dawn o) "nAna( and the time )rame in '-( as the time )rame +KA 'time )rame during the avidyA phase(. '/ with time )rame + M +KE ( AN- '- with time )rame + M +KA( which is ':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or some time t in time )rame +KE, )or some &ocus 8( AN':'t(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or some &ocus 84( +he second de)inition o) mithyAtva may next #e written #y )ixing the &oci 8 and 84 to #e the 5AM:. +he de)inition c&ear&y states that the thing that is mithyA is su#&ated in the 0:RB 8?>U5 where it is cogni*ed. +his makes the de)inition3 ':'t( such that 5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or some time t in time )rame +KE, )or &ocus 8( AN':'t( such that >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or &ocus 84( AN- '8 M 84( Next, making the condition in the '/( part o) the de)inition stronger means the su#&ation shou&d ho&d )or a&& periods o) time in time )rame +KE. '5'F,8,t,+KE(, )or A88 time t in time )rame +KE, )or &ocus 8( AN':'t( such that >'F,84,t,+KA(, )or some time t in time )rame +KA, and )or &ocus 84( AN- '8 M 84( ....................................'<( or more concise&y, :'8(,:'84(''U't in +KE(3 5'F,8,t,+KE(( AN- ':'t in +KA(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(( AN- '8 M 84( ( ................................'<4( Actua&&y, i) we wanted to #e more picky and precise, we can say3 :'8(,:'84(''U't in +KE(3 5'F,8,t,+KE(( AN- ':'t in +KA(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(( AN- '8 M 84( ( AN- '+KE 2M +KA(..........................'<44( to insist that the time )rame +KA and +KE must not #e the same.

,2M, means ,not e@ua&s,. Introducing a predicate M'F( which means ,F is mithyA,, the predicate is de)ined as 'using ,NMI, to indicate e@uiva&ence(3 M'F( NMI :'8(,:'84(''U't in +KE(3 5'F,8,t,+KE(( AN- ':'t in +KA(3 >'F,84,t,+KA(( AN- '8 M 84( ( AN- '+KE 2M +KA(..........................'G( ;e have arrived at the )ina& )orm o) the second de)inition o) mithyAtva3 F is mithyA i) it is su#&ated )or A88 times in the very su#stratum where it is cogni*ed. ,pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM vA mithyAtvam.h !, +he second de)inition, i) it has to #e a re)inement o) the )irst de)inition, must imp&y the &atter. ie. '<( -I ':( It is easy to see that this imp&ication ho&ds. C?ther artic&es in this series may #e retrieved #y searching )or ,siddhi, in the su#"ect &ine.D +he o#"ection o) the opponent is #ased on the acceptance #y advaitins o) three orders o) rea&ity as de)ined in, )or examp&e, the 0edaanta pari#haashhaa o) dharmaraa"a adhvarin3 yadvaa trividhaM sattvaM -- paaramaarthikasattvaM #rahmaNa$, vyaavahaarikaM sattvamaakaashaade$, praati#haasikaM sattvaM shuktira"ataade$ ! +he a#so&ute rea&ity o) /rahman is paaramaarthika satya, the empirica& rea&ity o) the o#"ective wor&d, which inc&udes space etc., is vyaavahaarika satya, and the i&&usory appearance o) si&ver in nacre 'oyster-she&&(, etc. is praati#haasika satya. +he ?#"ection in #rie)3 +he o#"ection #y the opponent is aimed to trap the advaitin in an unrecovera#&e position #y pointing out de)ects in any assignment o) onto&ogica& status to the negation 'su#&ation( used in the second de)inition o) the mithyAtva. advaita-siddhi text3 nanu, pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhasya tAttvikatve advaitahAni$ prAti#hAsikatve siddha-sAdhanaM, vyAvahArikatve .api tasya #Adhyatvena tAttvikasattvAvirodhitayA arthAntaraM, advaitashruteratattvAvedakatvaM cha tatpratiyogina$ prAti#hAsikasya prapaENchasya pAramArthikatvaM cha syAt.h, +rans&ation3 ?#"ection #y the opponent3 Now, i) the a#so&ute negation 'o) a thing, such as the wor&d, that is #eing ca&&ed mithyA as per the second de)inition( is a#so&ute&y rea& 'pAramArthika(, then the #asic princip&e o) advaita 'non-dua&ism( is destroyed2 'I) the a#so&ute negation( is on&y i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika(, then you are proving what is a&ready

esta#&ished 'ie. the rea&ity o) the wor&d(. :ven 'i) the a#so&ute negation( is empirica& 'vyAvahArika(, you wi&& #e proving something other than what you intended #ecause 'such negation( wi&& not #e opposed to the a#so&ute rea&ity 'o) the wor&d(. +he shruti texts that are non-dua&istic wi&& #e incapa#&e o) revea&ing the truth. And 'i) it #e c&aimed that( the wor&d is i&&usory, 'that wi&& not ho&d( and 'the wor&d( wou&d have a#so&ute rea&ity 'pAramAthikatva(. 8et us examine the opponent4s o#"ection in a &itt&e more detai&. +he opponent says3 Bou de)ine three orders o) rea&ity - pAramArthika, vyAvahArika, and prAti#hAsika. And you have de)ined mithyAtva as the counter-positive-ness o) the a#so&ute negation ')or a&& periods o) time( in the very su#stratum where the thing that is mithyA is cogni*ed. In essence, you wou&d &ike to categori*e the wor&d as mithyA. Now, what rea&ity do you assign to such a negation o) the wor&dA =( Is this negation pAramArthika 'a#so&ute&y rea&(A %( Is this negation prAti#hAsika 'i&&usory( A .( ?r, is this negation vyAvahArika 'empirica&( A Regard&ess o) the type o) rea&ity you assign to this negation, you run into pro#&ems. =( +he negation o) the wor&d is pAramArthika. In this case, you have a direct contradiction with the non-dua& princip&e o) advaita. /rahmAnanda exp&ains the o#"ection3 advaita-hAni$ ,neha nAne,tyAdishruti#odhitasya #rahmaNi dR ishyasAmAnyA#hAvasya virodha$ '+here is( damage to the princip&e o) non-dua&ity as known )rom shruti statements such as ,neha nAnAsti kiENchana, 'there is no mani)o&d-ness here whatsoever( '#ecause( o) the contradiction due to the common a#sence o) the ,perceived, 'dR ishya(. I) the negation o) the wor&d is pAramArthika, then you have two such rea&ities - =( /rahman, and %( the said negation o) the wor&d. +his compromises the non-dua&ity princip&e. %( +he negation o) the wor&d is prAti#hAsika, i&&usory. In this case, you have siddha-sAdhana-doshha. /rahmAnanda exp&ains3 siddha-sAdhanamiti ! kapA&e gha+o nAstItyAdi#hrame prAtItikasyaatyantA#hAvasya vishhayatvena siddha-sAdhanamityartha$ ! siddha-sAdhana means that in cases o) erroneous cognition or i&&usion such as denying the pot in its parts, the a#so&ute a#sence o) the 'erroneous&y( cogni*ed negation is a&ready esta#&ished 'in another system(. In other words, i) you say the negation is i&&usory, such as the negation o) a pot in its two ha&ves, such a position is a&ready admitted #y another system. 'A who&e is said ,inhere, in its parts as per nyAya. 5o a who&e, such as a pot, cannot #e denied in its parts. Any such denia& is erroneous.( In other words, i) you say the negation o) the wor&d is i&&usory or

erroneous, that is a&ready admitted #y the rea&ist schoo&s. 5o you are committing the mistake o) siddha-sAdhana. .(+he negation o) the wor&d is vyAvahArika. In this case, what you are saying is that the negation o) the wor&d wi&& itse&) get su#&ated upon rea&i*ation o) /rahman. ;hat does this meanA +he wor&d itse&) >ANN?+ #e vyAvahArika #ecause it is a#surd 'a contradiction( to say that the wor&d as we&& as its negation get su#&ated upon /rahman rea&i*ation. :ither the wor&d or its negation can get su#&ated at the same time #ut not #oth2 +here)ore, you are &e)t with two possi#i&ities - a. the wor&d is pAramArthika or a#so&ute&y rea& ?R #. the wor&d is prAti#hAsika or i&&usory. /ut you deny the wor&d is i&&usory, and so the wor&d can on&y #e pAramArthika. +his point is stated #y /rahmAnanda as3 prAti#hAsikatva-asaM#havena pAramArthikatvameva #a&AtsyAditi #hAva$ ! '5ince the wor&d( cannot possi#&y #e i&&usory it is )orced to #e a#so&ute&y rea& 'pAramArthika( on&y. +his is the purport 'o) the opponent(. Again, 0i++ha&esha exp&ains why the wor&d cannot #e i&&usory when he comments on the term ,prAti#hAsikatva-asaM#havena, o) /rahmAnanda3 #rahmaGBAnAnyA#AdhyatvAditi '+he wor&d cannot #e i&&usory( #ecause 'it is admitted #y the advaitin( to remain un-su#&ated 'not negated( #y anything other than know&edge o) /rahman. 5o what is the resu&t o) accepting the wor&d as pAramArthika and the negation o) the wor&d as vyAvahArikaA +hese are the de)ects. <irst, you wi&& have esta#&ished the wor&d as a#so&ute&y rea& which is di))erent )rom what you set out to prove. +his is the de)ect o) arthAntara. 5econd, the shruti texts that speak o) non-dua&ity such as ,neha nAnAsti kiENchana, wi&& have to #e accepted as N?+ revea&ing the u&timate truth #ecause they can on&y revea& what is empirica& ' vyAvahArika(, ie. the negation o) the wor&d. In response to the o#"ection o) the opponent, MadhusUdana now #egins his rep&y3 iti chet.hA na ! I) this is what you say, we say no2 +o understand MadhusUdana4s rep&y to the o#"ection 'advaita-siddhi =%(, we need to )ind out what it means to negate something in the wor&d. 5hankara states in his commentary on gItA %.=J3 sarvatra #uddhidvayopa&a#dhe$, sad#uddhi$ asad#uddhi$ iti ! yadvishhayA #uddhi$ na vya#hicharati tat.h sat.h, yadvishhayA vya#hicharati tat.h asat.h! +here are two cognitions everywhere 'in any cognition in the wor&d( cognition o) the rea& and cognition o) the unrea&. +hat cognition which does not change is rea& 'sat( and that which changes is unrea& 'mithyA(.

C7&ease note that 5hankara4s usage o) asat corresponds to mithyA.D In the cognition, ,the pot is, 'san.h gha+a$(, the permanent )actor is , is, which indicates the under&ying existence. ;hat is an i&&usion is ,the pot,. ;hat is cogni*ed is "ust this permanent )actor #ut it is )a&se&y understood to #e a pot #y the super-imposition 'adhyAsa( o) the name-and-)orm on the under&ying :xistence 'sat(. In another cognition, ,the c&oth is, 'san.h pa+a$(, again the common, permanent )actor is ,is., ;hat is an i&&usion has to do with ,the c&oth., In other words, #etween the cognitions ,the pot is,, and ,the c&oth is,, what is common, constant, and permanent is the )actor, ,is., ;hat we see a#ove is a cognition where the cogni*er gives a name to a cogni*ed o#"ect, such as a pot, c&oth etc. Another type o) cognition tries to assert an ad"ective or attri#ute o) an o#"ect. In the cognition, ,the #&ue pot is,, again what is common, constant, and permanent is the )actor ,is., ;hat is i&&usion is ,the #&ue pot., 5o what is #eing denied u&timate rea&ity is the ,#&ueness, and ,potness, o) the o#"ect #ut not pure existence indicated #y ,is,. Genera&i*ing this to a&& cognitions, a&& o#"ects are rea& as )ar as they are treated as pure existence, #ut the moment you start associating them with names and )orms, the i&&usion #egins. +his :xistence is the common, unchanging, and permanent )actor among a&& cognitions. +here)ore, status o) anything in the wor&d may #e said to #e comprised o) two components =( a Rea& part and %( an unrea& part. +his is somewhat simi&ar to the Mathematician4s expression o) a comp&ex num#er as 'F O iH B( where F is the rea& part and B is the unrea& 'imaginary( part. ':&ectrica& engineers pre)er to write F O " HB, using " instead o) i.( /ut here we are not dea&ing with num#ers, rather cognitions. 5o every cognition is made o) two parts - a rea& part, : and an unrea& part, F. 5hankara assures us that the rea& part : remains the same )or a&& cognitions whi&e the unrea& part F changes. 5o we come to the interesting @uestion3 what does it mean to negate something in the wor&d, such as a potA It is c&ear that the rea& component o) the pot, which is :xistence, can N:0:R #e negated. $owever, the unrea& name-and-)orm 'nAma-rUpa( component o) the pot can #e negated. +his means on&y one thing. +he negation o) the pot a&so has two components - =( a rea& component, :xistence '/eing( and %( an unrea& component that negates on&y the unrea& component, name-and-)orm 'nAma-rUpa(, o) the pot. +his is essentia&&y what MadhusUdana says. +he negation o) the wor&d has two components. +he rea& component 'pAramArthika( is identica& with /rahman 'sat( and the unrea& component is o) the same order o) rea&ity as the wor&d, ie. vyAvahArika. +he unrea& component o) the negation on&y negates the unrea& component o) the wor&d. ;e wi&& )irst see how MadhusUdana exp&ains the rea& component o) the negation. advaita-siddhi text3 prapaENchanishhedha-adhikaraNI#hUta-#rahmA#hinnatvAnnishhedhasya tAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h ! na cha tAtvikA#hAvapratiyogina$ prapaENchasya tAtvikApatti$, tAtvikA#hAvapratiyogini shuktira"atAdau ka&pite vya#hichArAt.h ! +rans&ation3

'I) we ho&d that( the negation 'o) the wor&d( is non-di))erent )rom /rahman which is the su#stratum o) the negation o) the wor&d, then there is no damage done to the non-dua&ity princip&e. And the wor&d as the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) the a#so&ute&y rea& 'pAramArthika( negation cannot #e ')orced to #e( a#so&ute&y rea& '#ased on an erroneous ru&e that the pratiyogin o) a negation and the negation itse&) must necessari&y #e&ong to the same order o) rea&ity.( An exception 'to this ru&e which proves the ru&e to #e erroneous( is the si&ver-in-nacre that is 'i&&usory on&y( and its negation 'at the end o) i&&usion( which is rea&. +o understand MadhusUdana4s stand more, we need to examine how negation or a#sence 'a#hAva( is treated in di))erent systems. +he @uestions are3 =( Is a#hAva a category 'padArtha( in itse&)A in other words, do we have a cognition o) a#hAvaA %( +hrough what means o) cognition 'pramANa( is a#hAva cogni*edA +he #hA++a-mImAMsakas, )or examp&e, ho&d that a#hAva is a separate category and it is cogni*ed through a separate pramANa ca&&ed anupa&a#dhi or non-apprehension. +he naiyAyikas and MAdhvas ho&d that a#hAva is a separate category #ut they do not recogni*e a separate pramANa &ike anupa&a#dhi )or it, and ho&d that a#hAva can #e known through standard pramANas such as perception, in)erence, and ver#a& testimony. +he prA#hAkara-mImAMsakas ho&d that a#hAva is not a category in itse&), nor is there a pramANa such as anupa&a#dhi. <or examp&e, consider the sentence ,there is no pot on the ground,, - #hUta&e gha+o nAsti. $ere, an a#sence or negation o) a pot is #eing asserted with respect to the ground, the su#stratum. +he #hA++as, naiyAyikas, and MAdhvas a&& accept that the a#sence o) pot on the ground is cogni*ed as separate )rom the ground. /ut the prA#hAkara-mImAMsakas ho&d that the a#sence o) the pot is rea&&y identica& to the ground, the su#stratum itse&). ?ne o) the greatest prA#hAkara mImAMsakas, shA&ikanAtha de)ines a#hAva in the prakaraNa-paENchikA 3 dR ishye pratiyogini yA tadekavishhayA #uddhi$ sA tada#hAvo vyapadishyate ! 'prakaraNapaENchikA( a#hAva 'negation or a#sence( is the cognition o) the 'su#stratum( a&one whi&e the pratiyogin 'the thing that is negated( is supposed to have #een perceived 'had it #een present(. ;hen we say ,there is no pot on the ground,, we are rea&&y on&y saying that we perceive the ground a&one where a pot was supposed to have #een present. ;e do not perceive such a thing as ,a#sence o) pot, on the ground. +here)ore, ,a#sence o) pot, is the same as the ground a&one, the su#stratum. $ere the pot which is supposed to have #een present #ut not seen is the pratiyogin. :ar&ier, it was stated that the negation o) the wor&d has two components - =( a rea& component, :xistence 'sat( and %( an unrea& component that is the negation o) the name-and-)orm aspects o) the wor&d. +he rea& component can #e identi)ied with /rahman, the su#stratum, and agrees with the 7rA#hAkara mImAMsA view o) negation that e@uates the negation with the su#stratum.

As to the o#"ection that the negation and the thing negated must #oth #e&ong to the same order o) rea&ity, MadhusUdana says this ru&e is )&awed #ecause there is an exception. In the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre, the si&ver is i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika( #ut the negation o) the si&ver 'at the end o) the i&&usion( is rea& or vyAvahArika at #est which is o) a di))erent order o) rea&ity. +he unrea& component o) the negation, which is vyAvahArika, is discussed next #y MadhusUdana. /RI:< R:>A73 MadhusUdana started #y accepting the de)inition o) unrea&ity 'o) the wor&d( as ,pratipanna-upAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvam.h, 'p&ease see advaita-siddhi =P(. Unrea&ity is that which is su#"ect to a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( in the su#stratum where it is cogni*ed. 5o the opponent asks3 Now, how do you c&assi)y this a#so&ute negation that you speak o)A Is this a#so&ute negation pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAti#hAsikaA ;e have seen how MadhusUdana has answered this @uestion #y pointing out that the a#so&ute negation can #e treated as pAramArthika, identica& with /rahman. In doing so, there is no harm done to the non-dua&ity princip&e. A&so, the opponent cannot insist on the ru&e that a negation and its counter-positive 'pratiyogin( have to have the same order o) rea&ity 'sama-sattAka(, #ecause an exception that #reaks the ru&e is readi&y )ound in the case o) an i&&usion such as the si&ver-in-nacre i&&usion. +he i&&usory si&ver is prAti#hAsika #ut its negation is pAramArthika i) the su#stratum o) i&&usion is treated as /rahman Itse&) or at &east vyAvahArika, i) the su#stratum is taken to #e nacre. $aving shown how the negation can #e pAramArthika, MadhusUdana now shows how the negation may a&so #e treated as vyAvahArika. +his corresponds to the unrea& part o) the negation. +he #asis o) this approach to ana&y*ing the negation is )ound in such treatises as the dR ig-dR ishya-viveka which says3 asti #hAti priyaM rUpaM nAma chetyaMshapaENchakam.h ! AdyatrayaM #rahmarUpaM "agadrUpaM tato dvayam.h !! %P !! :verything has )ive )actors3 =( :xistence, %( >onsciousness .( /&iss, 1( Name, and Q( <orm. ?) these, the )irst three are o) the nature o) /rahman and the &ast two 'Name and <orm( #e&ong to the wor&d. khaMvAyvagni"a&orvIshhu devatiryaN .h narAdishhu ! a#hinnAssachchidAnandA$ #hidyete rUpanAmanI !! %= !! In the e&ements, space, air, )ire, water, and earth, in Gods, anima&s, and humans, 'and other things in the wor&d( what is non-di))erent 'constant, unchanging( are :xistence, >onsciousness, and /&iss. ;hat are di))erent 'among a&& these things( are the Name and <orm aspects. C+he )irst verse a#ove a&so occurs in the sarasvatI-rahasya-upanishhad.D ;hen the wor&d is negated, the sachchidAnanda aspect, which is un-negata#&e, remains. +he nAma-rUpa aspects are negated. +hese were never rea& to #egin with. A rough ana&ogy, that has its own &imitations, may #e given to i&&ustrate the two aspects o) negation. 5uppose we see a pot on the ground. +hen the pot is removed. <or a whi&e a)ter the pot has #een removed, we

,)ee&, the a#sence o) the pot, a&though we continue to perceive the ground. -uring this phase, we perceive, in some sense, the a#sence o) the pot, as we&& as the ground. 5u#se@uent&y, we )orget a&& a#out the pot. At this point, we are on&y aware o) the ground, not the pot or its a#sence. /oth the pot and its a#sence have #een )orgotten. +here is no memory o) either having existed. In such a case, where the negation is cogni*ed as di))erent )rom the su#stratum, the negation can #e taken to #e the same order o) rea&ity as the thing that is negated, the pratiyogin. +his is what MadhusUdana says next. advaita-siddhi text3 atAtvika eva vA nishhedho .ayam.h ! atAtvikatve .api na prAti#hAsika$, kiMtu vyAvahArika$! nacha - tarhi nishhedhasya #Adhyatvena tAtvikasattvaavirodhitvAdarthAntaram-iti vAchyam.h ! svApnArthasya svApnanishhedhena #AdhadarshanAt.h ! nishhedhasya #AdhyatvaM pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve na tantram.h, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA nyUnasattAkatvam.h ! prakR ite cha tu&yasattAkatvAt.h kathaM na virodhitvam.h ! +rans&ation3 atAtvika eva - on&y unrea&, vA - ?r, nishhedho .ayam.h - this negation, atAtvikatve .api - :ven i) it is unrea&, na prAti#hAsika$ - it is not i&&usory, kiMtu vyAvahArika$ - #ut empirica&, nacha - And 'it( cannot, tarhi nishhedhasya - then, o) the negation, #Adhyatvena - due to #eing su#&ata#&e, tAtvikasattva-avirodhitvAd-arthAntaram - due to #eing not opposed to the rea&ity o) 'the wor&d(, there is the de)ect o) arthAntara 'proving something other than what was intended(, iti vAchyam.h - #e said thus, svApnArthasya - o) the dream-o#"ect, svApnanishhedhena - #y negation in the dream, #AdhadarshanAt.h - #ecause o) experiencing the su#&ation, nishhedhasya - o) the negation, #AdhyatvaM - su#&ata#i&ity pAramArthikasattva-avirodhitve - in #eing not opposed to the a#so&ute rea&ity, na tantram.h - is not dependent 'does not imp&y(, kiMtu nishhedhyApexayA - #ut as compared to what is negated, nyUnasattAkatvam.h having a &ower order o) rea&ity, prakR ite cha - And in the point under discussion, tu&yasattAkatvAt.h - #ecause o) the e@ua& order o) rea&ity, kathaM na - how is there no, virodhitvam.h - opposition. Meaning3 ?r we may say that this negation 'o) the wor&d( is unrea&. :ven though it is unrea&, it is not i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika(, #ut empirica& 'vyAvahArika(. And 'you( cannot say3,5ince the negation, that is itse&) su#&ata#&e, cannot #e in opposition to the rea&ity 'o) the wor&d(, there is the de)ect o) proving something other than intended., ';hyA( /ecause, o) the instance o) su#&ation o) a dream-o#"ect a&ong with its dream-negation. +here is no dependence or imp&ication o) the non-opposition to a#so&ute rea&ity on the su#&ata#i&ity o) the negation, #ut on the negation4s #eing o) a &ower order o) rea&ity than the thing that is negated. In the present case, there is e@ua&ity o) the order o) rea&ity 'o) the negation and the thing that is negated, ie. the wor&d(. 5o how is there no opposition 'to the rea&ity o) the wor&d(A MadhusUdana says here that the negation o) the wor&d can #e viewed as vyAvahArika. +his prompts an o#"ection3 I) the negation o) the wor&d is vyAvahArika, then this negation shou&d itse&) #e su#&ated. Upon su#&ation o) the negation o) the wor&d, the wor&d4s rea&ity, not unrea&ity, wou&d

#e a))irmed. +hat means the advaitin is proving something other than what he intended, a de)ect ca&&ed arthAntara. +o this o#"ection, MadhusUdana rep&ies that it is not the case that wor&d4s rea&ity wou&d #e a))irmed upon su#&ation o) the negation o) the wor&d. In the examp&e o) a dream, an o#"ect in the dream may #e negated &ater in the same dream. And the negation itse&) is negated upon waking up. +his does not resu&t in the dream-o#"ect #ecoming rea& in the waking state2 5o what imp&ies the rea&ity o) a thing is N?+ the mere )act that its negation is su#&ata#&e, #ut the )act that such negation is o) a &esser order o) rea&ity than that o) the thing itse&). <or examp&e, i) we see a rope in semi-darkness and imagine it to #e a snake, we may say ,+here is no rope., $ere we are negating the rope. /ut this negation is i&&usory 'prAti#hAsika(. Upon remova& o) the i&&usion, we rea&i*e that the thing seen #e)ore is indeed a rope. 5o the rope, which was negated #e)ore, is #eing a))irmed 'as vyAvahArika(. ;hat has happened here is that the rea&ity order o) the negation is prAti#hAsika which is &ess than the rea&ity order o) the rope, vyAvahArika. It is on&y in such cases that the rea&ity o) the thing negated may #e a))irmed, not otherwise. In the case under discussion, the negation o) the wor&d #eing descri#ed and the wor&d are o) the same order o) rea&ity. 5o the mere su#&ata#i&ity o) the negation cannot make the wor&d rea&. /RI:< R:>A73 MadhusUdana started #y accepting the de)inition o) unrea&ity 'o) the wor&d( as ,pratipanna-upAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvam.h, 'p&ease see advaita-siddhi =P(. Unrea&ity is that which is su#"ect to a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( in the su#stratum where it is cogni*ed. Now the opponent tries to show that the unrea&ity o) the wor&d de)ined #y the advaitin actua&&y amounts to admitting that the wor&d is a chimera 'a vastu-shUnya( or a pure&y )ictitious thing that is on&y imagined, #ut without a rea& #asis. Is the wor&d according to advaita a vastu-shUnya, a mere nothing or is it something with a rea& #asisA 8et us )ind out. C?ther artic&es in this series may #e retrieved #y searching )or ,siddhi, in the su#"ect &ine.D advaita-siddhi text3 nanu evamatyanta-asattvApAta$ pratipannopAdhau traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM hyanyatra-asattvena saMpratipannasya gha+Ade$ sarvatra traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM paryavasitam.h 6 anyathA teshhAM anyatra sattvApAtAt.h, nahi teshhAmanyatra sattA saM#havatIti tvadukteshcha 6 tathAcha kathamasadvai&axaNyam.h, nahi shashashR iNgAderito .anyadasattvam.h! +rans&ation3 '?#"ection(3 /eing the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) the a#so&ute negation ')or a&& three periods o) time( in the very su#stratum where it 'the thing that is unrea&, mithyA( is cogni*ed has thus #een de)ined as #eing unrea& 'mithyA( '#y you( and it is a#so&ute&y unrea& 'comp&ete&y nonexistent(. <rom this, it )o&&ows that things o) the wor&d, such as a pot, which are not existent in su#strata other than where they are cogni*ed, are eterna&&y negated in a&& su#strata2 ?therwise, they wou&d have to #e existent in su#strata other than where they are cogni*ed. '/ut( you have

said that +his such

that they 'the as a

they do not exist in other su#strata. According&y, how is it 'things o) the wor&d( are di))erent )rom nonexistence 'asat(A wor&d( is certain&y not di))erent )rom pure&y nonexistent things hare4s horn, 'according to your view(.

+he gist o) the argument here is that i) the unrea&ity o) a thing consists in its #eing negated a#so&ute&y ')or a&& periods o) time( in the very su#stratum where it was cogni*ed, then it must #e admitted that such a thing is negated a#so&ute&y everywhere. ?therwise, it wou&d mean the thing appears somewhere other than the su#stratum where it was cogni*ed. /ut this is denied #y the advaitin. +here)ore, the unrea& thing stands negated everywhere and )or a&& times. 5o it is no di))erent than a chimera which is a&so a#so&ute&y a#sent everywhere. advaita-siddhi text3 nacha nirupAkhyatvameva tadasattvam.h6 nirupAkhyatvapadenaiva khyAyamAnatvAt.h ! nApyapratIyamAnatvamasattvam.h6 asato .apratItau asadvai&axaNyaGBAnasya-asatpratItinirAsasya-asatpadaprayogasya chAyogAt.h ! nacha-aparoxatayA apratIyamAnatvaM tat.h6 nityaatIndriyeshhvativyApte$ +rans&ation3 '?#"ection continued3( Nonexistence 'asat( cannot #e unde)ina#&e 'nirupAkhya(. /ecause, 'the moment you say it is nirupAkhya(, it #ecomes de)ined #y the 'very( word nirupAkhya2 Nor can you say asat is what cannot #e cogni*ed. I) asat were not cogni*ed then there wou&d #e no cognition o) anything that is di))erent )rom asat. And there wou&d #e no su#&ation o) cognition o) a non-existent thing. And it wou&d not #e possi#&e to use the word ,asat,. <urther, you cannot de)ine asat as that which is not cogni*ed as #eing direct&y perceived #ecause this wou&d make the de)inition too wide 'having the de)ect o) ativyApti( due to the inc&usion o) eterna& #ut supra-sensuous things. iti chenmaivam.h ! I) this is what you say, we say no 'ie. your o#"ection is not "usti)ied(. ;e wi&& see how MadhusUdana answers this in the next part. /ut )irst, &et us see what /rahmAnanda 'the Gau-a#rahmAnandI commentary( has to say here. :ssentia&&y what the opponent is c&aiming here is that even a chimera 'a&Ika( that is a#so&ute&y )a&se ')ictitious such as a hare4s horns( is a&so the onto&ogica& status o) the wor&d as per the second de)inition o) mithyAtva o) the advaitin. I) the c&aim ho&ds, then we wi&& have proved that the wor&d is not sadasad-vi&axaNa, di))erent )rom sat and asat, #ut rather pure&y asat. In that case, the advaitin wi&& have proved something other than what he intended to in the )irst p&ace, there#y committing the )au&t o) arthAntara. Gau-a#rahmAnandI /rahmAnanda cites the Boga sUtra o) 7atan"a&i3 sha#daGBAnAnupAtI vastushUnyo vika&pa - Boga sUtra 0ika&pa is the chitta-vR itti that is devoid o) any rea& o#"ect and that arises )rom the word 'sha#da( and cognition 'GBAna(.

7atan"a&i &ists )ive kinds o) chitta-vR itti4s or modi)ications o) the mind - =( pramANa, vR itti arising )rom means to right know&edge, %( viparyaya, vR itti arising )rom misconception or i&&usion, .( vika&pa, vR itti arising )rom pure&y imaginary things, 1( nidrA, vR itti during s&eep, and Q( smR iti, vR itti arising )rom memory. +he three )actors to #e considered in any cognition arising )rom words are =( sha#da, the word, %( artha, the denotation o) the word, and .( GBAna 'or vR itti(, cognition that resu&ts )rom the word. ;hat happens in the case o) a vika&pa such as that associated with a pure&y )ictitious thing expressed #y words such as ,shashashR inga, or ,hare4s horn, is that we hear the word a&right and there is some cognition produced in the mind, #ut there is no corresponding denotation. ;e cannot point out a thing in the wor&d that represents the word ,hare4s horn., ?n the other hand when we hear the word ,gau$, or ,cow,, apart )rom the sha#da that we hear and the cognition o) the word or the vR itti in the mind, there is a&so a denotation o) the word, the o#"ect which is indeed a cow. +o #e more precise, every word or sha#da may have associated with it a HrepresentationH in the mind o) the &istener. <urther, there may a&so #e a denotation o) the word which represents the actua& o#"ect that corresponds to the word. In the case o) a chimera 'a&Ika(, however, there may #e a word and its representation in the mind, #ut there is no denotation or correspondence with an o#"ect. +his counters the o#"ection #y the opponent who says that a chimera may #e expressed #y words 'ie. is upAkhya(, and has a cognition 'chitta-vR itti( corresponding to it. ;hat #rahmAnanda is saying is that sure&y these two aspects wi&& #e there )or even a chimera #ut it is vastu-shUnya, ie. devoid o) any denotation, devoid o) any rea& #asis. ataeva ,vR ittaya$ paENchatayya$ pramANaviparyayavika&panidrAsmR itaya, iti vR ittiGBAnAnAM paENchadhA vi#hAgena viparyayarUpAt.h sadrUpa-adhishh+hAnavishhayakAt.h #hramAtpArthakyena vika&pa$ pAtaEN"a&asUtra evokta$ ! It is precise&y )or this reason that 7atan"a&i4s Boga sutra says that the chitta-vR ittis are o) )ive kinds - pramANa or right know&edge, viparyaya or misconception, vika&pa or imagination, nidrA or s&eep, and smR iti or memory, and thus distinguishes #etween viparyaya which is 'the same as( #hrama 'i&&usion( with Rea&ity 'sat( as the #asis 'adhishh+hAna(, and vika&pa. 'vi++ha&esha-upAdhyAyI commentary on the gau-a#rahmAnandI( nanu #hramasyApi sadavishhayakatva-avisheshhe kathaM vika&pa$ pR ithagityata Aha sadrUpeti ! idaM ra"atamiti #hrame .api shuktyavachchhinnachaitanyarUpaM sadevedantvena #hAsata iti #hAva$ ! In order to counter the argument3 #hrama 'i&&usion( is a&so without any rea& content and so how can vika&pa and #hrama #e di))erentA, '/rahmAnanda( says sadrUpa, etc. 'ie. that #hrama has sat as its #asis #ut vika&pa does not have such a rea& #asis(. :ven in the i&&usion ,this is si&ver, 'in regard to the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre(, 5at, which is consciousness &imited #y nacre, shines as ,this., +his is the purport.

0i++ha&esha is answering another possi#&e o#"ection. +he opponent may argue as )o&&ows. In the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre, the nacre is no dou#t the #asis o) the i&&usory si&ver. /ut the #asis nacre itse&) is unrea& according to the advaitin. 5o how can the i&&usory si&ver #e any di))erent )rom an entire&y )ictitious thing such as a hare4s horns, something that is imagined without a rea& #asis. In rep&y, 0i++ha&esha says that even in the si&ver-in-nacre i&&usion, the #asis nacre is not a#so&ute&y )a&se #ecause the nacre is itse&) an i&&usion on the a#so&ute&y rea& sat '/rahman(. +here)ore, a vika&pa is di))erent )rom a #hrama. advaita-siddhi text3 'MadhusUdana3( sarvatra traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM yadyapi tuchchhaanirvAchyayo$ sAdhAraNam.h tathApi kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvaM atyantAsattvam.h tachcha shuktirUpye prapaENche cha #AdhAtpUrvaM nAstyeveti na tuchchhatvApatti$ ! na cha #AdhAt.h pUrvaM shuktirUpyaM prapaENcho vA sattvena na pratIyate ! etadeva sadarthakenopAdhipadena sUchitam.h ! shUnyavAdi#hi$ sadadhi5h+hAna#hrama-anaN gIkAreNa kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvarUpa-asadvai&axaNyasya shuktirUpye prapaENche cha-anaN gIkArAt.h ! sarvatra - everywhere, traikA&ikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM #eing the counter-positive 'pratiyogin( o) an a#sence )or a&& periods o) time, yadyapi- even though, tuchchhaanirvAchyayo$ - o) the trivia& 'a#so&ute&y non-existent, or )ictitious( and the unde)ina#&e 'anirvachanIya(, sAdhAraNam.hcommon, tathApi - #ut sti&&, kvachidapyupAdhau - in any su#stratum, sattvena - as existing ' as identi)ied with :xistence(, pratItyanarhatvaM - incapa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed, atyantAsattvam.h - a#so&ute non-existence, tachcha shuktirUpyeand that in the si&ver-in-nacre, prapaENche cha - and in the wor&d, #AdhAtpUrvaM - #e)ore su#&ation, nAstyeveti - is not at a&&, and thus, na tuchchhatvApatti$ - 'they( cannot #e a#so&ute non-existence, na cha #AdhAt.h pUrvaM - nor #e)ore su#&ation, shuktirUpyaM prapaENcho vA - the si&ver-in-nacre or the wor&d, sattvena na pratIyate - is not cogni*ed as existing, etadeva - it is exact&y this, sadarthakenopAdhipadena - #y the word ,upAdhi, which has Rea&ity 'sat( )or its denotation, sUchitam.h - 'is( indicated, shUnyavAdi#hi$ - #y the shUnyavAdins, sadadhi5h+hAna#hramai&&usion with Rea&ity 'sat( as the #asis, anaN gIkAreNa - #y not agreeing, kvachidapyupAdhau - in some su#stratum, sattvena - as existing 'as identi)ied with :xistence(, pratItyanarhatvarUpa - o) the nature o) #eing incapa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed, asadvai&axaNyasya - o) 'what is( di))erent )rom non-existence, shuktirUpye prapaENche cha - in the si&ver-in-nacre and the wor&d, anaN gIkArAt.h - due to not agreeing +rans&ation3 A&though #eing the counter-positive o) a#so&ute negation 'negation )or a&& times( is common #etween the a#so&ute&y nonexistent and the unde)ina#&e 'anirvachanIya(, sti&&, what is a#so&ute nonexistence is HHincapa#i&ityHHo)HH#eingHHcogni*edHHasHH existingHHinHHanyHHsu#stratum. And that 'incapa#i&ity( is N?+ either in the si&ver-in-nacre 'the i&&usory si&ver( or in the wor&d HH#e)oreHHsu#&ation. +hus, they 'the i&&usory si&ver or the wor&d( cannot #e a#so&ute&y nonexistent 'as, )or examp&e, a hare4s horn(. <or, it is not the case that the si&ver-in-nacre

or the wor&d is not cogni*ed as existing 'as identi)ied with :xistence(. +his is precise&y what is indicated #y the word ,upAdhi, that has Rea&ity 'sat( )or its denotation 'meaning(. +he shUnyavAdins '/uddhists( do not agree that the #asis o) 'any( i&&usion is the Rea&ity 'sat(. 5o they do not agree that the si&ver-in-nacre and the wor&d are capa#&e o) #eing cogni*ed as existing in some su#stratum, which is what makes them 'i&&usory entities such as the si&ver-in-nacre and the wor&d( di))erent )rom the a#so&ute&y non-existent. Notes3 -----/rahmAnanda c&ari)ies the advaita position vis-a-vis the /auddha4s in his gau-a#rahmAnandI '&aghuchandrikA( commentary on the advaita-siddhi. nanu shUnyavAdino mAdhyamikasya mate sarvaM mithyeti svIkAre .api gha+a$ sannityAdidhI$ svIkriyate sarvAnu#havasiddhAyAstasyA apa&Apa-asaM#havAt.h6 '?#"ection3( :ven in the mAdhyamika or shUnyavAda system 'o) the /auddhas( it is accepted that everything is mithyA or unrea&, #ut cognitions such as ,the pot is,, etc. are accepted #ecause they are esta#&ished #y universa& experience and, as such, cannot #e denied. '5o how is the advaita position di))erent )rom the mAdhyamikaA( Rep&y3 tatra cha-a#AdhyarUpasattAdAtmyaM na #hAti, kiMtv-arthakriyAkAritvamiti tai$ svIkriyate $owever, in their 'mAdhyamika( system, the 'unrea& thing( does not appear as identi)ied with Rea&ity 'sat(. Rather, what is accepted is that 'existence o) the wor&d is the same as( the capacity to produce e))ects or causa& e))iciency. In the /uddhist system, existence is de)ined as arthakriyAkAritva or arthakriyAshakti, the capacity to produce e))ects. A pot exists simp&y #ecause it produces some e))ects, such as cognition, in us and its surroundings. $owever, in this system, this arthakriyAshakti is universa&&y concomitant with momentariness which means that everything that exists is on&y momentary. <or examp&e, the ta#&e I see now exists #ecause it produces some e))ects in me and its surroundings. +he next moment, the e))ects produced #y the ta#&e are not the same as they are now. 5ince the ta#&e4s existence is de)ined #y the e))ects it is capa#&e o) producing, the ta#&e I see now is not the same ta#&e in the next moment. 5imi&ar&y the ta#&e I see now is not the same as the ta#&e in the previous moment. $ence, we may understand the /auddha position on :xistence 'sattva( as xaNikatvavyAptam.h, ie. whatever exists is on&y momentary. In contrast, the advaita position on sattva is trikA&a-a#AdhyatvasvarUpa, ie. sattva consists in not #eing su#&ata#&e at any time. In any cognition such as ,san.h gha+a$,, ,the pot is,, ' or ,san.h pa+a$,, ,the c&oth is,( the advaitin ho&ds that what is #eing cogni*ed is :xistence 'sat( with a super-imposed re&ation o) identity 'tAdAtmya( #etween :xistence and the pot 'gha+a(. In other words, the pot is #eing cogni*ed as identi)ied with an eterna&&y unsu#&ata#&e

#asis 'adhishh+hAna( which is sat. +his is what /rahmAnanda is pointing out in his &aghuchandrikA. +hat is why he interprets ,sattvena, in MadhusUdana4s rep&y as ,a#AdhyarUpasattAdAtmyena,, ,as #eing identi)ied with Rea&ity 'sat( that is unsu#&ata#&e., $e says )urther3 ,san.h gha+a, ityAdipratyayopapatterukta-a#AdhyatvaM mAdhyamikena na svIkriyate +he said unsu#&ata#i&ity that is esta#&ished in cognitions such as ,the pot is, is not accepted #y mAdhyamika. nacha #AdhAtpUrvama#AdhyatvaM prapaENche .astyeva tanmate .apiiti vAchyam.h Nor can 'you( say that even in that system 'mAdhyamika( the unsu#&ata#i&ity o) the wor&d I5 there #e)ore its su#&ation. ';hyA( trikA&a-a#Adhyatvasya-eva-asmA#hirniveshAt.h ! /ecause we have inc&uded the term trikA&a-a#Adhyatva , non-su#&ata#i&ity )or a&& times. ;hat /rahmAnanda means here is that the wor&d is itse&) unsu#&ata#&e unti& o) course there is the #AdhakaGBAna, GBAna that su#&ates the wor&d. And unti& that happens the wor&d appears identi)ied with the eterna&&y unsu#&ata#&e /rahman. No such view is expressed anywhere in the mAdhyamika system 'tanmate tu na kutra .api iti(. /rahmAnanda conc&udes3 a#Adhyavisheshhyaka-prapaENcha#hramasya svIkAre prapaENche apy-a#AdhyatAdAtmya#hramo .avashyaM svIkArya$, paraspara adhyAsAnurodhAt.h, anyathA tu tatra mAnA#hAva iti #hAva$ ! Upon accepting that the wor&d is an i&&usion on the unsu#&ata#&e @ua&i)icand '/rahman(, one must necessari&y accept a&so that there is the i&&usion o) identi)ying the wor&d with the unsu#&ata#&e, #ecause o) the re@uirement due to the mutua& superimposition '#etween the wor&d and /rahman(. :&se, there wou&d #e no evidence 'to accept that the wor&d is an i&&usion on the unsu#&ata#&e /rahman(. +his is the purport 'o) what MadhusUdana says(. A&though the advaitin says the wor&d is an i&&usion on /rahman, he is care)u& to point out that the i&&usion invo&ves the 'erroneous( identi)ication o) the wor&d with the unsu#&ata#&e /rahman. Unti& and un&ess there is a #Adhaka-"nAna, "nAna that su#&ates the wor&d, the i&&usion o) the wor&d wi&& persist, HHindependentHH o) time. +he su#&ation o) the wor&d depends HHso&e&yHH on the #Adhaka-"nAna. In contrast, there is no such re@uirement in the /auddha system. ;hatever exists does so on&y momentari&y. +he su#&ation o) whatever appears to exist is not in any way dependent on a #Adhaka-"nAna. +his is shUnyavAda. As the Atmatattvaviveka says3

na grAhya#hedamavadhUya dhiyo .asti vR ittistad#Adhane #a&ini vedanaye "ayashrI$ ! nochedanityamidamIdR ishameva vishvaM tathyaM tathAgatamatasya tu ko .avakAsha$ !! +he cognition o) an o#"ect does not exist i) its di))erence )rom the o#"ect is disregarded - the power)u& 0edAnta has scored a victory #y de)eating this view. +his wor&d o) i&&usion as we know it is 'in essence( rea&. 5o where is the scope )or the theory o) the /auddha in this '0edAnta( A In )act, the characteristic o) 'the wor&d4s( #eing su#&ated #y "nAna '"nAna-nivartyatva( is taken to #e one o) the de)initions o) mithyAtva itse&), as we sha&& see &ater. +his underscores the paramount importance o) "nAna as the destroyer o) a&& dua&ity. ;e cannot simp&y wish the dua&ity to go away without resorting to "nAna. And what is this "nAnaA It invo&ves shravaNa, manana, and nididhyAsana #y the aspirant who has the )our-)o&d @ua&i)ications, sAdhana-chatu5h+aya. Eust saying that wor&d o) dua&ity does not exist or putting )orth a nice theory wi&& not #e o) much use. In this connection, there is a &esson in the 7anchadashI. 5omeone who has mere ver#a& )ami&iarity with advaita asks3 ;hy am I sti&& without rea&i*ationA 0idyAraNya gives the examp&e o) a man who heard that an award was #eing given to anyone who knew the )our 0edas. +his man c&aimed that he knew there were )our 0edas 'and pro#a#&y their names( and so he was entit&ed to the award2 ;ith respect to /rahmanL5e&), 0idyAraNya asks ,-o you "ust say the word /rahman or do you rea&i*e its meaningA, 'sha#dAneva pa+hasyAho te5hAmarthaM cha pashyasi(. advaita-siddhi - =R - +he third de)inition o) mithyAtva <rom3 Anand $ud&i 'view other messages #y this author( -ate3 ;ed, . Ean %PP= =S3Q=3P%

$aving seen the )irst two de)initions o) mithyAtva 'unrea&ity(, we wi&& now study the third de)inition o) mithyAtva that MadhusUdana dea&s with in the advaita-siddhi. 7revious artic&es on the advaita-siddhi may #e retrieved )rom the archives #y searching )or the key word ,siddhi., +hese artic&es a&so inc&ude the #ackground in nyAya that is use)u& in making sense out o) MadhusUdana4s work which is certain&y one o) the )inest po&emica& treatises in the who&e o) Indian phi&osophy. Reca&& that the )irst de)inition o) mithyAtva said that what is mithyA is characteri*ed #y ,sadasadanadhikaraNatva,, not #eing the su#stratum o) either sat ':xistence( or asat 'nonexistence(. And the second de)inition o) mithyAtva said that what is mithyA 'unrea&( is characteri*ed as #eing the counterpositive 'pratiyogin( o) an a#so&ute negation in the very su#stratum where it 'the thing that is mithyA( is cogni*ed. +he third de)inition that is now taken up in the advaita-siddhi simp&y says3 GBAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h ! A&ternative&y, unrea&ity is the property o) #eing su#&ated #y

know&edge or cognition. +his is an extreme&y pithy de)inition which must on&y #e understood #y care)u& ana&ysis, not "ust #rushed o)) as something o#vious and trivia&. +he de)inition comes )rom the 0ivaraNAchArya, 7rakAshAtman. <irst o) a&&, &et us do a simp&e ana&ysis. ;e know that GBAna and aGBAna are &ike &ight and darkness. aGBAna, ignorance is su#&ated, negated #y GBAna. <urther, what is aGBAna, ignorance, is a&so unrea&. I) I am ignorant o) something, I have erroneous in)ormation a#out that thing. +his erroneous in)ormation does not represent any true state o) a))airs. 5o it is )a&se. ;hen do I e&iminate the erroneous in)ormationA ?n&y when I have the correct in)ormation, GBAna o) the thing in @uestion. Next, &et us try to ana&yse the de)inition in a deeper and technica& manner using nyAya. In any phi&osophica& de#ate, any de)initions that you make must #e unam#iguous and must withstand c&ose scrutiny #y the opponent. +his is especia&&y true in the advaita-siddhi context #ecause the opponents here happen to #e &ed #y the mAdhva exponent 0yAsa-tIrtha, who in the words o) contemporary mAdhva scho&ar /N9 5harma 'i) my memory serves me right(, su#"ects a&& theories to ,microscopic scrutiny., ;e4d #etter make sure the de)inition is ,air-tight, with no ho&es whatsoever. A signi)icant di))icu&ty with the de)inition, when we take a c&oser &ook, is this. +he de)inition shou&d app&y to ordinary cases o) i&&usion such as the si&ver-in-nacre and snake-on-rope as we&& as the @uite extra-ordinary and )antastic i&&usion o) the wor&d on /rahman. +he cognition o) the rope as rope 'or nacre as nacre( ends the ordinary i&&usion. Now what ends the i&&usion o) the wor&dA 5ure&y, /rahman cannot #e cogni*ed in the same o#"ective way that a piece o) rope or nacre is cogni*ed. +he cognition o) an o#"ect, such as a rope, o) the )orm o) ,this is a rope, is )undamenta&&y di))erent )rom the GBAna o) /rahman or /rahmasAxAtkAra, the direct rea&i*ation o) /rahman. ;hat is it that is so )undamenta&&y di))erent #etween the two types o) GBAnaA 8et us investigate )urther with the he&p o) nyAya, more speci)ia&&y the tarka-saMgraha o) aNNaM#ha++a. tatra ni5hprakArakaM GBAnaM nirvika&pakam.h! saprakArakaM GBAna savika&pakam.h ! An indeterminate cognition 'nirvika&paka-GBAna( is one with no attri#ute 'prakAra(. A determinate cognition 'savika&paka-GBAna( is one with an attri#ute 'prakAra(. Any savika&paka-GBAna can #e #roken down into three components, as per nyAya. ?r more precise&y, any savika&paka-GBAna has an o#"ective content 'vi5haya( consisting o) =( a vishe5hya or @ua&i)icand, %( a vishe5haNa 'a&so prakAra(, ie. a @ua&i)ier, and .( a saMsarga or re&ation #etween the @ua&i)icand and @ua&i)ier. +his a&so corresponds rough&y to the su#"ect-predicate )orm o) a sentence in natura& &anguage. >onsider the 5anskrit sentence ,nI&o gha+a$, 'the pot is #&ue.( $ere the vishe5hya is ,pot,, the vishe5haNa is ,nI&a, and the re&ation #etween them is that o) inherence o) #&ue co&or in the

pot. 5uch a re&ation is ca&&ed ,samavAya, in nyAya. In the &anguage o) navya-nyAya, the cognition corresponding to the sentence 'nI&o gha+a$( is ana&ysed as )o&&ows3 nI&atva-avachchhinnaprakAratAnirUpita-gha+atva-avachchhinnavishe5hyatAnirUpita-samavAyatva-avachchhinna-saMsargatAnirUpita-vi5hayitAshA&i-GBAnam.h ! An awkward :ng&ish trans&ation is3 It is a cognition whose su#"ectness is descri#ed #y the @ua&i)icandness de&imited #y potness, descri#ed #y the @ua&i)ierness de&imited #y #&ue-ness, and descri#ed #y the re&ation-ness de&imited #y inherence-ness. +he naiyAyikas say that in a nirvika&paka cognition, it is not possi#&e to identi)y the vishe5hya, the vishe5haNa, and the saMsarga, even though they may #e present. +his is where the advaitins part company with the naiyAyikas. +he advaitins ho&d that in a nirvika&paka-GBAna, on&y :xistence '/rahman( is presented. +here is no vishe5hya, no vishe5haNa, no saMsarga. <ina&&y now, we can #e satisi)ied that the de)inition o) mithyAtva as ,GBAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h, app&ies to ordinary i&&usions as we&& as the wor&d-on-/rahman i&&usion. ;hen an ordinary i&&usion such as a snake-on-rope is negated in an ordinary )ashion, the cognition which negates the i&&usion is the savika&paka type, ,this is a rope., ;hen the wor&d-i&&usion is negated #y /rahma-GBAna, this GBAna is o) the nirvika&paka type. In the next part, we wi&& see how the opponent &aunches a new &ine o) attack on the de)inition. In this part, we wi&& study the o#"ections raised #y the opponent against the de)inition o) mithyAtva as #eingsu#&ated #y GBAna. advaita-siddhi text -------------------GBAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h ! nanu - uttaraGBAnanivartye pUrvaGBAne ativyApti$, mudgarapAtAdinivartye cha gha+AdAv-avyApti$, GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAmapyayaM do5ha$, sAFAtkAratvena nivartye shuktira"atAdau cha GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva-a#hAvAt.h sAdhyavika&atA, GBAnatvavyApyadharmeNa GBAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAM GBAnatvavyApyena smR ititvena GBAnanivartye saMskAre ativyApti$ +rans&ation -----------e)inition3 A&ternative&y, unrea&ity is the property o) #eing su#&ated #y know&edge or cognition. ?#"ection #y oppponent3 +his de)inition o) mithyAtva, ie. GBAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam, is too wide 'ativyApti( in the case o) a cognition4s #eing su#&ated #y a su#se@uent cognition. And in the case o) a pot4s #eing destroyed #y stroke o) a hammer,

adhi5h+hAna-

is cognition,

the de)inition wou&d #e too narrow 'avyApti(. I) the intention that unrea&ity consists in #eing su#&ated #y cognition as 'GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva( even then there is the same de)ect, ie. o) #eing too narrow. <urther, in the case o) the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre, the su#&ation o) the i&&usory si&ver is due to the direct

rea&i*ation &eads de)ective.

o) the su#stratum, ie. the nacre, 'adhi5h+hAna-sAxAtkAra(, and there is no su#&ation due to cognition as cognition, which to the de)ect o) sAdhyavika&atA, ie. the de)inition is I) the de)inition means that unrea&ity is what is su#&ated #y a property concomitant with the property o) #eing a cognition 'GBAnatva-vyApya-dharma(, in the case o) a memory 'smR iti( su#&ates a menta& impression 'saMskAra(, the de)inition is too wide. As /rahmAnanda4s Gau-a#rahmAnandI c&ari)ies, this third

that

de)inition

is #ased on the shruti itse&). 4vidvAnnAmarUpAdvimukta4 ityAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha - GBAnanivartyatvaM veti ! A di))erent sAdhya 'thing to #e proved, ie de)inition( is 'now( stated, as per the interpretation o) the shruti ,+he knower o) /rahman is )ree )rom names and )orms., 8et us now examine the o#"ection o) the opponent point #ypoint. =( -e)inition is too wide ------------------------<irst o) a&&, he says that the de)inition has the de)ect o) #eing too wide 'ativyApti(. $owA In the case o) a cognition #eing rep&aced #y a su#se@uent cognition, the )irst cognition though ,out o) )ocus, right now is certain&y not )a&se.

5uppose,

sun app&y

I see the sun rising in the :ast and next I see a cow. At that moment when I am cogni*ing the cow, the cognition o) the sun is in the #ackground or out o) )ocus, so to speak, #eing disp&aced #y the cognition o) the cow. -oes it mean my cognition o) the is )a&se. No. +he de)inition is too wide #ecause it seems to to this case where a cognition is disp&aced or su#&ated in some sense #y a su#se@uent cognition. %( -e)inition is too narrow ----------------------------Next, the opponent says that in the case o) a pot #eing

destroyed

#y stroke o) a hammer, there#y driving the pot into nonexistence, the de)inition is too narrow. +he advaitin c&aims that things such as a pot are su#&ated #y GBAna a&one. >&ear&y, the opponent says,

shou&d GBAna, #ut

the pot is not existent any more a)ter #eing destroyed. 5o it #e su#&ated. /ut what destroys or su#&ates the pot is not something as simp&e as the stroke o) a hammer2 Actua&&y, I suspect that the dvaitin seems to #e making )un o) the advaitin here - ,Bou cannot make things such as a pot vanish #y means o) what you ca&& GBAna. I) you want to make the pot vanish, why don4t you smash it with a hammer2, 5uppose a de)inition o) a characteristic, say M, can #e expressed &ogica&&y as M'F( N-I GN'F(, which means F has characteristic M i) and on&y i) F has characteristic GN. Now, i) we can )ind some B such that B has GN #ut not M, then the de)inition is too wide and su))ers )rom the de)ect termed in nyAya as ,ativyApti,. In the case o) a cognition > which is su#&ated #y another su#se@uent cognition, >4, > has the characteristic GN, GBAnanivartyatva, #ut not M, mithyAtva. +he de)inition here is too wide.

?n the other hand, i) we can )ind a B such that B has characteristic M #ut not GN, then the de)inition is too narrow, a de)ect ca&&ed ,avyApti,. In the case o) a pot, 7, it is destroyed #y a stroke o) a hammer and there#y has characteristic M, mithyAtva, #ut not characteristic GN. It is not destroyed #y any GBAna. 5o the de)inition is too narrow in this case. .( ;hat i) GBAnanivartyatva means GBAnatvena GBananivartyatva -------------------------------------------------------------+he opponent now seems to anticipate a move #y the advaitin to si&ence the charge o) ativyApti. 5uppose the advaitin says ,/y GBAnanivartyatva, we rea&&y mean that the cognition 'GBAna( that su#&ates what is mithyA has to #e considered as a cognition acting as a cognition, not anything e&se., /rahmAnanda c&ari)ies this ,anticipated position, o) the advaitin in the &anguage o) navya-nyAya3 GBAnatvena GBananivartyatveti ! GBAnatva-avachchhinnakAraNatApratiyogika-kAryatAvan-nAsha-pratiyogitvetyartha$ ! /y ,GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva, is meant the characteristic o) #eing the counterpositive 'pratiyogin( o) the destruction which has an e))ect-ness, where the e))ect-ness is re&ated to a cause-ness de&imited 'determined( #y cognition-ness. +he gist is that what determines the cause o) destruction o) something unrea& is the GBAna acting as a GBAna, ie. the characteristic GBAnatva. Now, suppose the anticipated position ho&ds that cognition o) the nature o) a vR itti 'a menta& modi)ication( is a @ua&ity 'dharma( o) the mind 'manas(. +he 0edAnta-pari#hA5hA says3 ,vR itti-rUpa-GBAnasya manordharmatve cha, and cites shruti as support )or this position. :ven in the nyAya system, cognition is said to #e a property 'guNa( o) the se&). 'GBAnAdhikaraNam-AtmA - tarkasaMgraha o) annaM#ha++a(. I)

cognition

disp&aces a #ut

is a @ua&ity o) the mind 'or se&)(, any cognition that previous cognition does so not in its capacity as a cognition in its capacity as a @ua&ity o) the mind. 5o what happens in this case is that one @ua&ity o) the mind su#&ates another @ua&ity o) the se&). +here)ore, the de)inition o) mithyAtva is )ree )rom the de)ect o) #eing too wide, simp&y #ecause the examp&e o) one cognition4s #eing su#&ated #y a su#se@uent one is no &onger re&evant.

1( +he charge o) avyApti sti&& ho&ds ------------------------------------+he opponent now says that a&though the advaitin has )reed his de)inition )rom this de)ect o) #eing too wide, the other de)ect o) #eing too narrow sti&& app&ies. +he GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva c&ari)ication sti&& does nothing to remove the de)ect in the case o) the stroke o) the hammer which destroys the pot. Q( +he de)inition is )&awed --------------------------<urther, there is another pro#&em with the ,GBAnatvena GBAnanivartyatva, de)inition. In the case o) the i&&usion o) si&ver in nacre 'shukti-ra"ata(, the cause o) the o) the i&&usion is not "ust any cognition o) nacre, rather it is the cognition o) that nacre which is the su#stratum o) the i&&usory si&ver. ;hi&e a person mistakes a rope )or a snake in the dark, it is not su))icient to end his i&&usion #y ho&ding some other rope in )ront o) him2 ;hat does end the i&&usion is his perceiving the rope which he mistook )or a snake. In such cases o) i&&usion, the destruction o) the i&&usion is not #y a cognition acting in its capacity as a cognition. $owever, the i&&usory thing is admitted to #e mithyA. 5o even though mithyAtva is present, GBAnanivartyatva is a#sent in the i&&usory thing. +his gives rise to the de)ect o) sAdhya-vika&atA, ie. the de)inition is de)ective #ecause we see that mithyAtva is rea&&y not de)ined as GBAnanivartyatva #ut as ,adhi5h+hAna-sAxAtkAratva,, which makes the advaitin4s attempt to prove the GBAnanivartyatva version )uti&e2 J( ;hat i) a su#-c&ass o) GBAna is intended -------------------------------------------+he opponent now anticipates another move #y the advaitin. ;hat i) GBAnanivartyatva is taken to mean ,GBAnatvavyApyadharmeNa GBAnanivartyatva,, ie. what is i&&usory is su#&ated #y a su#-c&ass o) GBAna, not "ust GBAna in genera&. +o understand property, words, this de)inition, remem#er that GBanatva is a property. A say 7, that is concomitant with GBAnatva, say G, is a property such that whenever 7 is present, G is a&so present. In other 7 imp&ies G. +he property 7 is said to #e GBAnatva-vyApya or ,pervaded #y GBAnatva., 5o the anticipated position is that what is i&&usory 'mithyA( is su#&ated #y a cognition o) thetype R( 5ti&& the de)inition is too wide ----------------------------------------

destruction

7.

+here is sti&& a pro#&em with the de)inition, says the opponent. >onsider smR iti or memory which is a su#-c&ass o) GBAna, ie. a speci)ic kind o) GBAna. +he tarkasaMgraha o) annaM#ha++a de)ines smR iti as ,saMskAramAtra"anyaM GBAnaM smR iti$,, or reco&&ection is cognition caused #y reminiscent impression a&one. 5o it is c&ear that reco&&ections are a su#-c&ass or a speci)ic kind o) cognition. +he opponent, however, contends that whenever a reco&&ection occurs, the corresponding reminiscent impression 'saMskAra( that caused it gets destroyed. In this case, the saMskAra, though destroyed #y the smR iti is not considered )a&se. 5o, once again, we have a case where the de)inition o) mithyAtva is too wide. +his &ast o#"ection #y the opponent is @uite shaky at the outset. <irst o) a&&, even the naiyAyikas are divided regarding whether the saMskAra gets destroyed #y the smR iti that it rise to. +he o&der nyAya-vaishe5hika schoo& ho&ds that the saMskAra gets destroyed #y the smR iti #ut &ogicians o) the newer navya-nyAya schoo& tend to side with the advaitins in re"ecting this theory. +he 0edAnta-pari#hA5hA says3 na hi smR ite$ saMskAranAshakatva niyama$, smR itidhArA-darshanAt.h there is no ru&e that reco&&ection destroys saMskAra #ecause a )&ow o) reco&&ection is o#served. +here)ore, the very premise o) the o#"ection is @uestiona#&e. /ut sti&&, the opponent might persist in cha&&enging the position that smR iti does not destroy saMskAra. As we sha&& see, MadhusUdana4s rep&y makes the &ast o#"ection irre&evant even i) this advaita position regarding smR iti is notadmitted. MadhusUdana #egins his rep&y thus 'as usua&(3 iti chenna ! I) this is what you contend, we say no 'your o#"ections are not "usti)ied(.

memory

gives

advaita