Symposia Papers: The Status of Epistemic Principles Author(s): Roderick M. Chisholm Source: Nos, Vol. 24, No.

2, 1990 A.P.A. Central Division Meeting (Apr., 1990), pp. 209-215 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215523 . Accessed: 19/10/2011 12:33
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The Status of Epistemic Principles

Roderick M. Chisholm
BROWNUNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

Since the terms "epistemology" and "theory of knowledge" are now used in many different ways and refer to many different inquiries, I will first say just what that inquiry is that I call "epistemology" and "theory of knowledge." It is that traditional Socratic and therefore "internalist" inquiry that is suggested by the three following questions: (1) "What can I know?"; (2) "How can I distinguish things I am justified in believing from things I am not justified in believing?"; and (3) "What can I do to replace unjustified beliefs by justified beliefs about the same subject-matter, and to replace beliefs that are less justified by beliefs that are more justified?" The epistemic principles with which this paper is concerned are the principles to which one is led if one is successful in answering the three Socratic questions. I shall discuss what I take to be three examples of true epistemic principles. They are what I shall call (1) "the self-presentation principle," (2) "the principle of perceptual taking" and (3) "the applied concurrence principle." The principles are these: Pi If (i) the property of being-F is such that every property it conceptually entails includes the property of thinking, if (ii) a person S has the property of being-F and if (iii) S believes
himself to be F, then it is certain for S that he is F. If (i) a person S thinks he perceives that there is an F, if (ii) it is epistemically in the clear for S that there is something that he perceives to be F, then it is beyond reasonable doubt for S that he is perceiving an F.

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If (i) there is a set of concurrent propositions such that all of the propositions are epistemically in the clear for a person S and if (ii) one of them is beyond reasonable doubt for S, then all of them are beyond reasonable doubt for S.

I choose these particular principles because each of them has logical features not shared by the other two. The first two principles are principles; and the third presupposes the apnormativesupervenience plication of normative supervenience principles. Consider the following principle of ethics. It tells us that there is a duty that supervenesupon certain "natural" properties. If an act is such that (i) performing it would result in more pleasure and in less pain than would any other act that a person S could perform and (ii) if the act is one of those that S is able to perform, then S ought to perform it. Our present concern is not with the truth of this normative principle but with its general features. For simplicity, however, I will assume that the principle is true. We will distinguish normativestates and their substrates.The consequent of the principle just cited describes a normative state and the antecedent describes the non-normative substrate of that state. upon its substrate, we In saying that the normative state supervenes true: in every possible mean, in part, that the principle is necessarily world, anyone who statisfies the non-normative substrate that is described in the antecedent is in the normative state that is described in the consequent. (The necessity, therefore, is not causal or physical.) A further feature of such principles of supervenience is sometimes put by saying that they are "synthetic a priori." The expression "synthetic" is suggested by the fact that the principles cannot be said to be "true in virtue of their form." And since the principles are necessary, it is concluded that if we can know them to be true, then such knowledge is a priori.
THE SELF-PRESENTATION PRINCIPLE

The first of our three epistemic principles - "the self-presentation principle" - is Cartesian, telling us, in effect, that our conscious states, or our thoughts (in Descartes' sense of the word ''thought"), are immediately evident to us. In formulating the principle, I will entailment,a concept that is useful introduce the concept of conceptual in explicating the psychological concepts that epistemic principles involve. D1 P conceptually entails Q = Df P is necessarily such that whoever conceives it conceives Q and whatever has it has Q.

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The relation of conceptual entailment, as here defined, is a relation between properties. Pi If (i) the property of being-F is such that every property it conceptually entails includes the property of thinking, if (ii) a person S has the property of being-F and if (iii) S believes himself to be F, then it is certain for S that he is F.

(A property P may be said to include a property Q provided that P is necessarily such that whatever has it has Q.) The properties that would satisfy the expression "being-F" in any instance of this principle are those properties that have been called "self-presenting" - properties which are such that, if you have them, and if you believe that you have them, then it is certain for you that you have them. Examples are: feeling; hoping; liking; disliking; being appeared to; and (to use a more specific example) thinking that one sees a cat. The normative character of P1 may not be immediately apparent, for it is concealed by the use of the epistemic expression "certain" in the consequent. But this epistemic expression, like the others to be used here, may be explicated in terms of epistemic preferability ("For S, A is to be preferred epistemically to B"). To say that a proposition h is certain for a subject S is to say this: for S, (i) accepting h is to be preferred epistemically to withholding h and (ii) there is no i such that accepting i is to be preferred epistemically to accepting h. Let us introduce another convenient abbreviation. We will say that the state which is evaluated or prescribed by the consequent of a normative principle is the objective of the substrate of that principle. Ordinarily the substrate and the objective of a normative state are logically independent of each other. But those substrates that are self-presenting (for example, my thinking that I see a cat) are identical with their objectives.
THE PRINCIPLE OF PERCEPTUAL TAKING

Our second epistemic principle is one telling us that perceptual taking, or "thinking that one perceives," provides a kind of justification for what it is that one thus thinks. P2 If (i) a person S thinks he perceives that there is an F, if (ii) it is epistemically in the clear for S that there is something that he perceives to be F, then it is beyond reasonable doubt for S that he is perceiving an F.

A proposition may be said to be "espistemically in the clear">, provided that withholding it is not to be preferred epistemically to ac-

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cepting it; and a proposition may be said to be "beyond reasonable doubt" provided that accepting it is to be preferred to withholding it. The antecedent of P2 contrasts in a significant way from that of P1. The antecedent of P1 is entirely non-normative. But the antecedent of P2 contains a normative core, expressed by clause (i), along with a normative rider, expressed by clause (ii). The antecedent, therefore, is "mixed" and not purely non-normative or 'naturalistic. "
PROBABILITY AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In order to formulate our third epistemic principle, "the applied concurrence principle," it is necessary to make certain fundamental points about the relations between probability and the theory of knowledge. These points concern: (A) the epistemic concept of probability; (B) the logical probability relation (or confirmation relation); and (C) the applied probability relation (or confirmation relation). (A) The epistemic concept of probability pertains to the way in which we ordinarily understand "probable" or "likely" whether or not we know anything about epistemology, statistics or inductive logic. It is the sense we have in mind when we ask ourselves such questions as: "Is it likely that the Senator has seen his mail today?" and "Is it probable that I might get him to change his mind?" This fundamental sense of "probability" has been the concern of epistemologists since at least the time of the Greek sceptics. The concern may be defined this way: D2 h is probable for S = Df For S, accepting h is to be preferred to accepting not-h.

We will say, of course, that, if h is probable for S, then not-h is improbablefor S. If it is probable for you, in this sense, that you will be taking a trip on Tuesday, then, for you, believing that you will be taking a trip on Tuesday is to be preferred to believing that you will not be taking a trip on Tuesday. (B) The logical, or formal, probability relation may be expressed either by saying "e confirms h" or by saying "e tends to make h probable." The relation is a necessary one that holds between propositions. The mathematical theory of probability investigates a more complex form of the relation. One version of this complex relation may be put by saying: "h is more more probable than i in relation to e. " The simpler relation with which we are here concerned may be defined in terms of the more complex relation as: "h is more probable than not-h in relation to e."1

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(C) The applied probability or confirmation relation may be expressed either by saying "e confirms h for S" or by saying "e makes h probable for S." The logical relation, "e tends to make h probable," as we have said, expresses a relation that holds necessarily between propositions. But the appliedlocution expresses a contingent proposition. It applies the logical relation to the epistemic situation of a particular person and tells us that that proposition confirms or makes probable another proposition for that particular person. Since we are concerned with the epistemic sense of probability and therefore with the probability that a proposition may have for a given person, our conception should be adequate to the following. Most of us are such that: (i) there are necessarypropositions that are merelyprobablefor us; (ii) there are necessary propositions that are neither probable nor improbable for us; and (iii) there may well be impossiblepropositions that are probablefor us. These facts, although they are overlooked by many writers on probability, should not be surprising. For there are mathematical and logical propositions that most of us are justified in accepting only on authority. Such propositions are made probable for us by the evidence we happen to have about the authorities involved. And, if this is so, then such evidence could even make impossible propositions evident for us. In order now to formulate our applied probability principle, we introduce the concept of the defeat of confirmation. If a proposition e tends to make a proposition h probable, and if another proposition i is such that e & i does not tend to make h probable, then the proposition e & i may be said to defeat e's tendency to make h probable. The relevant concept of defeat is this: D3 d defeats e's tendency to make h probable = Df e tends to make h probable; and d & e does not tend to make h probable.

Our definition of the applied probability or confirmation relation is this: D4 e makes h probable for S (e confirms h for S) = Df (1) e is evident for S; (2) e tends to make h probable; (3) there is no d such that d is evident for S and d defeats e's tendency to make h probable; and (4) if e implies h, then it is evident for S that e implies h.

(A proposition may be said to be evident for a person S, provided that, for that person S and for any proposition i, accepting e is to be preferred to withholding i. Accepting an evident proposition is even preferable to withholding those propositions that are counterbalanced - those propositions such that there is as much to be

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said for accepting them as there is to be said for accepting their negations.) Our definition allows us to say that some but not all necessary propositions are such that something makes them probable for a person S. And it also allows us to say that impossible propositions may be made probable for S. As we have noted, these consequences, however questionable they may seem at first, are actually desiderata for the theory of epistemic probability. In considering the application of probability, we must take care not to be misled by writings about so-called "subjective probability." Some writers are interested in applying the probability relation to the set of beliefsthat a person happens to have, whatever the epistemic status of these beliefs may be. But the theory of knowledge is concerned with applying the relation to what it is that is evidentfor a person. Some propositions that are evident may not be believed; and some propositions that are believed may not be evident. Since our definition of the applied probability relation contains the expression "any proposition that is evident for S," the definition may be said to apply the logicalprobability relation to the total evidence of a particular subject.2 But, given the way in which we have used the concept of defeat in our definition, we need not make use of the concept of total evidence.
THE APPLIED CONCURRENCE PRINCIPLE

We are now in a position to consider our third and final epistemic principle-the applied concurrence principle. The principle presupposes the following definition of concurrence: D5 A is a set of propositions that are concurrent for S = Df A is a set of three or more propositions each of which is made probable for S by the conjunction of the others.

The following three propositions provide a somewhat simplified example. (1) Most of the people who are in the Embassy building are employed by the Embassy; and the tallest spy is in the Embassy building if and only if the ambassador's wife is there. (2) The tallest spy is in the building and is employed by the Embassy. And (3) the ambassador's wife is in the building and is employed by the Embassy. It should be noted that this principle makes use of the applied probability relation just defined, for it speaks of propositions that are probable for a particular subject S. This restriction enables us to avoid a number of unacceptable consequences (for example, that all necessary propositions stand in the relation of concurrence).

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Our third epistemic principle is this: P3 If (i) there is a set of concurrent propositions such that all of the propositions are epistemically in the clear for a person S and if (ii) one of them is beyond reasonable doubt for S, then all of them are beyond reasonable doubt for S.

This final principle has no normative core in its antecedent. But its application presupposes that the person S satisfies the objective of other supervenience relations. And these other relations involve epistemic concepts other than that of concurrence.
REFERENCES [1] Bolzano, Bernard 1942 Theory of Science(Oxford: Basil Blackwell). [2] Carnap, Rudolf
1951 The Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).

[3] Chisholm, Roderick M. 1989 Theory of Knowledge, Third Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc.). [4] Jefferies, Harold
1939 1921 1949 The Theory of Probability (Oxford: The Clarendon A Treaties on Probability (London: Macmillan Press).

[5] Keynes, John Maynard

and Co.). Press).

[6] Kneale, William

Probability and Induction (Oxford: The Clarendon

NOTES 'This more complex relation is taken as primitive by Harold Jeffries, in [4]. He uses the locution, "Given p, q is more probable than r. " For purposes of our present discussion, I shall take the concept of tending to make probable, or confirmation, as undefined. In [3], p. 55, I have suggested a procedure for defining it by reference to epistemic preferability. 2Bernard Bolzano in [1], first published in 1837, seems to have been the first to be clear about this point. More recent philosophers who have stressed the importance of the concept of total evidence in applying probability are John Maynard Keynes [5], William Kneale [6], and Rudolf Carnap [2].