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74-10,382 SMORYNSKI, Craig Alan, 1947INVESTIGATIONS OF INTUITIONISTIC FORMAL SYSTEMS BY MEANS OF KRIPKE MODELS. University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Ph.D., 1973 Mathematics

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan I

i

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

INVESTIGATIONS OP INTUITIONISTIC FORMAL SYSTEMS BY MEANS OP KRIPKE MODELS

BY CRAIG ALAN SMORYNSKI B. S., University of Illinois, 1969

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Mathematics in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois, 1973

Chicago, Illinois

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO CIRCLE THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

1 AUGUST 1975

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION

rv CRAIG ALAN SMORYNSKI

ENTITLED.

INVESTIGATIONS OP INTUITIONISTIC FORMAL SYSTEMS

BY MEANS OF KRIPKE MODELS

BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE r>F

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
<TZ<>AS>
In Charge of Thesis

pJlj-yC

c^jyU.A/iy^ i
Head of Department

Recommendation concurred inf

Committee on Final Examination!

t Required for doctor's degree but not for master's.

1)517

Investigations of Intuitionistic Formal Systems

By Means of Kripke Models

Craig Alan Smorynski Mathematics Department University of Illinois, 1973

Applications of Kripke models to formalized intuitionistic theories are given. For example, the decision problem for many theories is discussed in the Third Chapter.

iii

PREFACE The advantage of a preface is that, in it, one can say things that would be out of place in the text or even in the Introduction. But such things may be questionable even in a preface and, besides, it is getting to be overly fashionable to tell anecdotes about how one discovered such and such result. Suffice it to say that we obtained all sorts of fine results on the Kripke models over the last four years and are reporting them here, if not for the first time, at least for the first time in their entirety. Most of the actual research was done during our first two years, near the end of which we were informed that we had enough material for a thesis. Even for one who likes to write, the thought of taking a half-dozen or so short papers and a lot of scratch paper and organizing the mess into a coherent whole is rather upsetting. We decided that it would be easiest to write the third Chapter first (whence the reader should consider himself warned that the references in the third Chapter to the earlier Chapters are not very specific). That was finished before leaving Stanford. When we left Stanford, we took a six month vacation from school and a year's vacation from our thesis. Most of the credit for our ever finishing it must go to A.S. Troelstra, who indicated that, at the speed we were writing, our first publication would be in 1984. At Troelstra's suggestion, we published the

iv

third Chapter (slightly modified) and wrote a long version of the fourth. Chapter for his forthcoming "book, Metamathematical

Investigation of Intuitlonistic Arithmetic and Analysis.(It will he the fifth Chapter of the "book.) Writing the fourth Chapter of our thesis was then a simple task. We waited, however, until we had written the first two Chapters so that the references to the earlier Chapters could be quite specific. Because this Chapter was originally written for Troelstra's book, in which Troelstra wrote four comprehensive Chapters on Heyting's Arithmetic, we felt that those Chapters gave sufficient background and, thus, i) we did not make Chapter 4 as self-contained as the other Chapters, and ii) we gave fewer references to the literature than is our custom. (Two specific references we ought to have made concern Luckhardt's Theorem (Lemma 2 of Section II A). This result can be found on page 150 of his Extensional Godel Functional Interpretation (Springer, Berlin, 1973) and is a strengthening of Kreisel's original result that J-/\x(AviA) o - n VxA ^ f- Ax(AV>A)o V/xA is not a derived rule for HA (page 122 of "Survey of proof theory, II" in J.E.Penstad, ed., Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971)).) As things turned out, only Chapter 1 was difficult to write and we finished it by typing it up as we wrote so that we would be very unlikely to throw everything away and start over. This may make the exposition a little rough at spots but it got the job done. As with most research, we received a great deal of help

from a great many people. Those who have contributed more or less directly include S. Feferman, D. Gabbay, W.A. Howard, D.H.J, de Jongh, G. Kreisel, G. Mints, and R. Statman. We should also thank M. Pitting for introducing us to the fascinating (Kreisel says "addictive") study of Intermediate Logics and H. Ono for keeping us informed on recent developments. We must also thank J. Myhill for solving a problem of ours and apologize to him for our ignorance (the problem having been solved a decade ago). Our greatest thanks must go to our teachers, S. Feferman, W.A. Howard, W.W. Tait, and (especially) G. Kreisel, who have been most influential in shaping our attitudes toward mathematical logic.

vi

CONTENTS PREFACE TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter 1. The Propositional Calculus I. INTRODUCTION TO THE KRIPKE MODELS A. Introduction B. The Completeness Theorem iii vi 1 15 15 15 20

C. Immediate Applications of the Completeness Theorem II. SOME MODEL THEORY A. Trees B. The Extension Theorem C. Minimization 26 27 .27 32 36 .38
. ^0

D. Finite Minimal Models

E. Strong Homomorphisms

III. THE GEOMETRY OF INTERMEDIATE LOGICS A. Examples

45 4-5 52 5^ 59 63 67 69 7^

B. Geometry C. D. The Finite Model Property LC and Extensions.

E. Height F. G. Slices Width

H. Local Width

vii 1. Counterslices J. Some Commente on the Counterslices 2. The Predicate Calculus THE KRIPKE MODELS FOR THE PREDICATE CALCULUS.. A. Definition and Examples B. Kripke Models as Classical Models C. The Completeness Theorem D. The Aczel Slash E. The Operation ( KRIPKE MODEL THEORY A. Trees B. C. Complete Sequences Revisited Models with Constant Domains ) i> {"& . .76 .79 .86 .86 .86 .90 .95
100

103

106 106 108

115

D. Herbrand Theorems E. Normal Models

118
121 123 124

F. Function Symbols G. Final Comment . 3. Elementary Intuitionistic Theories QUANTIFIER ELIMINATION A. Introduction B. Proof of Theorem 1 C. Applications of Theorem 1: Quantifier Eliminations D. Applications of the Quantifier Elimination COINCIDENCE WITH A CLASSICAL THEORY: CRITERIA A. Quantifier Elimination B. A Coincidence Criterion

126 126 126

127

130 133 139 139 ,141

viii

C. Another Criterion D. Almost Coincidence

142 146 149 149 150 154 162 169 170 176 17@ l8l 181 183 186

III. UNDECIDABILITY A. Introduction B. The Monadic Predicate Calculus C. The Theory of Equality D. Some Extensions of the Theory of Equality E. The Theory of a Successor Function P. The Theory of Dense Linear Order G. Further Examples H. Comments

IV. THE COMPLETENESS PROBLEM A. Discussion B. Completeness of Mg in E

Chapter 4. Heyting's Arithmetic I. THE MODEL-THEOPETIC TREATMENT OP HEYTING'S ARITHMETIC A. Heyting's Arithmetic B. The Operation ( ) ^ ( )'
)

186 186 189 ? ( )' 193 197

C. Formulae Preserved Under ( D. de Jongh's Theorem

E. de Jongh's Theorem for One Propositional Variable F. Another Theorem of de Jongh.( Digression ) II. THE GODEL INTERPRETATION FORMULAE A. Markov's Principle B. The Independence of MP C. Proof-Theoretic Closure Properties 201 202 205 205 209 215

ix

D. The Operation (

) > (+^j )'

216 219 220 222 223 223 225

E. The Independence-of-Premise Postulate F. Mutual Independence of MP and IPq

G. Final Comments on MP and IPq III. DEFINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS A. The Operations ( ) ? ( )* B. Definability C. i Substitution Instances in de Jongh's Theorem D. Uniform TJ 2 Substitutions in de Jongh's Theorem E. de Jongh's Theorem for MP F. Further Applications Appendices Chapter 1, Section IV Appendix A; Lattices Appendix B: Formulae in One Variable...... Chapter 4, Section IV Appendix: The Godel-Rosser-Mostowski-Kripke-Myhill Theorem. References Vita

230

236 239 240 244 244 244 259 269

269 273 282

INTRODUCTION 0. As indicated by the title, the table of contents, and

the size of this paper, the present work gives a fairly complete treatment of the Kripke models and their applications to intuitionistic formal systems. Basically, a Kripke model is a partially ordered set of classical models. Kripke models were introduced to give a model for intuitionistic logic where the partial order can he taken to represent either varying stages of time or states of knowledge. In the propositional case, "both interpretations are quite convincing. For the pure predicate calculus, the Kripke semantics may also be fairly convincing. But when one chooses a concrete theory, the models are clearly unrelated to the intuitionistically intended interpretation of the given theory. Nonetheless, there is a strong formal connection between intuitionistic theories and their Kripke models namely the Strong Completeness Theorem. This completeness result, combined with the relatives ease in handling the models, makes the Kripke models an extremely useful tool for the study of intuitionistic formal systems. 1. As a glance at the table of contents will show, the

prfesent work is divided into four Chapters on the Propositional Calculus, the Predicate Calculus, Elementary Intuitionistic Theories, and Heyting's Arithmetic. In the first two Chapters, we study the Kripke models themselves and prove several results needed for later applications. In the first Chapter, we also

present applications of the Kripke models to the study of Intermediate logics. The third and fourth Chapters apply results of the first two Chapters to elementary intuitionistic theories (primarily the decision problem) and to Heyting's Arithmetic, respectively. Let us briefly discuss the contents of the individual Chapters. The first Chapter treats the propositional case. We start with the Completeness Theorem and its immediate applications. We then present some techniques which have proven themselves to be of use in studying the propositional calculus. In Section III, we apply these techniques to obtain numerous results (old and new) on Intermediate logics. We also include two Appendices as a fourth Section. The first of these discusses the relations between the Kripke models and lattices. This is included not only for the sake of completeness, but also because most discussions of the equivalence of the Kripke models with the lattices only discuss one or the other of the two approaches. The second appendix discusses formulae in one variable and proves some results needed in the fourth Chapter. It also allows one to compare the difference in geometric restrictions on height and on width. The geometrical aspect of the Kripke models is their most important aspect in the propositional case. Since we discuss this ad nauseum in Section III of Chapter 1, we shall only consider one example here: the Jaskowski sequence. In his book (cited in the bibliography). Mostowski gives several references to work on proving the completeness of Jaskwski's sequence of lattices.

Eg, a significant portion of Rose's dissertation is devoted to reproving this completeness, and, further, Gal, Rosser, and Scott devoted a paper to one of Rose's lemmas. When one looks at Kripke models, Jaskowski's lattices become the Jaskowski trees, and, although there are things to prove, one can literally see why one has completeness for this and many related sequences. Unlike the other Chapters, the second Chapter, on the first-order case, contains little of anything new. It was written primarily to round out the exposition and to establish some results needed in the later Chapters. One point that is novel is our treatment of several results (eg. Compactness, LowenheimSkolem) which are usually proven directly by mimicing the proofs given in the classical case. In this manner, since classical models form a special case of the Kripke models, one may be tempted to consider the result for the Kripke models as a generalization of the classical result. A classical model of the theory of dense linear order; a Kripke model of the theory is not a dense linear order. Combined with other evidence, we see that Kripke models are not, a priori, of interest in themselves and the generalizations of results of classical model theory to Kripke model theory, however useful, are not significant as generalizations. Thus, nothing is gained by proving these results directly and we prefer to obtain them by a trivial reduction to the classical case. In addition to putting these results in their proper places, there is another reason for giving the trivial proofs where possible: With less effort, we obtain stronger results. For

example, one can compare the strong form of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem obtained by the reduction with the form obtained by an appeal to the proof of the Completeness Theorem (where a moments thought is still required). A direct proof of the strong form would amount to copying the proof for the classical case, using the fact, without admitting it, that a Kripke model is a classical model. For another example, consider the existence of arithmetically definable models, of r.e. theory; Arithmetizing the completeness proof gives aA^ model; reduction to the classical case yields aA 2 model. The third Chapter surveys the decision (and related) problem (s) for intuitionistic theories. We begin by presenting Lifshits' Theorem on quantifier elimination, giving some examples, using Kripke models to give simple decidability proofs for these examples, and giving some applications. In the second Section, we give some simple sufficient conditions for recognizing that an intuitionistically formulated theory actually coincides with its classical extension. In section III, we present a number of undecidability results for intuitionistic theories whose classical extensions are decidable. In the propositional case, the geometric configuration of the underlying partially ordered set and our ability to decide where to force the atoms were the two parameters we had to work

with. In the first order case, we can also manipulate the,domains. This latter parameter, together with our ability to force atomic formulae where we please, gives us a large amount of freedom in constructing models. Thus, even the simple theories turn out to

be undecidable. Indeed, the simpler the theory, the easier it is to guarantee that the model constructed is a model of the given theory. It follows that the undecidability results are hereditary undecidability results. As a survey, this Chapter is incomplete. The mayor omissions are a discussion of reduction classes and several more recent results of Gabbay. The fourth, and most important, Chapter is devoted to the study of Heyting's Arithmetic. Here, a simple closure property of the class of models of Heyting's Arithmetic is used to give new proofs of some standard results, some not so standard results, and some new results. The Highlights of the Chapter are our simple proof of the prepositional case of a Theorem of de Jongh and our (more difficult) proofs of a couple of refinements. De Jongh's Theorem is an analog to a trivial result in classical arithmetic. Let A(p1,...,pn) be a proposltional scheme. Then every substitution instance, A(B.j,...,B ), within Peano's arithmetic is pro-viable iff A(p1,...,pn) is a tautology. The proof is quite trivial-- by Hilbert-Post Completeness, the scheme A(p-j,... Pn) is consistent iff A is a tautology. In the intuitionistic case,where one doesn't have Hilbert-Post Completeness, the corresponding result, that every substitution instante is provable in Heyting's Arithmetic iff the original propositional formula is an intuitionistic tautology, is far from obvious and was first proven by de Jongh by combining the use of forcing and realizability. We present an extremely simple proof of this result

in Section I. In Section III, we use a more sophisticated argument to simplify the substitution instances to being a model-theoretic proof of Friedman's uniform TT and to give result. (It
-,. A

might be added that Friedman has recently announced uniform z, ^ instances, thus obtaining the best result possible.) 2. Having briefly described some of the results, we ought

to discuss the relation between our work and work in the literature. The largest overlap in results said proofs occurs in the first Chapter, where, having begun our work in comparative isolation, we reproved many results which had already been published.Segerberg's Minimization Theorem is a good example. As with this example, some results are used so often in the text that we had to include them. Some examples are included because we prefer our treatment. Eg. our proof of the completeness of Jaskowski's sequence is very similar to Gabbay's but, our proof, not depending on the symmetry of the models, allows us to recognize at a glance the completeness for other sequences of trees (eg. sequences as irregular as those trees pictured in Mostowski's book cited in the bibliography). Similarly, our characterization of Hosoi's slices is slightly stronger than Ono's. Many of the results on Intermediate Logics are wellknown, but were originally obtained by the use of pseudoboolean techniques. The reader familiar with such proofs may wish to compare them with the model-theorectic proofs presented

here. Of course, there "being a partial equivalence of the two techniques, some of the alternative proofs are trivial variants. As commented in 1, above, the Kripke model can be viewed as a classical model and in Chapter 2 we obtain some results by a direct reduction to the classical case. We also remarked that some of these results can also be given proofs analogous to those of their classical counterparts. Thus, in the quantified case, the Kripke theory looks like classical model theory but only at first. With Kripke models, there are new topics to be discussed eg. Glivenko and Explicit Definability Theorems. For the former, we mimic, but extend, Fitting and Gabbay to obtain a much weaker result than those obtained proof-theoretically. For the latter, we present bezel's treatment, but also diverge from it to give the most simple-minded treatment possible with Kripke models. Our coincidence criterion, in the third Chapter, relates forcing and model completeness in the same fashion that Barwise and Robinson relate forcing and model completeness. This, along with the result on almost coincidence, however, is the only place where our treatment resembles Barwise and Robinson's work on forcing and model theory. (For one thing, this is the only place where generic structures have been of importance in our work.) Our technique for proving undecidability results is to interpret the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus within the theory we wish to prove undecidable. Lifshits gave a syntactic proof that such an interpretation works for the theory of equality

Our proofs are semantic and most closely resemble the Rabin-Scott

method. Gabbay's technique (We only present one example of this technique.) is a combination of such a Rabin-Scott argument with the use of a reduction class. For arithmetic, our proofs of de Jongh's Theorem and its refinements resemble de Jongh's proof in that we both use the geometry of Kripke countermodels to propositional formulae. Our bridges to arithmetic, however, are different we use forcing and de Jongh uses a combination of forcing and realizability. Friedman's proof uses a slash-theoretic generalization of realizability. In Chapter 4, with the exception of Section III, where we use some logic, our methods are fairly standard, more or less algebraic, tricks. Thus, rather than discussing proofs, it might be best to say something about the range of applicability of our methods. First, most of our results require us to assume that, in whatever extension T of HA we consider, the axioms must, loosely speaking, be generated from Harrop sentences, induction principles, and reflection principles. Thus, we cannot treat systems such as HA + CT or HA + EOT. (One might also notice that the concrete models which we construct are all on finite trees, whence they do not contradict any laws of classical logic. This can be gotten around to some extent by placing Kripke models instead of classical models at the terminal nodes. The crucial thing here is that the theory T be preserved under our operations for constructing new models i.e. T be generated by the Harrop sentences and induction and reflection principles.)

Two interesting axiom schemes, well-known from Godel's Diatectica Interpretation, are Markov's Principle (also called the Principle of Constructive Choice) and the Independence of Premises Postulate. Kripke models are quite applicable to Markov's Principle, although the class of extensions T = HA + MP to which we can apply our methods is narrowed considerably: T must be true in the standard model. The Independence of Premises Postulate, however, is simply not as amenable to study by means of the Kripke models as Markov's Principle and we only prove its mutual independence with Markov's Principle. Aside from our de Jongh Theorem for Markov's Principle, realizability interpretations can be used to obtain approximately the same results as obtained here for this scheme (the mayor difference being the classes of extensions T 2 HA + MP to which the methods are applicable). (See eg. Troelstra's paper cited in the bibliography). The relation between our method and Friedman's generaliza tion of the Kleene slash if not clear. First, we might expect some sort of relationship since our approach generalizes Aczel's approach to a slash predicate. (This terminology is atrocious since Kleene's slash was based on realizability, we ought, perhaps, to refer to slashes as (function free) realizability interpretations.). Second, both techniques are useful not only for proving Explicit Definability Theorems, but also for characterizing the intuitionistic proposifcional calculus in terms of disjunctive properties. (See de Jongh's thesis, cited in the bibliography to Chapter 1, for a slash-theorectic characterization

10

of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. With Kripke models, the intuitionistic propositional calculus is the only Intermediate Logic closed under the operation 5^* (X *3)1 for finite S-' .

If the elements of * have origins and we bound the cardinality

t

of y

we get more logics.]

) Thus, both techniques can be

used for proving de Jongh's Theorem. Further, we both give the same closure properties of the class, IP , of theories T -2 HA for which we can prove Explicit Definability. (These closure properties assert that tf5 is closed under the addition of Harrop sentences, taking unions, and the following operation: Te TP , A has only x free, and T h An for all n>T
+ 1\xAx$P.)

Perhaps a combined use of forcing and the Kleene slash (a la de Jongh's combination of forcing and recursive realizability) will clarify matters somewhat. of this form.) Historically, set theoretic semantic methods (lattice theoretical, topological) have no been useful in studying Heyting's Arithmetic the greatest difficulty probably being in
s

(Observe that the Aczel slash is not

the construction of non-trivial models. (This is certainly the mayor obstacle to the use of Kripke models. ) To a certain extent, this is still true for the Kripke models unless we apply the Completeness Theorem and quote results from other sources, we cannot even give a model of HA contradicting the law of the

Excluded Middle. Nonetheless, we can easily give some non-trivial models. The situation changes, of course, when one considers the Theory of Species, Here, non-trivial models are easy to construct

11

simply because we now have a new easily manipulable parameter. The arithmetic portions of such models, however, are usually trivial and, partially for this reason, we have not studied models of the Theory of Species. We might mention, however, that Prawitz has proven a Completeness Theorem for the Theory of Species with full Comprehension with respect to a class of secondorder Kripke models (in Intuitlonism and Proof Theory, eds. Myhill, Kino, and Vesley (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1970) ). 3. an The third, and especially, the fourth Chapters give us uneasy feeling about Kripke models. As mentioned above, the

Kripke model, with its partially ordered set of worlds, is supposed to represent either some temporal or positivistic idealization of intuitionistic logic. One feels, eg., that, thus, a Progression ought to be a natural Kripke model. Unfortunately, this just doesn't happen to be the casei we must assign domains to each element of the underlying partially ordered set and, in the case of arithmetic, the natural domain to assign is the set of natural numbers. But this, combined with the decidability of atomic formulae, reduces our model to the standard classical model. The net result is that, to get a non-trivial model, we do not use new positive information at later stages, but new negative information (supplied by the addition of non-standard integers). This is most unpalatable. Prom the basic motivations given for the definition of a Kripke model, it follows that a natural way of obtaining models of Heyting's Arithmetic is to choose a partially ordered system

12

of non-standard models of classical Peano's Arithmetic. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that the structures so obtained will indeed be models of Heyting's Arithmetic and we are required to use overly sophisticated techniques (in Chapter 4 Section III) to make such a simple idea work and then only with limited success. (Eg. we still cannot find, without referring to the Completeness Theorem, a model of Heyting's Arithmetic and the negation fo some instance of the law of the Excluded Middle.) Thus, we have two reasons for dissatisfaction with the Kripke models in their present form. If we consider the truth definitions for the various connectives, we see that the most questionable interpretations are those of 1 , 3 , and Ax. There is room for a relnterpretation of these connectives and quantifier and, thus, the possibility of new models. The use of pseudo-boolean-valued Kripke models (like the use of boolean-valued models in classical logic) will yield some results (eg. an improvement on the recursion-theoretic complexities of countermodels), but it will still not allow one to avoid the use of non- standard integers or obtain Progressions as models. A more promising alternative is given by de Jongh's combination of forcing and realizability. Whenever one makes some attempt at a constructive' semantics- by focussing on some temporal aspect of the logic, using fuzzy truth values, realizing formulae recursively, or whatever one will probably obtain a model of Heyting's Arithmetic.

13

The usefulness of such an approach depends to a large extent on the sort of constructive principles one is trying to model. For the pure predicate calculus, temporal logic may be close enough to the intended interpretation, "but for an applied theory, such as HA, it is far too simplistic. (Thus, eg., we have to use results on definable models of classical arithmetic complementing the temporal interpretation with a mild flavor of explicitness.) Combining the use of forcing with some more powerful constructive attitude (than mere explicitness) ought to yield something mare palatable and more technically useful. 4. A final comment concerns the non-intuitionistic character

of many of the proofs. For the sake of philosophical homogeneity, one may object that proofs of intuitionistically meaningful results ought to be intuitionistic. While the proofs given here are set theoretic in nature, many of them can be made arithmetic by means of the Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem. (Observe that such proofs are not carried out in Peano's Arithmetic, but rather in Peano's Arithmetic augmented by some consistency statements (which can be recognized as valid on constructive grounds).) Then, by a result of Kreisel's, if the result is^T (eg. an independence result), the proof can be carried out within Heyting's Arithmetic (augmented by the necessary consistency statements). Thus, intuitionistic proofs can be obtained for many of the results presented here. [There is, however, something to be gained by giving (settheoretic) non-intuitionistic proofs: The less object A resembles

14

object B, the less the possibility of mistaking object A for object B. Though one might simply pass it off at thoughtlessness, there is a growing tendency in logic today to make such mistakes. A typical example is the confusion between an intuitionistic formal system and systems with the Explicit Definability Property (occasionally reffered to as "formally intuitionistic" systems!). While the Explicit Definability Property is a property shared by a great many intuitionistic formal systems, it can hardly be considered characteristic: The set of true sentences of arithmetic has the Explicit Definability Property but is it "formally intuitionistic"? . The fact that the model-theoretic proofs given here bear no resemblance to intuitionistic proofs may help the reader remember that the results obtained are formal results about formal systems and do not deal with the intuitionistic notions directly. (Unfortunately, even this realization cannot be taken for granted.) ^ .

Chapter 1, The Propositional Calculus I. A. INTRODUCTION TO THE KRIPKE MODELS Introduction

15

In [26^ Kripke introduced a set-theoretic semantics for intuitionistic logic. Despite the fact that his models for intuitionistic logic are not themselves natural objects of study, they have proven to be of great use in attacking formal problems in intuitionistic mathematics. In this Chapter, we present and study these models and some of their applications in the propositional case. The quantified theory and arithmetic will be treated in subsequent Chapters. There are three standard ways of motivating the definition of a Kripke model for the intuitionistic propositional calculus: i) via modal logic; ii) via tense logic; and iii) via forcing,

i) lies beyond the scope of this work and we will not consider it. Neither ii) nor iii) is completely convincing, especially in considering models of arithmetic. Nonetheless, we shall take them as our starting point. ii) proceeds as follows: We first note the obvious temporal content of some discussion of intuitionistic principles,

eg. in [15], page 115, where Heyting discusses "infinitely proceeding sequences, depending upon the solving of problems." Here, Heyting defines a tested if either ip or mathematical proposition p to have been np has been proved. Whit this notion,

he defines an infinite sequence by the rule: "As long as p has not been tested, ... choose an = 2~n, but if p is tested between the choice of am and that of am+-j then ... choose am+^ = 2
n

for

16

for every q." Here we have various stages of time (the times when we choose am and am+-|) and certain additional items of information at the succeeding stages (namely, knowledge when choosing am+^ that p has "been tested). The problem now is to formulate a set-theoretic model theory for the underlying tense logic. For this, we need first a partially ordered set (K, ) of stages of time. Supposedly,

the stages are not linearly ordered, because, at any given time, we may imagine the future branching off into different directions i.e. we may imagine different possible futures. For later reference, we will call a partially propositional model structure (pms). Our next task is to determine, for a staged in time and a formula A, when A is true at anticipating, read "
ot 11oC

ordered set,(K, ), a

, written " oC |f- A" and,

oC \\- A\B oC tl-

forces A." Clearly <* <1- A vB iff

ot|l-

iff ol
I*-

A and

ok

|h

B. Also

A or

B.

Implication is tricky: If since we must have

P it-

AoB,

(3 (3 If-

and

(3 |(- A, then,

A B', we know

B. The converse is not which forces

obvious, since we may not know at & that every (3

A also forces B; but a) we are not interested here in episteraologi cal questions, and b) we need a usable condition to define , if

oH. |f- AaB, so we agree that o<, II- A^B iff for all p f3 |f- A then no
(3

p \[- B. Similarly, we agree that

{3 If-

\\~ tA iff for

oi does

A.

Except for a convention concerning atomic formulae, we have just defined the Kripke models. More formally, a Kripke model

17

is a triple, (K,6 ,

ih), where (K,^ ) is a pins and

IV- is a

forcing relation defined on (K,^l) satisfying: i) for atomic A, ii) iii) iv) v)
oC

tL

II-

A and

ot & p

imply

fi

II-

A;

ih Aa B iff

ot ||-

A and

|(- B; <* |l- B; |f- A-> A). ( |J- B); and

<K It- A v B iff

ot Ih A or

d It- Ao B iff Vf3 2<X (p

oc i f -

iA iff V p 50*- (

{3

A word about notation: Iripke models shall always be denoted by K = (K, , II-), with possible super - or subscripts. The time

stages, 01 K, will always be denoted by small greek letters,* , , y >

an(l

will be called nodes (to avoid conflict with the

use of the word "elements" when domains are added for the predicate calculus in Chapter 2). Prom this definition immediately follow several useful facts (which will be used without mention in the sequel): a) for all A, if
oc

l|- A and ot 6

p f

then {3 |J- A; i)

b) any relation defined on atomic formulae satisfying extends uniquely to a forcing relation on all formulae;

c) the relation x. ||- A depends only on those [it ; and, from this, d) if there are no p
> o t

, then

ocll- A iff A follows

tautologically from the atomic subformulae of A forced by together with the negations of those atomic subformulae not forced by ot . A node <x satisfying the property of d) that (& ^-oc implies = dL is called terminal (as opposed to maximal think of a

18

path through the pms as terminating). As we shall see shortly, the existence of terminal nodes can be fairly useful. To obtain this existence, we shall turn to forcing. Uote: Since the tense logic approach naturally yields complete sequences (as stages at eternity), there is no actual need to introduce forcing at this point. Nonetheless, it is a convenient point to introduce this approach.^ Following 23 and C^l, a complete sequence in the model K = (K, ^ , |h) is an increasing sequence, s = {s^r for each formula A there is an n , such that,
l h ~IA.

such that s n II- A or s n

The existence of complete sequences is guaranteed by the following Lemma of Cohen's: Lemma 1. Given K and oi e K, there is a complete sequence that Sq = oL . The proof is well-known and we omit it. To obtain the terminal nodes promised above, we add to K its complete sequences to obtain a model Kc = (Kc, i) Kc = K U {s: ii) s is complete over K} ; K and 6 (3 or o4 e K and ^ = s \hc): s such

iff oc ,j3

and for some n c< ^ sn, or 0< = (3 = s; iii) for atomic A, K, ot A iff c* (I- A; and

iv) for atomic A, s l|-c A iff sn f|- A for some n. We must show that iii) and iv) extend to all formulae: Theorem 1. For all A,oC K, and complete sequences s, ot U-C A iff tt- A; and s |hC A iff3 n(sn lhA).

18

path through the pms as terminating). As we shall see shortly, the existence of terminal nodes can be fairly useful. To obtain this existence, we shall turn to forcing. Note: Since the tense logic approach naturally yields complete sequences (as stages at eternity), there is no actual need to introduce forcing at this point. Nonetheless, it is a convenient point to introduce this approach.^ Following C2] and C6l, a complete sequence in the model K = (K, ^ , |l-) is an increasing sequence, s = {s^r for each formula A there is an n such that sn
II-

, such that, A or
sn i|-

~)A.

The existence of complete sequences is guaranteed by the following Lemma of Cohen's: Lemma 1. Given K and oL K, there is a complete sequence that Sq
= oC .

such

The proof is well-known and we omit it. To obtain the terminal nodes promised above, we add to K its complete sequences to obtain a model Kc = (Kc, ^c, lh): i) Kc = K U {s: ii) s is complete over K} ; K and ^ $ or o(. e K and ^ = s

iff oc ,|3 6

and for some n c< ^ sn, or 0( = (3 = s; iii) for atomic A,

K, oc ||0 A iff

ot ff~ A; and

iv) for atomic A, s lh A iff sn ||- A for some n. We must show that iii) and iv) extend to all formulae: Theorem 1. For all A,oC K, and complete sequences s,
oc |(-C

A iff |h A; and

s |h A iff3 n(sn lhA).

19

Proof: By induction on the length of A. For atomic A, this follows by definition. For A = B a C , ByC, the proof is trivial. Let A = B3C and let implies (* 11- C, and hence p ll-cB lh A, ot implies (3 . If f 6K, (3 pjl-cC.
If-

Supposep is a

sequence s and s )f-B . Then for large n sn II- B. Butrf^cs iff

o t

*=sn for some n. Thus, for large n, sn ft- B^C, and sn ||- G.

By induction hypothesis, s ^(-CG. Thus s \l-B implies s \V,C and we may conclude U-CA. |I/A. Then there is a <* 1|/CA. such that (3 i|-B,

Now suppose

P W/C. Hence (3|hB and (& \c0 and

Finally, let s ll-CA, sn l^A for all n. Choose n such that sn It-B or sn \\- TB. If sn If- IB, then sn U-B^C, i.e.

sn If-A. Hence sn ||-B for all large n. But sn l|/C, since sn |{/A. However, by induction hypothesis, s
ft-B,

whence s

|HCC.

Again

by induction hypothesis, sn l^-C for some n, a contradiction. Thus s \hA implies sn |(-A for some n. The case A = nB is handled similarly. Now that we have terminal nodes, we may give some immediate applications. The first is a preliminary form of the Glivenko Theorem: Corollary 1. tautology. Proof: Half of this is trivial, since a classical model (i.e. a truth table) is a special type of Kripke model. For the converse, let A be a tautology,^ K, Let s be a complete oC|V- 11A for all models K,*K, iff A is a QED

20

sequence with b q= ^. Then, obviously, s II-CA, whence sn If-A for some n. Hence ^ ll/ 1A and, since (3 was arbitrary, ot ~| TA. QED

Corollary 2. 1A is always forced iff ~\A is a tautology. Proof: Notice that for any A, if tt-lA. A final Corollary, due to Godel, is Corollary 3. L e t A contain only the connectives forced iff A is a tautology. The proof is an easy induction on the length of A, which we omit. The use of complete sequences to prove Glivenko Theorems is due to Fitting ( whose treatment differs slightly from
1 , A

oc l|- inA,

then QED

, A is always

ours. The present treatment is basically that of

Cs].

We shall give further applications of complete sequences and terminal nodes in the succeeding Sections. First, however, we turn to the problem of the formal connection between the present models and the intuitionistic propositional calculus i.e. the question of completeness. B. The Completeness Theorem The completeness of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, denoted here by I, with respect to validity in Kripke models was established by Kripke in 126] . Completeness with respect to logical consequence within the models was established independently by Aczel
( t i l ) ,

Fitting

([6l)>

and Thomason

(C42^).

The proof, in the propositional case, is, as pointed out in [6l , a straightforward generalization of the use of maximal filters in

21

the Lindenbaum algebra. Instead of using maximal filters, we use prime filters, and, since the prime filters have inclusion relations among them, we have a natural candidate for a Kripke model. To "be precise, this is the mechanism behind the completeness proof a discussion of lattices and prime filters being postponed to an Appendix. Here we deal with theories and their prime extensions, (This is not merely a renaming, as the result we prove shortly is weaker than the result for lattices.) In order to give the proof, we will need a list of axioms and rules of inference. For convenience, we will use the following sequent calculus from [26l (T , being finite, unordered sets of

formulae, with possible repetition): Axiom: Rules: T,A > A, fa;

> A,
p

^ r2>B,
^

P
* A " *
1

p >

^
fa ^

A -| ,A >

B-*

r > A, fa ^ P > B,
|V-

r 2 B

> &2 t

P > AvB, P,
A B

P > AvB, jf^

s,

Y2 * AvB

* 1V| A2 r2 B
> &2,

P1

M,

P > A^B
f. A-. 1 ^

P.j , P 2
r-A.

&2
A ,

22

Cut

rf1 ,

> * ^1
'

Tg -~*A &2 . ^2

^ ^2

As usual, we write I

T * fa, or simply |- P } fa, if

there is a derivation of p? A from the above rules and axioms. We also write ^ A for

V* > A,

and S

IrP ^

for an arbitrary set

S of formulae, when we have a derivation of T * fa from axioms A, for A6 S. Notice that, by using an admissible weakening

rule and cut, S i- f1->^ iff (- Sq ,J** ^ for some finite Sq ?=S. Let us digress a moment to motivate the choice of rules. Suppose we are given a formula A which we believe to be false, say A = (B3C)v(C3B). Let us write and ^ if
oC

|J- A for all AC P

Then we want > ( B 3C )v(C 3B). But oc <* U /(BC) v (CB) iff at C, C OB and so -r-> B=>C, C^B. for any A6
oc

oC WA

A.

Now oL l[/B 30 iff for some{3^t we have p l\-G sB, so there is a B

(3 ||B and^M/C. Thus B such that C C

C. But

B. Thus,

we have constructed a countermodel to A = (B3C)v (C5B). Now, if we look at the rules, we notice that they form the reverse process: When we go from f1
fa

to P '

fa*

for

p^ol, we can give derivations, using the above rules, of T from P f * fa1
>

Continuing, our construction will only be blocked /\, A. If every attempt is blocked (Note

when we have P , A

that we may branch as follows: If F * AAB, then either there is

23

such that P A or a y such that PB,) we may read off a proof of T /\. If an attempt is not "blocked, we have a countermodel forT > h. (This is perhaps clearer if one uses the rules in 1343.) A readable proof of this completeness theorem may he found in [6] , Chapter 2. This proof yields completeness of the cut-free miles and the standard proof-theoretic corollaries. Model-theoretically, it gives completeness of I for finite tree models. However, as we will require completeness with respect to logical consequence as well as with respect to validity, we will present the alternative completeness proof. These corollaries will then follow by a model-theoretic constructions. First, we will need several definitions. That A is a logical consequence of a set S of formulae, written S
)r

A, shall

mean that for all models K and all oL K, if oc j|- B for all B6 S, then 11- A. Logical validity of A shall mean 0 |= A and shall defines validity with respect to a

be written |= A. Similarly one

class of models and5 for any theory T extending I, we shall refer to the result T 1- A iff|=A (relative to a class of models) as a (weak) completeness theorem and the result that for all S, T+S }-A iff S IsA (relative to the given models), as a strong completeness theorem. The result we wish to prove is Theorem 2. For all S, S M iff SNA i.e. I is strongly complete

for the class of all Kripke models. To prove this, let us make two more definitions: By a theory, T, we shall mean a consistent set of sentences closed under the rules of inference. T is prime if T J- AvB implies T (- A

24

or T

t-

B. Our first Lemma is the analog of the Lindenbaum Lemma:

Lemma 2.

Suppose TVj ^ A. Then there is a prime theory T2T such

that T (-/ A. Proof: We obtain T as the union of an increasing sequence, {Tn), of theories. First, let (a^B ^ enumerate all disjunctions and let T n be T. For k+1 , let Av,yB 0 nk nk be the first untreated disjunction such that T, I- A V B . nk * k By the rule Veither T,+A V/ A or T,+B l/A. Let K nk k Tfc+i be the deductive closure of Tj+An if the first alternative k holds and that of T^+B^ if not. By closure under cut, that k Tk+1^ A f o l l o w s from "the fact T +A W A A in "the k n second case.) Letting T = ^ Tn, we see immediately that I is a theory and T)t* A. If T V and for some k, =
T n

I"

A vBm f o r arl3i"trarily m

large n, ^ Bm'

A ^Bn " Henoe Tk+1 n k

>" Am

or Tk+1

whence T m or T m. 1 A 1m Bm Thus T. is prime.

QED

Lemma 3. Let T be prime and let Tf range over all prime extensions of T. Then, i) T B^>C iff for all T', T' B implies T1 ] 0, and B.

ii) T'. V IB iff for ll T1 , T1

Proof: i) Let T ^ B C and let T' extende T. Then T' J- B^C. If, in addition, T' V- B, then, by cut, T' \r C. Conversely, suppose T BaC. By :>, T+B|/ C. Lemma 2

yields a prime T1 such that T+BST1, T' h/ C. ii) For "(B, consistency requires that T ^ ib implies

25

T1

B. The converse follows from >1.

QED

We may now prove Theorem 2 quite easily. Let K be the set of prime extensions of I (relative to the language, which we have tacitly assumed is countable); let ^ be the set theoretic inclusion relation; and let \\- be defined, for atomic A, by T IIiff T V- A. Lemma 3 easily yields the following Lemma 4. For all prime T, A, T \\- A iff T V- A. Now suppose St/ A. Then for some prime theory T, Sc T &/ A and so T IV- B for all B6S and T 11/ A. Hence S^ A and Theorem 2 is half-proven. For the converse, interpretTas asserting that for all
oc

, if oc \\- A for all A

, then

o4

B for some

BC^. This assertion is true for all axioms P,A > A,/\ and for sequents >A for ACS (when we restrict our attention to those OC such that 06 \(- A for all ACS). One then verifies that this property is preserved by the rules of inference. Thus, if S J- A, then sl=A. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. The reader interested in the relations between Kripke models and lattices is invited to skip ahead to the Appendix on lattices. Let us say that a node oC is an origin of a pms, (K, ^), if ot = pfor all Theorem 3.
(3K.

Then Theorem 2 easily yields

I is strongly complete with respect to the class of

Kripke models with origins. To see this, notice that S and anot^K such that A iff there is a model K

\\- B for all Be S andoC \t/ A. Restricting

the model to thoseyields th result.

26

We shall find it convenient in the sequel to assume. unless otherwise noted, that every model has an origin/which we will denote byd^. C. Immediate Applications of the Completeness Theorem The first application of a Strong Completeness Theorem is usually Compactness: Theorem 4. S Is A iff Sq I=A for some finite Sq 6 S. The proof of this is standard. Recalling our applications of complete sequences, we have the Glivenko Theorem ( Theorem 5. Let
2~] ) and its corollaries:

be a set of formulae.

i) P y. VIA iff A is a tautological consequence ofP ; ii) ta iff 1A is a tautological consequence of P; and

iii) for A containing only the connectives 1 , A,P (. A iff A is a tautological consequence of P . Another application is the Disjunction Theorem ( ["I). Theorem 6. If V AvB, then V- A or Proof: Let K1, K2 B. with origins d 1, oL 2, ^ B. Define

models

respectively, such that oC ^ \\/ A and Kq = (K0, *Q, ll-Q) by i) Kq = ii)( ot , i) iii) "0 ^ * {1)^ K2 X {2}
u

, 0 C

a n e w o l : ) 3ect

^ , ;)) iff i=j and oC f o r a 1 1 t K e Ko;

(3

iv) for atomic C, ( oe , i) v) for atomic C, Cq 1(-/q C.

C iff oC

0; and

27

First, property iv) is easily seen to hold for all ( ) 1) H-/q A and ( oi q 2)

C. Thus

B. Hence *q can force neither

A and

A nor B and

AvB. Thus

B imply I-/ AvB.

QED

Aczel

(Lil)

pointed out that a much stronger result than

Theorem 6 can be obtained from the completeness proof itself. In the case of the propositional calculus, however, we shall concern ourselves more with the, model theory than with the proof theory.

II. A.

SOME MODEL THEORY Trees Trees are always of interest to logicians and we shall

"be no exception. If we attempt to construct a countermodel to a formula A, eg. by the method briefly described in Section I above, we will probably construct a finite tree. Thus, trees form a natural class of Kripke models. Let us formally define a tree to be a partially ordered set (K,-), with origin ^q, such that: i) for every ^ K, and for every least Y > with ^ ^ 'Y . , there is a

Such a y is called a successor of oC ; ii) for every** k , there is a finite sequence t oc 2^**#ot-n
= oc sucl1

that

i+1

is a succesor of c*i.

Further, if (3 ^ 6 , then

for some i.

By ii) the set of (not necessarily immediate) predecessors of any node oc form a finite linearly ordered set, as opposed to a more general notion of tree where the finiteness condition is

28

dropped (eg. in 18} , Theorem 12). The notion of tree considered here is isomorphic to that of a tree of finite sequences. We first wish to establish the completeness of I with respect to trees (i.e. models whose pms's are trees). To do this, we simply split a model into a tree: Let (K,^, 11-) be a Kripke model and let K^r be the set of all non-trivial finite sequences Tf = ( Tf o> '^n-1 ^
sucJl

that i)^T0 ~Tr

is

origin of

(K,^),

and ii) for i < j, ^i ^ sequences and

is tlie

"fcree ordering of finite

is defined by II- A,

tr lV-Tr A iff

A atomic, and where 1(Tf) is the length of Tf , i.e. 1(Tf0,..., ) = n. Kripke (C2^!) showed that the relation stated holds for all A: Theorem 1. For any formula A, Tf H-Tr A iff IV- A.

Proof: By induction on the complexity of A. For A atomic, the assertion follows by definition. The cases A = BAC, BVC are trivial. Thus, let A = B 3 C and suppose first that If ^ ^ ^ |l-B=>C, ^Tr6. and and so
6

^TrB- then *1($)-1 II- C. Thus 6 H-TrC and

But Vi(if).i

"f(s)-l

If \lrTr B^C. Then, for some

Conversely, let <=*-^(TO-I' ifot ^ & IH

B' ^ M

\W- B =C.
C* Let 6

= (V0'-"'Tri(TO-1'^
S and S |hTr B,

and & =*1* otherwise. Then IT whence Mb*Tr B 30. The case A = "IB is handled similarly.

QED

The immediate Corollary is

29

Corollary. trees.

I is strongly complete with respect to the class of

If K is finite (i.e. K is finite), then KTr=(KTr,^Tr, |l-Tr) is also finite since the sequences were chosen to be strictly

increasing. Thus, once we've proven that I is complete with respect to the class of finite models,we know that it is complete with respect to the finite trees. Theorem 2. Let K be a model and let oi^ liy A. Then there is a

finite sub-pms (K*, *) of (K, ^), containing the origin, and a forcing relation |(-* on (K*, ^*) such that for all \W* A. Proof: The idea of the proof is simple we successively pluck nodes out of K which contribute to the falsification of A, until we have enough nodes to falsify A. Since A is only one lh* B iffo<-|l- B

K* and all subformulae B of A. In particular,

formula, after finitely many steps, we run out of new information and are finished. More formally, let S be the set of subformulae of A, and, for P K, let S( p ) {B^S:
(3 \\-

B> .

Now define K* to be the union of a sequence, {Kn\ , of sets defined as follows

K 0

t-'oJ P
K * Le'fc n

Suppose we have defined Kn and maximal set of i) ^

Y^i T ^ te a

such that ^ for all i;

ii) S(p ) ^ S( 6^ for all i; iii) if p and 6^ S , then S(S ) = S( p ) or

30

S( S) = S( S ^); and iv) S( S.) ^ S( 6p for i j.

Se^ Kn+1 = Kn

^ *

eKn

~ Kn-1^" '

where K_1 is

empty. As mentioned, K* = ^ Kn and to K*. is the restriction of ^

The finiteness of K* follows easily from the finiteness U-* B iff <Mt- B for atomic B.

of S. Define \V-* by

We must show ot IJ.* b iff ot |j_ b f0r all B S. The proof of this is by induction on the length of B. For B atomic, this follows by definition. The cases B = CAD, CVD are trivial.

Let B = C^D. Assume oMiy* C=D. Then there is a ^ ^*ot such that p U-*C, |3 \V/* D* By induction hypothesis, U/ C OD. cMI/ CoD. p \hC,

P lb* D. Thus

Conversely, assume Case 1.

oc U- C. Then <*- \Vf D and & U-*C, MV/* D. C,

Case 2. Ml/ C. Then there is a ^ oL such that p \M D. Choose aYCP with S(Y) = S((J ). CDD C S a n d s o
y

It- C,Y II/

By induction hypothesis, "YII-* C,

II/* D.

Hence

Ml/* C^D. The case B = TC is treated similarly. QED

Corollary 1. (Finite tree theorem). I is complete for the class of finite trees. Corollary 2. (Alternate Proof of the Glivenko Theorem) . [ "HA iff A is a tautology. The proof follows the same lines as that using complete sequences by noting that finite models have terminal nodes beyond

all nodes. The fact that

V-Y1(A=>B) = A^^B, Corollary 2, and

the Compactness Theorem (Theorem 4, Section I) are easily combined to give a proof of the more general version given by Theorem 5, Section I. For the sake of Chapter 3, we mention the following Corollary 3. I is decidable. To see this, notice that we can get an upper bound on the size of K* effectively from the number of subformulae of A. To decide a formula A, we then need only test its truth in all pins's with cardinality less than this bound. Since there are only finitely many such pms's (and finitely many forcing relations on them relative to the subformulae of A), we can decide A after finitely many steps. The reader who has read the alternate proof of the Completeness Theorem, refereed to above, will notice that the proof yields a relatively simple decision procedure (see also[27] ). It also yields, if IV A, a simple procedure for constructing a finite tree in which l|-/ A. That something is gained by the

present approach will be clear later, when we use the fact that certain geometric properties of K are preserved in the passage to Kf Until then, we beg the reader's indulgence. Notice that ((K*)Tr, -*Tr) is a subtree of (KTr, -Tr) but that the forcing relation IV-*Tr is not the restriction of J|-Tr to K*Tr, except for subformulae of A. In general, we cannot expect that, if a formula is falsified in a tree, it can be falsified in a finite subtree: I is complete with respect to the full binary tree, but not for the class of finite binary trees.

32

We leave this as an exercise (which requires a few techniques not presented yet). B. The Extension Theorem

A strong converse to the problem discussed at the end of

Section A does hold: Every forcing relation on a subtree (Kq- q) of a tree ( ) is "the restriction of a forcing relation on (K^,^) to Kq. This is the content of the following Theorem, which generalizes a result of Gabbay ( Lei ): Theorem 3. let (Kq ,^q ) be a subtree of the tree (K^,^). let l\-Q

be a forcing relation defined on (Kq,^q). Then there is a forcing relation 11-.j defined on (K^
oi

, such that, for all

oL

and

all formulae A,

||-q A iff

||-1 A.

Note: By a subtree we do not mean merely a tree which is a subordering of another tree, as is evident by the exercise stated at the end of Section A. The successors of a node ^ KQ must be successors of in the tree (K1 ). For convenience, we also

require the origins of (Kq,-q) and (K^-j) to coincide. Proof: We will define I by making the nodes of K ^Kq behave like complete sequences over Kq. For each a complete sequence s^ of Kq such that s^ (0) Then there is a maximum (* KQ such that atomic A, model Kq C). For choose . Letcx-eK^KQ.

^ f* . Define, for

A iff s^ H-oA (i,e* forcing in the completion and atomic A, let <* W-1 A iff <* t|-0 A.

As in the proof of Theorem 1 Section I, it is easily seen by induction on the length of A that the defining relations extend to all A:

33

i) for <* 6 KQ,

<* -1 A iff <* fJ-Q A; and U-.| A iff s p

H-QA.

ii) for c^Ce^-Kq, ^ as above, The details are left to the reader. This has the immediate Corollary: Corollary. Let n
a secluence

QED

trees with the a

property that every finite tree (K,^) may be embedded as

subtree of an element of the sequence. Then I is complete with respec to the sequence
n

We present some examples. 1. The Diagonal Sequence. This is the sequence whose n-th element (n ^ 1) is n-ary and of height n:

V
etc. 2. The Jaskowski Sequence. This economical sequence, due to Jaskowski ( [22] -- See the Appendix for the relation between these trees and Jaskowski's lattices. See also [si , [10] ,[29] , , and [38] . ^8jgives a treatment similar to ours for this sequence.), is obtained by letting the n+1-st tree be the result of taking n copies of the n-th tree and dropping a node below them;

, etc.

34 3. A modified Jaskowski Sequence. Jf Jf

'

J1

Let us close this Section with some remarks. First, I is not complete with respect to any element of any of the above sequences. Indeed, it is not complete with respect to any finite model, as we will see in Section III below. We will also see that the completeness fails when "finite" is replaced by "finite dimensional" or "finite measure", where these terms stand for natural geometric measures of complexity of a partial order. A second remark concerns a useful property of the modified Jaskowski trees (a property shared, incidentally, by the Diagonal trees): Every node of J* is determined by the terminal nodes lying beyond it. From this, we can prove the following lemma: Lemma 1. Let otoC n "k*16 terminal nodes of J*. Suppose

we have a forcing relation, |l-, defined on J* such that, for each i^j, there is a formula A^ such that Then, if S is a set of nodes ItA

and C ^ \l/

A ij*

of J* such that <* S and C ^ p

35

imply pCS, there is a formula A, built up from.the -^..'s, for which S s ; oC.ll- A}-. In particular, for any01- there is an

A ^ such that {^: J3 > oC.^ =[ (3: |3 IIProof: First, if oC. . 11/lA. ., then oC
J XJ J

|f-TA^. Let
J- J

Ai =

^i Aij*

Tllen

Ai

andot^lj- lAi for i^j.

Now, since oc is determined by those ol 5s ot, it is also determined by J thoseoc.^oc. Let A_, = 01
x
Aoc 0 =AiDAr

A. for ^4^^* and 0

We must show that p trivial. Let ot jt&Q. If beyond includes those not

iff^ =ot. For ot q this is

\V- A^ , the set of terminal nodes not beyond oc(otherwise (3 11-/ ~A^ for

some i). Hence the set of terminal nodes beyond (1 is included in the set of terminal nodes beyond ot.. Let be one of these.

Since the set of predecessors of & ^ is linearly ordered, either {3 or p <ou But ^ <- <* would imply that C and (& have the same terminal nodes, a contradiction. Thus^ <* implies p and . The converse is easy:

(3U- ^Ai ( since no extension of p

forces A^). Hence (Ml- Ai. Finally, let S have the property stated in the Lemma and let A = Aoc QED

This Lemma shall be important in Chapter 4, below. For the moment, let us simply comment on the content of the Lemma. For these trees, it gives a simple criterion for determining whether on not there are any redundant nodes i.e. two or more nodes forcing the same formulae. In the present case, as long as the terminal nodes are irredundant, all the nodes are irredundant. In

36

fact, every node is the least node which forces some formula, and every set, closed under is the set of all nodes forcing some

formula. It is this latter strong property, combined with the completeness of I for
C. Minimization The problem of minimization, or the removal of redundancies, is familiar to us from Automata Theory (See eg. where the problem is easily solved by identifying states that perform the same task. Basically, the same trick will yield the result for Kripke models we collapse the structure onto itself, by making identifications and changing the order where necessary, to obtain a (in certain respects) minimal model equivalent to the original one. Here, we say two Kripke models, , K^, are

, that will be used in Chapter 4.

equivalent iff for any ci K-j there is a fieK ^ such that fA: ot 11-^ = = ft lh2 $ and, conversely, for any there is a

such that ^A: c(. V

l~2

= fe'- ^ \h-|

Let T be a set of formulae, transitive in the sense that it contains all subformulae of every formula in it, and let K be given. For O^K, let (odlT = k T: d If- A^ . Let k 3 and let :

be the usual set theoretic inclusion relation.

For atomic A, define = (Krp, problem:

foOT 1V-T A iff A

U] T . The model

I j-j,) yields a relative solution of the minimization

Theorem 4. ( [39l ). For A T, C4ji I hp A iff A 6 L(\

iff o( A.

37

Proof: By induction on the length of A. For A atomic, this follows by definition. For A = Ba C , B v C, the proofs are . trivial.
Thus, let A = BOC and assume that ot lh B C. If then BrC eTplT. ButCp^T ||-T B implies B whence Eplrp 5

T,

andCplT C. Hence

B imply f> ft- C, i.e. ceCp] T# A.

Thus CpiT

Conversely, one easily shows that Of- IM BOC implies

W/T B=C.

The case A = TB is treated similarly. Let T = F, the set of all formulae. Then

QED is called the

Minimal Model of K. Note that, forc< K,Ct*-"3 ^3 ^ =(<<1^, whence (Kj,)f = Kp. i.e. Kp is its own minimal model. The existence of Kj, has some interesting consequences. Eg. if K is finite, then K is the unique (up to isomorphism) model with the least number J? of elements equivalent to K. Thus, Kp is for finite K, minimal in a very strong sense. Sometimes, we may not want to make as many identifications as are made in the step KH-K-p. Eg. when dealing with trees, identifying two terminal nodes whose predecessors are not identified does not yield a tree. For such cases, Theorem 4, as stated, yields nothing. To get the proper statement of the result needed, let R be a reflexive, transitive binary relation such that
ocR p implies CoOrp - ^rp. Since R need not be symmetric, define

an equivalence relation letting3

by

iff

R p & |jRod . Then,

denote the equivalence class of C , if we define

38

iff oc R (3 andCoO A T), we have Theorem 5. Then

.oc

1)-R A iff At0 ^ (for atomic

Let KR = (0*-3 A iff

It-

:oCc K} , ^R, ||-R) and let A T.

A.

The proof is identical to that of Theorem 4 and we omit it. Theorem 5 can he used as the basis of justifying certain reductions on trees which, when applied to a finite tree, result in another finite tree equivalent to the original. While this has some interesting applications, we will find minimal models to he of greater use in the present work than minimal trees. We thus refer the reader to [23] &nd [24] for these reductions and their applications. ( C23l also considers reductions on finite models and proves that reductions D. Finite Minimal Models By their irredundancy, minimal models possess some useful properties. One of these is that they often reflect, geometrically, properties of the theories which they are models of. This is especially true of finite minimal models. Before we can clarify this remark, we must first establish a few basic properties of finite minimal models and introduce the notion of an Intermediate Logic. T.pmma P. Let K be a finite minimal model. Then, for any subset
Sck

terminate in minimal models.)

closed under ^ (i.e.

oc

S and

jS

imply p S), there is

a formula Ag such that S = {<* :

ot

AgJ- .

The proof differs from that of Lemma 1 at the end of Section II-B only in that, by minimality, we no longer have to

39

construct for oC
A &p

6 a formula A , r
oc p

such that

oc |f- A

&p

and

'

5111(1 i s

" the reader.

Theorem 6.

Let K be a finite minimal model of the scheme of ||-' be another forcing

substitution instances of a formula A. Let relation on (K, ^). Then (K, determined by A. Proof: Let

I}-') is also a model of the scheme

11/' A1 for some instance A' of A. For

each atom B in A', associate the set B = {oc : oC U-* B}. Replace B in A' throughout by A^ to obtain another instance A1' of A. One easily sees that o<. q
\V/-

A'1 , a contradiction.

QED

A related and more or less obvious result is Theorem 7. Let (K, be given (with cardinality at most that of ||-,

the set of atomic formulae). Then there is a forcing relation, defined on it such that K = (K, to its minimal model). To see this, let, for each o< , A^ be an atom which is forced only at oc and above.

|l-) is minimal (i.e. isomorphic

Now suppose T is a theory given by a collection of axiom schemata. Theorems 6 and 7 easily yield the Corollary. T is complete for its finite minimal models iff T is

complete for a class of finite pms's. To see that we need the assumption on T that it be axiomatized by a set of schemata, we prove the rather obvious Theorem 8. If T is the theory of a class of pms's, then T is closed under the rule of substitution (i.e. T is axiomatized by schemata). Proof: Suppose A is a formula valid in the given class

40

of pms's and suppose A' is a substitution instance, obtained from A "by replacing the atoms A^ ,...,A in A by formulae .,B ,

respectively. Suppose also that K = (K,

|f-) is a model on

one of the pms's of the given class and <* Q 11/ A'. We can define a new model K' = (K, and |h ') by letting Ai iff C II- B..

0 for any other atom C. K is a member of the class of

models defined on the pms's of the original class (It has the same pms as K.). The usual induction shows that If/' A, QED

contradicting the validity of A in the class of pms's.

Any theory T extending I which is closed under substitution (i.e. is given by axiom schemata) is called an Intermediate logic. We shall study Intermediate Logics in Section III. E. Strong Homomorphisms Consider the map f: K * K-p given by f^ = homomorphism from (K, i) VxeKp ii) OC =[5 > foe onto (K^,,
K(fot f$

f is a

i.e.

= x);
.

If Kj, is finite, we also have iii) VotfK \/x6Kj[f oc ^ x > To see this, let Cp]p * p for any -y ^ oc. such 3peK(po<_& x=f(3)3. and assume that

By Lemma 2, we can find for any node C"Ylj,Kp a formula that Let 1 p IV-p
iff

~ ^1"
F

^ ,..., ~i ^ be representatives of all classes . Some y and

for which

there is a tSlp = Wlp and since otherwise 1A---J

must force

sM,. Let

41

9 ThuS *Vi-l *" "* * ^ ^i^F^^F and, every node y = 0( "being equivalent to a y we see that, if

V It- A <* |h tfV

f o r some i.. Thus _ , then Y D" ArY-s EPJ I,'ij) J

^
l h?

^"[^ip
A [^i

N o w

~ ^^F implies whence

;j l

CP\ tW p ^

ACYi

d1

Thustp"3j, ihp Aj^^ -jfor some i.. and CflF2tv i "J j,, a contrail 3 diction. let (Kq, ^q) and (K^ , ^) "be pms's A function f:KQ > is a strong homomorphism if it satisfies the conditions: i) f is onto; ii)

V xy 6KQ(x -Q

y > fx ^ fy); y

iii) V x e KQ V y eK1 [fx

3 z KQ(z

x & y=fz)].

In these terms, we have proven the following (See also [23^ . ): Theorem 9. Let K be a model with
a

finite. The canonical map strong homomorphism.

(KQ,

K *%,, given by e< *rOp is

If f is a strong homomorphism of

onto

( K ^ , --J )

and if |V*^ is a forcing relation defined on (K^, --j) define a forcing relation tt-o on (Kq, 6Q) by oClho
A lff f<*

^1

A'

for atomic A. We can now state a Theorem explaining the usefulness of the notion of a strong homomorphism. Theorem 10. ( [23] >[3ll ). Let K-j = (K^,
Kq

= (Kq, ^ Q f ||-q) and

.j) be as just described. Then, for all nodes A.

o<. K q and all formulae A, ocH-q A iff f ot Proof: By

induction on the length of a formula. The

42

Theorem holds by definition for atomic formulae. The connectives

A ,v are handled with no difficulty.

Let A = BoC. First assume

B-^C,

B=C. lt/1 C. By

Then there is a P-| --j foe such that P ^ |l-1 B,

property iii) of a strong homomorphism, Pi f p q for some 00 -q04" By induction hypothesis, oc IH / q B^C, a contradiction. Conversely, let we have f (3
1K1 {5 (iQ

B,

C, whence

Ih^Q

^hen, for some (3 ^ oc ,

\)T Q B,
IM1

I^/q C. The induction hypothesis yields B^G. QED

B, f (i

C, whence fw.

The case A = "|B is treated similarly.

As an application, we prove a slightly weakened version of the Extension Theorem of Section B: Corollary 1. Let (K1, ^) be a sub-tree of (K2, that for every nodeoC
e

and suppose
^3

there is a terminal node

such

that p --1^ Then every forcing relation, extends to a forcing relation on (K2, -2) Proof: Choose, for each *- Map J3 of Kg into by p p element of such thatoC, ^2

IV--) on (K^ , ^)

, a terminal node t ^^ <*- . > P , if [3 e ^ ^oc , largest

i f o < : i s

The map is obviously a strong homomorphism.

QED

The reader may observe that this proof differs from that of the Extension Theorem only in that, in the latter, we had to introduce complete sequences when terminal nodes t^ were not guaranteed to exist. Corollary 1 is strong enough for the

43

applications of the Extension Theorem given in Section B. Using Theorem 10, we can also prove the following Corollary 2. I is complete for the full binary tree. We will show that there is a strong homomorphism of the full binary tree onto each of the modified Jaskowski trees. We let B denote the full binary tree (i.e. the tree of all finite sequences of O's and 1's). If J* is the n-th modified Jaskowski tree, we let Jn1'**,,Jnm
deno-te m

distinct isomorphic copies of

it. Jlj- is the one-node pms and, with the obvious interpretation,
J B S+i i

Also, B is isomorphic to

We show by induction on n how to find a strong homomorphism onto J*. For n = 1, simply map the full binary tree onto the single nodec<0. For n+1, we may indicate what the nodes of B are to be mapped onto by the picture:

44

Jn1 'oio^ / \/ j* cf* 0 y nn

/
t

JS2

X ./
<x~0 origin C-q of J+i The copies

n1

That is, every node of the left-most path of B is mapped onto the of B immediately above these nodes

are mapped successively onto the copies of J* in the periodic sequence Jn1'***'Jnn' Jn1''* *'Jnn'* * * *
We leave as an ea6J

exercise to the reader the task of proving that the resulting map is a strong homomorphism. (Observe that condition iii) of the definition requires us to repeat the maps of B onto each infinitely often.) The possession of a strong homomorphism of B onto each J* readily yields completeness: If I A, then oC A for some

forcing relation on some J*. By Theorem 10, this relation is pulled back to B in such a way that A is not forced at the origin of B. Further, since the composition of strong homomorphisms is a strong homomorphism, and since every finite tree is a strong homomorphic image of some modified Jaskowski tree, it follows that every finite tree is a strong homomorphic image of B. We might mention, however, that this can be proven directly by mimicing the construction of a strong homomorphism of B J*. We might also mention that f23l and f24]use the notion of strong homomorphism in their study of reductions of trees.

45

III. A.

THE GEOMETRY 0? INTERMEDIATE LOGICS Examples At the end of the last Section, we defined an Intermediate

Logic to "be any extension T of I by axiom schemata. By our definition of theory, T is consistent and, hence ICT^C, where C is the classical propositional calculus. To see this, observe that if T C, then T h A1 for all substitution instances A1 of

some non-tautology A. Since A is not a tautology, there is a substitution instance A' obtained by replacing each atom of A by one of the formulae D AID, DDD, such that A' is contradictory, i.e. C 1- tA1 , whence I V" "lA1 , whence T V- nA'. Thus, the Intermediate Logics are precisely those Logics intermediate between I and C. The set of Intermediate Logics is partially ordered under inclusion and, in fact, forms a distributive lattice under this ordering. Eg. if T1 and T2 are Intermediate Logics axiomatized by s c h e m a t a ^A ^-j- a n d fB -j"? j, r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e n T.| a T 2 ( T ^ T g ) i s axiomatized by the schemata ? A i vB j^ IXJ ( AiAB;j3
Ix j

Properties of this lattice are discussed in eg.

fl8l

and [193 .

If T is an Intermediate Logic and T' is an extension of T by the addition of the scheme of substitution instances of a formula A, we write T' = T + A. The expression T1' = T + T' is similarly defined. Further, we will denote certain special Intermediate Logics by special symbols. We consider some examples: 1. LC. The system LC of M. Dummett ( r+1 ), also known

46
as su>

)>

is

obtained by adding the scheme

(Au B) v(B-DA) to I. Theorem 1.

( [!. C16] ).

LG is strongly complete for the class

of (models defined on) linear pms's. Proof" We must show two things: i) LC is valid in this class of models; and ii) this is a representative class of models. i) Let (K, be linear and let \\- be a forcing relation

defined on it. Suppose c(.q \|/ (A DB) V(BOA) for some formulae A, B. Then o(Q lb* A^B, (0 BDA, and there are ^

such that oC If- A, 0( l|/ B, ^ Vf- B, ^

A. By linearity, el ^ ^

or 0( -^ , but the larger node must force both A and B, a contradiction. ii) To show that the linear models are a representative sample of models of LC, we shall show that, if K is a model of LC, then its minimal model, K^, is linear. LC and let K be such that Thus, let K be a model of and are incomparable.

Since the ordering on classes M,is given by set theoretic inclusion, this incomparability means that there are formulae A, B such that A WF - Cplp .

ol Q |ADB, BDA,

Thus, <*, l|- A, cC W B, p ||- B, ||-I A and whence c^0

(A^B) V(BD A),. a contradiction.

QED

Theorem 1 now gives us our first example of an Intermedi ate Logic other than I or C. The simplest way to see that LC / C is to give a model of LC in which Ayl A fails: ^ . A

otQ I This picture means that we have a linear model with only two nodes

47

and c(lh A for some atom all other atoms failing to be forced. Since d If- A, it follows that 0W -iA. It being given that A, it follows that A viA. By linearity, we have

a model of LC and hence LC ^ C. To see that LC ^ I either i) use the Disjunction Theorem (Theorem 6, Section I) to deduce that, if LC = I, then I |- ADB or I |- BaA for all A, B, which is absurd; or ii) use Theorem 7, Section II, by which there is a forcing relation making a non-linear model minimal. 2. KC. The Logic KC is obtained from I by adding the scheme nA y-YiA, The following result was communicated to us by M. Fitting: Theorem 2. KG is strongly complete for the class of directed pms *s. (A pms (K, a Y K such that is directed if for any o(, ^ e K there is ^ V and ^ "t >)

We shall also prove Theorem 21. KC is strongly complete for the class of mps's with maximum nodes. Proof of Theorems 2 and 2': We shall prove i) KC is valid in every directed pms; and ii) if K = (K, ||) is a model of KC,

then (Kc)-p has a maximum node, where Kc is the completion model of K (See Section I-A) and (K)-p is the minimization of this completion. i) Let K = (K, and suppose o (q ||-/ ~iA be a model with (K, directed

Then (q ||-/ "lA,-*lA and there are

( *? - ^o

such that

^ N A P

nA. By the directedness of

(K, ^), there is a

. But then til- A,-iA, a contradiction.

48

Thus KC is valid in K. ii) Let K be a model of KC and let s "be a complete sequence over K. Then s o( Q and we have q \(- lA > s
-\A,

o( Q tfc--?TA >| s |-C-|1As|f-C A. Since v~nA, we have s ||- A iff

oi Q If- -jiA.
and

Thus, if s^ every node

and s2 are complete sequences, fs^p = C82~^f

since

of K lies below a complete sequence, there is a unique maximum node in (K)p. i) and ii) obviously prove the Theorems. If one recalls the discussion of Kripke models as a modelling of tense logic, then Theorems 1, 2, and 2' make intuitive sense. If time is linear, then either A must be known at least as QED

early as B, whence B^A, or B is known at least as early as A, whence

Az>B.

There is a unique eternity iff every negation is

decided, i.e. -iA v nA is always true. In particular, if time is linear, there is a unique eternity: Corollary 1. LC is strongly complete for the class of linear pms's with maximum nodes. By Corollary 1, I ^ KC^LC^C. To see that LC 4 KC, apply Theorem 7, Section II, to the non-linear pms:

Thus, all inclusions listed are proper. The minimal models of LC are all linear. We have shown that certain geometric properties of models correspond naturally to KC namely directedness and the existence of maximum nodes.

49

The minimal models of KC need notf however, have these properties: Consider the model K with two infinite ascending sequences o.j,.., and ^,... , beyond o(Q, such that p n IH .A2n+-j where

II"

and

,... is the list of atomic formulae:

Ai Ag t A j Clearly this model is minimal (no two nodes force even the same atomic formulae). However, any complete sequence forces all atomic formulae, whence any two complete sequences are equivalent and are identified in (K0)^. Thus K is a minimal model of KC is neither directed nor has a complete sequence. 3. KP. The system KP., named after Kreisel and Putnam who introduced it ( ), is obtained by adding to I the scheme

(1A3BVC) O [( iA3B)v(lA3C)"]. The completeness proof for IC was simple all minimal models were linear. KC was not quite as trivial we had to minimize the completion models. KP offers an even more complicated example, both in the description of the models and in the completeness proof. First, let us describe the family of models for which

KP is complete. For this, we need some notation. Given a pms (K,^), with o(fe-K, let (K^ ,^) be the restriction of (K, (9 ^ o(, , and for ECK, let to those
*

E+ = y: ^JxE(x y)J ,
E"

= y: *3xE^y -

x) 5

Eg. K^ =

We

define the following curious property on

(K, ^):

(*)

Vol ^ E&K( [ Ke?( "^E+)~

is

empty or anti-

directed}. Anti-directed just means that, if we reverse the order, the set is directed, i.e. for ^,l( there is a Lemma 1. Let (K, such that J|-) be

have property (*) and let K = (K,

a model on this pms. Then K is a model of KP. Proof: Let ^0 y- (n A 3B v C) for some o<0, J"(-|A"5B) V (1A0 0)"] . Then -vAdO. let

pi^AMvO. p If-/ -lAOB, (? A^. Then - (E+)~

E=fot:o(lh

is just the set of those

nodes lying above

which force -| A (since E = E+ and (E+)~ is

the set of nodes lying below some node forcing A). Either K p -(E+r is empty or anti-directed. If K g - (E+)~ ~IA. Thus, is empty, then for no o{ ^ do we have

IA :>B and lh nA DC, a contradiction.

Let K p - (E+)~ be a non-empty and anti-directed. Since -iA exactly fore/ in this set, and since ^ |j-/ tAsB, ^Jf-/iAi?C, there must be o(. T that oC B, oC)M C,
y \ y b-

~ (E+)~ such

y \\- o.

But, there is a K ^ - (E+)~ such that > Tf

- ^ ^ As with

II-IA, whence J If- BVC. If Stir B, then YII- B, ||- C, again a contradiction QED

a contradiction. If J" II- C, then

Thus p must force one of the implications nA 15 B, ^A ^>C.

As seen in the proof of Lemma 1, the curious condition ( *) simply asserts that the set of nodes beyond anywhich could concievably force iA cannot be split into two subsets forcing B

51

and C respectively. The linear models of LO and the directed models of KC are examples of models satisfying the non-splitting condition (*). A non-trivial example of partial orderings satisfying (*) are given by the Medvedev Orders. (See .) If X is a non-empty set,

then collection of non-empty subsets of X ordered under reverse inclusion, (P(X) - {*].3), is the Medvedev ordering determined by X. (Equivanlently, one could take (P(X) )) Medvedev

orderings strongly satisfy condition (*). Let SX be non-empty and let E C yX: 0
Y S~$

(i.e. E-^: Y ^ X J ). Then

Z)J

E+ =[y P(I) - 0$ E4"" =

fYP(X) - [0$

* *3 z E(YC

and

: T)ZE(YrZ j* 0)J . Thus, deleting (E+)~

from ^Y: Y - sf yields the set of subsets of S disjoint from all elements of E. If this set is non-empty, its union is a minimum

element of it and, hence, it is anti-directed. In

f7l , Gabbay proved the following

Proposition 1. KP is complete for the class of mps's satisfying condition (*). Observe that this reads "complete" and not "strongly complete". Gabbay's proof is as follows: One takes a model
K of

KP and minimizes relative to a transitive set, T, of formulae containing a formula A not forced in K. T happens to be infinite, but has only finitely many non-equivalent formulae. The model so constructed is a finite minimal one and forces enough axioms of KP to guarantee that if satisfies condition (*). This yields completeness, but not strong completeness, and the question of strong completeness is open. Since we will not need to use this result, we omit the proof of the Proposition. The interested reader

52

is referred to B. Geometry By the Completeness Theorem (Theorem 2, Section I), every Intermediate Logic T is strongly complete for a class of Kripke models. The examples given above were also complete for classes of pins's. It is not known whether or not this is a general property of Intermediate Logics-*-- i.e. whether or not every Intermediate Logic is complete for a class of pins's. As evidenced by the examples considered in Section A, above, there are connections between the geometric forms of pms's and formulae valid on them or, perhaps better, formulae not valid on them. In the example of LG, all minimal models had to be of a certain form. For KC this failed and for KP the problem is open. Thus, we cannot describe this connection in terms of the geometry of the minimal models. Further, one may have completeness for two distinct geometric forms eg. KC is complete with respect to the directed pms's and with respect to pms's possessing maximum nodes. If T is complete for a class of pms's, the most natural geometric property to associate with T is whatever property characterizes the largest class of pms's for which T is complete, i.e. in which T is valid. Let us reconsider the examples of Section A: 1. LC. LC is naturally associated with the linear pms's both because its minimal models are linear and because of the following Theorem 3. LC is valid in (K, i) iff (K, ) is linear.

53

Proof: That linearity implies the validity of 1C was shown in Section A. Conversely, suppose (K, o( , ft K are such that *>y Y tt"
A iff

is not linear, say

. Let A, B be atoms and define ||,

Y-

TCll- b iff t P , C for any a*fconi C o"fchr "tha.ii A or Obviously, (ADB) v(BPA). QED

2. KC. KG is valid in directed pms's, but its minimal models need not be directed. However, we have Theorem 4. KC is valid in (K, iff (K, ) is directed.

Proof: Again, half of this has already been established, let (K, -) fail to be directed, say^,^ have no common superior node, and let A be an atom. Define Ih by J II- A iff Ot ,

Tt 11/ B for any atom B other than A. Then oi l| A, (? ||/

A and (o iA V HA.

QED

3. KP. For KP we have Theorem 5. KP is valid in (K, (*) of Section A. Proof: Let (K, Then there are o(K be a pms which does not satisfy (*). such that K^ - (E+)~ is non-empty - (E+)~ be such that for p.r . Define a model on (K, by iff (K, satisfies condition

and E - ^

and not anti-directed. Let no Ka - (E+)~ is

letting, for atoms A, B, C. i) ii)

+ ! |\- B iff JV ( f(?S" AfK^ - 0S+)-)) C iff Si and

iii) (|- A iff S&s+'

54

iv) no other atomic formula is ever forced.

Then, by iii) but J* \\- nA for all <T6 -(E+)". By i), ^ // B, C. Finally, for every

B. By ii), $ If C, but -(E+)~, either

/ ^ fp?- (whence ^ ||- B) or cf ||- *\A ^BVC. But by QED

( w hence \\r C). Thus construction, C.

J H- B v C and

oi J|/ ~\A"2B, -\Az>0.

The Finite Model Property

Let T be an Intermediate Logic. We say T has the Finite Model Property (FMP) if T is complete for a class of finite models. The Corollary to Theorem 7, Section II, immediately yields Theorem 6. T has the FMP iff T is complete for a class of finite pms1s.
Corollary. If T has the FMP, then T is complete for a class of pms1s.

Thus, the FMP is an important property for an Intermediate Logic to have. Further, while minimal models need not be geometrically correct (as in the example of the model of KC), the finite minimal models do have the desired geometric property (by Theorem 6, Section II). Besides yielding the completeness of a Logic T for a class of finite pins's, the FMP can be used to prove decidability, as the following well-known result of Harrop's shows: Theorem 7. ( ). If T is axiomatized by a finite set of

schemata and T has the FMP, then T is decidable.

Proof: Since T is finitely axiomatized, we can enumerate the set of theorems of T. On the other hand, we can enumerate the

55

set of noil-theorems as follows: By Theorem 8, Section II, a necessary and sufficient condition that the scheme of substitution instances of A fail to be valid in a finite pms (K, is that A

itself fail to be valid in (K, ). Since T is finitely axiomatized, we can decide which finite pins's T is valid in. Since we can enumerate these, we can enumerate the formulae refutable in them. Finally, since the set of theorems of T and the set of nontheorems of T are recursively enumerable, the set of theorems of T is recursive and T is decidable. QED

For example, KP has the FMP and is finitely axiomatized. Thus KP is decidable. LG and KG are finitely axiomatized and once we show that they have the FMP, we can conclude that they are also decidable. To conveniently discuss the FMP, we introduce the basic

language of partial order. We have variables x^,x2,..., ranging over nodes, a binary relation symbol ^ denoting the order, the symbol for equality, the usual logical connectives and quantifiers At A, V,Z),

V*
x

The connectives and quantifiers are

interpreted classically and we assume the axioms ^x(x^x)

, A y( -y A y-xo X=y), Axyz(x^y a y-z :>x-z),

x

as well as the axioms of equality. We may add a constant symbol ^ 0 to denote c(Q and the axiom Ax(5g-x). Two important classes of sentences are the classes of universal sentences and positive sentences. A sentence A, i.e. a formula A all of whose variables are quantified, is universal if it is of the form, A x^.. xnB(x^ ... XJ^) >

where B contains no quantifiers. A sentence A is positive if it

56

is constructed using only the connectives a,v and the quantifiers

A.V -- i.e.
Theorem 8.

A is positive if it contains no 1 or D .

i) Let T he complete for a class of pms's which are

defined by a set of positive sentences in an extension of the basic language by the addition of individual constants to denote special nodes (eg. oc q to denote or, in the case of KC, a

constant o( -j to denote the maximum node). Then T has the FMP. ii) Let T be complete for a class of pms's which are defined by a set of universal sentences in an extension of the basic language by the addition of finitely many individual constants. Then T has the FMP. Proof: i) As is easily seen (See eg. , Chapter 5,

exercises.), positive sentences are preserved under homomorphic images, i.e. and let quotients. Let K be a model on one of these pms's

iw A. If we let S be the set of subformulae of A, then

the minimization K c of K relative to the set S of formulae is such o that (Kg, ^g) also satisfies the sentences defining pms's of T. Hence K is a model of T, 1
and

it suffices to prove that

the set Kg is finite. But, a node set of formulae of S which only many such sets.

/k]g of Kg is determined by the

forces. Since S is finite, there are

ii) Universal sentences are preserved by passage to substructure i.e. if A is universal and holds of (K, ^), then A is also true of (K*, ^*), for the substructure (K*, 4*) of (K,(=) as defined in the proof of Theorem 2, Section II. As in part i), this will yield the result. If the basic language is augmented by finitely many individual constants, these constants will denote

57

certain nodes of (K, ^). The construction of (K*, *) will then be modified by also including these nodes in K*, along with whatever other nodes are required. Corollary 1. 1G has the FMP. Corollary 2. KC has the FMP. Corollary 3. LC and KC are decidable. To prove these Corollaries, observe that the linear pins's are defined by the axiom, QED

A xy(x^y V y^x),

which is both universal and positive. Thus, we may conclude that LC has the FMP by either part of Theorem 8. Directed pins's are defined by the axiom,

A xy V z(xz A yz),
which is positive. Hence Theorem 8-i) yields the FMP for KC. On the other hand, if we add a constant o(. ^ and the axiom, /\x(x^ 1), we define the pms's possessing maximum nodes. This axiom is both positive and universal, whence we can conclude that KC has the FMP from either part of Theorem 8. The decidability of LC and KC then follows from Theorem 7 In these cases, however, a simpler procedure is obtainable. If, for example, LC A, then we can obtain an upper bound on the

size of the models we have to inspect in our search for a counterexample. Eg. in minimizing with respect to the set S of subformulae of A, Kg has most 2n nodes, where S has cardinality n. Also, by the simple geometric forms of the models, we do not have to enumerate all finite pras's and test them for the validity of

58

the logics in question the enumeration of the finite linear pms's and finite directed pms's are easy tasks. Theorem 8 offers a very weak converse to the Corollary to Theorem 6, "by which every Logic which has the FMP is complete for a class of pms's. As mentioned, it is an open problem whether or not every logic is complete for a class of pms's. Jankov, in 21"} , produced a large number of Logics failing to possess the FMP. Fine, in 5 1 , gave a simple example of a decidable finitely axiomatized Intermediate Logic complete for a class of pms's which did not have the FMP. The converse to the Corollary to Theorem 6 is, thus, false in general. The FMP is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for a logic to be complete for a class of pms's. Coupled with finite axiomatizability, the FMP guarantees decidability. Further, finite minimal models reflect geometrically the formulae that are valid in them. Thus, the FMP is an extremely useful property for an Intermediate Logic to have and special interest attaches itself to finding sufficient conditions for a Logic to have the FMP. An interesting example is the following Theorem of Ono, which we state without proof: Proposition 2. ( 33"!). Let T "be in a finite slice. Then T has the FMP iff T is complete for a class of pms's. We define what it means for an Intermediate Logic to be in a finite slice in Section F, below. For the time being, we can state this result as follows: If the models of T are short enough, then the completeness of T for a class of pms's guarantees the

59

FMP for T. Thus, Proposition 2 is similar to Theorem 8 in that they both assert that, if T is complete for a class of pms's of a sufficiently simple geometric form, then T has the FMP. One of the most useful theorems yielding the FMP is due

to McKay and is based on the following Proposition of Diego: Proposition 3. ( ). Let be atoms. Then there are

only finitely many non-equivalent formuale constructed from these atoms using only the connective "D . McKay generalized this to Proposition 4. ( 281 ). Let A^,...,A^ be atoms. Then there are only finitely many non-equivalent formulae constructed from these atoms using only the connectives The proofs of these Propositions lie beyond the scope of this Chapter. We will, however, cite the application referred to above: Proposition 5 ( [ 2 8 ] ). Let T be axiomatized by a finite set of formulae (where we use a rule of substitution) which are built up from their atoms using only the connectives 1,A ,~2. Then T has the FMP. Gabbay ( \l"\ ) extended this to T which are not finitely

axiomatized, but where the atoms of the axioms are negated. We omit the proofs of Proposition 5 and Gabbay's result the interested reader may consult the papers cited. D. LC and Extensions Preparatory to studying the Slice Classification of the Intermediate Logics, we determine all extensions of the Logic LC.

60

In this and the following Sections, we shall let small letters, p,q,r,pQ,p1 ,..., etc., denote atomic formulae. Arbitraryformulae will still be denoted by the capital letters A, B,... We will continue our as yet unused convention that T + A denotes the Logic extending T by the addition of the scheme A. let the cardinality statement, Cn, be defined for n ^ 1
by

n:

<PiSPj)-

Also, define for n ^ 1 the pms Ln to be the linear pms with n nodes oi 0 oi .|^...<! Finally, define for n ^ 1 the Intermediate

Logics Sn ( = LCn) by Sn = LC + Cn+1. We also allow n to equal <JJ and define Observe that Sn. = LG. For, as we shall see, is

complete for the class of finite linear pms's. Since LC possesses the FMP, LC is also complete for this class. Theorem 9. ( [16} ). For 1 ^
Ln

Sn is strongly complete for

Proof: Observe that, for any forcing relation on Ln, any set of n + 2 formulae
Ao****,An+1 mus"t have

i0 formulae forced

by the same set of nodes. I.e. there are A^, A^, i^j, such that for all <^, < ll A iff oC || A... Thus ^0 in L^ n. 0*i^^n+1
(A i~

^Q

)J- A S. A^ and

ThuS every instance of Cn+1 is valid

Conversely, let K be a minimal model of Sn. Since S^^-pLC, K is linear. We shall first show that K has at most n nodes. If K has at least n + 1 nodes, say o^Q < o( formulae A^ (0< i^n) such that
we 1 /L ... <<n>

an find

||" A^. Also

6i
A 0 =

P^P is forced by all nodes and An+1 = pAnP is never forced. A.., whence <0 W WUiSi.). K. Hence, if L2Sn and L A for any

For no pair i/j does

i,e * Cn+1 is not valid in

theory i (not necessarily an Intermediate Logic), then * 0 l ^ A for some forcing relation on 1 (for some m^n) in which 1 is valid. But 1 is a subtree of Ln and we can apply the Extension Theorem

(Theorem 3, Section II) to extend the forcing relation on Lm to Ln. This completes the proof. By Theorem 9 we have C = S^S2-?***^scv
=

QED
now

present two Theorems which show i) exactly where the inclusions fail to be proper, and ii) that no new logics can be found between C and LC. Theorem 10. ( are equivalent: i) S I- A, ii) Sn+1 I- A,
Ui)

). Let A have only n atoms. Then the following

Vl f=

Proof: Obviously i) > ii) > iii). Thus we need only show iii) >i). Let s<J*< A. Then there is a model K of su, in which A. Clearly we can change the forcing relation, lh*

on K to ||^ without effecting the validity of A or Sw , where, for atomic p, [l--| P iff || P and p is an atom of A.

(This is clear because atoms p not in A are now being treated like C A*1 C and is axiomatized by a scheme. Alternatively, first is valid under all forcing

minimize so the model is linear and

relations on the resulting structure.) We now have a model

62

= (K,

|1--]) let Kj, denote the minimal model of

(i.e.

we drop the subscript 1). We claim that

Crf]P = ^ iff <* and @

force the same atoms of A. To see this, let S~^...CS , denote Or T m-1 the various sets of atoms forced by the various o(K, and define a map from (Kf, p) onto Lm ( = iff ^p: p is an atom & ^ f: o/ *

lb P? = S^. This is obviously a

strong homqjj^^j^^^and, if we define 1^0 P iff PS1, Theous that, defining iff tot J
0

p,

mf for all formulae B. But this new pies with (^-j, and the claim is established. (Altei the lengx: P-ove the claim by a direct induction on E5a. But one uses exactly the properties used

in proving Theorem 10 Section II.) Summarizing, if S^ |-/ A, then o^q A for some Lm, where

m is the length of some increasing sequence of sets of atoms of A. But any such sequences has length at most n + 1. Thus, if 5<A/ y- A, then Lm ^ A for some m^n+1. But, as observed in the proof of Theorem 9, Lm |=^ A implies Ijn+1 |=^ A for m ^ n+1. QED

Theorem 11. ( (/18*] ). let T be a Logic and suppose S^ S TC. Then for some l^n^to, T = Sn. Proof: Assume T ^ Sw . let A be an instance of an axiom of T such that S^ A. Then S ^ f-/ A, where A has n atoms, let

m be the least n for which Sn+1[J A for some axiom A of T. (Note m^1). m ?T. We show ' Then Sm ' A for all A such that T J- A and Sm

62

K.J = (K,

Let Kj, denote the minimal model of

(i.e.

we drop the subscript 1). We claim that [*(\ = [fa iff <* and @ force the same atoms of A. To see this, CS .. denote ' let S-.^... 0 -r T m-1 the various sets of atoms forced by the various o(K, and define a map from (Kp, ^p) onto Lm ( = iff ^p: p is an atom & ... by f: <^ I> <*\

\h P? = S^. This is obviously a

strong homomorphism and, if we define o/. lV-0 P iff pS., Theorem 10 of Section II tells us that, defining d |lr~i P 11o

for atomic p, the same holds for all formulae B. But this new forcing relation coincides with and the claim is established.

(Alternatively, one can prove the claim by a direct induction on the length of a formula. But one uses exactly the properties used in proving Theorem 10 Section II.) Summarizing, if S^ }-/ A, then o^q A for some Lm, where

m is the length of some increasing sequence of sets of atoms of A. But any such sequences has length at most n + 1. Thus, if
SU/

then Lm

A for some m^n+1. But, as observed in the A implies Ijn+i |=^ A for m ^ n+1. QED

proof of Theorem 9, Lm

Theorem 11. ( l8j| ). Let T be a Logic and suppose S^ S. TC. Then for some ln^U), T = Sn Proof: Assume T ^ S^ . Let A be an instance of an axiom of T such that S^ \f A. Then Sn+1 A, where A has n atoms. Let

m be the least n for which Sn+1f/ A for some axiom A of T. (Note m=M ). Then S 7 m * A for all A such that T J- A and S PT. We show m

63

Let K be a minimal linear model of T containing more than m nodes. Then there are o/L < o^. ... < ( and .....A 0 1 m 0' m such that < ii- A. iff j ^ i. Let A be an instance of an axiom
J

of T such that Lm+1 j=^ A. Replace each atom p of A by A^ iff the least element of Lm+^ forcing p is c(y and by Aq/\iAq if p is never forced. This yields an instance A' of A for which we claim that <^0 A' in the given model K of T. This is seen

by proving by induction on the legth of C that, for o( among ^Co,,,,,0^m' ^ "*"s ^orce<* in "the model on

Lm+i where C' results from C by substituting the A..' s for atoms p of C as described above. But K is a model of T and we have a contradiction. (If we wish to apply Theorem 10 of Section II on strong homomorphisms, first introduce new atoms for AQ,...,A , and AqA^Aq. This still yields a model of T. Then change the forcing relation so that all atoms but the new ones fail to be forced. This still yields a model of T. Minimizing yields a model on the pms Now T is valid on this finite minimal model, and,

by Theorem 6 of Section II, T is valid in all forcing relations on Lm+-] contradicting the fact that Tcp.^,) An alternate set of axioms for Sn is given in The interested reader may wish to prove directly the completeness of these axioms for Ln< E. Height A pms (K, is said to have height n (n iff the QED

maximum legth of its strictly increasing sequences (i.e. sequences

64

q^

<^m) is n. The height of a pras is ov if it is not of

finite .height. We wish to study those pms's of height *=n. We begin by axiomatizing them. Define the sequence of formulae A1 = p1v*P1 (or, p1 v(p1-sp0)),
An+1 = pn+1v^pn+1^ An^*

and define BHn = I +An. Theorem 12. For

BH(iU= BHn is strongly complete for the class of

pms's of height at most n. Proof: We consider the finite case first. let K have height at most n and suppose *0 some sequence PQ,...,Pn of formulae. Then c/Q Then there is an ^><0 such that since V1 |l-/ An-1 = that o^2 If"
p n_i p

for

, ?no An_ ^.
U

II-

An-1. But,
such a

p ^ An-2^' there is an n_-|V( n_-| Con"fcinuing in

*2 ><'l
we

2 ^ An-2*

way

Set

sequence o^Q<o(1 <"...<< n of length n + 1, a contradiction. Conversely, Let K be a minimal model of BHn and suppose there is a sequence o^Q^...<o^n in K. For each i = 1,...,n, find P. such that Then ^n-i 4t-i+1 W" Pi' ^n-i Pi* )|- P.^ iff j > n - i. We prove by induction on i that
Ai*

Clearly o(n_1 \U A1. Row, n-i-1 II" But ^n-i-1 ^ Pi+1 0^n_i |[/
and Ai +1

"^n-i-1 'I" Mi+i

ft-/
but >

by construction. Further,

by induction hypothesis. Thus

Henoe

Pi+-| ^ Ai

( n-i If Pi+1

*n-i-1

Ai+1

65

We conclude O^q

An, a contradiction.

For the case n = ou , observe that, since I has FMP and every finite pms has finite height, BH^s I. But every pras has height at most cw by definition. QED

We might also mention that BHn is related geometrically to the pms's of height at most n in the sense of Section B that BHn is valid in a pms iff the pms has height at most n. We leave the proof of this fact to the reader. We will make use of the following Corollary 1. BHn has the FMP. Proof: Observe that the pins's of height at most n are those pms's satisfying the universal axiom, & *^xi+1 D ^ *r=*i+i>QED

We might also mention that Harrop's Theorem (Theorem 7) yields the decidability of BHn. The following sequence of modifications of Pierce's Law is called Nagata's Sequence ( P1 = ((P1 :> P0)OP-|)^=>P1 = ^n+l^n^Vn'= ^n+1" Define LPn = I + Pn, LP^ = I. Theorem 13. LPn = Proof: The case n = w is trivial. Let n be finite. It suffices to prove that LPn is complete for the class of finite pms's of height at most n. The proof that each axiom of LPn holds in these pms's is easy and is left to the reader. For the converse, LPn has, by Proposition 5, the FMP. Let K be a finite minimal model of ^et be
Pn+1

):

66

maximal. We show k<n. By Theorem 6, Section II, it suffices to show that, if ksW n, then Pn is not forced under some forcing relation on the pms (K, ). Define a forcing relation on the pms (K, (=) by G* \Y Pi for all atoms pQ ^k-i' Let PQ = pQ and Pn+1 = ((pn+1 OPn)oPn+1 )^Pn+1

We show by induction on i that "'k-i to pThe case i = 0 is trivial. Now, *k-i I!" First,
p i^k-i

IV- ((Pi^Pi.^sPiVaPi.

P^ "by construction. Let </wk_r " u >4.i. IK (Pi^ Pi

and

then c(lH p^ and so If

ol

=^k_i

*k-i+1

Pi-1* since

k-i+1 ^ ^k-i' * k-1 P-PV^

p.OP^^ (If i=1, verify directly that

Thus, if o(-^k_i

and

i If" Pi^pi-1

then

^^k-i
p i

whence c(. (|- p. Thus ok-i ||- ( p 3Pi_1 );> pa. Since A ^k-il^PiIt follows that ^k-i

P^ for all i and, in particular, QED

<*0 y P^. If k ^ n, then Pn is not valid in (K, ^=).

An alternate (and more direct) proof that LPn = BHn may be found in [32! , where Ono proves that this equivalence is a special case of a more general one. It follows from the equality of LPn with BHn that LPn is strongly complete for the class of pms's of height at most n.

67

The completeness of LPn for this class of pms's is also proven in [3ll , where Ono also shows that, if T is complete for a class of pms's, then T is complete for a class of pms's of

height at most n iff Tpi]?n. P. Slices Let us say that

a

Logic T has height n if it is complete

for a class of models of height n, but is not complete for any class of models of height m<n. In particular, T has heights if there is no finite n such that T has height n. For 1 ^ n ^ , define the n-th slice, to "be the

class of Logics of height n. By the strong completeness of LP^ for the class of pms's of height n,
T ^3

iff

hT^CT

for m<n.

With this equivalence, we can present the following Theorem of Hosoi: Theorem 14. ( [18~] ). T Proof: a. Let
iff LP LP n~ T - S n' n* iff T + su, = s n-

n-

T^s

We consider first the

case of finite n. Then there is a formula A such that T J- A and

L nH A* Since

^here

is a miniroal

model K of T of height

n. We show how to find an instance A' of the theorem A such that

Q

A' in K.

This will yield a contradiction.

Fix the sequence pQ,p,|,... used in defining the sequence P1,..., and let PQ = p0a~P0. The reader may easily verify the following
1

h Pk+i 3 pk.2.pic fp k^ p k +i a maximal

Let

< ... <<n-1

sequence in (K, 6) and

let, for i = 1,..,n, Qi be chosen so that

68

olj |j-

0 - n - i.
Q m +1 ) O

Let Q Q = Q 1 An Q 1 and define PQ = Q 0 , Pm+1 = Z> Qm+1.

Ey the above equivalence and implication, any formula

built up from PQ,...,Pn is equivalent (in K) to some P^: eg.

PjvPkHPmax(o,k)' nP j= P 0.

Let Cdl = /p.: <>C (|- P.f. For any . J <J P h u s , 4 = (P.. , ^ +1'* *'* 3 * T where Kp = (Kp, p, jf-p) iS defined by Kp
= FWJJ,: O(6K?,

m o d e l

i s

linear,

ij, = e.

To define ||-p, choose new atoms <3p |l-p Pj_

Pq,...

and let

If- P1.

A simple induction shows that, for all B built up from p^ with B' built up accordingly from P^,

|l"p
allc( in K. Kp

B'.

But the height of Kp is exactly n since Pn is forced by being minimal, any formula A falsibiable in Ln
A** Le"tting

has a substitution instance A* such that R0lp I^P B = A*, o^0 \[/ B', i.e. oiQ instance of A. The converse, that LPnTSn implies and we have completed the proof for the case n For n = OJ , note A^T -S^ > AGT-Sn

A*' which is a substitution

is trivial

for some finite n.

A slight modification of the above argument yields the result, b. -> TCSn ^ ^
+ &uo

^n* . But> for some m,T

Conversely, let T + SM> -

m,

69

whence T +

S^. Thus n = m and

n.

QED

In rial , Hosoi introduced the notion of slice to get a "better view of the structure of the lattice of Intermediate Logics. In view of our geometric characterization (See also are led to the opinion that the slices do not exhibit much of the structure Logics in the slices for n^<o are to Logics we

in general as finite dimensional vector spaces are to vector spaces in general. We shall discuss this point further, after we have introduced some notions of width. For the moment, let us note some facts:

i.2\

= c?;

ii) \/T ^n(T 2 n )i iii)

is

i) and ii) are obvious, iii) can be proven fairly easily, but we will first introduce some notions of width which will enable us to observe this as a trivial fact. G. Width There are at least four notions of width two local notions, a global notion, and an utimate notion. In this Section, we consider the global and utimate versions one local version being discussed in Section H, below. The global version is quite simple: Let (K, ) be a pms. A non-empty subset ACK is called an anti-chain if any two elements of A are incomparable under the ordering of (K, ^). We say that the pms (K, ) has width n if it has an anti-chain consisting of n elements, but no anti-chain of greater than n

70

elements. If (K,^) has no finite width, we say that (K,^) has width w . Define, for pQ
EA W

pn,

= I

(Pi 3 ^ Pj)> let

= Q sanw

Theorem 15. For 1 n ^

, BAn is strongly complete for the

class of pms's of width at most n. Proof: We consider the finite case first. First we show that BAn is valid in this class of pms's. Let K = (K, ^,|h) be a model whose pms has width n and let < 0
(p i D j^i p3)Then

<0 W
such

Pj for i = 0,.., n. 'fcha'fc \l" Pi_i

Hence there are ^-| > ^n+-|<K i \V Let oL. 4

X J

Pj*

In

Particular, tt"
-L J

Pd f 5 - i-1
J

and suppose ot. ^ ol . Then oCJ.

a

P-i-i implies
J"" '

P-j_i

contradiction. Thus the set

> >^n+i

forms

an anti-chain of cardinality n + 1, a contradiction. Conversely, let K be a minimal model of BAn with antichain ^n+1 Find, for each ol^ a formula Bi such that

o( ^ \\- Bi iff j=i. Then </ 0 i^(i^

a

l|-/

whence

contradiction.

For n = u> , we use the facts that I has the FMP and that finite pms's have finite width to conclude that BA^ = I. Further, by definition, every pms is of width tt. Corollary 1. BAn has the FMP. Proof: Pms's of width at most n are defined by the positive universal sentence QED Corollary 2. BAn is decidable, Thus, for each n, we have axiomatized the models whose QED

71

"global" width is at most n. The systems BAn are also related to these pms's in the sense of Section B that BAn is valid in a pms (K, omit it. We might make one final comment that, for n = 1, the axiom of BA1 reduces to (pQ op^) V (p1opQ). Thus, the axiomatization of the class of pms's of width n is just a generalization of the familiar axiomatization of the pms's of width 1, i.e. the linear pms's. The simplest generalization of the axiom for S
VV/

iff (K,

has width

The proof is easy and we

is

Pi^Pj' kat "this does not always axiomatize the pms's of

width n is shown by the example: < Pq P-J P2

The disjunction for n = 2 is not forced at the origin of this model. A notion of the ultimate width of a model is given by is a

the number of complete sequences in the model. If (K,

pms in which every node lies below some terminal node, then the (ultimate) width of (K, is defined to be the number of terminal if this number is not finite.

nodes if this number is finite and

If K is a model, the width of K is defined to be the width of the pms of (Kc )j, . Models of width 1 are axiomatized by KC = I + nAv^A, One may easily check that KC is also axiomatized by
(lA31B)v(iB^3A). This suggests that, in going from BAn to the

system CSn of n complete sequences, we use the axiom, for

72

?0* Pn V
VViPi = .iX',P.il-

This does not always work, however, since the incompatibility of the-ip^'s entailed by failing to force Dn is only temporary. If we permanize this incompatibility, we define CS_ n =
1

+ i<3",("lZ>iA",pj)o;Dn*

Also

define CScU='JCSn.

Theorem 16. For n^ C*>, CSn is strongly complete for the class of pins's of (ultimate) width at most n. Proof: We consider only the finite case the proof that CS^ = I being identical to the proofs that BA0U= I and BH^ = I. Let K be a minimal model of CSn and let^Q,..., f3n be distinct terminal nodes of K. Let Q. be such that
J

ll" Qi Then let Ai = Qi A (3.. and

i = 3 Observe that i = j

, ( v u A r , II- i < j ' i V -

But, if (3.. Thus ^ (n

iff i = j, we see that Pi ^ if A .) and we have a contradiction.

Aj.

Hence, it suffices to show that CSn is valid in all models K in which i) every node lies below a terminal node, and ii) there are at most n terminal nodes. Let all the terminal nodes of K and suppose (kn) be VI/ Dn i*e.

^0^T^ p i Si" 15 ;))*

that

Then there are

ft)' * * *' PtoT ^0

8noh

^i lh->Pi

and

pi IM 3^i->Pr

But, there are only k^n terminal nodes, whence for some i,;j,m with

73

wa, e(oll/

y
n ^ p i Anp j^ *

o(m Ih^Pi'^Pj
Thus CS n

and

^o

Whence QED

is valid *

Corollary 1. For all n, CSn has the FMP. Proof: Add new constants o^1,...,c/n and the positive universal axiom
AX(^V X ^ O^) .

This axiomatizes the class of pms's with at most n terminal nodes in which every node lies below some terminal node. Corollary 2. For all n, CSn is decidable. We might also repeat the fact that CS^ = KC. As with KC, CSn is strongly complete for a larger class of pms's than those described. Let us say that a pms (K, ) is n- directed if there are k=n subsets, S^,...,S-^, of K such that 1) V<*K 3^ii) Each iii) tfi \/<6 closed). Note that, just as the condition that there be a single terminal node is replaced by the condition that the pms be a directed set, we are now replacing the use of terminal nodes directed sets S-|,...,S^. Theorem 17. Let n be finite. ,... by 3i( S.); QED

is directed; K(<^ 4= ^ > ^Si^ (ie* each is

i) CSn is strongly complete for the class of n-directed pms's. ii) Let (K, ^) be a pms. CSn is valid in (K, ^) iff (K, <) is n-directed. The proof is straightforward and is left to the reader.

74

Let us only comment that the proof is made easy by the observation that (K, is n directed iff any collection S^... of disjoint,

non-empty closed subsets of K. at most n sets.

H.

Local Width The two notions of width considered above were both of

a global character. The anti-chain measure indicated the maximum width a model had. The complete sequences measure allows for unbounded antichain width, but measures the ultimate behavior of the partial order. Here, we consider a more local notion of width which is defined for finite trees. This new measure can be defined on a larger class of pms's, but as we will not need this information, we consider only the finite trees. Locally, we define the width of a tree to be the maximum number of successors a node of the tree can have. For example, looking at the trees given in Section II-B, the Diagonal tree Dn has width n, the Jaskowski tree J has width n-1 for n>1, and the modified Jaskowski tree n J* has width n. In other words, the local width of a tree is n if n the tree is n-ary. Let PQ,...,Pn be atoms and consider the axiom

v ^ fap $ v In 9] , Gabbay and de Jongh proved that I + En is complete for

the class of finite trees of width at most n. By the Extension Theorem, I + En is complete for the class of trees of width n. The only result we will need is the following easy. Lemma 3. (9*3 ) Let (K, (K, iff (K, be a finite tree. Then En is valid in

has width at most n.

75

Proof: Let (K,^ ) have width at most n and let K be a model on (K, ) such that ^ for some instance E^ of En< E^ for some instance E^

Then there is an (j(^ ol^ such that and every

forces all instances of En. Denoting the instance

of En by En itself, we see that if o/Jj/^ [(pjL O ^ p..)3^ p^"] ^^/pi then for sorae^^o^ P|\/Vyp^. By the maximality of <K t ^= it follows that, for any i, fact that o< \\and there are ^ ( such that P^], but But, sinceo(

Pj* This, combined with the P-j means that o( ||-/ p^^ p.. ||- p^, (3^ (// p^ for j i.
mus ^

Since the tree is at most n-ary, two of the nodes ^o'*,,,^n lie above a common node ^ Let these be (*^q, ^
nor

But now

6\u p.. for j / 0,1 since neither f0 Futher, ^

0

P ^ forces these atoms. ^ Pj/

But a

|L^ P1

and

(?-|

ll~/

PQ

wtience

whence ^ |(- En and (){(-^ C^Pi^j^i Pj)^ J$i Pj~]

contradiction.

For the converse, an appeal to the Extension Theorem shows that we need only prove that En is not valid in the pms

^0

p^ is forced

Letting ^ l(- pj iff i = j, observe that p^ 3 only at those terminal nodes not forcing p^, i.e. Pk n-pi^jjfpj
lff k ^-

But, for k/i, Pk \\- pk, whence

||-

p^. Hence

But clearly

((/ N/ pi.

QED

76

An interesting immediate consequence is that, as remarked at the end of Section II-A, although I is complete for the full binary tree, I is not complete for the class of finite binary trees. The reader who would like to see the proof of the completeness of I + En for the class of n-ary trees is referred to [93 . These Logics are also considered in [31I . I. Counterslices In Section F, we used a notion of height to characterize Hosoi's slices. This suggests generalizing his notion of the n-th slice,to the class of all Logics of measure n, where one uses some measure of geometric complexity. In particular, we could use the notion of width. It will be convenient to use the notion of ultimate width. Thus, define a Logic to have width n if it is complete for a class of models with n complete sequences, but is not complete for any class of class of all Logics of width n. Observe a n^>CSn^T &
cs m^ T for

is defined to be the

"-O*

CSn is the smallest element of C3nAlso define the mn-th box: that $1 n mn m A n Note first = 0 for n >1 since -<31 contains only C and C uu , define LPmr) = LPm + CSn.
mn>
an<*

For 1 <T m^ U/ ,

Theorem 18. LPmn is the least element of Proof: If T then T

6
m

&n*

Thus

LPmT and CSnT, whence LP^^T. Corollary 1. For m>1, is infinite.

QED

77

Corollary 2. For all n,&$n is infinite. Let = U?m + CSn + BAp. By constructing suitable

pms's, one sees that for m>2 and p^n, LP 9^ LP , for p^p', ^ mnp mnp' ' and each ^(Dmri. This yields the Theorem 19. For is infinite. ^ac^
wliat

But what about $2n^*

about <5 2^'

^ar
s^ia-'-^

only element of #2n whose existence we know of is I^n* see that this is the only element ^>11 ^as* First, to be the one-node pms and Tn to be the pms: 1 \
o(
we

define Tq

\i;

/*

oI

0 Theorem 20. For 1^n<i <-u , LP2n

strongly complete for T .

Proof: Note that T \ is the collection of all pms's m'm-n of height at most 2 with at most n complete sequences (i.e. termimal nodes). By the Extension Theorem, any forcing relation on T , for m^n, extends to an equivalent forcing relation T . Thus the strong completeness of completeness for Tn< ^or ^0'***,^n y^-el^s strong QED

Our next two Theorems are analogs of Theorems 10 and 11. Theorem 21. let A have only n atoms. Then the following are equivalent: i) LP2a> ii) LP2-2n iii) T2n J= A. The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 10. If K is a minimal model of LPg* then K is a tree of height at
A

(i.e. LP2 f- A);

A;

77

Corollary 2. For all n. Let

is infinite.

= LPm + GSn + BAp. By constructing suitable

pms's, one sees that for m >2 and p^n, LP ^ LP , for r p^p', mnp mnp' and each LPmnp ^1Dmn m. This yields the Theorem 19. For is infinite. ^ac^
w^at

But what about $2n^* only element of "$?2n

whose

about <3

So far,
s^a^-^

existence we know of is

see that this is the only element *^2n ^as*-First, we define Tq to be the one-node pms and Tn to be the pms:

Theorem 20. For 1^n^ u;, LP2n is strongly complete for Tn Proof: Note that fT \ / is the collection of all pms's v m' m-n of height at most 2 with at most n complete sequences (i.e. termimal nodes). By the Extension Theorem, any forcing relation on T , for m^n, extends to an equivalent forcing relation T . Thus the strong completeness of completeness for T . ^or ^0'**',^n strong QED

Our next two Theorems are analogs of Theorems 10 and 11. Theorem 21. Let A have only n atoms. Then the following are equivalent: i) 1P2UU H
A

(i.e. LPg J- A);

ii) LP2,2n |- A; iii) Tgn |= A. The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 10. If K is a minimal model of LP2, then K is a tree of height at

78

most 2. Minimizing now with respect to subformulae of a formula A, the terminal nodes are determined by the sets of atoms of A that they force. Since there are only 2n such sets, if A can be falsified at all, A can be falsified in TpR. Theorem 22. Let LP2T. Then T = G or, for some n^ T = Ll^n*

The proof is completely analogous to that of Theorem 11. Corollary 1. For , 2n =

Theorems 21 and 22 were also proven by Hosoi and Ono,

[20~] , who gave a different axiomatization of LPn. We might

mention some further axiomatizations: ip2n = LP2

+ BAn

= W2 + ^ = 1P2 where the atoms are

+

PjP^Pi

/f hPi.S^i
The

PQfPn

first equation is proven in

exactly the same manner as Theorem 20. For the second, recall that the formula given defines our notion of local width. Similarly, the formula of the third equation is also related to a notion of local width. ( See .). Hosoi and Ono (20^ )

The first infinite box is showed that, like 4,

consists of a descending sequence of

Logics and their limit. Recall our definition of LPmnp = LPm + + CSn + BAp. Let the n-th Chinese Lantern, CLn, be

d &

The reader may easily prove the following Theorem 23. LP, _ is strongly complete for CL. ' >P "
"" > f

Analogously to Theorems 10 and 21, one has Theorem 24. Let A have n atoms. Then the following are equivalent: i) ii)
n f2

y A (i.e. LP5>1 ^ A); I' A>

iii) CL2 |= A. Finally, this yields Theorem 25. Let LP^ ^ TC. Then I = C or Sn or T = LP^ n 5,1 , U j l ?>l for some 1^n^ OJ. Corollary 1. *|
=

^LP5 *| 1 LP^ -| n'* * *'

3 1

*
f

Thus we have Hosoi and Ono's classification of J. Some Comments on the Counterslices

Hosoi originally used Theorem 11 to define the n-th slice, \n , to "be the class of Logics T such that T + S, u> = Sn. He then proved the equivalences

LPn9T & LPm^T for m<r n. Later, the geometric characterization of *3 Ono and ourselves. Although was discovered by

was defined geometrically, one can also be

might ask whether or not the Counterslice

characterized as the set of Logics T such that T + L,^ = Ln for some Logics L^,...^^ -).I* . For n>2, this fails: Theorem 26. For n > 2, es has no greatest element.

Proof: Consider the pins's:

80

(Kv 6 ):

"

yu/ "

(K2, ~2):

let T. . * be the Logic of the pms (K., j. i . Observe that each T. j a n Now has local width 2, in the sense of Section H and Tg has height 2. If T^T^Tg, then T or and, since Logics of

height at most 2 and local width at most 2 contain LPg2 we see that T_2IjP22* ^ ^llws that T ^
n

for n>2.

QED

The second slice"^2 ~ ^21 * * ^2n* * * *'^2^contains the geometrically simplest elements of the Counterslices. Thus, it is natural to ask if there is a way of slicing the Logics along some geometric measure so that LPn is the largest element of the n-th slice. This has been done by Ono in /~32*] : Let PQ,...,Pn be atoms and let Bn iff I + Bn ^ T. ^0 ^i^pi*
Then T +

^2 ~ L'E>2n

Further, I + Bn is complete for a class of pms's

whose width, not defined here, is at most n. Thus, width can be used to slice up the class of Intermediate Logics in a manner analogous to the slicing in terms of height. However, the geometric properties may turn out to be more useful. Ono's proof ( [33~] , Proposition 2, above) that a Logic T n finite, has the FMP iff T is complete for a class

of pms's depends essentially on the finiteness of the height, as does our proof, in the next Section, that every T6 has the FMP.

81

let us recall the Disjunction Theorem: I J- AvB implies I ( A or I |- B. To prove this, we simply took models K1 and K2 with origins defined the model c/ 2 such that <^1 \W A, o(2 \y B. We then

K1
o*

KP

where oi Q p for any atom p. Clearly

|[/ AvB. Note that the

countermodel to AvB constructed from countermodels of A and B has greater height and width (measured globally). Thus, if T is an Intermediate Logic possessing the Disjunction Property, we expect T to have infinite height and width: Theorem 27. Let T have the Disjunction Property. Then T Proof: As observed by Ono (C32"J) T *3^ , since, if T , for finite n, then TpBHn and T pnv ( p ) . The n

Disjunction Property and the unprovability of pn implies T Pn^>An_1 . Replacing pn by pop, T An_1. Repeating this

process, T = C, but does not have the Disjunction Property. To see that T P0 V T " Let, for i = 0 Thus assume T
n>

Then, for

Qi =

P^A

Then

I \-

QA AI Qj)

^-nQ.j). If T has the Disjunction Property, Qj Then C \Qy Replace

then for some i T 1- nQ^

X J

p. by pop and p ., for j^i, by p A"ip. Then C ( Q., C/-1Q. a contradiction. QED

Thus we see that, measured in terms of height or width, finite dimensionality rules out the Disjunction Property. As we

82

have not previously considered this property in the context of Intermediate Logics, we might mention some examples: i) KP has the Disjunction Property (See
111, [Z5l)l

ii) The Theory Trn of finite n-ary trees is easily seen to have the Disjunction Property; iii) I (IPj^ = Pj^^j^Pi
has

Dis3unc-tin

Property (See [32]. ). By examples ii) and iii), locally hounded width does not guarantee the failure of the Disjunction Property. K. Any discussion of the importance of the geometry of Logics

would "be unconvincing and incomplete if no interesting applications of the geometry were given. We present the following extension of Ono's Proposition 2: Theorem 28. Let T 6-<3n for some finite n. Then T has the FMP. The idea behind the proof is given "by the following T h e o rem 29. Let TeJn for some finite n and let
P Q , . . . , P m

"be

atoms. Then there are only finitely many formulae constructed from PQ>-*>Pra which are not equivalent over T. Lemma 4. Let K = (K, ^,||-) be a model of T and define h y o (il-1 p Lemma 5. Let
oflV" P
&

= (K,

P* fPo'**,'pml*

Then

-1

is a model of T'

be as in Lemma 4 , S = set of all formulae

Then is

constructed from Po,,*>Pm*

isomorphic to (K^g.

Lemma 4 has already been used, if only implicitly. Lemma 5 is also obvious. Proof of Theorems 28 and 29: We shall prove these by induction on n by proving that there are at most finitely many non-equivalent models (K^g of the given height and that each

83

is finite. The case n = 1 is trivial. The case n = 2 can be handled separately by an appeal to Theorem 21, but we will not do so. Let n>1 and let (K^)g have height n. Consider the successors e/^... of o^q. (Dropping the subscript 1) let K , be i the restriction of Kg to induction hypothesis, there are only finitely many such models. Let us observe that there are only finitely many models of the form K , V \ /
u

K
s^V

(*)

w / /
0 where the distinct K , 's are non-equivalent. Such a model is -o<i obtained by choosing finitely many K 's and then choosing one "*i of the finitely many subsets of fpQ,...,Pm^ to be the set of atoms forced by o/q. Hence there are only finitely many models of the form (*). Now Kg is equivalent to a model of the form (*) simply split Kg at the nodes ( n as in the proof of Kripke's

Tree Theorem (Theorem 1, Section II). Hence there are only finitely many models of the form Kg of height n. Having established that there are only finitely many models of the form Kg of height n, we observe that this immediately implies Theorem 29 if we has infinitely many non-equivalent formulae, then we would have infinitely many models Kg of height ^ n. For Theorem 28, either apply Theorem 29 to <3n
or

note

directly that each Kg of height n is finite. This can be proven

84

using Theorem 29 for the case ofx3v, k<"n. Either way, if

-K

XX

and T

A, then

||^ A for some model K forcing only atoms

occurring in A. Kc = K is also a model of T in which A is not "O ~~x forced. But Kg is finite. QED Oorollary 1. Let . For any m there is a T -<3 such that pm>

T is not axiomatized by any set of schemata on the atoms pQ Further, T may be chosen to be finitely axiomatized.

Proof: Since there are only finitely many non-equivalent formulae on the atoms PQ,...,P , there are only finitely many Logics in <3n axiomatized by schemata based on formulae with only the m + 1 given atoms. But, for n ^ We can restate this as follows. Corollary 2. Let tized T . For any m, there is a finitely axiomais infinite. QED

such that T is not axiomatized by any set of schemata

in which each axiom scheme is based on a formula with at most m atoms i.e. for any axiomatization of T, some axiom scheme requires more than m atoms. To see this, assume it is false and replace the atoms of each axiom by atoms from Po,,,,,Pm

We should mention that, in unpublished work, Y. Komori and M. Sato have also proven Theorem 28. While we haven't seen Sato's proof, we can mention that Komori's proof is similar in spirit to ours but uses pseudo-boolean methods instead of Kripke models. (See Appendix A for a discussion of pseudo - boolean

algebras and their relations with Kripke models.)

85

By Appendix B, Theorem 29 fails when we choose to bound the width of a model instead of the height. Nonetheless, as K. Fine has shown in unpublished work, bounding the width does

have certain interesting consequences.

Chapter I. A.

2.

The Predicate Calculus

86

THE KRIPKE MODELS FOR THE PREDICATE CALCULUS Definition and Examples In Chapter 1, we considered only the propositional

calculus. It is now time to consider the quantified theory. For this, we must be more careful with our terminology: "Formula" will mean formula; "sentence" will mean formula with no free variables. The Kripke models for the quantified theory arise from those of the propositional calculus by the addition of domains. Specifically, a quantificational model structure (qms) is a triple (K, D), where (K, is a pms and D is a function associating

with each nodeo(K a non-empty domain, DOC , of elements. D is assumed to satisfy the monotonicity condition: -^Do( 9 D^. From the standpoint of tense logic, at stage certain objects

may have been constructed (eg. part of an infinitely proceeding sequence), and at stage ^ further objects may have been constructed. Thus I)Q may be larger than D<* . Before defining forcing on a qms, we must make some conventions about languages. First, there being no point in discussing uncountable languages, we restrict our attention to countable languages. For simplicity, we shall assume that there are no function symbols in the language. The addition of function symbols will be discussed in Section II-F, below. The most important conventions concern constants. Given a qms, (K, D),

we shall also add to the basic language (i.e. the language of whatever theory we are discussing) new constants, or parameters,

87

denoting the elements of U Dot . If this set is uncountable,

oteK
then the language augmented "by the addition of such parameters will "be uncountable. We shall later show that this can be avoided. Forcing will be viewed as a relation between nodes and sentences of the augmented language i.e. formulae with paramaters replacing the free variables. The relation o( ||- A( 3- ^ f f 9-^) f where a^,...,a if is the list of all parameters in A, can hold only (i.e. a.|,....,a name elements of D( but

.,a n Bol

we can moderately lax on such fine points). If it happens that all parameters of A lie in D^ , then we may indicate this by calling A an applicable formula. This merely means that we can have o<\\r A or < 11/ a. Suppose that (K, D)is a qms and that

Do is not empty. Then we assign elements of this

intersection to the constants of our basic language, so that sentences with no parameters are applicable with respect to all nodes. When this is satisfied, we can define forcing inductively by choosing for each atomic formula P(x^,...,x ) an indexed family of gelations (x 1 ,x n ) C (D ) n . It is assumed that

oL Q &R We then define lb by

(a^,. ,a n ) ^ R ^(a^,...,a^).

1)

(h

a ) n

The extension of

|j- to all aplicable sentences is as follows:

ii-v) Modulo the necessary applicability assumptions, propositional connectives are treated as in Chapter 1; vi) o( \\- VxAx ^aGDoi ( o( ||- Aa);

88

vii) o ( | | - AXAX

V^-( VBE D|?

( F? |/- Ab).

We have some immediate consequences: a)for all A, if A and ^ ot , then ^ jf- A;

b) any relation defined on atomic sentences and satisfying a) extends uniquely to a forcing relation defined on all applicable formulae; c) the relation thus, d) terminal nodes force all sentences valid in the classical predicate calculus. To indicate a model, we may draw a pms and list the domains of the nodes. Eg. the picture, fa,b? fa?. denotes the qms (K, -,D) where K , D<< = fa7 A depends only on those ^ o(

and

and D f-fa,b$ . As with the propositional calculus, we may indicate the forcing relation by listing the atomic sentences forced at a given node: P fa,b^ a? A,Ba a
AX(A VBX) ,

Here, A is a propositional sentence. Observe that but

o(

v AXBX.

Thus eg. AX(AVBX)*DA VAXBX is not valid.

By d), terminal nodes force all classically valid sentences. In the propositional calculus this meant that the double negations of classical tautologies were valid. This fails in the firstorder case. Consider the model:

89

f0,1,2l I 0,l1 {O^ I.e. we have a sequence O^q

AO,A1 AO

^ . of nodes with

= ^0,..,n^

and otm II- An iff m >n. Suppose o(Q II- i~>A x(Axv"iAx). Then
VP-> <0 M iAX(AXVIAX). In particular, o( Q |\/n>1x(Ax vi Ax).

But then C^N

n

\\-

AX(AXVTAX) for some ^n- ^O*

In

PAR"KICULAR | J / An by-

| L - Anv^An, i.e. O(

IV- An or O/N )|-iAn. But

definition and VJI/ 1 An since ^n+1 (

An. It follows that

Ax(Axv*i Ax)-<-- in fact o^q j\- "\A x(Ax vl Ax). It also

follows that the quantified theory will not have the FMP where we refer here to the cardinality of K even the classical predicate calculus does not have the FMP if we refer to the cardinality of the domain of the model. When we are dealing with larger domains, it is more convenient to describe the Kripke model as a partially ordered set of classical models where (\1- A for atomic A iff M^ where M^ is the classical model associated with the node if U> denotes the standard model of arithmetic and oj+, non-standard models, then ^ to' denotes the Kripke model on the pms, i3 f= A, . Eg., denote

*
,lf are those of
f cw+,

\o</
The domains at U)' respectively;

90

and an atomic sentence is forced at

, P r iff it is true in

OJ , cu+, tu1 * respectively. We shall especially discuss such models in Chapter 4. B. Kripke Models as Classical Models Many results from classical model theory (Compactness Theorem, Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, etc.) also hold for the Kripke model theory see eg. Chapter 1 above (for Compactness in the propositional calculus),
[ 3 ] ,

r9i, or [23], where such results

are reproven for Kripke models. Insofar as a Kripke. model can be viewed as a classical model, there is no need to reprove many of these results. (This observation that a Kripke model is a classical model appears to have first been made by Mints.in [^8*] ). Let L be a language for some theory T. We shall describe the language and classical theory of its Kripke models. Replace each n-ary relational symbol (i.e. atomic formula) of L, R(x1,...,x ), by an n+1-ary symbol, R1(xQ,...,xn). In addition, add new relational symbols K(x), D(x,y), and ^(x,y) (which we will write as x^y), as well as the relation of equality. The atoms K,D,-,R', together with the constants of L yield a new language L'. The next step is to give axioms for the theory T' of models of T. First, we say that ^ is a partial order on K: i) Ax [*Kx = Vy(x^y)l ii) AX(KX3X^X); iii) Axy(x^y/s y^xoxfcy); iv) Axyz(x^yA y^z^x^z). Next, we must mention that K is non-empty, every DC is non-empty, , Ax(Kx S Vy(y^x)) ;

91

D is a monotone function on K, every constant a fo L is in each D<^ , and every element is either a node (i.e. in K) or an element of some D< : i) VxKx; ii) Ax /*Kx "5 VyDxyl ; iii) A xyz l)xz/\ x^y ^Dyz^ ; iv) AxDxa, for each constant a of L; v) A x /"kx v Vy(Ky ADyx)!. Having described the qms, we must state that we have a Kripke model. The extra variable added to R to obtain R1 is for the purpose of expressing o( \[- R;
f Rf(xQ,...,xn)=>

KXQA

DXQXJ^J ;

ii) /V xyx1...xn[R' (x,x1,...,xn)A x^y "DR' (y,x1 ,...,xn)1 . (If R is O-ary, the conjunction /MDXqX^ is simply omitted). So far the axioms assert that we have a Kripke model for the language L. To assert that we have a model of T, we must assert in L' that each axiom of T is forced i.e. we translate all formulae A of L into the statements that they are forced and obtain T' by adding the translations of the axioms of T to the axioms of T1 so far given. Let A(x.j ,...,xn) be a formula of 1 with the free variables rn indicated. We find a formula A (xQ,x^,...,xn) of L' expressing xQ 1|- A(x1,...,xn) by induction on the length of A: i) If A is atomic, say R(x,j ,...,xn), RT is Rf(xQ,...,xn). Let A,B,AT,BT be given. ii) a(x.j t... x^) AB(y^ ,. . . y m )7
=

A (xq x^)/ \ T B (xQ,...,ym);

92

iii) fA(x1,...,xn) vB(y1,...,ym)l

= AT(xQ,...,xn)v T (X0,. . . y m ) ;
A aT(x ,x,x ,...,x )"] q 1 n

iv) [ \/xA(x,x1 ,... xn)"]T= \/x[px0x

D, i , and A require us to add the applicability assumptions: v) [a(x1 ,...,xn)-3 B(y1,..,ym)lT=

A

^x.^Dx^Pa

AY^X fAT(y,x1,...,xn)'3BT(y,y1 ,...,ym)l .

A

etc. Define T1 "by addign the axioms Axx.|...xnA T(x,x1 ,..,,xn), for axioms A of T. The following Theorem is obvious: Theorem 1. There is a natural correspondence "between models of T and models of T' given "by: i) If K (K,^,D,|j-) is a model of T, define a model of T' by taking K v
&c&

Doi as the domain, letting the formulae

K,^,D describe the qms, and letting R1( o( ,a^,...,a ) be true iff 11 R(a^ an)

ii) Given a model T', define one of T by choosing the elements satisfying the formula K(x) to be the set K, etc. Theorem 1 has several immediate Corollaries for Kripke models: Corollary 1. (Compactness), f* |= A iff
r

J= A for some finite

cr Corollary 2. (Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem). If K is a Kripke model of C there is a model K^ of rwith k, o that i) K., K; ii) for iii) for K1 , ^ K^,o/ ^ a n d u countable such

93

iv) for all that ^/l/1 A.

K, if </||/ A, then there is a

K1 such

i) - iii) assert that the model K^ is, in some respects, a submodel of K. This is a weak formulation of the L'owenheimSkolem Theorem which one obtains by means of Theorem 1. The following is even weaker: Corollary 3. (Weak Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem). Let K be a model of

r, ant

A. Then there is a countable model, A for some o(K.|.

, of

P in

which

Let us indicate the proof of Corollary 2. We start with a Kripke model K of T. Let f"" be the classical theory corresponding to

P and

M the classical model corresponding to K.

By the Lowenheim Skolem Theorem for classical logic, there is an elementary submodel to M-j. Observe that we can choose a node d of K and find such that o( D1 this if A iff o<l|-^ A for any A whose parameters are from is countable, we can also have = D^ for of M. Let be the model of

P corresponding

. We leave other variations to the reader. We might mention that the Compactness Theorem for the

propositional calculus also follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 but observe that the reduction is not (directly) to the Compactness Theorem for the classical propositional calculus, but to the classical predicate calculus. Another application of Theorem 1 is in defining ^ be a non-empty family

ultraproducts of Kripke models. Let

of Kripke models and let P be an ultrafilter on I. To define

94

"FT K^/F,

let

"be the classical model corresponding to

and

define K to "be the Kripke model corresponding toUw^/F. Thus

K ="H"K / F .

Up to isomorphism, TTk./F can be described by: i) setting (K,^) = is classical; ii) defining D similarly; and iii) defining o( 11- R(f^ ,fn) /i: (i)))^(f^(i),.. ...,fn(i))?* P (recalling that (and f^,....,f are functions modulo F).

TT(k,,^)/F, where

this ultraproduct

Los1 Theorem for the Kripke models follows immediately from the Theorem for classical models: Corollary 4. For all sentences A(f^.,fn)> K = ~TJ K^/F,
o(\V- A(f1,...,fn)^fi: c< (i) J|~i A(f1(i)

fn(i))?<?F.

Gabbay (C9l) defines ultraproducts in this fashion and proves Corollary 4 directly. Aczel (ft!) defines ultraproducts for prime theories rather than models (A first-order theory is prime if, in addition to having the Disjunction Property as required in Chapter 1, it has the Existential Property: If A contains only x free and VxAx is provable, then Aa is provable for some constant a.). Osswald (Qll) considers ultraproducts of the following form: j is an indexed family of models over a single . Thus, each

pms, (K,^), i.e. for each i,

may be viewed as a set of classical structures indexed by the single pms (K,^). The ultraproduct of this family is taken to be the partially ordered family of ultraproducts: For each < 6 K, we have the family M ^ of classical structures and we take

95

/F to be the structure at

in the ultraproduct. Both

Gabbay's and Aczel's approaches can be subsumed as applications of Theorem 1 Osswald's seems to require a new proof. As a final application of Theorem 1, we mention the existence of arithmetically definable Kripke models. Basically, a Kripke model is considered to be arithmetically definable if its corresponding classical model is arithmetically definable. The reasons for this are fairly clear eg. not only should the relation " ot II- A" be equivalent, for each A, to an

arithmetical formula, but the structure (i.e. qms) itself should be arithmetically definable. Observing that T has an r.e. axiomatization iff T' has one, the Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem (See eg.[23 ,
C12J)

yields:
se"k K an^

Corollary 5. Let T be r.e. Then there is a /\

A2

relations D, ^ defining a qms (K,^,D) on which there is a forcing relation which, restricted to atomic sentences, is fa 2* The importance of Corollary 5 is two-fold: i) Arithmetically definable models are technically useful (See Chapter 4, below.); and ii) it indicates that set-theoretic flavor of the work is misleading and that many of the results can, when applied to a particular r.e. theory, be proven within arithmetic, ii) is first mentioned by Mints in Dsl C. The Completeness Theorem As in classical model theory, if our purpose were to study model theory, we could dispense with proving the Completeness Theorem. Since, however, the significance of all of our results lies in the fact that they pertain to the formal systems of

96

intuitionistic mathematics, we must prove that we know what we are talking about i.e. that our results do indeed pertain to these formalisms. By the Compactness Theorem (Corollary 1, above), the Strong Completeness Theorem ( T ^ A F t= A) follows from the

weak Completeness Theorem ( V- A<?|= A). Thus, we could present Kripkes's original proof (Z~51 j|). There is, however, a reason for presenting a direct Henkin-style proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem. To state this reason, let us state the Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem, cited above more carefully: Proposition 1. (Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem). Let T be r.e. and let Con(T) be the canonical statement fo the consistency of T within Peano's Arithmetic, PA. Then there are 2 relations

such that, when one interprets the atomic formulae of T by them, the translations of all theorems of T are provable in PA + Con(T). Thus, if T is an r.e. intuitionistic theory, its corresponding classical theory T' is also r.e. Then the proof of Corollary 5 can be formalized in PA + Con(T'). A proper analog to Proposition 1 would require the proof to be formalized within PA + Con(T). This is easily done by arithmetizing the proof of the Completeness Theorem. While we shall not carry out such an arithmetization, we shall present the proof in such manner that arithmetization will be an easy task for those familiar with arithmetization. The Henkin-style Completeness proof for Kripke models is due independently to Aczel

(til), Pitting (33),

and Thomason

([233).

97

We present Thomason's proof since it is the easiest to arithmetize. First, we need to extend the sequent calculus used in Chapter 1. We use the following rules from [151 :

> V
% A

\/

\/

V->

r f Ay

^ ,

P >VxAz, ^ P>Ay A

P, \JxAx ?^ rAy^A

_>/\

r ^ a xAx
where, in

p, a xAx * ^
we assume that the variable y does not .

V-* and >A

occur free in T or

The proof of soundness, i.e. that S (- A implies S |= A, is easy and is left to the reader. To better present the proof, let us introduce some notations: M will denote a countable first-order language containing a non-empty set, C^, of constants. The set of formulae of M will be denoted by Fm^. We must extend the notion of a prime theory to firstorder theories. Let M be given. A set T Fm^ is an M-prime theory

(also called M-saturated) if the following hold: i) T is consistent; ii) AFmM ATM > AT (i.e. T is a theory); iii) if A, B are sentences of M and AvBT, then ACT or B"T; and iv) if AxG-Fm^, x is the only free variable of A and \/xAx T, then Ac 6 T for some cf Cm<

98

Observe that, in iii) A,B are assumed to he sentences. In model theory, we are usually interested only in sentences. Lemma 1. Let T U fA? jFFnijyj, A a sentence, and suppose TJ-/ A. Let he a countahly infinite set of new constants disjoint from Cjyj and let M' he obtained by adding ^e-pCg,...^ to the constants that T' A. Proof: Set Tq = T and define Tk+-] inductively as follows: Case 1. K is even. Let VxB be the first sentence of this form in M' (under some fixed enumeration) which has not already been treated and such that Tk ^ c.| ,Cg,....
VxB. Let c be the first constant in

of M. Then there is an M'-prime theory T1 P T such

not occurring in T^. Then set T^^ = Tk + Be.

Case 2. k is odd. Let BvB/be the first untreated disjunctive sentence of M' such that Tk J- BvB'. If Tk + B
=

V-

A, put

"^k

+ B *

Otherwise set

= Tk + B'. Tk and let T' be Tw together with .We must show

Finally, set T^ =

all formulae whose universal closures are in

that T' satisfies conditions i) - iv) of the definition of M'prime above. i) We show by induction on k that Tkf/ A. For k odd, this is as in Chapter 1, Section I, Lemma 2. For O^k even V-> shows that, if Tk (- A, then T^ I- A. But T' f- A iff Tk f- A for some k. iii) - iv) By construction. ii) Suppose TT B. Then T1 (- B*, where B* is the universal

closure of B. Thus T' I- B*vB* and for some K B*rTk. Then B*^/Tk and B T1 QED

99

Observe that we could also have used the argument for ii) in the proof of lemma 2 of Chapter 1, Section I, instead of taking the deductive closure at each step. The advantage of taking the deductive closure is that, since the deductive closure defines a filter on the Lindenbaum algebra, the relationship with the algebraic representation theorem is made clearer. Let I be a theory with language L. We wish to prove Theorem 2. If T is L-prime, then for some Kripke model K = (K,D,lf-.), and for some dQ.K, T
A<-* of ||- A

for all sentences AL. In fact,e( may be assumed to be an origin of K. Proof: Let = L and let Mi+1 be obtained by adding the , where SinCM_ = 0. Set prime for some if.

set Si = fc|+1,...,cj+1 ,...? to CM K = ^T1: TSTf and T' is

We define T1 ^ Tg iff T.jSTg, D(T') = CM > , where T' is Mj-prime. Finally, for atomic sentences A(c1t...,c ) with c^,...,cn Cj^ and T' M^-prime, let T' | j- A( ,...,c^) > T' A( c-j ,...,c^) .

We wish to show that this last equivalence holds for all applicable sentences. For this, we need the following analog to Lemma 3 of Chapter 1, Section I: Lemma 2. Let T' K. a ) B O C e T ' H V t * 2 T '( B T * C T * ) ; b)iBfT1 <-> Vt*P T' (B^T*); c) A xBx T1 T* \/ceDT*(BcT*).

100

Proof: The proofs of a) and b) are exactly as in the proof of Lemma 3. The proof of c) is similar and we omit it. The proof of Theorem 2 on the length of the sentence A. QED

is now straighforward induction QED

Theorem 3. (Strong Completeness Theorem). For any theory T, T \- A iff T |= A. In fact, I |> A iff T entails A in the class of models

with origins. Proof: If T j-/ A, then T' }/ A for some M'-prime T'j? T in a language M' extending M by the addition of constants. By Theorem 2, there is a model K with such that A. QED

B for all B T', Since T'3T> i't follows that T A.

As in Chapter 1, we shall find it convenient to assume. unless otherwise noted, that every model has an origin, which we will denote by .

Two immediate applications of the Completeness Theorem are the Compactness and Weak Lowenheim-Skolem Theorems: Corollary 1. Corollary 2. T A iff TQ for some finite TQ T.
(K,

If T j/ A, then there is a countable K = IV A.

D,f|-)

such that cijHB for all B T and D. The Aczel Slash

By Theorem 2, if T is M-prime, there is a Kripke model K and a node such that (restricting ourselves to sentences)
1 = fA: A|.

101

The converse, that every such set is M'-prime, where M' is obtained from M "by extending to include constants naming all

of the elements of D^, is an easy exercise wich we leave to the reader. As observed by Aczel in "l 1 , we can obtain more information on M-primality than just this. Observe that T = f~A:
o(

(I- A J for some

o(

implies that (

is the origin in the pms constructed. Thus, let us start with the model K constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 (i.e. the model of all prime extensions of T) and add a new node ^q such that o(Q - ot for all o( K. (Note: This model may or may not already have an origin). Let D ^0 = defining, for A atomic, oiQ ||- A The Aczel Slash is defined by T \A<- otQ U- A. Also define \(T) = f.A: Tl aJ . (if we wish to extend | to all formulae, we say T|a(x^,...,xn) iff T|a(c^,...,cn) for all C,j , . . .,Cn CJjyj) . Lemma 3. |(T) is M-prime and |(T)"fA: Proof: Clear. Theorem 4. |(T) is a maximal M-prime subtheory of T. Proof: Let l(T)"fA: T f- A3 , T1 M-prime. We show that T' J- A implies A |(T). i) If A is atomic, T' Af?T|- A-A/(T). T T f- A. and extend the forcing relation by

aJ.
QED

ii) & iii) A = BaC, BvC. These cases are trivial, iv) Let A = B3 C.

102

T' |-

BOO > T

I-

B^C.

a) |(T) h B. Then Tf [- B and so T' b) |(T) V B. BPC^|(T) implies But

C. Thus |(T)

C.

B & BjV C).

T"2 T and so BT" ? C^" T", a contradiction. v) A = "IB. Similar to iv). vi) Let A = VxBx. T'
VxBx ^^a^C^T' \- Ba, since T' is M-prime,

> Ba | (T)

> V XBX 6 J( T) .
vii) A =

A xBx.

Similar to iv).

QED

Corollary 1. Let T be a theory. Then T is M-prime4>T = J(T) ^tS|(T). Corollary 2. The intuitionistic predicate calculus is prime i.e. the following hold: i) If A,B are sentences, h A v B ^ M or f-B; ii) If Ax has only x free, I- VxAx constant a. Aczel also showed that his slash can be characterized by an inductive definition: Theorem 5. The relation T A is inductively defined by the following i) For atomic A, T|A^-^T J- A; H Aa for some

ii) T(Ba C<^ TlB & TJC; iii) T|BvCr*T|B or T|C; iv) TiBD C- TH*>C & (T tB ^ TlC); v) ThB T |-tB & T Jf B;

103 vi) T \ V xAx vii) t | AXAX

<r->

T \a& for some a. C-^; T |-AXAX & T|Aa for all a C^.

Proof: i) is by definition and ii), iii), and vi) are obvious. iv) Let tIb^G, i.e. c^Q||- B^C. ThenofQ|H B P o^Q jf- c, i.e. t|b ^t|c. Since l(T)j?T, T h BPC. Conversely, | if T BDC, i.e. ^q||/ B3C, then either 0^qJI- B and *SQW C or f |- B, T' I/ C for some prime T'? T. The latter can only be true if T 1/ B3C; the former if T|B, T^(C. v) and vii) are similar E. The Operation ( ) ( )' The Aczel Slash, like the Kleene Slash (3*3) can be used to prove primality results (also called Explicit Definability results). In {""0 > Aczel used his inductive characterization (Theorem 5) to give a version of Kleene's Slash-theoretic proof of the Explicit Definability Theorem for Heyting's Arithmetic. However, our interest in this Chapter is primarily in the model theory and in model-theoretic proofs. Thus, let us ignore Theorem 5 and reconsider what we did in proving Theorem 4. The proof of the Completeness Theorem involved our constructing a model of a theory T. We observed i) that T is prime iff it is the set of sentences forced by a minimum node of that model, and ii) that, if we added a minimum node, we obtained a maximal prime subtheory of T. We shall generalize the model theoretic construction of ii). Let K be a Kripke model over a language M with a nonempty set CM of constants. We let K1 denote any model (K1 ,^',D' ) QED

104

obtained by adding a new node 0iQ to K such that i) oSQ ii) DV0 = for all ol K;
CM' D'< = D<* for

c^fK; A for all c(e K.

iii) for A atomic, Also, for

K and any formula A, let o( |\-'A iff o( ||- A. Of special

interest is the case in which the implication in iii) is replaced by an equivalence. This is the case we most often encounter. By Theorem 4, if the class of models (not necessarily possessing origins) of a theory T is closed under the operation K > K', then T is M-prime. We shall give another proof of this shortly (mimicing the proof of Theorem 6, Chapter 1, Section I). First, we define another operation. let^=^K^: i^I^be a family of Kripke models. The disjoint sum,2 J , of / is defined to be the model K = (K,^,D,f|-) defined by: i) K =^K xfi? ; ii) ( ot , 1) * ( 0 ,3) iff 1=3 & iii) D( Q( , i) = DjO* ; iv) for atomic A, (of, i) (V A iff o([|-^ A. The relation iv) in the definition of \)r extends to all sentences: ( 0< ,i) ||- A<-*o^ ||-i A. were used f!

Analogs of the operations K ^ KJ_ and

in Chapter 1 in proving Theorem 6 of Section I, and in Appendix A. If^T is a family of Kripke models, we can apply the two operations successively: Theorem 6. Let the class of models of the theory T be closed under the operation ?( f{Sr),
Then

T is M-prime.
' ,

Remark: By closure under K ^ K

we only require that

105

there be at least

one model K' satisfying the definition of this

operation usually it will be the one where we define l|""

A

II"

A )

Proof: Let Ax contain only x free and let, for each aCM, T \/ Aa. Then, for each a 0^, there is a model K such that K : a Suppose and has a least node, say ot nt with c/ cL cL
and
r

of T

Aa. Let

le"t ^q "be the least node of

|j- VxAx. Then o<q (j- Aa for some aCjyp But o^q ^ ^a

[J- Aa, a contradiction. Hence, if T {/ Aa for all Af C^,

T j/ VxAx. Disjunction being handled similarly, we have the result. QED Observing that the class of models (not necessarily possessing origins) of T is closed under the operation we have the immediate Corollary 1. Let the class of models of T be closed under the >

*r,

operation K ^ K'. Then T is M-prime. Since we are primarily interested in models possessing origins, Theorem 6 will be more useful to us than Corollary 1 which can be false if we only have closure under K >K! for K possessing an origin. Aside from the condition on origins, the difference between using Theorem 4 and Theorem 6 to prove that a theory T is prime is that, to apply Theorem 4, one has to show that a particular model K of I yields a model K' of T, while Theorem 6 requires us to show that, for any model K of T, K' is a model of T. ModelTheoretically, both tasks should be equally difficult. Theorem 5 makes the first task easier but the second approach will be more

useful in Chapter 4, below.

106

II. A.

KRIPKE MODEL THEORY Trees The first question we may ask is if we can restrict

ourselves to models K = (K,^,D,||-) whose pms is a tree. The proof that we could in the propositional case extends easily to the first-order case. First, let Km be the set of all non-trivial Tr finite sequences W = ( > * * *^"n-1 ^ suc^ "that i) is the origin of (K,^); and

ii) for Kj.ir. ^ 1r., ~Tr by ^ree ordering of finite sequences and Vr= Bir1(r)..j , is defined ,

where H(17) is the length of

i.e. 1(1T0,...,1Tn_1) = n. Finally |\-Tr is defined by TT ||-Tr A iff

A for A

atomic.

Kripke's Tree Theorem asserts that this last equivalence extends to .all sentences A: Theorem 1. For any sentence A,<(f[|-Tr A iff ^ 1
A*

Proof: The cases A atomic or of the forms B aC B VC, BOC, -|B were treated in Chapter 1. For A = VxBx, observe

irlbpr ^xBx^^ajj 4P||-TrBa

^3aDtr1(ir).1
<-5

^ Ba AxBx. Let 1T-Tr<r~ ^T(^*)-1 ^

Ba*

(<r)-i ^ V x B x .

Let A = /\xBx and suppose first that ^ Then ^^ (<r)-1

II"

and for a11 a^I)<r'1(0")-1'

Thus, for all aDTr<^, <T|f-Tr Ba. Thus <TT ||-Tr A xBx. Conversely, let^1^_1 j|/ AxBx. Then for some

107
and SOme al)<*

cMl/ Ba. Let(T=(1T0,...,1Ti(^)_1 QED

and observe fT -Tr^ and ^|l/Tr Ba. Thus TT/(/Tr AxBx. The immediate Corollary is

Corollary 1. I is strongly complete with respect to the class of trees. In Chapter 1, we were interested in showing completeness for the class of finite trees. By the underivability of
TIAX(AXHAX), this fails in the first-order case. Thus there

is no reason for using strictly increasing sequences in defining K^r and one may relax ii) above to ii1) for i fT...

The advantage of such a weakening is the following Corollary which will be useful in Chapter 3, below. Corollary 2. I is strongly complete with respect to the class of trees possessing no terminal nodes. The Extension Theorem asserts that, in the propositional case, every forcing relation on a subtree of any given tree extends to a forcing relation on the entire tree. The proof given in Chapter 1, Section II, used complete sequences. The underivability of NA x(Ax Ax) tells us immediately that this

approach will fail. Another difficulty arises from the differences in the domains if (Kq, ^q) is a subtree of (K1, ^) and is such that D1 ^ may be no node Theorem 2. Let (KQ, ^Q) be a well-founded subtree of (K1, ^) and suppose are domain functions such that i) for all Kq, is countable; for the greatest oC KQ less than feK-Ko , there

108

ii) for all infinite.

cl^o* f ~-|* implies

p-

is

Then every forcing relation on (K0,^0,Dq) extends to

(K1 ,->! ,D1). Proof: The will-foundedness condition on (KQ,^Q),i.e. that any strictly increasing sequence in (Kq-q) terminates, guarantees that to any (K0^q). Let Kq there is a terminal t^

- Kq and find the maximum 0(6 Kq such that

Then we make ^ behave like t^ . The cardinality conditions imply that can map of D-]^ - DQ0^ is at least as large as onto Dq"^ by mapping elements of Dq ""
an<^ we

to themselves

onto D0t^ - DQ< . (If the latter set is empty, map

D

-Dqd( onto a single element of by f, we can define U-1 by

QC

). If we denote this map

rP II-0 A(ai * * ,an^' ^cK0* (Ml~1

A(^ ,...,a ) 1 n

oL

^"0 A(fa^,....,fan) ^^K^-Kq,

where t^ is as above. A simple induction on the length of A shows that this relation holds for all sentences A. QED

The reader may wish to precisely formulate a more general version of Theorem 2. Since we have no application of such Theorem, we omit such B. a result. a

Complete Sequences Revisited By the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, we may restrict ouselves

to models (K,^,D, \^-) in which

^ is countable. Such a model

has plenty of complete sequences. Formally, a sequence s in K is called complete if

109

^ 8n~sn+1 for a11 n; ii) for every sentence A with parameters from there is an n such that sn ||- A or sn Lemma 1. Given K and that Sq = o(. The proof is a minor variation of the standard proof in set theory and we omit it. Define KC = (KC,^C,DC, \|-c) as follows: i)
K olGK,

there is a complete sequence s such

= KU fs: 8 is a complete sequence over K 3 iff of,(3 e K & eC^/3 or c(eK & ^=s & ^n( d sn)

ii) o( ore/=p= s;

iii) DC<* = D<if

and Dcs =

Dsn; oC If- A;

iv) for atomic A, o(k,

CK

l|-C A iff

v) for atomic A, s |j-CA iff *Jn(sn I/- A). Thus, Kc is just the model obtained from K by the adjunction of its complete sequences. Theorem 3. For any sentence A containing no universal quantifier, any ol K, and any complete sequence s, ( II-c A iff I/- A, and

s ||-c A iff 3n(sn (I- A). Proof: This holds by definition for atomic A. The cases A = B a C, BvC, B O C , t B were treated in the proof of Theorem 1 of Chapter 1, Section I. Let A = VxBx. <^\l- VxBx iff Ba-^ /. ||- Ba. But U |/- Ba iff o( l|-C Ba and thus (f-c VxBx iff
<*

J|- VxBx. Now let

s ||-c VxBx. Then for some a, s |l-c Ba. But then, for some n, s^Ba whence sn ll~ \/xBx. QED

110

Corollary 1. Let the sentence A contain no universal quantifier. Then, if I and C denote the intuitionistic and classical predicate calculi, respectively, i) It- n A iff G |- A; ii) I |- nA iff C |- "A. Proof: i) If I h nA, then C if C |- A, I |/
oi

t*A and so C J- A. Conversely K such that

A, then there is a model K and

1J- 1A. In Kc, oi lt*C lA since "(A has no universal quantifier, , we have

letting s he a complete sequence such that Sq =

s |(-c TA. But forcing at s behaves like classical truth, whence s |JA, a contradiction. ii) Either repeat the argument or note that -|A Sin(iA). QED The present proof of Corollary 1 is basically Fitting's

(IX))--

the difference being that Pitting does not explicitly

adjoin the complete sequences to form a new model. Models so obtained have the property that, for every <4, there is a such that implies ^ i.e. every ^ <

lies below some termi-

nal node. By Theorem 3, for sentences with no universal quantifier, we may restrict ourselves to such models. In Gabbay proved

that we can carry out the induction step for the universal quantifier in the proof of Theorem 3 in the presence of the axiom scheme.
~l[Axm

Ax a i

xAx~].

Let MH denote the extension of I by this scheme. Gabbay proved Theorem 4. MH is strongly complete for the class of models in which every node lies below some terminal node.

111

This is proven "by simply observing i) that MH is valid in such models, and ii) that the induction step for the universal quantifier in the proof of Theorem 3 can be carried out in MH. Corollary 1. ( MH is the least extension T of I in which

any of the following hold: i) T ii) T -nA iff G J- A; l A iff C hT A;

A

iii) for A containing only

,A

, T

A iff C \- A.

To see this, observe that i) - iii) hold for MH and that "1 xnlAx /AxAx"] is valid in any such T.

Theorem 3 gives a large class of sentences whose truth at a given node is preserved by the step K >KC. Theorem 4 states carefully what is needed for all sentences to be preserved. Two questions we can ask are i) the extent to which Theorem 3 is best possible and ii) whether or not we can strengthen Corollary 1 to Theorem 3. For the first, define A to be preserved by the operation K > Kc iff for any model K and any o(|h A > o(. ||-c A. (Here, we would be interested in A with free variables, A(x1,...,xn), so that for any choice of parameters a1,...,an, A(a.j f...,an) is preserved. Hence we may take this as defining preservation for A with free variables.) Lemma 2. If A is preserved, then so ism A. Proof: Let o( ||(3 ilA.

K,

Then, for all^aC, there is a

lf-

such that

A. But then Y

A. To conclude that

e( ||-c->nA, we must show that for s -coi, s |j-c A (since then there is a^c s such that Ylh A and s A). But for large n,

112

sn and

A (since otherwise sn s \\-c A.

H-'1

A and

ha).

Then sn

H-c

A QED

Theorem 5. Let A "be a sentence such that both A and iA are preserved. Then, for some B with no universal quantifier, I h -nA 3m B. Proof: Choose B with no universal quantifier such that C \- A = B. Then C V-n A = Case 1. I o(tK, oi ||B. Suppose I 1/-n A ^-i-B.

onB. Then there is a model K such that for some A* ~B. ButnA,TB are preserved, so c( l|C Aa-B. . s ||-cm A aTB, whence

Let s be complete such that Sq = C Y 11A HnB, a contradiction.

Case 2. I \/~nB OliA. Then there is a model K and ,(H-iAAnB. Again, in K, s l(-c -\AaiiB, where Sq = o{.

K such that

QED

Thus, up to a doubly negated equivalence, the formulae with no universal quantifiers are characterized as those which, along with their negations, are preserved under the operation K Kc. In this sense, Theorem 3 is "best possible. If we are only interested in the preservation of A, Theorem 3 is not "best possible and we can improve on part ii) of Corollary 1 to that Theorem. (Observe that part i) uses the preservation of nA and part ii) that of A and nA.) We shall describe
c

a class of formulae which are preserved by the operation K K and for which a weakening of Theorem 3 holds. We must define the notion of a negative entry of a

universal quantifier. First, we define occurrences of subformulae in the obvious manner: A occurs positively in itself; a positive (negative) occurrence of A in B or C is a positive (negative)

113

occurrence of A in B>\C, BvC, /VxB, and VxB; a positive (negative) occurrence of A in B is negative (positive) ocurrence of A in B3C, IB', and, finally a positive (negative) occurrence of A in C is a positive (negative) ocurrence of A in BD C. An occurrence of a formula AxBx in A is said to be an occurrence of the universal quantifier the latter occurrence "being positive or negative as that of AxB. Finally, we say that a quantifier Ax has a negative entry in the formula A if it has a negative occurrence in a subformula of A. Eg. Ax has a negative entry in m/lx(Axvi Ax), because it occurs negatively in the subformula - AX(AX vi Ax). Alternatively, we may define the set of formulae possessing no negative entries of universal quantifiers inductively as follows: i) atomic formulae have no negative entries; ii) if A,B have no negative entries, then AAB, AvB, /\XA, and
\/xA

have no negative entries; and

iii) if A has no occurrences of the universal quantifier and B has no negative entries, then AoB and entries. Theorem 6. For A possessing no negative entries of the universal quantifier and for any d fc K and complete sequence s such that </.-Cs, o \\r AS> oC ll- A, \l~ A > s )|-C A. Proof: By induction on the length of A. The only interesting cases are A A have no negative

= B^C, A xBx.
B"DQ, t>C\\{ c BOO.

Let A = B^C and suppose o( \\some

Then for C, whence

(ill-0 B, ^il/C 0. If 06 K,

pn- B and

^|1/ BOG. Thus ^ is a complete sequence s. B contains no universal

114

quantifier and so, by Theorem 3, there is an n such that

s n

\V- B.

Hence sn |(- C and, by induction hypothesis, s ||-GC, a contradiction. Now suppose e/ll/ B3 C, Then for some P |l/ C. Thus B, $||/c C, whence ^|l/c B3C. l|-C BC?G and, since s^c* ,

Finally, if ol II- BOG, then it follows that s |\-c B3 C.

Now let A = A xBx and suppose ( \ V A xBx, Thus, for some ^-C o< and some bD^ , Q[(/ Bb. If

xBx. K, ^)/- Bb

and by induction hypothesis, ^|\- Bb. Thus ^ is a complete sequence s. Now, for sufficiently large n, sn Bb for all

b & Dsn and thus s '' )|-c Bb for all b^ n Dsn = Ds. Hence there are no ^ oi , b , such that $ f(/ Bb. Hence o( /|- c AxBx. Now suppose we have
\V o( |J/ AXBX.

Then, for some

O( , bD^,

Bb. Then

Bb and o(/(/ AxBx.

Again c( l|- AxBx trivially implies s 11C AxBx. Corollary 1. Let A have no negative entries of the universal quantifier. Then Cj^nA iff I MA.

QED

Proof: By Theorem 6, A is preserved by K >KC. If I |/lA, then there is a K with o^K such that s
o(

||- A. Then

A and QED

l\-c A for any complete s with Sq = o(. . But then C // -i A

Corollary 2. ([nj) Let A be prenex. Then C |- iA iff I I-tA. This follows from the observation that prenex formulae have no negative entries of the universal quantifier. Corollary 1 can be generalized directly to Corollary 3. Let Pbe a set of sentences having no negative entries of the universal quantifier and let A also have no negative entry. Then -A follows from T intuitionistically iff it follows from

115

classically. We may prove this in two ways. The first is to note that

+ A is preserved by K > Kc. For the second, we can reduce this ,...,Bfc I- i A classically
B^ a. . .abk

to Corollary 1. P l-iA classically iff for some

B^ , , . . ,B^.& P

. But this happens iff G

" A,

which holds iff C &-*i(B.j/\... A.B^ A a\ which holds iff

AB-^aA). By Corollary 1, this is equivalent to

.. AB^AA) . Reversing the steps yields the result. Stronger results than Corollaries 1 and 3 are known. For

instance, there is the following result of Mints and Orevkov (B s l ) (on which Theorem 6 was modelled) which we state without proof: Proposition 1. Let A have no negative occurrences of the universal quantifier. Then C |r~*A iff I t-*iA. For improvements on this, see 1 el and E.20 "J . C. Models with Constant Domains A qms (K, D) was defined to be a pms (K, together

with a domin function D associating a non-empty domain with each node of K. In studying the propositional calculus, we observed that the geometric form of a pms was an important factor to deal with.

With qms's, the domain function is another parameter. The simplest type of domain function is a constant function, i.e., for all ol , (5 K, DoC= vf* . First, observe that the restriction to models with constant domains is a genuine restriction: lemma
3.

Let x no occur free in B. Then AX(AX V B)" O

AxAvB

is

valid in a qms (K, Proof: Let

D) iff the function D is constant. be a forcing relation on a qms in which D

116

is constant. Suppose

A x(Ax v
axa,B.
Since

B)O

AXAVB.

Then for some Ac for some

(? \ I A x(AxVB),
and

AxA,

yiw

cG B Y .

But DY = D ^ , whence ^

Ac. But

<?/J/ B and

we have (ill/ AcvB, contradicting the fact that Conversely, let (K, Define |\- by:

If-Ax(AxvB).

D) be given and let aCD"^ - D^q.

^ |V- Ac for all |J, C"D|3, c^a. Observe that *0 li- a x(Axv B) since, for any^ ^o'
we

^ave

^ ||- Ac for all c^D^ unless aB^, in which case fyf- B. But <<0 H/

A xA v B

since c/0 I^AXA, o^q |J/ B.

QED

let CD, the so-called Logic of Constant Domains, be obtained by adding to I the scheme AX(AXV B)"3 AXA VB. By Lemma 3, CD is valid in a qms iff the qms has a constant domain function. In M . Gornemann proved the following (See also Proposition 2. CD is strongly complete for the class of models with constant domain functions. In discussing models with complete sequences, we not only presented Gabbay's axiomatization, but also discussed some classes of sentences for which these models were complete. In the present case, we have the following result of Pitting Pro-position 3. Let A have no universal quantifier. Then A iff A

is valid in the class of models with constant domain functions. Corollary. Let P be a set of sentences with no universal quantifiers and let A have no universal quantifier. Then f% A iff f l= A (relative to the class of models with constant domain functions). Proposition 2 can be proven by a modification of the

117

proof of the Completeness Theorem. Fitting proved Proposition 3 by modifying a proof of the Weak Completeness Theorem ( |- A The Corollary follows from Proposition 3 "by Compactness. (Either use Proposition 2 to obtain Compactness for these models or use the method of Section I-B and the fact that Kripke models with constant domains can be described in the first-order language of the classical theory of such models.) Another result of the form of Proposition 3 can be found in As commented above, qms's have the domain function as an additional parameter. Fixing this parameter to be a constant, a qms looks more like a pms and we might expect to prove analogues for CD of results on the propositional calculus. For instance, the major obstacle to applying the Minimization technique (Chapter 1, Section II C) to first-order logic is that nodes cannot be identified if they do not have the same domains. One can get around this by defining D^ & for all A with parameters from D ol oi ||- A f |/- A; c . A).

The proof of the Minimization Theorem is then straightforward but the Theorem is not as useful. Eg. minimal models of 1C need not be linear. If, however, we assume that domains are constant, the minimal models of LC are linear. The same holds for and all Intermediate logics whose Completeness Theorems were proven by direct minimization. KC requires us to assume MH as well as CD and logics such as KP for which the proof of completeness depends on the FMP cannot be immediately treated. Thus CD is of interest in that it is a minimal extension

118

of I in which we can apply some of the techniques discussed in Chapter 1 to the study of Intermediate Logics. To avoid using CD, one must develop new techniques eg. LC can "be shown to "be complete for the class of linear models by modifying the proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem ( ).

The assumption that domains are kept constant is useful for other purposes as well. In fiO , de Jongh wanted to prove the existence of arithmetical counterexamples to schemata which are not provable in I. He was able to accomplish this for schemata which are not valid in models with constant domains. To obtain a more general, albeit weaker, result, he observed the following: Proposition 4. Let A be a sentence and let Px be a new monadic (P) predicate not occurring in A. Let Av ' be obtained by relativizing the quantifiers of A to P. Then h A iff A^ is valid in the class of models with constant domains. Keeping in mind that the purpose of P is to single out a sub-domain of each node thus yielding a new model without constant domains the reader can easily prove this for himself. Dk Herbrand Theorems In Sections A and B, we were concerned with extending results proved for the propositional calculus to the predicate calculus. We also touched on this in Section C. We wish now to discuss a more direct relation between the propositional and predicate calculi namely the existence of analogs to the Herbrand Theorem. The first variant we wish to discuss is an Herbrand

119

Theorem for prenex formulae ( [ 2 2 1). Lemma 4. Let A have only x1,..,xn,x free. Then V- VxA(x1 ,... xnx) implies |- Ax^...x A(x^,...,xn,z)where z is either a constant

of A or one of the variables x^,...,x . If A contains only x free and no constants, then I- VxAx implies 1-AxAx. Proof: If where a^,...,a VxA(x^ ,...,xnx), then \r VxA(a.,,...,an,x)

are new constants. Let L be the language whose and the constants occurring in

only constants are a^,...,a

A(x^,...,xn,x). By Corollary 2 Theorem 4 in Section I, above, A(a^,...,a ,a) for some constant a of L. Then

hAxv..xnA(x^,...,xn,z), where z is x^ if a is a^ and a otherwise. If A has only x free, use the language L with C-^ = fa ^ . QED To state the Herbrand Theorem, let Pp denote the propositional calculus and Pd the predicate calculus. Theorem 7. Let Q-]xi QnxnA *>e prenex, A possessing no quantifiers and only the variables listed. Let Q. ,...,Q. be the universal 11 xm quantifiers in the prefix. Then Pd |- Q^x^...QnxnA iff V* A' for some A' obtained from A by i) replacing the variables x. ,...,x. 1 m by distinct new constants a^,...,a , respectively, and ii) choosing for each existentially quantified variable a constant from this list or from the constants of A to replace it in A. Proof: By induction on the number of quantifiers in the prefix. If we have
A

xAx or \- VxAx, then, by Lemma 4, Pp

Aa.

Suppose we have proven that

Pd

^ Qk+1xk+1'* *QnxnAk+1^xk+1xn) ^^P h Ai+i

120

where Afc+1 may have constants but no additional variables. There are two cases to consider. Case 1. rAx^. I.e. we are considering *QnxnAx^xk,xk+1'* * *,xn^ *
Then

QkxkQk+1xk+1* * Let Ak+1

Ak(ak'xk+1'*x ^ * n

Pd \r Qkxk.. and by hypothesis,

Pd

...)

Pd V- Qk + i x k+i *QnxnAk+1 ^ak'' * * ^'

^ Qk+1xk+1 * * ,QnxnAk+1 Case 2.

Pp V- Afc+1(afc)'. By Lemma 4, we can assume A^-j =

Ajc(a,x^ ^ ,...,xn) where a is some constant occurring in

Ak^xk'' *

* ,xn^ * ne

now rePea^s

"kke argument of Case 1.

QED

Corollary.

The decision problem for prenex formulae of the

intuitionistic predicate calculus is solvable. In jj4*3 Kreisel also proves an Herbrand Theorem for negations of prenex formulae by using Corollary 2 to Theorem 6 in Section B, above. He mentions that one also has an Herbrand Theorem for disjunctions and conjunctions of prenex formulae and suggests that such a Theorem be proven for implications of prenex formulae. This is carried out by Mints in bil- Using Kripke models, we can easily prove the following special case: Theorem 8. Let A,B be quantifier free. For convenience, we assume that A,B have no constants and only the variables to be indicated. Then Pd l"Axr..xmA(x1,...,xm)Z>/\ y1.. .ynB(y1 ,...,yn) iff ^">2? A(a<r1,...,a maps from ,... into B(a1 ,...,an) where eT ranges over all {1 nj.

Proof: Let

,...,an be constants and consider

121

B(a1,...,an) and all instances A(a^1,...,a^ ). If the indicated implications is no provable in the propositional calculus, then there is a propositional model (K,^,\l-) with origin ^0
if" >' ' * a

such that

0-JJI ) ^or

a H

o We shall extend

("|

to a quantificational model "by setting

u = fa.,,...,a? for all o(.6 K and, for atomic P(a. ,...,a. ) X1 xk occurring in A or B, we let oUl-' P(a. a. )<-<||-P(a ,...,a. ) (*) X1 xk X1 k (Observe that, in (K,^,|^), P(a. ,...,a. ) is a propositional X1 ^ variable indexed by a. ,...,a. . In (K,^,D,If-'), P is a relational X1 k symbol). One easily sees that (*) holds for all applicable formulae, whence ^0 N~"' cr 1 ) f o r a l l q jj/1 (a.j ,...,a^), whence <^0l(-Axi *xmA <^0^^y1 * * ,ynB*
QEI)

Again, one has the decidebility of such formulae as an immediate Corollary. One also has as a Corollary the fact that, if \4 A for A as in Theorems 7 or 8, then A can be falsified in a model with a constant domain function. E. Normal Models There are two standard topics that ought to be discussed for the benefit of the Chapters that follow. The first of these is equality. Let K = (K,^,D,|H) he a model and suppose we have a relational symbol for equality which is interpreted by actual i d e n t i t y .( S u c h m o d e l s are called N o r m a l m o d e l s . )T h e n ,f o r any o^.

122

and a,b6B^, we have of \\- a=b if a and b are identical and o(\W a=b if not. Thus o(Q ||-Axy(x=y vix=y). Since equality is not always decidable (Eg. the equality of the reals satisfies
/\XT Ay(x=yv"*x=y) intuitionistically.), it follows that we cannot

always assume that equality in Kripke models is given by actual identity. Equality is, thus, generally treated as a binary relation satisfying certain additional axioms. If equality is deciddable, however, we can assume that equality is given by actual identity. Theorem 9. (Normal Models Theorem). Let T be an extension of I with a decidable equality. Then T is strongly complete for the class of its mormal models. Proof: let K be a model of T. We shall construct a new model K1 equivalent to K in which equality is identity. For this, observe that, for each , the relation of equality is an
\J

equivalence xelation which we can extend to one on xy "3<>i(x,y6 D & ck |\- x=y).

ct

by

Let x} = (yi x^yif be the equivalence class of x. Let K^=K,^=^, and define by
= f[x~]

: x

DoC$ .

(Observe that the decidability of equality guarantees the monotonicity of this function.) Finally, define ||~1 on atomic A by c( ||-1 A ( f a ] , . . . , f a J ) 1 n u |J- A ( b 1 , b ) n

for some sequence b^,....,bn^ Di such that b^a^. Observe that this latter relation extends to all A. QED

123

F.

Function Symbols A second standard topic is the addition of function

symbols. Syntactic arguments show that function symbols can be added without any syntactic difficulties. But they do not show that semantic defficulties do no arise because they do no distinguish the differing semantic interpretations of function symbols. Thus, we must give a semantic proof that we can conservatively add function symbols. let f be an n-ary function symbol. It is interpreted in a model K = (K,^,D,l|-) hy a partially ordered set of functions such that, if aj ,... ,a g Do( andc ,then f ^(a^ ,...,an)

is identical to f g(a^,...an). let us use = to denote identity and flJto denote the relation of equality. We define o( \\- f(a1,...,an)a- ^ b(f u (a1 ,....,an)=b &o(j|- b *a), and similarly for occurrences of f in other atomic relations. If we do not have a decidable equality, we may have, at a node , non-identical elements which are equal. Thus both with

respect to equality and identity, our functions are functions. The syntactic proofs of eleminability of function symbols do not

take both of these into consideration. (Of course, we could only be interested in our functions behaving like functions with respect to equality but, for the sake of Chapter 3, below, it is more convenient for us to have them behave like functions with respect to identity.) Theorem 10. There is a natural way to associate to any model K of the axioms, Ax-| xn \/yR(xi

124

^ x^ . . 2 (x^,.,x^,y)yyR(x.j,..,,x^,z)O y ss z f a model K with a function f satisfying ^\x.j (^-| ^ , . . . , x ^ ) )

The converse also holds. We only comment on the proof. The existence of such functions locally, i.e. of functions , is guaranteed, by the

Axiom of Choice. The compatibility requirement, that f^ is the restriction of f^ to D( for

f , is most easily guaranteed by

assuming that K is a tree and defining f^ inductively on the length of the finite sequence ei. The converse is quite trivial. One can easily see that, if equality is decidable, without changing the proof, we can drop the single-valuedness axiom on R and still justify the use of Skolem functions. If equality is decidable, Theorem 10 can be proven by normalizing the model, appealing to the theorem in the classical case to obtain a function f(o< fx^,...,x ) and defining f(a^,...,an) to be f(o( ,a^,...,an) for any

oi

such that a^ ,... ,an^ D < . Finally, one

has the alternative of proving Completeness directly for the theories with function symbols. G. Pinal Comment There are still several topics on the Kripke models for the quantificational theory that could be pursued but we have already presented more than the minimal amount of material

necessary for several interesting applications. Thus, we will, in the following Chapter, apply these results to a study of the Decision Problem for formalized intuitionistic theories. In the

125

Fourth Chapter, we apply the results of the First and of the present Chapter to Heyting's Arithmetic. Before proceeding to the applications, we may refer the reader to several further papers and results. The proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem forms a useful technique for proving theorems.
We

mentioned above that Completeness Theorems for 1C

and CD can be given by modifying the proof of the Completeness Theorem. Further results obtainable in this way are the Interpolation Theorem, Robinson's Joint Consistency Theorem, and Beth's Definability Theorem (See

fs],

r?1.).

Chapter 2. Elementary Intuitionistic Theories

126

I. A.

QUANTIFIER ELIMINATION Introduction The method of elimination of quantifiers, which has long

since proven its use in classical logic, has also been applied to intuitionistic theories i) to demonstrate decidability ( ii) to prove the coincidence of an intuitionistic theory with its classical extension ( [9].

fnl). and

iii), as we will

see below, to establish relations between an intuitionistic theory and its classical extension. The most general of these results is to be obtained from the method of lifshits'quantifier elimination for the intuitionistic theory of decidable equality. Since the details of Lifshits' proof have not been published, and since the proof yields a more general result than that stated in his abstract (^15"]), we include the proof and several corollaries. First, however, we must formulate precisely what we mean by a quantifier elimination. We do not mean a literal elimination of quantifiers to quantifier free formulae, but rather an elimination of quantifiers to a special class of formulae. Specifically, we have a basis set, P, of sentences P^Pg, such that every formula is provably equivalent to a disjunction (1) each R^ being a propositional combination of basic sentences of and each being a conjunction of atomic formulae and

negations of atomic formulae. (Of course, the addition of new propositional constants would allow a literal elemination of

127

quantifiers. But, since this affords us no particular advantage, we omit this step.) Let us say (for those who object to "quantifier free") that any formula of the form (1) is in normal form. Lifshits' method yields the following Theorem 1. let T be an intuitionistic theory with decidable atomic formulae (i.e. T I- A w A for atomic A). Then a. necessary and sufficient condition that every formula be equivalent to a formula in normal form is that every formula of the form
VxKx (Kx a

conjunction of atomic formulae and negations of atomic formulae) have an equivalent normal form. Moreover, if the association of each VxKx with its normal form is effective, then the association of every formula with its normal form is effective. This is a significant generalization of the standard lemma for classical logic (See eg.flO^, p. 50 ) and is, to our knowledge, the first result of this kind for intuitionistic theories. B. Proof of Theorem 1 The theorem will follow from two lemmas. First, we list a few theorems of the intuitionistic propositional and predicate calculi which will be used: AvlAO (AaBVIAACS.(AOB)A ("*A oG)l, AvTA ^ (B^ AA.C v nAAD).cr.( (A 3(B AVI A.A( A OB\= A/\B VA,
Ax (Ax3B)5( VxAxt>B),

(2)
ra (BsD) ) )J

0) )A("1A

,(3) (4 ) (5)

where x has no free occurrences in B.

128

Lemma 1. The set of formulae possessing normal forms includes the atomic formulae and is closed under the application of the propositional connectives. Proof: The proof is by induction on the complexity of a formula. For A atomic or a disjunction, the proof is trivial. Let A be BAC, K^R^, C=\^KIaRJ. then

A-5'<*K <vR K(V/Kl*Rp 1 i

~ ^(K.AKI)A(R^R^), which is in normal form. 1> J 1 J 1 J Let A "be BDC, so that A =,( V V K N R ) o( V V K I A R J ). i i Then A^AVk.aR, ^VVkI/vR') 1 11 J J J ^ (R:> V^KJaRJ)).

(6)

Thus, we must first prove that every formula of the form RD\|(/K^ possesses a normal form. Without loss of generality, we may assume that every R^ is non-vacuous, i.e. there is no disjunct of the form K^. If, in addition, there are no non-vacuous occurrences of the form then the implication is of form

R"^Wr. and is already in normal form. 11 Otherwise, let have a non-vacuous occurrence in R^^K.aR..
J J J

Then
R^KjARj-s-R

(WVVV*;)) (7)

where KJi is
J

if j^i and is absent otherwise,(if there are no

129

the disjunct on the right in (7) is dropped.) By (3), the right hand side of (7) is equivalent to fKiO(RO^R;j)^f,Kl3(R^^ K.ARj)!. Now each of the implications RD WK1 -AR , R O
J J J J

Stf

K.AR. has fewer

J J

non-vacuous occurrences of K's and, "by induction, we may assume each to e possess a normal form. Thus for suitable K', R1, K", R", m' m' n' n' we have
R

= ^KrRd-S"(Ki

by (2), = < NST W i W Kk">a( where K^''=p

R

).

Distributing the K^,f 's yields

( 8 )

for suitable K^, R|. By (6) and (8),

, by (4). But, as above, "iK^S.^K^, for some K. Now, by closure under conjunction and disjunction, /xs (K.aWk* .aR* . v^K') has a 1 J -* * tJ J-fJ normal form. We have thus completed the proof for the case of implication. Finally, for a negation, nB, we use the fact that nB.=,B^P for any contradiction F. QED

Lemma 2. If the set of fromulae possessing normal forms is closed under existencial quantification, then it is closed under universal quantification. Proof: We proceed as in the case of implication. Let be the first non-vacuous occurrence of a K in ^'k^aR-j. Then

130

A=:Ax( VpK./\R.)
J J J

s Ax [V(R.V

K^R.l

=.Ax [(K^(RlVj^ KjAHjJWnK^ $1,^)1, ty (2), We may now iterate the process to get A=./\x(AV(DpR*)) for suitable R.j, where then A.^/^Ax(Dk D R*) S/^CVx^OR*) by (5). Now, by Lemma 1 , D, has anormal form K Kt" . 's. Thus
K" f D

is a conjunction of K^'s and "AK^'s. But

K,' for some -K 9 J

A= /XV(Vx( ^k'(.):r* ) .
The lemma follows immediately; for, if we replace each formula Vx (VVk^ .) by its normal form, we amy apply the procedures of
J -K F J

Lemma 1 to put A in normal form. To complete the proof of the Theorem, notice that Vx(Vj/KiARi)5 ^Vx(KiARi)

QED

~W ( VXK.)AR;L.
Thus if each formula VxKx possesses a normal form we see that every formula possesses a normal form. Further, by the effectiveness of the procedures of Lemmas 1 and 2, if the association of each existential formula with an equivalent normal form is effective, the general association of every formula with a normal form is effective. C. Applications of Theorem 1: Quantifier Eliminations The simplest example of a quantifier elimination is that for the monadic predicate calculus with decidable monadic

131

predicates, P1, P2, ... . A formulaVxKx will be of the form -'PjM), (9)

where the variables x^., x^j, are all distinct from x. Then (9) is equivalent to /^pk(xk)A "Pfc, (xk,)/v\/x( A\Pi(x),A\nP..(x)) . (10)

Now let, for finite sets,1f , 0"', of indices,

Vx(i!fir E i'x'"w'"'VI!)''

be the sentence

The equivalence of (9) and (10) shows that the sentences form a basis set, for a quantifier elemination for the monadic

predicate calculus with decidable manadic predicates. The next example is the theory of a decidable equality and was the quantifier elimination treated originally by Lifshits in [ 1 5 ] . Our basic sentences will be of the form

Vx(x=x),
En:

(n=1),

lx.=x.) (n^2), Just as in the step from {9) to (10) above, we need only look at the formulae Vx(/^x=x1^ix=x-). (11) 1 'J J If one of the variables is distinct from x, we may simply replace all occurrences of x in (11) by x^ and delete the existential quantifier to obtain a normal form. Any conjunct x--x may be d e l e t e d ,u n l e s s( 1 1 ) is of the f o r m Vs:(x=x), i . e . E.,. Thus we need only consider Vx(/^ -> x=xi). Then, eg., Vx(ix=x1 X=^x1=x1 Vx(nx=x1Alx=x2).S.(-ix1=X2^> E^)/\(x1=x2 (12)

\/x 1 .. .xn( A

132

V xhx=x1aix=X2aTx=X5).^(nx1 =x2A-\x2=x^A-\ x1 =x^ OE^)y A (X1=X2aix2=X^ D Ej^hx^x^x^x^E^/j

a (~"ix^ x^ /v x 2 = x 5 e ^ ( x 1 =x 2 ax 2 =x^
In general, (12) is equivalent to a formula

^)
< 1 3)

J where K. ranges over all possible consistent relations of equality

J

and inequality "between the variables x. , and n . is one greater j. j than the number of x. 's distinct under the relations of K..
X J

To give a rigorous proof of the equivalence of (12) and (13), note that K.o[(K.3E
J J N- -J

).=..(12)~] .

Further, K.OiK. for

J J-

i^j, so that K . D(K."D E

). Thus i K^f(13)5(12)-3.

From this, we conclude that VpK^ 3f(13)S(12)"]. But, by choice of K., we have VpK. and, hence, we have proven the
J J J

equivalence of (12) and (13). Now, by Lemma 1, (13) can easily be put in normal form, and we have completed the quantifier elimination for the theory of decidable equality. For our final example, let us consider the monadic predicate calculus with decidable monadic predicates and decidable equality. Our basic sentences will be of the form ^X1 * *xnfi^jlxi=xj *(i J^irP^xi^(i,/jC<r,p^xi)"3 for n^2. Note that, if ff,<T are empty, M3^ ^ is En(n^2); for n=1, we define M^^to be E1 for empty 1T,<T. Otherwise, defined to be M
1 1
:

g- will be

, , as above for the monadic predicate calculus, *ir ><r where ;jtr' (<r') (1 o)^1T (<r). As in the preceeding examples, we may reduce the problem

153

to that of finding a normal form for formulae of the form Vx(^x=x.aA\p.(x)a^ Tk(x)). (14)

This problem is solved as in the case of decidable equality. Eg. VK(->X=X1A-IX=X2AP1 (XVP2(X) ) is equivalent to the (rather long) conjunction:
[x1=x2^1 ( X 1) ^
P

(15)

2 ^ X 1 M f ( 1, 1 ) , ( 1 , 2 ) , ( 2 , 1 )J, f 2,2 j P *

["x1=x2AP1(x1 )A"*P2(x1)^^(l ,1), (2,1 )|,f(1 ,2), (2,2)J^A [X1=X2A"P1(x1 )AP2(X1 )"S M2^1 ^ ,(2,1 )?,f(1 ,1 ), (2,2)^* ... (16)
FNX1=X2A"iP1 (x1 )A'I>1 (x2)AnP2(x1 )A-IP2(X2) ?

,1), (1 ,2), (2,1), (2,2), (3,2)^ . The formula contains 20 conjuncts corresponding to each consistent and complete description of ther relations =, P^, P2 which hold between x^, x2. The proof of the equivalence of (15) with (16) is similar to that for (12) and (13) given above and also proves the equivalence of (14) with its corresponding formula of the form of (16). We omit the proof and the precise description of the corresponding formula for (14) on the grounds that both the description and the proof should, by now, be sufficiently clear to the reader. D. Applications of the Quantifier Elimination The quantifier eleminations given above readily reduce the decision problems of the theories in question to the decision problems for propositional combination of the basic sentences. For the theory of decidable equality, Lifshits asserts that this latter problem can be solved by standard Gentzen techniques. To

M%5,1)?,

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prove this, and to obtain some interesting corollaries, we will reduce this problems to those of corresponding propositional calculi. That is, we will show that a propositional combination of the basic sentences is a theorem of one of the theories in question iff it is derivable by the rules of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, I, from a simple set of axioms. The proof of this will use the Kripke models. For convenience, we will treat only the theory of decidable equality the treatment of the other two theories being sufficiently similar that the reader should have no defficulty in carrying out the proofs. The obvious relations between the En 's are the implications En for n^m and the statement . Thus define a

propositional calculus T with atomic formula A^,A2 ..., and possessing, in addition to the usual axioms of I, the axioms An1>Am for n^m and A^. Form a correspondence between formulae of T and the propositional combinations of the basic sentences by replacing all occurrences of each An in a formula A of T by En to obtain a propositional combination A' of En 's. For convenience in the following pages, let us denote the theory of equality by E the theory of decidable equality being thus denoted by E + x=yVx=y. The classical extension of an intuitionistic theory will be denoted by a superscripted "C!f Thus,eg. EG = (E + x=yvix=y)C is the classical theory of equality. Lemma 3. T V- A iff E + x=yvTx=y A'.

Proof: The implication from left to right is trivial. To prove the converse implication, we show to transform a model

135

(K,^,\l>) of T into a model (K,^QU-1) of E + x=yvix=y in such way that, if ot K, then oCIV- A iff ill-' A' for all A. But the transformation is obvious, let x^,..., x ,.... be a sequence of distinct objects. If *11/ An for any n^2, let D( ol ) =
< Vv-' x^xr IfcMh An but 0(11/ An+1 , set D(c^) = fx1

and xQl ,

and -dh' xi=xi

Finally, if e^|| A^ for all n, set

xjL=xi

D( O = fxj,...,xn,...3 and 0{/f-?

fr

a H

i*

It is easily verified that the model (K,^,D,|j-') so obtained is a model of E + x=yv"x=y. Further, o( II- An iff o( H- En and, by a simple induction,^ II- A iff of I]-' A1. But the lemma follows, for if TA, there is a model such that ||/ A. Thus ll/' A' and E + x=yvix=y j/ A1 . QED

To deduce the decidability of the theory E + x=yv1x=y, we must first prove the decidability of the theory T. To this end, we prove the following Lemma 4. Let A contain A^ only for m^n. Then, T W A iff I Proof: Let A . a( ^ A. ^A.)P A. 1 i 1*i^n 3 be a model of AW
1

Al A. -ok.) and 1 1^i^n 2 define a new forcing relation ||-' on the pms (K,^) by
A i f f m

<*'/"

A m

and

m ^ n .

A simple induction shows that, for any oC and any formula B containing only Am for mn,o<l|- B iff o(If-* B. Hence
O/lU A-A(
1 1 1

A.3A.). Further, if m>n, ej II-1 iA and thus, for

3 1 m

such m, ft

A]nDAj for k^m. Hence

is a

model of T. The QED

Lemma follows immediately. We now have Lifshits1 Theorem:

Theorem 2. The theory E + x=yvTx=y, of decidable equality, is

136

decidable. The proof is immediate. Lemmas 3 and 4 reduce E + x=yvr,x=y to a propositional calculus. We thus expect the corresponding Glivenko Theorem: Theorem 3. Let A be a sentence of E. Then E + x=yvix=y l-fiA iff EC A.

Proof: Trivially, if E + x=yvnx=y 1-nA, then EC |- A. For the converse, let E + x=yvix=y V- A=B', B in the language of T and B1 as described above. Then we have E + x=yvnx=y V-t*AS.-oB' and E +x=yvlx=y V-1~A iff T |-tB. But, by Lemma 4, T K*">B iff A/\ 1 A / l A : , A , I B o r s o m e n 1 1 ^ ^ n ^ o i ^ " ' 'f * Now suppose E + x=yvix=y fnA. Then there is a Kripke /y\ countermodel to A.V././ (A.sAJp^B. By the Finite Model i i i j n j l Property for I, there is a finite countermodel (K,^,||-) for this statement. From this, we immediately deduce the existence of a yyl finite model of jn(A-j A^)a"iB. Lemmas 3 and 4 yield a model (K,^,D, 1^') of E + x=yvix=y +tB' with only finitely many nodes. LetCbe a terminal node in the model. Then the forcing semantics aW is just the classical truth definition. Hence c / forces the axioms of E and thus forces A. But, (K,,D, If-') being a model of nB1, a contradiction. Thus E + x=yvix=y |-11A. QED Corollary. The conclusion of the Theorem holds for arbitrary formulae, A, of E. This follows from the theorem ..xnA x1..,xnnA.

Another immediately corollary of Theorem 3 is the

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decidability of E0. Better decision procedures are known, including the following, which is taken from Ackermann's book
CLL:

Theorem 4. Let A be prenex, with m free variables and n quantifiers, and let k = m+n. Then E A iff A is true in all

classical models ("classical" as opposed to Kripke models) with at most k elements. Proof: Checking the proof of the quantifier elemination, we note that an E^ can arise only if there are already p variables in the formula A. Thus E^ |-Ax., 1 ..,xm AB.B, 'B a propositional combination of If E^ 's for p ^ k. A, then E + x=yv*1x=y 1/nA and, by the proof of +~>A. But then
n

Lemma 4, there is a model of E + x=yv1x=y +nE E

0

+ "lA is consistent, since otherwise E |-t(nEjc+1 atA) QED

and so E + x=yv"*x=y |-t(-iE^+^/\tA) a contradiction.

For our final application, define the theory En to be E + En + "1En+i EooWill be E + E^ + Eg + ... Theorem 5 Let 1^n^ C coincides with En.
0

. En + x=yv">x=y

is complete, decidable and

Proof: Por each m, either Em or -iEis a theorem of En + x=yvTx=y. Hence every propositional combination of Em 's is decided by the theory and it is thus complete. Decidability is obvious and En + x=yvix=y coincides with E0 n since it is contained within the latter theory and is complete. QED As stated above, results analogous to Theorems 2 and 3 hold for the theories of decidable monadic predicates and decidable monadic predicates with equality. These are obtained by

138

proving the analogs of Lemmas 3 and 4 for these theories. The proofs for the decidable monadic predicates are extremely easy the proofs for the other theory are more complicated, but still within the grasp of the average reader and are, as mentioned above, omitted. On the basis of three closely related, ''purely logical'1 (i.e. no non-logical axioms) examples, it is, perhaps, pointless to attempt any general statement on the consequences of the quantifier elimination. (For example, even with an analog to Lemma 4> we could no deduce the Glivenko Theorem without further argument, since the propositional calculus corresponding to the classical extension of the theory in question might involve additional non-logical axioms i.e. we may have to add more than A A to obtain the classical theory). We can note that, for the

examples above, in the propositional calculus of basic sentences, any finite set of basic sentences has only finitely margr basic sentences as consequences and that the negations of all nonconsequences can be added consistently. In these examples, this can be made to account for Lemma 4, the finite Model Property for the theory, and, hence, Theorem 4. Whether or not this observation is useful must be determined by an examination of further quantifier eliminations. The examples mentioned in Section II below are not particularly useful for this purpose better candidates arise by attemting to eliminate quantifiers for this sort of theory with an additional decidable predicate (except, of course, ACF and RCF see CO). For the specific theories dealt with above (decidable

139

equality, monadic predicate calculus with decidable predicates, and decidable equality), alternate proofs of decidability may be found in TO. The method used there is to describe the models of the theories in Rabin's decidable second order theory of two successors ([2-0).

II. A.

COINCIDENCE WITH A CLASSICAL THEORY: CRITERIA Quantifier Elimination There are more than three examples of intuitionistic

theories which admit an elimination of quantifiers. Most of them, however are shown by their quantifier eliminations to be complete. Hence they coincide with their classical extensions. Further, in these eliminations, all formulae actually reduce to quantifiertree formulae, and, thus, much of the difficult work in Lifshits' elimination is avoided eg. closure under implication becomes trivial (because one is dealing with decidable formulae). Finally, the quantifier eliminations for these theories are (except in length) almost identical to those for their classical extensions. It is thus desirable to have a method of of proving the coincidence without carrying out the quantifier elimination, so that, when we want to eliminate quantifiers, we may shorten the proof by using the Law of the Excluded Middle as a derived rule (i.e. we may use the elimination for the classical theory). This will be done (in section B) below first, however, we will list some examples of these theories: 1. The theory, En + x=yv"x=y, of decidable equality on

140

a domain of exactly n elements (1^n^o). (See Theorem 5, section I, above). 2. The theory, SA, of successor arithmetic ([171). This theory has equality, a zero, 0, and a successor function, Its axioms are: ~iO=x'. 1x=x x1 =y' => x=y, ~j x=0 d Vy(x=y"), and finally, either decidable equality, or, equivalently, the induction scheme: A0AAX(AX OAX') /\xAx. 3. The theory, SOA, of successor and order arithmetic. For this theory, add to SA, an order relation with the following axioms: ix<x, x<ly/\y<Tz ^>x<z, x<yvx=yvy<x, 0<x', x<y x<yvx=y.
1

4. The theory, OR, of the order of the rationals. Here we have equality and order as primitive relations and the following axioms: ix<x, x<yAy <z 3 x < z , x<yvx=yvycx, x<y 1 Vz(x<z<ry),

Vy(x<y),
Vy(y<x).

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5. The theory, ACF, of algebraically closed fields with decidable equality and order. See D>1. 6. The theory, ROF, of real closed fields with decidable equality and order. See f9l. For more examples of such theories, see eg. [l0~] , Chapter IV. B. A Coincidence Criterion Before presenting our criterion, we must prove a Lemma. Lemma. Suppose a model K = (K,^,D,||-) is obtained by associating
o(

with each

in K a classical model

and forcing at

all atomic M p is an

formulae true in

. Suppose further that,

elementary extension of M* . Then, for any A whose parameters are from , ol ||- A iff |= A.

Proof: By induction on the complexity of A. The only non-trivial cases are A = B^C,AxBx. We prove the first: <?( ||- B OC iff for all^ iff for all^ iff for all iff BOC. ^|l- B implies C

|= B implies M^|= C M p h BOC QED

We may now prove the following G Theorem 1. Let T be an intuitionistic theory and T its classical i c extension. Let ^ be a set of prenex axioms for T and suppose the following are satisfied: ri i) T is model complete, ii) T iii) T AvlA for all atomic A, A for all A in

142

Then T and T^ coincide. Proof: Define a model of to be D(< ) and letting for o( in K "by taking the domain \p A iff ot \\- A for atomic A. Let

Q^...QnA be prenex. By the Lemma, we need only show oI \\- Q . . Q A implies v n \= Q ^ . ^ A .

We give an example and leave the details of the general case to the reader: o( If- VxAy/tzVwAxyzw ^ B a ^ ^ P ^ V b p V ' V ^P ^ C p y ^ d ^ ^ l f - Aabcd Aabcd ^ ^ aDo<VbW
a ( t / b c d ^ ^ l X ' D o < V D ^ 3 I ) 0 ( Aabod

j= Aabcd QED

l=Vx AyA z VwAxyzw.

It is now an easy matter to prove the coincidence of the theories listed above with their classical extensions. As an example, the classical extension of OR, the classical theory of dense linear order, is well known to be a model complete (see [:o] .). Decidability of atomic formulae in OR follows easily from trichotomy: x<yvx=yvy^x. Finally, the only prenex axiom of dense linear order needing proof in OR isVz( x^y x<rz<y). But

this follows easily from x<y ~D Vz(x<z<y) and the decidability of order. Thus OR coincides with the classical theory of dense linear order. C. Another Criterion The above criterion is fairly useful: i) it applies to many theories; ii) it saves us the work of carrying out two quantifier eliminations; and iii) it sometimes allows us, if we are only interested in the coincidence of the intuitionictic and

143

classical theories, to avoid a quantifier elimination entirely. (This is an advantage since it is often easier to prove model completeness than to carry out an elimination of quantifiers.) We now wish to present a criterion whose usefulness is not as great, "but which is of interest in its own right. It is due, essentially, to Lifshits and is extracted from his paper, Cl6'3 , in which he models various classical theories in the constructive theory of algorithms. The following scheme is known as Markov's Principle, or the Principle of Constructive Choice, and will appear again in Chapter 4: Axx^. .,xn(Av"lA)~D AXl.. VxAx^ VxAx).

Theorem 2. Let T he an intuitionistic theory with classical n extension T . Let T' be obtained from T by adding the decidability of atomic formulae, Markov's Principle, and the scheme Ax1. ..xn("iTA^ A)^> A x1. ..xn(Av*iA), 0 for A containing no universal quantifier. Then T = T'. Proof: First let A* be obtained from a formula A by replacing every occurrence of a universal quantifier,/\x, by "vX/x"1 One then prove by induction, that both T' T' |- A3 A*. AvHA and QED

Before we present the Lifshits criterion, we need the notion of positive and negative occurrences of the universal quantifier. First, we define occurrences of subformulae in the obvious manner: A occurs positively in itself; a positive (negative) occurrence of A in B or C is a positive (negative) occurrence of A in ByC,VxB, andAxB; a positive (negative)

144

occurrence of A in Bjs a negative (positive) occurrence of A in BOC, nB; and finally, a positive (negative) occurrence of A in C is a positive (negative) occurrence in B^C. An occurrence of a formulaAxB in A is said to be an occurrence of the universal quantifier the latter occurrence being positive or negative as that ofAxB. We will use the following theorem of Mints and Orevkov: Proposition. Let A be a formula of the predicate calculus containing no negative occurrences of the universal quantifier. Then^A is a theorem of the classical predicate calculus iff it is a theorem of the intuitionistic predicate calculus. For a proof, see . Stronger results may be found in

[ 1 3 1 and[ 2 0 l . We shall need Lifshits' observation ( p6"3) that the Mints-Orevkov proof goes through for the predicate calculus with equality. Using this fact, we may present the Lifshits criterion: Theorem 5 Let T be an intuitionistic theory. If T q admits an

elimination of quantifiers (in the strong sense that every formula is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula) and if T has a set of axioms containing no negative occurrences of the universal quantifier, then T
ft

is obtained by adding to T the decidability

of atomic formulae and Markov's Principle. Proof: We need only derive the scheme, A x^..,xn(-nAO A)^> Ax1.. .xn(Av~A), for A with no universal quantifier. This will be proven by induction on the complexity of A.

145

As induction hypothesis, assume Axx^...x (BxV'Bx), B containing no universal quantifiers. Then, to prove Ax1...xn(mVXBX"3 \/XBX)"!5 A X^.. xn(V xBx v^VxBx), we will show.VxBxviVxBx. Let C "be quantifier-free and such that T VxBx = C. Let D be a conjunction of finitely many axioms of T such that D D~V(^xBx =C) is a theorem of the classical predicate calculus (with identity if T has an equality relation). By the tautology, (p^T q)=--\(pAq), d a(V xBx = c)3 is a theorem of the

classical predicate calculus (possibly with identity). But Da"i( VxBx ZC) contains no negative occurrences of the universal quantifier, and its negation is thus a theorem of the intuitionistic predicate calculus (possibly with identity). Now, observe that n(p<vq)^ (p^nq) is a theorem of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, and that, therefore, D DT( VxBx= C) is intuitionistically provable. Thus

T
whence,

( VxBxr C),

T Yn V x B x ^ . T ' C . But, by Markov's Principle,TlVxBx of C,-PC.= C, whence T Thus T \/xBx E C . v"11/xBx. QED xBx, and, by decidability

)r V xBx

As stated above, this criterion does not seem to be as useful as that of Theorem 1 mainly because of the presence of Markov's Principle, which, in general, should not be any easiier

146

to verify than the Law of the Excluded Meddle. Nonetheless, if one is interested in logic with Markov's Principle, then Lifshits' criterion ought to prove useful. D. Almost Coincidence In Section B, above we showed that, if an intuitionistic theory has the same prenex axioms as its classical extension and that, if the classical extension is model complete, then the addition to the intuitionistic theory of the decidability of atomic formulae yields the classical extension. In this Section, we attempt to clarify somewhat the close connection of the relation between an intuitionistic theory and its classical extension with the model completeness of the classical extension. More precisely, we prove the equivalence of the following assertions (for certain intuitionistic theories T): 1. The Law of the Excluded Middle is derivable in T from a set of axioms of bounded nested (alternating) quantifier complexity (blocks of like quantifiers being counted as only one quantifier); Q 2. The classical extension, T , satisfies a generalized model completeness property. First we need a few definitions. A formula A will be called a k-formula if it has nested quantifier complexity at most k. A (classical) model M' extending a (classical) model M is a k-extension, M-^M*, iff for any k-formula A with parameters from M we have M f= A iff M' |= A. A classical theory T is k-model complete iff, for any models M, M1 of T, if M-^M1 , then M^Mf, i.e. M1 extends M elementarily. Finally, T is finitely model

147

complete iff T is k-model complete for some k. Remarks: i)let T' result from T by adding atomic formulae PAx.|...xn and axioms pAx^..,xn^ Ax1 .. .xn, for all k-formulae A. Then T is k-model complete iff T' is model complete. ii) T is k-model complete iff, for any model H of I, T extended by the k-diagram of M (the set of k-sentences with parameters from M which are true in M) is complete. By i) and the Chang-Zos-Suszko Theorem, if T is k-model complete, T1 has an va axiomatization, and hence T has an axiomatization by a set of axioms of bounded complexity. Thus, to obtain a suitable equivalence (as mentioned above), we shall assume we are dealing with theories whose axioms are so bounded. This convention will also apply to intuitionistic theories. Lemma 2. Let T be an intuitionistic theory with classical 0 n extension T with the same proper axioms. If T is k-model complete, then it is an extension of T by a set of k+1-formulae (which may be taken to be the universal closures of instances of the Law of the Excluded Middle). Proof: Add to T, as axioms, the universal closures of the Law of the Excluded Middle for k-formulae. Let K be a Kripke model of the resultingtheory and let o( Q K. By induction on the length of a formula A if A is a k-formula, Thus |= A iffof ||- A (M^ is defined as in Section B.).
T

andc/^f^ implies

<( k M^. But then

M.*^ M|j and K is a model of T^. QED ^ Let T, TG be given, with axioms of complexity at most Lemma 3. 0 m. Suppose T is an extension of T by the addition of n-formulae.

148

n Then T is k-model complete for any k^max(m,n). Proof: Let T^ fail to be k-model complete and find M, M1 such that M^^M' but M-^M'. Define a Kripke model K by placing M' above M: M'

I
M. and , with the domain of being

That is, we have nodes

that of M and the domain of ^ being that of M'. Further, for atomic A, define ct 1|- A iff M ^ A, ^ If- A iff M1 |= A. By induction on the length of a formula A, if A is a k-formula, U \|- A iff M \= A,
( J 1 | - A iff M |= A.

Now the axioms yielding T

are k-formulae which are

true in M. Hence K is a model of T^ and o( forces every instance of the Law of the Excluded Middle. Now,, choose A to be of minimal length such that M1 )= A but M & A. A simple argument shows A to be of the form VScBx. Further, by minimality of A, M' J="TBa for all a D^ , and consequently o(\[-iBa for all aDo* . Thuso( [1/ VxBx and, since f>\|- VxBx, oL U/-aVxBx. Hence c* fact that K is a model of T^. Lemmas 2 and 3 immediately yield the following Theorem 4. TC is an extension of T by axioms of bounded complexity VxBx vl VxBx, contradicting the QED

149

iff T

is finitely model complete. Theorem 4 may be restated as

Theorem 4?. From T, every instance of the Law of the Excluded Middle can "be derived from a "bounded set of instances iff T is finitely model complete. For example, no subsystem of Peano's arithmetic is finitely model complete. Thus, if T is a bounded subsystem of Heyting's arithmetic, the corresponding classical arithmetic, n T , is an unbounded extension of T. For systems T with an unbounded set of axioms, Theorems 0 4 and 4' yield no information on the relation between T and T . (The reader may construct a simple counterexample in this case). For the special case of arithmetic, the extension is unbounded,
Q

as we will show elsewhere.

III. A.

UNDECIDABILITY Introduction Among the byproducts of the theorems of Sections I and

II are decision procedures for the theories encountered therein. Since the proofs of these theorems depended on the decidability of atomic formulae, and, since other of the corollaries fail for the corresponding theories in which the decidability condition is dropped (eg. the obvious failure of the Glivenko Theorem (Theorem
3,

Section I) for the monadic predicate calculus) we are

led to expect that some of these corresponding theories may also be undecldable. Our expectations receive additional support when we

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reflect on the expressiveness of the intuitionistic language. The sentence iV\x(Pxvipx) asserts, in a way, the existence of infinitely many elements more correctly, it asserts the essential nonfiniteness of the universe. Nothing comparable to this can "be expresed in either the classical monadic predicate calculus or (by the Glivenko Theorem) the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus with decidable monadic predicates. Our expectations are first fulfilled by the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus. Kripke announced in l 1*3 (and proved in the unpublished j2H ) the undecidability of the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus on two monadic predicates. This result was sharpened by Maslov, Mints, and Orevkov ( Del), who proved the undecidability of the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus on one monadic predicate. Later, lifshits ([^53) used the Maslov, Mints, Orevkov result to prove the undecidability of the intuitionistic theories of equality and normal equality. The original proofs of the Maslov, Mints, Orevkov Theorem and Lifshits1 Theorems are syntactic and rather involved. We therefore omit them in favor of simple model-theoretic proofs. In Section B we present G-abbay's proof of the Maslov, Mints, Orevkov Theorem. Sections C and D contain alternate proofs (and minor strengthenings) of Lifshits'results. Sections E through G contain several other undecidability results (some of which were announced in our abstract & 6 ] ) . B. The Monadic Predicate Calculus Kripke proved the undecidability of the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus on two monadic predicate letters by

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reducing to it. the decision problem for the classical predicate calculus with a single binary relation. Gabbay's proof (W). both a refinement and a simplification of Kripke's proof, uses the classical theory of a symmetric, reflexive binary relation (proven undecidable by Rogers, [22]). Naturally such a reduction of a classical theory to an intuitionistic theory cannot be obtained by the usual method of interpretation (See 23,f27] for this method. ), but will require the use of a reduction class

i.e. a special class of formulae to which the decision problem of the classical theory may be reduced and another class of formulae of the intuitionistic theory which is closely related to the reduction class. We will use, as our reduction class, the class of negations of sentences of the form,

where Q^,...,Q

are quantifiers. To see that these negations

constitute a reduction class, we need only notice that the matrix of the sentence (1) is obtained from the equivalent conjunctive normal form, /ft ^iyi^iRUj v.1 .

We may motivate the choice of reduction class briefly as follows: If ||- (1), then f= (1), where is defined as

in Section II - B. From this, it follows that a negation of a formula of the form (1) is provable intuitionistically iff it is provable classically. This also follows from a Theorem of Kreisel's (fsl), or the Mints-Orevkov Theorem mentioned in

Section II - C. The present proof, however, extends enough to

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allow us to prove lemma 1 "below. Given a negation, t A, where A is of the form (1), we associate with it the formula A1: QjZ^.. Q n z n /XI
n (Px i APy i )oV^/i(Pu^./\PVj

)v VxPxl -'VxPxv ^x""Px.

(2)

Here, Rxy is to be defined by -iRxy iff n(Px ^Py). The presence of Vx^Px will yield a reflexive relation in lemma 1 below and the presence of VxPx will make the implication,
n(PxiAPyi)'^ W ^(PUjAPVj )v 1/xPx,

behave like a classical implication in lemma 2. To conclude the undecidability of the monadic predicate calculus, we need only prove that 1A is a theorem of the classical theory of a symmetric, reflexive binary relation iff A' is a theorem of the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus on one predicate letter, which theory we will denote by equivalence is given by the following lemma 1. if-iA is theorem of the classical theory of a symmetric, . . Half of this

reflexive binary relation, then A1 is a theorem of

Proof: let (K,^,D,||-) be a model and let o/fK be such that <A\V A1 . We may assume that
v , ^)|- Q z . . Q z X [ ^ " ( P x / v P y ) o ^-( P u ^ / v P v ^ v V x P x T, 1 1. n n/ i i

(3) and that Jj/ VxPx A/xTPx. Define a classical model, M, with a be the domain of M and defining Rxy iff oi[{/ i(PxAPy)).

binary relation R by letting M V= nRxy iff o(|l-"*(Px*Py) (i.e. M

First, we easily see that R is a symmetric, reflexive binary relation on M. Symmetry holds since o< 11/ i(PxAPy) iff

153

o( ll/"i(PyAPx). Reflexivity follows since o( II/\/x "iPx* i.e.

0( |I/-I(PXAPX) for all xf D<^.

To complete the proof of the Lemma, we must show that M t= A. By the same reasoning as in Theorem 1, Section II, (3) yields

...c) z ^&U-^ "i (Px. APy.)o n (Pu ./vPv .)v v4:Px"l . n nj)0(. 1 1 1 J)o< J J J If M\=^nRx^y^, then c{ l|-^-(Px^/Py^), whence lb ^-iCPUjAPv..)vV^Px.
But

qj1 z11

|L/ VxPx, so <* ||- ^-(Pu .APV .). Thus M|=W-iRu.v.. This yields j J } <j <3 <J

f
and so M |p A. lemma 2. If |- A', then
iA

^Rujvp'
QED

is a theorem of the classical theory

of a symmetric, reflexive binary relation. Proof: Let M |= A and define (K,^,I^||-) by: K = fof U f fx,yj : M (= RxyJ ; eC - P iff ot=0 or o(= p;
Do( = the domain of M; and

eI |l- Px iff, for some y,o* = fx,yj. We will show that 0||/ A'. Let 0 lb A'. Since 0 \/xPx v 1/xtPx,

0|^Q1z1...QnznA\CfWPxiAPyi)=> ^^(Pu.aPv^vWxPxI . (4) Prom (4) follows

Q1z1 * *'Qnzn 0 H/ do D0

A\ f^-(PxlAPyi)O ^-"(PU^APV^V VXPX"], (5)

Qz is Vz (A z).

where Q'z is

Vz (^z)

To see why (5) follows from (4), consider the example: 0(V/ /VxVy az[-i(Pxy>Py):>n (PyAPz)vV/wPwX This is equivalent to

154

fl^zDfi2 ^2*^ f'CP^Py)-=- (PyAPz) v VwPw But, for any (32>,

J.

(6)

II- VwPw and so P2-i (Px/%Py) -i(Py^Pz)vV VwPw.

Hence (6) is equivalent to the following: ^xLO^yDO^ ZD0 ^C""1(PxAPy)-D-(PyAPz)vVwPw]. The proof for the general case is similar. But we may now easily complete the proof. First, by (5), 0 does not force one of the conjuncts, i.e. for some ^-0, Pll- ^X^/vPy^, but |5|M ^(PUj/vPv,.)/l/xPx. (7)

Again, if (3^0, (?||- YicPx. Hence we have ^ =0 in (7). But clearly, M J= TRxy iff 0H-1 (PxXPy), so M fc/^-xRx.y. and M|^V(/-iRu .v.. Hence l 1 l I; J U U
z z l 1 ' 3 A n I ) 0 3 x ) M I* M D

?nRujvp "k*1*8 states that QED

i.e. M t="lQ.]

..*Qn z n /VV

M f= -A, a contradiction. Hence Oil/ A'.

Lemmas 1 and 2 immediately yield the Maslov, Mints, Orevkov Theorem: Theorem 1. is undecidable.

If we recall, from Chapter 2, the definitions of MH and CD as the minimal extension of the intuitionistic predicate calculus for which the full Glivenko Theorem holds and the extension complete for Kripke models with constant domains, respectively, we notice that the following has also been proven: Corollary. M1 + MH + CD is hereditarily undecidable. C. The Theory of Equality In fl5l , Lifshits proved the undecidability of the

155

intuitionistic theories, E, of equality and, NE, of normal equality (E + ~px=y:3x=y) by proving the completeness of respect to substitutional validity within these theories. Formally, a formula A of is (substitutional^) valid in a with

theory T iff T (- A1 for each substitution instance A1 of A in the language of T. The completeness theorem states: M1 J- A iff A is valid in T. The completeness theorem yields the undecidability of T: if T is decidable, we may decide a formula A of simultaneously enumerating theorems of by

and refutable formulae

of T until A occurs in the first list or a substitution instance A' of A occurs in the second list. Thus T undecidable. Moreover, T is hereditarily undecidable, since the completeness theorem holds for substitutional validity in each subtheory of T. lifshits' proof, and proofs given below, not only establishes completeness, but yields the substitution instance A' for A uniformly in the theory T, such that I- A iff T f- A',

where, by uniformity of the procedure for obtaining substitution instances, we mean that there is a formula Qx in the language of T, containing free only the variable x, such that, for each A, A' is obtained by replacing every occurrence of Px in A by Qx. Thus the proof of the undecidability of T may also be viewed interpretation in T of the undecidable theory as an

. We prefer,

however, to think of the proof in terms of completeness and will return to this point in Section IY below. To obtain the uniform substitution instances, we will look at Kripke models of the theory in question and try to see

156

what degree of freedom we have in assigning properties, given by formulae of the language, to the elements of a model at its various nodes. Evidently, complete freedom in assigning (say) the property given by Qx will yield the substitution instances we are looking for. Such complete freedom is, of course, too much to ho'pe for; but, in many cases we have enough freedom to obtain the desired substitution instances. Models of the theory of equality may be obtained as follows: Given a tree, we simultaneously define the domains of the nodes and equivalence relations on the domains in such a way that, if o/
1

is a succesor of W , the equivalence relation

defined on Do(' is an extension of that defined on D ( . (Note that previously non-equivalent elements of D may be made

equivalent at tJL 1). Now, define VlV- a=b, for a,bDe<., iff a and b are ^equivalent at d*. Verification that the equality axioms are forced is routine and is left to the reader. Now it is evident that we have a great deal of freedom in constructing models of E. We may add as many new elements to the domains at the successor nodes as we wish, or we may identify elements at any node we choose. Combining these two variations, we may, for many elements, choose the nodes beyond which all other elements are comparable to these elements i.e. given a, v/e may choose the c< 1 s such that for all <* , b D f? , @14-a=b or

{3 ||-~a=b. This is done by adding, at a node o( at which we don't QJ want comparability, an element x, not equivalent to a at Thus, a ||/
a = x a

Foro<.to f a i l to f o r c e -i a = x * , we may l e t or 'lh a = ^

for all successors <*' of oC. (Notice that this will require*.to

157

have at least one successor). Let Qx =Ay(x=y vn x=y) and let A' "be obtained by replacing every occurrence of Px in A by Qx, where A is in the language of M.|. We will prove Lifshits'Completeness Theorem: Theorem 2. J- A iff E ( A1.

The immediate corollary is Theorem 3. E is undecidable. Proof of Theorem 2: Let K = of |(-) be a tree model

all of whose paths are infinite i.e. (K,^) is a tree with , on (K,^=) as follows:
&fi l/

no terminal nodes. Define a new model, D 1 = De( U { x f : $ & a D p

Pa 1 .

H- 1 is defined by o( Pa iff ot|| Pa for a <D , and

o( JV--, Pxf iff <y lh Pa for a D , 04*. So defined, = (K,^,D^ ,||-^) is a model of . To see that it is

equivalent to K, we state the following Lemma 3. Let (K,^,D, \)r) and (K^Dyi-') be models of i ) TM D'W , ii) VaDo, e( ||- pa (/(-' Pa, and, such that

iii) VVa'DIol 3^ Vp ** P\l- Pa iff (?//-' Pa'. Then for any formula A with parameters from D( 0(||- A iff ol/)-1 A. Conditions i)-iii) assert, basically, that (K,^,D! ,/A') extends (K,^,D,|l-) by the addition, for many elements a of the original model, of new elements which cannot be distinguished from a by the use of atomic formulae. The conclusion of the Lemma assures us that this does not affect the truth of any formula at

158

a given node. Viewed this way, the Lemma is obvious, and the proof, a routine induction, is omitted. Returning to the proof of Theorem 2, Lemma 3 implies that, for any formula A with parameters from D o(, at II- A iff \\-.j A. We now extend the definition of II-^ to include formulae containing equality. This is done by defining equivalence relations ,at the nodes as follows: At the origin, o^Q, we let every element be equivalent to itself and to nothing else; at a successor oL ' of a node , we extend the equivalence relation

on Lot by setting x^ and a equivalent whenever xf ]).,< ' and cl ct I closing under transitivity, symmetry, and reflexivity. This yields a new forcing relation, |l~2> K2 =
an^ a new

model ,

^) Now, for any formula in the language of A iff d

with parameters from D^e(

^ A. Similarly, if we

define \(-^ to be the restriction of llt-g to formulae A in the language of E with parameters from we haveo(|l-2 A iff from a model of A. , in , Ibj),

is thus used merely as a bridge

to a model of E.
II 2

We must first show that, for all x6D^ ,

qL\I"2

iff

Qx> i.e. <^||-2Ax(PxHQx) . Let x be aD*. Assume first Then in K, cfll- Pa and has no element of the

that o< II-2

form x5 Thus, if y 6 D1 1 case o(. ll-*2

a=y or

, y is. _either an xf, O- (3^( , in which @'

in which

is no"t an xa for any Pa

cas

o/|j-2Ta=y. Since for all^o* ,

ll-g Pa implies

for|3^o<, we see that

, (?ll-2 a=yv-ia=y, i.e. ^ll-2 Ay(a=yv^=y). .

This means d l(-2 Qa. Conversely, if UI/2 Pa, o<II/ Pa and x* D,| But |^2 a=x^v~a=x^, whence Qa Finally, for x of the form

159

d ll-2

Px^f iff ^(|-2 Pa iff &\\-2 Qa iff o/U-g Qxa

as

-*-8

easily

verified.

We may now complete the proof of Theorem 2 quite easily. For all o/tK, V ll~2 Ax(PxS"Qx). It is a theorem of the intuitionistic predicate calculus that
Ax(Px ^Qx)

(A ^A') for sentences A,A1 as

I I g
1 a A E A n d o ^ l l - A iff

in the statement of the Theorem. Thus o( ll-^

we

know that, if

1/ A, there is a model K of the

a( |J/

form described above such that

A in K (See

fill

or Chapter 2 QED

above). Then o(\V3 A' and EJ/ A'.

By Lemma 3, we can extend Theorem 2 as follows: Given K, choose an element af D^g and a sequence of new elements a^,... . Define
D,ol =

D<* U

,... 3 and <*||-' Pan iff ii- Pa and, for x^D** ,

c< t* Px iff o* /J- Px. This defines a model K' = (K,^,D'^If-')

equivalent to K. We now proceed with the construction of KJj , K, and as in the proof of Theorem 2 and notice that ^ is a model of E^ and we conclude |- A iff E^ f A * . E^ is hereditarily undecidable.

for a^j. Thus Theorem 2'. Theorem 3'.

In Section I, we defined the theory En to be E + En +",En+^ , for the sentence En asserting the existence of a least n elements. En, unlike En + x=yv^=y, is not complete. (For a complete theory of equality on a domain of exactly n elements, replace lEn+1 by Axp..
xn+1^i^j

xi=xj)* Equality is decidable in this theory and,

nE -| n+

hence, the theory coincides with En + Decidability of En is open.

+ x=yvx=y).

160

The Theory NE of normal equality is obtained by adding to E the axiom "Vbcsy ^xsy, which holds in the reals (See 5]or Section F, below). In the model but of constructed above, c^H-^i^asx*,

a=x^. Hence K, is not a model of NE. To construct a j a v model, say K^, of NE, we may, at one successor of ( force a=x^ and at another successor force ~ia=x^. To do this, we shall split nodes. We let %r range over the set, T, of finite sequences of 0 's and 1 's 1t 0 ( TT1) denotes the sequence extending adding a 0 (1) at the end. <> denotes the empty sequence. Let K be a tree model and define K* as follows: i) K* = : olK and 1( * )=1(1T ) 1, where 1( *),
of,1T',

ft by

1(Tf ) denote the length of

respectively, when considered as

finite sequences (Recall that (K,^) is a tree and may be thought of as a tree of finite sequences. Recall also that 1(< >)=0 and 1(lTi)= 1(1f)+1; ii) (ot.m^p ,<n iffol^^ and Vis an initial segment of
( r ;

iii) D*( o( ,1T)=D </; and iv) (oS,7f) \h* ^ iff ll- ^ for aD*.

We easily see that K* is obtained from K by going up the tree and splitting successors. Ppr example, let be

identified with ( <^0, <">), of1 a successor of c/Q. Then (^Q,<>) has (c^',0) and (ot'1) as successors* If d." succeeds <',
(o(

",00) and

(el",01) succeed

(oT,0), while (o<",10) and (<*",11) and o(" is split over

succeed (o^',1). Thus oC/ is split over each occurrence of o( '.

161

Lemma 4. For any formula A in the language of f r o m D and f o r any tr, ( ot, 17") ll-* A iff e<||- A.

, with parameters

Proof: By induction on the complexity of A. As usual, the only non-trivial cases are A = B^C,AxBx. We prove the first. o( II- A iff V iff
(3 II-

B -> ft- c B -> QED c

V(p ,<r)^(oC,ir) (

iff (< ,1T) ||-* B P C .

We are now ready to prove Lifshits' theorem for NE: Theorem 4. Let A be a sentence of and let A' be obtained by

replacing every occurrecen of Px in A by Qx (Qx if Ay(x=yv7x=y)). Then M1 }- A iff NE |- A1. Proof: Given K, define K* as above. As in the proof of
1 Theorem 2, we shall add a new element x^ a. ' ' for many a s. To ensure that Ax Ay(nx=y Px=y) is forced, we will define

)IV-2 a=x P'^

iff ( |3 <T ) <(*. ,1T ) and VO is an initial segment of fT. Thus, if ot ' is a successor of oI in K, no extension of ( d' ,m) forces a=x^ ^. Thus ( o i ' , ^ 0 ) 11~2
a = = x n d i* ' ^a % a = x < ) ^ 2 ' a

It will then easily follow that In defining

is a model of NE.

, however, a slight complication arises. > At right

We wish to have (( ,T) |f*2 Qa iff ( cf.,ir)^2 Qxi

( 0 <r1 \

successors a and x^ ?' ^ are no longer identified and we must 8L explicitly treat them alike. Thus, once *7a=x^ * oi
( t IF)
Of

is forced,

we must not only introduce a new x^ ' ', but also a new
x(f
x(

0 , <r)

(whenever Pa is not forced).

162

For the sake of notation and, also, to make the relation between
Y

( x

< r ) and

a more explicit, we inductively define,

for aD*(<?<,1T), the relation x~a by, x ^ ^ ' ^ ^ a and, if y/-a, then Xy^'^l-a, for all applicable ( ^ , V ). We can now define = (K*,^,D^ , ) as follows. First, for ( W ^ > ) , 0

D^Q,^) = D*(^0,^ >)ufx^</0'^>): afD*(^Q,*>) &

( * Q , < > ) I I / * Pa 7 For tX' succeeding o( define ( o^',1Y i) to be D*(o ',1/i)l/ such that

U Bj(oi,fT), together with the set of all x^.** i) yD*(c< SITD & (U 1 ii) y D1(<<
,1?) & 3aD#^ , ^

Pa, or ft'.jjCy-a & (*',7Pi) |J/*Pa).

( cK ,1f) I t * Pa

Finally, for x J?1(< , jf), ( oc,^17^) \H-| Px iff x~a.

where

Now, defining Kg = (K*,^,D^ IJ-g) as described above, it is clear that, if y~a, then C<* >Dr )if-2 Qy iff (oc ,1? ) lh2Qa. The construction yields W-2 ^ )J|-2 ^*
and

arguing as in the proof of Theorem 2, we have the Theorem. QED As above, we may strengthen the result slightly to Theorem 4'. With A, A' as above, A iff NE^I- A'.

Corollary. NE^is hereditarily undecidable. D. Some Extensions of the Theory of Equality From Section I, we know that E + AxQx and E
Ax Qx,

the theories of decidable equality and decidable equality on infinite domains, are decidable. The theory of a strongly undecidable equality, E + Ax -iQx, is however, undecidable. In fact, NE<>0+Ax-iQx is hereditarily undecidable.

163

To force Ax

n Qx,

we need at least one incomparable for

every element a 6D t We can, however, have more than one incomparable at the nodes where we previously had only one. Thus, define Q2 x3. Ayz jx=yv'ix=y v x=zvtz=z v y=z"J, and, for A in the language of occurrences of Px in A by Q2x. Theorem 5. M., f- A iff + >\ x-Ay (x=yvTx=y) A*. , define A* by replacing all

Proof: The idea of the proof is simple in defining K.j as above, we shall add a new element w^ addition to any possible x^.** for each y, in

which may be added. Delaying

equality with y as usual, Ax^x will be forced. By forcing (' ,TT )_ (,TT) whenever y=y^ is forced, we will keep the y cardinality of the incomparables down and will thus force Ay (Q2y-py)It will be easiest to define and|l-^ simultaneously,

statting at the origin (assuming K* to be alredady given), and working our way up the tree: = D*(o/0,<>)ufw^O^>:): aD*(-<0,<>)l
u

fx(-^ : aO*(^0,^>) & (<*Q,< > )H/* pa"?. Also (o^0,<> )IK,Pw^otO'^>\ Pa iff ( o^0,C IV-* Pa (Notice that (o^Q,<\f/1 ), and for all x6 D1( ,

^0'<> ^ "~1 x=x* For oJ ' succeeding <4, define

^ i )to be

D*(oi,'n'i)uI)i(et^') together with the set of all w^ ^ such that

yv*(tf

'

i)V D., ( o( , 1T), and the set of all

( oi ' iTi) xA.^ ' satisfying conditions analogous to those in the proof

164

of Theorem 4, above. Define (e^',1Ti) ||--|

iff ( o*-'flr i)II-* 3?a>

where ya. (We assume the relation'"has been extended to include the w-terms.). Extend the definition of |l-^ for equality on to D^tf'.fTi) by (o^'.UO) |1-1 x ^)=y. Also, close

under reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and the rule: (0*',1l'i)M-1y=y1 implies ( L 1,1ri)IKx^',iri'=x' 1 w(t'.Tri)_w(^MTi) y y1 To show that, for all x, (oL ,iT)
,1ri)'

^ PxirQgX, we will need

some Lemmas. The Lemmas are straightforward, but rather long, and the uninterested reader is invited to skip the details. First, define the rank, r(y), of a term by r(a)=0 if a D*(ot ,TP) for some ( ,1T ), and r(x^.*"
J

}=r(w|**
V

^) ='TF'. The

ordering on ranks is given by 0* tr and Lemma 5. Let s,t be incomparable at (<*',7T1 )\b1 -is=t. Proof: The case (*,)=( it. Define, for each axioms: (_ * flT ) = w ^ x )=y, for all ( </ *-)'

as in the binary tree. Then (< ',fTO)||~1 s=t,

is trivial and we omit

a forinal

system with the

,<7"") such that fTO^

(*^( 84 ,V)

x=x; and with the rules:

y1~y2

'<r'=xy^<' ^

if

x=y, y=z > x=z; and

165

x=y > y=x. Clearly (ji1 ,C )/f-1 s=t iff s=t is derivable at if,**!). Now suppose r(s),r(t)^fT, where ( c,1T ) < (Ji
f

<T) , and

suppose further that ( J i * , <7"i) proves s=t. We may eliminate any application of the rule ^-n Prof s=t, since

any rule in which any of its conclusions appear as premises must have a conclusion x=y, where r(x)=r(y)= tfi. We may also eliminate axiom (*)/ o xW
( 15 0~) ( 3 o~)

For this, replace

.

', wv J by y throughout, for all terms of rank The y axioms are translated into axioms. By the eliminability of the
we need

rule of rank

not consider the case where a term

is in the premise of a ( * * ) rule. For a conclusion, both

terms of the equality are of rank </, so the rule is translated into the derived rule: y=y1 > y=y>,. Finally, the rules of symmetry and transitivity are translated into instances of the same rules. Thus, if s=t is (j8',<7"i) derivable, r(s), r(t)< then s=t is (j5 ^r) derivable. Thus, if any extension of (uC',fT"i) proves s=t, r(s), r (t) TT, (ot',fri) proves s=t. Now let i=1. The only rule which applies at (C',,7l'1) which does not apply at (c* ,ft) is y But, as above,

we may eliminate this rule, and (oi tV') deduces s=t. Thus, incomparability of s,t at (oC,Tf) implies that no extension of (c* 1
,11" 1)

forces s=t, i.e. that ( o( ' TT1)

is=t. means that

For i=0, incomparability of s,t at (U

some extension forces s=t. This extension is not an extension of (* trD and hence must extend ( o^',tTO). Thus ( MTO)||-1 s=t.

166

This completes the proof of the Lemma. Lemma 6. i) Let r(x),r(y)<TT . Then ( ,1J-)(| ^ x=yv^x=y.

QED

ii) If x,s are incomparable at (*,1T) and x,t are incomparable at ( oL ,W ), then either s=t is forced at (*,!T~) or s,t are incomparable there. iii) If (IT') |f-1 ny1=y2 then (* ,1T) If-., ix^. = x^ ?2'9,iwJ ^1'**1 )=w ?2 yi y2 y2 , and ixj ^1'^ ^ yi ^ w|?2'^2 y2

iv) If x-~a, y/^-b for distinct a,b D*( ll-1">x=y.

jIT), then

The proof of Lemma 6 is left as an exercise. Lemma 7. Let (*,ir)px, r(x)= ir, and let x,s be incomparable at (><-,IT). Then, if r(s)= TT, s is a w-term (i.e. a term of the form Proof: x cannot be an x=term, since, if x is x^ ' then ( <*,'IT)|f-1 Py, in which case is not added to
( ai *fr )

D1(U ,IT). Thus x is w^ ^ for some y. Now let s be x^.**''0'), y J *i r(y), r(y1)<iT Then ( *-,T)II-1 y=y1vTy=y1 by Lemma 6 i). This, combined with Lemma 6 iii), yields (
1 r .IT ) I f*, 1 'j

j -j

y -|

i . e .(

,TT )I)-1 x 1 QED Q^x.

v i x=s. Lemma 8. Let r(x)^^ . Then ( ol ,TT)|f-^ Px iff ( oL , Proof: Let ( o^lT) Px, (

,<1r)||/1 Q2x. Then, at some

extension (oif,Trf) of (<* ,fT)> there are s,t such that ( ol' TT')U/-J xssvTXss^xst... . Since s,t are incomparable to x, r(s)=r(t)=r'- By Lemma 6 iv), s,t,x<~a, for some a D*( ,W ).

But (cL ,TT)lb* Pa, so ( ot'.lf') (1-* Pa, and s,t are w-terms. This follows from Lemma 7 by noting that w is incomparable

167

to s,t and of rank If'. Thus, letting s,t be w,

( a/
1

'

Tt ' )

, w)r

( tJ *

'

, respectively,
But now

y1

y2

we see that ( c< * , TT1)f I- -] y1 =y2v"ly-|=3^2 (r(yi) ^ IT *)

lemma 6 iii) yields 1 !) 1) ^ oc*, ~i fri1\ (<*'.ir (ot'7T') (oC'.ir . y=w_; ;=w; ( )ii_ (< ,t " ') ' ' 'vn w_; ' ', i.e. r y *1 y2 / 2 s=tvTs=t, contradicting Lemma 6 ii). We thus have a contradiction and conclude ( ot , 1T)||-1 Q2x The converse is obvious. QED

Lemma 9. Let r(x)= 'Tr'. Then ( o/, 1T)ll-^ Px iff ( <,fh)|f--| Q2x. Proof: Let ( ,TT ) If-Px. Then x is y. Suppose
(<* , TT) If/. |

for some

Q2x. Then r(x) IT1 for all ( <' ,fT )>(* ,tf)

and so Lemma 8 yields ( o^1 , tt') II--j Q2X Hence there are s.teu^oc ,it) such that ( i ,t7")||/^x=s vTx=s wx=tvix=t >s=t. If r(s)= fT, s is a w-term, by Lemma 7, and as in the proof of

Lemma 8, we conclude (CH IT)|f-.| x=svix=s. Hence r(s),r(t)^ Tf , and ( o(/Hf )\|- -i s=t. Now Lemma 5 yields (oC'fVO) (^-^x=s=t, a contradiction. Thus ( ,Tf") |V -j Px;^>Q2x. QED

Again the converse is trivial

Now,noting that Lemma 5 yields mx=y^>x=y, the proof of the Theorem may be completed in the usual manner. As usual, we have the Corollary. NE^+
Axn

QED.

Ay(x=yvTx=y) is hereditarily undecidable.

More generally, define for n^2, Qnx: Axr..xn[yp(x=xivix=x.)v f/. x^x^]. A stralghforward extension of the above argument yields Theorem 6. Let A be a sentence of and let An be obtained from

168

A by replacing every occurrence of Px in A by Qn+iX Then iff NEp^ + Ax^Qx +Ax~lQ2x + .. + AxnQn x J- An<

)- A

Corollary 1. NE^ + AxtQx + .AxiC^x + ... +/\x-nQnx is hereditarily undecidable. Corollary 2. There is an infinite ascending sequence of finitely axiomatized, hereditarily undecidable extension of NE*. Corollary 2 yields a sharp contrast with the decidability and completeness of E with the following Theorem 7. There are two infinite ascending sequences Tn, T^ of finitely axiomatized, hereditarily undecidable extensions of such that, for all m.n, T and T1 are mutually inconsistent n m (i.e. Tn + T' m is inconsistent). E Proof: Notice that Axy(nx=yv^xsy) holds in the model defined in the proof of Theorem 2, since -nxel=a is always forced. The analog to Theorem 6. for E + Axy(nx=yvrx=y) is proven easily by simply omitting the complications necessary for normal equality. Then notice that E + Axy(ix=y vr?x=y) + Axy(-nx=y 3x=y) fV-A

+ x=yVx=y. We may sharpen

the contrast

xy(x=y \flx=y), which is inconsistent with Ax~i.Ay(x=yv?x=y). QED If

we

now set T = E^+ AxiQx + AxtQ2x + ..., we may

prove that T is hereditarily undecidable. For the proof, let Q'x =/\y(nx=yviix=y) ( or Q'x^Ay(nx=y3x=y)), and, using the tricks above, force Q'x at exactly the nodes where Px is forced. Of course, this does not allows us to decide whether or not T + Axy(-nx=y=> x=y) or T + Axy(-ix=yvT?x=y) are undecidable. Also, it does not give us any idea of where the "upper bound" is,

169

if indeed there is one. But, considering that we may now start with T and form a new sequence based on predicates Q'x, Q^x, .. .., it does demonstrate that there is a large degree of freedom in constructing models of E of which only a very small amount has been used to prove the undecidability results obtained so far. We shall return to this problem in Section IV, below the remainder of Section III being devoted to more orthodox undecidability results. E. The Theory of A successor Function The second theory listed in Section II above is the theory, SA, of successor arithmetic. The theory, S, of a successor function is the theory obtained from SA by dropping the decidability of equality. Thus the classical extension S n is SA

and is complete. It also is, except for equality or the monadic predicate calculus, the most trivially decidable classical theory available. S, however, is undecidable: Theorem 8. S is hereditarily undecidable. Proof: Let Qx be Ay(x=y v~bc=y). Then S (- /\x(Qx =Qx'). It follows that S x x=yA.Qx-QyD , whence S is not a

conservative extension of E . Thus we must modify the completeness proof so that all elements in the block, ...x,x',x",. ..., are treated identically. The modification over the proof of Theorem 2 is, however, slight. Given a tree model, K, of M1, we may transform it into a model of S as follows. First, define by adding the elements

(for aD<>*.) where necessary, as in the proof of Theorem 2. a Then choose an element aDi to be 0 and replace it and by

170

x^O (if it exists) sets of elements fa^ and Replace all other elements of

for n^O.

by sets an^for all

integral n. IfoC' is a successor ofoC and x Q ~DaC - D*< , replace x by for all n^O, if x~0, and for integral n, if x^. We

thus get a new model K' = (K,^,D* , U-'), where D'o< = fxn'> xfil^ & ( x~0 and n=K) or x/0 and n is integral)"? , and *p PXn iff c( ||-1 PX. Now extend the forcing relation to the language of S by i)<'o^2
i.i)o(
a=^

^or

0 e^-emen^ a>

)J~2

a -|=an> n+

^or a-^

an^

an<^

iii) o(' ll-2(xa ^n=an'

f o r aeD/, <' a

successor of <* , when

. This gives us a model Kg analogous (but not identical) to the model Kg used in Theorem 2. The reader may easily verify that the axioms of S are forced and that otlj-g Qx iff all o( and all x D'o^ . M"2 fr QED

Similarly, if we define SO by replacing the trichotomy axiom, x<yvx=yvy^x, in SOA, by x<yo x-^zvz^y, we have Theorem 9. SO is undecidable. The proof is left to the reader. Notice that we only mention undecidability instead of hereditary undecidability. This is because SO may be finitely axiomatized by simply dropping the infinite set of axioms, TX=X'...', which follow from the axiom x<x . P. The Theory of Dense Linear Order Mathematically, the interest in a theory of successor without induction, or an undecidable "discrete" linear order, is not clear. We thus consider, in this Section, a theory whose major

171

models do not satisfy some of the most obvious theorems of the classical theory. This is the theory of dense linear order, whose main models,are the rational numbers and the real numbers with their respective orders. The axioms of dense linear order, DLO, are the following: Equality: x=x, x=yo y=x, x=yAY=z^> x=z, x=Ya y<r z x< 2,

x=yAZ<-yz> z<x. Order: nx<x, x<yv\y<z r?x<z, x<yr> x<zvz<y. Apartness: Unboundedness
n ( x c y v y c x ) o x=y.

Vy(x<y),

\/y(y<x)'
Density: \Jz(x<y 3 x<z/>z<y). That the axioms hold in the rationals is obvious. That they hold in the reals is proven in Heyting ( consider the Apartness axiom. The Apartness axiom asserts that (x^yvycx) is an apartness relation (which we shall discuss later). Since it implies that
7(x<yvy<x) 5 x=y, it follows that nx=yt>x=y, i.e. that equality

). We shall only

is normal. It also implies a weak axiom of trichotomy, -i(x<yvx=y^y<'x). This is seen by simply noticing that -fl(x<yvx=yvyTx).=r-n(x*y vy^x vi(x^yv/y^x )). Alternatively, normal equality and this weak form of trichotomy

172

imply the axiom of Apartness: -\(x<yvy<x)A""" (x<yvx=yvy<x) implies ~fl x=y propositionally. Thus T(x^yvy<x)onx=y, and normal equality yields -i(x<yvy<x)^x=y. Another point to make is that, since i(x<yvy<x) is equivalent to x=y, we may interpret DLO within its order fragment DLO ^ , whose axioms are those of Order, Unboundedness, and Density (See 241 .) To prove that these axioms suffice, we must show that the translations of the axioms of DLO are theorems of DLO^ The only axioms which are not immediately obvious are the axioms of substitutivity of equality. To prove, for example, -l(x^yvy<x)Ay<z:?x<z, notice that y<Tz:p y<xvx<^z. But -i(x<yvy<x)^ i y<x and so n(x<yuy<"x)Ay<z ox<z. For convenience, let x^y (read "x is apart from y") denote x<yvy<x. (There is no danger in confusing this with ix=y, since formally we never use x/y to mean the latter.) Then let Qx be Ay(x^yvix^y), and let A' be obtained from A in the language of by replacing every occurrence of Px by Qx. As

usual we shall prove Theorem 10. (- A iff DLO^ I- A'.

This again yields Theorem 11. DLO^ and DLO are undecidable. Corollary 1. The intuitionistic theory, LO, of linear order (given by the axioms of Equality and Order) is undecidable. Corollary 2. The oreder fragment, LO^ , of the intuitionistic theory of linear order (given by the axioms of Order) is undecidable. Corollary 2 answers a question of Scott's ( 24], 251)

173 We may state a stronger form of these corollaries as follows, where LOoo is obtained from LO by adding the axioms x.^x.) (instead of the usual Vx1..xn(^;j*lxi=Xj)): Corollary 3. LO^and LO^ are hereditarily undecidable. Before proving Theorem 10, we must consider the problem of constructing models of DLO^ . The simplest models are those formed by placing copies of the rationals, Q, at the nodes of a tree. However, by the lemma to Theorem 1, Section II, these are all models of OR. To get around this, we consider, as in the case of the theory of equality, replacing single elements by blocks of incomparables (i.e. elements which, at the given node, are incomparable neither x<y nor y<x are forced, and, hence, x/y is not forced). In constructing models in this way, we must be more careful than in our treatment of equality. If x,y are incomparable (say) at ol, then x^y must be forced at some extension of

By the axiom of Density, there is a z distinct from x,y in the domain of ot which lies in the same block of incomparables. (This also requires the third Order axiom: for, let ^\V- x<z<y. If z is not incomparable to x and y at o/, then <lh x^z or for example, *fi- x<z. Then *l|- x<yvy<z. Since
o(

lb z<y. Let, y<z, we have

til- x<y and x,y are not incomparable.) Thus the set of incomparables to a given element is either empty or infinite. In the infinite case, we will assume the set to be indexed by the set of rationals. Thus, at the node at which we wish to make the elements of the set comparable, we will have an order already chosen. We may now begin the proof of Theorem 10. Let K be given

174

such that each D0^ is infinite and define again, not identical to at the origin o/Q, if

(analogous, "but,

of Theorem 2) as follows. Starting Pa (a f Do^q), embedd a in a set

fx^O^of incomparables (all q Q, Q the set of rationals), o of A identifying a with xa q. If o^0 lh Pa, replace a by x& q. At a ' of o( , if o( '||/ Pa ( a D o C 1 ) , there are two o( -3 cases to consider. First, a Do< . Then we have defined rx_ i , *i for sequences of rationals. We now replace this set by successor node
fca,'a,q '
x ^aeEW & 11 Q

identifying xf>a with x^Q. If

N

c* p ajDo( , then a is a new element at c(' and we replace it by fxa. > q. 5 , identifying a with x^q. The case oC lb Pa is handled in the obvious manner, so that: d^o
=f/-a,q

ft/

^o""

f a

5=0

o r

""xj

p a &

a n d

=K^aq: xa,a V *' M Pa & q Q ^ U fx.'' v a,q : a^Do/' & afD*& ot' /I/ Pa & qCQ]u K 1 a 0 =
x E & a a W o l '11" P ^ > a Pa"?

^x^O : aCDoC1 & af^Dof & o<'/h ^ of K . Finally, l[~1 Pxf^

f o r

successor nodes

iffc(l{- Pa.

We must keep in mind the fact that we want i)o/H-1 Pa iff

ol

H~"2 Qa (when

we

define ||-2) and ii)t*U-2

as usual, requires incomparables the large number of which being necessary to force the axiom of Density, ii) requires us, as in the case of normal equality, to keep splitting all new
0* elements. Thus eg. x* is split into fx. _ : q Q?at ', a 0 .Q v a(locJ each element being split again into Q elements aitf". The net

result is that we have elements indexed by sequences of rationals.

175

We now extend

to include formulae in the language

of DLO^ by first ordering each W in a dense linear order such that a<"b at
C(

and

o(-

@ imply a<b
< <q
2

at p. Now define

*0^2

x ^q/xlf,42 iff a<b- and

'Vr2 < g

i q i

i f f

o r

a=b and 0/' if"? 2 a,

is less than
n <

first place they differ. Thus

iff

b,^^
r,

a>L-|< X"h^r. ^*2.2

0 T

Xa a

r. >.S.-]

End

are incomparable at ^(whence and q^qg. That is, at the successor node

a and b are identical) , we order the block

in the type of the rationals. But now it easily follows that Fx i^ I"2 ^or

all x6D^ ; for by construction, there are incomparables to x at iff oi\\^2

Pa>

where a CDd is the element x was constructed

from. Theorem 10 is, thus proven. If we look more carefully at the model constructed, we notice that for any x,y ctfll-gix^y or

c(ll-2

>

for onl y x

is

never forced apart from itself. Thus we also get the following Corollary 4. DLO^ +lx^yv^x^y and D10 + x=yv~>x=y are undecidable.

We wish to mention one more corollary, which concerns the theory of an apartness relation (as mentioned above). Following Heyting ( ), an apartness relation, 4* is a positive notion

of inequality (i.e. divergence) of objects. It satisfies the following laws: i) ~\x^x, ii) x^y^>y^x, iii) x/y^ x^zvz^y,

176

iv) ix^yDx=y. Axioms 1) iii) are obvious for any notion of divergence. Axiom iv), though less obvious,holds in the reals (See kl.) and is

included for that reason. As remarked above, axiom iv) implies 1x^y-x=y, and we may formulate the theory, A, of apartness, with only ^ as primitive, by using axioms i) iii) above and iv)' below: iv)' -ix^yAy z z > x z . (Axiom.iv)' is an instance of substitutivity of equality). We may also consider the theory, A", of apartness formulated with both = and
A~ has axioms i) iv) and the axioms of equality.

It is easily verified that A" may be faithfully interpreted within A. The (non-faithful) interpretation of A in DLO given by interpreting x^y as x<yvy<x yields the following Theorem due jointly to R. Statman and myself: Theorem 12. A and A- are undecidable.

Indeed, the interpretation yields the hereditary undecidability of A^t nx^yvfx^y and A^+ x=yVx=y, where ACk,(A^>) is obtained from A (A-) by the addition of the axioms Vx-I''*xn^i<jxi^xo^ G. Further Examples Recall that, in Section A above, we were interested in theories obtained by dropping the decidability of atomic formulae. If we retain this condition, we may still have undecidable theories but, these theories cannot be as simple as those discussed in Sections I and II, as the methods there would prove

177

their decidability. It turns out, however, that they need not be too complicated, as the following examples of Gabbay show: Theorem 13. i) The intuitionistic theory, L0^+ x<yvTx<y, of decidable linear order is undecidable. ii) The intuitionistic theory of a single unary function with decidable equality is undecidable. For the linear order, we may well-order the original domains of the model we start with and, letting Qx^/ly VU(x<y 3X<<y), add an unbounded dense linear order to the right of a at nodeswhere d ft- Pa. Then Qx will be forced for x equal to a or in the dense set associated with a. Por the theory of a unary function, let Qx=;\/yzCiy=ZAfy=XAfz=x). Our starting model contains infinite sequences ...,a,fa,... . When at II- Pa, we add x cl and let xcl=a'

where a=fa', and also let 4II- a=fx&. We then have the choice of
1 or like a. treating xa Q like a The undecidability of 10^+ x<yv"'x<y has the following

interesting Corollary. OR with an additional decidable monadic predicate is undecidable. To prove this, start with a model of L0^+ x<yvnx<y. Extend the domains, D , to dense linear orders and let *( II- Pa

iff a was in the original domain of ( . Then any sentence A is forced at a node in the original model iff the corresponding (p} sentence Av , obtained from A by relativising all quantifiers to P, is forced at that node in the modified model. Theorem 13 and its Corollary offer a nice contrast to

178

the situation in the classical case,

where

the second order theory

of countable dense orderings and the second order theory of a unary function over countable domains are decidable ( 21!). The Corollary is also of interest in that it tells us not to expect to make much progress in eleminating quantifiers from intuitionistic theories with additional decidable monadic predicates (See Section I, above.)* Nonetheless, it should still be worthwhile to investigate several other theories with the additional predicates, eg. SA or SOA. H. Comments At this point, we should like to make some remarks about the two methods presented here for proving the undecidability of intuitionistic theories. These are, of course, the method used by Gabbay to prove the undecidability of the intuitionistic monadic predicate calculus, M,| , on one predicate letter, and our own method of using Kripke models to prove completeness of within the theory we wish to prove undecidable. First, our method has the limitation that it applies only to theories of a very restricted sort namely theories in which is complete with respect to substitutional validity. One might attempt the same method for logics with which is undecidable,

eg. MH or CD. But this can be very difficult in MH, for instance, we cannot interpret Px by/\y(x=yvnx=y), since i Ay(x=yvnx=y) is inconsistent, and we must look for a new substitution instance. More to the point, many logics may simply have more geometrically restricted models eg. we may not be able to split nodes as in Section C without falsifying an axiom of the theory in which we

179

wish to interpret Px. Gab"bay's method certainly seems more promising than ours in such a situation, in that it requires less freedom in constructing models. The usefulness of Gabbay's method becomes apparent when one tries to prove the undecidability of a theory with more structure. For instance, in ACF or RCF (or even for discretely ordered abelian groups) when we drop the decidability of atomic formulae, we run into defficulty because of the group operation. In considering S, we noted that S

y- A x Vy(nx=y^Qx= Qy);

with the

group operation, we prove that ^x(Qx= QO). That is, the more or less obvious candidates for Q are translation invariant, and it is not clear how to get around this. Using his method, however, Gabbay ( 3*1) has obtained two rather general results, both to the effect that if the classical extension of an intuitionistic theory is reasonably model incomplete, and if the intuitionistic theory has axioms of specified form, then the intuitionistic theory is undecidable. One such example is the intuitionistic theory of abelian groups (with decidable equality). While Gabbay's two theorems do not give any information about intuitionistic theories with model complete classical extensions (eg. the theories considered in the present chapter), the generality, of these results more than complement our own results insofar as undecidability results for theories are concerned. For more specific information (eg. interesting reduction classes) the proof theoretic method of Maslov, Mints, and Orevkov, although more difficult to follow, yields much stronger results (Compare Ci8 3.>.

180

Also, one shortcoming of all the methods discussed is the fact that all results are hereditary undecidability results as opposed to essential undecidability results. The axiomatic systems considered are proper subtheories of the interesting intuitionistic theories and the hereditary undecidability of the former yields no information about the latter. For instance, the theory of an undecidable equality, E + Ax ~i Ay(x=ywx=y), is a proper subtheory of the theory of equality of the reals. To see that this theory is not essentially undecidable, consider the following example, adapted from : We will define a linear

Kripke model whose nodes are natural numbers and whose domain at n is given by Dn = o,...,n^ . m=n is forced only at a node p which is greater than both m and n. One may verify easily that this yields a model of E+^xnAy(x=y v*?x=y). To prove the decidability of the theory of the model, we interpret its semantics within the classical theory SOA. First, we define the model,
II-):

i) Kx is interpreted by x=x; ii) uDx is of the model is interpreted

interpreted by u^x; iii) the order,

by the order of the natural numbers; and iv) for atomic formulae, u=v, x11- u=v is interpreted by u<xav<x. The interpretation of logically complex formulae is given by the standard definition, eg. x ||- AaB iff xlh A and x If- B. For any sentence A of the theory of equality, A is true in the model iff Oil- A is a theorem of SOA. But this latter theory is decidable and we have a decidable extension of E + AxtAy(x=y vnx=y). (For stronger theories, eg. NE^h-AxnAy(x=yv7x=y), one can sometimes apply Rabin's theorem ( f21~l ) see rn>.

181

The importance of the preceding example is that it demonstrates the purely formal nature of the present results and the limitations both of the interest of the results and of the usefulness of the methods. IV. A. THE COMPLETENESS PROBLEM Discussion As mentioned several times above, we prefer to view our method of proving undecidability as proving a completeness theorem rather than as providing an interpretation of the undecidable theory M|. One reason is this: Suppose we are given a classical theory T^ and define an intuitionistic theory T by taking some standard set of axioms of T^ as the axioms of T. A natural question would be: What is the "underlying" logic of T? I.-e., is the "logical part" of T the intuitionistic predicate calculus, or does, for instance, T coincide with T>| (the logical part being thus the classical predicate calculus)? If the logical part of T is defined to be the set of those sentences of the predicate calculus all of whose substitution instances are provable (i.e. the valid schemata), we are left with a completeness problem analogous to that described in Section IIIC for M1. [Note: i) There are several variants on the notion of completeness (which, in general, do not coincide), for instance: a) We may decide that A is to be a counterexample to a formula B of the predicate calculus, not if T |/ A, but rather if A has a free variable x and T t-~i/\xA. (See Scott, C25].) b) We may

182

VxPx^A^"^ for some predicate (P) P containing only x free (where Av ' denotes A with all
T 1/

relax the requirement T

A to

quantifiers relativised to P). (See de Jongh,

Cel.)

ii) We wish to emphasize the fact that we are not considering the question of the completeness of the rules of Heyting's predicate calculus with respect to an intuitionistic notion of validity (i.e. provability in the abstract sense). (See

Col.) Rather,

we are (here) merely interested in the purely

technical problem of proving completeness of some variant of the predicate calculus (here monadic) with respect to substitutional validity within a given theory."3 The problem of completeness with respect to substitution al validity has received a fair amount of attention in the literature, but with surprisingly few results. The first results were negative: Rose ( [23l ) and, later, Kleene ( hi) proved the incompleteness of the propositional calculus with respect to validity in Heyting's arithmetic extended by the addition of realizable, respectively, special realizable, formulae. A positive result in Heyting's arithmetic was recently obtained by de Jongh, f6~] , who proved the completeness of the intuitionistic propositional and predicate calculi there in (the latter completeness theorem in the sense of the Note, above). (We give our own proof of de Jongh's result for the propositional calculus in Chapter 4, below.) With regard to more elementary theories, in /"25J , Scott proved the completeness of the propositional calculus (in the sense of the Note, above) for his model of the theory of the

183

order of the reals. As discussed in Section III, Lifshits ( J\ 5l ) established the completeness of the monadic predicate calculus on one predicate with respect to substitutional validity (there called deductive validity see also ( 141 ) within the theory of equality. And, finally, in Section III, we established the completeness of within several further theories.

Completeness of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, I, for the theories discussed in Section III can easily be established by the method of Chapter 4, below, for the proof of the propositional case of de Jongh's Theorem, and the proof is left to the more ambitious reader (who, of course, needs only carry out the proof for validity in ).

In Section B, we extend the completeness result for validity in E (very) slightly by proving completeness of Mg in E. We also discuss some open problems. B. Completeness of M2 in E As mentioned in Section III-D, we have a great deal of freedom in constructing models of E which we haven't used yet. In this Section, we take advantage of this freedom to prove the completeness of M2 with respect to substitutional validity within E. This is achieved by using cardinality and normality to obtain monadic predicates:
Q^x =Ayz(x=yvnx=yvx=zvTx=zvy=z),
Q2X

y(IN x=y => x=y).

Theorem 1. Let A' be obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of P^x, P2x by Q^x, Q2x, respectively. Then M2 (- A iff E I- A'.

184

Outline of proof: Start with a model K of construct K* as in Lemma 3, Section III. Then define

and by always

adding an x^ for y in an earlier domain and, when P^y is not, forced, also adding w . When Pgy is not forced, we identify y with Xy and w^" at all successors, and when Pgy is forced, we make the identifications only at left successors (exactly as in Theorem 5, Section III). The Lemmas corresponding to Theorem 5, Section III, are easily proven and the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. More generally, let QED

and let

"be obtained in the obvious manner. Then the analog to

Theorem 6 for E may be proven, thus yielding the results promised at the end of Section III D. The Theorem immediately raises the question of the completeness of the full monadic predicate calculus in E. Unfortunately, a proof of this is not immediate it would require, for arbitrary n, n properties which we could assign independently to the elements of the domains; and, with, the fairly crude properties we've been using, existence is not obvious. A somewhat more interesting problem arises when we replace E by : Is the full monadic predicate calculus complete ? Or even: Is the full predicate

with respect to validity in

calculus complete with respect to validity in M^? In the classical case (and the intuitionistic case where the monadic predicate are decidable), these possibilities are rules out by the fact that a classical counter-model to any non-theorem of classical can

185

be chosen with a domain of only two elements. In

, we cannot

restrict ourselves to a finite domain, as -nAx(Axu"Ax) demonstrates. Further, we cannot restrict ourselves to locally finite domains (in the sense that each Dot is finite even though may be infinite), for, if we let Rxy "be reflexive and * _ symmetric and define x<y= Rxy/\ Vw(Ryw/pRxw), every classical model of A, A: Axyzfi x<xA(x^yAy^z ^x<z)lA/V x\/y(x<y)A A xy Vz(x<y o x<zAz<y), is infinite, and infinite models are easily seen to exist. By Gabbay's proof of Lemma 1, Section III, for any model K and K such that A', DoL may be used to construct a model of A.

KJ DoI

But, by Theorem 1 of that Section, there is such a model and DC must be infinite. Another interesting problem concerns the choice of substitution instances Qx for Px. Let A(p^,...,p ) be a tautology of the propositional calculus which is not valid intuitionisticalLy (P-j Pn) denoting the propositional variables of A). Can we choose Qx to be/\x1...xn A(x=x^ ,...,x=xn) ? [Note that some condition similar to A being a tautology is necessary, since, if A(p)HP) we have
Axy(Qx= Qy)"il

Chapter

Heyting's Arithmetic

186

I. A.

THE MODEL THEORETIC TREATMENT OF HEYTING"S ARITHMETIC Heyting's Arithmetic Heyting's Arithmetic, usually written H or HA, is the

intuitionistic analog of Peano's Arithmetic, PA. One has the operations of successor, addition, and multiplication as primitives and, as axioms, the recursion equations for these function and the scheme of induction (i.e. the usual Peano axioms), together with the axioms and rules of inference of the intuitionistic predicate calculus with equality. The simplest formulation for our purposes is the one without function symbols: We have constants 0,1,... for each natural number, relations S(x,y), A(x,y,z), and M(x,y,z) defining the functions of successor, addition, and multiplication.

The arithmetical axioms are: i) -\S(x,0), -ix=0 -p \/yS(y,x), S(x,y)AS(x,z)z> y=z, S(y,x)AS(z,x)^ y=z, VyS(x,y); ii) A(x,y,z)/\A(x,y,w)^z=w, VzA(x,y,z), A(x,0,x), A(x,y,z)AS(y,w)AS(z,v)3A(x,w,v); iii) M(x,y,z)AM(x,y,w) z=w, VzM(x,y,z), M(x,0,0), M(x,y,z)AS(y,w)>vA(z,x,v)^>M(x,w,v);

187

iv) S(n,n+1), for each constant n; an the scheme, for any formula A whose free variables include x and do not include y: v) A0/\ Axy (Ax^S( x , y ) d Ay)z>/\ xAx. Aesthetically, it is more pleasing to use a formulation with function symbols, and, as shown in Chapter 2, Section F, we may do so. However, that would require a little more care in defining various structures and a little more work in proving results about them. We shall occasionally, however, freely use the fact that there is a natural correspondence between models of our official system above and the system with function symbols (or, if one prefers, we shall abuse notation by using function symbols). Before embarking on our model-theoretic investigation of Heyting's Arithmetic, we wish to discuss several schemata which will be of interest to us. Let-^be a primitive recursive (or even provably decidable, i.e. HA
z-i y\TVL<y) well-ordering of &he natural numbers.

By the scheme, TI(0, of Transfinite Induction on-^is meant the following: TI(^):
AOaAx (A y ^

xAy^ Ax)2 /\xAx,

where, for convenience, 0 is taken to be the first element of the ordering. To discuss the next set of schemata, let, for an r.e. extension T of HA, Prov^ be the canonical proof predicate. The properties of Prov^, which we use are i) Prov^ is decidable, and

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ii) 3n HA J- Proven,rA1) iff T |- A, where *A is the godel number of the sentence A. If A contains the Ay denote s(y, A ), where s is a

free variable y, we let

primitive recursive function such that s(n, rAl) - ry/nl a"* , is the godel number of the sentence obtained by replacing the variable y in A by the numeral n. We may use this notation to list the following schemata: local Reflection for T: Rf(T) : VxProv^,(x,rA7)DA, for sentence A. Uniform Reflection for T: Rfu(T): Ay[VxProvT(x, rAp )3 Ay] , for A containin only y free. Uniform1 Reflection for T: Rfu' (T): A y VxProv^ (x,""Ay1)~D AyAy, for A containing only y free. Consistency of T: Con (T): 1^cProv^Cx/b^ ). UJ -Consistency of T: tt/-Con(T): VxProvT(x, for A containing only y free. In [ 2 l . Feferman gives an intuitionistic proof of the following Proposition 1. The schemata Rfu and Rfu' are equivalent. Thus we need not consider Rfu'(T). For further information on the relative strengths of these reflection principles, see [2 J or [l2~] . y&y*V^Prov,p(x,"Ay1),

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Regarding the relation between Transfinite Induction and the Reflection Principles, there is the following result of Kreisel and Levy ( 12! ): Proposition 2. For small ordinals oLt HA together with the scheme TI()(transfinite induction on the canonical well-ordering sx of type ) is equivalent to the system obtained from HA by iterating the process T ^T + Rfu(T) 1+< times. Eg. HA + RfU(HA) = HA + TI(^C ). *0 As a final example, we prove the following Lemma, which will be used in Section C, below. Lemma 1. Let A be a sentence. If T h A, then HA + Rf(T) J- A, i.e. HA + Rf(T) extends T. Proof: Observe T h A implies that HA Rf (T) yields HA + Rf(T) A. V/xProvT(x,rA~'). QED

We shall consider two additional schemata in Section II. B. The Operation ( ) > )'

Our first goal is to prove the closure of the class of models of HA under the operation ( ) ^ (<E. )'. Recall that, in the definition of K K' we left open the problem of deciding stating that we usually

which atomic formulae to force at

have <^q |l- A iff o^(|- A for all olK. For HA, there is no ambiguity in this operation closed atomic formulae are decided by the theory and, if K1 is to be a model of HA, we must have

o( 0(I A iff A is true in the standard model, for any atomic A.

Thus, our operation *5^> (^5*)' is given by tacking on a new node ^q below all nodes of setting 2)oC0 = ^0,1,...|and

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letting A iff A is true in for any atomic A. Eg. if of and to* are non-standard models of classical arithmetic, then (uu u/ ^ U/ . Theorem 1. The class of models of HA is closed under the operation ( ) (2 )*. Proof: Let i/ be a set of models of HA an consider (^ ( ^? )' is trivially a model of the intuitionistic predicate calculus with equality. Further, verification of the axioms i)~ iv) of HA is straightforward and we omit it. For induction, let Ax have only x free (We leave the general case to the reader.), and suppose (x,y)
11/

+ uu )' is

)'

AO

a A

xy[ Ax*

Ay~l ^/^xAx. Then,for some ^K>. fih AO /v /\xy [Axy\ since then

S(x,y) z> AyU ,^(VMxAx. Now, we cannot have (?K for some

and ^forces all axioms of HA. Hence ^xAx. Since oiQ |\/ A*Ax, Ab. Again

o/0IW AO AAxy/^AxAS(x,y)^ Ayl , there is some ^

^ ^q and some bDf2 such that

and b is some natural number. Let m be the smallest

such number. Since c^qIV- AO, m is a successor, say n+1, and, since m is the smallest number b such that Ab, we have

q|l" An. But ckQ l|-Axy(Ax/vS(x,y)-p Ay), whence An AS(n,n+1)O A(n+1). Thus a contradiction. A(n+1), i.e. <^0 ||- Am, QED

The immediate Corollaries are the Explicit Definability and Disjunction Theorems:

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Corollary 1. (Explicit Definability). If Ax has only x free and HA (- VxAx, then HA f- An for some n. Corollary 2. (Disjunction Property), let A, B be closed. If HA (- AvB, then HA f- A or HA J- B. The closure of the class of models of HA under ( ) > (^ )' will be a basic tool of our study of HA. We have already

used this to prove the Explicit Definability Theorem. Its use here is simply that it allows us to take countermodels to A0,A1,. ...., and put them together to construct a countermodel to \/xAx. It is in this construction of models that this operation is so useful. Eg., it gives a simple proof of the old result of Kreisel's ( l0*3 ): Theorem 2. Let Ax have only x free and suppose HA Then HA [- /\xAx vVx"*Ax iff HA KAXAX "O VX"AX iff HA Vy PI AXAX 3>lAy 1. /V x(Axv/",Ax).

Proof: We shall show that HA |-" A xAx "D \ / x 1 Ax implies HA j-Vy fiA xAx AyD and leave the rest to the reader. Suppose

HA J-^AxAx^VxTAx and HA i/Vy [l/\ xAx "3 Ay!. Then, HAAxkx. Z? An for each n. But HA Anz?(tAxAx'P"* An) whence Hat/iAn.

By the decidability fo A and the Disjuntion Property, HA f- An. On the other hand, HA \-AxAx HA
( / A xAx.

xAxO"*ACT3 , and so

Let Then for some

K be a model of HA

with ^K such that ofty AX AX . Ab. By decidability,

( and some bD^0, x A x .

||-~IAb and h e n c e

Now consider K (the restriction of K to those nodes "Y

192

^ ^) and Kp :

(JU .
Observe that V ^ ^Q implies y= c/Q or ^(3 and that ry implies xAx. Also o^qU/AxAx since if o/qM-^xAx, then |?|J- A xAx and one has a contradiction. Thus yl(//\xAx for aliy^ q and ^q||-tAxAx. We now use the fact that HA \-"iAr.kx.D\/x i Ax to conclude xlAx. But, D is just the set of natural

F '

numbers, whence, for some n, o^q|/-1An, contradicting the fact that HA An. Not having used the basic operation ( ) > QED )1 in the

direct construction of models, we turn our attention to this tasfc^ Let T = (T,^) be a finite tree. We denote by Ter the set of terminal nodes of T. For any node denote the set of successors of o( . Let us assume that we have assigned models of classical arithmetic to each of the terminal nodes say is assigned to
o(r

T-Ter, S(o<) will

GTer. We now associate with each /e T a Kripke model K(V ) as follows: i) if model); ii) Ter, K(<) = ( )Uf ))' is the origin of T. Ter, K(of ) = ^(viewed as a one-node Kripke

Finally, define K^, = K( o ^ 0 ) , where Theorem 3. Kq, is a model of HA.

Proof: We show by Bar Induction that K(o^) is a model of HA. This is trivial for terminal nodes. If* is not terminal, apply

193

Theorem 1. It follows that K( o(.) is a model of HA for all letting e^= completes the proof.

K. QED

Note: Obviously, we may replace the finiteness restriction "by the well-foundedness one. C. Formulae Preserved Under ( ) > ( ) If Pis a set of sentences, we may wish to know whether or not some metamathematical result which we proved for HA also holds for HA +

P. The Explicit Definability Theorem is an often

discussed example. Since we proved this for HA by means of the operation ( ) >( ), our proof for HA +Twould also use this operation and we are thus concerned with closure properties of formulae under ( ) > )'.

The first nice closure property is closure under union: If Tf A

are

Preserved under the operation ( ) p

)1, then

r-^is also preserved under it i.e. if the validity of HA + T is preserved by the operation holds for HA + and the same

then the validity of HA + P+ & must also be

preserved by this operation. Thus, we trivially have a better closure property for ( )' than for the Aczel Slash.

Since one of our applications of the operation ( ) > (C )1 is in proving explicit definability results, it behooves us to prove that Harrop sentences are preserved. Harrop formulae are defined inductively by i) atomic formulae are Harrop formulae; ii) if A,B are Harrop formulae, then so is A/VB; iii) if B is a Harrop formula, then so is AoB;

194

iv) -\A is a Harrop formula; v) if Ax is a Harrop formula, then so isAxAx. A Harrop sentence is-a Harrop formula with no free variable. One may also describe a Harrop formula by stating that it has no strictly positive Vor

V,

Lemma 2. Let A be a Harrop sentence. Then A is preserved under ()-(* )' Proof: By induction on the length of A. To carry out the induction step corresponding to v, we must make a convention concerning free variables. If B has x,j ,...,xn as its free variables, we shall prove that B(m^,...,mn) is preserved for all numerals m^,...,mn. The result then follows trivially for sentences. i) The preservation of atomic formulae follows by the decidability of atomic formulae in HA. ii) Let A(m1,..,mn)a B(m>|,...,mn) be valid in ^. Then A(m1,...,mn) and B(m1f...,mn) are valid in J. But each of these are preserved in the step ( "*5^)', whence AAB is valid in

SI

iii) Let A(m1,...,mn)l? B(m1,...,11^) be valid in Harrop. For this implication to fail to be valid in must have
A^m1* *

for B T)'
we

* ,ran^' > * * * ,mn^ * But "^en ^1, 0^. A(m1,....,mn) is valid in ^ , whence B(m.j ,...,11^) is valid in /.

Again, B is preserved, whence ^qIJ" B,.a contradiction. iv) Similar to iii). v) Let A(x,m,j,... ,mn) be Harrop,/^xA(x,m1 ,...,11^) valid in J-. For AxA(x,m1,...,mn) to fail to be valid in (^$T)', we

195

must have o^ 0 H /A(m,m1,...,mn) for some mDo*0= fo ,1,....? . But A(m,m^ ,...,mn) is valid inland is preserved, leading to a contradiction. Theorem 4. The class
tot

QED sets,
f, such

that the validity of

HA +p is preserved under the operation ( ) (U )' has the following closure properties: i ) iPis c l o s e d u n d e r a r b i t r a r y u n i o n ; ii) if P^TPand A is Harrop sentence, then
f+

iii) if /vy, A has only the variable x free, and HA + P I- An for each numeral n, then f 1+/VxAx Proof: The only case we haven't proven already is iii). The proof of this is "basically the same as that of case v) in the preceding proof. QED

Corollary 1. ( 51). IfPcan be obtained from HA by using the operations i) - iii) of Theorem 4, then the Explicit Definability Theorem and the Disjunction Theorem hold for HA + r. Condition iii) above was introduced in hi for the purpose of proving results like Corollary 1. By it, if we have an axiom scheme for which we wish to prove the preservation result, we need only prove the result for the scheme without free variables. For induction, AOA Axy (AxAS(x,y) S>Ay)p/\Ax, we need only prove the preservation result for each instance, AOAAxHAXAS(x,y)7?Ay)^> An, where A now has only the variable x free. If we examine the proof we gave, we notice that we reduced the .problem to proving the preservation of this last sentence. We shall now use condition

196

iii) to formally justify proving the preservation result for the special case of no free variables for some schemata. L e t b e a primitive recursive well-ordering. Lemma 3. Let rbe the subscheme of TI(^) determined by the restriction that Ax have only x free. Then the preservation theorem holds for HA + P. Proof: Let^~be a family of models of HA +Tand observe that K.is a genuine well-ordering ontu. Thus, if/"*is not valid in (^ )1, we have
< ^ H - A O AAX(A y ^xAy PAX), 0

An, for some n. Let nQ be the least such n, i.e. o(q m^n0, o (J/ AXIQ. Then
UQAy,

Am for all whence QED

/xAx for all

whence O(Q||- AnQ, a contradiction.

Theorem 5. The scheme TI(-^) is preserved. Proof: Let/"be as in Lemma 3 and let B(x^,...,xn) denote the instance, A(0,x^ ,... /\ x[A y^xA(y,x^ ,... A(x,x^ ,...,x^)3 ^
"N
of

AXA(X,X1 ,...,xn) of TI (<{). For each choice M1

numerals to replace x^,...,xn, B(m^,...,mn )eP , whence HA + P HA +f+ B(m1,...,mn). It follows, by condition iii) that B QlP. Thus HA + TI(-<) =
B ^ TI (^)HA

+ P+ B elP.

QED

Corollary 1. Let T extend HA by the addition of some schemata of transfinite Induction on primitive recursive well-orderings. Then T has the Disjunction and Explicit Definability Properties. Observing that Con andW-Con are Harrop sentences, we have the following

197

Theorem 6. Con(T) and w-Con(T) are preserved under the operation ( ) ( )' Trivially, Theorem 6 yields the Disjunction and Explicit Definability Properties as Corollaries. For the stronger Reflection Principles, we have Theorem 7. If T is preserved "by the operation ( ) ^ ("i )1 , then so is HA + Rf(T). Proof: Let jTbe a family of models of HA + Rf(T) and let ( % )' fail to be a model of HA + Rf(T). Then

(0\lr V xProv^,(x ^A*1), o ^ 0 ( ^ A,

for some sentence A. Thus, for some n, P(gl|- Prov^(n, rA*). But Prov^ is decidable, whence HA (- Proven, ia"1 ) and T (- A. By Lemma 1, T is valid in jr , whence, by hypothesis, T is valid in ( Thus, ||- A, a contradiction. QED )', )'.

Corollary 1. If T is preserved by the operation ( ) ^ (" then so is HA + Rfu(T).

Corollary 2. If T is preserved under the operation ()>(!" then so are T + Rf(T), T + Rfu(T), T + Rf(T + Rf(T)), etc.

)',

The Disjunction and Explicit Definability Theorems are further Corollaries. D. de Jongh's Theorem In addtion to its use in proving Explicit Definability results and the validity of an occasional derived rule, we observed in the end of Section B, above, that we could use the operation ( ) - ) ' to construct Kripke models of HA out of

models of classical arithmetic. This last application has, as a Corollary, a simple proof of the propositional case of an

198

interesting Theorem of de Jongh. Let A(p1 ,..,pn) be a propositional formula constructed from the propositional variables p1,...,p . In an as yet unpublished paper, *3(See fO .), D.H.J, de Jongh proved the following: Theorem.8. If Pp |/ A(p^,...,pn) then HA f- A(B.j,...,Bn), for some sentences B^,...,B of arithmetic.

(Note: Pp denotes propositional calculus.) According to this Theorem, if A(p1t...,p ) is not an intuitionistic tautology, there are arithmetical substitution instances resulting in a sentence underivable in HA. Thus we can view this as a completeness result, if we define the validity of a formula A(p^,...,pn) in HA to be the validity of the Scheme A(B1,.... fB ) determined by A(p^ ,....,pn). Actually, de Jongh proved a stronger result: The choice of substitution instances BH,...,B can be made J n of p<.,...p^ 1 1 n uniformly in all A(p^,...,pn). A proof of this means of Kripke models is more difficult and will be given in Section III-D, below. Another result of de Jongh's is a completeness theorem for the predicate calculus. To date, the only proof of this result is de Jongh's original proof, which combines the \ise of Kripke models and realizability. We turn now to the proof of the weak version of de Jongh's Theorem. Proof of Theorem 8: Let ol0\\+ A(p1,...,Pn) for some forcing relation of J*, the n-th modified Jaskowski tree (Chapter 1,

199

Section II-B). Let

be independent over PA (See the

Appendix Section IV, below) and find, for each i a model of PA + A^ + Associate these models with the terminal

nodes of J* and look at K* . XI ~*<J, n Eg. KT* is

3
OU

VJU

let, for each p^, S^ be the set of nodes forcing p^. By Lemma 1, Chapter 1, Section II-B, we can find a sentence B^ of arithmetic built up from the AJs such that Si - ff =J?IIB i?

Now, a simple induction can be used to show that, for any formula C(p1,...,pn) and any node ft ,

(J ii-

C(pv

,Pn) iff Plh C(B1..,Bn),

under the two forcing relation. In particular, V0|j/ A(B1,...,Bn). QED

The sentence corresponding to S is (except in the trivial case S) of the form

whence we have the following Corollary due to Myhill: Corollary 1. The substitution instance B^,...,B 0 be taken to be disjunction of Tl -j sentences. in Theorem 8 can

Observe that one cannot use fT sentences, because, if B is IT?, i" |-mB DB.

Starting with A1,...,Am

__o
1

and independent, we have the

200

following Corollary 2. The substitution instances in Theorem 8

can be taken to be disjunctions of double negation of sentences. Since the only properties of HA used in proving de Jongh's Theorem were the closure of the class of models of HA under the operation ( ) > )', the consistency of HA with

classical logic (so that ^,...,CUffl could be chosen), and the incompleteness of PA, we can conclude that de Jongh's Theorem holds for HA +

P for

any r.e.

(as in Theorem 4 above), which

is consistent with classical logic. In particular, de Jongh's Theorem holds for HA + Tl(<^ ), HA + Rf(HA), HA + Rfu(HA), etc. If HA + f~ is not consistent with classical logic, the independence of A is replaced by the independence of iA, so that models of A andnA exist. Then the models ^,.., models. As mentioned above, Theorem 8 has a uniform due to de Jongh. Friedman ( any collection B1,...Bn of version are replaced by Kripke

) improved this by showing that

2 sentences strongly independent

over PA augmented by all true tr? sentences will work uniformly for all A(p.j,...,pn). Friedman's proof made use of his generalization of the Kleene Slash. We shall present a (Kripke) model-theoretic proof of his result in Section III-D, below. In terms of the simplicity of the substitution instances, Corollary 2 shows that B1,...,Bn (in the non-uniform version) can be taken to be disjunction of double negation of which, classically, would be 0 . We obtain 1 sentences, substitution

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instances in Section III-C, below. For only one propositional variable, an extremely nice version holds. E. de Jongh's Theorem for One Propositional Variable

For one variable, de ^ongh and I independently obtained 5T 0 uniform ^ ^ substitutions: Theorem 9. Let B be independent over PA, and let Pp }/ A(p).

Then HA U A(B). Proof: By Theorem 12 of Appendix B to Chapter 1 (Section IV-B), if (/ A(p), then ->or
a forcin g

relation on a

finite tree T in which only terminal nodes can force p. Let cv>+ be a non-standard model of PA +B and let w be the standard (in which B is false). model

Associate uu+ with the terminal nodes

forcing p andcuwith the other terminal nodes and consider K^. A simple induction shows C(p) iff^||- 0(B), under the two forcing relations. Thus O/QM/ A(B). QED

Alternative Proof: Use the Nishimura Pms and the following model:

u> uu

cu

.i

QED

Recall Theorem 2 by which, eg. we showed HA (- AxAxv\/x-VAx iff HA fc-"l/lxAx V xnAx, when HA t-A x(AxviAx).

We may restate this equivalence as HA V-VxAxv"1 VxAx iff

202

HA

VxAx "DVxAx, for decidable A. But, for this formulation,

Theorem 9 readily applies. If HA 1/ VxAxvi \/xAx, then HA 1 / V xAx and HA

| / | l /xAx, whence PA 1/ \ZxAxp VxAx. The

decidability of A implies that ~\/xAx is true in w and there is a non-standard model cv + of VxAx. But the proof of Theorem 9 carries over to yield HA W B(VxAx), where B(p) =-Tp^p. The converse, when HA J- V x A x V x A x , is trivial. (In particular, we

have an independence proof for Markov's Principle, rnVxAx^VxAx, A primitive recursive we discuss Markov's Principle in detail in Section II.) We might observe that we do not have the result for all HA + P, r<nP, since we must have Pvalid in u>. To get around this slightly, replace u at the terminal nodes by models +"f"

of iB. We leave the investigation of such results to the reader, taking time only to mention the following result of de Jongh's:

Theorem 10. Let B be a sentence such that HA |/*v*B, HA^/viBoB. Then, if Pp I/ A(p), we have HA |/ A(B). This can be proven by using Kripke models. Alternatively, in [vl. de Jongh proves this result by using an arithmetization of the Kleene Slash. F. Another Theorem of de Jongh (Digression) The Nishimura Pms was used by de Jongh to solve a problem of Kreisel. In fl2l , Kreisel and Levy mention that, when one wants a truth definition for formulae of bounded complexity, one must include the number of nested implication and negation occurring in a formula as well as the number of nested alternating quantifiers in one's measure of complexity. The infinitude of the

203

Nishimura lattice tells us that there are infinitely many formulae in one variable which are non-equivalent over Pp. Kreisel asked for a proof that there is no truth definition within HA for the substitution instances i.e. for any formula Tx and some sentence B, not all of the following equivalences are derivable: T(rA(B)'1)^A(B), where A(p) ranges over all propositional formulae in one variable and
rA(B)

denotes the godel number of A(B).

We present de Jongh's proof of this result here: Theorem 11. Let B be independent of PA, and let Tx have only

x free. Then, for some propositional formula A(p), ' HA U T( rA(B? )SA(B). In other words, for any independent sentence B, there

is no truth definition for the set of propositional formulae in B. Proof: Since B is^ and independent, B is false in the standard model. Letbe a non-standarde model of PA+B, and assign levels to the nodes of the Nishimura model as follows: uu+ B to B level 0

1~ Z i e v e i 1

JL

leTCl 2

Let C(x1,....,xn) be a formula with free variables as indicated. We shall prove by induction on the length of C that there is a level nQ^1 such that, for any m1,...,mn if C(m.|,... ..,mn) is forced by a node of level nQ, then C(nLj, *..m^) is forced by all nodes.

204

i) Let C "be atomic. Then n^ = 1. 11) - iii) If C is DaE or DvE, n^ = max(np,n.g) will do the trick. iv) Let C be DdE. Then take n^ = max(n,ng) + 1. To see this, label the nodes as follows:

t'>^'
>2

^*1

Let n = max(ND,nE) and let ^n + 1 II- BOE. First, observe that

n

lh- D DE and, if

E and all nodes force D and E, whence

they force DDE. If |^nll- D all nodes force D, whence o/n If- D, whence all nodes force DDE. If, for some that^"H- D and above B^E, then there is a j^^such

Jf-/ E. If the level of <Jis ^n, then *n or ^ lies

But,if this is the case,0' or A forces D and all nodes n f n

force the implication. On the other hand, there is no node of level <n which is not The case in which^n+1 Hence all nodes force DDE. l|- D5E is similar.

v) C is -ID. Similar to iv). vi) Let G(x1,...,xn) be \/xD(x,...,xn). Then nQ = n^. Since n^l, the domain at level n^ is o,1,..."^
e6*

o^n |(-VxDCxjm^,...,mn). Then, for some m, ^n ||- D(m,m1,...,mn) and all nodes force DCm,!!^ ,....,mn), whence they forc'e >%> A is handled similarly. VxD(x,m.j,..

205

vii) C(x1>...>xn) is AxD(x,x1,...,xn). Then nQ = nD and the proof is similar to that in Case vi). Thus, any formula Tx will have a level n^ associated with it in such a way that, for all or ^nrp A(B) , if
IV- T(
r A(B)

T(rA(B) ), then c(\\- T( ^(B)1 ) for all nodes

in the

model. The proof is completed by appealing to Theorem 11 of Appendix B to Chapter 1, by which there is, for any node sentence A(B) such that A(B), but A(B) for all QED , a

II. A.

THE GrODEL

INTERPRETATION FORMULAE

Markov's Principle We have already encountered Markov's Principle (or, the

Principle of Constructive Choice) in our discussion of the Xripke models. In Section I-B, we presented a model-theoretic version of Kreisel's proof of the independence of Markov's Principle (Theorem 2) and, in Section II-E, we observed that this result also came as a Corollary to a special version of de Jongh's Theorem for the special case of one propositional variable. Both proofs are off-shoots of the simple fact that Markov's Principle is not preserved by the operation ( ) > Before discussing this last fact, let us consider several formulations of Markov's Principle: )'.

i) A X(Ax \PAx )/v"il VxAx O VxAx, ii) A xy(AxyviAxy)A A x-nVyAxy:> A xVyAxy, iii) Axy(Axyv"iAxy) 0/\ x fiiV/yAxy oVyAxyT ,

iv) A x[Ay(Axyv-5Axy)a*1"1 VyAxyD VyAxy3 ,

206

v) A z /~Axy(Axyzv"iAxyz) A A x~*~*VyAxyz ? A xVyAxyz"^ , where A contains only the free variables shovm. Observe that the schemata obtained by replacing x,y or z by finite sequences of variables reduce to the present schemata via a pairing function. Thus, there is no loss of generality in considering only i) - v). Lemma 1 v 4> iv $ iii $ ii ^ i. Proof: v >iv. Trivial. iv v. Let K be a model of iv and let o/f K be such that

dl-M z[/\xy(Axyz^Axyz)AA x-n\/yAxyz"Dy\ x\/yAxyzl. Then, for some (3 ol and b^DJ3, we have

Axy(AxybvTAxyb),

xn">VyAxyb, and j3||/ /\x VyAxyb.

But then there are

and c^Dlf such that

VyAcyb.

We also have "Jfll-(AcybvnAcyb)A^T WAcyb. Let d=Yc, b > , where ^ , "> is a primitive recursive pairing function with inverses ( )Q, ( ) r Then

yll- Ay (A( ( d ) Q , y , ( d ) 1 )vTA( ( d ) 0 , y , ( d ) 1 ) and yH-1iVyA((d)0,y,(d)1),

whence, applying iv to A'xy: A((x)Q,y,(x)^), we have Tfll- VyA((d) Q , y ,(d)1), a contradiction. iv V iii. Let K be a model of iv,<^ ||and d||/Ax C^VyAxy O VyAxyJ Then there are

Axy(AxyvoAxy)
and b such

that ^|[-nl^yAby, J$H/ VyAby . Now Jill-Ay(AbyvnAby) and, by iv,

J& I

Ay(AbyvTVby)

"> VyAby D V yAby.

whenceJ3|l-\/yAby, a contradiction. iii ^ii. Let K be a model of iii, o( l|- Axy(Axy*"Axy), and

arfl/ AxnVyAxy

A xVyAxy. Then there are

and b VyAby^ VyAby,

such that jJ^^Aby and J11/ VyAby. But, by iii,

207

TsY =

Figure 1

208

a contradiction. ii ^ i. Trivial. QED

Unfortunately, we cannot settle any of the converse implications. (Simple model-theoretic independence proofs are ruled out when we replace the operation ( ) ^ )' by one

which preserves Markov's Principle, we will see that all five schemata are preserved) However, we can prove the following: Theorem 1. The scheme iv is derivable in HA + Rfu(i). Proof: Thp proof is based on a remark of Kreisel's that the uniform reflection principle allows one to add free variables. We show HA J~ A x VZPROVJJ^i(Z, rA y(Axytfi Axy)A"1"1 V yAxy O V yAxy1 ). Let BQ(X), be a primitive recursive enumeration of all

instances of A y(Axyv~i Axy) A ~n VyAxy "D VyAxy. a) HA (-AwProvWA+^(rBw(0>* , rBw(0)"1 ) , i.e. every axiom is its own proof. b) Let/\w VzProvHA+i(z, rBw(x) ). Also let f be primitive recursive such that HA h Bw(x+1)=Bfw(x). By well known properties of Prov, HA |- VzProvHA+i(z, rBw(x+1 j1 )=\ VzProvHA+i (rBfw(x7 ) But VzProvHA+i(z, rBfw(x)~') and so c)Thus HA I-Aw VzProvfiA+ (z, rBw(x f ) -j A w V zProvHA+i(z,rBw(x+1 f*). This and a yields HA|-AWX VSBPROVHA+i(Z,RBW(X)1 ). VzProbHA+i ^z' r;Bw^x+1 ^ )*

209

Rfu

(HA + i) (which is equivalent to Rfu (Proposition 1, Section Rfu > Rfu , however, is trivial.) yields,

I) the'implication

for w the index of A y(AxyvTAxy)yf",^rAxyO VV-Axy, HA + Rfu(HA + i) /- /\x[A y(Axy*/"lAxy)^'lV yAxy o\ZyAxy~] . QED Thus, if schemata i-iv are not formally equivalent, they are almost equivalent. Combining this with our model-theoretic inability to distinguish these schemata, we shall allow ourselves to be sloppy and let MP denote any of the schemata i-v. As a final comment, let us remark that MP can be formulated as a rule of inference (where, for convenience, we consider only scheme i): Lemma 2. (Luckhardt). MP is equivalent to the rule: mr. ^x(AVA) O-nVxk . /\ x(A^iA)^VxA Proof: Clearly the rule is valid in HA + MP. Assume the rule and let Ax be-nl/yByiD Bx. Obviously, HA J-/T X(AXVTAX) pnVxAx. On the other hand,
AX(AVTA)

xA

is equivalent to Ay(ByviBy) at* VyBy 3 VyBy. B. The Independence of MP As remarked above, we have already proven the independence of MP twice. This time, however, we shall be more direct. Theorem 2. Let HA + Tbe r.e., as defined in Section I-C). QED

Then some instance of MP is not derivable in HA + P. In fact, let xA be independent with Ax primitive recur-

210

sive (so

HA \~ /\x(Axv" Ax)). Then HA + P \1> nVxAx ^\/xAx. Proof: Let VxAx be independent of HA +/~\ Ax primitive

recursive, and let K be a model of HA +flwith a nodeJ? such that

/II- VxAx and

consider (K^ )':

aI

'

We will show
or

Tl/xAx oVxAx. Since

implies
An for

2T-/? C^ J^A/xAx. But if </Qft-^xAx, then a/0U-

some n. As usual, this means HA {- An and so Ha |-\/xAx, contradicting independence. But piPand so HA +F is preserved by the step from K^to (Kjj)'. For example, MP is independent of HA + Rfu(HA), HA + TI(^), HA + Con(HA + MPji etc. In addition to outright independence results, one can obtain results on the form of the axiomatization of MP as follows. First, let us define a measure, m, of the complexity of a formula of number theory. We do this inductively as follows, i) if A is atomic, m(A) = 1; ii) - iv) M(aO B) = M(ADB) = max(m(A),m(B)); v) m(~iA) = m(A); ^m(Ax), vi) m(VxAx) = ^ \ m(Ax) i(Ax) + 1 /m(Ax), vii) m(A xAx) = V Cm(Ax) + 1, otherwise. Ax = VyBy for some B, otherwise; Ax =AyBy for some B. QED

211

Observe that, for classical arithmetic, PA, this is a reasonable measure in the sense that a truth definition for formulae of bounded complexity can be given. We have observed in Section I-F that no such definition can be given in HA. (To obtain one, redefine m(ADB) = max(m(A),m(B)) + 1 and m(iA) = m(A) +1). Theorem 5. HA + MP is not axiomatized by any restriction of the scheme MP to formulae A for which m(A) ^ ng for any nQ. I.e. no set of instances of MP of bounded complexity can axiomatize MP (over HA). Proof: We know from recursion theory that all formulae whose complexity is of measure ^ nQ lie in a certain level of the Arithmetical Hierarchy. We also know form the Hierarchy Theorem and the Completeness Theorem (for classical logic) that there is some non-standard model tu+ of PA in which the truth of sentences at or below the given level of the Hierarchy agrees with truth in the standard model, but truth at higher levels does not. Thus, consider (u>+)': , to+ i
w

We first show by induction on m(A) and on the length of A that, if m(A) nQ,
A A is

"true in

(writtenu|= A),

For this, we use the facts that 0<\V- A iff U)+ j= A

iff u> |= A. Atomic A are decidable and there is no problem. The connectives
A

and Valsp offer no defficulty. Consider A = BZ?C. If o^qU- BOO,

212

then/|f- BDC, whence *u+|= A. Since m(BO C) < nQ,k>(= A. If <*11/ BI>G, then ot BDC. So suppose B^C, whence or

forces B but not C. Thus /H- B and, the length of B being less than that of BDC, we have <*i |= B and ^Q W- B. But, ot0\V B^>C, whence w 0 *
ot\tf

c.

Again,

c, whence u/ |j BDC. Also

B^c. TB is handled similarly. Now consider the quantified formulae. For convenience,

we only exhibit one quantifier, although there may actually be a block of like quantifiers. Thus, consider VxBx:

VxBx > <//f- VxBx > U>+ h VxBx

>Uil= VxBx, by choice of ut +. Conversely ,U/= VxBx ^3n Bn Bn, by induction hypothesis.

For AxBx,
xBx >LU+ \= /lxBx | = A x B x , b y c h o i c e o f c v +. If tvl^yAxBx, then U>+ N AxBx and {)/-AxBx. To conclude O^Q\\- AXBX, it suffices to show^0 B- Bn for all natural numbers n. But Lul=ABx >\/nU|= Bn

> Vn o/Q \\- Bn, by induction hypothesis.

Thus, we see that, for m(A) (= nQ , c/0||- A iff d If A iff cv |= A. But tv+ is not an elementary extension ofwand, for some

213

prenex sentence A, we have UJ+[= A,

A. Let A be such a

sentence for which m(A) is minimal. Then A is of the form

Vxr..xnB,

where m(B)< m(A). To see this, observe that, by

minimality of m(A), the above argument holds for all prenex C for which m(C)< m(A). In particular, ojQ\\- C iff iff G |= G,

and C is decidable. Suppose A is of the form /\x^,..,xnB(x^,... ...,xn), m(B)<m(A). Then

iAj

|=

* ,xn^x1'* * 'Xn^ '

~ Ax.j

x^) .,an)

^a r ..a n e Drf*||- B(a1

Vm1...mnu/K. ih BCm.,,...,11^)

- 4Vm1.. .mneu

II- B ( m 1 , . . . , 1 1 ^ ) ,

since m(B)<m(A). This last fact, together with the fact that
OTLT-A x^...xnB, implies *o\\-

A x1***xn*

Bu"t

more importantly,

since m(B)^m(A), 0II- B(m^,..,mn)

U> f=

B(m^ ,. ,m^),

whence Ui |=/^x^..,xnB and A cannot be of the form suggested. Hence, we have u/+
qI -

i/x^...xnB, uj |= ~^x.^.. xnB, and |h- ^x^...xnB,

Q

A x i .xn(B^iB) (as mentioned above). But .xnB. 0 |f- TlV^.. But we cannot have o(

and so

II-

...x^B.

Contr&ejbing quantifiers, we have an instance,

AX(B'xB'x) A "'"'^xB'x

\ZxB'x,

of MP which is not forced at (QFinally, for m(C)<nQ, we have m( VxC) ^ ng, whence VxG i s decidable in the model (m( V xC vt \^cC) = mCVxC)^ whether ^oll- ^xC or c^lf-l^xC, we have
n o)
Bu-t

214
/ 0 IJ-

Ax(GxviCx)/v^^xCx "2 ^xCx.

Hence MP is true in the model for instances of low complexity, but not for high complexity. The fact that we can make the "low complexity" large enough to include nQ yields the Theorem. QED Corollary. MP is not derivable from the subscheme,

A x" \/yAxy^ Ax VyAxy,

where A is primitive recursive. The above proof was rather long, but the idea is simple. If we start with a model UJ+ of PA which agrees with in the

truth of formulae of low complexity, but not for formulae of high complexity, then formulae of low complexity are decidable in the model: uu+ ol0 u; ,

whence MP holds for sentences of low complexity. But sentences of high complexity are not decidable and, in particular, there is some sentence VxBx which is not decidable ato^Q, but for which Bx yields a decidable property. Hence MP fails in some instance of high complexity. We might also comment on the measure of complexity used. One might object that we should consider an intuitionistically meaningful measure i.e. one for which the bounded truth definition can be given in HA as well as in PA. As observed above, such a measure m1 is obtained by defining m'(AOB) = max(m'(A), m'(B)) + 1 and m1 (-*A) = m'(A) + 1. But then, for any formula A, m'(A) ^ m(A), whence the result follows from Theorem 3. Further, concerning the specific choice of a measure m, Theorem 3 can be

215

shown to hold for any measure for which truth definitions for formulae of bounded complexity can be given in PA ( and hence for those measures whose bounded truth definitions can be given in HA). Theorem 3 and its Corollary easily generalize to any r.e. HA + P, where ret and Pis true in the standard model, eg. HA + Rfu(HA). C. Proof-Theoretic Closure Properties We have used the failure of MP to be preserved by the operation ( ) > (Z )' to prove its independence and to prove that it cannot be replaced by a bounded set of its instances. (In the next Section, we will replace the operation ( ) ^ by one which will &llow us to extend many standard results for HA to HA + MP.) We have also given a derived rule whose proof was based on MP's failure to be preserved: Theorem 4. let A contain only x free and let HA 1- /\x(Ax^i Ax). Then the following are equivalent: i) HA f- VxAxvtVxAx; ii) HA J-TlVxAx 3 VxAx; iii) HA I- Vy("1,~l VxAx ^ Ay). (This is Theorem 2 of Section I-B.) An almost trivial derived rule is Theorem 5. Let A contain only x free and let HA |-/\x(AxvnAx) and HA l-"V*VXAx. Then HA )'

VxAx.
xAx implies VxAx is true in

Proof: Observe that HA

the standard model and, hence, An is true for some n. But HA J- Anv"*An and the Disjunction Property yields HA I- An or

216

HA |-"* An. Hence HA (- An, i.e. HA V- ^xAx. As shown by Kreisel ( fuT ) (But see also result also holds for A with free variables: Proposition 1. Let A contain x,y free and let HA and HA I-A xT^yAxy. Then HA (- ^xVyAxy.

QED

fl9] .),

this

/Ixy(AxyvlAxy)

The present proof of Theorem 5 admits no easy extension to a proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that we decide to attempt to prove this directly. That is, let K be a model with node such that o/jly /\xVyAxy. Then for somefi^c/L and bCDJ?f we have

J$ll/

VyAby. Since HA (-/\xy(Axy VAxy), we see that ju- lAbc for

all cDjS. Also, since HA J-/I x "^VyAxy, we can find some and c^DUfsuch that

r>s

HI-

Abe. But c

DY - DJS and

we obtain no

contradiction. We cannot pull D^3 out of the model K and define a non-standard model of arithmetic on it, because it does not follow from the fact that an axioip is forced at a given node that it will be true in the classical model determined by domain and atomic formulae forced at that node. (Note: We have not here done anything that we would not do to show HA J- Axy(Axy "TAxy)a

a/^x"1"1 VyAxyD AxVyAxy. Thus, we should not expect to get

anywhere. Also, unfortunately, there seems to be no place at which to apply the trick used in proving Theorem 4.) We might also mention that Luckhardt's Theorem (lemma 2, above) shows that the following is not a derived rule for HA: HA j- Ax(AviA) D. VxA > HA h /x(Av^A) VxAx.

Operation ( ) ^ ( +u>)' The failure of MP to be preserved under ( ) ^ ( )

217

has its applications. But applications such as the Explicit Definability Theorem required preservation under ( ) > )1

and, to obtain such results, we must give a similar such operation under which MP is preserved. Fortunately, the solution to this problem is simple: If $~is a family of models of MP, define an operation on^~by
+uu)1.

Eg. let$~=fK1f K2"$ . Then (u)' is

i a j
x i /

Theorem 6. If HA + MP is valid in (jT", then it is valid in (+ UJ) ' i.e. the validity of HA + MP is preserved under the operation ( ) (" + u>)'. Proof: We consider the scheme i). It being valid in ^T+ let we need only look ,at o<q. Let o(qII-Ax(AxviAx)a71^xAx. be the'node corresponding to . Then II n^xAx,

whence //|-VxAx. But De( =

o ,1,....^and

so, for some n,c(II- An. jf- An, i.e. O/QM- \/XAX.

A is decidable and os HA |- An, whence Thus,

* 0 M x(AxvlAx)a"1"* VxAx O l/xAx.

QED

Corollary. HA + MP has the explicit Definability and Disjunction Properties. Proof: We can't quite quote Theore 6 of Chapter 2, Section I-E; but we can observe that the proof carries over easily, the additional summand being used only to guarantee the validity of MP. Regarding closure properties of the class U QED of sets

218

^such that the validity of HA +!"is preserved "by the operation ( ) > ( + "0 ', we get almost exactly the same properties corresponding to ( ) > (2T )' (Theorem 4, Section I-C). The difference is that we must also insist that P be true in the standard model: -U> Theorem 7. The class w of sets,P, such that the validity of HA + r is preserved under the operation ( ) > (" + u>)! has the following closure properties: i9w i) 'is closed under arbitrary union; ii) if VtT and A is a Harrop sentence, and vu fc A, then T+ A slT; iii) if Pef HA +P , A has only the free variable x, and

An for each numeral n, then r +A xAx IP10. (Note that, in iii), the fact thatto|=AxAx follows

from the facts that HA + P J- An for all n and tu{= f ) The proof of Theorem 7 is identical to that of Theorem 4, Section I C, and we omit it. The results of Section I-C carry over easily. We leave the verifications to the reader.

The proof of de Jongh's Theorem does not carry over: Consider J*:

\/2
If we wish to force MP when we turn this into a model of HA, or we must associate the standard model with either c

219

Similarly, it must be associated with one of one ofand

and (A and with p 4 Thus, we end up with something of the form

below with three of the terminal nodes having the standard model associated with them. But we can see that the proof of de Jongh's Theorem does not go through because Lemma 1, of Chapter 1, Section II-B does not apply. A sophistication of our technique in Section III-E will allow us to get around this problem. Also, it will yield a method of generalizing Theorem 7 to cases where Pneed not be true in the *1
(J ip

standard model. at, uj

E.

The Independence-of-Premise Postulate One of the reasons for interest in Markov's Principle

is its validity in the Godel Dialectica Interpretation ( /X) ). Also valid in this Interpretation is the following variant of the Independence-of- Premise Postulate:

IPQ: AX(Ax\P Ax>\ ( A xAx D VyBy) 1> Vy( yVxAx^ By),

where we assume that A,B have only the free variables indicated. As in Section A, where we considered variants of MP, we may consider variants of this scheme. IPQ however, is simply not as susceptible to study by means of the Kripke models as MP, and, thus, we shall only consider the scheme as presented. The reader may consider variants as he pleases (Eg. the full scheme, IP, (- AO V/yBy)^

Vy(-A^By).).

We first consider some proof-theoretic closure properties of HA. Let TPand be as defined in Sections I-C and D, above.

220

Theorem 8. Let A have only the variable x free, B only y free. Let then HA + P j- Vy(/\xAx3By). Proof: Suppose HA + P // Vy(AxAx UBy). Then, for each n, there is a model Kn with originy?n such that ^/^H-ZlxAx, Bn. Let o(q "be the origin of (^Kn)t. B y the decidability of A and the fact that If HA + F 1- Ax(Ax Ax) and HA + P |-y\xAxO V yBy,

ll-AxAx

for all n,
Bn*

/\xAx. Hence *^0

and 80

^ 0 l|-VyBy and, for some n,

j3n/f- Bn, a contradiction.

QED pep
If

Theorem 9. Let A,B be as in Theorem 8 and let

HA + r

Ax(Axv"7Ax) and HA +P f- /\xAx ^ ^yBy, then HA + R J- Vy( AXAX OBy).

Proof: Replace (^Kn)' by (2^ +u*). For instance, we may let P = MP, TI(-^), Rfu(HA), QED

Rfu(HA.'+ MP), etc. P. Mutual Independence of MP and.IPQ There is one useful property that IPQ has: It is not preserved under ( ) > (2f )' or ( ) ( + cc)' Because of

this, we may prove the following Theorem 10. Let be r.e. Then there is a primitive recursive

Ax and a formula By (each with only the free variables indicated) such that HA+P// (A xAx"D Y yBy)2V y(AxAx3By). Proof: Let VzCz and AXAX be formally undecidable in

PA + P, Ax and Cz primitive recursive. Also, let AxAxaVzCz be

221

consistent (by the Appendix,below). Define B y . ^ .y = 0 A V z C z v y= 1 a 1 ^ Z C Z .

let tu+, u> ++ be classical models ofAxAx/\VzCz and
I A X A X , Consider (u> + u; + + tu ++ ) ':

o^j

AxAx/pVsCz
^

0^2 /+AXAXAVZCZ
I

C *,+"t,A x AX

o( 0 No w o /q K-P since re IP and o ^q It- Ax(Ax vlAx) since A is primitive xAx and

recursive. Also, ^II- /\xAxo VyBy, since only ^ B1 , c^2 I/BO.

But <'0l|/\/y( AxAx"5By), since then ^qU- /IxAx "^BO or

W0IV-A*AX=>B1.

In the first case, it follows that ^II-AXAXOBO

and in the second case, that ^^"AxAxDB1, both implications leading to contradictions, It is worth singling out the case P = MP: Corollary. IPQ is not derivable from MP. IP0 is preserved under a special case of ( ) > faf )', under which MP is not preserved: Theorem 11. Let ur+ be a model of PA. Then HA + IPq is valid in QED

Proof: Suppose that, in the model (tx/ + ).> u/+ I , h0 u> does not force an instance of IPQ:
AX(AXV" AX)A(A XAX3V yBy)O V y( /\xAxo By).

IPq being valid at o( , we must have

<0 l|- Ax(Axv"Ax)/\^kAx "D 1/yBy),

222

o<qI|/ ^y(A xAx^By). By this last statement, o^qI|//VxAxOBO and, for some c<0, we

have fib-A xAx,A BO. In particular, oc||-A xAx and, A "being decidable,c^0H- An for all n. It follows that ^0 ^0U- AxAx Thus xAx. But

whence ^0|j-\/yBy and, for some n, o/Q//- Bn.

AxAxDBn and so o(q If-Vy(AxAx :?By), a contradiction.

QED
The immediate Corollary is Corollary. Let HA + P be r.e.,/"^^, PA + P consistent. Then some instance of MP is not derivable in HA +T+ IPQ Proof: HA +P + IPQ is valid in ( ow+)1 for any model u>+ of PA + P. But, as shown in the proof of Theorem 3, MP valid in (uu + )f unless tj+ is an elementary extension of is not
tw .

QED
G. Final Comments on MP and I P Q The non-preservation of IPQ under ( ) > )' allows

us to prove for IPQ an analog to Theorem 3. We may also generalize Theorem 3 by using the fact that IPQ is preserved under U/+ > ^ (tu+)'. Also, aside from such results, and formulations of such corollaries as the independence of IPQ from HA + MP + Rfu(HA + MP) + Con(HA + IPQ) + etc., we may observe that we can obtain subtler results such as the following: Theorem 12. There is a formula By and a primitive recursive Ax (each with only the indicated free variables) such that i) HA + MPM (A XAXD V/yBy)o Vy(AxAxoBy), ii) HA + IP0 l/-nVxAxDVxAx. (In other words, the same formula A works in both

223

independence proofs). Proof: Observe that A may be taken in both independence proofs to be arbitrary up to the requirement that VxAx be independent of PA. Beyond this, there is little that we can do modeltheoretically since i) the only models of IPq we have so far are (except for those given by the Completeness Theorem) models w + of PA and models of the form (u/+)', and ii) the only models to which we know we can apply the operation ( ) ^ ( )' and preserve QED

IPQ are the models of PA.

III. A.

DEFINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS The Operations ( ) > ( The operation ( ) > (^ )* )', while extremely useful, is

too restrictive for certain purposes. In proving de Jongh's Theorem for instance, we had models of the form, UJ
1

U> \ / /1 ^
2

Uf
3

u, v /
4

U/
5

Lu, > /
6

5<

This cannot possibly give us /2, and

substitution instances since sentences (and

must all force the same

similarly for models on the other modified Jaskowski trees). The observant reader will also have noticed that, to apply ( ) ^ (If + uj) 1 in proving (say) the Explicit Definability Theorem for HA + MP + P, we had to assume that F*was true in the standard model.

224

Let

a family of models and let u/+ "be a non-standard

model of PA such that i) the domain ofto+ is contained in D/ for all UG K, K^", and ii) atomic formulae whose parameters are from Uj+ are forced at any node o(. exactly when they are true in uu
+.

Then, we can define a model (^^")* in the manner in which ,K. Then is

we defined (^^r)1. Eg. let

Unfortunately, we don't know if (

)* will always be

a model of HA. For, what have we got to guarantee that the induction scheme will be forced at ^q? Truth in to+ is not convincing the Law of the Excluded Middle is true in io+, but not forced at ^q. In ( model of PA placed at ) -r? (+<*)', we did not merely have a we had the natural numbers themselves.

Let us consider how we proved the induction axiom to be valid in Our " Second proof" was to observe that, by

Theorem 4 - iii) of Section I - G, to conclude that induction was valid, we not only had to look only at the scheme without free variables other than x in Ax, but we only had to look at all instances AOa A xy(Ax/sS(x,y) DAy)^An. This is obviously valid in )* but, since the domain at

has non -standard integers, we cannot conclude from the fact that *0 ||- AO/\Axy(Ax/>S(x,y)OAy) that c*Q ||- Aa for all a^D^, but only that 1^" AO, A1 ,... .

The actual proof we gave in proving the validity of induction in was based on the following reasoning:

225

If ^QU- AO/Axy(Ax aS(x,y) DAy) and e^JlZ/VxAx, there is a least n such that An. There are two cases in which we can guarantee

the existence of a least element in w/+ of which A is not forced: , and ii) the condition A" is expressible in the

language of w + in other words, if the truth (or, forcing) definition for a formula in the Kripke model can he given within the classical model uj+. B. Definability In this Section, we formally define what we mean by the definability of a Kripke model in a model of PA and prove some results about such definable models. Suppose K is a Kripke model, in which HA is valid, U>+ a non-standard model of arithmetic. Let, for each a^ Q Dot , K and

denote a number in cu+ indexing a^ .We assume that

we have formulae as follows, with the free variables as indicated: K (*),

D(o^ ,x),

S( v ,x,y), A( oC ,x,y,z), M(<rf,x,y,z). Also, 0,

T,... wilLdenote indices of 0,1,

Let us suppose that there is a one-to-one correspondence

between elements ol^K and elements a of c*>+ for which such a way that, if a,b are associated with then iff H)+ a^b,

|= Ka, in

, respectively,

226

and uj+ M xy(x^y o Kx/JCy). Then, obviously, we may identify elements of K with a definable subset fo the domain of and ^ with the definable partial

ordering on this subset. We also assume that tw+ j= D( o< ,a^ ), and u>+ h D(<* ,a) > a is an index a^ for some &or D( If d we may assume either that the set of constants is contained in
e DJ3$

f a^ : a^ e Doi ^

or that there

is a definable function f(x,y,z) such that f( oLtf ,a^ ) is an inde:c of a^ In what follows, we shall ignore this minor distinction. Finally, if, in addition to all of this, we have U> B( ,a.^ > anot ) iff If~ BCa-j^,..,#ana^ )* , then we

for all atomic B, nodeso(and elements a^ ^ >...,an<^ D

say that the model K is definable in Cv+. (See Chapter 2, Section I-B.). The definability of a classical model, w>++, in cu+ can be taken as the definability of the one node Kripke model, or can be taken in the obvious manner. Three rather obvious Lemmas are Lemma 1. Let K be definable inw/+. Then, for aiiy formula A(x^ ,.. ..,xn) with free variables as shown, there is a formula A*(x,x1,.. ...,xn) with free variables as shown and parameters from w+ such that, for alioand a^ ^ ,... anf)t D IV* an o< ^ ,
a ^) nc

*** t2 A* ( , a^^

227

Lemma 2. Let 5"= in to + . Then

,...>K,n? be such that each

is definable

is definable in *-o+.

Lemma 3. Let K be definable in u++ and let cu++ be definable in

+.

Then K is definable in w+. These Lemmas will be applied shortly in the construction

of models. For this, we will need to prove that ( model of HA when each K

)* is a

is definable in w+ (^-"finite). But,

before we can do this, we need the following: Lemma 4. Let K be a model of HA definable in u+ and let K have a least node

OIQ.

There is a canonical embedding of ou + into

Do^q which is one-to-one and preserves the atomic formulae. Proof: Obviously one can match up the 0 of ui+ with the 0 of D<<0, the 1 of u+ with the 1 of D^q, etc. But, for nonstandard elements, we must observe that, in HA, the relation "y is the result of the x-fold application of the successor function of K to 0" (i.e. y = Sx0) is expressible. By the closure of <aj
+,

(in K) under the successor function, and by induction in for all xew+ there is an element in D*Q which is the

x-fold application of successor to 0. The truth of atomic formulae S(a,b) is obviously preserved under the map which associates x with the object Sx0 in D^q. The preservation of the truth of other atomic formulae follows from the validity of the recursion equations in K and induction in

uj+.

QED

^Kote: It is in steps like this that the embedding functions f(x,y,z) are introduce in the model. We shall, however, suppress further mention of these function in favor of a more informal approach to these proofs, in much the same way that

228

algebraists avoid mentioning such minor difficulties.! We may now prove the following Theorem 1. Let ^"= fk.|,... Kj3
Ki
1 * *

definable in ** +. Then (

)*,

K n

\ ./
+ tu is a model of HA. If, in addition, cu+ is definable in u++, ( Z?)* is definable in c*j++. Proof: By Lemma 2, is definable in w + . Obviously,

U/+ is definable in u + . To define ("2^")* in oo+, first recall that, formally,tf = K, where K = K1 x flf O ...V; Kn x ("n^ , etc. Thus

OIQ

= (0,0)$fe K and we may let

be the node for cu+ and

define J & f iff. < = ^ o i j M , , 0 v Thus K*, are definable. Let D*( < ,x) o(Q^x w + v oCoAD(t>t ,x).

^To explain "x"u/+", recall that the elements of u>+ index elements in all domains and so we must choose special indices to denote elements of u+ that is, we have a formula singling out the indices for
cu+.

If au>+, a will denote its index. (Recall

that oj+ is definable in u+ and consider what we mean by this.)] To complete the. proof that (2^")* is definable in ou +, we need only show how to define the atomic formulae. Let ,us assume that is defined in u>+ as a Kripke model (say with ;

nodeoQ). Let B be atomic: B^ denotes its definition for B+ its definition for U/+. Then

229

B * (cL , x , . . 1 . . . x ) . n

X x ^^0, 1 * * * *' n ^^

^ (^*X1 * *

By lemma 1, for any formula A, there is a formula A*(x,x^,...,x ) such that, for any node oC and elements a^ ,...,an DC , t= A* ( , a^
a^)

A(a^ ,..,a^) iff

Suppose CzT)* is not a model of HA. Then, for some A(x,x1,... ...,x ) with only x,x^ xn free,

o^0|(//Vx1...xn f*A(0,x1 ,...,xn)A Axy(A(x'x1 >xn)as(x,y)3 3A(y,x1 ,...,xn)) ^ AxA(x,x1, . . . ,xn)3. Then, for some a^,...,an ^uj+,
a) x a) ( x tY) A(y , a) <*o||/ A(0,a^ ,..* , \ A y ( A ( x , a ^ , . . . , a ^ , . ., n / n n )

^AxA(x,a.j, ,a^) Then ^0 |(- A(0,a1,...,an), o^0jj-Axy(A(x,a1

a <0||/ A ( a , a ^ , . . ^ )

an)AS(x,y) pA(y,a1 ,...,afl))

for some aetx/+. Letting a be such that ^QM/ A(a,a1 ,...,an), we see, for A* defining ^0ll- A(x,x1,...,xn), tAi v A*(o^q,0,a^,.,an),

a) \A?( = / U y r A * ( c ^ , x , a . . ., a ) S * ( ^ , x , y )3 A * (o ^ , y , a , . . ., , 0 1, n A t Q Q 1 n ]

(*)
i*j+ A*(QtB.fa.^ , tan)

Nov S*(o/0,x,y)^s(x,y), whence (*) becomes <+ \= Axy fA*(o/0,x,I1

a )AS(x,y)OA*(c^ J,a ,...,I )]. n 0 1 n

(**

But the map a fa. is definable into4", whence there is a least aQ such that u>+ (j*

A*(O(Q

230
aQ^0

whence ag=b+1 for some b. By minimality, caj |=( A* a ) . n

By this last statement and (**),

a , a a v |= A*( o ^ o ' 0 1 '* * *' n ^ '

a contradiction. Thus (^^")* is a model of HA. The final comment that is definable in w++ if

K/ + is definable in t^++ follows from the definability of in uj+ and Lemma 3. We have just proven two important results: i) if ..,K n QED .

are definable in*i+, then (K.. i +...,+K n)* is a model of HA; and ii) if u>+, as above, is definable in vu++, then (K_1 +...+Kn)*

is definable in o++. To be able to apply these results, we need a stock of definable Kripke models and definable models of PA.

This is obtained by appeal to the Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem: Proposition 1. (Hilbert-Bernays Completeness Theorem). Let T be a consistent r.e. extension of PA. Then, for any model of

PA + Con(T), there is a non-standard model u>++ of T which is definable in W + . For a proof, see Kleene b3 or Feferman TO. C. Substitution Instances in de Jongh's Theorem Recall that the reason we used the modified Jaskowski trees in proving de Jongh's Theorem was that every node was determined by the set of terminal node not lying beyond it. Thus, if each terminal node was the unique node satisfying a particular sentence, it followed that every node was the least node satisfying a conjunction of negations of sentences corresponding

231

to terminal nodes. Then, any set which could be the set of nodes forcing a propositional variable under a propositional forcing relation was now the set of nodes forcing a disjunction of such conjunctions of negations. In proving the existence of 2! substitution instances, we will assign to each node of a tree a Z. s e n t e n c e w h i c h is f o r c e d only at and a b o v e t h a t n o d e . The substitution instances will be disjunctions of these sentences (and will thus be Note that we no longer need to use the special property of the modified Jaskowski trees that every node is determined by a set of terminal nodes. Nonetheless, by their symmetry, it will still be convenient to work with them. Consider eg. J*: 3

Starting at the terminal nodes and working our way down the tree, we shall assign theories to the nodes. Let A^,...,Ag be strongly independent over PA (or, let theni be individually independent and Assign to mutually contradictory-^ see the Appendix, below).

the theory Ti=PA

+

i +

f1lA

By the independence of the family ^A^,....,Ag^ T^ is consistent. Now choose B^BgjB^ individually independent over PA + Qon(T1)+ .. .. +Con(Tg) + "^A^ + ... + lAg (which is true in u; and hence consistent) such that PA theory for i^j. Assign to ^ the

6 T! = PA + Bj + Con(TJ + i J *' o

6 Q ""A,, J ~~' <J

252

Again, T| is consistent. Finally, assign to ^q the theory PA + Con(TJj) + Con(T) + Con(T^) + 1B1 + 1B2 + nBy Having assigned such theories, we now assign models of PA to the nodes. Place "^at o<q. ou |= Con(T^j) + Con(T^) + Con(T^), whence there are models ^, <^2,
and

^3

fo

T2 and T3

respectively, such that each w is definable in , Now, 6 6 tv (= Tj = PA + Con(Tj) + + B. Thus, in w CU 11, W-|2 there are definable models to T1t...,Tg. Let
models of T-|T2

respectively, definable in
***2'
and

^1' **21'^22 models o;f T3T4 models of T^,Tg definable in Thus, we have

de;Cinable in

"^31 ^32

Now, successively apply the Lemmas of Section B to conclude that the resulting structure is a model of HA. Further, as we will prove below, A^ is forced only at the node corresponding to A2 at ^12 -and above, B2 at
A3 at

' B1

is forced only at

and above, and B^ at

and above. Any

provable X sentence is forced at ^. Hence each node is characterized by a 3:^ sentence and we may proceed from here. For ease in assigning theories and models to nodes in the general case, and for ease in giving the proof, let us use

233

the notation of trees of finite sequences . This will differ slightly from that used in Chapter 1, Section II and Chapter 2, Section II. We let 1T,<7~ denote finite sequences. <? denotes the empty sequence. ^a> denotes the sequence whose only element is a. ir*<Twill denote the concatenation of Aland cr i.e. if & 0
p m 1 ^'

( T - <"s0, . . . s > , then fr*<7~ = n 1

In

^ Pq >Pm_i s o * * **sn-1^ *
^Pq Pm-l
<1 ,2>

Par'ticu]-ar>

^a> =

eg*' w i l 1 1,6

represented by <2,2> 0,1> ^3 > <3,2>

<2,1*>

Let J* be given and let 0~,,..., <T , be its terminal n i n . nodes. Choose A^- ,...,Aj- ^ such that PA + kr + is d consistent and let = PA + A + .J\ A . 1 *i 3 Let 0^,..., be the non-terminal nodes n< of length m and let
cr.* <1 >
(r*4 A(\

d >(i =

be their successors of length A ^ for

r )

,...,A _ be chosen such that PA V- A_ r r ri ^1 \ ij^j and s u c h that each A <r* is consistent with 1 t k k i
Tm+1

m+1. Let

PA +

^ C o n C T ^

;j^1nA C T ^ ; )>

(Observe that cu is a model of this theory and, thus, it is consistent.) Let ~ Tm+1 + A <r- ' Thus, every node cr gets a theory T^ assigned to it.
T a

234

Futher, if<r*^j**is a successor of (T, then Con (T^ ^ ^ is provable in of let ^

Let

Thus, every model

of T^has a definable model

> be Cuand for each t*^~and successor (T*<j> ,

UJ . <r

be a model of T g. ^^^definable in

Having

defined these models, assign Kripke models K^-to the nodes as follows: i ) = UJf- f o r t e r m i n a l <r% be the successors of <f~ and let

ii) let 0**^1 . = (^ c r * < 1 > > *

E <r*<i>

*r*<k>

By the results of Section B, each K^-is a model of HA in particular, K^is a model of HA. Lemma 5. Let A be a sentence. Then c< lh A iff A.

If<7"|l- V^xBx, say B p r i m i t i v e r e c u r s i v e , we k n o w t h a t

CTL\ Bs for some sF D(T. LetfT-0"~be terminal. Then

ify,|= Bs.

Now, it does not follow trivially that

U/Q,|=

Bs model-theoreti -

cally, the well-known characterization of recursiveness is preservation under extension and restriction for end extensions (i.e. extensions in which the smaller model is an initial segment of the larger model, under the natural (ordering). (Of course, Matiyasevich now gives us the result for arbitrary extensions-

but this is far from trivial.) Proof of Lemma 5. There are three tricks we can use here: i) Expand the language so that primitive recursive relations are atomic. The lemma follows trivially.

235

ii) Observe that the definable extension u/+ of w+ is an end extension. The Lemma now follows, because, for sf(+, ^x<s means the same in both models. iii) Apply the Theorem of /"14I by which, if A is
x x x x e r e HA |- A =\ / i , m ^ ( i * * , m ) 'w ^

q u a n t i f i e r f r e e . The QED

Lemma then follows trivially. Lemma 6. to A_ iff &- /V. <t * tr Proof: Clearly 0^, <r- ((- A ^ ,w h e n c e j= A ^. j=

A^.. Then V ll- Ay , whence, if

Conversely, first assumelTis terminal. Then implies that & , = A*-for all terminal
cr *

But,the only

terminal <r' for which

A^.is 4T. Hence <T=ir by the property

of the modified Jaskowski trees. no avoid using this property, let Then, for some
, ff = <r'*<i>;

but

v-*contradicting the fact that

J= T

%- ^ , = PA + ^)

v
+ >^{\ Con (...),

where if' ranges over terminal nodes. J Letlfbe non-terminal and let i= A^j-. Assume ^1*'.

<T" cannot be of length less than 17", because , by choice,

w

r-i

for anyJ*of length greater than that of <T. Thus, the length of 0" is at least that of "IT andtf"^^-' for some <r' of the same length as ff . Now
W

, t= A^ , , whence

g*

If- A

, whence 0"H-A^,t , whence

113 t A . . But PA I- A , D n A ^ , by d e f i n i t i o n ,a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . *cr CT ^ 1r QED Note: The above proof could have been simplifies by unifying the cases which could have been done by stipulating

236

that the

sentences assigned to terminal nodes be mutually

contradictory instead of strongly independent. The non-terminal nodes must be treated as they were unless we know PA A^_ ,

nAp,, we have no guarantee that A^-will be false in extensions <T of <r'. (This observation is due to de Jongh, who found and corrected the corresponding error in our original attempt at proving the existence of We may now prove Theorem 2. let Pp f/ A(p^,....,p ). Then there are
B1 * *

substitution instances).

sentences

* * ,Bn

sucil

"that

V A(Bi > n )

Proof: Let J* be given with a forcing relation on it it such that A(p1 Pn)* Let' for eacl1 Pi B = W k*. i ~ <r\\- Pj. * (If notf~forces p.^, let B.^ be any refutable Bi is S,<r/|-

sentence.) Then

iff f If- Pif and a simple induction on the

length of 0(p^,...,pn) shows

<T If-

C(p1,...,pn) iff <r//-(B1 ,...,Bn) Substitutions in de Jongh's Theorem

QED

D.

Uniform

The problem with the

substitutions is that we cannot sentence to be

choose the nodes at which we want a particular forced. Eg. consider the tree oi B

* B,A

V /

Suppose we want A,B forced as indicated, A,B 2^. Then, at must have a model
Lu, of 4

we

237

PA + B + Gon(PA + B nA) + Con(PA + B + A). Since B is false in the standard model. PA + nB + Con(PA + B + ~iA) + Gon(PA + B + A) is also consistent and B must be independent over PA + Con(PA + B + iA) + Con(PA + B + A). Larger trees will require larger nested consistency statements and we junst don't know if any such sentences exist. (Observe that we cannot have as
TT

much independence from consistency statements as with sentences since, if B is

then B + Con(PA +~iB) is

inconsistent. However, we only need ~\B occurring inside Con(...) when it occurs otitside as well and we cannot trivially rule out the possibility of finding ^^ statements as needed.) If, however, B,|,...,B are "Tf and strongly independent

over PA when augmented by all true 17 sentences of arithmetic, we can assign nodes to the formulae as desired. This is the basis of the following model-theoretic proof of a result of Friedman: Theorem 3. (Friedman). Let B1#...tB PA augmented by all true "jf Then HA 1/ A(B1,...,Bn). Proof: Let(k,^, II-) be an arbitrary tree model of Pp and let OH/ A(p^ ,...,pn). Let B1,...,Bn satisfy the hypothesis of the Theorem (For the existence of such B's see the Appendix.) and assign theories to nodes as follows: If tT is terminal,
T<r= rA +

be "If* Independent over

sentences, and let Pp I/ A(p^,...,Pn)

1$ Pi Bi - wPVl
cr*41>,...,<r

IftThas successors

*^k >,

V "p A

238 k o n ( ) . +$C T ( r ) ( < j >

Each T^- is obviously consistent and we may define models "fr- as usual, starting at with an arbitrary model of T< . Then Kf

is defined for each a* and, finally, we have a model of HA. Eg. with the tree featured above, we have U <2,1> UJ UJ 2 > <1 ,1 > s<

Uu ^2,2>

< >
where u^2,1>' *<h,2>' %2> ^ B *%f2> ^ A* Lemma 7. Let

A be ff- <ni- A iff \JIR<R tty f= A.

Proof: Probably the simplest thing to do is to appeal to 14"! or add new predicate symbols so that A is of the form, /^X-| \/y^..y C ( x . , x , y m 1 ,. n 1 y ) , m

where C is quantifier-free and decidable. Then

sr[Y A >

A
v f r ^ V s . , . . . s e mr 3 t1.. . t m e n
viftrH-

c (s1,...,sn, t1f..
-

* *'^m^ \f s^.. .sn"By 3"t-j 'bm' sn "k-j *"^m)

Vtr-<r UJ,|=Ax1...xn\/y1...yinC, i.e.

combination.

|f A. A\/

The converse is just the definition of forcing for an

To finish the proof of the Theorem, observe that

<r|l-

iff iff

\/tr<r

f=

Vf

iff irl(- p.

239 The rest is just the usual induction. E. de Jongh's Theorem for MP Just as MP was not preserved under ( ) >( is not in general preserved under ( ) * each element of valid in )', it QED

)*. If, however,

,...>K.n^ is definable in u>+, and MP is

then MP is valid in (^?$T +to+)*. This is just a

variation of the result we will need. A direct verification of this variant is left to the reader. The general Lemma we will need is the following: Lemma 8. Let
K

be a tree model of HA obtained by the process of

placing non-standard models of arithmetic at the nodes. Suppose that, for every node there is a terminal nodefr^**"such that

= u-Jp. Then MP is valid in K. Proof: Assume MP is not valid in K take MP in the form iv of Section II-A:

Ott/ Ax[A y(AxyvlAxy )A"* n VyAxy^ VyAxy^ .

Then, for some (T-<> and s

<T/|/ A y(AsyviAsy) a"*'1 VyAsy "^VyAsy.

Thus, for some ^ -

yNl- -Ay(AsyviAsy), J) |h^^yAsy, Let be terminal with , whence t

Then H-||- \/yAsy, say frlh Ast . Also,

for t DtT. But D1T =

/II-

AstvT Ast,

whence f i t - Ast, i.e

VyAsy, a contradiction.

QED

Theorem 4. Let Pp {/ A(p1,...,pn). Then there are sentences B1,.. ..,Bn such that

240

HA + MP |/ A ( B , . . . , B ) 1 n Proof: Let J* "be given and define theories as follows: = PA + A.j, where A^ is
Tm+1

independent of PA;

"

PA +

0n(Tm) +1Am + Am+1>

m

where Am+^ is independent of PA + Con(Tm) + "*Am. Let ^

"be the terminal nodes of J*. Let w . be a model of T, .. Given k tA a model *m+1 of T..,, m+1' let cum be a model of Tm m definable in ^m+l *
AssiSn

"^

terminal node cLm In going down the

tree, assign to <T the classical model assigned to the right-most successor of <T. J*, eg., looks like 3 L9

\ /

This gives us a Kripke model of HA. By the Lemma, it is also a model of MP. Finally, each terminal node is the unique node forcing a particular sentence. The proof of de Jongh's Theorem, as given in Section I-D, now goes through easily. QED ,

Note that ^ substitutions are impossible: If A is HA + MP b niA^A. F. Further Applications We first present a Lemma.

Lemma 9. Let ^be primitive recursive, ILj ,...Kn models of HA + TI(<0 each in definable in u> +, and u + }= TI(^). Then TI(^) is valid )* Proof: Use TI(^) in <*/" applied to A*( to verify that TI applied to A(x,x1,...is forced at QED .,xn)

241

By insisting that each theory T also contain TI(^), every model TI(^). Thus, the
K

used in Sections C-E

encountered is a model of

substitution and uniform""JT substitution

results hold for HA + TI(^ ) (where independence over PA(PA + true

ir

is replaced by independence over PA + TI(^) (PA + TI(-^ ) +

+ true TT^)). Further, the unrefined version of de Jongh's Theorem holds for HA + MP + TI(^). A similar prooof does not work for Rf(T) of Rfu(T). Recall that, to prove Rf(T) was preserved if T was, when we assumed V xProvT(x,rA"1) was forced by otQ in , it followed that

Proven,tA1) was forced for some natural number n. From this it followed that A was indeed provable. We can no longer reason in this manner for (^")*. We can, however, appeal to the result of Kreisel and Levy (Proposition 2, Section I-A) by which Rfu(HA), Rfu(HA + Rfu(HA)),... are equivalent over HA to Tl(^^ ), 0 0 TI(-<, ) , . . . . It f o l l o w s ,t h u s , that the 1 e s u l t sf o r 1 and r *1 HA -f R f ( H A )f o l l o w t r i v i a l l y f r o m the r e s u l t s f o r the e x t e n s i o n HA + RfU(HA). It also follows that we get the unrefined version of de Jongh's Theorem for HA + MP + TI(^), HA + MP + Rfu(HA), HA + MP + Rf(HA) we do not have the result for HA + MP + + Rfu(HA + MP) because it is not known if HA + MP + RfU(HA + MP) = HA + MP +
TI(<S e )'. K0

In discussing the operations ( ) (^ )' and ( ) p (

+w) t

we gave some closure properties of the classes

f, f, respectively,of sets,r, preserved by these operations. In discussing the operation ( ) ^(C )* and the class of models

242

described in the statement of Lemma 8, we should comment on the classes iP* of sets of sentences valid in the Kripke model of the Lemma provided they are valid in all of the non-standard models of which the Kripke model is composed. We both lose and gain some closure conditions. In both cases, we lose Friedman's condition iii) (Theorem 4 of Section I-C and Theorem 7 of Section II-D) which we restate here for convenience: iii) If
Pelf (^Pa>) f

^ jias

oniy x

free and HA +

r h

An

for all n, then F+ AxAx Recall that, if be valid in forced at the node

(resp.,^ ). valid in $ 7 / N x A x could only f a i l to

P +/\xAx was
1

or or+ ou)1 when some instance An was not which is ruled out by the hypothesis.

Obviously, this is no longer valid reasoning in the present situation where the new origins have non-standard integers in cheir domains. For ( ) ^(%. )*, the use of definability does not give us an alternative to Condition iii). For applications to MP, however, we do have a slight rebate. Rather than to try to state an intelligible analog to Theorem 7, Section II-D, let us consider an example: Theorem 5. Let i) MP ii) TI iii) the union of any r.e. sequence of elements of ^ is in % iv) if rfip,, A is a Harrop sentence, and A is consistent be the class obtained by the following: ;

243

with

PA + all true It sentences, then f+ A elP^.

, HA +P has the Disjunction Property. are consistent with

Then,for any

Proof: First, by iv) all PA + all true

sentences, which includes the consistency then J"*is ,K_2

s t a t e m e n t s n e e d e d to d e f i n e m o d e l s . A l s o , if r.e., and, if HA +

rv

A,B, we can find Kripke models

definable in some model u>+ of HA + f*, in which A, respectively, B, fails to be forced. (To see that there are definable Kripke models, see Chapter 2, Section I-B.) Then (K^ + a model of HA + f1 in which AvB is false. We cannot generalize this to obtain the Explicit Definability Theorem. First, the domain at the origin would have non-standard integers and ^Q|(- VXAX would not imply O<Q ^ An for some n. Second, to have the definability of forcing for (i^^T+u*+)* in tw+, for an infinite family we must have a + U/+)* is QED

uniform forcing definition for all elements in the class. But, the minute we have this, we have models ""a K for non-standard a occurring in our description of i.e. we are not defining the model we want to define. Such esoteric results as Theorem 5 are of little interest in themselves. They do, however, illustrate the differences in our abilities to treat HA and HA + MP (as do such negative results as our inabilitity to prove the Explicit Definability Theorem for

PT?>.

244

APPENDICES Chapter 1, Section 13? Appendix A: Lattices A. Discussion The Kripke models only give one of several interpretations of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. Algebraically, modulo equivalence of formulae, the set of formulae of the propositional calculus form a lattice with an additional operation of implication. Homomorphisms into other lattices yield new interpretations. In this Appendix, we describe the relation between the Kripke models and the lattice interpretations. A lattice is a partially ordered set (L,^) in which greatest lower boundds, xAVy, and least upper bounds, x\^y, exist for all pairs x,y,L. A lattice is distributive if it satisfies the distributive laws: xA\(yV7z) = (xAVy) v/(xA\z), xV/(yV/z) = (xv/y)av(xV/z). A pseudo-boolean algebra is a lattice, (L,^), in which, in

addition to distinct greatest (1) and least (0) elements, there is an additional operation x ^ y defined by x y = sup fz: x Az ^ y ^

which satisfies the obvious properties of implication. Pseudoboolean algebras are automatically distributive. Elementary properties of lattices, psedo-boolean algebras, and boolean algebras may be found in 36 3, to which we refer the reader. We will concern ourselves only with some simple facts about the representation theory of distributive lattices.

245

Every beginning student in logic learns the Stone Representation Theorem for boolean algebras: Every boolean algebra is isomorphic to a subalgebra of the algebra of all subsets of its set of prime (i.e. maximal) filters. Virtually the same proof yields the Stone Representation Theorem for distributive lattices: Every distributive lattice is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of subsets of its set of prime filters. The importance of this theorem for Kripke models is that, given a pseudo-boolean algebra, the colloection of its prime filters forms a pms and every interpretation of I in the algebra yields an equivalent forcing relation in the pms. This if first observed in Fitting's book, , and we present it in Section B. For finite boolean algebras, one easily proves a Baby Stone Representation Theorem: Every finite boolean algebra of all subsets of its set of atoms-- an atom being an element x such that 0yx implies y=0 or y=x, where 0 is the least element of the algebra. This generalizes to a characterization of boolean algebras isomorphic to power sets: An algebra is isomorphic to a power set iff it is complete and completely distributive, or, e q u i v a l e n t l y , iff it is c o m p l e t e and a t o m i c( i . e .f o r a l l O^x there is an atom y^x). The distributive lattice analog is much weaker and is due to Raney ( C35l ): A distributive lattice is isomorphic to the lattice of all closed subsets of a partially ordered set iff it is complete and every element is the supremum of the set of sup-irreducible, elements lying below it. We will define these terras in Section D below. The importance of this T h e o r e m is that there ia a n a t u r a l c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n a l l

246

interpretations in such a lattice and all forcing relations on the pms. The finite case was discovered by virtually everyone who has studied Kripke models. The infinite case is discussed in

M
The latter representation theorem is particularly nice in that two simple basic operations on lattices, cartesian product and a piling operation, correspond to simple operations on the Kripke models namely a disjoint sum and another piling operation, respectively. We discuss this in Section E. B. The Representation Theorem Let (1,^) be a pseudo-boolean algebra i.e. a distributive lattice with 0,1 in which sup fz: xA\z^yJ exists for

all x,y 1. We denote this sup by x => y and define nx = x ^ 0. A non-empty subset F L is called a filter if it satisfies the following: i) x,y F xA\yeF; ii) & y^x > y gP.

If F ^ L, F is called proper. As we shall only be interested in proper filters, we will use the word filter to mean proper filter. If F is a filter and F satisfies the additional condition, iii) xV/yF<->xF or y^F, then F is called a prime filter. Lemma 1. Let F be a filter and let xWyF, zgF, Then there is a filter FO F such that either x<"F', z0' or yfl", z^F1. Proof: Consider F1 = {w: w^x/tvf for some f *F ^ ,

F2 = fw: w^yANf for some fF

247

Clearly F1 and F2 are (possibly improper) filters. Assume that zfF^F^ Then there are f^,f2^F such that
zx A\f ^ ,

z^ynxf2 .

F is a filter, whence f = f^^fgCF. Thus

z^x A\f, z^y A^f.

But then z^(xA\f)V/(y>wf)=(xv}y)a\p, whence zF, a contradiction. QED Lemma 2. (Prime Filter Theorem). Let F be a filter such that x =T>y6^F. T h e n there ia a p r i m e f i l t e rF ' 3F u ^ " x ^s u c h that y ^ F ' . Proof: First observe that the set, z: z^x/\vf f o r s o m e f F ,

is a filter containing x an not containing y. For, if y were in this set, then y^xAvf for some fF a n d , since x ^ y = sup ^z: x*\z-yJ , x =y-f F.

Let X be the set of all filters F*2 F such that xF*, yOrder X under inclusion and apply Zorn's Lemma to find a maximal element F'. A simple application of Lemma 1 shows that F' is prime. QED

From here on, we will only be interested in prime filters. Thus we will ley F,F', etc., denote prime filters. Lemma 3. i) x yF iff ii)nixFiff \/f,?F(x^F' -^yF);

Vf ? F(x^F') y F and xf F'2F. Then x ^yF'. By

Proof: i) Let x definition, x ^ y = sup z:

XA>ey ^ .

248

Thus XA\(X =y)^y and y^F'. The converse follows by Lemma 2. ii) observe that nix = x $ 0 and C#F'. QED

There are now two theorems we can prove (i) the set of filters of (L,^) form apms under inclusion, and (ii) ( L 5 > , H) is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of closed sets of the pms of all prime filters (i.e. (L,^) is isomorphic in such a way that the operations as V/, are

preserved). To prove the first, we must drop our convention that pins's always have origins. We must also define the notion of an interpretation of I in a pseudo-boolean algebra. This is done simply as follows: A map f of the set of propositional formulae into a pseudo-boolean algebra is called an interpretation iff it satisfies: f(AaB) = f(A)A\f(B), f(AvB) = f(A)Wf(B), f (AO B) = f (A) ^ f(B), f ( A ) = -|f( A ) .

Clearly an interpretation is uniquely determined by the values f(p) for atomic p. Theorem 1. Let L = (L,^,/t\, V, ^,-rO be a pseudo-boolean algebra and let (K,^) be the set of prime filters of L ordered under inclusion. Then (K,^) is a pms. Further, if f is an interpretation in L, then the forcing relation defined by F II- P <-f(p) F, for atomic p, is such that FitA

f (A) F

for all formulae A.

249

Proof: That (K,^) is a pms is obvious. Let f be an interpretation in L and define p lh p-*f(p)<?F. We show by induction on the length of A that Fll- A<f->f(A)"F. This holds by definition for atomic A. For A/\B, F||- A ^ B ^ F l l - A & Fl|- B c ^f ( A ) F & f ( B )C F f ( A )A \ f ( B ) F f(A/\B) ^F. For AvB, F |f A*B f (A)^F or f ( B ) e F (A)v/f(B) F, since F is prime, ^f(AvB)fF. For AOB, F If- A D B^ ^ V F ' O F C F ' I I - A ^ F ' H - B ) <(f (A)^F' ->f(B)^F') f(A) =J>f(B)^F, by Lemma 3, ^-^f(A^>B) F. Finally, FH--A<S-* VF'aF(F'||/ A) f > \ / F ' 2 F ( f ( A ) ^ ' ) <-*-|f(A) = f(-\ A ) F . QED

Corollary 1. If A is valid in the pms of all prime filters of ( L , ^ ) ,t h e n A is valid in ( L , ^ ) . Theorem 2. Let (L, - , / i \ ,
v / , =., - n )

be a pseudo-boolean algebra.

Then it is isomorphic to a subalgebra of the algebra of all closed

250

subsets of the pms of its prime filters. Proof: We defer until the next Section the proof that the class of closed subsets of a pms forms a pseudo-boolean algebra. Recall that a subset X of a partially ordered set is called closed iff f o r all x y , xX and y ^ x imply y ^ X . f let (K,-) be its pms of prime filters and define f by f x3 xfiFj.

One easily sees that x^y iff x ^ y = 1. Thus,if x^y, either x 4 y ^ 1 or y 4x / 1. Let F be the filter J and apply Lemma 2

to conclude that fx fy. Thus f is one-to-one. We must show that f is a homomorphism:

f(xA^y) = x/i\y F^ = fs: x F & ytfPj

= f(x)/1f(y). By primality, f(xV/y) = f(x) Uf(y). f(x=>y)={P: x^y^FjsfP: V F'g P(x e F' ? y* F1)?. Let S be a closed set of filters such that S Af(x) f(y). Let F'S. Then F' f(x) implies F1 f(y). Since this holds for all F"3F', we see that, if S satisfies Snf(x) f (y), then sSf(x =^y). Thus the union of such S is contained in f(x =5>y), i.e. f(x) ^f(y)f(x =y). Conversely, let F^f(x^y). Then x =^yF. If Ff(x), it follows that xF. But then x,x ^ y^F, whence y^F, i.e. F^f(y). Hence f(x)Af(x =^y) ^ f (y), whence
f(x =^y) = sup fs:

Sof(x)gf(y)5 = f(x) =>f(y).

This proves f(x ^ y) = f(x) =^f(y). Finally, f(~l|x) = f ( x = ^ 0 )= f ( x ) =5>f(0) = f ( x )= ^ 0 ,

251

since C$F for any F. Thus, f(-||x) = ~Vf(x). Theorem 1 is a generalization of the Completeness

QED

Theorem of Section I: Observe that, using the Lindenbaum algebra of I, it yields the Completeness Theorem as a corollary. Theorem 2 is a slight modification of the Stone Rpresentation Theorem for distributive lattices. To obtain this representation, drop the implication and negation operations and use the lattice of all subsets of the set of prime filters. Observe that and Hare not alway preserved if one uses this

larger lattice for the representation: negation is complementation and xv^Hx is not valid, whence the map cannot always be a homomorphism. C. The Lattice of Closed Subsets of a Pms In proving Theorem 2, we used the fact that the set of closed subsets of a partially ordered set form a pseudo-boolean algebra. In this Section, we prove this and give a theorem showing the correspondence between forcing relations on the pms and interpretations in the lattice. Let us repeat our comment that, j:i this Appendix, we drop the requirement that a pms have an origin. Theorem 5. Let (K,^) be a pms. Let L be the set of closed subsets of (K,^) and order L under inclusion. Then (L,fr) is a Complete pseudo boolean algebra and, in particular, sup i) =
\J 5",

inf ^ = A y ,

where jf-is a family of closed subsets of (K,^);

252

ii)

S = T = Ufz: S/^Z^T 7, * "lis = S $ 0

Proof: Let if lie a family of closed subsets of (K,^) and let o( Grsffi", ok-(3. Let S S . T h u s ^3 Then c(S and, "by closure,

it f o l l o w s t h a t rft is c l o s e d . Then for some S 6 5^, otf S, whence

Let at

Then JHUT. It follows that Ufis closed. Hence (L,^.) is a complete lattice. To see ii, note that S =>T-sup ^*Z: SaZ ^ T ^ B u t

we have just shown that sups and infs are unions and intersections, respectively. QED

Theorem 4. Let %=) be a pms and let (L, S.) be the lattice of its closed susets. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence between interpretations in (L, ) and forcing relations defined on (K,^) given by: i) If f is an interpretation, define lb f by ((--fP iff o^f(p). for atomic p. ii) If If- is a forcing relation, define f by (1)

for atomic p. Further, relations (1) and (2) hold for all formulae. Proof: Let S,TL and define S T =
: VjS ^<( fits

, ~S -

{+:

<.(>**

Then prove that S > T = S = T, ^S = KS in the same way we proved f(x =^y) = f(x) =f(y) in the proof of Theorem 2. (Observe

253

that the only fact we used about a prime filter F was that x =>yF iff ^F'^FCxfi-F' ^y^F1)- )

Using the equations S ->T = S =>T, *S = "US, a simple induction shows that the defining equivalences (1) and (2)

extend to all formulae. Finally, to see that the correspondence f one-to-one and onto, observe that f(p) = frf : P? , is

for any atom p, i.e. f=fM . It follows that the correspondences M-f is one-to-one. To see that it is onto, observe otl(- P < > whence Ih = ll-f ( P )

QED UCorollary 1. For any formula A, A is valid in a pms iff A is valid

in the lattice of closed subsets of the pms. D. Raney's Theorem Theorem 4 and its Corollary state to each pms there is a pseudo-boolean algebra equivalent to it. Theorem 1 and its Corollary state a weaker converse. Since this converse is weaker, it would be helpful to know when this situation can be improved. An obvious case is when the lattice in question happens to be isomorphic to the lattice of all closed subsets of a pms. To do this, and to enable us to find the pms whose closed subset lattice is isomorphic to a given lattice, we present Raney's Representation Theorem. We first prove a simple Lemma: Lemma 4. Let (L, ") be a complete set lattice in the sense that all infinite sups and infs exist and are given by union and

254

intersection, respectively. Then (1, c r ) is isomorphic to the lattice of closed subsets of a partially ordered set. Proof: Let L be a lattice of subsets of X. Without loss of generality, we may assume that, if x,y X, then there is a set S l s u c h that e i t h e r x S and or x$s and y ^ S .

(Topologically speaking, we are assuming TQ-separation. T^separation, i.e. for any x,y,X there is an S and such that S

already guarantees that L will be a boolean algebra.) We define a relation, X^y on pairs of elements of X by y . S ] .

<r> Vs 1[x 6S

Clearly ^ is a partial order. (This is where TQ-separation is used). let (K,-) be the partial order just described. We wish to show that 1 is the lattice of all closed subsets of (K,^). First, let S^L. Then x GS and x^y imply y^S by the definition of Conversey, let SSK be closed, S ^ 0. For any xf K, let Kx = y: y-x^ . Clearly S = ^s x Kx. Thus, it suffices to show

that each KXL. But Kx ={y: y^xj = fy: \/TGL(xeT *yc=T)?. Thus Kx = whence Kx I. QED

Corollary 1. Every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the lattice of all closed subsets of a partially ordered set. Proof: By Theorem 2, each finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to a complete set lattice. QED

Observe that x^y iff Kx2Ky. Thus the pms (K,) can be taken to be a special subset of L ordered by reversing the order

of 1. To describe this pms without direct reference to the fact

255

that 1 is a set lattice, we must characterize the sets K . To

X

do this, observe that K_S iff xS for all S61. Thus K

X

for some ~TsEL iff Kj\- SS for some S 6-9". We define an element O^x l, L an arbitrary complete lattice, to be sup-irreducible (usually called completely joinirreducible) iff whenever x = sup(S) for some Sf1 it follows that xS. Observe that the sets K
X

are the only sup-irreducible

elements of the complete set lattice of lemma 4. Theorem 5. (Raney's Theorem). Let (L,^) be a complete lattice. A necessary and sufficient condition that (1,^) be isomorphic to the lattice of all closed subsets of a partially ordered set is that every element of L be the supremum of all of its inferior

sup-irreducible elements. In the latter case, the partial order can be obtained by taking the set of sup-irreducibles of 1 and reversing the order. Proof: Consider the map f: x sup-irreducible Clearly fx = fy implies x = y. Thus f is one-to-one. Let S be a set of sup-irreducibles such that xS and y^x imply y^ S (so that S is closed under the reverse ordering). Then S = f(sup(S)). Thus f is a one-to-one order presenrving map of (L,^) onto the lattice of all closed subsets of the pms of supirreducibles. But such an isomorphism preserves all sups and QED >/*y: y-x & y is

infs, whence the map is a complete lattice isomorphism.

Observe that we have stated the isomorphisms as of complete lattices and not as isomorphisms of pseudo-boolean

256
algebras. Since the implication operation is an infinite sup and since isomorphisms preserve infinite sups, the results automatically hold for pseudo-boolean algebras. E. Examples

Theorem 6. Let (L,^) be the lattice of all closed subsets of a pms. (L,-) is a boolean algebra iff all elements of the pms are incomparable. In this case, is isomorphic to the full

power set of the set of atoms, where an atom is an element x such that O^y^x implies y=0 or y=x. Proof: Let (L,^) be a boolean algebra and let x be sup-irreducible. If CKy^x, then x = (x/N\y)v/(x y\\-uy), whence

x /vVly = x or XA .yy = x. If xA\y = x, then y =x. If x*\Vtly = x,

we see that ~i|y-x^y, whence y=0. Thus x is an atom. But the atoms are obviously incomparable and, since the pms is the set of atoms with the ordering of the lattice reversed, this yields the one implication. For the converse, if all of the elements of the pms are incomparable, then (L,^) is isomorphic to the lattice of all closed sets i.e. the power set of the set of elements of the pms. Hence (L,^) ia a boolean algebra. Finally, under either condition, (L,^) has as its sup-erreducibles the set of atoms. Thus (L,^) is isomorphic to the llatice of closed sets of atoms, i.e. to the power set of the set of atoms. QED

L.et L.j,....,Ln be pseudo-boolean algebras. The cartesian product Lj[

is

defined t>y taking all n-tuples (x1,...,xn) ordering them as follows:

such that xiLi and

(x1,...,xn)^(y1 ,...,yn) iff ^ x^y.^ Lemma 5. The pseudo-boolean operations on the cartesian product are defined componentwise:
I) (X1,...,XN)A,V(Y1
t

.,YN) = (X^Y^.

. ..,*N*YN), II) (X1,. ,XN)V/(Y1 9 .,YN) = (X1 V/Y1 , III) (X^ ,...,XN)=>(Y1 IV) "(X1

x

9*

.,YN)

(X1 =>Y>|,. ,X N^YN''

^ )

(N X1 .."WXN)-

The proof is an easy exercise which we leave to the reader. Let (K^ ,-.j ),..., (Kn,-n) sura, 3f(K^,^), to be (K,^) where K = $ K xfi? ; ( << ,i)^((3 ,3) iff i=j & *-1? Theorem 7. Let L^,...,L (K^,^) be the lattice of closed subsets of pins's. We define their disjoint

^Kn'~n^' respectively. Then TTl^ is isomorphic to

the lattice of closed subsets of ^?(K^,^). Proof: For convenience, identify with x fi} and

let L be the lattice of closed subsets of ^(K^,-^). Let SL. Define S = S/\K.. Then L and, for S,TL, ST iff Si^Ti

for each i. Since the map S f> (S^f...,S ) is easily seen to be one-to-one and onto, it follows that it is an isomorphism of L onto ir L. QED

Another useful operation on lattices is one of piling (See eg. |j7*3 ) Xf Xj^ and L2 are lattices, then the piling operation, L1 L2, is defined by placing L2 above L^ and

identifying the 0 of L2 with the 1 of L^. Of particular interest is the case in which L2 is the two element boolean algebra. In this case, L^ L2 amounts to adding a single new element above

258
every element of . We shall consider only this special case

the general case being considered in /~31 ~] let L be a pseudo-boolean algebra na let L* be defined by:

1* = 1 O fl } ,
x^*y iff x,yL & x^y or y=l. Lemma 6. L* is a pseudo- boolean algebra and, for x,y^L: i) x A\*y = x/\\y, ii) xv?*y = xV/y, iii) x-? x=>*v = 111; y Cx=>y> L> x=*y^1,
x = 1f

iv) -*x

C "tlx,
I L,

Xj^O,
x=0,

where the starred operations are operations in L*. The proof is routine an we omit it. We define a similar operation on pins's. Let (K,^) be a pms and define (K,^)1 to be (K',^1) where K' = KU fxjand. x^'y iff x,y K & x^y or x=K. In other words, (K',^') results from (K,^) by the addition of a new least element. We have already encountered this operation in proving the Disjunction Theorem: If and Kg were models

falsifying A and B, respectively, then the forcing relations on (K.j ) and (K2,^2) were extend to ((K^ ,-^) + (K2^2^'
in sucl1

a way that AvB was falsified. Theorem 8. Let L be the lattice of closed subsets of (K,^). Then L* is isomorphic to the lattice of closed subsets of (E,^)1.

259
Proof: Let S be a closed subset of (K,^)1. If S(Ajt then KS and so S=K!. Thus, the lattice of closed subsets of (&-)1 arises from that of (K,^) by the addition of an element above all of those in I i.e. it is isomorphic to L* In as follows: QED

Jasiowski introduced a sequence of lattices

Jq is the 2 element lattice;

k + 1 " By Theorems 7 and 8, we see that each Jn is the lattices of all closed subsets of some pms. In fact, Jq is the lattice of closed subsets of the pms . It follows by induction that Jn is the be the lattice

lattices of closed subsets of Jn+i For, let of Jn+1. For, let Then J.k+1
Jk+2*

be the lattice of closed subsets of Jk+1. k+*1 is the lattice of closed subsets of ( ^ Jk+1)' =

Appendix B: Formulae in One Variable A. The Nishimura Lattice In 5o"3, Nishimura proved that every formula with only the variable p is equivalent to exactly one of the formulae Pn(p) 0^n*= where P0(p) = PA"P>

P#(P)

= P3P

^(p) = P ?2(P) =->P

and, for n^O,
P2n+3^ P2n+4^ = P2n+1 P2n+2^p^'

= P2n+3^P^^P2n+1 ^p^

He also showed that these formulae give rise to the following lattice:

4n+4

To generate this sequence

of formulae, start trying to generate

the free pseudo-boolean algebra. Obviously p, t P , P a T P , P V P will look like PV7P O P

PATP

261
Now ~"*p will lie above p and "be disjoint from pWp:

TP

We are already provably closed under A , V, ~J, and so we must try r> : np^p .-.""P pwip -3 p ir Ttp

txPDP is not equivalent to any element

we have yet, Recall that, in a lattice, x y = sup ^"z: x/\\S3-y^ .

Thusvp^p will lie above pvlp, but must not lie above pvipv/np. One may also check that (i^p p)^ pw^p^p is not provable. Thus ii p*3p does not lie below pv"Jp i/"p and we have >A(t P => P)vP viP m p (f*p-p);>p =nP0P/ J>sPVipvmp = p*Tpv(np-*p) ^ -IPOP = -"P TP / JXP

^PA-P. This already contains the basic idea behing the definition of the sequence. The reader may wish to progress a step or two higher in the lattice until he is convinced that the sequences given actually is a sequence of representatives of all formulae with one propositional variable. Let us outline Nishimura's proof of the following

262
Theorem 9. Let A(p) be a formula in the propositional variable

p. Then there is a unique 0^n^%uch that A(p) is equivalent to pn(p>The uniqueness i.e. the non-equivalence of the distinct Pn(p)'s is easily shown by observing that the Nishimura lattice is a pseudo-boolean algebra and that the interpretation of the formulae given is correct i.e. that they occur in the positions shown. We will show that the Nishimura lattice is a pseudo-

boolean algebra in the next Section. The rest we leave as an easy exercise for the reader. To show that every A(p) is equivalent to a Pn(p), we need only show that the set of formulae Pn(p) is provably closed under the operations A , V ,
^.
;f>or

First, notice that P^ ->I>2n+1

P2n+1 = P2n

-k-2n+1 For, if k=2n,

-1v P2n (unless

n=0

and

trivially Pq^P.,), and ~P2n~>

^ P2n+1 *

If k<2ri>

Pk":>P2n-1

and

so

We now show P.^P. if O^i,unless i = 2n+1 and 1 J j=2n+2 or i = 2^-Ol and j = 2n+4. Let 3 = 2n+2, i =2n-1. Then
Pj = P2n+1 Pi * so Pi"=>Pr

Thus, for k^i^2n-1, Pj^P^. These comments now allow us to complete the proof of closure
under

a, v1

f1

by inspecting these cases. Obviously, we have tP^ . Thus

First, consider

negation is handled by considering implication.

11

P2n+1 3 Pn+2*=r*Pn+2 *

For n=0, p^pg^p^ip

265
^p2* For n>0, P2n+1P2n+2-^ P2n-1
P2n-1 PP2n+2 VrP2n P

^P2n+1 ^ P2n-1 ^ * so

But

^1,e*

P2n-1^P2n+1 D P2n-1 ^,

P2n+1 ^ P2n+2'^ P2n

^P2n-n1
A P2n+1

P2n-1 ^ P2n-1

- P2n
But p2n3p2n+1 and

thuS P2n+1^P2n " P2n+1' whence p2n+1

*"* P2n+2*:=:,P2n+1^ P2n-1

= P2n+2.

12 *

P2n+2^ P2n+4^P2n+4 *

We leave the proof to the reader. 13. P .O P

-L J

P o o , f o r

e x c e p t a s I n 1 1 a n d 1 2 .

This was proven above. 14. 15 16. 17. PpP0=P2. P2DP0=P4. P^^Pq ^:PQ. P4'DP2.=P2

18.

P^^^Q

P2

1 4 - 1 8 are obvious. 19.

PJPPQ.^PO, for i *5.

This is because P^ is a classical tautology for i^5.

110, P2n+3

^P2n+1 -="P2n +4* Definition.

111, p2n+2 >p2n+l-='p2n+4:

By 13, r2n+2PP2+3. so P2n+4'P(P2n+2='P2n+1). Sor the converse, r2n+? = P2n+2vP2n+1 a<S aasume P2n+3 and P2n+2
3 p2n+1-

264
Case 1. I > 2n+2*
Case 2. P2n+1 *
Then clear ly I> 2n+1
Then even mre

clearly P2n+1

Thus, from (A^C)a(B^C)"^(AvBoC), we have ^2n+3^ ^2n+1,

i,e* P2n+4' P2n+6 P2n+1 P2n+4

112 113

P2n+4 ">P2n+1 P2n+5 ">P2n+1

114 P2n+6 "^P2n+1

115 Pi=P2n+1.S P2n+1, for iS2n+7. 116

pi3p2n+2 - p2n+2' for i^2n+'-

112-160 are left as exercises for the more energetica reader. Conjunction requires only 5 verifications: C1 P^P^Pq This is obvious.
02 * P2n+3 A P2n+4~ P2n+1

By 110, P2n+3 C3. P2 AP4.^P0. Again obvious.

04 *

P2n+4*

P2n+4 * P2n+6-'=r P2n+1 * for

C5. Use'113.

except as in C1-C-4.

Disjunction only has 3 cases:

1 ) 1

P p P 2 n + 1V 2 n + 2 ^ 2 n + 3* P2n+2

D2 *

VrP2n+4.^P2n+5 *

By definition, P2n+5eP2n+5* P2n+4

P2n+1 v P2n+2^ P2n+4* But P2n+1^ P2n+4' 80

P0 2n+5

2n+2

vp

2n+4.

265
D3. P V P^. , for i^j except as in D1, D 2 .

C5 yields this and the Theorem.

B.

A simple way to prove that the Nishamura lattice is

a pseudo-boolean algebra is to observe that it is the lattice of all closed subsets of a partially ordered set. To find that partially ordered set, by Theorem 5, we find the set of supirreducibles of the lattice and order them by reversing the order. A glance at the lattice tells us that the sup-irreducibles are P.j and P2n for all n> 0. This yields the pms:

If we now construct the lattice of closed subsets of this pms, we will obtain a lattice isomorphic to the Nishimura lattice. Let us relabel the nodes of the Nishimura pms as follows:

F.

The interpretation f of I into the Nishimura lattice given my mapping p into the element denoted by P^ corresponds to the

266
forcing relation defined by letting p. Further, we have

Theorem 10. Let A(p) "be a formulat in the variable p. If I {/ A(p), then o^nfl/ A(p) for all large n. The proofs follows from Nishimura's Theorem by the equivalence of the interpretation in the lattice and the forcing relation on the pms. For our purposes in Chapter 4, below, we will not need to use the full content of Theorem 10. One result we need is that, for the forcing relation defined by It" P^ of = .

we can find formulae A . and A /> with only the variable p such n ( n that (A, ) iff . W (/*n.). n n Theorem 11 For the given forcing relation, there is for each ol ( Bn) a formula A ^ ( A * ) such that "til- A*n < Vn> if * First Proof: Use the facts that Pq.n * USecond Proof: ^ ~ *n+1' * " fti+1 <Vn>-

o(IW

p n 2 iff 4 +

To avoid using any knowledge of lattices, obserbe

that A . = p.A/a = np, A-/ =np, A^ = (pvipo p)^> pvip. For w 2 <1 ' P i " 2, 1' Pl ' ' ^is is obvious. Suppose (P^1 P'P)^ P*">P' But <2 //- pvTPDP, whence o^2U- PvTp, a contradiction. On the

other hand, the only extensions of^ forcing pvTp op are ^ and , which force pvip. Thus A"- (p vip-p p)o pwip. It

follows that this formula is forced only atand above. We no proceed by induction. Suppose and have

267
already been defined for k^n+2. Observe that near ^n+2
P n+2 -Pras ^00-k:s ^ / f a
an<*

*^n+2 For A/ that

J^n+2 '

, take (A, va . DA . v A )^>A. v A _ . Observe n+2 n+1 / n *n /n * n+1 ^n

A+1"" Vn+/VnPA-nVA^n'^1ie" ^ ThUS implies t ^/*n+1 i*e' observe that tf~ Thus V II- A. n+2 o<!n+2 A , ~ ^n+2 *
To 8ee that

A* A

n+2 * ,

^n+2' U~

01 n+1

^A a^^A*/ ^A,* n Pn

implies

A^

V A/9 n+1 -/n

Let A i? (A^ v A "3 A "/4o)^ A ^ \/ A a /n+2 n+1 /n+1 ^n+1 Ai+1 Observe that * n+2 J- A . , ^ V rfn+2^
A
V N + 1

A^n,
>?n+1' Wlh f0re

Vn+l'

BUt

^n+2~

Atn 1VAj8n 1 + +

and

A+2^

A^ A :>A-( 1VA>,n' Hene n+/ /n+i +

n+2 It"

A + 2

and

H" kfi n+2

iff

" /n+2'

ED

We might comment here on the essential use of the finite height of the Nishimura pms, By Theorem 29, Section III, if we restrict the height of a pms, there are only finitely many nonequivalent formulae in any prescribed finite number of variables. Observe that the finiteness of the width not only did not hinder our search for infinitely many formulae, but actually helped: Consider ^
n+2' We used

'fc^e (nly finitely many least elements andy?n and the least elements

above ^ n+2 namely,

268
a b o v e ( w h i c h is the largest node not grearter than & ) n+1 n+2 namely a n d to find a formula expressing this difference between (*n+2 andy+1. C. A Lemma Theorems 9 and 10 can also be proven by a more direct use of Kripke models. In C^l ,de Jongh applied his study of reductions on trees to obtain a classification of finite minimal trees forcing only one atomic formula. For the purposes of Chapter 4, below, we do not need the full impact of Theorem 10 we only need, for one result, Theorem 11, and, for another result, the following simple lemma: Theorem 12. Let Ifc/ A(p). Then there is a finite tree and a forcing relation on that tree such that

ii) Only terminal nodes can force the variable p. Proof: Let K = (K,^, ij-) be a finite tree in which &qW A(p). Let

sk be defined by
(f l U p)&

K1 = foC : o</^ p or (* J|- P & In other words,

consists of those nodes not forcing p together by

with the least nodes forcing p. Define Ihj for CC U-! P<-*o(||- P. We claim that, for o , and for all formulae B(p), ^ll-1 B(p) afll- B(p).

To see this, apply the Extension Theorem:

extends from (K,^) QED.

to (K^,-) and this extension coincides with {(-.

269
Chapter Section XV

Appendix:The Godel-Rosser-Mostowski-Kripke-Myhill Theorem The use of non-standard model of PA to sutdy HA depends, obviously, on the existence of inequivalent non-standard models i.e on the incompleteness of PA. But, for good quantitative information, as in Sections I-D, III-C, and III-D, one needs a good quantitative form of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. Since such results do not appear in in ant of the setandard texts, we include them here. First,, the Godel-Rosser Theorem ( [4], ZjsI) is wellknown: Theorem 1. Let T be an r.e. extension of PA, Then there is a sentence A undecided by T, i.e. Tl/A, "A, whence T + A, T + iA are both consistent. Iterating the use of theis Theorem, one can easily construct, for any n, sentences A^ ,...,An such that T +j[fex*+i^l ""^i is consistent for every I fl ,...,n^ .We shall call such a family of sentences independent (or, if the reader prefers, strongly independent). Unfortunately, this direct construction yields an independendent set of ^ sentences. Independent sets o f sentences were first constructed
/V\a jv\

by Mostowski in [15I and later by Kripke ( [13^ ) and Myhill ( [is] ). Mostowski's construction generalized Rosser's and Myhill's construction is related to Mostowski's in the manner in which the effectively inseparable set construction is related to Rosser's, We present Myhill's proof of the following

Theorem 2. Let Tq,T.j,..., be an r.e. sequence of consistent r.e.

270
extensions of PA. Then we can find a is independent over each Theory T^. Proof: Let X,Y be recursivley inseparable sets and let X,Y be nuraeralwise represented by formulae respectively, i.e. we have nex iff "3m R(n,m) iff HA ^yR(n.y), VyR(x,y), VyS(x,y),

_0

sentence A such that A

nY iff -^m u> V= S(n,m) iff HA f-VyS(n,y), and HA h ~i ( VyR(n,y)AV/yS(n,y)). Let X = fx: T V- N/yR(x,y)$ , X! = [ x : T K*VyR(x,y)^ , and consider X* = V X^, X' = ^ X|.

By the Reduction Theorem in Recursion Theory (See eg. l7~\ .) there are r.e. sets U,V such that U U V = X*uX',

UAV - 0,

USX* and VXF Clearly XU. For if n ex/TV, then n 6X' and, for some

Ti' Ti

V yR(n,y) and T^ K1\/ yR(n,y) contradicting the

consistency of T^. Also, Y S V , since nY implies T^ I- ^yS(n,y), whence Ti I-tV yR(n,y). But, n^U implies Ti I-VyR(n,y) for some i, again contradicting consistency. Now, U and V separate X and Y, whence there is an n0fU uV. Then, if we let A +VyR(n0,y), we see that A is independent over each T^. QED

sr 0 Corollary For any m, we can find m.independent 2_^ sentences. Proof: Let A^ be independent over PA; A1 independent over PA + A1, PA + nA1; Aj independent over PA + A^ + A^*

271
PA + A1 +"^2* PA +1a.J + A^, PA +1A^ +iA2; etc. QED

For the sake of Section III-C, we need A^f...,A individually independent over PA such that PA h We presente Kripke's ( C13"} ) proof of the following Theorem 3. let T be a consistent r.e. extension of PA. There is an r.e. relation P(y) such that, for every natural number n, T + Pn + VlxPx is consistent. Proof: Let R(e,x,y) numeralwise represent the relation fel>(x)=y. Define a partial recursive function as follows: f(x)=y iff T j-"l CR(x,x,y)/> Vl zR(x,x,z)J , (choosing the first theorem of this form is there are more than one ). Then f has an idex, say e. Let Px be R(e,e,x). We show for ij^j.

that, for all n, pn -h Vj xPx is consistent with T. First, observe that f(e) is undefined. If not, f(e)=nQ for some nQ. Then T
1-

->(R(e,e,n0 ) A V !zR(e,e,z)).

But clearly, if f(e)=nQ, T h R(e,e,n0)A V.'zR(e,e,z). a contradiction. Hence f(e) is undefined and for no n do we have T
|-n (R(e,e,n)A

V !R(e,e,x)). QED

Hence, for all n, T + R(e,e,n) +\J !R(e,e,x) is consistent.

Letting An be Pn, we have the desired result. One might mention that we have HA j- A^TA^ as well as PA I- A^otA^. Letting pQ,..., enumerate the primes, the sentences Bn, VxTpJx^xl,

272 are strongly independent.

In Section III-D, we needed independent IT sentences: Theorem 4. let PA^ denote PA augmented by all true *17 ^ sentences of arithmetic. If T?PA^ is consistent and has a ^ enumeration,

then there is an infinite family, A.j,....T jOfH^ sentences strongly independent over T. To see this, observe that the proof predicate is and that the ^ relations are precisely those numeralwise representable in T. Thus we can mimic the proofs of Theorem 2 and its Corollary to obtain independent sentences. Their negations

are the independent llg sentences we need.

273 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 1

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31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Ono, H., "Kripke models and intermediate logics", Publ. RIMS, Kyoto Univ., 6 (1970), pp. 461 - 476. Ono, H., "Some results on intermediate logics", Publ. RIMS, Kyoto Univ., 8 (1972), pp. 117-130. Ono, H., "A memo on my paper, 'On the finite model property for Kripke models'", to appear. Orevkov, V.P. "On Glivenko sequent classes", in V.P. Orevkov, ed., The Calculi of Symbolic Logic (AMS, Providence 1971). Raney, G., "Completely distributive complete lattices", PAMS 3 (1952), pp. 667-680. Rasiowa, H. and Sikorski, R., The Mathematics of Metamathematics (PWN, Warsaw, 1963). Rose, G., "Propositional calculus and realizability", TAMS 75 (1953), PP. 1-19. Scott, D., "Completeness proofs for the intuitionistic sentencial calculus", in Summer Institute for Symbolic Logic. Cornell University (IDA, Princenton, 1957). Segerberg, K., "Propositional logics related to Heyting's and Johanssons1s", Theoria 34 (1968), pp. 26-61. Shoenfield, J.R., Mathematical Logic (Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1967). Thomas, I., "Finite limitations on Dummett's LC" Notre Dame Jnl. of Formal Logic 3 (1962), pp. 170-174. Thomason, R.H., "On the strong semantical completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus", JSL 33 (1966), pp. 1-7.

39 40 41 42

276 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2

1 Aczel, P.H.G., "Saturated intuitionistic theories", in: H.A. Schmidt, K. Schutte, and J.-J. Thiele, eds., Contributions to Mathematical Logic (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1968). Feferman, S., "Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting", Fund. Math. 49 (1960), pp. 35~92. Fitting, M., Intuitionistic Logic Model Theory and Forcing (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969). Gabbay, D., "Applications of trees to intermediate logics, I, ONR Technical Report No. 31, 1969. Gabbay, D., "Montague type semantics for non-classical logics, I", Air Force Off. Sci. Res. Tech. Report No. 4, 1969. Gabbay, D., "Semantic proof of the Graig interpolation theorem for intuitionistic logic and extensions, part I", in: R.O. Gandy and C.E.M. Yates, eds., Logic Colloquium '69 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969). Gabbay, D., "Semantic proof of the Garig interpolation theorem for intuitionistic logic and extensions, part II", in: R.O. Gandy and C.E.M. Yates, eds., Logic Colloquium '69 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969). Gabbay, D., "Applications of trees to intermediate logics", JSL 37 (1972), pp. 135-138. Gabbay, D., "Model theory for intuitionistic logic", ZML 18 (1972), pp. 49-54. Gornemann, S., "A logic stronger than intuitionism", JSL 36 (1971), pp. 249-261. de Jongh, D.H.J., "The maximality of the intuitionistic predicate calculus with respect to Heyting's arithmetic", to appear in Comp. Math. Kleene, S.C., Introduction to Metamathematics (Van Nostrand, Princenton, 1952). Kleene, S.C., "Disjunction and existence under implication in elementary intuitionistic formalismsV JSL 27 (1962), pp. 11-18. Kreisel, G., "Elementary completeness properties of intuitionistic logic with a note on negations of prenex formulae", JSL 23 (1958), pp. 317-330.

2 3 4 5

8 9 10 11

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277
15 Kripke, S., "Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic, I, in: J.N. Crossley and M.A.E. Dummett, eds., Formal Systems and Recursive Functions. (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 19657). Leivant, D., "A note on translations of 0 into I", Math. Centrum, 1971. Mints, G., "An analogue of Herbrand's theorem for the constructive predicate calculus", Soviet Math, Doklady 3 (1962), pp. 1712-1715. Mints, G., "Imbedding operations associated with Kripke's 'semantics' ", in: A.O. Slisenko, ed., Studies in Constructive Mathematics and Mathematical Logic. Part I (Consultants Bureau, New York, 196$). Mints, G., and Orevkov, Y.P., "A generalization of the theorems of V.I. Glivenko and G. Kreisel to a class of formulae of the predicate calculus", Soviet Math. Doklady 4. (1963), pp. 1365-1367. Orevkov, V.P., "On Glivenko sequent classes',1 in: V.P. Orevkov, ed,, The Calculi of Symbolic Logic. I (AMS, Providence, 1971). Osswald, H., "Modelltheoretische Untersuchungen in der Kripke-Semantik", Arch. math. Logik 13 (1969), pp. 3-21. Rasiowa, H., and Sikorski, T., "On existential theorems in non-classical functional calculi". Fund. Math. 41 (1954), pp. 87-91. Thomason, R.H., "On the strong semantical completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus", JSL 33 (1968), pp. 1-7.

16 17

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19

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23

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1 2

278

Ackermann, W. Solvable Cases of the Decision Problem (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1954). Ershov, Yu. 1., Lavrov, I.A., Taimanov, A.D., and Taitslin, M.A. "Elementary theories" Russian Math. Surveys 20 (1965), pp. 35-106 Gabbay, D. "The decision problem for intuitionistic theories; part I undecidability results" Mimeographed, Stanford. Gabbay, D. "Decidability of some intuitionistic predicate calculi, I" Mimeographed, Stanford. Heyting, A. Intaitionism: an Introduction. 2nd. (NorthHolland, Amsterdam, 1966). de Jongh, D.H.J. "The maximality of the intuitionistic predicate calculus with respect to Heyting1s arithmetic" to appear. Kleene, S.C. "Logical calculus and realizability" Acta Phil. Fenn. 18 (1965), pp. 71-80. Kreisel, G. "Elementary completeness properties of intuitionistic logic with a note on negations of prenex formulae" JSL 23 (1958), pp. 317-330. Kreisel, G. "Rotes concerning the elements of proof theory" Course notes, U.C.L.A. Kreisel, G. and Krivine, J.L. Elements of Mathematical logic (Model Theory) (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967). Kripke, Saul "Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic, I" in: Formal Systems and Recursive Functions, eds. J.N. Crossley and A.E. l)ummett (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1965). Kripke, Saul "Semantical analysis of intutionistic logic, II" Unpublished. Leivant, D. "A note on translations of C into I" Math. Centrum, 1971. Lifshits, V.A. "Deductive validity and reduction classes" in; Studies in Constructive Mathematics and Mathematical Logic, ed. A.;. Slisenko (Consultants Bureau, New York 1969). Lifshits, .A. "Problema of decidability for some constructive theories of equalities: in: Studies in Constructive Mathematics, and Mathematical Logic,ed. A.O. Slisenko

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1 2 3 4 Feferman, S., "Arithmetization of metamathematics in a general setting", Fund. Math. 49 (1960). pp. 35-92. Feferman, S., "Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories", JSL 27 (1962), pp. 259-316. Friedman,, H., "Some applications of Kleene's methods for intuitionistic systems",, to appear. Godel, K., "Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I"", Monatsh, Math. Phys. 38 (1931), pp. 173-198. Godel, K., "IJber ein bisher noch nicht benutzte Erweiterung des finiten Standpunktes", Dialectica 12 (1958), pp. 280287. de Jongh, D.H.J., "Teh maximality of the intuitionistic predicate calculus with respect to Heyting's arithmetic", JSL 35 (1970), p. 606. De Jongh, D.H.J., "Disjunction and existence under implication in intuitionistic arithmetic", JSL 36 (1971), p. 588. de Jongh, D.H.J., "The maximality of the intuitionistic predicate calculus witL respect to Heyting's arithmetic", to appear in Comp. Math. Kleene, S.C., Introduction to Metamathematics (Van Nostrand, Princenton, 1952). Kreisel, G-., "The non-derivability of xAx x Ax, A primitive recursive, in intuitionistic formal systems", JSL 23 (1958), pp. 456-7. Kreisel, G., "Inessential extensions of Heyting's arithmetic by means of functionals of finite type", JSL 24 (1959), p. 284. Kreisel, G., and Levy, A., "Reflection principles and their use for establishing the complexity of axiomatic systems", ZML 14 (1968), pp 97-142. Kripke, S., "Flexible predicates of formal number theory", PAMS 13 (1963), PP. 647-650. Matiyasevich, Yu. V., "Diofantovost perechislimikh mnozhestv". Doklady AN.SSSR 191 (1970), pp. 279-282; Improved english translation: Soviet Math. Doklay 11 (1970), pp. 354-7.

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281
15 16 17 18 19 Mostowski, A., "A generalization of the incompleteness theorem", Fund. Math. 49 (1961), pp. 205-252. Myhill, J., "An absolutely independent set of sentences". ZM1 18 (1972), pp. 107-9. Rogers, H., Jr., Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967). Rosser, J.B., "Extensions of Bome theorems of Godel and Church", JSL 1 (1956),pp 87-91. Troelstra, A.S., "Notions of realizability for intuitionistic arithmetic and intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types',' in J.E. Fenstad, ed., Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971).

282

V I T A

GRA.IG A L A N S M O R Y N S K I , w a s b o r n i n C h i c a g o o n J u n e 13, 1947. After obtaining his B.S. at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle in 1969, he briefly attended classes at Stanford, returning to the Circle in 1971. He completed his degree requirements for the Ph. D. in 1973.

Chicago, Illinois 1973.