16.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919 FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary. Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation? HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

16.. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring. Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead. The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed. Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being

exercised in accordance with law. It is a well-known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation. The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands ================ 17. PLDT vs NTC G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM, INC., (EXPRESSTELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]), respondents.EN BANCFacts: There are two (2) Orders, namely, Order of 12 December 1988 granting private respondentExpress Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) provisional authority to install, operate andmaintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro-Manila (Phase A) in accordance withspecified conditions; and the Order, dated 8 May 1988, denying reconsideration, enacted bythe respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) but assailed by petitionerPhilippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).ETCI filed an application with NTC for the

issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience andNecessity (CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular MobileTelephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the SouthernLuzon regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal withinMetro Manila.But in an Order, dated 12 November 1987, NTC overruled PLDT's Opposition and declared thatRep. Act No. 2090 (1958) should be liberally construed as to include among the services undersaid franchise the operation of a cellular mobile telephone service.After evaluating the reconsideration sought by PLDT, the NTC, in October 1988, maintained itsruling that liberally construed, applicant's franchise carries with it the privilege to operate andmaintain a cellular mobile telephone service.In a "Motion to Set Aside the Order" granting provisional authority, PLDT alleged essentiallythat the interconnection ordered was in violation of due process and that the grant of provisional authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm.PLDT urges the Court to annul the NTC Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 and toorder ETCI to desist from, suspend, and/or discontinue any and all acts intended for itsimplementation. Issues: 1. Whether the status and coverage of Rep. Act No. 2090 includes franchise; 2. Whether there is transfer of shares of stock of a corporation in holding a CPCN; and3. Whether there is a need to merge principle and procedure of interconnection. Held: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NTC, upon the following considerations: 1. NTC Jurisdiction The NTC is the regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction over alltelecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with authority and given ample discretion togrant a provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a motion from an applicant.What the NTC granted was such a provisional authority, with a definite expiry period of eighteen (18) months unless sooner renewed, and which may be revoked, amended or revisedby the NTC. It is also limited to Metro Manila only.What is more, the main proceedings are clearly to continue as stated in the NTC Order of 8 May1989.The provisional authority was issued after due hearing, reception of evidence and evaluation,with the hearings attended by various

oppositors, including PLDT. It was granted only after a prima facie showing that ETCI has the necessary legal, financial, and technical capabilities and that public interest, convenience, and necessity so demanded. Hence, the final outcome of the application rests within the exclusive prerogative of the NTC. Whether or not a CPCN would eventually issue would depend on the evidence to be presented during the hearings still to be conducted, and only after a full evaluation of the proof thus presented. 2. The Coverage of ETCI's Franchise Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of constructing, installing, establishing and operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception and transmission of messages on radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed point-to-point and public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, ... with the corresponding relay stations for the reception and transmission of wireless messages on radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony ...." PLDT maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited to "radio stations and excludes telephone services such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC construed the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the operation of a cellular mobile telephone system. 3. The Status of ETCI Franchise PLDT alleges that the ETCI franchise had lapsed into nonexistence for failure of the franchise holder to begin and complete construction of the radio system authorized under the franchise as explicitly required in Section 4 of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 2090.More importantly, PLDT's allegation partakes of a Collateral attack on a franchise Rep. Act No.2090), which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warrant, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), 2 the reason being that the abuse of franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.

4. ETCI's Stock Transactions ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the outstandingcapital stock sold their holdings to the Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos re-acquired the shares theyhad sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to HoracioYalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964,ETCI had increased its capital stock from P40,000.00 to P360,000.00; and in 1987, fromP360,000.00 to P40M.In other words, transfers of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, notCongressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of sharesstarting in 1964 until 1987. But again, whether ETCI has offended against a provision of itsfranchise, or has subjected it to misuse or abuse, may more properly be inquired into in quowarranto proceedings instituted by the State. It is the condition of every franchise that it issubject to amendment, alteration, or repeal when the common good so requires (1987Constitution, Article XII, Section 11). 5. The NTC Interconnection Order In the provisional authority granted by NTC to ETCI, one of the conditions imposed was that thelatter and PLDT were to enter into an interconnection agreement to be jointly submitted to NTCfor approval.Rep. Act No. 6849, or the Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, approved on 8 February 1990, mandates interconnection providing as it does that "all domestic telecommunications carriersor utilities ... shall be interconnected to the public switch telephone network." Such regulationof the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary policepower of the State for the promotion of the general welfare.The importance and emphasis given to interconnection dates back to Ministry Circular No. 82-81, dated 6 December 1982; Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) CircularNo. 87-188, issued in 1987; The sharing of revenue was an additional feature considered inDOTC Circular No. 90248, dated 14 June 1990, laying down the "Policy on Interconnection andRevenue Sharing by Public Communications Carriers."The NTC order to interconnect allows the parties themselves to discuss and agree upon thespecific terms and conditions of the interconnection agreement instead of the NTC itself layingdown the standards of interconnection which it can very well impose. Thus it is that

PLDTcannot justifiably claim denial of clue process. It has been heard. It will continue to be heard inthe main proceedings. 6. Ultimate Considerations The decisive considerations are public need, public interest, and the common good. Those werethe overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI.Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired improvementin the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handymobile service, and reduced user dissatisfaction. After all, neither PLDT nor any other publicutility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in view of the Constitutionalproscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be exclusive in character or shalllast longer than fifty (50) years. Ruling: There is no grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on thepart of the NTC in issuing its challenged Orders of 12 December 1988 and 8 May 1989 in NTCCase No. 87-39, and this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs National Telecommunications Commission on November 27, 2012

190 SCRA 717 Business Organization Corporation Law Corporate Fiction Franchise Right of Succession
In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCIs shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? not specified in the case); that such transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise

which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC. ISSUE: Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper. HELD: No. 1. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto.Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place. 2. The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of

the shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual succession. 18.PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law 17. Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the

comfort

and

happiness

of

residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. 19.City Government of Quezon City vs Ericta Date: June 24, 1983 Petitioners: City Government of Quezon City and City Council of Quezon City Respondents: Hon. Judge Vicente Ericta and Himlayang Pilipino Inc Ponente: Gutierrez Jr Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held: No Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers

who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino,Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

20.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila SECOND DIVISION NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus YUNITA TUAZON, ROSAURO TUAZON and MARIA TERESA TUAZON, Respondents. G.R. No. 193023 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* BRION, PEREZ, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: June 22, 2011 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION BRION, J.: This is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision[1] (dated March 15, 2010) of the Court of Appeals (CA)[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480, which set aside the order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40, and remanded the case back to the RTC for determination of just compensation. The RTC had dismissed the complaint of respondents Yunita Tuazon, Rosauro Tuazon and Maria Teresa

Tuazon against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for payment of just compensation and damages. ANTECEDENTS The antecedent facts are not in dispute. The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land[4] in Barangay Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the respondents predecessor -in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR[5] installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power TL Project. In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed. Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-of-way agreement[6] with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents payments for damaged improvements (P23,970.00), easement and tower occupancy fees (P1,808.21), and additional damaged improvements (P1,200.00).

In 2002, the respondents filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid just compensation in sums ranging from P2,000.00 to P2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to the determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar. Instead of filing an answer, NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss based on the full satisfaction of the respondents claims. The RTC granted the motion in this wise: ORDER Acting on the Motion to Dismiss and the Opposition thereto and after a very careful study of the arguments raised by the Parties, the court resolves in favor of the Defendant.

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of this case without costs. IT IS SO ORDERED. Tarangnan, Samar, Philippines, February 3, 2004. (Sgd.) ROBERTO A. NAVIDAD Acting Presiding Judge[7] The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals The respondents filed an ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellees Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire a right-of-way easement upon payment of just compensation equivalent to not more than 10% of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.[8]

The CA disagreed with the RTC. Citing National Power Corporation v. Hon. Sylvia G. Aguirre-Paderanga, etc., et al.[9] and National Power Corporation v. Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corporation,[10] the CA pointed out that the demolition of the improvements on the land, as well as the installation of transmission lines thereon, constituted taking under the power of eminent domain, considering that transmission lines are hazardous and restrictive of the lands use for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the CA held that the respondents were entitled, not just to an easement fee, but to just compensation based on the full market value of the respondents land. Citing Export Processing Zone Authority v. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, etc., et al.,[11] the CA maintained that NAPOCOR cannot hide behind the mantle of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 as an excuse of dismissing the claim of appellants since the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings,[12] the CA added. The dispositive of the assailed decision reads:

In sum, after establishing that NAPOCORs acquisition of the right-of-way easement over the portion of the appellants land was a definite taking under the power of eminent domain, NAPOCOR is liable to pay appellants [referring to the respondents herein] just compensation and not only easement fee. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order dated February 3, 2004 of the RTC, Br. 40, Tarangnan, Samar is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC, Br. 40 of Tarangnan, Samar for the proper determination of just compensation.[13] The Petition The present petition reiterates that by installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR did not expropriate the respondents land, but merely established a right-of-way easement over it. The petition relies heavily on the lack of transfer of the lands title or ownership. NAPOCOR maintains that since the respondents claim involved an easement, its charter a special law should govern in accordance with Article 635 of the Civil Code.[14] NAPOCOR insists that its agreement with the respondents predecessor-in-interest and the easement fee that was paid pursuant thereto were authorized by its charter and are, thus, valid and binding. Finally, the petitioner alleges that establishing right-of-way easements over lands traversed by its transmission lines was the only mode by which it could acquire the properties needed in its power generation and distribution function. It claims that R.A. 8974,[15] specifically its implementing rules, supports this position.

THE COURT RULING We find the petition devoid of merit and AFFIRM the remand of the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation. The petitioner pleads nothing new. It essentially posits that its liability is limited to the payment of an easement fee for the land traversed by its transmission lines. It relies heavily on Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 to support this position. This position has been evaluated and found wanting by this Court in a plethora of cases, including Manubay[16] which was correctly cited by the CA in the assailed decision.

In Manubay,[17] NAPOCOR sought the reversal of a CA decision that affirmed the payment, as ordered by the RTC in Naga City, of the full value of a property traversed by NAPOCORs transmission lines for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court echoing the 1991 case of National Power Corporation v. Misericordia Gutierrez, et al.[18] formulated the doctrinal issue in Manubay,[19] as follows: How much just compensation should be paid for an easement of a right of way over a parcel of land that will be traversed by high-powered transmission lines? Should such compensation be a simple easement fee or the full value of the property? This is the question to be answered in this case.[20] In holding that just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission lines, we said: Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. Republic v. PLDT held thus: x x x. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of

a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.[21] (Emphasis ours; citations omitted.) We find it significant that NAPOCOR does not assail the applicability of Manubay[22] in the present case. Instead, NAPOCOR criticizes the application of Gutierrez[23] which the CA had cited as authority for the doctrine that eminent domain may also be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession.[24] NAPOCOR assails Gutierrez[25] as irrelevant on the ground that the expropriation proceedings were instituted in January 1965, when the NAPOCOR Charter had not been amended with the insertion of Section 3-A(b) in 1976.[26] To NAPOCOR, Section 3-A(b) provides for a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation i n cases of acquisition of easements of right-of-way. Heavily relying on Section 3-A(b), therefore, NAPOCOR argues: Absent any pronouncement regarding the effect of Section 3-A (b) of R.A. 6395, as amended, on the computation of just compensation to be paid to landowners affected by the erection of transmission lines, NPC v. Gutierrez, supra, should not be deemed controlling in the case at bar.[27] We do not find NAPOCORs position persuasive. The application of Gutierrez[28] to the present case is well taken. The facts and issue of both cases are comparable.[29] The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as well the owners use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez[30]

 that the exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession[31] therefore remains doctrinal and should be applied.[32] NAPOCORs protest against the relevancy of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due for properties traversed by transmission lines, has no merit. We have held in numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not conclusive upon the courts.[33] In National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui, et al.,[34] we categorically held: Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. (Citations omitted.) The determination of just compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.[35] This judicial function has constitutional raison dtre; Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, et al.,[36] we noted with approval the disquisition of the CA in this matter: The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a judicial function but would also render as useless the protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The same principle further resolves NAPOCORs contention that R.A. 8974, specifically its implementing rules, supports NAPOCORs claim that it is liable to

the respondents for an easement fee, not for the full market value of their land. We amply addressed this same contention in Purefoods[37] where we held that: While Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, and the implementing rule of R.A. No. 8974 indeed state that only 10% of the market value of the property is due to the owner of the property subject to an easement of right-ofway, said rule is not binding on the Court. Well-settled is the rule that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court held that any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed compensation. (Citations omitted.) That the respondents predecessor-in-interest did not oppose the installation of transmission lines on their land is irrelevant. In the present petition, NAPOCOR insinuates that Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose the instillation now estops the respondents from their present claim.[38] This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr. Tuazons failure to oppose cannot have the effect of thwarting the respondents right to just compensation. In Rafael C. de Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., et al.,[39] we ruled: The owner of land, who stands by, without objection, and sees a public railroad constructed over it, can not, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company. In such case there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation. (Goodin v. Cin. And Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St., 169.) One who permits a railroad company to occupy and use his land and construct its road thereon without remonstrance or complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free from the servitude he has permitted to be imposed upon it. His

acquiescence in the company's taking possession and constructing its works under circumstances which made imperative his resistance, if he ever intended to set up illegality, will be considered a waiver. But while this presumed waiver is a bar to his action to dispossess the company, he is not deprived of his action for damages for the value of the land, or for injuries done him by the construction or operation of the road. (St. Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co., 35 La. Ann., 924. In sum, we categorically hold that private land taken for the installation of transmission lines is to be paid the full market value of the land as just compensation. We so ruled in National Power Corporation v. Benjamin Ong Co,[40] and we reiterate this ruling today: As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts. (Citations omitted.) WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 15, 2010, in CA-G.R. CV No. 82480. SO ORDERED. 21. Issue: Is the Republic liable for just compensation if in enforcing the legal

easement of right-of-way on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?
It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. We are unable t sustain Republic's argument that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in enforcing the legal easement of Andaya's property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable. TAKING in the exercise of the power of eminent domain occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is practical destruction or material

impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining area of Andaya's property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the property. But the nature and the effect of the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming form the Agusan River.

For this reason, in our view, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less that the monetary equivalent of the land. JC (Just Compensation) = FMV (Fair Market Value) + CD(Consequential Damages) CB (Consequential Benefits) (CBshould not exceed CD) Eminent Domain is the substantive law. Expropriation is the procedural law. Public use or public purpose may cater only to a minority.

22. HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN VS ATO G.R. No. 162779FACTS: Sometime in 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead provision of Act No. 2874 aparcel of land consisting of about 22 hectares situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883 and OriginalCertificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued on the land, in the names of the Pidacan spouses.In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Upon the death of the Pidacan spouses in 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building onthe property. The ATO also lengthened, Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for the use of the occupied premises. However, they were told that payment couldnot be made because the to payment of rentals plus the value of the property. The ATO countered that the heirswere not entitled to any payment, either of the value of the land or of the

rentals because the property had been sold to itspredecessor, the defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter. The ATO claimed that even if it failed toobtain title in its name, it had been declaring the property for taxation purposes.The Trial Court rendered a decision ordering ATO to pay rental and the value of the land at P89 per square meter. On appeal, theCA ruled to remand the case to determine the just compensation. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE SUED IN THEIR EXERCISE OF ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN. HELD: Preponderance of evidence on record strongly indicates that the ATO s conversion of the property into an airport in1948 comes within the purview of eminent domain. Eminent domain or expropriation is the inherent right of the state to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain:(1) The expropriator must enter a private property;(2) The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;(4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners private property was converted into an airport by respondent ATO. As a consequence, petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept of expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed on petitioners private land. As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is reckoned from the time of taking. In this case, however, application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that the ATO had been using petitioners property as airport since 1948 without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow

the ATO to conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners. In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners property is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As for the fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount arrived at by the commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39 per square meter, constitutes just compensation to petitioners. PRINCIPLE: When is a suit against the State? 23. EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987] Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. 24. Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos (Consti1) Commissioner of Public Highways, petitioner, vs. Hon. Francisco P. Burgos, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, Branch II, and Victor Amigable, respondents. March 31, 1980 De Castro, J: Facts: On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for roadright-of-way purpose. On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines). Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right

of the owner to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the government was invoked. In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775. The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees. Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken. Held: Not applicable. Ratio: Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only when there is an agreement that the inflation will make the value of currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment, the basis for payment. The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, not P49,459.34, and the interest in the sum of P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be reduced. 25. 25 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO G.R. No. 146733 January 13, 2004

Bill of Rights

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCOG.R. No. 146733January 13, 2004

FACTS: This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the decision of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit.

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP.

On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just compensation by the RTC.

Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary administrative

proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.

On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.

The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic.

LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.

2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at supported by evidence.

3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.

4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid.

HELD: 1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:

Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.

2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 3. Judicial Notice. When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. Only the market value was taken into account in determining the just compensation. Since other factors were not considered, the case was remanded for determination of just compensation.

3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.

4. Yes, Wycocos claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account opened as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. The conversion should be retroactive in application

in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation.

The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted because Wycoco failed to show proof of loss.

Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special Agrarian Court cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the case to the trial court for determination of just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied for lack of basis.

26

27

28 29 G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporationcre ate d to und er take th e d eve lo pme nt o f h yd ro-e le ctr ic ge ner atio n of power and the produ ctio n of e le ctr icity from any and all so urces ; and par ticular ly th e cons truc tio n,operation, and maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains,tr a nsm iss ion lines, pow er s tatio ns and sub statio ns, and o t h er w or ks for th e pur pose of dev e loping h ydrau lic pow er from any r iver, lake , cre ek, s pr ing and w at erf alls in the Philippines and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof.#Under Republic Act No.6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the ownersthereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.

For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No.SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son,Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property,which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Part ida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Mariaexecuted a Right of Way Grant#in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged improvements thereon.

The payme nt vo uch e r for th e res ide ntial po r tio n of the lo t v alued at P6,000 ,00 0.00 ( at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.#However, the NPC Board of Directorsapproved Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion. On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their report,#recommending as payment for just compensation P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq mfor the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment,#declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with regards to the fair market valueof the residential and agricultural property? HELD:The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as follows: (1) P499.00 per sq mon the 17,195 sq m agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the6,565 sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not blindly accept therecommendation of majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lotand P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court took into account theevidence of the parties, in tandem with the findings and recommendation of the majority of the commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court as affirmed by the CA isreasonable as it is and supported by the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason todisturb the same. The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from the towers and transmissionlines, especially on rainy days; the constant fear on the part of the landowners that the largetransmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge tower in front of their lotwill affect their safety and health; and the slim chance that no one would be interested to buythe remaining portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project, to the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of the land and financial gains to bederived therefrom, makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.

31 32 33 LBP vs Puyat BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

LAND

vs. Heirs of MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA PUYAT, represented by Attorney-in-Fact Marissa Puyat, Respondent. G.R. No. 175055 June 27, 2012

(Supreme Court, First Division) Facts: Gloria and Maximo Puyat (deceased) owns a parcel of riceland consisting of 46.8731 hectares. The said land was subjected to acquisition pursuant to PD 27 but the records does not show when the DAR acquired the same. Sometime in December 1989 DAR then, issued several emancipation patents in favor of various farmbeneficiaries. The Puyat's however, did not receive any compensation for the acquisition. Sometime in September 1992 LBP received DAR's instruction to pay the just compensation to the Puyats. The LBP made its evaluation, but the heirs of the Puyat rejected the valuation and filed a complaint for determination of just compensation with the RTC. The following are the valuation of the property: 1. LBP = P 92,752.10 @ P 2,012.50 per hectare (in compliance with the formula under PD 27 and EO 228. LBP also contended that the valuation should be done at the time of the taking (1976)); 2. RTC = P 4,430,900.00 @ P 100,000.00 per hectare since 44.3090 hectares were distributed to farmer-beneficiaries and 6% legal interest from the date of taking until the amount is fully paid (due to delay in payment); 3. CA = same as RTC but modified the legal interest not from 1990 but from March 20, 1990 for precision. Issue:

Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors in Sec. 17 of RA 6657. Whether or not the 6% legal interest proper in this case.

Held: RA 6657 should govern, in catena of decided cases of the Supreme Court it has been held that, when the government takes property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after the affectivity of RA

6657, it becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657.

The SC finds that there is no need to disturb the legal interest issue since there is no current jurisprudence to substantiate such change, and the respondents (Heirs of Maximo and Gloria Puyat) did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts. Thus, there is no need to remand the case to the lower court for the determination of just compensation, during the pendency of the case, Congress enacted RA 9700 further amending RA 6657, the amendment provides: Sec. 7. The DAR in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the final acquisition and distribution of all remaining unacquired and undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity of this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows: xxxxx ...that all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 665... xxxx That the just compensation has already been computed pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 6657 by the CA.

34