I Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia Population (million) 2013 est. 38.1 Population growth rate 1.9% Life expectancy, years 76.18 Age structure: o -14 years 28.1% 15 - 24 years 18.1% 25 - 54 years 42.7% 55 - 64 years 6.0% 65 + years 5.1% Government type Republic Area (million km 2 ) 2.38 Population density 15.99 Arable land, % 3% Literacy, % 72.6% Male literacy 81.3% Female literacy 63.9% GDP, billion US$, 2010 est. 251 GDP growth rate, 2010 est. 3.3% GDP / capita 2010 est. 7300 GDP, billion US$, 2012 est. 277 GDP growth rate, 2012 est. 2.5% GDP /capita 2012 est. 7600 GDP composition 2012 est. Agriculture 8.9% Industry 60.9% Services 30.2% Unemployment, youth 15 - 24 21.5% Total unemployment, 2012 est. 10.2% Population below poverty line 23.0% GDP / capita 2010 7300 GDP / capita 2012 7600 Youth employment 21.5% Total unemployment 10.2% North Africa overview and the 'Arab Spring' 85.3 1.88% 73.19 32.3% 18.0% 38.3% 6.6% 4.8% Republic 1.00 . 85.68 3% 73.9% 81.7% 65.8% 498 5.1% 6200 549 2.2% 6700 14.7% 17.0% 51.0% 24.8% 13.5% 20.0% 6200 6700 24.8% 13.5% North Africa is viewed as having been the launching pad for the protests and demonstrations that later became known as the 'Arab Spring' . This ic; a complex and evolving process across the region, but at the most basic level, the protestors expressed dissatisfaction with government and the authorities. The people held that legitimate governments should be elected by the people. There were many root causes of the protests, including poverty, unemployment, a widening gap between rich and poor, violation of human rights, and a desire to move December 2013 HYDROCARBON ___ _ _ _ ___ ENGINEERING 6.0 32.6 10.8 4.85% 1.04% 0.95% 75.83 76.31 75.46 27.3% 27.1% 23.0% 18.6% 18.0% 16.5% 45.6% 41.7% 44.7% 4.6% 7.0% 8.1% 3.9% 6.3% 7.7% Republic Monarchy Republic 1.76 0.45 0.16 3.41 73.15 69.75 1% 19% 17% 89.5% 67.1% 79.10% 95.8% 76.1% 87.40% 83.3% 57.6% 71.1% 91 151 100 4.2% 3.2% 3.7% 14000 4800 9400 79 174 107 104.5% 3.0% 3.6% 12300 5400 9900 1.6% 15.1% 8.9% 43.5% 31.7% 31.9% 54.9% 53.2% 49.8% 17.9% 30.7% 30.0% 9.0% 17.4% 33.0% 15.0% 3.8% 14000 4800 9400 12300 5400 9900 17.9% 30.7% 30.0% 9.0% 17.45 towards democratic reforms and greater freedom from too powerful, and often corrupt, governments. There were a variety of responses from entrenched interests, all too many of which escalated into violence and outright civil war. The Arab Spring protests quickly toppled the long standing dictatorships of u n i ~ i a Egypt, and Libya. The civil war in Libya ended only when Muammar Qaddafi was slain. King Mohammed VI of Morocco, the lone monarch remaining, appeared to be more in touch with the populace, allowing peaceful protests and qUickly promising a new constitution. This staved off any serious violence. . , I 0.35 .-----------------------, 0.3 0.3 r---------------------' 0.248 0.2S r-------'-'-'--'o------
O. IS I 0.1 0.21S 0.102 AI geriiJ Egypt Libya 0.179 Morocco 0.307 0.174 Tunisia Figure 1. High rates of unemployment and youth unemployment. ,...--------------------- -, - Algeri a - Egypt - libya - Morocco - Tunisi&! - - Unit ed Kinadom ,..- --_.-. ....... 1.S 0.5 r---..:;;:::::::-- ---:;r-- ------.:-:;;;;;o---..... ==;;;--j 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Figure 2. North African gasoline prices relative to UK prices. Two years later, much of North Africa remains in a state of flux. As new leaders have emerged, they have found leadership to be a challenge. Gaining the consensus needed to implement reforms has been time consuming. Unfortunately, the delays cause frustration, which in turn makes consensus more difficult to reach. Some observers have even lamented that the Arab Spring has turned into the 'Islamist Winter', not just in North Africa but also in the Middle East, where violence in Syria has reached crisis proportions. Table 1 provides an overview of key statistics in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Only 1- 3% of the land in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya is arable. Most of the population lives on the coast. The smaller, coastally oriented countries of Tunisia and Morocco have 17% and 19% arable land. The Sahara Desert continues to expand. Desertification is a major problem, impeding agricultural activity in much of the inland area. Moreover, the residents of the inland desert areas often have little to do with their more urbanised coastal counterparts, and they may largely be excluded from participation in the new governments. This also contributes to internal strife. North Africa's most populous country is Egypt, with 85.3 million people, accounting for nearly half of the region's population. Algeria's population is 38.1 mj llion, followed by Morocco with 32.6 million people, Tunisia with 10.8 million, and Libya with 6 million. Libya is the only country that had a recent drop in population, related to the civil war. The age structure is young, with only approximately 4 - 7% of the North African population aged 65 years and older. Literacy rates are below the world average, with a wide disparity between male literacy rates and female literacy rates. December 2013 HYDROCARBON ENGINEERING Figure 1 displays the high rates of unemployment and youth (ages 15 - 24) unemployment in the North African countries, as estimated by the CIA World Factbook. The data are 2012 estimates, with the exception of Libya, for which no youth unemployment rates are available, and the overall unemployment rate of 30% is an estimate for 2004. Unemployment is viewed as an increasingly critical social problem. Tunisia's rebellion in January 2011 was in fact attributed largely to unemployment and frustration among young people. Total unemployment is estimated at 17.4%, and it is an extremely high 30.7% for young people aged 15 - 24, including many who have college degrees. Tunisia's government had been led for 23 years by President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali , who had pledged many improvements in prosperity, education, health care, and social stability. But the realities continually fell short of the promises. By the end of 2010, a college educated 26 year old named Muhammad Bouazizi protested in a self immolation that set off such a rebellion that President Ben Ali had to leave the country. The Tunisian rebellion is regarded as a starting point for the rebellions that spread in Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Algeria. The 2011 Egyptian Revolution began with a popular uprising on January 25 th , and the revolution is ongoing. On February 11th, after weeks of protests and demonstrations, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigned from office. Egyptians were unhappy with many of the same social issues seen in Tuni sia: high unemployment, low wages, inflation, police brutality, and political censorship. These same problems plagued other North African countries. There was a wave of protests, including self immolations, in Algeria, where the protests grew stronger after the Egyptian Revolution removed President Mubarek. The successor, President Muhammad Morsi, was elected in 2012, but he too was ousted in 2013, and the country remains in flux. The civil war in Libya escalated rapidly. A series of peaceful protests in early 2011 were countered with crushing force by Colonel Qaddafi's troops. The protests escalated into a widespread uprising, and the rebel forces set up a rival seat of government in Benghazi, naming themselves the National Transitional Council. The rebels were backed by NATO, and the civil war ended only when Colonel Qaddafi was slain in October 2011. Yet the provisional government has struggled ever since to forge unity among the disparate tribes, regions and parties that make up the country. Security has not been restored, and armed militias remain active. In September 2012, the US Embassy in Benghazi was attacked by heavily armed militants, and the US Ambassador,). Christopher Stevens, was assassinated. At the time of this writing, a year has passed, and although arrests have been made, the investigation has not been concluded. Important oil export infrastructure has been blockaded, cutting into vital oil export revenues. The Libyan government received 91% of its revenues from the oil and gas industry in 2011, underscoring the critical need for a healthy flow of oil : North Africa's oil and natural gas resources and production Key role of oil and gas revenues The social and political turmoil in North Africa has hampered developments in the oil and gas industry. Because oil and gas contribute so much to the local economies, this is having a cyclical impact on the ability of governments to meet the expectations of the citizenry. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, oil and , , I - Egypt, Arab Rep. - Libya - Morocco - Tunisia - - United Kingdom ;; ;r ;; .... ---." 1.5 ;;;; ------; 0.5 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Figure 3. North African pump prices for diesel relative to UK prices. Figure 4. North Africa proved oil reserves, billion bbls. 51 2300 Figure 5. North Africa proved gas reserves, billion ft3. Al geria EllYpt UbY' gas 0.06 ,..--------------------------. b ; om '- ' ------- ---------------, ....... N. Africa % of World Gas Reserves ___ N. Africa % of World Oil Reserves 1'"1 : 0.Q1 1 '----------------------- o - Figure 6. North Africa: Falling share of global oil and gas reserves. December 2013 HYDROCARBON _ _ ___ _____ ENGINEERING revenues in 2011 accounted for 10% of government revenue in Egypt, 67% of government revenues in Algeria, and a whopping 91% of government revenues in Libya. For the governments now in transition in North Africa, reviving and stimulating the hydrocarbon industry is critical. Pricing issues It is typical for oil and gas rich countries to use the revenues from the hydrocarbon sector to subsidise other sectors and programs. It is also common for governments to subsidise fuel prices. This is viewed as a way of sharing the wealth with the citizens. But it also creates its own set of market problems. For example, demand for the subsidised fuel or fuels may grow so disproportionately that the pattern of fuel demand is skewed and encourages inefficient energy use. The domestic refining industry may not be able to satisfy the lopsided pattern of demand, and subsidised fuel prices may discourage the investment needed to change this. Subsidised fuels may also be smuggled out of the country, giving rise to organised crime. Eventually, the government bill for fuel subsidies may outweigh the benefits, yet removing long standing subsidies may be tantamount to political suicide. All of the North African governments subsidise gasoline and diesel prices. Figure 2 compares the pump price of gasoline in North African countries with the price in the UK, as reported by the World Bank. In 2012, the average price for gasoline in the UK was US$ 2.17/ltr, above the prices in all of the North Africa countries, usually by orders of magnitude: 4.8 times as high as the Egyptian price, 7.5 times as high as the Algerian price, and even 18.1 times as high as the Libyan price of a mere 12 cents/ltr. As noted, oil and gas revenues overwhelmingly dominate the government budgets in Libya and Algeria. These two countries have the most heavily subsidised gasoline in the region, with gasoline priced at only US$ 0.12/ltr in Libya and US$ 0.29/ltr in Algeria. Figure 3 compares the pump price of diesel in North Africa with the price in the UK. The US$ 2.27/ltr price in the UK in 2012 was 13.4 times as high as the Algerian price of US$ 0.17/ltr and 22.7 times as high as the US$ 0.10/ltr seen in Libya. Resource governance Petroleum and natural gas are critical to the North African economy. Yet the presence of oil and gas reserves may not translate directly into economic health, even in countries considered resource rich. A group known R-S the Revenue Watch Institute recently released their report, The 2073 Resource Governance Index. The Resource Governance Index, or RGI, was developed to evaluate the governance of the oil, gas and mining industries in 58 countries. These 58 countries produce 85% of the world's oil, 80% of the world's copper and 90% of the world's diamonds .. The premise is that good governance of resource extraction industries is critical to long term economic success. The evaluation criteria were organised into categories of Institutional and Legal Setting, Reporting Practices, Safeguards and Quality Controls, and Enabling Environment. Despite the importance of resource' extraction in North Africa, Algeria received a 'failing' score of 38, ranking 4st h out of the 58 countries. Egypt received a 'weak' score of 43, placing 38 th out of 58 countries. Morocco received a 'partial ' score of 53, ranking 25 th out of 58 countries. Libya received a 'failing' score of19, ranking 55 th out of 58 countries. The report noted that Libya's very low scores on all , 0.7 +-\:------------------- -=j 0.6 0.5 0.4 -I--- - ---------------- -----"'\--+i 0.3 t---------------------------j - North Aftica Gas Production % of 0.2 Total Africa - North Africa Oil Production % of 0.1 Total Africa Figure 7. North Africa's falling share of African oil and gas output. measures reflected decades of corruption and inefficiency, obviously a difficult system to reform. On the whole, however, the RGI study establishes that resource governance is difficult around the world, not just in North Africa. The Resource Watch group concluded that '80% of governments fail to achieve good governance in their extractive sectors'. Yet while North Africa is not alone in grappling with this problem, the consequences in this region have been severe, and there is little doubt that poor governance of the oil and gas industry is part and parcel of the overall poor governance that fomented the Arab Spring protests. Logically, therefore, it is doubtful that the political and economic reforms now underway will be able to succeed without serious attention given to the oil and gas sectors. Losing ground: Oil and gas reserves Oil was discovered in Algeria in 1956, shortly befc;>re the Suez Crisis. Oil was discovered in Libya in 1959. Libya joined OPEC in 1962, and Algeria joined in 1969. North African oil and gas resources were viewed historically as a strategic alternative to Persian Gulf producers. Oil exports had the added advantage that Suez Canal transit was not required to reach the markets of Europe and the Americas. North Africa quickly became a premier oil centre, with a host of foreign companies participating. But its dominance is waning, and investment is needed or it will continue to lose ground. North African proved oil reserves by country, January 2013, are shown in Figure 4, as reported by the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ). Libya's oil reserves account for nearly three quarters of the regional total, at 48 billion bbls. Algerian reserves also are considerable at 12.2 billion bbls, followed by Egypt, with reserves listed at 4.4 billion bbls. For the five countries, total oil reserves are 64.9 billion bbls, slightly more than half of total African continent oil reserves. Algeria, Libya and Egypt also possess the majority of North Africa's natural gas resource, approximately 54% of which is located in Algeria, followed by 26% in Egypt. Figure 5 shows North Africa's proved gas reserves as reported by OGYUntil recently, natural gas reserves had been growing significantly, particularly with new finds in Egypt. Egypt launched LNG exports in 2005, exporting 7.6 billion m 3 that year. Libya's national oil company had been working to expand natural gas reserves, and it hoped to nearly double reserves to 100 trillion ft3, but the civil war derailed these plans. In recent years, North Africa's additions to oil and natural gas reserves have lagged relative to the rest of the world. According to Hi-Force HTP, AHP & ATOP Hydrotest Pumps HTP Manually Operated Hydrotest Pumps Working pressures up to 1 000 Bar > > Two stage with semi automatic pressure changeover > > Lightweight aluminium design with 15 litre reservoir capacity AHP Air Driven Hydrotest Pumps Output pressures up to 2931 Bar > > Chart recorder available as standard in AHP-CR and AHP2-CR models > > Choice of standard, medium and high flow models ATOP Air Driven Hydrotest Pumps > > Output pressures up to 1489 Bar Twin double acting design offering high volume flow > > Infinitely variable output pressure and flow AHP58 ATDP125 IHil1!liWlll www.hi-force.com 1.6 1.41 1.43 1.42 1.38 1.4 1.28 1.29 1.3 1.31 1.27 1.26 1.2 ............ , 1}6 1.18 116 "5 1.!. . \ I [ 0.8 , 0.7 0.69 0.69 0.68r 0.68 0.68 0.67..___ U. 1l 0.6 0.57 \ 0.4 \ / - Algeri a - Eeypt - libya 0. 2
Figure 8. Recent North African crude production. Figure 9. North African crude/ NGL production trend, 1965 - 2012. 100 80 , 60 40 20 Figure 10. North Africa falling share of African natural gas output. l as I
- Algeria - Egypt - libya _______ --="""""'"-=--________ ---' 10 Figure 11. Dwindling North Africa LNG exports. December 2013 HYDROCARBON ENGINEERING the data series maintained by BP, North Africa's share of global gas reserves was fairly steady at approximately 5% from 2003 to 2007. However, during the five years from 2007 to 2012, North Africa's share has fallen to 4.3% of global reserves. North Africa's share of global oil reserves had been on an upward trend, growing from 4.1% in 2003 to 4.3% in 2007, but this share fell to 3.9% in 2012. These falling shares are shown in Figure 6. Oil and natural gas production: Also flagging As North Africa's share of oil and gas reserves have fallen, oil and natural gas production has fallen also. Figure 7 shows North Africa's falling share of output relative to total African output. In 1970, North Africa produced 92% of total African natural gas plus 79% of African crude oil. These shares have fallen conSiderably. By 2012, North Africa accounted for 71% of the continent's natural gas output and only 42% of the crude output. In 2011, the drop in Libyan crude production had caused North Africa's share to drop to just 34%. Figure 8 provides a closer look at the impact of the Libyan civil war on oil production by displaying quarterly production as reported by the International Energy Agency (lEA). In the first quarter of 2011, Libyan output was 1.13 million bpd. By the second quarter, it had plummeted to 0.12 million bpd, and it fell to a mere trickle of 0.04 million bpd in the 3 rd quarter. By October, Sirte had fallen and Colonel Qaddafi had been slain. Crude production began to be restored, and it averaged 0.57 million bpd in the fourth quarter. In 2012, output hit a peak ofl.43 million bpd before subsiding to 1.31 million bpd in the second quarter of 2013. Libyan officials affirm that they will be able to boost crude production to 2 million bpd by 2017. By the third quarter of 2013, however, output fell once again, as striking workers blocked Sharara and Elephant oil fields and terminals in western Libya. This helped to drive up the international oil price. As of the time of this writing, an agreement has been reached that is intended restore Libyan production. Algerian crude production was in the range of 1.26 - 1.28 million bpa in 201l, but it fell to 1.14 million bpd in the second quarter of 2013. Egyptian crude production declined modestly from 0.7 million bpd in the first quarter of 2011 to 0.67 million bpd in the third quarter of 2012, but it recovered and averaged 0.72 million bpd in the second quarter of 2013. Figure 9 shows the long term trend in crude and NGL production for the four main North African producers, 1965 - 2012, per BP. Libyan production hit a.peak of nearly 3.4 million bpd in 1970, but output collapsed to 1.0 million bpd in 1987. When sanctions were lifted in 2003, some international firms returned to Libya, and production rose to 1.8 million bpd by 2006 - 2008. The impact of the civil war is starkly visible in 2011, followed by a recovery in output in 2012. Algerian production reached 1.0 million bpd in 1970, and it neared 2.0 million bpd from during the 2005 - 2008 period. Some of the strength in liqUids output has been the result of increased natural gas production and processing. Output fell to 1.67 million bpd in 2012. Egyptian oil production was only 0.1 million bpd in 1965, but output began to grow in the late 1970s, reaching a peak of 0.94 million bpd in 1993. Production trended down gently until 2005, when the production decline was reversed. Output in 2012 was approximately 0.73 million bpd. Tunisian output has been roughly stable in the range of 70 000 - 80 000 bpd over the past decade, though recent years have shown a slight downturn. Algeria 5 497 15 0 6 Egypt 9 794 95 39 0 Libya 5 378 4 0 0 Morocco 2 155 27 0 5 Tunisia 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 22 1858 140 39 11 Cracking: Distillation ratio 4.5% 80r----------------------------------------, 70 6 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 20 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Figure 12. North Africa active rotary rigs, monthly 2007 - 2013. Other a tuclOil Oiesel - Gasoline g : 2S0 1------1.'''' ~ libya Output 2011 li bV;l Demand lOll Figure 13. Libyan refined product output versus demand. North Africa is the key natural gas producing region in Africa, but as is the case with oil, its overall share of production is declining. Figure 10 shows natural gas production in Algeria, Libya and Egypt from 2002 through 2012, along with their percentage share of total African output. Algeria is the main producer, and its natural gas production had been trending upward until the middle of the decade, when it stagnated and began to slide. From its peak of 88.2 biHion m 3 in 2005, Algerian production fell to 81.5 billion m 3 in 2012. Egyptian gas production, as noted, had been growing strongly, climbing from 27.3 billion m 3 in 2002 to 62.7 billion m 3 in 2009. This leveled off and declined slightly to 60.9 billion m 3 in 2012. Libyan output also had been expanding in the post sanction years, reaching 15.9 billion m 3 in 2008, but production stagnated by the late 2000s, and it dipped to 7.9 billion m 3 in December 2013 HYDROCARBON ENGINEERING 0 90 0 0 83 3 5 34 84 9 27 208 8 20 0 20 0 0 43 3 0 27 0 0 53 2 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 224 9 27 387 14 30 2011 before recovering somewhat to 12.2 billion m 3 in 2012. Overall, in 2002, these three natural gas producers accounted for 82% of African output, but their share fell to 71 % in 2012. Egypt started exporting LNG in 2005. Exports rose to 14.8 billion m 3 in 2006, but soon they began to slide, and by 2012 Egyptian LNG exports totaled only 6.7 billion m 3 . Algeria is the premier LNG exporter in the region, but its LNG exports have also fallen steadily. Algeria exported 27.9 billion m 3 of LNG in 2003, but exports fell to 15.3 billion m 3 in 2012. Figure 11 illustrates this decline. In 2004, Algerian LNG exports of 24.8 billion m 3 were slightly larger than Qatari exports of 24.1 billion m 3 . By 2012, Qatar's growth in LNG exports had eclipsed not only Algeria but all of North Africa, amounting to 105.4 billion m 3 , 6.9 times as much as Algerian exports and 4.8 times as much as total North African exports. In early 2002, spot prices for Brent crude oil were in the vicinity of US$ 20/bbl. They marched upward and spiked at approximately US$ 133 for the month of July 2008. Much of the world fell into recession, and Brent spot prjces collapsed by late 2008. Yet prices recovered, and they have remained at over US$ 100/ bbl since early 20ll. This type of price horizon has stimulated a great deal of interest in exploration and production. Much of the enthusiasm has bypassed North Africa, however. Figure 12 displays the number of active drilling rigs in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia each month from January 2007 through August 2013, as tracked by Baker Hughes. Although oil prices were rising strongly in the 2007 - 2008 period, the number of active rigs increased noticeably only in Egypt. When the oil price collapsed in late 2009, active rigs in Egypt fell. When prices began to recover, the number of active rigs in Egypt recovered as well. Yet despite the continued strength of oil prices, the number of active rigs leveled off and began to fall in 2012, in conjunction with the rise in political unrest and the ousting of the newly elected President. Tunisia typically has had only three to five rotary rigs active, but in August 2013, only one rig remained active. From 2007 until early 2011, Libya had 10 - 20 active rigs, and this dropped to zero during the civil war. Rigs were reactivated since then, and there were 15 active as of August 2013. Algeria has seen a recent rise in active rigs, which had been in the range of 25 - 30 for most of 2000 through 20ll. In August 2013, Baker Hughes reported 49 active rigs. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Arab Spring protests did not unseat the head of state, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has ruled since 1999. Despite suffering a stroke earlier in 2013, he remains in power, and many believe that he will be able to hand pick a successor when elections are held next in April 2014. The oil and gas sectors remain highly active, therefore, but they are losing ground relative to competitors at a time when they could be growing. Governments have been taking steps to increase international participation, but some investors are wary. For example, Algeria amended its hydrocarbon laws in early 2012 to attract more foreign investment, and Parliament approved the changes in January 2013. But this progress was set back by militant attacks on Algeria's Amenas LNG plant, which claimed over 60 militant and worker lives and shut down the facility. The Amenas plant is located inland and near the border with Libya, raising security concerns. In fact, some of the recent interest in exploration and development in Morocco, which is far less oil and gas prone than many areas in Algeria and Libya, has stemmed from the idea that Moroccan installations will be safer. North Africa's refining industry Recent events have affected refinery plans Mirroring the situation seen in the upstream oil and gas sector, the social and political changes sweeping North Africa also have detracted from the downstream sector. There have been a number of refinery upgrades, expansions, and even grassroots projects planned in North Africa, but the past two years have proven challenging, and many projects have been postponed or shelved. Algeria, for example, developed an ambitious downstream plan that includes rehabilitation and expansion of its three largest refineries (Arzew, Algiers, and Skikda), a condensate splitting refinery at Skikda, a fuel oil conversion unit at Skikda Energy Global Bringing you the power of information
RSSfeed,simp!yc!]c 00 lho orange blJlIOf and load the URL in! your news rcaaeror ___ Other Fuel Oil Di esel - Kerosene Gasoline 177.1 67.4 AtgeriaOut put Algeria Demand Figure 14. Algerian refined product output versus demand. (80 000 bpd capacity,) and four new grassroots refineries now envisioned at 100 000 bpd each. Over the past two years, most efforts have focused on the Skikda refinery, which often has been closed or running at low utilisation rates during maintenance and upgrades. These are planned to add 30 000 bpd of nameplate capacity, a catalytic reformer, and a hydrotreater. There have been a variety of technical problems, unfortunately, plus a fire and an explosion, and gasoline imports have grown. As of the third quarter of 2013, Skikda's crude capacity was increased to 335 000 bpd, and crude runs are expected to rise for the remainder of the year. The Arzew refinery also has been partially shut down for maintenance and repairs in 2011 and 2012, which reduced gasoline output. The ~ ABUTECTM Advanced Burner Technol ogi es ---- www. abutec.com ---- SPECIALIZING IN HIGH-EFFICIENCY, LOW-EMISSION ENCLOSED COMBUSTORS TO THE OIL 6 GAS INDUSTRY MIDSTREAM UPSTREAM Quad 0 Compliant Combustion Devices >98% DRE Customizable Vapor Control Systems 99.9% DRE address 112959 Cherokee Street, Suite 101, Kennesaw, GA 301 44 email Ilinfo@abutec.com phone 11 770.846.01 55 Soralchin refinery reportedly reduced its runs in 2012 over disputes concerning profitability. Libya's Ras Lanuf refinery also has been run at low utilisation rates since the civil war, with problems getting crude deliveries and disagreements between the government and the refinery operator. At 220 000 bpd, Ras Lanuf is Libya' s largest refinery. Some of the protests in 2012 resulted in a blockade of the Ras Lanuf port. The Ras Lanuf refinery reopened in late 2012, but closed again in early 2013 because of technical problems at the refinery, power outages, plus a strike by workers at the Port. There was also a brief shutdown at the Zawiya refinery, caused by a worker' s strike. Libyan officials have announced that they will expand Libya's refinery capacity from its current 0.38 million bpd to 1 million bpd within the next six years, but even the capacity that now exists is subject to closure or low utilisation rates because of security concerns along the supply chain. Table 2 provides a summary of North Africa's refining industry, partly as reported by OGJ with additions and corrections provided by Trans-Energy Research Associates, Inc. Total crude capacity is 1 858 000 bpd. The industry lacks technological sophistication, with a cracking to distillation ratio of only 4.5%. North Africa's refining sector remains in need of investment and attention to raise its sophistication and competitiveness. The region' s refining industry is long established, but it more or less operated in the same business environment as the upstream sector, and it too would benefit from more investment and more openness. As an example, consider the capability of the Algerian and Libyan refining industries to meet domestic demand. Algerian and Libyan refinery output versus demand . As noted, all of the North African oil producing countries subsidise domestic fuel prices, Libya and Algeria to an extreme degree. The Libyan gasoline price was only 12 cents/ltr in 2012, and diesel prices were only 10 cents/ ltr. Algerian gasoline was priced at 29 cents/ltr, while diesel was priced at 17 cents/ltr. Unsurprisingly, the demand pattern is skewed toward gasoline and diesel in both countries. And despite the fact that nameplate refinery capacity is greater than domestic demand, both countries are net importers of gasoline and diesel. There are plans to expand refinery capacity in both countries. But it can be seen that it is not so mud') the amount of capacity, but the type of capacity and how it is utilised, that determines how well the industry will be able to meet domestic demand. Figure 13 compares refined product output with product demand in Libya, and Figure 14 shows the same information for Algeria, as reported by OPEC. Algerian refined product output was 501 300 bpd in 2011, while product demand was 329 400 a surplus of 171 900 bpd of refined product. Libyan refined product output was 473 200 bpd, while demand was 231 400 bpd, leaving a surplus of241 800 bpd. The surplus output is a rough estimate of potential product exports. However, Algerian output was only 41% gasoline plus diesel , whereas Algerian demand was 74.2% gasoline plus diesel. Libyan refinery December 2013 HYDROCARBON ENGINEERING production was only 20.4% gasoline and diesel, whereas the demand pattern was 78.1% gasoline and diesel. In net terms, therefore, Algeria needed imports of 16 100 bpd of gasoline plus 22 800 bpd of diesel. Libya needed 80100 bpd of gasoline imports and 4100 bpd of diesel imports. The exports were primarily lower value products such as fuel oil. As noted, an 80000 bpd fuel oil conversion unit has been planned in Algeria, as well as a condensate splitter, which would create a lighter output slate, but many plans and goals have been set back. Conclusion: A weakening breeze? The winds, like a sirocco, have swept through North Africa, bringing changes of leadership in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt once again. This included an end to the infamous Qaddafi regime in Libya. Protests and demonstrations have taken place in Algeria and Morocco as well. The ageing president of Algeria held on to power, but may hand over the reins to a successor in early 2014. The King of Morocco allowed peaceful demonstrations and has made many concessions toward more open government. Throughout North Africa and in the Middle East, this movement became known as the 'Arab Spring' . The situations vary from country to country, but there are many commonalities in what the people are protesting: high levels of unemployment, a widening gap between rich and poor, crime, violence, and corruption. The people's disaffection stems from a long standing failure of the governments to deliver on promises. Some of the economic problems, however, were exacerbated by the global economic downturn, which local governments were powerless to combat. Other social and political ailments were so deeply rooted that reforms will come only slowly. After the first whirlwind of change, the slow pace of reform and rebuilding has caused frustration, leading observers to speak of how the 'Arab Spring' turned into the 'Islamist Winter'. North Africa's oil and gas sector is critically important to the region's economic health, and also to government stability and basic function, since the governments run the energy industry and derive a major share of their operating revenue from it. Yet for all of its importance, the North African governments receive very poor 'grades' when it comes to how they manage their resources. When evaluated according to the criteria of the Resource Governance Index, the two main producers, Libya and Algeria, received failing scores, and Egypt received a 'weak' score. Libya ranked 55 th out of 58 countries examined, with consistently low scores attributed to decades of mismanagement and corruption. Yet in a way there is cause for optimism. The same inefficiency and corruption that typified the energy industry was endemic across the government, and this was its eventual undoing. The new regimes hope to change this and build stronger, healthier economies, and the same principles that improve overall governance of the countries will improve governance of the energy industries. Although the changes may take time, and the sirocco winds may have weakened, it can be hoped that a gentler breeze will fill the sails and transport North Africa's energy' sector to smoother seas. ill , I