MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538) Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during

the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective position (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non -political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquezs Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of Quezon. Issue: Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice. Held: NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

MARCOS versus COMELEC (208 SCRA 300) Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitutions one -year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. Issue: Whether or not the statement in the COC determines whether an individual satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement, to warrant herein petitioners disqualification. Ruling: NO. Having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order

the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703) Facts: Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmea on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. Issue: Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship. Held: YES. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznars contention was not meritorious. Aznars argument that Osmea is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that Osmea has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmea is a Filipino remains. In this case, Osmea denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963. The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmea obtained certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water. The court in this case held that Osmea is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a dual citizen.

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost". Issue: Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy. Held: The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing. LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

Facts: On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996. On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner exceeded the age requirement to run as chairman in Sanggunian Kabataan? Held: The petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The court discuss the one-year cycle of successive years in construing Section 428 of the Local Government Code Providing that certain elective officials should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of their election, The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth -- the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day. The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. Petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

Brillantes vs Yorac0
Constitutional Law COMELECs Constitutional Independence In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the

quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.

ELECTION LAW Pre-proclamation controversies and manifest errors FACTS Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay, Rizal during the May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as Vice-Mayor.P e t i t i o n e r a f t e r c o m p i l i n g a l l c o p i e s o f e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r correction of manifest errors in the election returns and for a nullification of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE Whether or not COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary correction in a petition for correction of manifest errors in the election returns. RULING The COMELEC, in a petition for correction of manifest errors, is limited to anexamination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or behind the face of the returns. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED forlack of merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of the COMELEC First Division and En Banc , respectively, are AFFIRMED . Costsagainst petitioner. [ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIONS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura,

J .] ELECTION LAW Pre-proclamation controversies and manifest errors FACTS Petitioner and private respondent Fernando Cabitac were candidates for Vice-Mayor of Taytay, Rizal during the May 2004 elections. Private respondent wonthe election and was proclaimed as Vice-Mayor.P e t i t i o n e r a f t e r c o m p i l i n g a l l c o p i e s o f e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r correction of manifest errors in the election returns and for a nullification of the proclamation of the private respondent as Vice-Mayor. The COMELEC FirstDivision dismissed the petition and was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE Whether or not COMELEC is required to go beyond the face of election returnsand make the necessary correction in a petition for correction of manifesterrors in the election returns. RULING

The COMELEC, in a petition for correction of manifest errors, is limited to anexamination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction togo beyond or behind the face of the returns. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the Resolutions dated June 30, 2006 and October 16, 2006 of the COMELEC First Division andE n B a n c , respectively, are AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner. [ A D E L I N A T A M A Y O R E Y E S , M . D . v s . C O M M I S S I O N O N ELECTIO NS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC. G.R. No. 175121. June8, 2007. Nachura, J .]