2|Local Government (Guanzon)
SYLLABUS PART 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;
CREATION, MERGER, ABOLITION AND POWERS.
Creation of Local Government Units:
Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELEC
Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating
Province of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residents
of the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelec
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in
implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is
unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the
LGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regarding
the requirements in land area and estimated annual income.
Petitioners also contend that a number of voters were
excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to the
inhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negros
del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of
Negros Occidental..
Comelec contends that the law is not unconstitutional. They
claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution because
the requisites of the LGC have been complied with. They
submit that the case has now become moot and academic
with the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the
plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of the new
province while only 30,400 were against it.
Issue: WON the province complied with the plebiscite
requirement
Held: No
Ratio: The more significant and pivotal issue in the
present case revolves around in the interpretation and
application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the
Constitution. It can be plainly seen that the constitutional
provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained
"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the
unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the
boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental
would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of
its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of
those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that
should conform to said constitutional requirement but
eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a
supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and
promote autonomy of local government units but at the
same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the
Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change
made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said
enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas affected." We
are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the
unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be
diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities
and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby
ignoring the evident reality that there are other people
necessarily affected. The court reversed the ruling in
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Paredes vs Executive Secretary (same issue but concerns
barangay).
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the
creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros
Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities
of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of
Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding
petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of
Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656
hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills
which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In
the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the
existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros
Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What
was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with
the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved
was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial
alteration of boundary.
Issue: WON the new Province of Negros del Norte
complied with the requirements as to land area
Held: No
Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expressly
declared that the new province contained an area of 285,656
ha. More or less. However, when Parliamentary bill was
enacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territory
of 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of the
provincial treasurer also indicates that there the province
comprised of a lesser area. Although the certification stated
that the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador was
not available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilometers.
This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will result in
approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC 1
(requirements) is most revealing. As so stated therein the
"territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular
provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last
sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein
used, has reference only to the mass of land area and
excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises
control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be
contiguous."
Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along
all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or
adjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in
the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical
contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter.
The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to words associated with or related
to them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of the
sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
1
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be
created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five
hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hun-
dred thousand persons, an average estimated annual in-
come, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than
ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its
creation shall not reduce the population and income of the
mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements under this section. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include
the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural
funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring in-
come.
3|Local Government (Guanzon)
"territory" ---- the physical mass of land area. There would
arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous
if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not
only land area but also territorial waters, It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of
Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area"
only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be
given the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense in
which the words are used furnished the rule of construction.
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which
respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of
the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are
arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to
bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or
unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute
is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A
construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its
words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to
be favored.
Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestly
void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the
implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the
proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the
appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited
holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed
new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the
exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral
province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of
Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La
Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran,
Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique,
Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly
contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI,
section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no
province may be created or divided or its boundary
substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is
plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of
Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new
province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the
voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental
have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,
because the whole province is affected by its proposed
division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit
the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be
partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and
illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the
secession that they demanded against the wishes of the
majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded
plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer be
enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has
been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the
challenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does not
look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction or
restraining order' which they have reason to believe might
be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and
pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the
restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have
been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs
shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status
quo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow a
failure to properly issue the restraining order stopping the
holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the
mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status
quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province
of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of
the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of
the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the
equally invalid appointment of its officials.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Torralba v. Mun. of Sibagat (1987)
Facts: BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province
of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section
3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution2. Petitioners are
residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner,
Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers
are the local public officials of the new Municipality.
According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code
must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio;
and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been
enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could
not have possibly complied with any criteria when
respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and
void.
Issue: WON BP 56 is invalid
Held: No
Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at the
time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to
cripple legislative competence to create municipal
corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution
does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial
and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It
contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way
that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the
enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision
means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government units should
conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum,
before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power
remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people
concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to
said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of
the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation
of the new local government unit. The officials of the new
Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and
are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been
created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a
municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In
the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative
body may create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government.The creation of
the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of
legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa.
There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec
and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at
the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3
December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885
in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new
province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining
areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of
the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or
units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a
plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan
case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new
2
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary sub-
stantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria es-
tablished in the Local Government Code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected."
4|Local Government (Guanzon)
province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue
in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here.
And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP
Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the
Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality
of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation,
and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in
that law.
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
Bai Sema v. Comelec (2008)
Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for
Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8
municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM,
created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA
9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanao’s first
legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII
(having voted against its inclusion in November 1989
plebiscite).
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9,
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11.
Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao
voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in 29 October
2006 plebiscite.
On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution
No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March
2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao.” Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the
COMELEC’s Law Department recommendation under a
Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued
on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902
(subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407
by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was
supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant to
Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation
285,372; Against the creation 8,802)
The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and
formed the new province. All of them were from the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu
Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was
chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was
the first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the
Expanded ARMM law.
Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which
combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single
legislative district during the Philippine general election,
2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of
the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen
Dilangalen.
Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can
Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government
units - province, city, municipality or barangay - must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict
with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be
a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
"only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities
or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local
government units is not one of the express legislative
powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with
the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides
5|Local Government (Guanzon)
that Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a
national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created
by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did
not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending
the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly
may exercise legislative power x x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x."
Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power
to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a
legislative district, the first representative is always elected
in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the
law.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to
Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member
of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It
would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The
office of a district representative is maintained by national
funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national
funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative
powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can
only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can
never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the
ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits
the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative
powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff
Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress'
power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether
Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and
new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng]
congressional districts without the apportionment provided
in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may
come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the
creation of a province — for "each province shall
have at least one member" in the House of
Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The
requirements concerning the apportionment of
representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to
the second method of creation of representative districts,
and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of
provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but,
also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to
refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed,
when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district, comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute —
which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment.
Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and
independence of the House of Representatives. Under
Section 19,Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM
with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461
of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of
P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the
membership of a superior legislative body, the House of
Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in
the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of
Representatives based on one representative for at least
every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM
Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in
Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created
must have a population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become
the majority in the House of Representatives through the
ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces
or cities within the ARMM.
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the
provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress
in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch
system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the
power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress
itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or
reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies.
Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states,
"[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself
through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a
province increases the actual membership of the House of
Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide.
Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38]
district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the
House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall
constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House,
there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every
election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed
winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district
representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district
representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to
increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
The present case involves the creation of a local government
unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a
legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and
barangays that does not comply with the criteria established
in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such
municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation
of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue
to an appropriate case.
6|Local Government (Guanzon)
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X
of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts,
a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that every province shall
have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like
the office of a district representative of Congress because
the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it
merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20
of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The Prov. Of North Cotabato et al v. Government
(2008)
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels,
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March
1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat
Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among
others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of
the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations.[1]
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF
was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing
the same.
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation
and the concluding of several prior agreements between the
two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF
Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of
Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents,
summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,
among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue
peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat
or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.[2]
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to
be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process.
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked
a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in
March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the
military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the
government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The
MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially
responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo
asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to
the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central
Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually,
decided to meet with the GRP.
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the
talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the
parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the
General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks
Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
suspended all its military actions.
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli,
Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement
2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect,
Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli
Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed
further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya,
Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing
of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status
between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which
was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence
between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to
2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed
away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad,
who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by
Mohagher Iqbal.[6]
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the
parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of
the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was
set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of
respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by
respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover,
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention
and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo.
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-
signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the
GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court
finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the
"moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional
7|Local Government (Guanzon)
character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c)
the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements
necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June
2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or
another one drawn up that could contain similar or
significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus
have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action
in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official
copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
The people's right to information on matters of public
concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in
splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps
and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. Corollary to these twin
rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to
public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these
public rights.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional
imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to
be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace
agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty
of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
before any project or program critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in such
locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership
of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does
not grant the Executive Department or any government
agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a
defense to the general right to information or the specific
right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft
of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O.
No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional , for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
framework will not be effective until that framework is
amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From
The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded,
it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to
the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome
of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international
agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of
guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally
defective.
Metro Manila Commission:
Gemiliano Lopez, Jr. v. Hon. Comelec (1985)
Facts: PD 824 or an act creating the Metropolitan Manila,
was enacted to establish and administer program and
provide services common to" the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the
surrounding area. This is in response to the sharp growth in
the population of Manila and the proliferation of commercial
firms and industries, which resulted to the ever-increasing
inability of the separate local governments to cope with the
ensuing serious problems. Metro Manila shall be
administered by the Commission.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of PD 824. They rely
on this provision: "No province, city, municipality, or barrio
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
unit or units affected." The Local Government Code was not
enacted until 1983.
Issue: WON PD 824 is unconstitutional as it was enacted
prior to the creation of a local government code
8|Local Government (Guanzon)
Held: No
Ratio: The challenge does not suffice to call for a
declaration of unconstitutionality. The last vestige of doubt
has been removed by the present constitutional provision
regarding the Batasang Pambansa. That provision clearly
recognizes the existence of the Metropolitan Manila.
Justification as to PD 824. In PD 824, reference was made
to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 wherein the
residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President
to restructure the local governments into an integrated unit
of the manager or commission form of government.” It was
then pointed out that "the rapid growth of population and
the corresponding increase of social and economic
requirements in the contiguous communities has brought
into being a large area that calls for development both
simultaneous and unified. It "is vital to the survival and
growth of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a
workable and effective system be established for the
coordination, integration and unified management of such
local government services or functions" therein. There is
necessity for "the unified metropolitan services or functions
to be planned, administered, and operated [based on] the
highest professional technical standards." 15 The foregoing
constitutes the justification for and the objective of such
Presidential Decree.
Application of Paredes vs Executive Secretary. In
Paredes vs Executive Secretary, the Court did came to the
conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected would be satisfied even if "those voters who are not
from the barangay to be separated were excluded in the
plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite
held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila
in the referendum on February 27, 1975 was not a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional provision. With the voters
in such four cities and thirteen municipalities, now
composing Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will,
the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has
been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of
such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local
Government Code.
Presidential Authority to Issue the PD. At that time
there was no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the
President who was entrusted with such responsibility. The
legality of the law making authority by the President during
the period of Martial Law was already established in Aquino
vs Comelec.
Sangguniang Bayan. The point has been raised, however,
that unless Presidential Decree No. 824 be construed in such
a way that along with the rest of the other cities and
municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang
Bayan, then there is a denial of the equal protection
provision of the Constitution. The point is not well-taken. It is
clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is
not forbidden. But classification on a reasonable basis, and
not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. . . . The
classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinction which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to
each member of the class." All such elements are present.
There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasons
that called for the creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite
obvious that under the conditions then existing - still present
and, with the continued growth of population, attended with
more complexity - what was done was a response to a great
public need. The government was called upon to act. PD 824
was the result. It is not a condition for the validity of the
Sangguniang Bayans provided for in the four cities and
thirteen municipalities that the membership be identical with
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample
justification for such a distinction
Basis in the Constitution. Article VIII, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly recognized the juridical entity known
as Metropolitan Manila. Such express constitutional
affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law calls for
the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it the first time that
there has been acknowledgment in law of the creation of
Metropolitan Manila. (Election Code of 1978, Presidential
Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human
Settlements, Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the
Metropolitan Manila Commission, Amendments to the
Constitution, Ordinance)
Control of the President. It is undeniable that the
creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from
any constitutional objection. There is, however, a question
that may arise in connection with the powers of the
President over the Commission. According to PD 824: "The
Commission, the General Manager and any official of the
Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control
of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this
Decree, the President shall have the power to revoke, amend
or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the
Commission, the General and the Commissioners." It may
give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it confers the
power of control on the President. That control he certainly
exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries.
His power over local governments does not go that far. It
extends no further than general supervision. These doubts,
however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision. Succinctly
put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as
against one that will destroy.
To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to
lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the
constitution enters into and forms part of every statute.
Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of
the Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be
considered national in character. There can be no valid
objection to such exercise of authority. That is a clear
recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national
character. Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila
Commission may be considered as properly appertaining to
local government functions, the power of the President is
confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Section
13 clearly appears to be free from any constitutional
infirmity.
Abad Santos, dissenting. 1. The referendum of February
27, 1975, did not satisfy the prohibition contained in Art. XI,
Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution. For one thing the provision
speaks of "the criteria established in the local government
code." There was then no local government code so there
were no criteria. Also the grant of power to restructure the 4
cities and 13 municipalities in the Greater Manila area
"under such terms and conditions as the President may
decide" was so broad that it was in fact not an intelligent
decision on the part of the people. I submit that a grant of
power must be definite to be valid; it must not be nebulous
and uncircumscribed so as to amount to a total abdication
thereof. Finally, the referendum did not include all of the
peoples of Bulacan and Rizal to ascertain if they were willing
to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. The
referendum suffers from the same infirmity present in the
case of Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, cited in the main
opinion, where I dissented.
2. The January 27, 1984, amendment to the Constitution
providing for representation in the Batasang Pambansa and
which allocates representatives to "districts in Metropolitan
Manila" cannot be construed to constitutionally validate P.D.
No. 824 for the simple reason that the issue before the
9|Local Government (Guanzon)
people when the amendment was submitted for ratification
was not the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Presumption of constitutionality:
Alvarez v. Guingona (1996)
Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the
municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent
component city to be known as the city of Santiago. The law
was challenged mainly because the act did not allegedly
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution.
Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago has
not met the minimum average annual income required under
Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a
component city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB
8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third
reading, the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January
18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on
May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was
transmitted to the senate. The committee recommended
that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration that the house bill was identical to the senate
bill.
Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation
of the average annual income of a municipality for the
purposes of its conversion into an independent component
city
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into
a component city because its average annual income for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices
falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for its
conversion into a city. After deducting the IRA, ti appears
that the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices.
Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income
but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national
government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be
converted into a component city, it must, among others,
have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the
Department of Finance.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the
State which is constituted by law and possessed of
substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not
intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given
more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
The practical side to development through a decentralized
local government system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate
on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty,
responsibility and accountability in every local government
unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively
carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local government
unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of
revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national
taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of
the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.
For purposes of budget preparation, which budget should
reflect the estimates of the income of the local government
unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income.
This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local
Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected
or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local
government unit.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit. 11 They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil
is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or
transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning
all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities
and government-owned-or-controlled corporations".
Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its
own version of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be sait to have
originated in the House of Representatives
Held: Yes
Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817
should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No.
1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the
Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while
SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No.
8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question
but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under
the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB
No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly
transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on
Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No.
8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on
December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on
January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on
February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243.
Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No.
1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the
Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing
in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long
10 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.
Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No.
7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those
who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis
that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our
stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720,
the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition
is, therefore, inevitable.
Governmental powers/ functions:
Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (1991)
Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing under
and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines. At about 7 am of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo
Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the petitioner
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the
injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physical
injuries.
Private respondents instituted an action against Nieveras
and Balagot before the CFI. The defendants filed a third
party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. The complaint
was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig.
Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, non
suability of the State, prescription and negligence of the
owner and driver of the jeepney.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner
and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the
jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed an MR
which was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Issue: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-
suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a
motion to dismiss.
Held: Yes
Ratio: In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution
of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial.
However, the judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and then rendered a decision
against the municipality and its driver. The judge did not
commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of
non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality.
However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when
in his decision he held the municipality liable for the quasi-
delict committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti, to wit:
"the State may not be sued without its consent." Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of
money claims involving liability arising from contracts is
found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-
delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into
business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they
are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability
of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver,
acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. Fontanilla).
According to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipal
corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance
of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case of
Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction
or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and
jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of
the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.
Proprietary powers/ functions:
11 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
City of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(1989)
Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in
North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto.
Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021.
The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however
from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease
over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years,
the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized
the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His
bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the
cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During
the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked
to find out that Vicencio’s remains were removed. The
cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in
the bodega.
Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for
damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the
City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the
North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's
predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds
owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The
court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make
use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award
of damages in favor of the private respondents.
Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public
cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary
function of the City of Manila.
Held: Proprietary
Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North
Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or purpose as
stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of
the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a
political subdivision in the performance of its governmental
function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused
by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private
respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a
contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary
functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers
therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of
lease.
The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such
endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through its city government in conformity
with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are
twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the
one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the
other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the
public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial,
public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community and include those which are ministerial, private
and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or
governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity.
The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for
public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and
further enumerates the properties for public use as
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provisions, cities or
municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v.
Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to
proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a
special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of
the City of Manila. The administration and government of the
cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and
police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or
tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the
same are under the charge and responsibility of the
superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion,
there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class
of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or
private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the
burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents.
Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract
executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision
entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for
such breach is prescribed in the contract.
Issue: WON the city is liable for damages
Held: Yes
Ratio: All things considered, even as the Court
commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening
complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place
and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the
reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis.
Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the
most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject
lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the
North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use
of without paying any rental to the city government for a
period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven
(11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term
of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when the
remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were
prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require
the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in
the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder.
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of
grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for
50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as
clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy
treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city
government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the
reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is
in itself a contract of lease. (
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v.
Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious
act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check
the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the
petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative
Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City
of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971
is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers
new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25,
1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty
(50) years was still in full force and effect.
12 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
13 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
SYLLABUS PART 2: DECENTRALIZATION; LOCAL
AUTONOMY; POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
5. Local Government Units vis a vis National Government:
Power of general supervision:
Drilon v. Lim (1994)
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality
3
of Section 187 of the Local Government Code . The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies
and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public
policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained
the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power
of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by
the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes
Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction
over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised
to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon
the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined
3 grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances
And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this
Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality
of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to
the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within
sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the
accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the
aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a
court of competent jurisdiction.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
the Constitution.
Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held: Yes
Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a
tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was
that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant
of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of
control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an
act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order
the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the
Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of
Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws
would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not
merely an examination of whether or not the requirements
or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would
smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power
was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the
right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila
Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion
therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another
matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no
publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing,
no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not
been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary
only because he had given it only five days within which to
gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25
exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the
trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed
been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings
are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C
show that the proposed ordinances were published in the
14 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in
the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in
the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the
posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does
not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text
of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but
this requirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and public investment programs of the
local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
Solicitor General v. Metopolitan Manila Authority
(1991)
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic
District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605
and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by
LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public
streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to
be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged
that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of
driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General
Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his
office had never authorized the removal of the license plates
of illegally parked vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance
No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and
impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro
Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit
separate comments in light of the contradiction between the
Ordinance and the SC ruling.
The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was
adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32
(formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol
Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it
violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not
permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license
plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention,
however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said
ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC
Held: No
Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of
legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing
that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the
delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local
governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect
and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity
of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the
particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the
accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and
consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the
measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent
law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for
traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is
nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing
the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such
sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of
such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic
violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as
are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere
is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the
decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the
Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides
that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not
be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong.
`The requirement that the municipal enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions
are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the
local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at
all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to
other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in
the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be
passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of
marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts,
to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture;
the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and
so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be
valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the
requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the
decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so
doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect
partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD
1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413
on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish
violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the
sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were
enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of
the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic
problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and
enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic
violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public
misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement
of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that
there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a
statutory prohibition against the imposition of such
penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless
of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged
enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.
15 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own
discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either
directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority
to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan
Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and
continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor
vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43)
and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (1991)
Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a
series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed
against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on
various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution,
and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and
reasons, the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued a
preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In the
other case, respondent ordered petitioner's second
preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. The
petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction in the RTC. The second preventive
suspension was not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon
instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in
the RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, in
the respondent CA. Meanwhile, the respondent issued
another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for
another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as
acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before
the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment
dismissing the cases.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
officials.
Issue: Yes
Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987
Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension
and/or removal over local officials. According to both
petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen
self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting
the phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip the
President of the power of control over local governments. It
is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates
of the Constitutional Commission. The issue consists of three
questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,
and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code?
(3) What is the significance of the change in the
constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding
the change in the constitutional language, the charter did
not intend to divest the legislature of its right - or the
President of her prerogative as conferred by existing
legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local
officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be
provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore
local governments' autonomy from congress and to break
Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over
municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-
states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of
the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution - and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest -
is to wean local government units from over dependence on
the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is
not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax
law, income distribution legislation, and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive.
It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal
of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise
removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to
strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control
of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the
power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing
more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes
the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
"supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully
point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to
defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because
although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the
power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas
Ople would not.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new
Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas
Blg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not
incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of
the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force
and effect. As the Constitution itself declares, local
autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does
nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of local governments and as put
by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not
meant to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step.
Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means
devolution of national administration - but not power - to the
local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
16 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
contituency.
Issue: WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon
Ganzon are proper
Held: No
Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on
Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the
Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that
since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the
Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie
findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in
public office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance)
but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600
days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out
of office.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with
suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it
is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government.
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is
simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal
cause of the investigation with his influence and authority
over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be
exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if
prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local
Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more
than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. We
reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through
the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet
we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with
a grave abuse of discretion.
Ganzon Supplement:
Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere
decentralization of administration, not of power, in which
local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
The change in constitutional language (with respect to the
supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative
control over local governments; it did not exempt the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is
consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;
Since local governments remain accountable to the
national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the
manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action
against local officials;
"Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent
terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the
President does not have);
The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the
suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspended for the offenses he was charged originally;
provided:
that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to
his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall
not be counted in computing the time of suspension."
[Supra, sec. 63(3)]
that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive
suspension, the petitioner commits another or other
crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled
against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section
63 of the Local Government Code.
MCIAA v. Marcos (1996)
Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958,
mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient
and effective control, management and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1: The authority
shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National
Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities.
However, the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded
payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to
petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It
also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the
LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs.
The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC
performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was
withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC.
Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trial
court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew
the tax exemption granted the GOCCs.
Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose
taxes on petitioner
Held: Yes
Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is
to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Since
taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions
from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption
from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on
language in the law too plain to be mistaken.
There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the
petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless,
since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the
exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the
taxing authority.
17 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the
constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power
to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the
exemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes
the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o)
Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs.
Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property
tax. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from
payment of GOCCs, except as provided therein. On the other
hand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemption
privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of
the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in
Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the
levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and
LGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities,
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose
the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial used
thereof has been granted to a taxable person."
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193
of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The
latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates
the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last
paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of
the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are
concerned by limiting the retention only to those
enumerated there-in; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the
LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the
Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions
covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the
exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property
has been granted to taxable person for consideration or
otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally
withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from
real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and
the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned
corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from
such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No.
6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can
only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any
of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under
Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the
said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the
petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section
133.
It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are
real property, are any one of those enumerated in Section
234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the
property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under
any explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. In
light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of
the Government", it could only be within be first item of the
first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the
terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace
."instrumentalities" and "agencies."
This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the
petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the
Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly
mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the
phrase "National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase
"Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision
"in Section 234(a).
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National
Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder
and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987
defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which
the functions of the government are exercised through at the
Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from
the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local
government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political
subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government"
refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as
distinguished from the different forms of local Governments."
The National Government then is composed of the three
great departments the executive, the legislative and the
judicial. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the
various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct
unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any
agency of the National Government, not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations".
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to
the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real
property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to
the agencies and instrumentalities of the National
Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should
have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not
Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of
the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property
owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the
government including government-owned and controlled
corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source
of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise
known as the Real Property Tax Code.
Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and
any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt
by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this
restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to
limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the
general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment
of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes
in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy
considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure
autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the
LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and
support myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the
general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress,
and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall
that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges granted to government-owned and controlled
corporations and all other units of government were that
such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and
distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated
18 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share in
the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by
paying the taxes and other charges due from them.
The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the
parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the
Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the
petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable
person". It may be reasonable to assume that the term
"lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by
the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the
respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property
taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among
other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the
beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by
the Republic of the Philippines.
This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the
ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized
capital stock consists of "the value of such real estate owned
and/or administered by the airports." Hence, the petitioner is
now the owner of the land in question and the exception in
Sec 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim
that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was
only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The
grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive
proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person
subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable
person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the
forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be
conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the
Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of
the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which,
as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly,
the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance on
Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided before
the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent
Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or
agencies of the government performing governmental
functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to
fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one
can doubt its wisdom.
Decentralization, local autonomy:
Limbona v. Mangelin (1989)
Facts: Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a
member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional
Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del
Sur. He was then elected speaker of the regional legislative
assembly of central Mindanao, composed of 18 members.
Later, Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker
of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a
conference. Petitioner then ordered Acting Secretary
Alimbuyao to inform the assemblymen that there will be no
session on said date as petitioner and Razul are attending
the house committee hearing.
The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice.
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-
Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion
to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen
in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair
declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
The petitioner then went to court praying that judgment be
rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents
during the session as null and void and holding the election
of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid
and subsisting, and(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Issue: WON the expulsion of the petitioner (pending
litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
Ratio: We do not agree that the case has been rendered
moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion
resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was
done purposely to make this petition moot and academic,
and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process
alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force
and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or
not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming
that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the
opportunity to do so. What appears in the records is an
admission by the Assembly that "since November, 1987 up
to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook." To be sure, respondents aver that
"[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to
come to Cotabato City," but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly,
that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no
matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for
the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a
bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the
petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution)
speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner]
before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly ---- an act
which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly
assails their integrity and character as representative of the
people," an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access
to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and,
unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no
one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that
should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line
with the most elementary requirements of due process. And
while it is within the discretion of the members of the
Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in
the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
Issue: What is the extent of self-government given to the
two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Ratio: The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the
national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines and its Constitution," "with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities"' specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions," except to "act on matters which are
within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1. National defense and security;
2. Foreign relations;
3. Foreign trade;
4. Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange,
banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
19 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
5. Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation
or utilization of all natural resources;
6. Air and sea transport;
7. Postal matters and telecommunications;
8. Customs and quarantine;
9. Immigration and deportation;
10. Citizenship and naturalization;
11. National economic, social and educational planning;
and
12. General auditing."
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general supervision and
control over the Autonomous Regions.
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners
in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to
Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration is a question foreign to this petition, since
what is involved herein is a local government unit
constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that
controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact
exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper
case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units
enjoy autonomy in these two senses
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic
act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and
limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the
internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services.
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an
inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991)
Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for
Rizal Province was left vacated. Petitioner, Gov. Reynaldo
San Juan informed Dir. Reynaldo Abella of the DBM that Ms.
Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO and requested
Dir Abella to endorse the appointment of Santos. In a memo,
however, Dir Abella appointed Cecilia Almajose as PBO of
Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal
Budget Officers. According to Abella, Almajose was most
qualified as she was a CPA. DBM Undersecretary Nazario
Cabuquit signed the appointment papers of Almajose.
In a letter, Petitioner reiterated his request for Santos’
appointment. DBM Regional Dir Agripino Galvez denied the
request as Santos was not qualified. When petitioner learned
of Almajose’s appointment, he protested on the grounds that
Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to
appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three
years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular
No. 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Governor, not the
Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to
recommend nominees for the position of PBO. The DBM
issued a memo ruling that petitioner’s protest is not
meritorious as the DBM validly exercised its prerogative in
filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's
nominees met the prescribed requirements. The CSC
affirmed.
Issue: WON petitioner has the right and privilege to
recommend the nominees to the position of PBO
Held: Yes
Ratio: The tug of war between the Secretary of DBM and
the Governor of Rizal over a position involves the application
of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that
of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on
local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. The exercise
by LGUs of meaningful power has been a national goal since
the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional
provisions and legislation mandating greater autonomy for
local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of
centralized powers. They deny or water down what little
grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal
corporations.
President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their
attention in the first instance to the establishment of
municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both
in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the
opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest
extent of which they are capable and subject to the least
degree of supervision and control which a careful study of
their capacities and observation of the workings of native
control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law,
order and loyalty." In this initial organic act for the
Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive
and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to
making local autonomy effective. The 1935 Constitution had
no specific article on local autonomy. However, the
Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision as may be provided by
law." The President controls the executive departments. He
has no such power over local governments. He has only
20 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
supervision and that is both general and circumscribed by
statute. Pursuant to this principle under the 1935
Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was
enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264 (Local Autonomy
Act) was enacted. The provisions of the 1973 Constitution
moved the country further towards greater autonomy. An
entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the
Constitution. It called for a local government code defining
more responsive and accountable local government
structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance
with the local government code and upon approval by a
plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to
levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked
in the present Constitution (Art II Sec 25, Art X Sec 2-3).
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the
recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely
directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM
Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers
and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-
reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds,
the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set
back.
Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local
level and after completion are forwarded to the national
officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials
who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They
are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing
DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether
or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for
this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a
balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals
from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason
that the nomination and appointment process involves a
sharing of power between the two levels of government. It
may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure
followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges. Under
Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial
positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council.
DBM’s grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact
that Dir Galvez required the Governor to submit at least
three other names of nominees better qualified than his
earlier recommendation. The appointment of Almajose was
formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy
of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The
complete disregard of the LGUs prerogative and the smug
belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and
discretion are manifest. In his work, Dean Vicente G. Sinco
stated that the value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. He
stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the
strength of free nations. A people may establish a system of
free government but without the spirit of municipal
institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." Our national
officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the
spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (1991), supra.
Held: The 1987 Constitution did not divest the President
[in this case acting through Sec of LocGov] of the power of
supervision over LGUs. The change in the constitutional
language merely underscores local governments' autonomy
from congress and to break Congress’ "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however,
intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of
local government units, as in the federal governments of the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
US. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local LGUs
from over-dependence on the central government.
Under the Constitution, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage
of a local government code, a local tax law, income
distribution legislation, and a national representation law,
and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local
level. Also, despite the autonomy, the Constitution places
the local government under the general supervision of the
Executive. Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include in
the LGC provisions for removal of local officials, which
suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as
the existing LGC has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
The petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. Legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
"Control" = the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for test of the latter. "Supervision" =
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. As we held,
however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990)
Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987,
which created the Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed
on the primary ground that the President pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by Congress and the approval of
such act through a plebiscite.
Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments
and agencies of the National Government in the areas
covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory
to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not
create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the
creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the
ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with
the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the
creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which
undoubtedly, will take time. The President, in 1987 still
exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not
yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to
address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime
the organic act had not yet been passed.
Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR
contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces composing it. It must be clarified
that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. On
the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political
autonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As said
earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
21 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp, Inc. (1991)
Facts: In 1992, representatives from PPC made
representations with the Pagcor on the possibility of setting
up a casino in Pryce Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. On
November 1992, the parties executed a contract of lease
involving the ballroom of the hotel which would be converted
into a casino.
Way back in 1950, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO
passed Resolution 2295 prohibiting the establishment of a
gambling casino. Resolution 2673, dated October 19, 1992,
reiterated this prohibition. On December 7, 1992, Ordinance
No. 3353 was enacted prohibiting the issuance of business
permits for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993,
Ordinance 3375-93 was passed prohibiting the operation of
casinos.
PPC filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
against CDO before the CA. It prayed for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Ordinance 3353. Pagcor intervened
claiming that Ordinance 4475 was violative of the non-
impairment of contracts and EP clauses. The CA declared the
ordinances unconstitutional and void.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panglungsod has the
authority to enact said ordinances
Held: No
Ratio: Petitioner’s Contention. CDO, like other local
political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for
the purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly vested with
the police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16. In addition,
Section 458 declares that the Sangguniang Panglungsod has
the power to approve ordinances and pass resolutions for
the efficient and effective city government. The petitioners
argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because
they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the
people.
The adoption of the LGC, it is pointed out, had the effect of
modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a
later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail
in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the
powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to
its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its
repealing clause. It is also maintained that assuming there is
doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on
P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code
calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the local
government units.
Morality of Gambling Not Justiciable. The morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests
of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal
with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether
or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. The only question we can and shall
resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of CDO.
Test of Validity. The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the
constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or
oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It
must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be
general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be
unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs
are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which
are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The
petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code
could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In
fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. We conclude that since the word "gambling" is
associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the
word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling
which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented.
Contravention of PD 1896. The apparent flaw in the
ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and
the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate
a casino in CDO. Petitioner deny that the ordinance changed
the PD, rather the LGC itself changed the PD. It seems to us
that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting
that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are
actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless
for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn
PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos.
Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the
prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Sec
458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be
given its accepted meaning. Local government units have
now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which
in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal
gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no
more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must
all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to
the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a
toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able
to exercise its powers as a prime source of government
revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of
the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the
provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or
the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the
Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not
lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing of such intention.
Moreover, the petitioners' suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase
the distinction between these two forms of gambling without
a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. In
light of all the above considerations, we see no way of
arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that
the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find
that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the
character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain
games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general.
Rationale for the rule that ordinances should not
contravene a statute. The rationale of the requirement
that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
22 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes
into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist.
As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act,
and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not
prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to
the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
Relationship between national legislature and local
government. This basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning
to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations
in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and
void.
Padilla, concurring: I concur with the majority holding that
the city ordinances in question cannot modify much less
repeal PAGCOR's general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 1869. However, despite the legality
of the opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro
City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that
gambling in any form runs counter to the government's own
efforts to re-establish and resurrect the Filipino moral
character which is generally perceived to be in a state of
continuing erosion.
Davide, concurring: Wrong mode, not prohibition but
declaratory relief. The issue that necessarily arises is
whether in granting local governments (such as the City of
Cagayan de Oro) the above powers and functions, the Local
Government Code has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869
insofar as PAGCOR's general authority to establish and
maintain gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is
concerned. I join the majority in holding that the ordinances
cannot repeal P.D. No. 1869.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They
can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So
reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
Taule v. Santos (1991)
Facts: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of
Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of
eleven (11) members convened with six members in
attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its
officers. The election proceeded with petitioner Ruperto
Taule declared as president.
The governor, Leandro Verceles sent a letter to respondent
Luis Santos, Secretary of DILG protesting the election of the
officers of the FABC on the ground of certain irregularities.
Taule, as president of FABC, filed his comment on the protest
of Governor denying the alleged irregularities and
denouncing the governor’s acts of meddling and intervening
in the election. Secretary Santos nullified the election of the
officers of FABC and ordered the conduct of a new one.
In the present petitioner for certiorari, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the resolutions of the respondent Secretary.
Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over election
contests involving the election of officers of the FABC
Held: No
Ratio: Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Consti,
the Comelec shall exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution
expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction or elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving
elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction
from decisions of the trial courts. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of
which are determined through the will of the electorate. An
election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. Specifically,
the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may
refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes which do not characterize
the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
Issue: WON the Secretary has jurisdiction over the
elections contests involving the FABC elections
Held: No
Ratio: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested
with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the
election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he
is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations
as set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative
Code.
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of
said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent
Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in
relation thereto and consequently declare an election null
and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless
expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of
23 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
quasi- judicial powers.The jurisdiction of administrative
authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the
statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to
their determinations.
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision
expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon
the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over local
governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." The general supervision is
exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local
Government.
Supervision vs Control: In administrative law, supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief
Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local government or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments
so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of
their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments,
We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the
katipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more
power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect
give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-
partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate
goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order
that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
Department with the political affairs of the barangays which
is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of
local governments. To deny the Secretary of Local
Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance
the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local
governments. The RTCs have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the protest
Issue: WON the Governor has the personality to file the
protest
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Governor has the personality to file the
protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code,
the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists
of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang
panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer of the
sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an
interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the
president of the FABC assumes his presidency under
questionable circumstances and is allowed to sit in the
sangguniang panlalawigan the official actions of the
sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity
or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to
question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the
FABC.
Issue: WON the election was valid
Held: No
Ratio: The elections were declared null and void primarily
for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-
09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the
Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational
meeting, there being a quorum." The rule specifically
provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-
President who shall preside over the meeting. The word
"shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it
must be imperative or mandatory and not merely
permissive, as the rule is explicit and requires no other
interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official
should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in
the elections at the town and city levels as well as the
regional level. It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC
President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting
and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the
Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a
clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this
ground, the elections should be nullified.
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board,
presided over the elections. There was direct participation by
the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what
is dictated by the rules. Worse, there was no Board of
Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the
walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial
COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The
objective of keeping the election free and honest was
therefore compromised.
Issue: WON the President’s appointment given to Augusto
Antonio as temporary representative of the FABC was valid
Held: No
Ratio: In the present controversy involving the
sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To be
appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the
sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang
panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications
set by law. The appointing power is bound by law to comply
with the requirements as to the basic qualifications of the
appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of
the Philippines or his alter ego, the Secretary of Local
Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does
not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of
the federation of barangay councils.
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is
a member of the federation but he was not even present
during the elections despite notice. The argument that
Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure in the
exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio
does not meet the basic qualification of being president of
the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang
panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such
appointment is merely in a temporary capacity. If the
intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the
interest of the federation in the sanggunian, he should have
appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over
capacity. For even under the guidelines, the term of office of
24 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the date
of their election until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their
appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they
may be correspondingly appointed. Since the election is still
under protest such that no successor of the incumbent has
as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but
to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of the
sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since
he was elected the president of the federation but not
Antonio. The appointment of Antonio, allegedly the protege
of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's
charge of political interference by respondent Governor in
the organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays
should be insulated from any partisan activity or political
intervention if only to give true meaning to local autonomy.
Binay v. Domingo (1991)
Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality,
through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 (A resolution
to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance
program extending P500 to a bereaved family, funds to be
taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the
municipal treasury.) Metro Manila Commission approved
Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement fired of P400,000 for the
implementation of the program.
However, COA disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in
audit the disbursement of funds. COA denied the petitioners’
reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained and the
alleged public safety, general welfare, etc of the inhabitant
of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few
individuals. Public funds should only be used for public
purposes.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause
Held: Yes
Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,
"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent
powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may
arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a
general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police
powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation
which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to
do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable
for the safety of the people.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the
general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed
with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein." And under
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper
for governance such as to promote health and safety,
enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace
and order in the local government unit, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is
the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and
has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,
the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and
almost every function of the municipal government. It covers
a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,
and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is
deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public
purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it
incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the
promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial
Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta (1983)
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at
least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section
of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but
seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the
Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the
City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the
25 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
for pauper burial.
Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same
is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the
Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
The Court declared the Section 9 null and void.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's
property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power
and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended
for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the
exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent
contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use
of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial
use of his property.
Issue: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid
exercise of the police power
Held: No
Ratio: An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does
not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in
question except the provision granting police power to the
City. The power to regulate does not include the power to
prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include
the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
park cemetery.
There are three inherent powers of government by which the
state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to
exist independently of the Constitution as necessary
attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting
the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If
he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof. The police power being the most active power of the
government and the due process clause being the broadest
station on governmental power, the conflict between this
power of government and the due process clause of the
Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police
power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion
of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace
and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article,
such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his
private property without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of
at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden
to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to
buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they
sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the development
of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn,
are made to pay by the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact,
the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any
express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise
of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal
interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this
particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was
passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated.
received necessary licenses and permits and commenced
operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even be considered as having been impliedly
acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted
the permits to commence operations.
Villanueva v. Castaneda (1987)
Facts: On November 7, 1961, the municipal council of San
Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24
members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the said
place. A protest was filed and the CFI decided that the land
occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was
beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. This decision was not enforced
for the petitioners were not evicted. In fact, the petitioners
paid daily fees to the municipal government.
On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens
and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the
immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore
the subject property "to its original and customary use as a
public plaza. Vicente Macalino (officer in charge in the office
of the mayor) required the municipal treasurer and engineer
to demolish the stalls. Petitioners filed a prohibition with the
CFI claiming that the disputed area was leased to them by
the municipal government. The CFI denied the petition/
Issue: WON the petitioners have a right to the said land
Held: No
Ratio: There is no question that the place occupied by the
petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a
public plaza pursuant to the previous case. It does not
26 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has
been reversed.
A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so
cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was
settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, where
the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public
plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private person. In
Muyot vs. de la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila
could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta.
Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man. We rule
that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy
the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there
now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They
should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering
that even before case was decided, the municipal council
already adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area as the
parking place and public plaza of the municipality.
It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said
resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that
respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he
ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the
disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor,
he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its
intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the
municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the orders
from the court and the council. It is, therefore, not correct to
say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into
his hands in issuing his order.
Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising
his authority for it has been established that he directed the
demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the
municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look
into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned
Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. There is evidence
that the petitioners were notified of this hearing, which they
chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, which
does look congested and ugly, show that the complaint was
valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as
recommended by the municipal attorney.
Since the occupation of the place in question, it has
deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the
community in general. The proliferation of stags therein,
most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has
converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the
fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market
itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy
condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are
sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems,
besides pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread
into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to
the dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want
it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can
all be proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled
into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby
impairing the convenience of motorists and pedestrians
alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay
substantial rentals to the municipality, are deprived of a
sizable volume of business from prospective customers who
are intercepted by the talipapa vendors before they can
reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people are
denied the proper use of the place as a public plaza, where
they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful
environment and civic and other communal activities of the
town can be held.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the
petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to
the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case
through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, by the municipal
council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the
resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement
for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered
or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation
of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an
act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
Republic v. Gonzalez (1991)
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of two
(2) parcels of land situated in Tañong Malabon, Metro Manila.
This piece of property was formerly a deep swamp until the
occupants thereof, among them appellants Policarpio
Gonzales and Augusta Josue, started filling it.
On 14 April 1955, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street
Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the
Public Domain." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes
mentioned in the Proclamation. The Municipality of Malabon
passed Resolution authorizing the filing of ejectment cases
against appellants. Separate complaints were then filed
against them.
Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover
the lot as: (a) the already filed sales application with the
Bureau of Lands, (b) he had a municipal permit to construct
buildings thereon, (c) the lot occupied was not needed to
widen the street and that the setting aside of the lots for
parking space purposes does not redound to the public
benefit. The trial court ordered appellants to reconvey the
property to the government.
Issue: WON Proclamation 144 is invalid
Held: Yes
Ratio: Proclamation No. 144 was issued by then President
Ramon Magsaysay in response to several resolutions passed
by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal, which had
become particularly aware of the increasing vehicular traffic
and congestion along F. Sevilla Boulevard. The Municipal
Council had proposed to widen F. Sevilla Boulevard and at
the same time, to reserve an area for parking space to ease
up traffic problems, in anticipation of the completion of the
then proposed market and slaughterhouse located to the
west of F. Sevilla Boulevard. In this day and age, it is hardly
open to debate that the public has much to gain from the
proposed widening of F. Sevilla Boulevard and from
establishment of a municipal parking area. Indiscriminate
parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main
thoroughfares was prevalent; this, of course, caused the
build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great
discomfort and inconvenience of the public who use the
streets.
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in
designated areas along public streets or highways is allowed
which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces
serves a useful purpose.
Appellants, however, allege that the benefits, if any, that
may be derived from the proposed street-widening and
27 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
parking space will be confined to people who have cars,
hence there would be lacking the essential feature of
property reserved for public use or benefit. The conception
urged by appellants is both flawed and obsolete since the
number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether
property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit.
In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use by
a local government but also of "quasi-public uses or
purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general
should have equal or common rights to use the land or
facility involved on the same terms, however limited in
number the people who can actually avail themselves of it at
a given time. There is nothing in Proclamation No. 144 which
excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a
parking area should they in fact happen to be driving cars;
the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for
the public in general.
Besides, the benefits directly obtained by car-owners do not
determine either the validity or invalidity of Proclamation No.
144. What is important are the long-term benefits which the
proposed street widening and parking areas make available
to the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly
transportation on land. This is the kind of public benefit
envisioned by the Municipal Council of Malabon, Rizal and
which was sought to be promoted by the President in issuing
Proclamation No. 144. We believe and so hold that
Proclamation No. 144 was lawful and valid.
Proclamation No. 144 specifically provided that the
withdrawal of Lots No. 1 and 2 shall be subject to existing
private rights, if any there be. Prior to the issuance of
Proclamation No. 144, appellants had applied for
miscellaneous sales applications over the lots respectively
occupied by them. Insofar as appellant Policarpio Gonzales is
concerned, it is not disputed that he had acknowledged the
ownership of the National Government of the land applied
for by him. The miscellaneous sales application, however, of
appellant Policarpio Gonzales had not been approved by the
Bureau of Lands at the time Proclamation No. 144 was
issued; the land therefore retained its character as land of
the public domain. Upon the other hand, the miscellaneous
sales application of appellant Augusto Josue had already
been rejected in an Order of the Director of Lands dated 8
January 1954.
Appellants allege having built mixed residential and
commercial buildings on Lot 2. The evidence of record
discloses that appellants had secured the appropriate
municipal permits or licenses therefor, that is, for the
construction of said buildings as well as the carrying on of
business therein. However, since the lease, sale or any other
form of concession or disposition and management of lands
of the public domain was directly under the executive control
of the Director of Lands, and not of local government
officials, the Malabon Municipal Mayor must be held to have
exceeded his authority in allowing the use of lands of the
public domain to appellants by constructing thereon
commercial and residential use buildings, or any other kind
of building for that matter.
Patalinghug v. CA (1994)
Facts: On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 363, series
of 1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City." Petitioner was able to obtain a
building permit for the construction of a funeral parlor.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his
funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay
Agdao, Davao City that the construction of petitioner's
funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363, since it was
allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia
ni Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is
only 8 inches to the south.
Private respondents filed a case for the declaration of nullity
of the building permit. After conducting an inspection, the
court dismissed the complaint holding that (a) the chapel is
55.95 meters away from the funeral parlor and (b) the
building owned by Mr. Tepoot is being rented to Mr. Asiaten
who devotes said place to his laundry business.
On appeal, the CA reversed. It disagreed with the lower
court's determination that Tepoot's building was commercial
and ruled that although it was used by Mr. Tepoot's lessee for
laundry business, it was a residential lot as reflected in the
tax declaration, thus paving the way for the application of
Ordinance No. 363.
Issue: WON petitioner's operation of a funeral home
constitutes permissible use within a particular district or
zone in Davao City.
Held: Yes
Ratio: In the case at bar, the testimony of City Councilor
Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for a dual
purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry
business was conducted. 8 But while its commercial aspect
has been established by the presence of machineries and
laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than
being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully
substantiated.
The reversal by the CA of the trial court's decision was based
on Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as
residential. It is our considered view, however, that a tax
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for
zoning purposes. A property may have been declared by its
owner as residential for real estate taxation purposes but it
may well be within a commercial zone. A discrepancy may
thus exist in the determination of the nature of property for
real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a
property for zoning purposes.
Needless to say, even if we are to examine the evidentiary
value of a tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code,
a tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the
same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does
not bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the
Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based
on the actual use irrespective of "any previous assessment
or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based on a
taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a
taxpayer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or
city assessor as commercial because its actual use is
commercial.
The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is
commercial and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is
strengthened by the fact that the Sanggunian has declared
the questioned area as commercial. Consequently, even if
Tepoot's building was declared for taxation purposes as
residential, once a local government has reclassified an area
as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must
prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned
vicinity has been declared thru the ordinance, private
respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to
substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Ave, where the
funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes
a "commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance 363.
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote
the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens
28 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual
may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the
location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of
the area covered thereunder.
Powers of municipal corporations/local governments
8.1 Police Power:
Binay v. Domingo ( 1991) – supra.
Ratio: The police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims,
"Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations). Before a municipal corporation may exercise
such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent
powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may
arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a
general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police
powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation
which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public
corporations have been construed as empowering them to
do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable
for the safety of the people.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the
general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed
with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health,
safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein." And under
Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper
for governance such as to promote health and safety,
enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace
and order in the local government unit, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is
the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and
has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,
the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and
almost every function of the municipal government. It covers
a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied
with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals,
and general welfare of the community, it is not limited
thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is
deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which
shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Chua Huat v. CA (1991)
Facts: First case is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the CA and the second is a petition for prohibition
with PI directed against the notices of condemnation and
demolition orders issued by the City Engineer upon authority
of the City Mayor.
In a civil case, the CFI sentenced the petitioners to pay one
Uy certain sums of money as well as to vacate the property
and surrender to the same Uy. The CA affirmed. Petitioners,
except Ong Choan, filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the SC contending that the case is actually an unlawful
detainer case, and therefore the CFI had no jurisdiction over
it. The SC denied the petition. After the decision in the civil
case became final and executory, the private respondents
filed a motion to execute the same. The court granted this.
Petitioner Chua Huat filed with the CFI a complaint for the
annulment of judgment on the ground that the CFI has no
jurisdiction over the civil case which was one for ejectment
and not for recovery of possession. Despite the case, the CFI
ordered the execution of the judgment. The petitioners filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to set
aside the order of execution of judgment and to prohibit the
respondents from executing the judgment. The CA denied
the petition for lack of merit. The CA invoked finality of
judgment and res judicata. On appeal, petitioners contend
that there is no res judicata as there is no identity of causes
of action (annulment of judgment, recovery of poseession).
Issue: WON the present action is barred by res judicata
Held: Yes
Ratio: The records of the two cases will bear it out that the
issue of lack of jurisdiction (which is the cause of action in
Civil Case No. 119751) has been squarely ruled upon, not
only by the trial court in Civil Case No. 74634 but also by the
Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
Plaintiff-appellant further contends that since the issue of
jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 74634 was raised in their MR
before the CA in CA-G.R. No. 51337-R, the CA did not, in its
resolution denying said motion, pass on the same and on
appeal by petition for review to the Supreme Court in L-
47603 and L-48649, where the same issue among others
was raised, the High Court in its minutes' (sic) did not rule
squarely on said issue. We find the same likewise untenable.
Issues raised by the parties in their brief and passed upon
subsilencio by the appellate court in a decision which has
become final and executory are considered closed and can
no longer be revived by the parties in a subsequent litigation
without doing violence to the principle of res judicata.
What more, neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate
Court is duty bound to discuss the pros and cons of
appellant's argument.
Tatel v. Mun. of Virac (1992)
Facts: On the basis of the complaints received from the
residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused
by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside
petitioner’s warehouse which emitted obnoxious odor and
dust, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of
Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted that
the warehouse was near residential houses and that the
inflammable materials inside created danger to the lives and
properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resolution
29 was passed by the Municipal Council declaring the
warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of Article
694 of the CC. The petitioner’s MR was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the CFI enjoining them from enforcing
Resolution 29 of the Council. The municipal officials contend
that the warehouse was constructed in violation of
29 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Ordinance No. 134, s 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and
properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said
ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process
and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and
void for not having been passed in accordance with law. The
court ruled in favor of the municipal council and held that
the ordinance was a legitimate and valid exercise of police
power by the municipal council.
Issue: WON the enactment was pursuant to a legitimate
exercise of police power
Held: Yes
Ratio: Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by
the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police
power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are
endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare
clause under the Administrative Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and
must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, s1952, meets these
criteria.
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated
by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses
are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of
houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The
purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire
which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.
Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in
law making bodies in small towns where local authorities and
in particular the persons charged with the drafting and
preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack
sufficient education and training and are not well grounded
even on the basic and fundamental elements of the English
language commonly used throughout the country in such
matters.
The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and
springs from simple error in grammar but otherwise, the
meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the
construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage
of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from
a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios.
And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and
property in case of accidental fire which is one of the
primordial and basic obligation of any government.
As to the contention, that warehouses similarly situated as
that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, the mere fact
that the municipal authorities have not proceeded against
other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating
4
AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF
HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY
DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES
BY FIRE ACCIDENT.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Ordinance 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is
discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law
itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by
the agencies in charge with its administration/enforcement.
There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the
absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him
are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the
complaints have been lodged against the bodegas
concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything
about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of
the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is
well within the objectives of sound government. No undue
restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing
inflammable products in the warehouse because of the
danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people
residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned,
there can be no better policy than what has been conceived
by the municipal government.
Power of Mayor to issue permits for rallies; BP 880
Bayan v. Ermita (2006)
Issue: They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public
assemblies without the required permits to press their claim
that no such permit can be validly required without violating
the Constitutional guarantee.  PERMIT IS REQUIRED! LG
SHOULD PLACE FREEDOM PARKS!
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their
right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and
exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
national streets and parks.
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful
assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to
engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with
hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the
peoples exercise of these rights.
There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed
is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in
the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the
cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or
tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled
out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost
calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States
v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a
high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and
the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will
be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give
free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for
condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate
Held: In this Decision, the Court goes even one step
further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a
deadline of 30 days within which to designate specific
freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that
30 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with
Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the
municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed
freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be
required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement
will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to
allow proper coordination and orderly activities.
Disposition. Petition GRANTED and respondents are
DIRECTED comply with Section 15 of BP No. 880 through
the establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After 30 days from the finality of this Decision,
subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit
shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble
and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or
municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the
law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR),
insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is VOID. The constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
8.2 Power of taxation: local taxes and real property tax
Local taxation:
Basco v. Phil Amusement and Gaming Corp (1991)
Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent
right to impose taxes. Congress has the power of control
over local governments. If Congress can grant Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power.
LGUs also have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
National Government. PAGCOR, being such, should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, mere
creatures of the State can defeat national policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as
a tool for regulation.
From class notes: LGU no inherent power to tax? Not
exactly true, because there is constitutional basis (but can’t
say that it is inherent) BASCO IS NO LONGER GOOD
LAW!!!
Phil Petroleum Corp v. Mun. of Pililia (1991)
Facts: Petitioner is a business enterprise engaged in the
manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum
product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla,
Rizal. PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including 49
storage tanks for its petroleum products in Malaya, Pililla,
Rizal. Under Section 142 of the NIRC of 1939, manufactured
oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.
On June 28, 1973, PD 231 (Local Tax Code) was issued
enacted. Sections 19 and 19 (a) provide that the
municipality may impose taxes on business, except on those
for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers,
importers or producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers,
rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilled
spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed
therein.
The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73
(December 27, 1973) directed to all provincial, city and
municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax
imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of
manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in
petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the
NIRC. Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 (January 9, 1973)was
also issued instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from
collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted
before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code, on the
businesses of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
dealing in, petroleum products subject to the specific tax
under the NIRC.
Respondent enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, S-1974
otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" which took
effect on July 1, 1974. Sections 9 and 10 of the said
ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those for
which fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on
manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers,
distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors,
distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule
found in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor's permit,
sanitary inspection fee and storage permit fee for
flammable, combustible or explosive substances, while
Section 139 of the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges
and interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges .
On April 13, 1974, P.D. 436 was promulgated increasing the
specific tax on lubricating oils, gasoline, bunker fuel oil,
diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum products levied
under Sections 142, 144 and 145 of the NIRC, and granting
provinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in the
specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed
on petroleum products. The questioned Municipal Tax
Ordinance No. 1 was reviewed and approved by the
Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, but was not implemented and/or
enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having
been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos.
26-73 and 26 A-73.
On June 3, 1977, P.D. 1158 otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, Section 153 of
which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and
manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels.
Enforcing the provisions of the ordinance, the respondent
filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of the
business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from
1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees
from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the
last-named fees starting 1985. The RTC rendered a decision
against petitioner.
Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific
tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on business
and (b) storage fees, considering Provincial Circular No. 6-77;
and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the
respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, based on Municipal
Ordinance No. 1
Held: Yes
Ratio: PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 2673
declared as contrary to national economic policy the
imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum
products as they are already subject to specific tax under
the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the above
declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones,
as well as those which may be enacted in the future; (c) both
Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective,
hence, unless and until revoked, any effort on the part of the
respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from
the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (d)
Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes
on petroleum products.
PC No. 26-73 and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity
of local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under
Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code, with regard to
manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers or dealers in petroleum
products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC, in view
of Section 22 (b) of the Code regarding non-imposition by
municipalities of taxes on articles, subject to specific tax
under the provisions of the NIRC.
There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No.
1 imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid
31 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court
"was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section
19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." It
conforms with the mandate of said law.
But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to
have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73
issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19
(a), were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptions
were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or
dealers in petroleum products.
Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing
rule or regulation, the former prevails. Furthermore, while
Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes
on petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections
19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, wherein
the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on
business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on
business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if
the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in
petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy,
it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436.
The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is
ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous
effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1)
would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by
mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that
may be established by Congress can define and limit such
power of local governments.
Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal
treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee
on flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local
tax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC
from the payment of storage permit fee.
The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax
ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage
of any flammable, combustible or explosive substances.
Inasmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by
the municipality of Pililla, but by petitioner PPC, same is
obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the
municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same
Code.
Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1
prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under
Section 36 of the amended Code.
As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the
mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court
did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes
the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative
prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an
executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an
expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The
waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an
ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon with
disfavor. Thus, in the absence of a clear and express
exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot
be recognized. As already stated, it is the law-making body,
and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an
exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit fee like
the mayor's permit, shall be required before any individual or
juridical entity shall engage in any business or occupation
under the provisions of the Code.
However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the
prescriptive period for collection of local taxes, Article 1143
of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action
upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10)
years from the time the right of action accrues. The
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of
the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986,
and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.
Floro Cement Corporation v. Gorospe (1991)
Facts: The municipality of Lugait filed with the SC a
verified complaint for collection of taxes against the
defendant Floro Cement Corporation. The taxes sought to be
collected by the plaintiff refers to "manufacturers" and'
exporter's "taxes for the period from January 1, 1974 to
September 30, 1975, inclusive, in the total amount of
P161,875.00 plus 25% thereof as surcharge. Plaintiff alleged
that the imposition and collection of these taxes" is based on
its Municipal Ordinance No. 5, otherwise known as the
Municipal Revenue Code of 1974, which was passed
pursuant to PD 231 and also Municipal Ordinance No. 10
passed pursuant PD 426,amending PD 231.
Petitioner set up the defense that it is not liable to pay
manufacturer's and exporter's taxes alleging among others
that the plaintiffs power to levy and collect taxes, fees,
rentals, royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever on
defendant has been limited or withdrawn by Section 52 of PD
463. It also contended that the defendant was granted by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a
Certificate of Qualification for Tax Exemption, entitling
defendant to exemption for a period of 5 years from April
30,1969 to April 29, 1974 from payment of all taxes, except
income tax, and which Certificate was amended on
November 5, 1974 CQTE P.D. 463-22), entitling defendant to
exemption from all taxes, duties and fees except income tax,
for five (5) years from the first date of actual commercial
production of saleable mineral products that is from May 17,
1974 to January 1, 1978; and that RA 3823, as implemented
by Mines Administrative Order No. V-25, and P.D. No. 463
which are the basis for the exemption granted to defendant
are special laws whereas, the municipal ordinance
mentioned in the complaint which are based on P.D. No. 231
and P.D No. 426, respectively, are general laws; and that it is
axiomatic that a special law can not be amended and/or
repealed by a general law unless there is an express intent
to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the special law. The
trial court rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay the
amount of P161,875 as manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes
and surcharges.
Issue: WON Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10 of Lugait apply to
Floro Corporation notwithstanding the limitation on the
taxing power of local government as provided for in Sec. 52
of P.D. 231 and Sec. 52 of P.D. 463.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Floro Cement Corporation holds that since
Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10 were enacted pursuant to P.D. No.
231 and P.D. No. 426, respectively, said ordinances do not
apply to its business in view of the limitation on the taxing
power of local government provided in Sec. 5m of P.D. No.
231 [(m) Taxes on mines, mining operations and mineral
products and their by-products when sold domestically by
the operator.]. Petitioner likewise contends that cement is a
mineral product, relying on the case of Cebu Portland
Cement Company vs. CIR. Petitioner further contends that
the partial exemption was rendered absolute by Sec. 52 of
P.D. No. 463, which expressly prohibits the province, city
municipality, barrio and municipal district from levying and
collecting taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or charges of any
kind whatsoever on mines, mining claims and mineral
products, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
On other hand, while respondent municipality admits that
petitioner undertakes exploration, development and
exploitation of mineral products, the taxes sought to be
collected were not imposed on these activities in view of the
32 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
mentioned prohibition under Sec. 52 of P.D. No. 463. Said
taxes were levied on the corporation's business of
manufacturing and exporting cement. The business of
manufacturing and exporting cement does not fall under
exploration, development nor exploitation of mineral
resources as defined in Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 463, hence, it is
outside the scope of application of Sec. 52 of said decree.
On the question of whether or not cement is a mineral
product, this Court has held that it is not a mineral product
but rather a manufactured product. While cement is
composed of 80% minerals, it is not merely an admixture or
blending of raw materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. It
is the result of a definite process-the crushing of minerals,
grinding, mixing, calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsum
In short, before cement reaches its saleable form, the
minerals had already undergone a chemical change through
manufacturing process. It appears that the foregoing cases
overruled the case of Cebu Portland Cement Company vs.
CIR which was cited by petitioner.
On the exemption claimed by petitioner, this Court has laid
down the rule that as the power of taxation is a high
prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment is never
presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with
respect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed,
and the same must be coached in clear and unmistakable
terms in order that it may be applied. More specifically
stated, the general rule is that any claim for exemption from
the tax statute should be strictly construed against the
taxpayer. He who claims an exemption must be able to point
out some provision of law creating the right; it cannot be
allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference.
It must be shown indubitably to exist, for every presumption
is against it, and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim.
The petitioner failed to meet this requirement.
As held by the lower court, the exemption mentioned in Sec.
52 of P.D. No. 463 refers only to machineries, equipment,
tools for production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same
decree. The manufacture and the export of cement does not
fall under the said provision for it is not a mineral product. It
is not cement that is mined only the mineral products
composing the finished product.
Furthermore, by the parties' own stipulation of facts
submitted before the court a quo, it is admitted that Floro
Cement Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and
selling, including exporting of cement. As such, and since the
taxes sought to be collected were levied on these activities
pursuant to Sec. 19 of P.D. No. 231, Ordinances Nos. 5 and
10, which were enacted pursuant to P.D. No. 231 and P.D. No.
426, respectively, properly apply to petitioner.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA (1992)
Facts: On March 14, 1977, Sangguniang Bayan of
Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 95 Soon
Saturnino Jurado sent his agent to the municipal treasurer's
office to pay the license fee of P285 for thresher operators.
Mapagu refused to accept the payment and required him to
first secure a mayor's permit. For his part, Mayor Domingo
Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution 9
and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued.
Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285
license fee by postal money order to the office of the
treasurer who, returned the said amount. The reason given
was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution
No. 9.
Jurado filed with the CFICagayan a special civil action for
mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the
issuance of the mayor's permit and license. He also filed a
5 damages on Article 27 CC (Refusal to Render Service). It has
Find raising scheme to finance the construction of the
Sports and Nutrition Center Building by soliciting 1%
donation form the thresher operators who will apply for a
permit to thresh within the municipality.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the
implementing agreement) for being illegal either as a
donation or as a tax measure. The trial court upheld the
challenged measure. However, it dismissed the claims for
damages of both parties for lack of evidence. The CA
affirmed, nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu to have
acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's
application for the mayor's permit and license.
Consequently, they were held liable to pay damages.
On appeal, petitioners stress that they were acting in their
official capacity and therefore they should not be liable for
damages. Jurado claimed that the refusal to issue the permit
and license constituted bad faith on the part of petitioners.
Also, he claimed that Resolution 9 contravened the
limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs under Section 5 of
the Tax Code.
Issue: WON the Resolution is valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: We need not concern ourselves at this time with
the validity of Resolution 9 and the implementing agreement
because the issue has not been raised in this petition as an
assigned error of the respondent court. The measures have
been sustained in the challenged decision, from which the
respondent has not appealed. The decision is final and
binding as to him. We may observe at this time that in
sustaining Resolution No. 9, the CA said no more than that:
“It was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan
in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers in pursuance
to Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which
provided that: "Each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law." And
under Article 4, Section 29 of PD 231 (Enacting a Local Tax
Code for Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barrios), it is
provided that:
Section 29. Contributions.In addition to the above specified
taxing and other revenue-raising powers, the barrio council
may solicit monies, materials, and other contributions from
the following sources: (c) Monies from private agencies and
individuals."
That is an over simplification. The CA has not offered any
explanation for its conclusion that the challenged measures
are valid nor does it discuss its own concept of the nature of
the resolution.
While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that
the municipal government merely intends to "solicit" the 1%
contribution from the threshers, the implementing
agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a
condition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's permit.
This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of
liberality and is never obligatory.
If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance,
then it must be shown in view of the challenge raised by the
private respondents to have been enacted in accordance
with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would
include the holding of a public hearing on the measure and
its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in
addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances
in general.
Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages
Held: No
Ratio: The private respondent anchors his claim for
been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the
"bribery system, where the public official, for some flimsy
excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty until
33 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
he gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may also
be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the
responsibilities of public service. The provision presupposes
that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his
official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is
justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or
damage the complainant has sustained.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the
Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to
bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be
said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were
motivated by spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to
issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to
show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent
for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners
stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the
mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were
not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On
the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was
uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality
without discrimination or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the
scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that it
was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a
judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to
be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellate
court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive
officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it
as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang
Bayan or annulled by the courts.
The private respondent complains that as a result of the
petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his
business all this time and earning substantial profit
therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the
petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the
prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and
later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to
"donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate
his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante
that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners'
wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but
still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or
profit.
Franchises
PLDT v. City of Davao (2001)
PLDT is liable for the local franchise tax. Section 137 does
not state that it covers future exemptions. The grant of
taxing powers to LGU's in the consti and the LGC does not
affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions in the
future. The only legal effect of the constitutional grant to
local governemnts: in interpreting statutory provisions on
municipal taxing powers, doubts should be resolved in favor
of municipal corporations.
City Government of Q.C. v. Bayantel (2006)
Facts: Bayantel is a legislative franchise holder under RA
3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and
telecasting. Of relevance to this controversy is the tax
provision of Rep. Act No. 3259, embodied in Section 14
thereof, which reads:
SECTION 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same
taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of the franchise, as other persons or corporations
are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines
each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of
the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one-half per
centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted
under this franchise by the said grantee
The LGC took effect and granted the LGUS within Metro
Manila the power to levy on real properties. On July 20,
1992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress
enacted RA 7633, amending Bayantel's original franchise.
The amendatory law contained an in lieu of taxes clause
(3%).
In 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the
taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Section
232 of the LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-
93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code
(QCRC), 5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property
tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in
its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real property
tax under Section 234 of the LGC, supra. Furthermore, much
like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew tax
exemption privileges in general.
Conformably with the City's Revenue Code, new tax
declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City
were issued by the City Assessor and were received by
Bayantel on August 13, 1998, except one (Tax Declaration
No. 124-01013) which was received on July 14, 1999.
Meanwhile, on March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, otherwise
known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines," envisaged to level the playing field among
telecommunications companies, took effect. Section 23 of
the Act provides an equality clause.
On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City
Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the
city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request
having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the
LBAA. And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status,
Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed
against it by the Quezon City government.
On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out
notices of delinquency for the total amount of
P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several
warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory to
their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002.
Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel
immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead
filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition
with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC then
rendered judgment exempting Bayantel from taxes.
Issue: WON Bayantel failed to exhaust administrative
remedies
Held: No
Ratio: With the reality that Bayantel's real properties were
already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real
estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an
appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy
within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65.
This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties
already scheduled on July 30, 2002.
Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the
exhaustion-of-administrative remedies rule is when, as here,
only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court,
cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved,
gave due course to the instant petition. As the Court has
said in Ty v. Trampe: . . . . Although as a rule, administrative
remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial
action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases
34 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but
only of law. . . . .
Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly
considered, required prior payment under protest of the
amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the
then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult
to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not
be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It is
thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its
earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition
for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in
Civil Case No. Q-02-47292. The remedy availed of by
Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must
be upheld.
Issue: WON Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are,
under its franchise, exempt from real property tax.
Held: No.
Ratio: The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative,
basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise"
found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise, Rep.
Act No. 7633. To petitioners, however, the language of
Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is neither clear nor
unequivocal. The elaborate and extensive discussion
devoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of said
phrase, they add, suggests as much. It is petitioners' thesis
that Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption
from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory
franchise.
There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption from
real estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the
franchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real
estate, buildings and personal property," found in Section
14, supra, of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 3259, as originally
granted.
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of
this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing
between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal,
owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly
and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications
business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. It
is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present
controversy are only those which are admittedly falling
under the first category.
To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259
effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments
of Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee's
properties belonging to the second group of properties
indicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of
this franchise," are not actually and directly used in the
pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power
of local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. Absent
such enabling law, local government units were without
authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties
within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied
delegation of power to tax, the delegation under that
provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over
properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly
and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in the
pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated
taxing power of local governments. In a very real sense,
therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusive
of its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately,
therefore, the inevitable result was that all realties which are
actually, directly and exclusively used in the operation of its
franchise are "exempted" from any property tax.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Bayantel's franchise being national in character, the
"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
3259 applies to all its real or personal properties found
anywhere within the Philippine archipelago.
However, with the LGC's taking effect on January 1, 1992,
Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties
of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was,
by force of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly
withdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20,
1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending
Bayantel's original franchise. Worthy of note is that Section
11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax
provision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel's original
franchise under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly
repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived
under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete terms,
the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel
under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by
force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633.
The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, local
governments are empowered to levy taxes. And pursuant to
this constitutional empowerment, juxtaposed with Section
232 of the LGC, the Quezon City government enacted in
1993 its local Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on
all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. And
as earlier stated, the City's Revenue Code, just like the LGC,
expressly withdrew, under Section 230 thereof, supra, all tax
exemption privileges in general.
This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's
Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of
Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's
real properties located within the City effectively withdrew
the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise,
as amended.
Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that
once again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any
other persons or corporations on all its real or personal
properties, exclusive of its franchise." Bayantel's posture is
well-taken. While the system of local government taxation
has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution, the
power of local government units to tax is still limited. As we
explained in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority:
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress;
however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local
legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under
the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide
which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy.
Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local
taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine
of local government units' delegated power to tax had been
effectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution now in place, the basic doctrine on local
taxation remains essentially the same. For as the Court
stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is (still) primarily
vested in the Congress."
This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the 1986
Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987
Constitution, thus:
What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of
municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change the
doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent
powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal
corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise
create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a
35 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative
authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments
has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on
municipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be
"consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." The
important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the
principle that doubts are resolved against municipal
corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions
on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor
of municipal corporations. It is understood, however, that
taxes imposed by local government must be for a public
purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory,
and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass.
In net effect, the controversy presently before the Court
involves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxing
power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the
power to exempt, and the local government's delegated
power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution.
Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which
imposed real estate taxes on all real properties within the
city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore
"previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical . . . .," there can really be no
dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to
tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly
provides that "a province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax
on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other
improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Under
this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter
exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local
government units. An interpretation denying Congress such
power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter
specifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without meaning
whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is
unacceptable.
For sure, in PLDT v. City of Davao, this Court has upheld the
power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of
local government units to impose taxes. There, the Court
wrote:
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units
under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the
power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons,
pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the
constitutional grant to local governments simply means that
in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing
powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.
As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on
whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel's
properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No.
7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. The more
decisive question turns on whether Congress actually did
exempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of
Rep. Act No. 7633.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to
the LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn
Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress
opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11
thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this
franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemption
from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section
11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its
successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes
on their real estate, buildings and personal property,
exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations
are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." The
Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of
the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually,
directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
FELS Enregy v. Prov. Of Batangas (2007)
Facts: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease
contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3x30 MW diesel engine
power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas.
The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion
Agreement, was for a period of five years. Article 10 states
that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxes.
(other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis of
the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its
employees and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental
permit fees and other similar fees and charges. Polar Energy
then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite
NPC’s initial opposition.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the
power barges from Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of
Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it
of its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate
taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to
represent it in any conference regarding the real property
assessment of the Provincial Assessor. NPC filed a petition
with the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real estate
taxes. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while
they may be classified as movable or personal property, are
nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes
because they are installed at a specific location with a
character of permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the
owner of the barges–FELS, a private corporation–is the one
being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC
responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and
assessments will not justify the exemption of FELS; such a
privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be
extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the
petition was filed out of time.
Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and ruled
that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are
actually, directly and exclusively used by it, the power
barges are covered by the exemptions under Section 234(c)
of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the
CBAA ruled that prescription did not preclude the NPC from
pursuing its claim for tax exemption in accordance with
Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed
itself.
Issue: WON the petition is time barred
Held: Yes
Ratio: Section 226 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, provides: SECTION 226.
Local Board of Assessment Appeals. – Any owner or person
having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with
the action of the provincial, city or municipal assessor in the
assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from
the date of receipt of the written notice of assessment,
appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province
or city by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed
for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations
and such affidavits or documents submitted in support of the
appeal.
We note that the notice of assessment which the Provincial
Assessor sent to FELS on August 7, 1995, contained a
reiteration of Section 226. Instead of appealing to the Board
of Assessment Appeals (as stated in the notice), NPC opted
to file a motion for reconsideration of the Provincial
Assessor’s decision, a remedy not sanctioned by law.
The remedy of appeal to the LBAA is available from an
adverse ruling or action of the provincial, city or municipal
assessor in the assessment of the property. It follows then
that the determination made by the respondent Provincial
Assessor with regard to the taxability of the subject real
36 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
properties falls within its power to assess properties for
taxation purposes subject to appeal before the LBAA.
We fully agree with the rationalization of the CA, citing the
case of Callanta v. Office of the Ombudsman, where we ruled
that under Section 226 of R.A. No 7160, the last action of the
local assessor on a particular assessment shall be the notice
of assessment; it is this last action which gives the owner of
the property the right to appeal to the LBAA. The procedure
likewise does not permit the property owner the remedy of
filing a motion for reconsideration before the local assessor.
To reiterate, if the taxpayer fails to appeal in due course, the
right of the local government to collect the taxes due with
respect to the taxpayer’s property becomes absolute upon
the expiration of the period to appeal. [38] It also bears
stressing that the taxpayer’s failure to question the
assessment in the LBAA renders the assessment of the local
assessor final, executory and demandable, thus, precluding
the taxpayer from questioning the correctness of the
assessment, or from invoking any defense that would reopen
the question of its liability on the merits.
In fine, the LBAA acted correctly when it dismissed the
petitioners’ appeal for having been filed out of time; the
CBAA and the appellate court were likewise correct in
affirming the dismissal. Elementary is the rule that the
perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both
mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure in this regard
renders the decision final and executory.
Issue: WON the action was barred by res judicata
Ratio: Res judicata pervades every organized system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of common law, namely: (1) public policy
and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State
that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit
litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed
twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari et eadem
causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace
and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer
the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.
This is in accordance with the doctrine of res judicata which
has the following elements: (1) the former judgment must be
final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on
the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action. The application of the doctrine of res
judicata does not require absolute identity of parties but
merely substantial identity of parties. There is substantial
identity of parties when there is community of interest or
privity of interest between a party in the first and a party in
the second case even if the first case did not implead the
latter.
To recall, FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to
represent it in any proceeding regarding real property
assessment. Therefore, when petitioner NPC filed its petition
for review docketed as G.R. No. 165113, it did so not only on
its behalf but also on behalf of FELS. Moreover, the assailed
decision in the earlier petition for review filed in this Court
was the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.
67490, in which FELS was the petitioner. Thus, the decision
in G.R. No. 165116 is binding on petitioner FELS under the
principle of privity of interest. In fine, FELS and NPC are
substantially “identical parties” as to warrant the application
of res judicata. FELS’s argument that it is not bound by the
erroneous petition filed by NPC is thus unavailing.
Issue: WON forum shopping exists in this case
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Ratio: Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an
adverse judgment in one forum, a party seeks another and
possibly favorable judgment in another forum other than by
appeal or special civil action or certiorari. There is also forum
shopping when a party institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
FELS alleges that there is no forum shopping since the
elements of res judicata are not present in the cases at bar;
however, as already discussed, res judicata may be properly
applied herein. Petitioners engaged in forum shopping when
they filed G.R. Nos. 168557 and 170628 after the petition for
review in G.R. No. 165116. Indeed, petitioners went from one
court to another trying to get a favorable decision from one
of the tribunals which allowed them to pursue their cases.
It must be stressed that an important factor in determining
the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused to
the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar
cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. The rationale
against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different fora. Filing
multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the administration of
justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and
adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of
the courts.
Thus, there is forum shopping when there exist: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts,
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other.
Having found that the elements of res judicata and forum
shopping are present in the consolidated cases, a discussion
of the other issues is no longer necessary. Nevertheless, for
the peace and contentment of petitioners, we shall shed
light on the merits of the case.
Issue: WON the petitioner may be assessed real property
taxes
Held: Yes
Ratio: The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property
and are thus subject to real property tax. This is also the
inevitable conclusion, considering that G.R. No. 165113 was
dismissed for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error.
Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and
made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of
proving otherwise. [48] Besides, factual findings of
administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their
field, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Court;
we will not assume to interfere with the sensible exercise of
the judgment of men especially trained in appraising
property. Where the judicial mind is left in doubt, it is a
sound policy to leave the assessment undisturbed. We find
no reason to depart from this rule in this case.
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v.
The City of New York, et al., a power company brought an
action to review property tax assessment. On the city’s
motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that
the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants
designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges
which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the
accessory equipment mounted on the barges were subject to
real property taxation.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that
“[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a
37 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property
by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other
implements intended by the owner for an industry or work
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or
work.
Petitioners maintain nevertheless that the power barges are
exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No.
7160 because they are actually, directly and exclusively
used by petitioner NPC, a government- owned and controlled
corporation engaged in the supply, generation, and
transmission of electric power.
We affirm the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner
of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which in fine, is
the entity being taxed by the local government. As
stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:
OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power
Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and
equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power
Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost.
POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power
Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into
electricity.
It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the
payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in Section
234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160. Indeed, the law states that the
machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by
the government owned or controlled corporation;
nevertheless, petitioner FELS still cannot find solace in this
provision because Section 5.5, Article 5 of the Agreement
provides:
OPERATION. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the
Lease Period, subject to the supply of the necessary Fuel
pursuant to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it
will operate the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into
electricity in accordance with Part A of Article 7.
It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have
the force of law between the parties. Not being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the
parties to the contract are bound by its terms and
conditions.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has stated that taxation
is the rule and exemption is the exception. The law does not
look with favor on tax exemptions and the entity that would
seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too plain
to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.
Thus, applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting
tax exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolved
in favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is
considered a taxable entity.
The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1
of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible for the
payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not
justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitioner
NPC cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between
FELS and NPC and does not bind a third person not privy
thereto, in this case, the Province of Batangas.
It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous
litigation has seriously resulted in the local government’s
deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude,
acknowledging in its very nature no perimeter so that
security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay for it. The right of local
government units to collect taxes due must always be
upheld to avoid severe tax erosion. This consideration is
consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy
of local governments and the objective of the Local
Government Code that they enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
development as self-reliant communities and make them
effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
In conclusion, we reiterate that the power to tax is the most
potent instrument to raise the needed revenues to finance
and support myriad activities of the local government units
for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion
of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people.
Digitel v. Prov. Of Pangasinan (2007)
Facts: The present petition stemmed from a Complaint for
Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages
instituted by the Province of Pangasinan against Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Section 137 LGC
withdrew any exemption from the payment of franchise tax
by authorizing the LGUs to impose a franchise tax on
businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross
annual receipts of the business. Section 232 lso authorizes
the imposition of an ad valorem tax on real property by the
LGUs within the Metropolitan Manila Area wherein the land,
building, machinery and other improvement not thereinafter
specifically exempted.
Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, a
provincial franchise to install, maintain and operate a
telecommunications system within Pangasinan. Under the
Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is required to
pay franchise and real property taxes. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax Ordinance 1 (Real
Property Tax Ordinance of 1992). Section 4, however,
expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial franchise
of Digitel to include machineries and other improvements,
not thereinafter exempted,. Provincial Tax Ordinance No 4
was then enacted. Sections 4, 5 and 6 positively imposed a
franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise within the
province of Pangasinan.
Thereafter, Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislative
franchise. Under its legislative franchise, particularly Sec. 5
thereof, petitioner DIGITEL became liable for the payment of
a franchise tax “as may be prescribed by law of all gross
receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications
businesses transacted under it by the grantee,” as well as
real property tax “on its real estate, and buildings “exclusive
of this franchise.” Later, the Province of Pangasinan found
that Digitel had a franchise tax deficiency for the years of
1992, 1993 and 1994.
In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed RA
7925, otherwise known as “The Public Telecommunications
Policy Act of the Philippines.” Section 23 of this law entitled
Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry,
provided for the ipso facto application to any previously
granted telecommunications franchises of any advantage,
favor, privilege, exemption or immunity granted under
existing franchises, or those still to be granted, to be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to earlier
grantees.
Thereafter, Digitel opposed Pangasinan’s claim on the
ground that prior to the approval of its legislative franchise,
its operation of a telecommunications system was done
under a Facilities Management Agreement it had previously
executed with the DOTC. It clarified that since “the facilities
in Pangasinan are just part of the government owned
facilities awarded to DIGITEL,” not only did the DOTC retain
ownership of said facilities, the latter likewise “provided for
the budget for) expenses under its allocation from the
government;” hence, “all revenues generated from the
operation of the facilities inured to the DOTC;” and all the
fees received by petitioner DIGITEL were purely for services
rendered. Further, it argued that under its legislative
franchise, the payment of a franchise tax to the BIR would
be “in lieu of all taxes” on said franchise or the earnings
therefrom.
38 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The Pronvince of Pangasinan filed a Complaint for
Mandamus, Collection of Sum of Money and Damages before
Branch 68 of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The trial court
decided the Province. It ruled that Digitel’s legislative
franchise does not work to exempt the latter from payment
of provincial franchise and real property taxes. It ruled that
provincial and legislative franchises are separate and distinct
from each other. Moreover, it pointed out that LGH already
withdrew any exemption granted to anyone.
On the other hand, Digitel maintains that its legislative
franchise being an earlier enactment, by virtue of Section 23
of Republic Act No. 7925, the ipso facto, immediate and
unconditional application to it of the tax exemption found in
the franchises of Globe, Smart and Bell. Stated simply,
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925, in relation to the
pertinent provisions of the legislative franchises of Globe,
Smart and Bell, “the national franchise tax for which Digitel
is liable to pay shall be ‘in lieu of any and all taxes of any
kind, nature or description levied, established or collected by
any authority whatsoever, municipal, provincial, or national,
from which the grantee is hereby expressly granted.’
Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of
provincial franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 in
relation to the exemptions enjoyed by other telcos.
Held: No
Ratio: Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise,
Digitel did not enjoy and exemption from the payment of
franchise and real property taxes. In fact the provincial
franchise made Digitel liable for the payment of such taxes.
The case at bar is actually not one of first impression.
Indeed, as far back as 2001, this Court has had the occasion
to rule against the claim for tax exemption under RA 7925. In
the case of PLDT v. City of Davao, we already clarified the
confusion brought about by the effect of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925 – that the word “exemption” as used
in the statute refer’s or pertain’s merely to an exemption
from regulatory or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the
NTC and not to the grantee’s tax liability. In said case, the
Court ruled that Congress did not intend Section 23 to
operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos. Moreover,
tax exemptions must be expressed in the statute in clear
language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the
legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is
granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. Moreover, it ruled that PLDT’s theory will leave the
Government with the burden of having to keep track of all
granted telecommunications franchises, lest some
companies be treated unequally. It is different if Congress
enacts a law specifically granting uniform advantages, favor,
privilege, exemption, or immunity to all telecommunications
entities.
R.A. No. 7925 is thus a legislative enactment designed to set
the national policy on telecommunications and provide the
structures to implement it to keep up with the technological
advances in the industry and the needs of the public. The
thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of
the entry, pricing, and operations of all public
telecommunications entities and thus promote a level
playing field in the telecommunications industry. There is
nothing in the language of §23 nor in the proceedings of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate in enacting
R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it contemplates the grant of
tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities, including
those whose exemptions had been withdrawn by the LGC.
The issue is then settled, the Court has no recourse but to
deny Digitel’s claim for exemption from payment of
provincial franchise tax. The foregoing pronouncement
notwithstanding, in view of the passage of RA 7716
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
abolishing the franchise tax imposed on telecommunications
companies effective 1 January 1996 and in its place is
imposed a 10% VAT, the “in-lieu-of-all-taxes”
clause/provision in the legislative franchises of Globe, Smart
and Bell, among others, has now become functus officio,
made inoperative for lack of a franchise tax. Therefore,
taking into consideration the above, from 1 January 1996,
Digitel ceased to be liable for national franchise tax and in
its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in accordance with Section
108 of the Tax Code.
Issue: WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estate
tax under its legislative franchise.
Held: No
Ratio: Pertinent Provision: SECTION 5. Tax Provisions. –
The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real
estate, buildings, and personal property exclusive of this
franchise as other persons or corporations are now or
hereafter may be required by law to pay x x x.
Owing to the phrase “exclusive of this franchise,” petitioner
DIGITEL stands firm in its position that it is equally exempt
from the payment of real property tax. It maintains that said
phrase found in Section 5 qualifies or delimits the scope of
its liability respecting real property tax –that real property
tax should only be imposed on its assets that are actually,
directly and exclusively used in the conduct of its business
pursuant to its franchise.
According to the Province, however, “the phrase ‘exclusive
of this franchise’ in the legislative franchise of Digitel did not
specifically or categorically express that such franchise grant
intended to provide privilege to the extent of impliedly
repealing RA 7160.”
Thus, the question is, whether or not petitioner DIGITEL’s
real properties located within the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Province of Pangasinan are exempt from real
property taxes by virtue of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7678. We rule in the affirmative. However, it is with the
caveat that such exemption solely applies to those real
properties actually, directly and exclusively used by the
grantee in its franchise.
The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between
the inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated
authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987
Constitution. In the PLDT v. City of Davao, we already
sustained the power of Congress to grant exemptions over
and above the power of the local government’s delegated
taxing authority notwithstanding the source of such power.
Had Congress intended to tax each and every real property
of Digitel, regardless of whether or not it is used in the
business or operation of its franchise, it would not have
incorporated a qualifying phrase, which such manifestation
admittedly is. And, to our minds, “the issue in this case no
longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to
exempt” Digitel’s properties from realty taxes by its
enactment of RA 7678 which contains the phrase “exclusive
of this franchise,” in the face of the mandate of the Local
Government Code. The more pertinent issue to consider is
whether or not, by passing Ra7678, Congress intended to
exempt Digitel’s real properties actually, directly and
exclusively used by the grantee in its franchise.
The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece of
legislation can be taken to mean that Congress, knowing
fully well that the Local Government Code had already
withdrawn exemptions from real property taxes, chose to
restore such immunity even to a limited degree.
In view of the unequivocal intent of Congress to exempt from
real property tax those real properties actually, directly and
exclusively used by petitioner DIGITEL in the pursuit of its
franchise, respondent Province of Pangasinan can only levy
real property tax on the remaining real properties of the
39 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
grantee located within its territorial jurisdiction not part of
the above-stated classification. Said exemption, however,
merely applies from the time of the effectivity of petitioner
DIGITEL’s legislative franchise and not a moment sooner.
In fine, petitioner DIGITEL is found accountable to
respondent Province of Pangasinan for the following tax
liabilities: 1) as to provincial franchise tax, from 13
November 1992 until actually paid; and 2) as to real property
tax, for the period starting from 13 November 1992 until 28
December 1992, it shall be imposed only on the lands and
buildings of petitioner DIGITEL located within the subject
jurisdiction; for the period commencing from 29 December
1992 until 16 February 1994, in addition to the lands and
buildings aforementioned, it shall similarly be imposed on
machineries and other improvements; and, by virtue of the
National Franchise of petitioner DIGITEL or Republic Act No.
7678, in accordance with the Court’s ruling in the
abovementioned Bayantel case, from the date of effectivity
on 17 February 1994 until the present, it shall be imposed
only on real properties NOT actually, directly and exclusively
used in the franchise of petitioner DIGITEL. In addition to the
foregoing summary, pertinent provisions of law respecting
interests, penalties and surcharges shall also be made to
apply to herein subject tax liabilities.
Real Property Taxation and Special Education Fund Tax
Sec of Finance v. Ilarde & Cipriano Cabaluna (2005)
Facts: Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., was the Regional Director of
Regional Office No. VI of the DOF. He co-owns with his wife
certain properties in Jaro, Iloilo City Private respondent failed
to pay the land taxes on Lot No. 12 and Lot No. 14 for the
years 1986 to 1992. For the years 1991 to 1992, taxes were
also unpaid on Lot No. 941-D-2, on the residential house, and
on Lot No. 941-D-1. A breakdown of the computation of the
delinquent taxes showed that more than 24% of the
delinquent taxes were charged and collected from private
respondent by way of penalties. Private respondent paid his
land taxes and the receipts were issued to him by the City
Treasurer’s Office with the notation “paid under protest.”
Soon, Cabaluna retired. He then filed a formal protest with
the City Treasurer of Iloilo wherein he contends that the
computation was erroneous since the rate of penalty exceed
24% in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464,
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. The
Assistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio turned down the
protest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No.
1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 of the DOF.
Despite his labors to exhaust all administrative remedies,
the denial of his protest and his MR compelled private
respondent to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
Damages assailing Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85
and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 which, according to
him, flouted Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 which fixed the
maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment of real
estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax. The respondent
judge declared as null and void the said regulations and
ruled that the total penalty must not exceed 24% of the
delinquent tax.
Issue: WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgate
regulations prescribing a rate of penalty on delinquent taxes
other than that provided for under PD 464, also known as
the Real Property Tax Code.
Ratio: Petitioner’s standpoint is devoid of basis in law or in
logic. The subject Regulations must be struck down for
being repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real
Property Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the time
material to this case. Note that under Section 66 of P.D. No.
464, the maximum penalty for delinquency in the payment
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
of real property tax shall in no case exceed 24% of the
delinquent tax. Upon the other hand, Section 4(c) of the
challenged Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local
Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 issued by respondent
Secretary (formerly Minister) of Finance provides that “the
penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency or
twenty-four percent (24%) per annum as the case may be,
shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time
the delinquency was incurred up to the time that the
delinquency is paid for in full.” As adeptly observed by the
trial court, the penalty imposed under the assailed
Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per
annum shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until
it is paid for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 of
the Real Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited
only to twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax.
That such is the effect of an application of the Regulations
under review is not disclaimed by the petitioner anywhere in
his pleadings. Petitioner, however, attempts to justify the
issued Regulations’ departure from the Real Property Tax
Code. Said Regulations, petitioner says, are sanctioned by
EO 73 and its implementing guidelines, Joint Local
Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86. Joint Local
Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86.
The Secretary of Finance avers in his petition that the last
paragraph of Section 1, Joint Local Assessment/Treasury
Regulations No. 2-86, explicitly provides for a 2% per month
penalty without any limitation as to the maximum amount
thereof, which is entirely consistent with the then existing
Regulations, the now challenged Joint Assessment
Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-
85. Petitioner further asserts that inasmuch as Joint Local
Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86, which echoes the
disputed Regulations, was issued to implement E.O. No. 73,
private respondent’s recourse is to file a case questioning
the validity of Joint Local Assessment/Treasury Regulations
No. 2-86 in the same way that he has assailed Joint
Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury
Regulations No. 2-85.
Petitioner’s reasoning is, to our mind, but a futile attempt to
muddle the facts of the case and the issues involved. Recall
that the present controversy cropped up when Cabaluna
protested the payment of penalties on his delinquent taxes
for being in excess of the 24% cap provided in p.d. No. 464
or the Real Property Tax Code. In response to his letter of
protest, the Assistant Treasurer of Iloilo City justified the
assessment by citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment
Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-
85 issued by petitioner Minister (now Secretary) of Finance.
This has lead to the filing of the present case by Cabaluna to
question the validity of the said regulations. It is the validity
of said regulations, not Joint Local Assessment/Treasury
Regulations No. 2-86, that is sought to be resolved herein
and petitioner should not depart from the issue on hand.
The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitioner’s
contention that the Regulations at issue are sanctioned by
E.O. No. 73. The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, as
gleaned from the whereas clauses and Section 1 thereof as
quoted above, is to advance the date of effectivity of the
application of the Real Property Tax Values of 1984 from 01
January 1988, the original date it was intended by E.O. No.
1019 to take effect for purposes stated therein, to 01
January 1987. E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter the
structure of the real property tax assessments as provided
for in P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.
Neither is this Court easily dissuaded by the submission of
the Secretary of Finance that E.O. No. 73, which provides in
Section 2 thereof that: “The Minister of Finance shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement this Executive Order,” has the effect of according
petitioner the blanket authority to tinker with the rates of
penalty on delinquency taxes as provided for in P.D. No. 464,
40 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
the general law on real property taxation. The Court takes
notice that E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of
amendment of rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment
of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. E.O. No. 73,
particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely designated the
Minister of Finance to promulgate the rules and regulations
towards the implementation of E.O. No. 73, particularly on
the application of the Real Property Values as of 31
December 1984, which is the general purpose for enacting
said executive order.
In our mind, what is patent from Section 3 of E.O. No. 73 is
the repeal of E.O. No. 1019, not Section 66 of P.D. No. 464.
Neither did E.O. No. 1019 directly or indirectly vest upon the
Department of Finance the right to fiddle with the rates of
penalty to be assessed on delinquency taxes as contained in
the Real Property Tax Code. Even assuming that E.O. No.
1019 had vested the then Ministry of Finance with the
authority to impose new rates of penalty on delinquency
taxes, as petitioner would have us believe, such authority
would have been automatically stripped off from it upon the
express repeal of E.O. No. 1019 by EO No. 73 on the 25th of
November 1986.
Despite the promulgation of EO 73, PD 464 in general and
Section 66 in particular, remained to be good law. To accept
petitioner’s premise that EO 73 had accorded the Ministry of
Finance the authority to alter, increase, or modify the tax
structure would be tantamount to saying that EO 73 has
repealed or amended PD 464. Repeal of laws should be
made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not
favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation
and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. Such
repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed
unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended
it.[15] The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the
terms of the new and old laws. We find, as the trial court
has found, no such inconsistency or repugnancy between EO
73 and Section 66 of PD 464. Jurisprudence thrives to the
effect that it is only Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991, which repealed the Real Property
Tax Code or P.D. No. 464.
Assuming argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized the
petitioner to issue the objected Regulations, such
conferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the well-
encrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation
is generally vested with the legislature.[ Yes, President
Corazon Aquino, at that time, was exercising both executive
and legislative powers. But, the power delegated to the
executive branch, in this case the Ministry of Finance, to lay
down implementing rules must, nevertheless, be germane to
the general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rules
cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is
designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are
intended to carry into effect, which in this case is merely to
antedate the effectivity of the 1984 Real Property Tax values
inasmuch as this is the raison d’être of E.O. No. 73.
In a last-ditch effort to salvage the impugned Regulations,
petitioner pushes on that Joint Local Assessment/Treasury
Regulations No. 2-86, or the so-called implementing rules of
E.O. No. 73, is not contrary to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464
inasmuch as the latter applies merely to simple delinquency
in the payment of real property taxes while the former
covers cases wherein there was failure to promptly pay the
real property tax due, including the increase in tax due and
demandable for the tax year as a result of the application of
the 1984 New or Revised Assessment of the value of the
subject property.
Such rationalization lacks legal traction. P.D. No. 464 makes
no distinction as to whether it is simple delinquency or other
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
forms thereof. The Real Property Tax Code covers the wide
ilk of failure to promptly pay the real property taxes due and
demandable for a particular period. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish. Further, P.D. No. 464
covers all real property titled to individuals who become
delinquents in paying real estate tax. P.D. No. 464 is a law of
general application.
On the second assigned error, the fact that private
respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance and
implementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular No.
04-89 which implemented Joint Assessment Regulations No.
1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 does not put
him in estoppel from seeking the nullification of said
Regulations at this point. In the case at bar, however,
petitioner is suing as a plain taxpayer, he having already
retired as Regional Director. His official acts as Regional
Director could not have stripped him of his rights as a
taxpayer. To be sure, the official acts of petitioner as
Regional Director cannot serve as estoppel for him to pursue
the present course of action that he has taken as a taxpayer.
In any event, a regulation which is in itself invalid for being
contrary to law cannot be validated by any act of
endorsement of any official, much less, by a subordinate of
the official who issued such regulation. Estoppel, certainly,
cannot make an invalid regulation valid.
At bottom, the law applicable, in the case at bar, for
purposes of computation of the real property taxes due from
private respondent for the years 1986 to 1991, including the
penalties and interests, is still Section 66 of the Real
Property Tax Code of 1974 or P.D. No. 464. the penalty that
ought to be imposed for delinquency in the payment of real
property taxes should, therefore, be that provided for in
Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, i.e., two per centum on the
amount of the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency
or fraction thereof but “in no case shall the total penalty
exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax.”
Accordingly, the penalties imposed by respondents City
Treasurer and Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on the
property of private respondent are valid only up to 24% of
the delinquent taxes. The excess penalties paid by the
private respondent should, in view of that, be refunded by
the latter.
However, from 01 January 1992 onwards, the proper basis
for the computation of the real property tax payable,
including penalties or interests, if applicable, must be Rep.
Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government Code, which
took effect on the 1st of January 1992[23] inasmuch as
Section 534[24] thereof had expressly repealed P.D. No. 464
or the Real Property Tax Code. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No.
7160 provides that rights and obligations existing on the
date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of
contracts or any source of prestation involving a local
government unit shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the
time such contracts were vested.
Benguet Corporation v. COA (1992), supra.
Realty taxes are national taxes collected by LGUs. While
LGU’s are charged with fixing the rate of real property taxes,
it does not necessarily follow from that authority the
determination of whether or not to impose the tax. In fact,
LGU’s have no alternative but to collect taxes as mandated
in Sec. 38 of the Real Property Tax Code. It is thus clear that
it is the national government, expressing itself through the
legislative branch, that levies the real property tax.
Consequently, when LGU’s are required to fix the rates, they
are merely constituted as agents of the national
government in the enforcement of the Real Property Tax
Code. The delegation of taxing power is not even involved
here because the national government has already imposed
41 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
realty tax in Sec. 38 leaving only the enforcement to be done
LGU’s.
National Development Co. v. Cebu City (1992)
Facts: National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCC
authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining,
agricultural and other enterprises necessary or contributory
to economic development or important to public interest. It
also operates subsidiary corporations one of which is
National Warehousing Corporation (NWC).
On August 10, 1939, the President issued Proclamation No.
430 reserving Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu
City for warehousing purposes under the administration of
NWC. Subsequently, in 1940, a warehouse with a floor area
of 1,940 square meters more or less, was constructed
thereon. In 1947, EO 93 dissolved NWC with NDC taking
over its assets and functions.
In 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real
estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. By the
first quarter of 1970, a total of P100,316.31 was paid by NDC
11 of which only P3,895.06 was under protest. NDC asked
for a full refund contending that the land and the warehouse
belonged to the Republic and therefore exempt from
taxation. The CFI ordered Cebu City to refund to NDC the real
estate taxes paid by it.
Issue: WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes
Held: No
Ratio: As already adverted to, one of the principal issues
before Us is the interpretation of a provision of the
Assessment Law, the precursor of the then Real Property Tax
Code and the Local Government Code, where "ownership" of
the property and not "use" is the test of tax liability. Section,
3 par. (a), of the Assessment Law, on which NDC claims real
estate tax exemption, provides Section 3. Property exempt
from tax. The exemptions shall be as follows: (a) Property
owned by the United States of America, the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, any province, city, municipality at
municipal district.
The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in National
Development Co. v. Province of Nueva Ecija where We held
that its properties were not comprehended in Sec. 3, par (a),
of the Assessment Law. Commonwealth Act No. 182 which
created NDC contains no provision exempting it from the
payment of real estate tax on properties it may acquire. NDC
does not come under classification of municipal or public
corporation in the sense that it may sue and be sued in the
same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense, it is an entity different from the government, NPC
may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation.
That plaintiff herein does not exercise sovereign powers
and, hence, cannot invoke the exemptions thereof but is an
agency for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary
or business functions, is apparent from its Organic Act.
We find no compelling reason why the foregoing ruling,
although referring to lands which would eventually be
transferred to private individuals, should not apply equally to
this case.
NDC cites Board of Assessment Appeals, Province of Laguna
v. CTA and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NWSA). In that case, the properties of NWSA, a GOCC, were
exempt from real estate tax because Sec. 3, par (c), of R.A.
470 did not distinguish between those possessed by the
government in sovereign/governmental/political capacity
and those in private proprietary patrimonial character. The
conflict between NDC v. Nueva Ecija, supra, and BAA v. CTA
and NWSA, , is more superficial than real. The NDC decision
speaks of properties owned by NDC, while the BAA ruling
concerns properties belonging to the Republic
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
In the case at bar, no similar statement appears in the
stipulation of facts, hence, ownership of subject properties
should first be established. For, while it may be stated that
the Republic owns NDC, it does not necessary follow that
properties owned by NDC, are also owned by Republic in the
same way that stockholders are not ipso facto owners of the
properties of their corporation.
The Republic may form a corporation with personality and
existence distinct from its own. The separate personality
allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its own
name and, thus, permit greater independence and flexibility
in its operations. It may, therefore, be stated that tax
exemption of property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines "refers to properties owned by the Government
and by its agencies which do not have separate and distinct
personalities (unincorporated entities).
The foregoing discussion does not mean that because NDC,
like most GOCC's engages in commercial enterprises all
properties of the government and its unincorporated
agencies possessed in propriety character are taxable.
Similarly, in the case at bar, NDC proceeded on the premise
that the BAA ruling declared all properties owed by GOCC's
as properties in the name of the Republic, hence, exempt
under Sec. 3 of the Assessment Law.
Issue: WON the property is exempt from payment of real
estate taxes
Held: Yes
Ratio: To come within the ambit of the exemption provided
in Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important to
establish that the property is owned by the government or
its unincorporated agency, and once government ownership
is determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether
for proprietary or sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial.
What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred
to NDC), in the case before Us, is merely the administration
of the property while the government retains ownership of
what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes
under Proclamation No. 430.
A reserved land is defined as a "[p]ublic land that has been
withheld or kept back from sale or disposition." The land
remains "absolute property of the government." The
government "does not part with its title by reserving them
(lands), but simply gives notice to all the world that it desires
them for a certain purpose." Absolute disposition of land is
not implied from reservation; it merely means "a withdrawal
of a specified portion of the public domain from disposal
under the land laws and the appropriation thereof, for the
time being, to some particular use or purpose of the general
government." As its title remains with the Republic, the
reserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemption
provision.
CEBU nevertheless contends that the reservation of the
property in favor of NWC or NDC is a form of disposition of
public land which, subjects the recipient (NDC ) to real estate
taxation under Sec. 115 of the Public Land Act.
The essential question then is whether lands reserved
pursuant to Sec. 83 are comprehended in Sec. 115 and,
therefore, taxable.
Section 115 of the Public Land Act should be treated as an
exception to Art. 3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law. While
ordinary public lands are tax exempt because title thereto
belongs to the Republic, Sec. 115 subjects them to real
estate tax even before ownership thereto is transferred in
the name of the beneficiaries. Sec. 115 comprehends three
(3) modes of disposition of Lands under the Public Land Act,
to wit: homestead, concession, and contract.
Liability to real property taxes under Sec. 115 is predicated
on (a) filing of homestead application, (b) approval of
concession and, (c) signing of contract. Significantly, without
42 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
these words, the date of the accrual of the real estate tax
would be indeterminate. Since NDC is not a homesteader
and no "contract" (bilateral agreement) was signed, it would
appear, then, that reservation under Sec. 83, being a
unilateral act of the President, falls under "concession".
"Concession" as a technical term under the Public Land Act is
synonymous with "alienation" and "disposition", and is
defined in Sec. 10 as "any of the methods authorized by this
Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of
the public domain other than timber or mineral lands."
Logically, where Sec. 115 contemplates authorized methods
for acquisition, lease, use, or benefit under the Act, the
taxability of the land would depend on whether reservation
under Sec. 83 is one such method of acquisition, etc. Tersely
put, is reservation synonymous with alienation? Or, are the
two terms antithetical and mutually exclusive? Indeed,
reservation connotes retention, while concession (alienation)
signifies cession.
Section 8 and 88 of the Public Land Act provide that reserved
lands are excluded from that may be subject of disposition.
As We view it, the effect of reservation under Sec. 83 is to
segregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-
alienable or non-disposable under the Public Land Act.
Section 115, on the other hand, applies to disposable public
lands. Clearly, therefore, Sec. 115 does not apply to lands
reserved under Sec. 83. Consequently, the subject reserved
public land remains tax exempt.
However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public
reservation, a different rule should apply because "[t]he
exemption of public property from taxation does not extend
to improvements on the public lands made by pre-
emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or
occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by
the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed on
the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by
NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as
such improvement does not appear to belong to the
Republic.
Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the
erroneous tax payments collected by CEBU should be
refunded to NDC. This is in consonance with Sec. 40, par. (a)
of the former Real Property Tax Code which exempted from
taxation real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions, as well as any
GOCC so exempt by its charter.
As regards the requirement of paying under protest before
judicial recourse, CEBU argues that in any case NDC is not
entitled to refund because Sec. 75 of R.A. 3857, the Revised
Charter of the City of Cebu, requires payment under protest
before resorting to judicial action for tax refund; that it could
not have acted on the first demand letter of NDC of 20 May
1970 because it was sent to the City Assessor and not to the
City Treasurer; that, consequently, there having been no
appropriate prior demand, resort to judicial remedy is
premature; and, that even on the premise that there was
proper demand, NDC has yet to exhaust administrative
remedies by way of appeal to the Department of Finance
and/or Auditor General before taking judicial action.
NDC does not agree. It disputes the applicability of the
payment-under-protest requirement is Sec. 75 of the Revised
Cebu City Charter because the issue is not the validity of tax
assessment but recovery of erroneous payments under Arts.
2154 and 2155 of the Civil Code. It cites the case of East
Asiaticvs City of Davao which held that where the tax is
unauthorized, "it is not a tax assessed under the charter of
the City of Davao and for that reason no protest is necessary
for a claim or demand for its refund."
In the case at bar, petitioner, therefore, cannot be said to
have waived his right. He had no knowledge of the fact that
it was exempted from payment of the realty tax under
Commonwealth Act No. 470. Payment was made through
error or mistake, in the honest belief that petitioner was
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
liable, and therefore could not have been made under
protest, but with complete voluntariness. In any case, a
taxpayer should not be held to suffer loss by his good
intention to comply with what he believes is his legal
obligation, where such obligation does not really exist . . .
The fact that petitioner paid thru error or mistake, and the
government accepted the payment, gave rise to the
application of the principle of solutio indebiti under Article
2154 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "if
something is received when there is no right to demand it,
and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation
to return it arises." There is, therefore, created a tie or
juridical relation in the nature of solutio indebiti, expressly
classified as quasi-contract under Section 2, Chapter I of Title
XVII CC.
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is one of the concrete
manifestations of the ancient principle that no one shall
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another . . . Hence,
it would seem unedifying for the government, that knowing it
has no right at all to collect or to receive money for alleged
taxes paid by mistake, it would be reluctant to return the
same . . . Petitioner is not unsatisfied in the assessment of its
property. Assessment having been made, it paid the real
estate taxes without knowing that it is
Prov. of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara (1992)
Facts: Tarlac Enterprises Inc is the owner of a parcel of land
in Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land, machinery
shed and other machinery. These properties were declared
for purposes of Taxation in the Provincial Assessor’s Office.
The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the
years 1974 until 1992 in the amount of P532,435.55
including penalties were not yet paid. Therefore, the
Provincial Treasurer Jose Meru filed a complaint praying that
the company pay the said sum as well as damages.
The company filed a motion to dismiss. But the lower court
denied the motion. Thereafter, petitioner set the auction sale
of the private respondent's properties to satisfy the real
estate taxes due. This prompted the private respondent to
file a motion praying that petitioner be directed to desist
from proceeding with the public auction sale. The lower court
issued an order granting said motion to prevent mootness of
the case considering that the properties to be sold were the,
subjects of the complaint.
The company then filed an answer saying that
under Section 40(g) of PD46 in relation to PD 551, it was
exempt from paying said tax. The court rendered the
decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551
expressly exempts private respondent from paying the real
property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise
to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light. The
court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had
been required to pay 2% franchise tax in line with the intent
of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private
respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates.
Issue: WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from the
payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. No.
464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended.
Held: No
Ratio: Sec. 40(g) of P.D. No. 464, the Real Property Tax
Code, provides: SEC. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Tax.
- The exemption shall be as follows: (g) Real property
exempt under other laws.
Private respondent contends that the "other laws" referred to
in this Section is P.D. No. 551 (Lowering the Cost to
Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the Franchise Tax
Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff on Fuel
Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public Utilities).
Its pertinent provisions state: SECTION 1. Any provision of
43 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to
generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat
and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts received
from the sale of electric current and from transactions
incident to the generation, distribution
We do not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieu
of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the
second paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551 expressly
exempts private respondent from paying real property taxes.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, said proviso is
modified and delimited by the phrase "on earnings, receipts.
income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale"
which specifies the kinds of taxes and assessments which
shall not be collected in view of the imposition of the
franchise tax. Said enumerated items upon which taxes shall
not be imposed, have no relation at all to, and are entirely
different from. real properties subject to tax.
If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise
grantees from paying real property tax and to make the 2%
franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerated
items would not have been added when PD 852 was enacted
to amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority would have
simply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority"
by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to
enumerate what should not be subject to tax thereby
delimiting the extent of the exemption.
We likewise do not find merit in private respondent's
contention that the real properties being taxed, viz., the
machinery for the generation and distribution of electric
power, the building housing said machinery, and the land on
which said building is constructed, are necessary for the
operation of its business of generation, distribution and sale
of electric current and, therefore, they should be exempted
from taxation. Private respondent apparently does not quite
comprehend the distinction among the subject matters or
objects of the taxes involved. It bears emphasis that P.D. No.
551 as amended by P.D. No. 852 deals with franchise tax and
tariff on fuel oils and the "earnings, receipts, income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric
current" are the items exempted from taxation by the
imposition of said tax or tariff duty. On the other hand, the
collection complaint filed by petitioner specified only taxes
due on real properties. While P.D. No. 551 was intended to
give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing some
of their tax and tariff obligations," to construe said decree as
having granted such franchise holders exemption from
payment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambit
of exemptions beyond the purview of the law.
The annexes attached to private respondent's comment on
the petition to prove by contemporaneous interpretation its
claimed tax exemption are not of much help to it.
Department Order No. 35-74 dated September 16, 1974 11
regulating the implementation of P.D. No. 551 merely
reiterates the "in lieu of all taxes" proviso. Local Tax
Regulations No. 3-75 12 issued by then Secretary of Finance
Cesar Virata and addressed to all Provincial and City
Treasurers enjoins strict compliance with the directive that
"the franchise tax imposed under Local Tax Ordinances
pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Tax Code, as amended,
shall be collected from business holding franchises but not
from establishments whose franchise contains the in lieu of
all taxes' proviso," thereby clearly indicating that said
proviso exempts taxpayers like private respondent from
paying the franchise tax collected by the provinces under
the Local Tax Code. Lastly, the letter 13 of the then Bureau
of Internal Revenue Acting Commissioner addressed to the
Matic Law Office granting exemption to the latter's client
from paying the "privilege (fixed) tax which is an excise tax
on the privilege of engaging in business" clearly excludes
realty tax from such exemption.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
We also find misplaced the lower court's and the private
respondent's reliance on Butuan Sawmill. Inc. v. City of
Butuan. In that case, the questioned tax is a tax on the gross
sales or receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved herein
is a real property tax. The City of Butuan is categorically
prohibited therein by Sec. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act
from imposing "taxes of any kind . . . on person paying
franchise tax." On the other hand, P.D. No. 551 is not as all-
encompassing as said provision of the Local Autonomy Act
for it enumerates the items which are not taxable by virtue
of the payment of franchise tax.
It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because
"taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to be
exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to
justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and
too categorical to be misinterpreted.; Private respondent has
utterly failed to discharge this duty.
8.3 Shares of LGUS in national taxes
Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
Facts: On December, 1997, the President issued AO 372
(Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998).
On December, 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43,
amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent
(5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be
withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that by issuing
AO 372, the President exercised the power of control over
LGUs. Moreover, withholding 10% of the IRA is in
contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the
Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of
these units its share in the national internal revenue. The Sol
Gen claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an exercise of
the President’s power of supervision over LGUs.
Section 4 of Article X of the Consti confines the President's
power over local governments to general supervision. This
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. In Mondano v. Silvosa, the SC contrasted
supervision and control, thus: "supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
In Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and
supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay
down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an
act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their
discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the
other hand, supervision does not cover such authority.
Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules,
nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. Thus,
members of the cabined and other executive officials are
merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are subject
to the power of control of the President, at whose will and
behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the
heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s
44 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers.
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state policy
of ensuring local autonomy. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,
we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization." The grant of
autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments,
x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and
local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local
governments are still subject to regulation, however limited,
for the purpose of enhancing self-government.
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national
administration, not power, to local governments. Local
officials remain accountable to the central government as
the law may provide. The difference between
decentralization of administration and that of power was
explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'
and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises 'general
supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law.' He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers
over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to
enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we
stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal
governments are still agents of the national government.
Issue: WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs"
LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: Under existing law, LGU, in addition to having
administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well.
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends
to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn
have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not
formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and
resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of
viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
local and national officials, who in any case are partners in
the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner
of national government intervention by way of supervision,
in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the
President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic
and planning agency of the government, primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing,
coordinated and integrated social and economic policies,
plans and programs for the entire country. However, under
the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of
such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with
the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and
local government units." The President cannot do so
unilaterally.
There are therefore several requisites before the President
may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged
public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of
Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment
shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather
commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that
the requirements of Section 284 of the LGC have not been
satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's
assurance that the directive to "identify and implement
measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely
advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory
or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The
language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a
command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather,
the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local
executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a
period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do
well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs
and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this
light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in
regard to Section 1.
Issue: WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid
Held: No
Ratio: Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
The LGC specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within 5 days after every
quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government
for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word
of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372,
however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998,
of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country.
Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and
the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback,
which means "something held back or withheld, often
temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention
45 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
by the national government does not matter. Any retention
is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof
has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively
encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his
Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires
that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
4 Abatement of Nuisance
Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. CA
Facts: A quonset was constructed by the American
Liberation Forces in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by
Gregoria Francisco. It stands on a lot owned by the PPA and
faces the municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83
issued by President Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared
for the exclusive use of port facilities. The PPA issued to Tan
Gin San, spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy
the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year,
to expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using
the quonset for the storage of copra.
On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or
relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance No. 147,
noting its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and
stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and
unsanitary surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Since the
notifications remained unheeded, the Mayor ordered the
demolition on 24 May 1989.
Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and
Damages before the RTC of Basilan. The RTC denied the writ
and upheld the power of the Mayor to order the demolition
without judicial authority pursuant to Ordinance 147. On 6
September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was
completely demolished. In its place sprang shanties and nipa
huts.
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that the mayor was not
vested with power to order summarily without any judicial
proceeding to demolish the Quonset building which was not
a nuisance per se. However, upon reconsideration, the CA
reversed itself and ruled that the deficiency was remedied
when petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and injunction
and was heard on oral argument.
Issue: WON the Mayor could summarily, without judicial
process, order the demolition of petitioner's quonset
building.
Held: No
Ratio: Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977,
and relied upon by respondents, is entitled "An Ordinance
Establishing Comprehensive Zoning Regulations for the
Municipality of Isabela." It is not disputed that the quonset
building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is
located outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in
Ordinance as a non-conforming structure, which should be
relocated. And in the event that an immediate relocation of
the building can not be accomplished, Sec 16 of the
Ordinance provides: A certificate of non-conformance for all
non-conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner or
agent of the property involved within 12mo from the
approval of this Ordinance, otherwise the non-conforming
use may be condemned or removed at the owner's expense.
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate
of Non-conformance, the provision should not be interpreted
as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming
building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
be struck down for being in contravention of the
requirements of due process, as originally held by the CA.
Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the
provisions of the Ordinance resides with the Zoning
Administrator . It is said official who may call upon the City
Fiscal to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce
the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved
by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the
enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of
Zoning Appeals.
That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further
evident from the penal provisions. Violation of a municipal
ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of
extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local
Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to
be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the
violation of ordinances".
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset building
is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to
be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of
the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per
se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention. While the Sangguniang Bayan may
provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government
Code, Sec. 149 (ee) ), it can not declare a particular thing as
a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance
can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset
building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when demolition
was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property
was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial
hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the
quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was
no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then
that the public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their
authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building.
They had deprived petitioner of its property without due
process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for
prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure
the defect, as opined by the CA, the demolition having been
a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish
without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
Technology Developers, Inc v. CA (1991)
Facts: Petitioner received a letter from private respondent
acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. The letter requested Plant Manager Armando
Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on
February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b)
Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other
document.
At the requested conference, petitioner undertook to comply
with respondent's request for the production of the required
documents. Petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-
DENR Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the permits
previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant
was a "Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation"
issued by the then National Pollution Control Commission
and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management
Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-
pollution devise to be installed as part of petitioner's request
for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of
mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of the
46 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
mayor to secure the same but were not entertained. On April
6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent ordered the Municipality's station
commander to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant,
thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent. The judge found that petitioner is entitled to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of a
bond worth P50,000. During the MR, the Provincial
Prosecutor presented his evidence prepared by Marivic
Guina, “Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw
materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may
contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the
health of the people. As such, the company should cease
operating until such a time that the proper air pollution
device is installed and operational." The lower court then set
aside the order which granted a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.
Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction should be
granted
Held: No
Ratio: The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the
trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a
preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the
circumstances may warrant.
The following circumstances militate against the
maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that
the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is addressed to the National Pollution
Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
now the Environmental Management Bureau, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much
responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by
virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a
permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same
unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community
from the emissions in the operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive
odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect
the health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner
was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it
was required to bring the following: (1) Building permit; (2)
Mayor's permit; and (3) Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution
permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels. The NBI finding that some of the signatures in the
4-page petition were written by one person, appears to be
true in some instances, (particularly as among members of
the same family), but on the whole the many signatures
appear to be written by different persons. The certification of
the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any
complaint on the matter must be because the complaint
was sent directly to the Governor through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only
after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her
report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building
permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit
to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission
on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May
25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the
residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate
court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its
huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be
stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the
economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the
health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious
effect of the pollution of the environment.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA (1995)
Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake
Development Authority." This agency was supposed to
accelerate the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
towns, in the act, within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.
PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the
concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the
suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay,
combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and
the like.
To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA
4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined and
enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and
named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also,
pertinent to the issues in this case are the following
provisions of EO 927 which include in particular the sharing
of fees:
Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects
or activities in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
SEC. 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby
empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and
its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not
limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal
purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected,
and the sharing with other government agencies and
political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fishpen
fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent
of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall
be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent
shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the
implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna
Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will
be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee goes to
the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the
Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent
shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share
of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not
47 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160
provides:
"Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a)
Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental
fees or charges therefor in accordance with the provisions of
this Section.
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to
issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen
operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages occupied almost one-
third the entire lake water surface area, increasing the
occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost
21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens
and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies
adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna
Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing
circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general
public that:
“ 1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to
which no application for registration and/or permit has been
filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March
31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens; fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which
shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal
Fishpen and Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to
demolition of their structures be criminally charged in
accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as
amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws.
Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of
not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos or both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures declared as illegal in accordance with the
foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27
October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures should
not be demolished/dismantled."
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the
concerned owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to
dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected.
The fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA.
The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on
jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied.
Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction
were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the
fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The
CA dismissed the LLDA’s consolidated petitions. It ruled that
(A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the
LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions
insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay
are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government
Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power
to grant permits devolved to respective local government
units concerned.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region - should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
Held: LLDA
Ratio: Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,
and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use
or all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region, including navigation, construction,
and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may
grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels
or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite
zone of the municipal waters.
The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was
no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be
made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA
constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basic
is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a
later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a
conflict between a general law and a special statute, the
special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative
intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law
is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the
absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored
and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the
legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
Authority, which are enviromental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development, there is every
indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to
proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that
"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its
own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface
water, the 8 major river tributaries and several other smaller
rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km2 basin or
watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural
ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining
sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural
resource-a very limited one-which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability
and preserve its ecological integrity and balance. Managing
the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation,
balanced growth and sustainable development of the region
with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources
by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of
48 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they
passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the
management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna
de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented
concepts of management policies where lakeshore local
government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific
portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive
and integrated lake water resource management policy,
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably
develop Laguna de Bay."
The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly
granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact
that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is
embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160
under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And
Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs.”
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant
permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for
lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of
the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers
including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of
the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police
power should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de
Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for
the proper sharing of fees collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a
quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that,
considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, there is no
question that the Authority has express powers as a
regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a "cease a desist order" and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to
the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may
only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be
sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal
questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided
for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of
RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
8.5 Power of Eminent Domain:
Moday et al v. Court of Appeals (1997)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
"Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-
Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday
for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approved
by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution
and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
The municipality filed a petition for eminent domain against
Percival Moday before the RTC. The municipality then filed a
motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upon
deposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount.
The RTC granted the motion. It ruled that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves
it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and
resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section
208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that
the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the acts
enumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari
before the CA. The CA held that the public purpose for the
expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did
not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of
petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, the
Municipality had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall,
the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the
Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and a
declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of
Bunawan is null and void.
Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of
Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental
State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use
or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature,
the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to
local governments, other public entities and public utilities.
For the taking of private property by the government to be
valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be
just compensation.
The Municipality's power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for BP 337,
the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation
proceedings were initiated. What petitioners question is the
lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution
No. 43-89. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not
render said resolution null and void. The law, Section 153 of
B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue.
Velazco v. Blas: The only ground upon which a provincial
board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or
order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is
"beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized
by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial
board in its consideration of a municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically
upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is
outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a
provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
49 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
function of the municipal council or president. Such has been
the consistent course of executive authority. Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows
that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be
used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged
that Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Bustillo when he
refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent
Mayor Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by
expropriating their land even if there were other properties
belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose.
Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant
seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land,
evidenced by a sketch plan.
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the
use must be public, compensation must be made and due
process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking
cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation,
necessity of the taking and the public use character or the
purpose of the taking, has ruled that the necessity of
exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character. Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
Prov. Of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals (1993)
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural
crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province through
Governor Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the
ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province to take possession of the property
upon the deposit of P5,714.00. The trial court issued a writ of
possession. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from
the order and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San
Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988
be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated
December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii)
allowing the Province to take possession of the property
subject of the expropriation and the order dated February
26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion
to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be
issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of
possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
The Province claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local
Government Code and that the expropriations are for a
public purpose. The Solicitor General stated that under
Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need
for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view
that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
The CA set aside the order of the court and ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until the
province shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
DAR.
Issue: WON the expropriation was proper
Ratio: The CA did not rule on the validity of the questioned
resolution; neither did it dismiss the complaints. However,
when the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until
the Province shall have obtained the authority of the DAR to
change the classification of the lands sought to be
expropriated from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it
assumed that the resolution is valid and that the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Public Purpose. Modernly, there has been a shift from the
literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose" or
"public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property
must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads,
bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could
satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under
the new concept, "public use" means public advantage,
convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project.
The expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to
the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center
would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, "Housing is a
basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum the general
welfare."
Eminent Domain vs CARL. It is the submission of the
Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of
eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the
CARL, particularly Section 65, which requires the approval of
the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an
agricultural to a non-agricultural land. The CA, following the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the
Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of
Section 65 of the CARK and must first secure the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, while the Court said
that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to
rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to
another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing
public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that
petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the
taking of 8,970 sq m formed part of the resort complex. A
fair and reasonable reading of the decision is that this Court
viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power
to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by
the Province of Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that
LGUs exercise such power only by delegation. It is true that
local government units have no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power
to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local
governments. While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the
50 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be
clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or
in other legislations.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government, units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural
lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law
that the CA could cite to justify the intervention of the DAR in
expropriation matters is Section 65 of the CARL.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals
that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian
reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years
from its award."
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section
4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987,
cannot be the source of the authority of the DAR to
determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for
the purpose to which it would be devoted by the
expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is
limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by
the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication. To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that
the LGUs can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the DAR, because all of these projects
would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the DAR to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an
expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to
the public use.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no
matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as
subject thereto. The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of
delegated sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions
of law couched in general term.
The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the
basis of the valuation declared in the tax declarations of
their property, are unfounded. This Court has declared as
unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just
compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to
the condemned property either by the owners or the
assessor, whichever was lower. As held in Municipality of
Talisay v. Ramirez, the rules for determining just
compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence
on what they consider shall be the just compensation for
their property.
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor (2000)
Facts: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a
Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In
an Order, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e) minent domain is an
exercise of the power to take private property for public use
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the
exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for
eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this
Court."
On appeal, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that an
action for eminent domain affected title to real property;
hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would
determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. The RTC concluded that the action should have
been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject
property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising
a pure question of law. Respondents contend that the
Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or
possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case
should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP
129 as amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law
provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions that involve title to or possession of real
property, the assessed value of which does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Issue: WON an expropriation suit is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and is therefore within the jurisdiction
of the RTC
Held: Yes
Ratio: "A review of the jurisprudence of this Court
indicates that in determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and
in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of
damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the
law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts
of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at
the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were
enacted allocating jurisdiction.”
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve
the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take
private property for public use. In National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, the Court ruled that expropriation
proceedings have two phases:
"‘The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, ‘of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
51 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.’ An
order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one,
of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too,
would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter
as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the
Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the right of
condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard.’
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of ‘the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of
the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be
done by the Court regarding the issue. ’"
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the
taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the
main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the
regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the
effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in
respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." The
1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended
to change these jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the
present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel
of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y.
Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that
condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of
real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel
of land.
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to
distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion
on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the
jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he
emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is
still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the
government may expropriate private property under the
given set of circumstances. The government does not
dispute respondents’ title to or possession of the same.
Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right,
for the government does not even claim that it has a title to
the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power
to "appropriate and control individual property for the public
benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may
demand."
Mun. of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp (1998)
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-
95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Parañaque filed a
Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation,
over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
"for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project." Petitioner, pursuant to
its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,
previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of
the property with private respondent, which the latter did
not accept.
The RTC authorized petition to take possession of the subject
property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an
amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as
required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private
respondent's motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to
dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
Issue: WON the resolution is different from the ordinance
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by
the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and
"resolution" are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing
authority [on] the local government unit through its chief
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Petitioner
seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI
of the IRR of the Local Government Code, which provides: "If
the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use,
purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the
Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate
expropriation proceedings."
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged
in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate
the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by
Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints
imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays
down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, the following
essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said
offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines
Sur vs. CA to show that a resolution may suffice to support
the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case,
however, is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Code,
which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an
52 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160
explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the
terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently - a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the
previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160
categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would
be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice."
34 In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this
rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all
impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves
a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.
35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative
language - from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance"
under RA 7160 - demands a strict construction. "No species
of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and
is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU
to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,
because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails
over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for
its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to
indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also
requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the
chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an
ordinance.
Issue: WON the complaint states a cause of action
Held: No
Ratio: In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the
existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any
certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner
did not raise this point before this Court. In fact, it was
mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In
any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect
of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on
September 23, 1993.
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the
face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based on a
mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing
the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed
the expropriation suit.
Issue: WON the action is bared by res juridicata
Held: No
Ratio: All the requisites for the application of res judicata
are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment
on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical
interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the
right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even
by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent
domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use."
"All separate interests of individuals in property are held of
the government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they
have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest requires it." Thus, the State or
its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from
exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the
right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply
to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a
final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or
its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as
prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of
eminent domain over the same property. By the same token,
our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not
bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said
legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are
properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of
reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law of
the case." In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the
power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is
not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment
over the property to be expropriated has become the law of
the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent
may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the
same property, once all legal requirements are complied
with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social
justice.
City of Cebu v. CA (1996)
Facts: Merlita Cardeno is the owner of a parcel of land in
Sitio Sto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling. The City of Cebu, filed a
complaint for eminent domain against Cardeno with the RTC
seeking to expropriate the said parcel of land. The complaint
was initiated pursuant to Resolution No. 404 and Ordinance
No. 1418, dated February 17, 1992, of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to
expropriate the said parcel of land for the purpose of
providing a socialized housing project for the landless and
low-income city residents. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of cause of action as there has been
negotiations for the purchase of the property without
resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed. Also,
53 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
there was no compliance with the conditions to the exercise
of the power of eminent domain (valid and definite offer
made to the owner and non acceptance). The RTC dismissed
the complaint. The CA affirmed the of the RTC. According to
the CA, an allegation of repeated negotiations made with the
private respondent for the purchase of her property by the
petitioner, "cannot by any stretch of imagination, be equated
or likened to the clear and specific requirement that the
petitioner should have previously made a valid and definite
offer to purchase." It further added that the term
"negotiation" which necessarily implies uncertainty, it
consisting of acts the purpose of which is to arrive at a
conclusion, may not be perceived to mean the valid and
definite offer contemplated by law.
Issue: WON expropriation may be granted
Ratio: An offshoot of the foregoing is the instant petition for
review on certiorari which has essentially become a battle of
semantics being waged before this Court. While petitioner
reiterates that paragraph VII of the complaint sufficiently
states compliance with the requirement of "a valid and
definite offer", private respondent insists that the term
"negotiations" is too broad to be equated with the said
requirement. Elaborating, private respondent posited that by
definition, "negotiations run the whole range of acts
preparatory to concluding an agreement, from the
preliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of the
agreement; the price; the mode of payment; obligations of
(sic) the parties may conceive as necessary to their
agreement." Thus, "negotiations" by itself may pertain to
any of the foregoing and does not automatically mean the
making of "a valid and definite offer."
At the outset, it must be said that without necessarily
delving into the parties' semantical arguments, this Court
finds that the complaint does in fact state a cause of action.
What may perhaps be conceded is only the relative
ambiguity of the allegations in paragraph VII of the
complaint. However, as We have previously held, a
complaint should not be dismissed upon a mere ambiguity,
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the cause of action stated
thereinfor these are not grounds for a motion to dismiss but
rather for a bill of particulars. In other words, a complaint
should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears
clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not
entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be
proved within the facts alleged therein.
The error of both the RTC and respondent Court of Appeals in
holding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
stems from their inflexible application of the rule that: when
the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, no evidence may be
allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light
of the allegations of the complaint. However, this rule is not
without exceptions. In the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry,
this Court departed from the aforementioned rule and held
that, ". . . although the evidence of the parties were on the
question of granting or denying the petitioner-appellant's
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the
motion to dismiss." Likewise, in Marcopper Mining
Corporation v. Garcia, we sanctioned the act of the trial court
in considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings
submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
This Court deemed such course of action but logical where
the trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of
the complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's
answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for
admission. The same liberality should be applied in the
instant case.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Furthermore, even on the face of the complaint alone, there
is extant a cause of action. All documents attached to a
complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are
not detained under oath by the defendant, must be
considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon. Additionally, the general rule
is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. Thus, Ordinance No. 1418
is not only incorporated into the complaint for eminent
domain filed by petitioner, but is also deemed admitted by
private respondent. A perusal of the copy of said ordinance
which has been annexed to the complaint shows that the
fact of petitioner's having made a previous valid and definite
offer to private respondent is categorically stated therein.
Thus, the second whereas clause of the said ordinance
provides as follows: WHEREAS, the city government has
made a valid and definite offer to purchase subject lot(s) for
the public use aforementioned but the registered owner Mrs.
Merlita Cardeno has rejected such offer.
The foregoing should now put to rest the long drawn
argument over the alleged failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action. There is no longer any room for doubt that
as alleged in the complaint, and as admitted by private
respondent, the petitioner had in fact complied with the
condition precedent of "a valid and definite offer" set forth in
Sec. 19 of R.A. 7160. The rules of procedure are not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure
are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would
be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in
importance are made to override the ends of justice; the
technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the
substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be
countenanced.
The doctrine finds compelling application in the case at
bench. For as correctly averred by petitioner, nothing else
was accomplished by the dismissal of the complaint for
eminent domain but a considerable delay in the proceedings.
The dismissal of the complaint did not bar petitioner from
filing another eminent domain case and from correcting its
alleged error by the mere expedient of changing paragraph
VII thereof. Indeed, precious time has been wasted while the
salutary objectives of Ordinance No. 1418 of the City of Cebu
have been put on hold by a quarrel over technical matters.
Francia v. Mun. of Meycauyan (2008)
Facts: On February 6, 2003, the respondent filed a
complaint for expropriation against petitioners. Respondent
needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m. idle property at the
junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig
main road artery and the MacArthur Highway. It planned to
use it to establish a common public terminal for all types of
public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In their answer, petitioners denied that the property sought
to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact developed
and there were plans for further development. For this
reason, respondent's offer price of P2,333,500 (or P111.99
per square meter) was too low. After trial, the RTC ruled that
the expropriation was for a public purpose as the terminal
would improve the flow of traffic during rush hours.
Moreover, the property as the best site for the proposed
terminal because of its accessibility.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
They claimed that the trial court issued the orders without
conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a public
purpose. The partially granted the petition. Finding that
petitioners were deprived of an opportunity to controvert
respondent's allegations, the appellate court nullified the
order of expropriation except with regard to the writ of
possession. According to the CA, a hearing was not
necessary because once the expropriator deposited the
54 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ of
possession became ministerial.
Issue: WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders
that, in expropriation cases, prior determination of the
existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Held: No
Ratio: Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not
accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated;
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
Before a local government unit may enter into the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must
(1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said
court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based
on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the
determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to
the issuance of a writ of possession.
Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes (1983)
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints
with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of 282 ha of
rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu
City for the development into integrated resort complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential
tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports complex, club
house, golf course, playground and picnic area on said land.
An electric power grid will also be established by NPC as well
as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support
facilities (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created.
The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not
impressed with public use under the Constitution. Also,
assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since
the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of
Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance, that
has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine
Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
PD1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing
PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and
directing the issuance of writs of possession.
Issue: WON the public use requirement has been complied
with
Held: Yes
Ratio: There are three provisions of the Constitution
which directly provide for the exercise of the power of
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the
interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities
and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang
Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just
compensation the expropriation of private lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving
citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of
private properties upon payment of just compensation, the
provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow
the exercise of police power together with the power of
eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional
objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of
private property is concerned. We cite all the above
provisions on the power to expropriate because of the
petitioners' insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent
domain provision. The thrust of all constitutional provisions
on expropriation is in the opposite direction.
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus
categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous and
based on a misconception of fundamentals. The petitioners
look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution.
Understandably the search would be in vain. To freeze
specific programs like tourism into express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a
bulky code and require of the framers a prescience beyond
Delphic proportions. In said case, this Court emphasized
that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and
inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. The
only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to
provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is
not a grant of authority .
The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and
declare that "public use" means literally use by the public
and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public
interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and much less
"public convenience." The petitioners face two major
obstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping in
its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is
unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the
lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power of
eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and
development of Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a
nation which circumscribes the scope of government
activities and public concerns and which possesses big and
correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take
private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance
applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire
State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce
public land or limited government resources.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional
purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports,
waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications
systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control systems is valid. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes.
Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly
limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been
discarded.
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has
aptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows:
"The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
55 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It
is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use."
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is
not "public use" because private concessioners would be
allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants,
hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed
with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets,
roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using
public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit
the public character of expropriations for roads and streets.
The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on
expropriated land does not make the taking for a private
purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed
area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private
concerns.
The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference
that is appropriately accorded to formulations of national
policy expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman v. Parker
(supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy
might mean taking from one private person and conferring
on another private person applies as well as in the
Philippines. An examination of the language in the 1919
cases of City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila and
Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited, shows that from
the very start of constitutional government in our country
judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and
manifest in eminent domain proceedings. The expressions of
national policy are found in the revised charter of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, PD 564.
(Disregard of Land Reform Nature) According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the
properties subject of expropriation may not be taken for the
purposes intended since they are within the coverage of
"operation land transfer" under the land reform program;
that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in
the order of priorities than other State policies like those
relating to the health and physical well-being of the people;
and that property already taken for public use may not be
taken for another public use.
The petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area
being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the
affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates
of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a
tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost
all of which is not affected by the land reform program. The
portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and
unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops
other than rice and corn can hardly survive. And of the 282
disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less than one
hectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40
defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the less
than one hectare of land affected.
(Non Impairment Clause) The non-impairment clause has
never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and
likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v. Springs
"parties by entering into contracts may not estop the
legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good."
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v. Genato which
involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza. The
issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They
claim that since the necessity for the taking has not been
previously established, the issuance of the orders
authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises, as well as the corresponding writs of possession
was premature.
Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings
is authorized to take immediate possession, control and
disposition of the property and the improvements, with
power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the
issues before the court, upon deposit with the Philippine
National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value
of the property expropriated. The issue of immediate
possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato. In answer to
the issue: ". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedings is
in the nature of one that is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fact
that the owner of the property is made a party is not
essentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns the
immediate taking of possession of the property and the
preliminary determination of its value, including the amount
to be deposited."
Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants
of the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fall
within the purview of the Land Reform Code, the petition
should be dismissed on that score alone.
There is no need to decide whether the power of the PTA to
expropriate the land in question predicated on the police
power of the State shall take precedence over the social
justice guarantee in favor of tenants and the landless. The
welfare of the landless and small land owners should prevail
over the right of the PTA to expropriate the lands just to
develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only.
Such a position would increase the disenchanted citizens and
drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted
primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are more
poor people in this country than the rich. The tourism
industry is not essential to the existence of the government,
but the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should
take precedence over the development of the tourism
industry.
Filstream International Inc. v. CA (1998)
Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of the properties
subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land
situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Petitioner
filed an ejectment suit before the MTC against the occupants
of the parcels of land (private respondents) on the grounds
of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of
rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private
respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to
petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed.
However, it appeared that during the pendency of the
ejectment proceedings private respondents, a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner which
was filed before the RTC. The City of Manila then approved
Ordinance No. 7813, authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the
acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other
legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the
properties of petitioner then occupied by private
respondents. The City approved Ordinance No. 7855
declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land situated
along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets in
Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano
Gutierez, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. The said
properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified
tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development
Program of the City of Manila.
56 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain. The
trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the city
which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed
premises to the City of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss but the court denied th emotion.
Concerning the first case, the trial court issued an order
commanding the demolition of the structure erected on the
disputed premises. To avert the demolition, private
respondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The TRO was granted which was later lifted. The
court the dismissed the case on the ground of forum
shopping. On appeal, the CA found merit in private
respondents’ allegations in support of their application of the
issuance of the writ and granted the same.
The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely procedural and
technical matter. Petitioner takes exception to the
resolutions of the CA which ordered the dismissal of its
Petition for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of
Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents
and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are
blurred and unreadable. Petitioner argues that respondent
appellate court seriously erred in giving more premium to
form rather than the substance.
We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the
technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat
rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the
violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in
the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of
their property rights over the disputed premises which have
been expropriated and have in fact been ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the
dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings
based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law as it
would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings
based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law as it
would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings
which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized
that where substantial rights are affected, as in this case,
the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed
if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.
With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitioner
Filstream objects to the issuance by respondent CA of the
restraining order and the preliminary injunction enjoining the
execution of the writ of demolition issued in the ejectment
suit as an incident to private respondents’ pending petition
assailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, of
the consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by private
respondents and the City of Manila on the ground of forum
shopping.
The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the
writ of preliminary injunction is but a mere incient to the
actual controversy which is rooted in the assertion of the
conflicting rights of the parties in this case over the disputed
premises. In order to determine whether private
respondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by
respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the source of
discord.
Petitioner anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over
the properties and the existence of a final and executory
judgment against private respondents ordering the latter’s
ejectment from the premises. Private respondents’ claim on
the other hand hinges on an alleged supervening event
which has rendered the enforcement of petitioner’s rights
moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings undertaken by
the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit
of herein private respondents. For its part, the City is merely
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
exercising its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction
by expropriating petitioner’s properties for public use.
There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and
executory judgment in favor of petitioner ordering the
ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject
of this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit became
final after private respondents failed to interpose any appeal
from the adverse decision of CA. Petitioner has every right
to assert the execution of this decision as it had already
became final and executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila
has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent
domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate
private property for public use is expressly granted to it
under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code. More
specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate
private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and
housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter
of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409).
In fact, the City of Manila’s right to exercise these
prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and
executory judgment over the property to be expropriated
has been upheld by this Court in the case of Philippine
Columbian Association vs. Panis.
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation
is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed
estate. It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to
be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare
only.
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent
domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by
changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including a
particular, urban land reform and housing.”
We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has
become a paramount task in view of the acute shortage of
decent housing in urban areas. Nevertheless, despite the
existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are
not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power
of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems.
The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as
follows: “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws; private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation”.
Thus the exercise by local government units of the power of
eminent domain is not without limitations.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned
in this section shall not apply. The local government units
shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.
Very clear from the provisions are the limitations with
respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and
in resorting to expropriation proceedings as means to
acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when
the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory because these are the only safeguards in
securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above
disquisitions, we now pose the crucial question: Did the city
of Manila comply with the abovementioned conditions when
it expropriated petitioner’s properties? We have carefully
scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that
would indicate the respondent City of Manila complied with
Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioners’ properties were
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of
Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of
57 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner
Filstream’s right to due process which must accordingly be
rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a
paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent
domain for the general good considering that the right of the
State to expropriate private property as long as it is for
public use always takes precedence over the interest of
private property owners. However we must not lose sight of
the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of
such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind
that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the
guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of
the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance
over compliance with the due process requirements is in
order.
Hagonoy Market Vendors Assn. v. Mun. of Hagonoy
(2002)
Facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28,
which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in
Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon
approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November
4-25, 1996.
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner’s
members were personally given copies of the approved
Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in
January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioner’s
President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner
claimed it was unaware of the posting of the ordinance.
Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the
ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the
ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law.
Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner’s appeal, made
over a year later, was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from
the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as
prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government
Code
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal
Held: Yes
Ratio: We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formally
deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner
exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed
Resolutions certified by the Department of Justice, but failed
to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.” Under the
circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of
the fortuitous event considering that litigation is not a game
of technicalities.
Issue: WON the petitioner should be dismissed
Held: Yes
Ratio: The petition should be dismissed as the appeal of
the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-
barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local
Government Code. The law requires that an appeal of a tax
ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the
Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of
the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity
of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the
case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December
1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance
in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed
it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to state
that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their
legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere
technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods
stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory.[10] Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure
adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect
public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of
revenues by the government is of paramount importance.
The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of
basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its
revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the
validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a
considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time
limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue
measures and tax ordinances.
In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely appeal
with the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner contends that its
period to appeal should be counted not from the time the
ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members
were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in
November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the
approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on
two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prior
to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approved
ordinance was not posted.
We do not agree. Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was
no public hearing conducted prior to the passage of
Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In
petitioner’s two (2) communications with the Secretary of
Justice,[12] it enumerated the various objections raised by
its members before the passage of the ordinance in several
meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. These
show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the
proposed increase and in fact participated in the public
hearings therefor. The respondent municipality likewise
submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings
conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on
Appropriations and Market on February 6, July 15 and August
19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall rentals.
Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public
hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure
were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure,
public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow
interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law
or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the
legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the
same. Sanggunian members are elected by the people to
make laws that will promote the general interest of their
constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and
best judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate
in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed
ordinance should not expect that their views would be
patronized by their lawmakers.
On the issue of publication or posting, (Section 188 of the
Local Government Code), the records is bereft of any
evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that the
subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In
contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which
clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the
assailed ordinance was complied with. Municipal Ordinance
No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy
on October 1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria
Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7, 1996.
After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the
Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9,
1996, the Ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period
58 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
from November 4 - 25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz:
in front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of the
Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of
the Market Master in the public market.[14] Posting was
validly made in lieu of publication as there was no
newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy.
This fact was known to and admitted by petitioner. Thus,
petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported claim that it was
only “sometime in November 1997” that the Provincial Board
approved Municipal Ordinance No. 28 and so the posting
could not have been made in November 1996 was
sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent
municipality. Given the foregoing circumstances, petitioner
cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the approved
ordinance. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivity
of the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause.
Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petition
must fail. Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue
Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting
the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax
rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates were
not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in
the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified.
To be sure, the Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete
public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the burnt
but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent
Lumang Palengke with wet market. However, the
Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded
from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift,
dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for security,
intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods
along the sidewalk.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(2002)
Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation
proceedingscovering a total of 544,980 square meters of
contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation
and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the
Philippines” project. Petitioner took over the premises after
the previous lessee, the “Voice of America,” had ceased its
operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or
more than nine years after the institution of the
expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order
condemning the property and ordering the plaintiff to pay
the defendants the just compensation for the property.
The bone of contention is the 76,589-square meter property
previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of
respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It
appears that the national government failed to pay to
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing
decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May
1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion
seeking payment for the expropriated property.
In the meantime, President Estrada issued Proclamation No.
22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to
the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities
and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion
was retained by the PIA. This fact notwithstanding, and
despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained
unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16
September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and
motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of
P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the
expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such
final computation as might be approved by the court. This
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and
motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the
compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed
in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at
P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause
the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March
2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and
issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the
ground of prescription. The CA denied the appeal (failure to
file during the reglementary period).
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a
State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose
provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its
presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due
exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the
power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even
that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to
every form of property the State needs for public use and, as
an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in
property are held under a tacit agreement or implied
reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume
the possession of the property whenever the public interest
so requires it
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in
the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense,
for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action,
the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
title and possession of the property, and the defendant
asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first,
the taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the
property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between
the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights,
upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former
and affording protection to the latter. In determining “public
use,” two approaches are utilized - the first is public
employment or the actual use by the public, and the second
is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the
matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say
that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so
increases, and each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof
being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan
State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public
purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the
utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing
out that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The
argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a
public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as
the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property,
the only limitation being that it be for public use, which,
decidedly, it is.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,
respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in
Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya
where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative
remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It
59 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent
domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited
application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to
local governments under RA 7160 cannot be understood as
being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in
the legislative branch of government. For local governments
to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be
delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then,
this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly
speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or
only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it
to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private
landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the
termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court
ruled - “The points in dispute are whether such payment can
still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been
the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were
condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered
sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue
of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well
as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of
the same.”
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the
expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment
of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise
adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over
which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner
has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the
judgment. The exercise of such rights vested to it as the
condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial
compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby
preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of
non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on
the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that
the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of
rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding,
condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation,
the paramount title is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a
disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title against all the world than
may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not
take into account that the same argument could likewise
apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings
for payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years
after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually
long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against
herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently
with the rule that one should take good care of his own
concern, respondents should have commenced the proper
action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed,
resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and
possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property
as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation
is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case,
the final compensation must include interests on its just
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property
and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in
imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be
computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation
proceedings and “took” the property in September 1969.
This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the
value of the property as of the time of the taking computed,
being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum[28]
should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[29]
Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of
extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency
at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be
the basis for the payment when no agreement to the
contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to
contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual
agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation
to be taken into account to alter the value of the
currency.[31]
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated
01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979
has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority
left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private
respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the
yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final
judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00
per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per
annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property,
i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have
been fully paid.
8.6 Reclassification of lands:
Fortich v. Corona (1999)
Facts: Concerns the MR of the court’s resolution dated
November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on
the separate motions for reconsideration, as a result of
which the decision was affirmed.
The Court noted in a resolution dated January 27, 1999 that
the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before
the Court as their motion to intervene was already denied
and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is
akin to a second MR which is prohibited.
In this motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed that
the case be referred to the case in banc inasmuch as their
earlier MR was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required
number to carry a decision under the Constitution (3 votes)
was not met.
Issue: WON failure to meet the three votes justifies the
referral of the case to the court en banc
Held: No
Ratio: A careful reading of the constitutional provision
reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction
between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other
hand, such that cases are “decided” while matters, which
include motions, are “resolved”. Otherwise put, the word
“decided” must refer to “cases”; while the word “resolved”
must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo
singula singulis.
With this interpretation, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the
60 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three
votes is not obtained in the resolution of a MR. Hence, the
second sentence of the provision speaks only of “case” and
not “matter”. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a
tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to
dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the
division and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting
does not leave the case undecided. There is still the
decision which must stand in view of the failure of the
members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,
the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision
is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.
Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of
November 17, 1998.
Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc is justified on
the ground that the issues are of first impression
Held: No
Ratio: The issues presented before us by the movants are
matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention of
the Court en banc. The issue of whether or not the power of
the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to
the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been
decided by this Court in the case of Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we
held that local government units need not obtain the
approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was
arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the
Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second
Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants
are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the
Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the
resolution of movants’ motions for reconsideration would be
inappropriate.
Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc partakes of
the nature of a second MR
Held: Yes
Ratio: The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of
November 17, 1998 did not dispose of the earlier MR of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the
present MR necessarily partakes of the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration which, according to the clear and
unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to
Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may
entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even
then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be filed with
express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only
did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more
importantly, they have been unable to show that there are
exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second
motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for
referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions
subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of
the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in
the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the
allegations contained therein have already been raised
before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Issue: WON the Win-Win Resolution was valid
Held: No
Ratio: This refers to the resolution “by authority of the
President” modifying the Decision dated 29 March 1996 of
the OP through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres.
NQSRMDC’s (Norberto Quisumbing) Application for
Conversion is approved only with respect to 44 hectares as
recommended by the DA. The remaining 100 hectares found
to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified
farmer beneficiaries (FBs) in accordance with RA 6657
The resolution is void and of no legal effect considering that
the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President
had already become final and executory even prior to the
filing of the MR which became the basis of the said “Win-
Win” Resolution. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the “Win-Win” Resolution was grounded on a
procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to
appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying
consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive
rights of petitioners. “Just as a losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.”
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in
dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon
and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by
the development of the property.
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it
necessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing of
intervenors in this case. In their present motions,
intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of
land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are
seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been
identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the
property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in
fact they have already been raised in intervenors’ earlier
motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision.
Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez,
intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive
interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no
right to own the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a
just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the “Win-Win”
Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have
yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive
finding of the DAR, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed
vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be
qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of
the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-Win” Resolution.
No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null
and void.
Melo: By mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a
division when the required majority of at least 3 votes in the
division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the
Court En Banc. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a
division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and
not to a larger division. In a situation where a division of 5
has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited
himself or is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has
retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be required before
there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division.
There may, then, be instances when a deadlock may occur,
i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that under
the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986
61 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Constitution, if the required majority is not reached in a
division, the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to
motions for reconsideration because the provision
contemplates “cases” or “matters” (which for me has no
material distinction insofar as divisions are concerned) heard
by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot be
divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to be
reconsidered. Consequently, if the required minimum
majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for
reconsideration has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as
mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art. VIII). To
say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, is to
construe something which cannot be sustained by a reading
of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for
reconsideration is not a “case” but only a “matter” which
does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote
thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not
required to elevated to the Court En Banc, is to engage in a
lot of unfounded hairsplitting.
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (1999)
Facts: This case involves 3 haciendas in Nasugbu,
Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under RA
6657 (CARL). Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the
registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality
of Nasugbu, Batangas. President Aquino signed in on July
1987, Proclamation 131 instituting a CARP and EO 229
providing the mechanism to implement the program.
Pursuant to this, Congress passed RA 6657, the CARL. Before
the effectivity of the law, petitioner filed with DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the
provisions of EO 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in
accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Palico. DAR, through Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled
“Invitation to Parties” to petitioner to discuss the results of
the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was
“scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the
CARP.”Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the
MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), Land Bank (LBP) and the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) recommending that 270 ha
and 75.3 ha of the property be placed under compulsory
acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and
P2,188,195.47, respectively.
DAR through Secretary Miriam Santiago sent a “Notice of
Acquisition” to petitioner. Petitioner was informed that
1,023.999 ha of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to
immediate acquisition and distribution by the government
under the CARL; and the government was offering
compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares.
Almost two years later, the DAR Regional Director sent to the
LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda
entitled “Request to Open Trust Account.” Each Memoranda
requested that a trust account representing the valuation of
three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the
petitioner in view of the latter’s rejection of its offered value.
Meanwhile, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of
Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite
petitioner’s application for conversion, DAR proceeded with
the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts
as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by
respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22,
1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda,
DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA)
No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA’s were distributed to
farmer beneficiaries.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Hacienda Banilad. DAR through the MARO of Nasugbu
Batangas sent a notice of acquisition to petitioner. Later, the
MARO sent an “Invitation to Parties” again to Pimentel
inviting the latter to attend a conference to discuss the
results of the MARO’s investigation over Hacienda Banilad.
The Reports were discussed the conference. Present in the
conference were representatives of the prospective farmer
beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on
behalf of the landowner. After the meeting, it was
recommended that 737.2590 ha under Tax Declaration Nos.
0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory
acquisition for distribution.
DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner
two (2) separate “Notices of Acquisition” over Hacienda
Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the
Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice
over Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda
Banilad were addressed to Roxas y Cia. Limited in Makati.
The DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation
Manager a “Request to Open Trust Account” in petitioner’s
name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda
Banilad. A second “Request to Open Trust Account” was sent
on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said
Hacienda.
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both
Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Hacienda Caylawa. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily
offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before
the effectivity of the CARL. DAR, through the Regional
Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate
Resolutions accepting petitioner’s voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-
44663.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its
President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of
DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed DAR that it was applying for conversion of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of
the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. The
Secretary also denied petitioner’s withdrawal of the VOS on
the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific
grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if
the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is
undeveloped.
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda
Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application
for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-
96-46 (BA) with the DARAB praying for the cancellation of
the CLOA’s issued by DAR in the name of several persons.
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where
the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone,
that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the
land to non-agricultural.
DARAB submitted the case to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination. The CA filed a petition for
before the CA questioning the expropriation of its properties
under the CARL. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of
the three haciendas was denied by the MARO. The CA then
dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON the Court can take cognizance of this petition
despite petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies
Held: Yes
62 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Ratio: Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the
courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to
exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was
not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
DAR issued CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries over portions of
petitioner’s land without just compensation to petitioner. A
CLOA is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary
under R.A. 6657. Before this may be awarded to a farmer
beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from
the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The
transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title
remains with the landowner. There was no receipt by
petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired
by the government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also
specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made
only in “cash” or “LBP bonds.” DAR’s opening of trust
account deposits in petitioner’s name with the Land Bank
does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account
deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the
trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure
the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination
of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. In
fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR
disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due
process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the
CLOA’s to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate
judicial action on the part of the petitioner.
Issue: WON the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas were valid and in accordance with law
Held: No
Ratio: Mode of Acquisition of Land Under RA 6657.
Two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and
voluntary.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries
must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal
delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous
place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Within thirty days from
receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner
accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor
of the government and surrenders the certificate of title.
Within 30 days from the execution of the deed of transfer,
the LBP pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner
rejects the DAR’s offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR
conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine
just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from
notice. Within 30 days from submission, the DAR shall
decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the
amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of
the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of
response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the
land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party
may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts
for final determination of just compensation.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices
are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the
landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer
beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.
O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition
sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and
its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps
designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise
of the State’s police power and the power of eminent
domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention
limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power
for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.” The CARL was not intended to
take away property without due process of law. The exercise
of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be
observed in the taking of private property.
The notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to
the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law.
They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in
DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended
in DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A. O. No. 1, Series
of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the
landowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and
that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also
notifies him, pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990,
that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may
attend to discuss the results of the field investigation, the
land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A. O.
No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs
the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding
shall be conducted where he and the other representatives
may be present
Compulsory Acquisition of Hacienda Palico and
Banilad. In the case at bar, DAR claims that it, through
MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
“Invitation to Parties” dated September 29, 1989 to
petitioner, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same
day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date
received at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With
regard to Hacienda Banilad, DAR claims that Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent
an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended
the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the
Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner. The Minutes
was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP
and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was sent or
conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway
because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to DAR.
When DAR, through the MARO, sent to the various parties
the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR
A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than
a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR
Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or
letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer
beneficiaries and other interested parties. The procedure
in the sending of these notices is important to comply
63 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
with the requisites of due process especially when
the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a
personality separate and distinct from its shareholders,
officers and employees.
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary,
cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, as
administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of
the corporation?
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a
corporation is to make it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it. Service must be made on a representative
so integrated with the corporation as to make it a priori
supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know
what he should do with any legal papers served on him, and
bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the
action. Petitioner’s evidence does not show the official duties
of Pimentel as administrator of petitioner’s haciendas. The
evidence does not indicate whether Pimentel’s duties is so
integrated with the corporation that he would immediately
realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices
were sent and the preliminary conference conducted,
petitioner’s principal place of business was listed in DAR’s
records as “Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes, Manila,” and “7 th
Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro
Manila.” Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of
business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions
in Plaza Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.,
Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and
actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a
place over two hundred kilometers away from Metro Manila.
Curiously, DAR had information of the address of petitioner’s
principal place of business. The Notices of Acquisition over
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at
its offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices were sent
barely three to four months after Pimentel was notified of the
preliminary conference. Why DAR chose to notify Pimentel
instead of the officers of the corporation was not explained
by the said respondent.
Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of
petitioner corporation, and the notices and letters of
invitation were validly served on petitioner through him,
there is no showing that Pimentel himself was duly
authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO,
BARC and LBP representatives and farmer beneficiaries for
purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner’s
landholdings. Even DAR’s evidence does not indicate this
authority. On the contrary, petitioner claims that it had no
knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have
given Pimentel the authority to bind it to whatever matters
were discussed or agreed upon by the parties at the
preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year
after Pimentel was informed of the preliminary conference,
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued and this required
that the Notice of Coverage must be sent “to the landowner
concerned or his duly authorized representative.”
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the
CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found actually
subject to CARP were not properly identified before they
were taken over by DAR. The acquisition of the landholdings
did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but
only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024
hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for
acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares
but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The
haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the
various tax declarations over the haciendas describe the
landholdings as “sugarland,” and “forest, sugarland, pasture
land, horticulture and woodland.”
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner
corporation had no idea which portions of its estate
were subject to compulsory acquisition, which
portions it could rightfully retain, whether these
retained portions were compact or contiguous, and
which portions were excluded from CARP coverage.
Even respondent DAR’s evidence does not show that
petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was
notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was
to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof
that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose
and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this
right is exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL
Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway. First of all,
the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that
the land, landowner and beneficiaries of the land subject to
agrarian reform be identified before the notice of
acquisition should be issued. Hacienda Caylaway was
voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total
area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles.
In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989,
DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted the
VOS over two of these four titles. The land covered by the
two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only
648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A.
6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where these
portions are located.
DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land
covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that
petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation
therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation
summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices
to attend the same were actually sent to and received by
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate,
EO 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much
less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by
DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be
dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and
is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to
exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed
under the CARL.
Issue: Assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from
agricultural to non-agricultural, WON this court has the
power to rule on this issue
Held: No
Ratio: It is petitioner’s claim that the three haciendas are
not subject to agrarian reform because they have been
declared for tourism, not agricultural purposes. In 1975, then
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the
municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in
Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedly
reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the
effectivity of RA 6657. In 1993, the Regional Director for
Region IV of the DA certified that the haciendas are not
feasible and sound for agricultural development. On March
20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted
Resolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as
non-agricultural. This Resolution approved Municipal
Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning
Ordinance of Nasugbu which zoning ordinance was based on
a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Development
allegedly prepared by the University of the Philippines.
Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8,
1993.
Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld
by DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827
64 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao
Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway
as within the potential tourist belt. Petitioner presents
evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the
haciendas subject of this petition, hence, the haciendas
should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to
take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule
accordingly.
We do not agree. DAR’s failure to observe due
process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings
does not ipso facto give this Court the power to
adjudicate over petitioner’s application for
conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate
of approving or disapproving applications for
conversion is the DAR.
At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the
Rules of Procedure governing the processing and approval of
applications for land use conversion was the DAR A. O. No. 2,
Series of 1990. Under this A. O., the application for
conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is
located. The MARO reviews the application and its
supporting documents and conducts field investigation and
ocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO
are subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct
further field investigation and submit a supplemental report
together with his recommendation to the Regional Agrarian
Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands
less than five hectares, the RARO shall approve or
disapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceeding
five hectares, the RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report and
forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for
Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty
hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. DAR is in a
better position to resolve petitioner’s application for
conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-
agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL
lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
Finally, we stress that the failure of DAR to comply with the
requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does
not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA’s already
issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is
to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to
run its regular course. DAR must be given the chance to
correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these
farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the
basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive
these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they
till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in
trust for the rightful owner of the land.
8.7 Closure and Opening of Roads:
Cabrera v. CA (1991)
Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted
Resolution No. 158 (Closing the old road leading to the new
Capitol Building and giving owners of properties traversed by
the new road an area form the old raod). Pursuant thereto,
Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province
conveyed to Remedios R. Bagadiong, Fredeswindo F. Alcala,
Elena S. Latorre, Baldomero Tolentino, Eulogia T. Alejandro,
Angeles S. Vargas, and Juan S. Reyes portions of the closed
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
road in exchange for their own respective properties, on
which was subsequently laid a new concrete road leading to
the Capitol Building.
Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed a
complaint with the CFI of Catanduanes for "Restoration of
Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of
Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged that
the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the
Province in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond
the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158
and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the
closure of the road.
The judge sustained the authority of the provincial board to
enact said Resolution. The CA affirmed and found that the
road was not a public road but just a trail. Also, pursuant to
RA 5185, municipal authorities, subject to the approval of
the Provincial Board, can close thoroughfares pursusant to
Sec 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because
Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road
in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with
private properties. He maintains that the public road was
owned by the province in its governmental capacity and,
without a prior order of closure, could not be the subject of a
barter. Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congress
and not with the provincial board.
Issue: WON the Provincial Board can validly enact said
resolution
Held: Yes
Ratio: Resolution 158 clearly says that it is "hereby
resolved to close the old road." The closure is as plain as day
except that the petitioner, with the blindness of those who
will not see, refuses to acknowledge it. The Court has little
patience with such puerile arguments. They border
dangerously on a trifling with the administration of justice
and can only prejudice the pleader's cause.
The authority of the provincial board to close that road and
use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the
following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to
Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: It
sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in
accordance not only with the charter but also with Article
422 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." In the case of Favis v. City of Baguio, the power of
the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets and
withdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Court
said:
5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's
act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end
from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an
alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to
close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is
the authority competent to determine whether or not a
certain property is still necessary for public use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And
the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered
with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed.
So the fact that some private interests may be served
incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.
While it is true that the cases dealt with city councils and not
the provincial board, there is no reason for not applying the
doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in
connection with the closure of provincial roads. The
provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such
roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of
the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the
65 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province
for the construction of provincial roads.
The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injury
and prejudice to be without basis because he had "easy
access anyway to the national road, for in fact the vehicles
used by the Court and the parties during the ocular
inspection easily passed and used it, reaching beyond
plaintiff's house." However, the CA ruled that the he "was
prejudiced by the closure of the road which formerly fronted
his house. He and his family were undoubtedly
inconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of
residence for which we believe they should be
compensated." On this issue, the governing principle was
laid down in Favis thus:
. . . The general rule is that one whose property does not
abut on the closed section of a street has no right to
compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he
still has reasonable access to the general system of streets.
The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a
right to damages to a property owner, even though his
property does not abut on the closed section. But to warrant
recovery in any such case the property owner must show
that the situation is such that he has sustained special
damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from
those sustained by the public generally.
Petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he
has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like him
must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not
a case where his property has been expropriated and he is
entitled to just compensation. The construction of the new
road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As
the trial judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience
the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared
to the greater convenience the new road, which is wide and
concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to the
pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the new
road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but
also to the whole province of Catanduanes." For the
enjoyment of those benefits, every individual in the
province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give
his share.
MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assn. Inc. (2000)
Facts: MMDA is a government agency tasked with the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of
Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner,
through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. BAVA was apprised
that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, BAVA instituted against petitioner before
the RTC a civil case for injunction. Respondent prayed for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the
opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of
the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the
trial court denied the issuance of preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the
case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance.
Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune
Road to the public
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Held: No
Ratio: MMDA claims that it has the authority to open
Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the
state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use
of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police
power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise
that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need
for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
street to the public.
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has
been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The
National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to
the President and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of
several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities
and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela,
and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San
Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and
projects is undertaken by the local government units,
national government agencies, accredited people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this
purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative
arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the
required services within Metro Manila.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the
delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is
transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It
also covers the mass transport system and the institution of
a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set
the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate
the implementation of all traffic management programs." In
addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties
for all traffic violations.
66 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court where we upheld a zoning
ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC),
the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power.
The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the
petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of
the first case and in addition discussed the case of Yabut v.
Court of Appeals.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang
cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both
involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council
of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the
proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the
notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not
cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize
the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and
convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of
roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the
scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of
the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an
express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much
less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the
MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the
forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the
MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers
which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Jjlex
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E.
O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan Manila
Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the
MMC were devolved to the MMA. It ought to be
stressed, however, that not all powers and functions
of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The MMA’s
power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban
services requiring coordination in Metropolitan
Manila." The MMA’s governing body, the Metropolitan
Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of
the component cities and municipalities, was merely
given the power of: (1) formulation of policies on the
delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions
and other issuances, approval of a code of basic
services and the exercise of its rule-making power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units
became primarily responsible for the governance of their
respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s jurisdiction
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
was limited to addressing common problems involving
basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not
have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide
the local government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of
legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of]
legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to
ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to
"advise the local governments accordingly."
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila
became a "special development and administrative
region" and the MMDA a "special development
authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to
the autonomy of the affected local government
units." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined
in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power. It is not even a "special
metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in
Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not
submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite.
The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is
to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by
the President, whereas in local government units, the
President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the
same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike
the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
local government units, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the
other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the
MMDA’s noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in
Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks
plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards
and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets
are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has
become a social malaise affecting our people’s productivity
and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the
country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the
powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions
cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in
a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The
promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
Sangalang v. IAC (1988)
MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare
of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases
of Sangalang v. IAC. From the premise that it has police
power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of
67 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the
public.
Macasiano v. Diokno (1992)
Facts: On 13 June 1990, the Municipality of Paranaque
passed Ordinance 86, s. 1990 which authorized the closure
of J. Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension
and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro
Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The
said ordinance was approved by the municipal council
pursuant to MCC Ordinance 2, s. 1979, authorizing and
regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets,
roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites
for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms
and conditions. On 20 July 1990, the Metropolitan Manila
Authority approved Ordinance 86, s. 1990 of the municipal
council subject to conditions. On 20 June 1990, the municipal
council issued a resolution authorizing the Parañaque Mayor
to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of
flea markets and/or vending areas. On 8 August 1990, the
municipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered
into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain
and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by
Palanyag on the said streets. On 13 September 1990 Brig.
Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of
stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These
stalls were later returned to Palanyag. On 16 October 1990,
Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10
days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market
stalls shall be dismantled.
On 23 October 1990, the municipality and Palanyag filed
with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and
mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary
injunction. On 17 December 1990, the trial court issued an
order upholding the validity of Ordinance 86 s. 1990 of the
Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining Macasiano from
enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag. Hence, a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed by Macasiano thru the
OSG.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and
set aside the 17 December 1990 decision of the RTC which
granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the PNP
Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from
enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. Gabrielle,
G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
streets.
Ratio:
Property of provinces, cities and municipalities;
Property for public use. The property of provinces, cities
and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to property for
public use, Article 424 of Civil Code provides that "property
for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them
is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." In the present
case, thus, J. Gabrielle G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Gacia
Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public
service and are therefore considered public properties of the
municipality.
Properties for public service deemed public and under
absolute control of Congress. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
(Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22
SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Local governments have no authority to regulate use
of public properties unless authority is vested upon
by Congress; e.g. Closure of roads. Local governments
have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use
of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress. One such example of this authority given
by Congress to the local governments is the power to close
roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code (BP 337), which states “A local
government unit may likewise, through its head acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in
accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code,
close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part
thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person
prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public
use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which
other real property belonging to the local unit concerned
might be lawfully used or conveyed."
Legal provision should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established
by law; LGU has no power to lease a road available to
public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic. The
legal provision (Chapter II, Section 10 of the LGC) which
gives authority to local government units to close roads and
other similar public places should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law.
These basic principles have the effect of limiting such
authority of the province, city or municipality to close a
public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 NCC lays down the
basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
leased by the local government unit to private persons.
Aside from the requirement of due process which should be
complied with before closing a road, street or park, the
closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the
road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended
or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
(LGU) (Article 422 NCC; Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA
481 [1975]). It is only then that the LGU can "use or convey
them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used
or conveyed." However, those roads and streets which are
available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted
to public use. In such case, the LGU has no power to use it
for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons.
Related case, Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles. In Cebu Oxygen
v. Bercilles, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution,
declared the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City as an abandoned road, the same not being included in
the City Development Plan. Thereafter, the City Council
passed another resolution authorizing the sale of the said
abandoned road through public bidding. The Court held that
the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to
vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can
be the object of an ordinary contract
Related case, Dacanay v. Asistio. In Dacanay v. Asistio,
the disputed areas from which the market stalls are sought
to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property
for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts.
420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it
may not be the subject of lease or other contract
(Villanueva, et al. v. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142
68 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.

citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; of municipality have the corresponding duty arising from
Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and public office to clear the city streets and restore them to
Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). The right of the public their specific public purpose.
to use the city streets may not be bargained away through Applicability of the Dacanay case; Contracts by Local
contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the Government governed by the original terms and
good of the greater number in the community whose health, conditions, and the law in force at time the rights
peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the were vested. As in the Dacanay case, both cases involve an
respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and
The leases or licenses granted by the City Government to authority in laws applicable during its time. However, BP 337
stallholders are null and void for being contrary to law. The (Local Government Code), has already been repealed by
Executive Order issued by the acting Mayor authorizing the RA7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which took effect
use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for on 1 January 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides
stallholders contravenes the general law that reserves city that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity
streets and roads for public use. The Executive Order may of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other
not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city source of prestation involving a local government unit shall
streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said
arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were
In gratia argumenti, ordinance cannot be validly vested.
implemented as municipality has not complied with
conditions imposed by the MMA for the approval of
the ordinance. Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that
the municipality has the authority to pass the disputed
ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because
it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority due to non-compliance by the municipality of the
conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the
ordinance. The allegations of the municipality that the closed
streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the
majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of
a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any
evidence that will show that the first condition has been met.
Likewise, the designation by the Municipality of a time
schedule during which the flea market shall operate is
absent (fourth condition).
Baclaran area congested; establishment of flea
market on municipality streets does not help solve
problem of congestion
It is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are
congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by
the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license
and allow the establishment of a flea market along J.
Gabrielle, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the
problem of congestion but rather leads to inconvenience to
children as the normal transportation flow is disrupted, to
pollution and deterioration of health of residents due to the
garbage left by the vendors on the streets. Further,
ambulances and fire engines are not able to use the roads
for a more direct access to the fire area and thus lose
valuable time that should have been spent in saving
properties and lives. And further, the ambulances and people
rushing patients to St. Rita Hospital located along GG Cruz
Street are delayed as they are unable to pass through said
street due to the stalls and vendors.
Powers of local government unit not absolute. The
powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are
subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the
laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such
powers should be subservient to paramount considerations
of health and well-being of the members of the community.
Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to
enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety
and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote
the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units.
Based on this objective, the local government should refrain
from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare.
General public has legal right to demand the
restoration of city streets to their specific public
purpose. As in the Dacanay case, the general public have a
legal right to demand the demolition of the illegally
constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials
69 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
SYLLABUS PART 3: ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, VACANCIES,
SUCESSION, DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
Qualifications
Abella v. COMELEC 201 SCRA 253
Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was
allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of
Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence
in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was
alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the
same office.
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the
Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already
proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified,
Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said
area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is
erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code
to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to
qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She
opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of
determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of
INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything
else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical
transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not
necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence,
for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced
by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the
course of the years, although she had physically resided at
Ormoc City."
Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second
highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the
candidate for such position was disqualified.
Held: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC
No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to
the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that
the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes were counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that
the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate.
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI
(Faypon v. Quirino:[M) ere absence from one's residence or
origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence.' ... The
determination of a persons legal residence or domicile
largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from
his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that
a person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must
show and prove pre-ponderantly such abandonment or loss.)
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in
1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is
clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with
her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The
intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence
in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she
occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does
not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It
is common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and
relatives although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.
Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte (the petitioner insists that she is such a
registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1 She
cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on Nov 25, 1987,
and 2 she then transferred her registration to Kananga,
Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3)
she later voted on election day (Feb 1, 1988) in Kananga,
Leyte. )
We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of
belief. The story is marked by so many bizarre cirumtances
not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the
natural behavior of persons. Among these are:
The application for cancellation of registration by respondent
Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened to be misplaced by a clerk in
the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not
sent to the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope;
The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only
on January 9,1988;
The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any
endorsement or covering letter from the Election Registrar or
anybody else;
The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation
only towards the last hour of the revision day, allegedly at
4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;
All the members of the BEI had already signed the Minutes
indicating that no revision of the voter's list was made as of
5:00 PM
The poll clerk and the third member prepared another
minutes stating that the election clerk had delivered the
application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any
reference to the minutes they had previously signed;
Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered
in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga, was supposed to have
filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in
Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent with
his registration. His application for cancellation was never
submitted in evidence.
The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses
Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are far removed from the serial
numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987
in the same precinct.
The most telling evidence is the list of voters, that the
Chairman and the poll clerk had written in Part II of the
same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing that
there were only 9 additional registered voters in Precinct 17,
petitioner was not there. It was only on February 15, 1988, or
two weeks after the election day that the same Registrar
certified for the first time that there were two voters lists,
the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the
second, which appeared only after February 1, submitted by
the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which contained
the spouses Larrazabals' names.
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered
voter of Kananga, Leyte, the petitioner poses an alternative
position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was
no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor
of the province of Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12,
Article X of the Constitution one comes up with the following
conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a
highly-urbanned city but is, nevertheless, considered
independent of the province of Leyte to which it is
geographically attached because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. The
question now is whether or not the prohibition against the
'city's registered voters' electing the provincial officials
70 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to be
elected as provincial officials. The argument is untenable.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that
aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials are independent of the province. In the
same provision, it provides for other component cities within
a province whose charters do not provide a similar
prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc City
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized
cities which are outside the supervisory power of the
province to which they are geographically attached. This
independence from the province carries with it the
prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not
to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The
resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The
Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987
applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo
City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same
principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of
the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of
Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices
in the province of Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en
banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte'
connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the
second, from voting for any provincial elective official."
The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She
opines that such interpretation is "wrong English" since
nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a
prohibition against running for provincial elective office. She
states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the
provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified
TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma
should have been used after the word qualified and after the
word "vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the
election of the provincial governor" is modified separately
and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words
"not entitled to vote."
The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.
In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo, the conjunction and between
the phrase shall not be qualified and entitled to vote refer to
two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the
demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial
governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte."
Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991
decision of the COMELEC's second division is null and void on
the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner
Andres Flores, one of the signatories of the majority opinion
(vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2, 1991.
Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term
from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991. In these three
years he exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner.
Granting in the absence of a statute expressly stating when
the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members
commence and expire, that his term expired on February 2,
1991 to enable a faithful compliance with the constitutional
provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a
staggered basis commencing and ending at fixed intervals,
his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a color
of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3,
1991 to February 15, 1991, are considered valid.
Issue: WON Abella can assume position of governor by
virtue of Section 6 RA 6646
Ratio: Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were
misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him these cases
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the
Frivaldo and Labo cases were petitions for a quo warranto
filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the
eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed
duly elected to the Office from which they were sought to be
unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before
proclamation under section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of
candidacy for material misrepresentations and was
seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore, avers that
since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided
therein that: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes case for him shall not be counted.
The votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the
highest number of votes are not considered counted making
her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest
number of votes should be installed as regular Governor of
Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No.
88004.
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition
to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of
Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of
February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters
of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she
was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her
votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo
and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why the
candidates who obtained the second highest number of
votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated by
Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the
position of mayor in Baguio City. The nature of the
proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters
is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is
voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at
the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes for the
same position can not assume the vacated position. It should
be stressed that in G.R. No. 88004, the Court set aside the
dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to
conduct hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal
was qualified to be a candidate for the position of governor
in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in
G.R. No. 88004. Thus, the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after
the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard
as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of the Court then,
with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote.
One was on official leave.
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of
votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
71 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into
office or maintain him there. However the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and
set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.
Labo v. COMELEC (1989)
FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the
Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In
1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.
Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian
passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR). He later applied for a change in status from
immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his
application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.
According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as
certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an
Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct
evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of
allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of
Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16
years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of
allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a
renunciation of all other allegiance.
Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local
elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis
Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds
of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as
Mayor be annulled.
ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court
concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's
petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto
was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the
jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship.
However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case,
given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a
foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in
the interest of the speedy administration of justice.
Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into
Labo's citizenship?
Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as
the runner-up in the elections, replace him?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto
was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the
petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not
require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC
reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the
filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day
period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities
should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues,
such as the one being decided in this case.
Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine
citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation
of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has
not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2)
naturalization, and (3) repatriation.
Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did
not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution
explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national
interest.
The contention that his marriage to an Australian national
did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is
irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his
Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon
the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his
marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in
1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary
decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is
even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter
can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does
not apply to questions of citizenship.
Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He
was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.
Despite getting the second highest number of votes,
Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he
has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City.
Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take
office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.
*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):
Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC
and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a
foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the
Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be
disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has
already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the
pendency of the case.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-
elect and assume office in due time. The League of
Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the
allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the
Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad.
Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of his election.
Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
72 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such
forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that
he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer’s entire tenure.
Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the
Province of Sorsogon.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The
evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul
Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he
expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier
noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of
protection from the persecution of the Marcos government
through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner
was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so,
it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and
must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to
greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do
they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished
status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to
the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly
declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce
and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case
the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino
heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship
despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not
relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a
conflict between the nationality laws of two states as
decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the
case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented
to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines
under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We
can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own
territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law
who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that
Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein
whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his
naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical
acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship
previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that
meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
Gutierrez Jr, Concurring: I concur in the pragmatic
approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should
supersede any procedural infinities which may affect a
petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the
office of Governor of any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed
by law for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or
election contest is mandatory and jurisdictional.
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the
petitioner's election and proclamation should have been filed
with ten days after the proclamation of election results. The
purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests
beyond the period fixed by law is to have a certain and
definite time within which petitions against the results of an
election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings
for the settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow
the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto
proceedings against any public officer who performs an act
which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the
Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good
reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court
should allow a person like Estuye or his league to bring the
action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited
to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office.
And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I
believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the
Court found it inexpedient to wait for the final decision of
COMELEC. This step is most unusual but considering the
total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioner's claim of
having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained
to concur in the procedure pro hac vice.
Mercado v. Manzano (1999)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice-mayor of
Makati City. Important details on Edu Manzano: born
September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to
Filipino parents.
On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati
City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B.
Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III.
Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was
suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an
American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano
on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him
according to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought
to intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano
opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was
unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
(with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second
Division’s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of
73 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as
winner, saying:
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by
operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of
jus soli (basis is place of birth).
Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural born
Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right
of blood).
Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport, he
has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not
renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the
USA.
Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as a
voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Philippine
elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
US citizenship.
Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-
mayor of Makati City.
ISSUES:
WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion
for leave to intervene granted.  Yes.
WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he
is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in
Makati City.  No.
REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal
interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty
post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.”
This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, there
had already been a proclamation of the election results for
the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has not
been such a proclamation. Certainly, the petitioner had, and
still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the
race when he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC only applies when the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is WON the second placer may
be declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring
action, so was Mercado, being a rival candidate.
Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion
on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the private
respondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of
1987 provides that intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of
COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for
intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion,
justifying this petition for certiorari.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends
that through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code (which
declares as “disqualified from running for elective local
position… Those with dual-citizenship”), Congress has
“command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office.”
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of
birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a
national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of
a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person
who has this raises a question of which state’s law must
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a country’s
sovereignty. In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on
Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per se,
but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their
countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, “dual
citizenship” in the aforementioned disqualification clause
must mean “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy,
such persons with dual citizenships have elected their
Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these
statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino
citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent
resident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I
am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will
support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might
have as a dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held
that “By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to
the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.” Therefore, petitioner Mercado’s
contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute his renunciation of his American citizenship. Also,
equally without merit is his contention that, to be effective,
such renunciation should have been made upon reaching the
age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered
as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used for his last travel to the US dated
April 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time of
said travel, the use of an American passport was simply an
assertion of his American nationality before the termination
of his American citizenship. Admitting that he was a
registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino
(Aznar v. COMELEC).
Manzano’s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has
spent his life here, received his education here, and
practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past
Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibility
refers to lack of qualifications prescribed.
Coquilla v. COMELEC (2002)
Nature: Petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,
dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the COMELEC,
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of
Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the
order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.Special Civil
Action in the SC. Certiorari
Facts: February 17, 1938 – Coquilla was born of Filipino
parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he joined the US Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
1970-1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on
leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his
retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the
U.S.
74 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the U.S. the last of which took place
on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.
Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A.
No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which
was approved Nov. 7, 2000
Nov. 10, 2000 – oath-taking as Filipino citizen; issued
Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 and Bureau of
Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 three days
after
November 21, 2000 - applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. Approved by Election
Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
February 27, 2001 – filed certificate of candidacy stating
therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for "two (2) years."
March 5, 2001, Neil M. Alvarez—respondent, incumbent
mayor of Oras and reelectionist—sought cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the
latter had made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a
resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided
therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000,
when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
COMELEC unable to render judgment on the case before the
elections on May 14, 2001 where petitioner won over private
respondent’s by 379 votes.
May 17, 2001 - petitioner proclaimed mayor of Oras by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and subsequently took his
oath of office.
July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
private respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis the
respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and
stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be added to his actual residence
thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure
his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render
him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines.
The 1-yr residency requirement of Sec 39(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in relation to Secs 65 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code contemplates of the actual
residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002.
Hence this petition.
Issues:
WON the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of
the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration by petitioner.
Private respondent contention: petition should be dismissed
cause his motion for reconsideration was denied for being
pro forma and did not suspend the running of the 30-day
period for filing this petition, pursuant to Rule 19, §4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, so and since the resolution
was received on July 28, 2001 and the petition in this case
was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be
considered as having been filed late and should be
dismissed.
Petitioner’s MFR and petition for certiorari were filed within
the prescribed periods. 5-day period for filing MFR under
Rule 19, §2 should be counted from receipt of decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of COMELEC. In this case,
petitioner received a copy of COMELEC’s Second Division July
19, ‘01 resolution on July 28, 2001. 5 days later, on Aug. 2,
‘01, he filed his MFR. On Feb. 6, ‘02, he received a copy of
the order, dated Jan. 30, ‘02, of the COMELEC en banc
denying his MFR. 5 days later, on Feb 11, 02, he filed this
petition for certiorari.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Contention that petitioner’s MFR did not suspend the running
of the period for filing this petition because the motion was
pro forma and, thus, petition should’ve been filed on or
before Aug 27, 01 is not correct. It was actually filed,
however, only on February 11, 2002. The MFR was not pro
forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the
petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a
motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties
and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro
forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a
reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy.
In the cases where MFR was held to be pro forma, the motion
was so held because
it was a second motion for reconsideration, or
it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify
the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or
not supported by the evidence,or
it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or
it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary
to law, or
the adverse party was not given notice thereof.
Petitioner’s MFR suffers from none of these defects, and
COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioner’s MFR was pro forma
because the allegations raised therein are a mere "rehash"
of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters."
Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the
30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as
earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period
provided by law.
WON COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this
case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6 & 7: Candidates who are disqualified by
final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and
the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those
against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been
rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on
motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification
or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.
Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates
or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy,
which have been begun before the elections, should
continue even after such elections and proclamation of the
winners.
In Abella v. COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC – the SC, in
the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the
decisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of
candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been
divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation
but on the merits.
WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate
of candidacy.
No.
First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)
provides: An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
“Residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or
legal residence—the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
75 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until Nov. 10, ‘00, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien
without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor
or as a resident alien.
If immigration to the United States by virtue of a
"greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that
country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines (Caasi v. CA), much more does naturalization in a
foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines, as was the case with the petitioner.
Petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which
applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of
the US, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for the
repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost
their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been
naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with
it his residence in the Philippines and had not reacquired it
until November 10, 00
Second, petitioner did not reestablished residence in this
country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the
mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax
Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his
townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be
waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a
resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at
the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As
an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under
§13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his
status as a non-resident.
On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by
naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a
former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which
case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his
status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status
when he entered the country on Oct and Dec ’98, Oct ‘99,
and June ‘00 is the statement "Philippine Immigration (–)
Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry
on Aug 5, ‘00, the stamp bore the added inscription "good
for one year stay." Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan
includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines
and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry
to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It
would appear then that when petitioner entered the country
on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for 1-yr only. Hence,
petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an
alien and as a non-resident only on Nov 10, ‘00 upon taking
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.
He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the
mayorship of Oras
Petitioner cannot invoke the ruling in the cases Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections and Bengson as residency was not
an issue in these.
Third, petitioner’s contends that his registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of
his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the city or
municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. But, registration
as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case
questioning a candidate’s lack of residency (Nuval v. Guray).
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the
COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present
evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646
(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur.
In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be
heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a
Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the
COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in
this petition, which, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are
complete and intact in the records.
WON COMELEC was justified in ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy since the
statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that
he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not
true.
Yes. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact
in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate
liable to cancellation.
Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false.
In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this
case is thus fully justified.
Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January
30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en banc are
AFFIRMED.
Disqualifications
Caasi v. CA (1990)
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local
elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however,
was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground
that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private
respondent was not qualified because he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a
permanent resident of the United States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a
permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for
immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of
such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
76 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an
irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran
for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18,
1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null
and void.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during
his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant
that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting
and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended
stay ," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by
the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and
Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear bold
letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the
upper portion, the following information is printed: Person
identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States."
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go
to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the limited States with the intention to
have there permanently as evidenced by his application for
an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on
that application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to reside
there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the
act of immigrating the entering into a country with the
intention of residing in it. As a resident alien in the U.S.,
Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the
country in which he resides. This is in return for the
protection given to him during the period of his residence
therein.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an
immigrant of the United States before he was elected to
public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan.
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987
and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao
in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his
act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such
prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective
office"
Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that
he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof
that he had waived his status as such before he ran for
election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.
We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a
candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is
not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he
intends to run for elective office for at least 1 year at the
time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess (Sec. 42, LGC). Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only 3
months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in
Nov 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality
on Jan 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who
are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country,
the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those
Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance.
The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have
cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations
or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are
resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland
for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep
another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as
permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration
and permanent residence in the United States, he never
really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to
the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court
believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under
false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the
United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even
if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party
to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and
giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public
office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
Marquez v. COMELEC (1995)
Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez
filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against
him for ten counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of
personal property was still pending before the Municipal
Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for
his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that
country.
Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the
77 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
candidate’s disqualification was filed by petitioner, but
COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of
Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings
against private respondent before the COMELEC but the
latter dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a
criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant
of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice.”
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
“Article 73. Disqualifications – The following persons shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
“(a) xxxx
“(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment.”
It is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer
only to persons who has been convicted by final judgment.
However, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on
whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice
when it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The
Court opted to remand the case to COMELEC to resolve and
proceed with the case.
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious
apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of
Section 40(e) of RA 7160 if the disqualification therein meant
were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were
facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by
Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral
conference committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, made this reservation: . . . de ipa-refine
lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of
fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who
has been convicted by final judgment.
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed
upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight . The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation
can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain
congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit
with some personal reservations of the ponente, that Article
73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the
term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite
finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a
"fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the
petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus
constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a
determination of this unresolved factual matter.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Davide, Concurring. The term "fugitive from justice" refers
not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee
to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug
finds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committee,
i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as
appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, as
inordinate and as undue circumscription of the law. I agree.
But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it
also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification
in the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies
all those who have been convicted by final judgment,
regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of
whether they have served or are serving their sentences or
have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving
for another country. The definition thus disregards the true
and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new
definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative
debates has been shown to sustain it and the clear language
of the law leaves no room for a re-examination of the
meaning of the term.
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the
constitutionality of the disqualification based on the
presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There
are certain fundamental considerations which do not support
the applications of the presumption
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the
authority of Congress to determine who are disqualified from
exercising the right of suffrage. Since the minimum
requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must
be a qualified voter, it logically follows that Congress has the
plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek
election for a public office. Secondly, a public office is a
public trust. Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not,
in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence.
Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is
presumed guilty by the filing of an information or criminal
complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a
"fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded
arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the
court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or
escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from
justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an
indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not the
challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the
presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person
himself who has proven his guilt.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a
candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May
8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position
was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent.
Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before
the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that
Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private respondent
revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property
is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles
Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from
justice” which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility
under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code
according to Marquez.
Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the
Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the
US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before
the Los Angeles Court.
78 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court,
on December 26, 1995, a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE
PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the
COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence, declared
that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in
the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a
180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Consolidated
Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC
opined that intent to evade is a material element of the
MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent
in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that
Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal
charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court.
But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body
expressed what it describes as its "persistent discomfort" on
whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decision
definition of "fugitive from justice".
Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
justice.”
Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a “fugitive
from justice” includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor
that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment or of a
promulgated judgement of conviction.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge
by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or
of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no
dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June
25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of
Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, preceded
the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on
November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the
arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five (5)
months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have
known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the
time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and
arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such
time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the
US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice"
under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to
be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
The circumstantial fact that it was 17 days after Rodriguez'
departure that charges against him were filed cannot
overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The
same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events
which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's
purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand
in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In
fact, the evidence of Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his
compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire
to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns
against former President Marcos. For indeed, not long after
petitioner's arrival in the country, the upheaval wrought by
the political forces and the avalanche of events which
occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the
Philippine history. And being a figure in these developments,
Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in
1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected
Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995.
Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a
period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of
varied political campaigns first against the Marcos
government, then for the governorship. And serving the
people of Quezon province as such, the position entails
absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the
office.
Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the
charges to be filed against him at the time he left the United
States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to
determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof.
While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does
not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a
person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges
against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in
view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same,
petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When, in
good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his
own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges
filed against him while in the relative peace and service of
his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to
the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him
outright as a fugitive from justice.
However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge
the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouse
the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign
authoritie scited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that
one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that
he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against
him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already
been filed at the time of his flight.
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids
the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from
justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision)
and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. The
various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in
People v. Pinuila. To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez
and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
"fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ
Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision
was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo
warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition
is also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC
resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez'
petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore,
what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition.
And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from
justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ
Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to
evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their
proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, to
re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability
in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZ Decision.
Torres, Jr: Petitioner returned to the Philippines from the
United States on June 25, 1985 while the criminal complaint
against him for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and
attempted grand theft of personal property was filed almost
5 months later, or on November 12, 1985. Verily, it cannot
be said that he fled to avoid prosecution for at the time he
left the United States, there was yet no case or prosecution
to avoid. That petitioner did not know of the imminent filing
of charges against him and that he did not flee to avoid
prosecution are bolstered by the facts that: 1.) he returned
to the United States twice: on August 14 and October 7 of
the same year but arrived in the Philippines on October 26
likewise in the same year; 2.) he left his wife in the United
States; and 3.) his wife was later on arrested for the same
79 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
charges. Had petitioner been aware of the imminent filing of
charges against him, he would never have returned to the
United States and he would not have left his wife in there.
Petitioner is a citizen of this country. Why should he not
come home? Coming home to the Philippines was the most
natural act of the petitioner, who happens to maintain his
residence in the country. The fact that he remains here even
after he was formally accused cannot be construed as an
indication of an intent to flee, there being no compelling
reason for him to go to the United States and face his
accusers. On the contrary, it is his official duty, as an
incumbent Governor of Quezon, to remain in the country and
perform his duties as the duly elected public official.
"Fugitive from justice" must be given a meaning in the
instant case having regard to "the circumstances and the
time it is used." Philosophers and jurists have tried
unsuccessfully at an exact definition of such an abstruse
term as justice. Unfortunately, whether in the metaphysical
sense or otherwise, the question of justice is still
unanswered as it ever was albeit characterized by secular
skepticism. If the question is asked: What standard of justice
should we enforce? The American sense of justice or the
Philippine sense of justice? Undoubtedly, the forum in which
it is raised should be controlling. By way only of hypothesis,
if an American flees to escape from Philippine Laws to the
United States, may we enforce in the United States our
standard of justice based on Philippine Laws? I am tempted
to ask these questions considering our zealousness to solve
legal problems in the light of laws obtaining in the United
States.
At any rate, an accused charged with a crime in the
Philippines cannot be a candidate and at the same time flee
from prosecution. Once he goes campaigning his opponent
would have him arrested. For this and the reasons above
discussed, the provision on disqualification of fugitive from
justice, being unnecessary and serving only to undermine
one's constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for
public service, should even be scantily considered.
Finally, petitioner appears to have garnered 285,202 votes.
According to the election results, petitioner won over private
respondent by a majority of 140,000 votes more or less. As it
is, to disqualify petitioner on the shaky ground of being a
"fugitive from justice" would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
De la Torre v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: Rolando P. Dela Torre filed an instant petition for
certiorari seeks the nullification of resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) allegedly with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case
for disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC.
The first assailed resolution dated 6 May 1995 declared dela
Torre disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna in the 8 May 1995 elections, citing as the
ground therefor, Section 40(a) of RA 7160 (i.e. “Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence”); the
other is the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the crime of fencing involves moral
turpitude
Held: A crime involving moral turpitude is one which is
“an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.” The elements
of the crime of fencing (as gleaned from the definition of
fencing in Section 2 of PD 1612, Anti-fencing Law) are: (1) A
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) The
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which have been deprived from the proceeds of the
said crime; (3) The accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.” Moral turpitude is deducible
from the third element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of
the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Thus, the COMELEC
did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that
the offense of fencing of which he had been previously
convicted by final judgment was one involving moral
turpitude.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual
knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that good morals.” The
duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired
either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds
expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on
“Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti.
Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for
instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the
property received is stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature,
are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in
point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual
perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process
“private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a
manner “contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of
right and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or
sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or
theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the
sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual
practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the
goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should
caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that “mere possession of any
goods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing”- a presumption that is, according to the Court,
“reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can
arise from the established fact of x x x possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.” All told, the
COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the
ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been
previously convicted by final judgment was one involving
moral turpitude.
Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his
probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of
Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it to
say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing
which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification
found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally
unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a
judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains
finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is
not executory pending resolution of the application for
probation. Clearly then, petitioner’s theory has no merit.
80 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Magno v. COMELEC (2002)
Facts: This is a petition for the disqualification of Nestor
Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija
during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that
petitioner was previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied
for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon
order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The
Comelec ruled that petitioner was disqualified from running
for the position of mayor by virtue of Section 12 of BP 881
(Omnibus Election Code) (crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon, or granted
amnesty.) According to the COMELEC, inasmuch as petitioner
was considered to have completed the service of his
sentence on March 5, 1998, his five-year disqualification will
end only on March 5, 2003. The MR was denied the by
Comelec.
Issue: WON direct bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner argues that direct bribery is not a crime
involving moral turpitude. Likewise, he cites Section 40 of
RA 7160, which he claims is the law applicable to the case at
bar, not BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code as claimed by
the COMELEC. Said provision reads: Section 40.
Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position: (a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.
Petitioner insists that he had already served his sentence as
of March 5, 1998 when he was discharged from probation.
Such being the case, the two-year disqualification period
imposed by Section 40 of the Local Government Code
expired on March 5, 2000. Thus, petitioner was qualified to
run in the 2001 elections.
‘Moral turpitude’ is “an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.”
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It
frequently depends on the circumstances surrounding the
violation of the law. In this case, we need not review the
facts and circumstances relating to the commission of the
crime considering that petitioner did not assail his
conviction. By applying for probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
the offender is a public officer;
the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his
official duty to do; and
the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The
fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary
to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Issue: What law should apply in this case
Held: Local Government Code
Ratio: It is the second sub-issue which is problematical.
There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the
five-year disqualification period provided in Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code and the two-year disqualification
period in Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
was approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In
enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it.
Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160
or the Local Government Code states that: (f) All general and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to
have repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7
of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and not the other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of
the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification
period of candidates for local positions from five to two years
is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws
is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. The
reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years
is the manifest intent. Therefore, although his crime of direct
bribery involved moral turpitude, petitioner nonetheless
could not be disqualified from running in the 2001 elections.
Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield
to Article 40 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5, 2000 and
he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore
when he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2001 elections.
Unfortunately, however, neither this Court nor this case is
the proper forum to rule on (1) the validity of Sonia Lorenzo’s
proclamation and (2) the declaration of petitioner as the
rightful winner. Inasmuch as Sonia Lorenzo had already
been proclaimed as the winning candidate, the legal remedy
of petitioner would have been a timely election protest.
Lingating v. COMELEC (2002)
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for the disqualification of
Sulong, pursuant to §40(b) of RA 7160 which disqualifies
from running for any elective local position “those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case.” It appears
that Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on
January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May
8, 1995 elections, he was reelected. In a petition for
disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his
first term as mayor of Lapuyan, Sulong, along with a
municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals,
was administratively charged with various offenses, and
that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and
81 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
ordered his removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this
decision had become final and executory, and consequently
the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his
oath as mayor.
The comelec was unable to render judgment before the
elections, Rulong was voted for in the elections and he won
as mayor. The comelec then rendered a decision declaring
Sulong disqualified as he was guilty of violating the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sulong filed an MR
contending that the decision has not become final and
executor as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by
the local elections of May 1992.
The comelec en banc, however, reversed. It ruled that while
it is true that one of the disqualifications from running in an
elective position is removal from office as a result of an
administrative case, said provision no longer applies if the
candidate whose qualification is questioned got re-elected to
another term. The re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and
1995 elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision which found him guilty
of dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc[.], granting
said decision has become final and executory.
Moreover, the people of LAPUYAN have already expressed
their will when they cast their votes in the recent elections
as evidenced by the results which found respondent Sulong
to have won convincingly.
Issue: WON Sulong was entitled to occupy the office thus
vacated
Held: Yes
Ratio: We stated in Reyes: Petitioner invokes the ruling in
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public
official could not be removed for misconduct committed
during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But
that was because in that case, before the petition
questioning the validity of the administrative decision
removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office
during which the alleged misconduct was committed
expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during
which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public
official is not removed before his term of office expires, he
can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected [for]
another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two
Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here,
the decision in the administrative case, was served on
petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,
because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the
President. He was thus validly removed from office and,
pursuant to §40(b) of the Local Government Code, he was
disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were
decided there was no provision similar to §40(b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective position
on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it
appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of
dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds,
has not until now become final. The records of this case
show that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del
Sur rendered judgment in AC No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992,
a copy of which was received by respondent Sulong on
February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he filed a
“motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;” that on
February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment;
and that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a
comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolved
respondent’s motion. The filing of his motion for
reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final.
While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be
interpreted as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, it was held that a party in a
disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, §12(c) can move
for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide:
Although Rule 139-B, §12(c) makes no mention of a motion
for reconsideration, nothing in its text or history suggests
that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed . . . .
Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged
before [an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency
rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to correct any error
it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts
or misappreciation of evidence.
There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak
of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo
Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply
considered the matter as having become moot and
academic because it was “overtaken by the local elections of
May [11,]1992.”
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of
Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal
councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and
vice-mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the
decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it
appears to have been made pursuant to §68 of the Local
Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative
cases immediately executory.
Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to resolve respondent’s motion, it is unfair to
the electorate to be told after they have voted for
respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially
since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been
rendered nearly ten years ago.
Flores v. Drilon (1998)
Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Under said provision, “for the first year of its
operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the
City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority.”
Petitioners, as taxpayers, contend that said provision is
unconstitutional as under the following constitutional and
statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public officer or position during his tenure," because the
City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the
subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall
appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since
it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;
and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code.
82 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Issue: WON the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment
or designation of elective officials to other government posts
Held: Yes
Ratio: The rule expresses the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so
that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job. Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 83815, should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention
and energy among too many positions of responsibility,
which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the
President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of
the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is
precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to
prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to
conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of
an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher
interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment
of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his office. But, the contention
is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no
legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the
land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC
is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared
unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can
we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority
for its validity.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph
authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent
by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the
government post, except as are particularly recognized in
the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the
economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may
be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of
Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio
to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an
excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, where we stated that the prohibition
against the holding of any other office or employment by the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in
Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend
additional duties and functions required by the primary
functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform
them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor. This
argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress
did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of
Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase
"shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to
make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the
legislative intent to make the subject positions ex officio,
Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed"
and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. Even in the
Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that
subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B,
but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have
the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the Senators
would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7,
first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio.
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way
the subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag
remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "the
Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the
issue. It is a legislative choice."The Senator took a view that
the constitutional proscription against appointment of
elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress
attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City
instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post.
Without passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag, it
suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be
appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they
are ex officio.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d),
itself vests in the President the power to appoint the
Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of
a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor,
to discharge the duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he
selection or designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public
function and discharge the duties of the same. In his
treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate Justice
Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office." Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion. Indeed, the power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is
not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the
appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a
fundamental component of the appointing power.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power
to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time
limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once
the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his
discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the
qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by
one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes
an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject
posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso
nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since
only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President
is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom
to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the
83 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes
against the very nature itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations
of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is
manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify.
Where, as in the case of Gordon, an incumbent elective
official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to
other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit
his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective
official is not eligible to the appointive position, his
appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view
of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto
officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer,
the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid
so far as they involve the interest of the public and third
persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void
because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a
want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the
public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment,
by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such.
Election Cases Involving Local Elective Officials
Galido v. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were
candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor
of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the
duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election
protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld
the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed
the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed
the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-
elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held that the
fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial
“C” after the name “Galido” were marked ballots and,
therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed
the present petition for certiorari and injunction before the
Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary
restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private
respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section
2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and
executory, and not appealable.
Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets
aside the trial court’s decision involving marked ballots, be
brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by
the aggrieved party?
Held: Yes
Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the
COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section
7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated,
“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolve this
issue in favor of the petitioner.
The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to
appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the power
of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing
of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen (15)
ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a
pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. This
finding should be conclusive on the Court.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article
IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution).
In the present case, after a review of the trial court's
decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15)
ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after
the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May this
COMELEC decision be brought to this court by a petition for
certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)?
Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which
petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:
"(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX,
(C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which
provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Elections in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that
decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,
does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a
special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.
We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled
that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent
power to decide an election contest on physical evidence,
equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence
in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the
extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion,
the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such
discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.
Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had
already assumed the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez
as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the
COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to
suspend all action and prevent the further performance of
the act complained of. In this light, the petition at bar has
become moot and academic.
Rivera v. COMELEC (1991)
84 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Facts: Juan Garcia Rivera and Juan Mitre Garcia II were
candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan, Albay,
during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected
Mayor by a majority of 10 votes.
Garcia filed an election protest with the RTC, which rendered
its verdict finding Garcia to have obtained 6,376 votes as
against Rivera's 6,222. On appeal to the Comelec, the
Comelec sustained with modification the judgment. It ruled
that Juan Garcia was the duly elected municipal mayor by a
majority of 153 votes over Juan Rivera instead of plurality of
154 votes. Upon MR, the Comelec affirmed the decision.
Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of
Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writ
of execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6
September 1990. He continued as mayor until 10 November
1990 when he was served notice of this Court's temporary
restraining order, issued upon Rivera's motion.
In this petition, Rivera prayed for the issuance of a
restraining order arguing that the judgment had not yet
become final and executory. He cites Article IX-C, Section 2,
Par. (2) of the 1987 Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule
39, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He also
contends that since the COMELEC decision has not yet
become final and executory, the COMELEC has no authority
to issue the assailed order and writ of execution. Petitioner
maintains further that he has a period of thirty (30) days
from 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within which
to elevate the COMELEC decision, on certiorari, to this Court,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. He submits that the questioned COMELEC
decision is not one that became final and executory unless
restrained by this Court as provided under Section 3, Rule 39
of the COMELEC Rules, as said rule applies only to "decisions
in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course
or to disqualify a candidate, and postpone or suspend
elections." Lastly, according to petitioner, Section 13(a) of
Rule 18 (finality of Comelec decisions or resolutions) and
Section 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of
Comelec decisions, orders and rulings) of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, should be read in the context of Section
7, Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court authority
to review on certiorari a Comelec decision, order or ruling).
Garcia contends that the Constitution declares that the
Comelec decision on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials are to be final, executor and
not appealable.
Issue: WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials,
being final and executory and not appealable, preclude the
filing of a special civil action of certiorari
Held: Yes
Ratio: Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution,
which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:
"(U)nless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.” On the other hand, private
respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph
2 of the Constitution which provides that decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory and not appealable.
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that
decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable,
does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening.
Flores vs Comelec: Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C,
Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final orders,
or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of
fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest
the Supreme Court of its authority to resolve questions of
law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. We eschew a literal reading of that provision
that would contradict such authority.
Actually, the main thrust of the present petition for certiorari
is that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First Division,
promulgated on 2 May 1990, annulling the proclamation of
the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan,
Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes of
Garcia at least 10 votes which were allegedly misappreciated
in Garcia's favor.
We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC
decision and find that the said decision was not arrived at
capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A
painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was
made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, fourteen (14) ballots
originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the
Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in
his favor to 894 votes out of the 2,445 contested ballots. On
the other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thus
increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes. Moreover,
the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual
determinations. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari,
findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless
grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determinations. We find none in this case.
Regalado, concurring: What the foregoing observations
actually boil down to is that the decisions, orders, or rulings
of said constitutional commissions are not subject to
appellate review, that is, with this Court acting in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction and exercising its power of
review over alleged errors of law and, sometimes, of fact or
both. Such decisions, orders or rulings are not, however,
invulnerable to an original civil action of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus invoking the original jurisdiction of
this Court, under its power of control and supervision over
the lower courts, to pass upon errors of jurisdiction imputed
to said commissions. This is inevitable and justified because
no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law lies from said adjudications.
Narvasa, dissenting: It bears stressing that the final,
executory and unappealable character of the COMELEC's
rulings, orders or decisions in election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices, is pronounced not
by statute or presidential issuance, but by the Constitution
itself. This is a relevant consideration because while
Congress is granted by Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution the "power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts, . . . (it) may not deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5" of the same Article VIII; and said Section 5
declares it to be one of the powers of the Supreme Court to
"(r)eview, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in . . . (specifically listed cases)."
It is in truth this fundamental limitation on the legislative
prerogative to "define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction" of courts which is, that the Supreme Court may
not be deprived by law of jurisdiction over certain particular
cases that underlay this Court's doctrines allowing review by
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
85 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
judgments and final orders of the National Labor Relations
Commission under the Labor Code, and the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, from which no appeal is prescribed by
law.
It cannot be gainsaid however that while Congress may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its constitutionally stated
powers, that self-same Constitution may itself effect that
deprivation; and this appears to be precisely the purpose
and intent of said Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution
as written: to remove from this Court's power to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari final
judgments and orders of the COMELEC in "election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices."
Rivera v. COMELEC (2007)
Facts: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat. On January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy. On January 10, petitioners filed before the
Comelec a petition to cancel Morales’ certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA 7160.
Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat
for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first
term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he
served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer”
because he was not validly elected as his proclamation as
mayor was declared void by the RTC and thereafter, he was
preventively suspended by the ombudsman.
The Comelec ruled that Morales was disqualified to run for
public office. Morales’ MR was however granted. The
Comelec ruled that his proclamation before was void and
that the discharge of the duties is that of a de facto mayor.
In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony Dee filed a
petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated the
previous arguments of petitioners. The RTC dismissed Dee’s
petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not
serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections for
the term 1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed.
Issue: WON Morales is disqualified from running for mayor
Held: Yes
Ratio: This Court, through Mr. Justice Cancio C. Garcia,
resolved the same issue in Ong v. Alegre with identical facts,
thus:
For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur,
to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government
post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as
a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in
Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent
(Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and,
therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente.
However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without
practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated
after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to
finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is
not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that
Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be considered as
having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless
electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such
term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above,
Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive
terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998
election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this
Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full
term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.
Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also
apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, but
also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which is likewise
inapplicable. In Borja, the Court held that Capco’s
assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the
incumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the position
from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less
than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that
position.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that
assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the
remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court
observed, there was a “break” in the service of private
respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a “private
citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall
elections.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as
mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v.
Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit-
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has
been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007,
he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution
specifically included an exception to the people’s
freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
term as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be
possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
86 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
This is the very situation in the instant case. Morales
maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)
only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official serves in the same
position for three consecutive terms. Whether as
“caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers
and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him
“to stay on indefinitely”. Morales should be promptly ousted
from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate
of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be
cancelled. In the light of the foregoing, Morales can not be
considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being
a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE
COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing
to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo
warranto has become moot.
Issue: WON it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who
shall serve for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007
term.
Held: Yes
Ratio: In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a
second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute
winner. As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a
permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in
accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.
Montebon v. Comelec ( 2008)
Facts: Montebon, Ondoy and Potencioso, Jr. were
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of
Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections. Petitioners
and other candidates filed a petition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that
respondent had been elected and served three consecutive
terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for the
same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth
consecutive term. Respondent admitted having been
elected, but claimed that the service of his second term in
2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he
succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not
disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor
in the 2007 elections. Petitioners, on the other hand
contended that voluntary renunciation of the office shall not
be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the official concerned was elected.
The comelec denied the petition for disqualification. On
appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that there
was no voluntary renunciation of office, but rather, an
effective disruption in the full service of his second term as
councilor.
Issue: WON respondent's assumption of office as vice-
mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as
municipal councilor.
Held: Yes
Ratio: In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections the Court
held that the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for
the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official
has been elected three consecutive times; he must also
have served three consecutive terms in the same position.
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal
councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on
whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term
in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan
on January 12, 2004.
Succession in local government offices is by operation of
law. Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of
the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal
councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear
therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in
no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office
as municipal councilor.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court
explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, `Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to
bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect
the people's choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service.
Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office
as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the
service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by
operation of law. Succession by law to a vacated government
office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the
non-performance of which exposes said official to possible
administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty
and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is
therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than
voluntary.
Borja v. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11,
1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he
was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending
June 30, 1998.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Benjamin
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would
have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms
by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve
for another term after that.
Comelec ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.
87 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
On motion, the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and
declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. It ruled that
Capco’s succession into office is not counted as one term for
purposes of the computation of the three term limitation
under the Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558
votes against petitioner’s 7,773 votes and was proclaimed
elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor
Held: Yes
Ratio: (Purpose of the three term rule) First, to prevent
the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The
other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless
of how the official concerned came to that office – whether
by election or by succession by operation of law – would be
to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional
provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X,
§8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power.
Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner
Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for
local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the
alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that
such officials be simply barred from running for the same
position in the succeeding election following the expiration
of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against
“prescreening candidates (from) whom the people will
choose” as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision “recognizing people’s power.”
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is
the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about
the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in
office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the
concern that the right of the people to choose those whom
they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the
drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that
the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is
that the people should be allowed to choose whom they
please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official
because he has already served three terms, although the
first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than
election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis
as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of
“the term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such
official[s) ” from serving for more than three consecutive
terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
local official may be deemed to have served his full term of
office, states that “voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for
which (the official concerned) was elected.” The purpose of
this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation
on the number of terms an elective official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to
have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas’ comment on
Art. VI, §7, which similarly bars members of the House of
Representatives from serving for more than three terms.
Commissioner Bernas states that “if one is elected
Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that
unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one
term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.” This is actually based on the opinion
expressed by Commissioner Davide: “Yes, because we speak
of “term” and if there is a special election, he will serve only
for the unexpired portion of that particular term plus one
more term for the Senator and two more terms for the
Members of the Lower House.”
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-
mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns,
becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-
mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On
the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the
vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative
serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of
the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected
and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is
rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we
believe to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with regard to
elective local officials, the case of a Representative who
succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution which
provides for succession of the Vice-President to the
Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision
says that “No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.”
Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should
likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if
he succeeds to the latter’s office and serves for the
remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision
because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into
the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for
President even if he has occupied that office for more than
four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, §8
on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference
between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional
intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may
have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on
local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service
by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who
succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more
than four years is ineligible for election as President. The
Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President
in the event of the latter’s death, permanent disability,
removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the
cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good
graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he
may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part,
the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate
who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it
becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more
than four years may rightly be considered as service for a
full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local
Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the
sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of
such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein
being only one of them. It cannot be said of him, as much as
of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the
88 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.

Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of the term limit.
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord
his service in that office should not be counted in the with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission
application of any term limit. that while the people should be protected from the evils
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly
right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it curtailed.
is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
Adorneo v. COMELEC (2002)
have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply. Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were the only
candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001
elections. Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He
Borja Supplement:
served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998.
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes
In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the
mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six
recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the
months before the next election, he resigns and is twice
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next
Petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
election.
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Yes, because although he has already first served as
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of
mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was
office before the full term expired, he has not actually
elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying
consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May
the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary renunciation of
1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of
the office is not considered as an interruption in the
May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is
the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the
one “for which he was elected.” Since A is only
unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the
completing the service of the term for which the deceased
1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talaga’s candidacy
and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have
as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an
1987 Constitution.
interruption of the full term
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he
was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his
but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his
first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total
defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat
of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for
the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted,
one more term in the next election?
and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms
Yes, because he has served only two full terms
of three years each. Respondent added that his service from
successively.
May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection
eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation
because the two conditions for the application of the
of the law and the Constitution.
disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely,
The Comelec found Talaga disqualified for the position of city
that the local official concerned has been elected three
mayor. The Comelec en banc reversed and ruled that 1)
consecutive times and that he has fully served three
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local
because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that
official is considered to have served three full terms
he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first
recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was
term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three
not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-
times. In the second case, the local official has been
term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve
elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully
the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11,
served three consecutive terms.
1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity
of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes
mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two
Issue: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor
conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X §8.
Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified
Held: No
to run again in the next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor
Ratio: The issue before us was already addressed in
in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by
operation of law. Neither had he served the full term Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the (1998), where we held,
death , of the deceased mayor. To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must
To consider C in the third case to have served the first be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the
term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to is not enough that an individual has served three
unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to have been elected to the same position for the same number
be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can
simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the be made clearer by considering the following case or
other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no situation:
way the people can return him to office (even if it is just Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first
the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1
89 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one
more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord
with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission
that while the people should be protected from the evils that
a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should
be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,
311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said,
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: a) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELEC’s
ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years
he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC
in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998
election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To
bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member,
stating that in interpreting said provision that “if one is
elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed.”
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’
comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is
no recall election provided for members of Congress.
Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be
deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
as “voluntary renunciation” for clearly it is not. In
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:
…The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect
the people’s choice and grant their elected official full
service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Socrates v. COMELEC (2002)
Facts: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the
incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa
convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the
recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (mayor). The
members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn,
president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim
chair of the PRA. The PRA passed a Resolution declaring its
loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall.
Socrates filed a petition to deny due course to the Recall
Resolution but the Comelec en banc dismissed the case for
lack of merit.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor in the recall election.Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E.
Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC, to disqualify
Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel
his certificate of candidacy. The petitions were all anchored
on the ground that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running for
a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having
served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the
same post.” The Comelec declared Hagedorn qualified to
run in the recall election.
G.R. No. 154512. Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEC
en banc resolution which gave due course to the Recall
Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September
7, 2002. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal
infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its
issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the
PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2)
the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally
deficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves
seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective
constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised
with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings
were conducted in a manner that violated his and the
public’s constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683. Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. sought to annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 insofar as it fixed the recall
election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a
ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be
enjoined from holding the recall election on September 7,
2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at
least an additional 15 days to campaign. The court gave the
candidates an additional 15 days within which to campaign.
Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September
24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84. Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave
assail the COMELEC’s resolutions declaring Hagedorn
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. The Court
ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any
winning candidate in the recall election until further orders
from the Court. In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the
highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238
votes. Rival candidates Socrates and Sandoval obtained
17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Issue: WON the recall resolution was valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall
Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA
members and the defective service of notice to other PRA
members. The COMELEC, however, found that the
proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA
to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local
Government Code. Notices of the convening of the Puerto
Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25
names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast
media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional
and national officials, and DILG officials].
The Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on
matters within the competence and expertise of the
COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous. In the
instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the
COMELEC’s findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority
to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a
majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral
mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15,
2002. This argument deserves scant consideration
90 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall
Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They
were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no
legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly
under Section 70 of the Local Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents
conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Socrates,
however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of
even sending his representative and counsel who were
present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the
recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall
Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of
the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA
members, and authenticated master list of barangay officials
in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and
copy all these public records in the official custody of the
COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the
COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in
Socrates’ claim that respondents violated his constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution
and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Issue: WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the
recall election
Held: No
Ratio: The constitutional and statutory provisions have
two parts. The first part provides that an elective local
official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.
The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear
intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the
same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second,
the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption
in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term
limit of elective local officials, the question asked was
whether there would be no further election after three terms,
or whether there would be “no immediate reelection”
after three terms. What the Constitution prohibits is an
immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not
prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as
the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from
seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent
election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The
debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently show
that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the
Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third
term, not any other subsequent election.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any
election within the three-year full term following the three-
term limit, then Senators should also be prohibited from
running in any election within the six-year full term following
their two-term limit. The constitutional provision on the term
limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of
elective local officials. The framers of the Constitution thus
clarified that a Senator can run after only three years
following his completion of two terms. The framers
expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers
only to the immediate reelection, and not to any
subsequent election, during the six-year period following the
two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not
intend “the period of rest” of an elective official who has
reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding
term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election
on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after
his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.
The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in
2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001
elections. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms
in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his
three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn
could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The
Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified
Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit,
from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus,
Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the
2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall
election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes
over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September
24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates.
During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private
citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of
his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal
prohibition. Hagedorn’s three consecutive terms ended on
June 30, 2001. Hagedorn’s new recall term from September
24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of
his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot
stitch together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his new
recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term
because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which
broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn’s
service as mayor.
In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15-month period he was out
of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as
mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or
hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is
that interruption “for any length of time,” as long as the
cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local
official’s continuity of service.
Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the
full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in
office. In the same manner, Hagedorn’s recall term does not
retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates.
Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September
24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact
to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute
a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn’s recall
term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30,
2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last
91 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot
declare as consecutive or successive terms of office which
historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorn’s recall term retroact to June 30,
2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom
of the people to choose their leaders through popular
elections. The concept of term limits is in derogation of the
sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their own
choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the
fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people
A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of
service is the start of a new term following the interruption.
An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired
term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself
one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. This
is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional
Commission. Although the discussion referred to special
elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the
same principle applies to a recall election of local officials.
Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term
can serve for more than nine consecutive years comprising
of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local
official who serves a recall term should know that the recall
term is in itself one term although less than three years.
This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and
winning in the recall election.
Davide, concurring and dissenting. The ponencia is then
correct when it holds that the three-term limit bars an
immediate reelection for a fourth term. But I disagree when
it rules that in the case of Hagedorn he did not seek an
immediate reelection for a fourth term because he was not a
candidate for reelection in the May 2001 election. It forgets
that what would have been his fourth term by virtue of the
May 2001 election was for the period from 30 June 2001 to
30 June 2004. The flaw in the ruling results from an apparent
confusion between term and election, the root cause of
which is the attempt to distinguish “voluntary renunciation”
of office from “involuntary severance” from office and the
term of office to which it relates.
I wish to add that the Constitutional Commission debates on
the issue of “no immediate reelection” after three
consecutive terms for members of Congress clearly indicated
that the “no immediate reelection” after the 3-term limit
would equally apply to the elective local officials. This
accounted for the immediate acceptance by the Committee
on Local Governments of the aforementioned Amendment of
Commissioner Davide, which is now Section 8 of Article X of
the Constitution. These debates clearly showed the Intent of
the Commission that the ban against an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms applies to the fourth
term, i.e., the term immediately following the three
consecutive terms, to be filled up by the regular election for
such fourth term. For one to be able to run again after three
consecutive terms, he has to rest for the entire immediately
succeeding fourth term. On the next fifth term he can run
again to start a new series of three consecutive terms.
The dichotomy made in the ponencia between “voluntary
renunciation of the office” as used in Section 8 of Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 and
“involuntary severance from office” is unnecessary, if not
misplaced. From the discussion in the ponencia, the latter is
made to apply to the banned term, i.e., the fourth term
immediately following three consecutive terms. Speaking
now of Hagedorn, he cannot have suffered “involuntary
severance from office” because there was nothing to be
severed; he was not a holder of an office either in a de jure
or de facto capacity. He knew he was disqualified from
seeking a third reelection to office. Disqualification is,
definitely, not synonymous with involuntary severance.
Even if we concede that involuntary severance is an act
which interrupts the continuity of a term for purposes of
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
applying the three-term principle the rule laid down in
Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 609), cited in the
ponencia, page 17, is not applicable in the case of Hagedorn.
The involuntary severance referred to in that case was one
that took place during any of the three terms; hence, the
term during which it occurred should be excluded in the
computation. In the case of Hagedorn, no such involuntary
severance took place during any of his three terms brought
about by his election in 1992 and reelections in 1995 and
1998.
More importantly, the voluntary renunciation referred to in
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of
R.A. No. 7160 is one that takes place at any time during
either the first, second, or third term of the three
consecutive terms. This is very clear from the last clause of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which reads: “shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.” The
purpose of the provision is to prevent an elective local
official from voluntarily resigning from office for the purpose
of circumventing the rule on the belief that the term during
which he resigned would be excluded in the counting of the
three-term rule. In short, the provision excluded is intended
to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule or make a
mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus, applying
it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned on
his third term, he would still be barred from seeking
reelection in the May 2001 election.
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in
that case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or
for a third term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the
recall election of 12 May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated,
fully served three successive terms.
Mendoza v. COMELEC (2002)
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside
the resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated August
15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to declare respondent
Leonardo B. Roman’s election as governor of Bataan on May
14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art.
X, §8 of the Constitution, which provides that:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the
petition:
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to
dismiss the petition. He contended that as revealed by the
records of the Constitutional Commission, the Constitution
envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for
three full terms before the proscription applies. Therefore,
not being a full term, a recall term should not be counted or
used as a basis for the disqualification whether served prior
(as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to
the nine-year, full three-term limit.
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined,
voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that, in
accordance with the ruling in Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 295
SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct.
6, 1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999);
and Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a
term during which succession to a local elective office takes
place or a recall election is held should not be counted in
determining whether an elective local official has served
more than three consecutive terms. He argued that the
92 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from
serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in
fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the
continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not
due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an
incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June
30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election
held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for
only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his
election on that day was actually only his third term for the
same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to
dismiss the petition. He argued that a recall term should not
be considered as one full term, because a contrary
interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official’s
service to less than nine years and shortchange his
constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political
power should be balanced against the need to uphold the
voters’ obvious preference who, in the present case, is
Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast. He
explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear
choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the people
should, as much as legally possible, be governed by leaders
freely chosen by them in credible elections. He concluded
that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions
are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be
tilted in favor of the people’s overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to
dismiss, arguing that it is clear from the constitutional
provision that the disqualification applies only if the terms
are consecutive and the service is full and continuous.
Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of
voluntary renunciation, should not count to disqualify an
elective local official from running for the same position.
This case is different from Socrates, where the full three
consecutive terms had been continuously served so that
disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.,
with whom DAVIDE, JR., C.J., and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the view that
the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the
period June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered
as one term. Since he thereafter served for two consecutive
terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001, his
election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and
contravenes Art. X, §8 of the Constitution. For this reason,
she voted to grant the petition and to declare respondent’s
election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES, J., also
dissented and voted to grant the petition. He held that a
recall term constitutes one term and that to totally ignore a
recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow
local officials to serve for more than nine consecutive years
contrary to the manifest intent of the framers of the
Constitution. He contended that respondent Roman’s
election in 2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term
limit imposed by the Constitution.
Tenure of Office
Osmena v. COMELEC (2002)
Facts: The petition) calls for a determination of the
validity and constitutionality of Republic Act 7056, "An Act
Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave
the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections
Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,"
which was signed into law on June 20, 1991. The suit was
instituted by Governor Emilio M. Osmeña (Cebu), Gov
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Roberto Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governors
of the Philippines, Representatives Pablo P. Garcia (3rd
District-Cebu), Raul V. del Mar (North District-Cebu City),
Antonio T. Bacaltos (1st District-Cebu), Wilfredo G. Cainglet
(3rd District-Zamboanga del Norte) and Romeo Guanzon
(lone District-Bacolod City), by way of a petition for
Prohibition, mandamus and Injunction with temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
implementation of said Republic Act 7056 and the
consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the
Comelec to immediately and with all deliberate speed set up
the machinery and make the necessary preparation for the
holding of synchronized national and local elections on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
The petitioners' claim they have actual and material legal
interest in the subject matter of this case not only because,
as public officials, they have taken an oath to support and
defend the Constitution but also because, as taxpayers, they
have an interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and, more importantly, lawfully disbursed. They pray for this
Court to declare Republic Act No. 7056 as unconstitutional
and, therefore, invalid and inoperative because: 1. Republic
Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the
holding of synchronized national and local elections on the
second Monday of May 1992.
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of
Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial,
city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056,
which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local
officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992
violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign
periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial
elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under
the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable
problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized
national and local elections set by the Constitution on the
second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the
second Monday of November 1992, and in the process
violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise
ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution,
to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this,
still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting
mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or
revision.
The Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition on
the ground that the question is political in nature and that
the petitioners are merely asking for an advisory opinion
from the court, there being no justiciable controversy for
resolution. On the merits of the case, the Solicitor General
contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of
legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending
process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its
transitory provisions.
Issue: WON the Court has competence to act on the
matter at bar
Held: Yes
Ratio: What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom
of RA 7056. And even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us is political in nature, We would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in proper
cases even political questions, provided naturally, that the
93 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
question is not solely and exclusively political (as when the
Executive extends recognition to a foreign government) but
one which really necessitates a forthright determination of
constitutionality, involving as it does a question of national
importance.
On the other procedural issues raised, We held as early as in
the Emergency Power Cases that where serious
constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we
must, technicalities of procedure."
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are
left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
To summarize, on the procedural issue, We hold in view of
the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us
in the case at bar, is justiciable rather than political. Even if
the question were political in nature, it would still come
within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government. As for the other alleged
procedural flaws lack of court standing, etc., assuming the
existence of such flaws, the same may be brushed aside,
conformably with existing doctrine so that the important
constitutional issue raised may be addressed.
Accordingly, We are left with no other alternative but to
uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present cases. It
goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is
superior to the Executive and/or Legislative but simply
because the Executive, the Legislative and this Court are
subject to the Constitution as the supreme law.
Issue: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional
Held: Yes
Ratio: It is evident from the wording of Article XVIII,
Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating
their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to
once every three years.
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art.
XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the following records of the
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. It thus
becomes very evident that the Constitution has mandated a
synchronized national and local election prior to June 30,
1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec.
5-on the second Monday of May, 1992.
On this point, it has to be stressed that the term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by
the Constitution at three years (Sec. 8, Art. X). The
incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988.
Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2,
1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June
30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well as
those of the Senators, members of the House of
Representatives, President and Vice-President, is the same to
synchronize the national and local elections.
Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandate
of the 1987 Constitution, RA 7056 provides for two (2)
separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. 2. Start of
Synchronization To start the process of synchronization of
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared
there shall be held:
(a) An election for President and Vice-President of the
Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all elective
Members of the House of Representatives on the second
Monday of May, 1992, and
(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective
officials on the second Monday of November, 1992.
The purpose of Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1
thereof under the heading "Statement of Policy"
. . . to start, as much as practicable, the synchronization of
the elections so that the process can be completed in the
1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 there
shall be only one (1) simultaneous regular elections for
national and local elective officials every three (3) years.
With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold
synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in
the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion
would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the
Constitution because it provides for the holding of a
desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic Act
7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes
Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
But this is not all. There are other provisions of the
Constitution violated by RA 7056. For one, there is Section 2,
Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local
official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these
incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30,
1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been
duly elected and qualified. It has been held that:
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of
officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution
has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official
term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue
the office beyond that period, even though the successors
fail to qualify with the time.
If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be
serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years as
provided for by the Constitution.
Then also, Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution provides
that: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special
cases, the election period shall commence ninety days
before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter. Under this provision the filing of the Certificate of
Candidacy and the ensuing campaign period must be
embraced or circumscribed within that election period of
ninety days, except when in special cases, the Comelec (not
Congress) alters the period. But RA 7056 provides for a
different campaign period, as follows: Sec. 8.
(a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one
hundred thirty (130) days before the day of election.
(b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day
of the election, and
(c) For the election of Members of the House of
Representatives and local elective provincial, city and
municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.
All these the postponement of the holding of a synchronized
national and local election from 1992 to 1995; the hold-over
provision for incumbent local officials; the reduction of the
term of office of local officials to be elected on the second
Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign
periods, are violative of the 1987 Constitution.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the method of
amendment or revision prescribed by the Constitution
(Article XVIII) does not apply to the Transitory Provisions
because in the nature of things Transitory Provisions are to
94 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
be carried out as soon as practicable, and Congress can, in
the exercise of its legislative power enact the needed
legislation, in this case RA 7056, deserves no consideration
at all. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear and
categorical language that "the six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization
of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992
(Article XVIII, Sec. 5)." As discussed earlier, the elections
referred to, to be synchronized with the election of the
President and Vice-President on the second Monday of May
1992, is the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and local officials.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General evaded the issue
of the constitutionality of RA 7056. Although he made a
lengthy discussion on the procedural issues and on the
legislative power of Congress, he failed to refute the
arguments of the petitioners that RA 7056 violated several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution more importantly, the
provision on synchronization of election.
Vacancies and Succession
Jainal v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147927 (2007)
Facts: Petitioner Jainal Julhatab J. Talib were duly certified
candidates for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu in the 10 May 2004
elections. During the canvassing, Talib objected to the
inclusion of certain returns before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC). On 20 May 2004, petitioner was
proclaimed by the MBC as the winning candidate with a
margin of 1,018 votes. On May 23, Talib filed a pre
proclamation case iwith the Comelec praying for the
annulment of election returns pertaining to 21 precints
representing 2788 votes. He alleged that the watchers were
asked to leave the precincts before the counting and
preparation of the election returns. Also, the returns were
not signed by the members of the board of election
inspectors. Also, the number of votes exceeded the number
of voters in two precincts.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case contending
that the allegations are not the proper subject of an election
protest. The comelec annulled the election returns in nine
precincts. The proclamation of Jainal was also annulled.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, including Hussi
Ahajan as private respondent in his capacity as Vice-Mayor
who, under the provisions of the Local Government Code,
will fill up the vacancy created by the annulment of
petitioner’s proclamation.
Issue: WON Talib should have followed the procedure
outlined in Section 20 of RA 7166 for contesting election
returns
Held: No
Ratio: Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 provides for the steps,
outlined below, to be undertaken by a party contesting the
inclusion or exclusion of any election return:
Submitting oral objections and thereupon entering the
objections in the form for written objections to be prescribed
by the COMELEC;
Submitting evidence in support of the objections within
twenty-four (24) hours;
Informing the MBC of his intention to appeal from the MBC
ruling on his objections;
Filing with the MBC a written and verified notice of appeal
within forty-eight (48) hours from suspension of the canvass,
and taking an appeal to the COMELEC within an inextendible
period of five (5) days from filing the notice of appeal.
However, the provision also requires the MBC to perform
certain acts, to wit:
Recording the oral objections in the minutes of the canvass;
Automatically deferring the canvass of the contested returns
and proceeding to canvass the uncontested returns;
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Summarily and immediately ruling on the objections upon
receipt of the evidence;
Entering its ruling in the prescribed form and authenticating
the same;
Entering in the minutes of the canvass a party’s signified
intention to appeal the ruling to the COMELEC;
Suspending the canvass after canvassing all the uncontested
returns and ruling upon the contested returns; and
Making an appropriate report to the COMELEC immediately
upon receipt of the notice of appeal, elevating therewith the
complete records and evidence submitted in the canvass,
and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.
Petitioner does not state in what respect and on what basis
Talib failed to comply with Sec 20 of RA 7166. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to prove the alleged non-compliance. In the
absence of such proof, there is no aspect in the proceedings
before the MBC which legally precludes Talib from filing his
petition before the COMELEC in accordance with the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In fact, petitioner did not even
raise this issue of non-compliance with Sec. 20 of R.A. No.
7166 in his Answer and Memorandum filed before the
COMELEC.
The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before the
COMELEC is, logically, no longer viable after a proclamation
has been made. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as
when the proclamation is null and void. The proclamation of
petitioner in this case is void for three (3) reasons: (1) it was
based on a canvass that should have been suspended with
respect to the contested election returns; (2) it was done
without prior COMELEC authorization which is required in
view of the unresolved objections of Talib to the inclusion of
certain returns in the canvass; and (3) it was predicated on a
canvass that included unsigned election returns involving
such number of votes as will affect the outcome of the
election. In this regard, it has long been recognized that
among the reliefs that the COMELEC may grant is to nullify a
proclamation or suspend the effects of one.
Assuming, however, that Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 was not
complied with, Talib cannot be faulted or made to suffer for
such non-compliance as it was the MBC who did not comply
with its duties under Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166. When Talib
made his objections to the inclusion of the contested
election returns, there was no other recourse for the MBC
except to rule on the objections, suspend the canvass of the
contested election returns, and suspend the proclamation of
petitioner, in that sequence. Instead of doing so, the MBC,
after ruling on the objections, included the contested returns
in the canvass and immediately proclaimed petitioner.
These actions of the MBC rendered it impossible for Talib to
comply with Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7166 any further. It should
be noted that the forty-eight (48)-hour period for filing a
verified notice of appeal with the MBC is reckoned from
suspension of the canvass. The appeal to the COMELEC is
also reckoned five (5) days from suspension of the canvass.
Understandably, Talib had no other recourse but to go
directly to the COMELEC. It is worthy of note that what was
filed with and resolved by the poll body is a pre-proclamation
case. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns.
Issue: WON the order of the RTC of Jolo, Sulu in Election
Protest Case No. 5-4-04 upholding petitioner’s proclamation
as Mayor of Indanan, Sulu precludes the COMELEC from
issuing the assailed resolutions
Held: No
95 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Ratio: Note that Election Protest Case No. 5-4-04 is an
election protest case filed by Isnaji, the third candidate for
the position of Mayor against petitioner and Talib. Being an
election protest or a post-proclamation case, it is markedly
different from the case filed by Talib before the COMELEC
which is a pre-proclamation case.
Verily, the order of the trial court in the election protest case
does not conflict with nor diminish the legal effect of the
COMELEC en banc Resolution, invalidating eight (8) of the
nine (9) questioned election returns. Particularly, the order is
not inconsistent with the directive of the COMELEC to the
Election Officer of Indanan to convene the BEI in the
concerned precincts for a recount, after notice to the parties
and after ensuring that the integrity of the ballot boxes are
not compromised. The order of the trial court directed a
dismissal of the election protest on a technicality, that is, for
failure of Isnaji as protestant to prosecute the protest. No
election returns were examined and no ballots revised. The
questioned election returns could not have been examined
before the trial court because they were already with the
COMELEC at that time in connection with Talib’s pre-
proclamation case. The trial court perfunctorily considered
the report of the Revision Committee and on that basis
concluded that it was no longer necessary to continue with
the case because of petitioner’s "enormous lead" over Isnaji,
not Talib.
Although denominated as a respondent in Election Protest
Case No. 5-4-04, Talib could not be expected to participate
therein because of his pending pre-proclamation case with
the COMELEC. Had he participated in the election protest, his
pre-proclamation case would have been deemed abandoned
because the general rule is that the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed. Without a
doubt, the dismissal of Election Protest Case No. 5-4-04
could not have cast an adverse or prejudicial effect on Talib’s
pending pre-proclamation case.
Issue: WON the Comelec observed the procedure outlined
in Section 235 of BP 881
Held: Yes
Ratio: Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the COMELEC
fully complied with this Court’s exhortation in Dagloc v.
COMELEC that the provision be followed to ascertain the will
of the electorate. Indeed, the COMELEC did not
instantaneously nullify the questioned election returns as
claimed by petitioner. Utilizing the first procedure contained
in the first sentence of Sec. 235, the COMELEC used other
copies of said suspect election returns, namely the election
returns submitted by Talib. When this was not enough, it
even resorted to an examination of the COMELEC copies.
And when it was evident that the election returns for the
nine precincts were manufactured or fabricated because the
printed names and signatures of the members of the BEI
were absent, it was only then that the COMELEC annulled
the said election returns and petitioner’s proclamation. The
COMELEC thereafter ordered the Election Officer of Indanan
to convene the BEI in the concerned precincts for a recount,
if possible, or to report to the COMELEC the impossibility of a
recount so that a special election can be immediately
scheduled. Clearly, the issuances of the COMELEC can hardly
be described as precipitate and premature.
Issue: WON it was proper for Comelec to pierce the veil of
election returns
Held: No
Ratio: It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that in
a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and
the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns.
In Chu v. COMELEC, aside from reiterating the rule against
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
piercing the veil of returns, this Court intimated that a pre-
proclamation case is the proper remedy if the defects and
irregularities are apparent from a physical inspection of the
election returns.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC did not have to look at
other evidence to conclude that the election returns were
manufactured because the defects were apparent on the
face of the election returns themselves. In fact, a detailed
description of each questioned election return was provided
in the Resolution of the COMELEC (2nd Division).
Forum Shopping: The relief sought in the Extreme Urgent
Ex-Parte Manifestation is basically the same as the prayer for
a temporary restraining order in the present petition which
was still pending resolution by this Court at the time the
Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation was filed before the
COMELEC. However, for as long as the present petition,
including the prayer for injunctive relief, pends before this
Court, the assailed COMELEC resolutions remain
presumptively valid. With the filing of the present petition,
only this Court has jurisdiction to nullify the COMELEC
resolutions or suspend their enforcement.
Another violation of the ban against forum-shopping lies in
petitioner’s failure to inform this Court of its filing of the
Extreme Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with the COMELEC.
What is worse than petitioner’s forum-shopping is the poll
body’s favorable action on petitioner’s Extreme Urgent Ex-
Parte Manifestation despite knowledge of the pending
petition with this Court. Such action on the part of COMELEC
should not be countenanced and deserves disapprobation.
Position of Municipal Mayor: The Local Government Code is
clear on the matter of succession. Sec. 44 of R.A. No. 7160
and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code governing vacancies and succession,
quoted below, apply:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. ─ If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall
become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor or
vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in
case of his permanent inability, the second highest-ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein:
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong
barangay, the highest ranking sanggunian barangay
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian
members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises
when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter,
ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis
of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding local election.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Verily, the vacancy created by the nullification of petitioner’s
proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and
may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge
96 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
the functions of his office." Ahajan’s assumption of the office
of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result of the
recount to be conducted in accordance with the issuances of
the COMELEC. Thus, there is an immediate need for the
COMELEC to speedily ascertain the true will of the electorate
in the eight (8) precincts whose election returns were
nullified.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992), supra.
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of
citizenship. Modes of losing Philippine citizenship –
naturalization in a foreign country, express renunciation of
citizenship, subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. The annulment
of Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of the finding that
his marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not
automatically restore is Philippine citizenship.
Menzon v. Petilla 197 SCRA 251 (1991)
Facts: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no
Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the
Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the
Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of
Leyte. On March 25, 1988, Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also
designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-
Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon took his oath of
office before Senator Alberto Romulo.
The Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from
the Undersecretary of the DILG as to the legality of the
appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of
Leyte. Undersecretary Rubllar stated that since B.P. 337 has
no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment
of the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not
necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily
performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently
assume the functions of both offices.
As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente
U. Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989,
issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the
appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of
Leyte. The petitioner through the acting LDP Regional
Counsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification from
Undersecretary Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22, 1989
opinion. Undersecretary Rubillar replied and explained his
opinion: “On the basis of the foregoing and considering that
the law is silent in case of temporary vacancy, in the Office
of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that the peculiar situation
in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy in
the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for
the designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as vice-
governor temporarily.”
In view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar,
the Regional Director of the DILG, Region 8, Resurreccion
Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the
Acting-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E. Petilla, requesting the
latter that Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. Despite these several
letters of request, the Acting Governor and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and
correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments
attached to the Office of Vice-Governor. Thus, petitioner filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
petition sought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for
the payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-
Governor of Leyte.
In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of
Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the
Governor of the province of Leyte.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Issue: WON there was a vacancy
Held: Yes
Ratio: The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a
legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a
vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to
assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be
readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left
vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla
was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the
office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally
qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the
Vice-Governor.
There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla, notwithstanding
his succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The
nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. More so when the vacancy
is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's automatic
assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the
vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the
Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the
petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the
period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the
discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial
Governor should devote all his time to that particular office.
Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally
acting, may revoke an appointment made by a higher
authority.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government had the
authority to designate the petitioner.
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of
succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office
of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must
not be understood to convey that a remedy in law is
wanting. The circumstances of the case reveal that there is
indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-
Governor. For about two years after the governatorial
elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for
the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that
time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election
case before the Commission on Elections.
The two-year interregnum which would result from the
respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people and in the proper management of the affairs of the
local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible
that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was
ever intended by the Local Government Code.
Under the circumstances of this case and considering the
silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that,
in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an
interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting
through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government,
may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary
appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-
Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded
nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting
Vice-Governor.
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain
public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit
both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision
97 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of
public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure
thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in
the present case. The respondents contend that the
provincial board is the correct appointing power. This
argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and
the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own
local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules
through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated
or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to
that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a
consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the
people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.
The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord
with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is
no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of
the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to
provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the
Vice-Governor.
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the
mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may
likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the
same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the
vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number
of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in
extending the temporary appointment.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the
salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is
indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated
to the petitioner, following the example in Commonwealth
Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code, and
pursuant to the proscription against double compensation
must only be such additional compensation as, with his
existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law
for the Office of the Vice-Governor.
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through
the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to
appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a
de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of
the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As
revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no
less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of
Local Government, after which he took his oath of office
before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department
of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra.
Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The
respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the
petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was
only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed
by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-
Governor that the validity of the appointment of the
petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties
attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was
acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle
of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and
basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous
to now deny him the salary due him for the services he
actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the
province of Leyte.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Docena v. Sang. Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
(1991)
Facts: Luis Capito, elected and serving as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) died in office. Petitioner
Agustin Docena was appointed to succeed Capito. This
appontment was issued by Department of Local
Government Secretary Santos on November 19, 1990.
November 27: For unknown reasons, respondent Socrates
Alar was also appointed by Secretary Santos to the position
already occupied by Docena. December 18: the SP passed
Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as
legitimate successor of the late Capito. December 19:
Secretary Santos sent a letter to Alar, informing the latter of
the prior appointment of Docena and recalling Alar's
appointment
Issue: WON Docena should be the appointed member to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Held: Yes
Ratio: The pertinent legal provision is Section 50, LGC:
SEC. 50. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. Except
for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come
from the political party of the sanggunian member who
caused the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of
the vacant office.
1. From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on
November 19, 1990, there is no question that it was
intended to be permanent. Petitioner's appointment had
already become complete and enforceable at the time it was
supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in
favor of Alar.
Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the
causes, and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the
Local Government Code. These requirements could not be
circumvented by the simple process of recalling his
appointment.
2. The respondents are ambivalent about the power of the
Secretary of Local Government to recall his appointments.
They described the December 19 recall of Alar as
"whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy" for lack of a
previous hearing (although they had no similar complaints
about the recall of Docena's appointment although also
made without hearing).
Appointive Local Officials Common to all Municipalities,
Cities and Provinces
De Rama v. CA (2001)
Facts : Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama, Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission
(dated July 13, 1995) seeking the recall of the appointments
of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama
justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of said employees were “midnight”
appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja,
done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution.
Three of the said employees, namely: Elsa Marino, Morell
Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for
payment of their salaries, alleging that although their
appointments were declared permanent by Conrado Gulim,
Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitoner
de Rama withheld the payment of their salaries and benefits
pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01.
Based on the documents submitted by Marino, Ayala and
Oriazel, the Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC
issued an Order finding that since the claimants-employees
98 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
had assumed their respective positions and performed their
duties pursuant to their appointments, they are entitled to
receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their
positions. The CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial Division ruled
that the said employees cannot be deprived of their salaries
and benefits by the unilateral act of the newly-assumed
mayor.
CSC denied petitoner’s request for the recall of
appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit,
and declared that the appointments of the said employees
were issued in accordance with pertinent laws, and cannot
be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until
disproved by the CSC. Furthermore, CSC dismissed
petitioner’s allegation that these were midnight
appointments. Constitutional provision prohibits only those
appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot
apply to local elective officials.
CSC upheld the validity of the appointments, and petitioner’s
failure to present evidence would warrant the revocation or
recall of the said appointments.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CSC’s
Resolution, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction:
(1) to refuse to revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to
uphold the validity of said appointments, even assuming
there was failure to present eveidence.
Issue : Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of the
Constitution covers local elective officials.
Decision : No. Records reveal that when the petitioner
brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the
fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only
justification he gave was that these were “midnight
appointments” that are forbidden under Article VII, Section
15 of the Constitution. The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that
the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth, there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last
days of his or her tenure.
DISSENTING OPINION: Mendoza. What the majority
overlooks is that Article VII, Section 15 is simply an
application of a broader principle that after the appointing
authority has lost the elections, his is the duty of a prudent
caretaker of the office, and therefore, he should not fill
positions in the government unless required by the
imperatives of public service.
Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective Officials
David v. COMELEC (1997)
Facts: In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay
77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng
mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Alex L. David filed a petition for
prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter
represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a
petition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional:
1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: (c)
The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on
the second Monday of May 1994.
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date
of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997
and other activities related thereto;
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in
Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs and
expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections:
Both petitions though worded differently raise the same
ultimate issue: How long is the term of office of barangay
officials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2 of RA 6653
"(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5)
years . . ." This is reiterated in RA 6679. Petitioners further
aver that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of
office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1)
RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while
RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local
government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or
impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay
officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987
constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three
years, the same provision states that the term of barangay
officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows
that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials
any term, except three years; otherwise, "there would be no
rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except
barangay officials from the three year term found in Sec. 8
(of) Article X of the Constitution."
Comelec maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other special
laws relied upon by the petitioner.
Issue: WON the term of the barangay officials should be
limited only to three years
Held: Yes
Ratio: In light of the brief historical background, the intent
and design of the legislature to limit the term of barangay
officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local
Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the law. And three years is
the obvious intent.
First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted
later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages,
the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law
repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will.
It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law
and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the
legislators could not have known the newer one and hence
could not have intended to change what they did not know.
Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones and not the other way around.
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay
officials was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after
the regular election of barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent
with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that
such "term shall be for five years." Note that both laws refer
to the same officials who were elected "on the second
Monday of May 1994."
Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven
kagawads and the candidate obtaining the highest number
of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. RA
6653 empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to
select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the
other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct
vote on the barangay chairman by the entire barangay
electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence,
under the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials,
namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads.
Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven
kagawads, and not for the barangay chairman.
99 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994
(second Monday), the voters actually and directly elected
one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with
the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the punong
barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex
David cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay
chairman, much less president of the national league, of
barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It
then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-
interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily
dismissed.
Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,
Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover
expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year.
Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a
general registration of voters shall be held "immediately
after the barangay elections in 1997." These are clear and
express contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance
with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
Fifth. In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that "the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned is
barely seven (7) months away, the same having been
scheduled in May, 1997." This judicial decision, per Article 8
of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the
Philippines."
Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a
special law, should prevail over RA 7160, all alleged general
law pursuant to the doctrine of generaila specialibus non
derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA. 7160 is a codified set of
laws that specifically applies to local government units. It
specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the
term of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three
years." It is a special provision that applies only to the term
of barangay officials who were elected on the second
Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision
cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct
in alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are
incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasons
therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a
special law insofar as it governs the term of office of
barangay officials. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states
that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance
and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they
cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus
prevail in accordance with its repealing clause. When a
subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of
the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.
Issue: WON the three year term is in accord with the
constitution
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City
Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officials whose
"term shall be determined by law" from the general provision
fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, the
Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from
legislating a three year term for such officers. We find this
theory rather novel but nonetheless logically and legally
flawed.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials.
It merely left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion
to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public
service. It must be remembered that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39
To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a
clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental
law prohibits, the statute permits. The petitioners have
miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly
the unconstitutionality they aver.
There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA
7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution
limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years,
except that of barangay officials which "shall be determined
by law" was an amendment proposed by Constitutional
Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the
amendment was "readily accepted without much discussion
and formally approved." Indeed, a search into the Record of
the Constitutional Commission yielded only a few pages of
actual deliberations.
Issue: WON petitioners are Estopped From Challenging
Their Three-Year Terms
Held: Yes
Ratio: Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as
Annex "A" of its memorandum, 43 a machine copy of the
certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the May
9, 1994 barangay elections, the authenticity of which was
not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of candidacy,
he expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his
"candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay
77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for
said office." The Comelec also submitted as Annex "B" 44 to
its said memorandum, a certified statement of the votes
obtained by the candidates in said elections.
If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679,
then (1) Petitioner David should not have run and could not
have been elected chairman of his barangay because under
RA 6679, there was to be no direct election for the punong
barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay
chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay
should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the
highest number of votes among the kagawads 150, which
was much more than David's 112; (3) the electorate should
have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong
barangay plus seven kagawads. In other words, following
petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David as
well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners
was illegal.
The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is
that barangay officials are estopped from asking for any
term other than that which they ran for and were elected to,
under the law governing thie very claim to such offices:
namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners'
belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their
election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art.
3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith."
Private Counsel/Lawyers for elective local officials
Alinsug v. RTC and Mayor Ponseca (1993)
Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug, had been a regular employee of
the municipal government of Escalante, Negros Occidental,
when she received a permanent appointment as Clerk III in
the office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator of the same municipality. Mayor Rolando Ponsica
detailed her to the Office of the Mayor. On 19 June 1992,
Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend to
family matters. She had asked permission from the
personnel officer but not from the mayor.
100 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending
Zonsayda for one month and one day commencing on 24
June 1992 for "a simple misconduct which can also be
categorized as an act of insubordination." The order also
stated that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of
benefits such as salary and PERA and leave credits during
the duration of its effectivity."
Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with
damages. She alleged that her suspension was an act of
political vendetta. Mayor Ponsica, through private
practitioner Samuel SM Lezama, claimed that Zonsayda had
not yet exhausted administrative remedies and that her
suspension was in accordance with law.
The foregoing elicited a motion from the petitioner, praying
that the answer be disregarded and expunged from the
record, and that the respondents be all declared in default
on the ground that since the respondents were sued in their
official capacities, "not including their private capacities,"
they should have been represented by either the municipal
legal officer or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as
provided for by Sec. 481 (b) (i) and (3) of the Local
Government Code. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 and
Art. 177 of the RPC which penalizes usurpation of public
authority.
The respondents opposed the motion. Manifesting that the
municipality of Escalante has no legal officer, they asserted
that both the Local Government Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987 do not have any provision "relative to the duty
of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent a
municipality or its officials in suits filed against them by an
employee or a private individual." They contended that it
was "unnecessary to provide such a provision because there
(exist) administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the
validity of the employment of a private counsel by municipal
officials.
The lower court issued the Order denying the motion on the
thesis that since the appointment of a legal officer was
optional on the part of the municipal government (Art. 481,
third paragraph, Local Government Code) and the
municipality of Escalante had not, in fact, designated any
such legal officer, petitioner's move to declare respondents
in default "for having retained a private counsel" was not
thereby legally sustainable.
Issue: WON a private counsel may represent municipal
officials sued in their official capacities
Ratio: It appears that the law allows a private counsel to
be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an
adverse party in a case involving the provincial government
or another municipality or city within the province. This
provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.
The Auditor General where the Court held that the
municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. With
Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the
Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which
enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if
and when original jurisdiction of case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to some other municipality in the same province, and
when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or
child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or
otherwise.
Thereafter, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that
a municipality may not be represented by a private law firm
which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration
with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such
representation was violative Sec. 1683 of the old
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Administrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the
law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the
municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring
a private lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality
would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its
litigations."
But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not
necessarily. It can happen that a government official,
ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that
capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the
one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten
by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his
personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can
attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI of
Bulacan, 10 the Court held that in the discharge of
governmental functions, "municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when,
the only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of
the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof."
In such instance, this Court has sanctioned that
representation by private counsel. In one case, We held that
where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local
officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to
redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel
would be proper. And, in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also
said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity
may engage the services of private counsel when "the
complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be
satisfied by them in their private capacity."
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local
government official may secure the services of private
counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity,
lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought.
While the petition below was filed against respondents as
public officials, its allegations were also aimed at questioning
certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere
confines of official functions; thus
2.12 These actuations of the respondent mayor in detailing
petitioner to his office and eventually suspending her from
work, particularly the latter are no doubt respondent mayor's
political vendetta of petitioner, a vengeance unleased on her
for her children's and family's not going with and voting for
him in the May 11, 1992 election and instead supporting the
candidacy of their relative-candidate (Mr. Barcelona) in said
election, who was his greated (sic) worry at that time.
2.13 The aforesaid acts of respondent mayor are clearly,
apparently and obviously a political harassment and
persecution, appreasive (sic), acts of vindictiveness, a grave
abuse of executive discretion, despotic, unjust, unwarranted,
condemnable and actionable; the indefinite detail order and,
especially the suspension, were not done in good faith, not
for a valid cause, and done without giving petitioner
opportunity to be heard, hence, null and void for being
violative of petitioner's legal and constitutional right to due
process. .
The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown by its
prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless
they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if
the defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless
negligence. A public official, who in the performance of his
duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and
his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an
incurrence of personal liability.
Municipality of Pililia, Rizal v. CA (1994)
Facts: The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, against private respondent
101 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, ordering therein defendant
to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00
representing the tax on business due from the defendant
under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said
municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983. The SC
affirmed the judgment with modification .
Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff
municipality with the RTC for the examination of defendant
corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and
1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on
business imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended.
The corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that the
mayor already received the sum as evidenced by the release
and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. The court
below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's motion
for examination and execution of judgment on the ground
that the judgment in question had already been satisfied.
When Atty. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with the
SC, PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority
to represent petitioner municipality. The CA dismissed the
petition for having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to
the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla
through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola has authority to file a petition
in behalf of the municipality
Held: No
Ratio: The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty.
Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in
the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of
representation of a municipality by a private attorney has
been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and
reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., where we ruled that private attorneys cannot
represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3,
Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the
aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the
provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's
case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is
nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on
appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is
without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad
enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal
refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's
refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal
justification for employing the services of private counsel.
Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline
employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions
on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath
of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special
attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary
of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its
case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein
counsel, Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality
itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion
for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quo
by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of
said municipality.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent
cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority
to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his
representation can be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of
lack of authority of private counsel to represent a
municipality was only raised for the first time in the
proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services
rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that
case had become final and executory and/or had been duly
executed.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the
municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said
authority is deemed to have been revoked by the
municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor
and without said counsel's participation, entered into a
compromise agreement with herein private respondent with
regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and
thereafter filed personally with the court below two
pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of
Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".
A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by
himself, is considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer.
Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue
representing the municipality since the latter is entitled to
dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law
and under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client
may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the
proceedings, and there is nothing to prevent a litigant from
appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation.
The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit
without the intervention of his lawyer. 22 Even the lawyers'
right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the
lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding
in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The
lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper
court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the
Rules of Court, but said rights may not be used to prevent
the approval of the compromise agreement.
The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that
the municipality will file a similar petition, considering that
the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the
initiative, is not only conjectural but without factual basis.
Contrary to his pretensions, there is presently a
manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filed
by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the
"Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim" 24
previously filed in the case therein as earlier mentioned.
Ramos v. CA (1997)
Facts: On April 18, 1990, petitioners filed a petition before
the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal
Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract
of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the
municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. Meanwhile, the provincial
Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed
an Answer on behalf of respondent municipality.
At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos
appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for the
municipality. On the same date, Atty. Romanillos filed a
motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an
Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. The provincial
attorney appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty.
Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty.
Romanillos who submitted the Reply to petitioners'
Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It
was also Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal
offer of evidence for the municipality.
Despite the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality
of Atty Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipality.
Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint
stating that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for
102 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his
collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is
adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken
by Atty. Romanillos. The judge denied the petitioners’ motion
to disqualify.
Issue: Who is Authorized to Representa Municipality in its
Lawsuits?
Ratio: In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs.
CA, this Court, through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set in
clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may
legally represent a municipality in a suit for or against it,
thus: . . . The matter of representation of a municipality by a
private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. IAC, et al., where we
ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or
municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal
district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof (sic)
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in
cases where the municipality or municipal district in question
is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality or municipal district in the same province.
When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal
shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal
is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province a special attorney may be
employed by its council.
Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, RA
2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only provincial fiscal and the
municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality
in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned
exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear
on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records
to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as
counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the
appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of
law.
The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser
for the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the
municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the
provincial attorney.
The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that
only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal
attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only
in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by
a municipality to represent it in lawsuits.
These exceptions are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs.
RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, to wit:
Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be
hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an
adverse party in a case involving the provincial government
or another municipality or city within the province. This
provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v.
The Auditor General where the Court held that the
municipality's authority to employ a private attorney is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. With
Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the
Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which
enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if
and when original jurisdiction of case involving the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to some other municipality in the same province, and
when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or
child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or
otherwise.
Thereafter, in Ramos vs. CA, the Court ruled that a
municipality may not be represented by a private law firm
which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration
with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such
representations was violative of Sec. 1683 of the old
Administrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the
law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the
municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring
a private lawyer" and that the interests of the municipality
would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its
litigations.
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It
may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent
municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi
Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in
this same case. The order of the trial court dated September
19, 1990, stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial
prosecutor and the provincial attorney." This collaboration is
contrary to law and hence should not have been recognized
as legal. It has already been ruled in this wise:
The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are
supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not
legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of
Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M. While a private
prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous
arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a
municipality is the plaintiff.
As already stated, private lawyers may not represent
municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in
collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is
anchored on the principle that only accountable public
officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that
public funds should not be expanded to hire private lawyers.
Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the
legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos,
notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of
respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal vs. Court of Appeals held that the legality of the
representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.
Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the
unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel
just because they did not question on the spot the authority
of the counsel for the municipality. The rule on appearances
of a lawyers is that until the contrary is clearly shown, an
attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the
litigant whom he purports to represent. His authority to
appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having
been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on
appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the
complaint and appear for his client.
Issue: Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the
proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate such
proceedings?
Held: Yes
Ratio: It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings
participated in or undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he
was private counsel for the respondent municipality of
Baliuag such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve
the injunction, wherein petitioners had even cross-examined
the witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in support of
103 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
said motion and had even started to present their witnesses
to sustain their objection to the motion would have resulted
in any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. As Wee
see it, to declare the said proceedings null and void
notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by Atty.
Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan in court and to
require trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hear
the same witnesses and to admit the same evidence
adduced by the same parties cannot enhance the promotion
of justice.
This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the
appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial
prejudice on petitioners. Requiring new trial on the mere
legal technicality that the municipality was not represented
by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest
of justice. After all, this Court does not see any injustice
committed against petitioners by the adoptions of the work
of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served by
requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal
representative of the town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private
lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of
substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may
adopt the work already performed in good faith by such
private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided
that no injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party and
(2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is
paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work
cannot bind the municipality.
Issue: WON Joint Motion Need Not Comply with Rule 15
Held: Yes
Ratio: We also agree with the justification of public
respondent than a motion to withdraw the appearance of an
unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that need
not comply with Section 4 Rule 15 as to notice to the
adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos was
what petitioners were really praying for when they
questioned his authority to appear for the municipality. The
disqualification was granted, thereby serving the relief
prayed for by petitioners. such being the case, no "notice
directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days
before the hearing thereof" 30 need be given petitioners, the
questioned motion not being contentious. Besides, what
petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority was
remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized
counsel, Atty. Regalado. The action of the trial court allowing
the motion of respondent municipality effectively granted
petitioners motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos. In People
vs. Leviste, we ruled that:
While it is true any motion that does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing
and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court
has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule
will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the
case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
the merits and not on technicalities. As this Court held in
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, "an order of the court granting
the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity
in the proceedings . . . which cannot deprive a competent
court of jurisdiction over the case."
It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such
that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend their operation.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Salalima v. Guingona 257 SCRA 55 (1996)
Facts: This refers to the administrative complaint filed
against Albay Governor Romeo Salalima, Vice-Governor
Danilo Azafla, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members
Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Jesus Marcellana, Arturo Osia,
Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap Fontanilla,
Vicente Go, Sr., and Nemesio Baclao relative to the retainer
contract for legal services entered into between the Province
of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and
the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the
disbursement of public fund in payment thereof.
The complaint alleges that by entering into the retainer
agreement with private lawyers and paying P7, 380, 410.31
to the said private lawyers, respondents violated several
provisions of law which warrants the imposition of
administrative penalties against them. It is to be noted that
respondents Victoria, Reyeg, Cabredo, Marcellana and Osia
were not yet members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
when Resolution No. 129 was passed. However, the
complaint alleges that these respondents were named in the
complaint because they approved the supplemental
budget/appropriation ordinances providing for the payment
of the attorney’s fees.
Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative
liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty.
Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making
payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the
case filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the
Province.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for the
province whose functions include the following: Represent
the local government unit in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official
thereof, in his official capacity is a party; Provided, That, in
actions or proceeding where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government
or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party.
The Supreme Court has ruled in Municipality of Bocaue, et
al. v. Manotok, that local government units cannot be
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial
Fiscal who can rightfully represent them. This ruling applies
squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the Local
Government Code is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised
Administrative Code which was the subject of interpretation
in the case of Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok. In
hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay,
respondents exceeded their authority and violated the
abovequoted section of the Local Government Code and the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.
qMoreover, the entire transaction was attended by
irregularities. First, the disbursements to the lawyers
amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the
Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made
without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General
and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit
(COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5 dated 2 April
1986.
The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by
presenting the Solicitor General’s conformity dated 15 July
1993. This conformity was, however obtained after the
disbursements were already made in 1990 and 1992. What
is required by COA Circular No. 86-255 is a prior written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General.
Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers.
Resolution No. 0 1-90 authorized the respondent Governor to
sign and confirm a retainer contract for legal services with
104 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at 202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd.,
Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by respondent
Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca
Building, 280 Tomas Morato Avenue, Quezon City. That Atty.
Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm are two
separate entities is evident from the retained contract itself.
In entering into a retainer agreement not only with the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago,
respondent Governor exceeded his authority under
Resolution No. 01-90.
Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the
transaction is the fact that it was only Atty. Cornago who
appeared as collaborating counsel of record of the Province
in the Supreme Court case. Even the Solicitor General, in his
letter to respondent Governor dated 15 July 1993, noted that
the Province is represented in the Supreme Court by Attys.
Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes
& Reyna Law Firm.
Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed
for the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm was not counsel of record of the Province in G.R.
No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by the
Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million were
issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty.
Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursed
money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter
did not appear as counsel for the Province in the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 87479.
Finally, the attorney’s fees agreed upon by respondent
Salalima and confirmed by the other respondents are not
only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent
fee of 18% of the ”P2l4 million” claim of the Province against
NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The word “unconscionable,”
as applied to attorney’s fee, “means nothing more than that
the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained
would be sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had
been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been taken
of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on
him.”
The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had
already filed a comment on NPC’s petition against the
Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort already covers
the basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago
filed an appearance and subsequently a memorandum for
the Province, the petition was already been given due course
by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by
the parties before the Court would issue its decision was a
memorandum. Surely, one memorandum could not be worth
P38.5 million.
Furthermore, the professional character and social standing
of Atty. Cornago are not such as would merit a P38.5 million
fee for the legal services rendered for the Province. During
the hearing, respondent Governor admitted that he had
hired Atty. Cornago because they were schoolmates at San
Beda College.
It is evident that respondent Governor hired Atty. Cornago
not on the basis of his competency and standing in the legal
community but purely for personal reasons. Likewise, the
standing of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as
would merit P38.5 million for one memorandum, which, in
this case, it had not even filed because it was not the
counsel of record. Hence, considering the labor and time
involved, the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services and the professional character
and social standing of the lawyers, the attorney’s fee of
P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing such
scandalously exorbitant attorney’s fees which is patently
disadvantageous to the government, respondents betrayed a
personal bias to the lawyers involved and committed abuse
of authority.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Disciplinary Actions
Ganzon v. CA (1991), supra.
Facts: DLG Secretary issued against Mayor Ganzon 3
separate orders of 60-day preventive suspensions dated
Aug11 1988, Oct11 1988, and May3 1990. A fourth order
was issued on July3, 1991.
On August 5, 1991, SC issued order that the first 3
suspensions are affirmed provided that Ganzon may not be
made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the
remaining admin charges against him. Ganzon filed a
petition for mandamus with "manifestation and compliance,"
alleging that he had already fully served the suspension
orders issued against him, in compliance with the August 5
SC Order, and that he should be allowed to re-assume his
office starting September 4 1991.
Held: Simultaneous service of the 3rd and 4th orders of
suspension can be allowed Under the bizarre circumstances
of CAB, It would work in favor of Ganzon, an elective official,
and it presumably will favor the local constituency and
certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever
motive may be behind the intriguing action of DLG Sec in
issuing the successive suspension orders especially when he
could have pursued a consolidated effort.
SC takes judicial notice of recently-approved LGC which
provides, under Sec63 as to imposition of preventive
suspensions, that
Sec63 (b). . . that, any single preventive suspension of local
elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
Provided, further that in the event that several
administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he
cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90)
days within a single year on the same ground or grounds
existing and known at the time of the first suspension."
Espiritu v. Melgar (1992)
Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with
Secretary Luis Santos of DILG charging Mayor Nelson Melgar
of Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct,
oppression. abuse of authority, culpable violation of the
Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and
ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of
Naujan without filing any charges until his released the
following day. An identical letter complaint was filed by
Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro
Benjamin Espiritu, accusing Melgar of the same violations.A
third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action
Center, OP.
Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that
while he was delivering a speech during a graduation
ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on
the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech,
he instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. It appeared
that Garing was drunk. The mayor also presented medical
certificate proving that Garing was not hurt. A balison was
then taken from Garing. The mayor informed Garing to go
home (he had sobered up), but he refused to go and only did
so the following morning.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed
Resolution No 55, recommending to the Provincial Governor
that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days
pending the investigation of the administrative complaint.
When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a
"Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer
for Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro
alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant,
despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. The
RTC judge issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
105 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of
suspension against Mayor Melgar
On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in
granting the preliminary injunction since the Governor is
empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal
official under preventive suspension pending decision of an
administrative case against the elective municipal official.
Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has
jurisdiction over the complaints against any municipal
official, while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over such
cases. Also, the mayor has a remedy of appeal under Sec 66
LGC.
Issue: WON the governor has the power to suspend the
mayor
Held: Yes
Ratio: Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of
Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively
suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the
issues had been joined and any of the following grounds
were shown to exist:
When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of;
When the evidence of culpability is strong;
When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
When the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the
charges against him are heard and before he is given an
opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is
allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal
course of the investigation through the use of his influence
and authority over possible witnesses.
Since the mayor believed that his preventive suspension was
unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought
relief first from the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts.
Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without
exhausting administrative remedies was premature. The RTC
had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.
There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to
the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they
warrant disciplinary action. However, as a general rule, the
office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and
sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of the
exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a
becoming regard for the principle of separation of powers
demand that the action of said officer or body should be left
undisturbed.
However, in this particular case. since the 60-day preventive
suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the
Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6,
1991, and therefore has already been served, he is deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of
the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
Aguinaldo v. Santos (1992)
Facts: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the
province of Cagayan. Shortly after the December 1989 coup
d'etat was crushed, the Secretary of Local Government sent
a telegram and a letter, to petitioner requiring him to show
cause why he should not be suspended or removed from
office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48)
hours from receipt thereof. A sworn complaint for disloyalty
to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was
filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep,
the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter
committed during the coup.
In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of
the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he
admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers. The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for
60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. During the hearing, petitioner did not present
any evidence and instead moved that the Secretary inhibit
himself, which motion was denied. Later, the Secretary
rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and
ordering his removal from office. The Vice Governor, Melvin
Vargas was installed as Governor.
In this appeal, the power of the Secretary to suspend officials
was repealed by the 1987 Constitution and that the act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
While the case was pending before the SC, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed
against him on the ground that he had been removed from
office. The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was
reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary
has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with
the Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the
elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual
proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Issue: WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or
remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending
before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the
canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec et al:
‘the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such
fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the
people.’
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
The power of respondent Secretary to remove local
government of officials is anchored on both the Constitution
and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The
constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4)
of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the
department head are presumptively the acts of the President
unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutory grant
found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having
been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to
106 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2. A similar
provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to
enact a local government code, which provides for the
manner of removal of local government officials, is found in
the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution,
then it can not be said that BP337 was repealed by the
effectivity of the present Constitution. Moreover, in
Bagabuyo et al. v. Davide, Jr., BP 337 remained in force
despite the effectivity of the Constitution, until such time as
the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved.
The power of he Secretary of the DILG to remove local
elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of
BP 337. As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority
of the Secretary to appoint Melvin Vargas as Governor, We
need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the
fallacy of the same. Equally without merit is petitioner's
claim that before he could be suspended or removed from
office, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required inasmuch
as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the
Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of
the RPC. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under
the provisions of the RPC, but administratively with the end
in view of removing petitioner as the duly elected Governor
of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic
where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.
Reyes v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: G.R. No. 120905. Renato Reyes was the
incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It
was alleged, that petitioner exacted and collected
P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong
Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the
DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor
reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and
that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle
dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened
the cattle for seven months. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice
Governor Pedrito Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to
vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the
office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order
upon petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy wit the
Comelec. Rogelio de Castro sought the disqualification of
petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the LGC. The
Comelec canceled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,
apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the
COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor. The
Comelec en banc affirmed. Invoking the ruling in the case of
Aguinaldo v. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on
May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
G.R. No. 120940. Julius Garcia, who obtained the highest
number of votes next to Reyes intervened, contending that
because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to
be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The
Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer since a candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes in an
election cannot be declared winner
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Issue: WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
is not yet final because he has not been served a copy
thereof.
Held: No
Ratio: The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of
petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As the
secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo,
stated in his certification, repeated attempts had been made
to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by registered
mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for
reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed
and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver
it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's
refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in the
administrative case had been rendered is evident in his
effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and
his client while their petition for certiorari in the RTC was
pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore,
be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the
decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the
party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is
duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to
protect his interests, enable a party to file an appeal or apply
for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes
final.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.
Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he
should have received the decision and taken an appeal to
the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160,
§ 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision
became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service
upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8,
1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had
already become final and executory. The filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality. An original
action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action
during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there
must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction
from the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the
case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was
issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction
was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order
issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there
was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon
petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the
administrative charges against him moot and academic
Held: No
Ratio: The case at bar is the very opposite of Aguinaldo vs
Comelec. Here, although Reyes brought an action to
question the decision in the administrative case, the TRO
issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that
the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to
appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly
107 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
removed from office and, pursuant to § 40(b) of the LGC, he
was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were
decided there was no provision similar to § 40(b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective position
on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be given
retroactive effect.
Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As
indicated earlier, the decision of the then Secretary of Local
Government was questioned by the petitioner in this Court
and that to date, the petition remains unresolved.
All in all, herein Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a
period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer
however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the end
proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of
the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a
waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1).
Art. 126 of Rules and Regulations implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991). All persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the
Constitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient
opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so.
Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on
the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this
was because he had filed a motion for postponement and
was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern
of delay he employed to render the case against him moot
by his election.
Issue: WON Julius Garcia should be declared mayor in view
of the disqualification of Renato Reyes
Held: No
Ratio: That the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just
that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is
without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to
have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for
that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.
As for Garcia's contention that the COMELEC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in not deciding the case before the
date of the election, suffice it to say that under R.A. No.
6646, § 6, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for
disqualification against a candidate even after the election
and order the suspension of his proclamation whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. For the same reason, we find
no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have
seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted
administrative remedies by appealing the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should have
disqualified him before the elections.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (1995)
Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed
against respondents (Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor
Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael
Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City
Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede) by
Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O.
Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated
R.A No. 3019, as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; and
R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that
respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the
alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by
increasing the allocated appropriation therein from
P3,494,364.57 to P7M without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension,
respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft
of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case
filed against them since, under Section 63 LGC, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said
local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President. Dionson and Bercede argued that the LGC could
not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the
Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all
public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the
Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to
dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of
respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M.
Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally
resolved by the Ombudsman.
A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by
respondent officials with the RTC. Acting favorably on the
pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued a
restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him from
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of
preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Yes
Ratio: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman
is decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987
Constitution, while his statutory mandate to act on
administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A.
No. 6770. Section 21 of the same statute names the officials
who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the
Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree
preventive suspension on any public officer or employee
under investigation by it.
Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials
must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
vests the authority to investigate administrative charges,
listed under Section 60 thereof, on various offices In the case
specifically of complaints against elective officials of
provinces and highly urbanized cities.
Thus, respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the
Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only be
imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an
108 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an
independent component city; . . ."
There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of
the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter
in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,
as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the
other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by
implication are not favored, and that courts must generally
assume their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus esf optimus interpretendi, i e, every
statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject.
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice
to the very reason that underlies the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate
said office from the long tentacles of officialdom." Quite
interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local
Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions
then existing under the old code.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to
impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city
officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770,
specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent
of the common grant The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what
already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local
Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month
preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day
preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local
Government Code to even now maintain its application. The
two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the
preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a)
the charge against the officer or employee should involve
dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) that charges should warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The
Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension
to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are
under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the
shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension
prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an
elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined),
it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c)
the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
The contention is without merit. The records reveal that
petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after
the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the
motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of
his memorandum in compliance with the directive of
petitioner Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension
can be decreed on an official under investigation after
charges are brought and even before the charges are heard.
Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to
any finding of guilt or innocence.
Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on
preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in
consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that
the evidence of guilt was strong.
Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor
General that respondent officials' petition for prohibition,
being an application for remedy against the findings of
petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should
not have been entertained by the trial court.
Salalima v. Guingona (1996), supra.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically
ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the
last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated
Article 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since
the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its
authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the
power to remove elective officials, a power which the law
itself granted only to the proper courts.
Grego v. COMELEC 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his
position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court Court upon a finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged
by Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate
for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
during the 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly,
assumed office.
After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He
again won. However, a case for quo warranto was filed by
Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who alleged
Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of
the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco
ran again for councilor.
William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct
No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's
disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and
for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly
elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. The Manila
BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor
of the Second District of Manila.
In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion
seeking to annul the illegal proclamation. The Comelec
dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the
administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was
wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected
him.
Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992
Held: No
Ratio: Petitioner submits that although the Code took
effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must
nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to
Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is
stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not
mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of
the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to
attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as
109 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place
during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to
petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive application
to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue
and there exist no compelling reasons for us to depart
therefrom.
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the
power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the
obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it
is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as
intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending
proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or
clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would
clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. It,
therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case."
Issue: WON private respondent's election to office as City
Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections
wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against
him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office
Ratio: At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie
semblance of merit to petitioner's argument. However, the
issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured
his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because
the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the
first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous
elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable
considering that Basco was NOT subject to any
disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to
those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In
view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner,
there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the
matter at length.
Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in
Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the
national or local government, including its agencies and
instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled
corporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contention
is baseless. Neither does petitioner's argument that the term
"any position" is broad enough to cover without distinction
both appointive and local positions merit any consideration.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did
not bar Basco from running for any elective position. (And
with prejudice to reinstatement..)
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of
the term "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service
Decree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a public
officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term
"reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to
an appointive position. In light of these definitions, there is,
therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred
from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is
contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is
reinstatement to an appointive position.
Issue: WON private respondent's proclamation as sixth
winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by
COMELEC is void ab initio?
Ratio: The inapplicability of RA 7166 Section 20(i) to the
present case is very much patent on its face considering that
the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to
contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a
candidate.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention
that the COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the Manila
City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use
of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a
proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature
and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made
mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the
continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the
COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is
so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be
left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere
therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such
discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously.
The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a
specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in
its field that its findings or conclusions are generally
respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not
found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the
records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different
conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample
justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion.
Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to
implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefore,
improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used
instead the word "shall" in its rules.
Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should
not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City
Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the
election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing
and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and
ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to
count the votes based on such returns and declare the
result.
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra,
cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the
factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose
than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not in
any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the
mere pendency of a disqualification case.
Issue: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be
legally declared a winning candidate
Held: No
Ratio: Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the
first place, Basco was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to
our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the
winning number of votes which put him in sixth place. Thus,
petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where
we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second
placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no
application in this case. The exception is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2)
the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both
assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's
allegation that Basco was well-known to have been
disqualified in the small community where he ran as a
candidate is purely speculative and conjectural, unsupported
as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of
his alleged disqualification.
110 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for
disqualification as not having been attended by grave abuse
of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for
private respondent's continuance in office as City Councilor
for the Second District of Manila.
Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres 290 SCRA 279
(1998)
Facts: Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija
while Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C.
Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G. Interior are
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The private
respondents filed with the Office of the President a complaint
charging Governor Eduardo Joson with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. Allegedly, Joson belligerently barged into
the Hall and angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall
and uttered threatening words at private respondents during
a scheduled session. Private respondents claim that this
incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 million from the PNB. Joson’s acts were
intended to harass them into approving this loan, which
private respondents opposed the loan because the province
had an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million
incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Private respondents prayed for the suspension
or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the
provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of the
proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the
province,
Joson failed to file his answer despite numerous grant of
extension. Thus, DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez
issued an order declaring Joson in default. Later, Joson, thru
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the letter
complaint was not verified and that the DILG has no
jurisdiction over the case and has no authority to require him
to answer the complaint. Executive Secretary Torres issued
an order placing Joson under preventive suspension for 60
days pending investigation of the charges against him. Also,
the Motion to Dismiss was denied. Secretary Barbers
directed the PNP to assist the implementation of the order of
preventive suspension. Also, Vice Governor Oscar Tinio was
appointed as Acting Governor.
Joson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
challenging the preventive suspension and default order. The
CA dismissed the case. Joson claimed that there was nothing
in his conduct that threatened the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the
employees. He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was
always accompanied by his official security escorts
whenever he reported for work. He also alleged that the
joint affidavit of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez
was false. Escombien was purportedly not inside the session
hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and
could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall.
Issue: WON the filing of a letter complaint before the
Office of the President was proper
Held: Yes
Ratio: Administrative disciplinary proceedings against
elective local officials are governed by the Local Government
Code of 1991.In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, the
Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in
a suppletory character.
Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the LGC
enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official
may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office. When
an elective local official commits an act that falls under the
grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaint
against him must be verified and filed under Section 61.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
In the instant case, Joson is an elective official of the
province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him
was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.
According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed
to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code.
He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private
respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of
the two witnesses named therein; that private respondents
later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while the complaint was
still pending with the Office of the President.
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The
absence of the document, page or book number of the
notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to
prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may
constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing
officer in complying with the requirements for notarization
and proper verification. They may give grounds for the
revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or
intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the
Office of the President.
Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the
affidavit of Solita Santos. Santos was one of the signatories
to the letter-complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she
be dropped as one of the complainants since she had just
joined the political party of Joson. She decided to reveal the
intercalation because she was disillusioned with the "dirty
tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner
Joson. Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiased
witness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit
suspect.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was
unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the
defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was
deemed waived by the President himself when he acted on
the complaint. Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional
requisite. Verification is mainly intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations therein made are done in
good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation.
The lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court
may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or
act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served.
Issue: WON the DILG has jurisdiction over the case
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the
Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act by
himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The
Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive
Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary
cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments. The
power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of
an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their
duties, the official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The
President's power of general supervision means no more
than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed,
or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
111 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in
his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has
the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by
the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,
contrary to Joson's claim. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate
administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle
or the doctrine of qualified political agency. This doctrine is
corollary to the control power of the President. Control is
said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As
head of the Executive Department, the President, however,
may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members
except when he is required by the Constitution to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in
behalf of the President in certain matters because the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a
department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary
usurped the power of the President when he required
petitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-
complaint was filed with the Office of the President but it was
the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not
comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should
have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter,
the complaint and the answer should have been referred to
the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that
as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the
answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make
a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found
the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its
further investigation. The judgment of the President on the
matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue: WON Joson was properly placed under preventive
suspension
Held: Yes
Ratio: In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file
answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to the
Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under
Section 63 of the LGC. Preventive suspension may be
imposed at any time after the issues are joined, that is, after
respondent has answered the complaint, when the evidence
of guilt is strong and, given the gravity of the offense, there
is a great possibility that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several
opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his right
to present evidence in his behalf. The requisite of joinder of
issues is squarely met with respondent's waiver of right to
submit his answer. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men constitutes
grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief
executive of the province is in a position to influence the
witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational
politics in the province dictates that extreme precautionary
measures be taken.'
Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for
the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied
with. Petitioner's failure to file his answer despite several
opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his
right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined.
The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of
petitioner Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance
in office during the pendency of the case could influence the
witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
evidence against him.
Issue: WON the Resolution finding Joson guilty and
imposing on him the penalty of suspension from office for six
months without pay was proper
Held:
Ratio: Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. To be heard does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process. Thus, when
respondent failed to submit his position paper as directed
and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he was
not denied of his right of procedural process.
The denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation is erroneous. Petitioner's right to a formal
investigation is spelled out in the following provisions of A.O.
No. 23. The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner
submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the
truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall
of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the
private respondents who were opposed to any move for the
province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his
Order of October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez admitted
petitioner's Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as a position
paper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to
Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner reiterated this
motion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion was denied
on November 11, 1997. Secretary Barbers found petitioner
guilty as charged on the basis of the parties' position papers.
On January 8, 1998, Executive Secretary Torres adopted
Secretary Barbers' findings and recommendations and
imposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay.
The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation
denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23
provides that at the preliminary conference, the
Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider
whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision
does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion
for formal investigation. As respondent, he is accorded
several rights under the law.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the
constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are
essentially part of procedural due process. The local elective
official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to
112 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the
Rules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner's
right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the
complaint against him was decided on the basis of position
papers. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23
that provide that administrative cases against elective local
officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.
No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require
the parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is
only after formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does
not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a
hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact
which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each
other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the
examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Position
papers are often-times prepared with the assistance of
lawyers and their artful preparation can make the discovery
of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its
order denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation
applies to appointive officials and employees.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
government officials are not exactly similar to those against
appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to
elective local officials are separate and distinct from
appointive government officers and employees. This can be
gleaned from the LGC itself.
In the LGC, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted
to elective officials. It provides for their qualifications and
election, vacancies and succession, local legislation,
disciplinary actions, and recall. Appointive officers and
employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code
entitled "Human Resources and Development." All matters
pertinent to human resources and development in local
government units are regulated by "the civil service law and
such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated
thereto, unless otherwise provided in the Code." The
"investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints
against appointive local officials and employees as well as
their suspension and removal" are "in accordance with the
civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws," the
results of which "shall be reported to the Civil Service
Commission."
It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on
the Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive officials
and employees. Their qualifications are set forth in the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code. The
grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V are
much more in number and are specific than those
enumerated in the Local Government Code against elective
local officials. The disciplining authority in such actions is the
Civil Service Commission although the Secretaries and heads
of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities are also given the power to investigate and
decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. When a complaint is filed and the
respondent answers, he must "indicate whether or not he
elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory." If the officer or employee elects a formal
investigation, the direct evidence for the complainant and
the respondent "consist[s] of the sworn statement and
documents submitted in support of the complaint and
answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the
presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary x x x,
upon which the cross-examination by respondent and the
complainant, respectively, is based." The investigation is
conducted without adhering to the technical rules applicable
in judicial proceedings." Moreover, the appointive official or
employee may be removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the
charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2)
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
when the respondent is a recidivist; and (3) when the
respondent is notoriously undesirable.
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials are markedly different from appointive
officials. The rules on the removal and suspension of
elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of
requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective
official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the
community that elected him. The official has a definite term
of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration.
Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and
shortens this term of office. When an elective official is
suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the
services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of
suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the
elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are
thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his
rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their
imposition.
Conducto v. Monzon (1998)
Facts: Complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Benjamin Maghirang,
the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City,
for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and violation of
law as Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian
Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary in violation
of Section 394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainant
filed a complaint for violation of Article 244 RPC with the
Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was,
however, dismissed on the ground that Maghirang’s sister-in-
law was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC, which
prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as
barangay secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Complainant obtained an Opinion from Dir. Jacob Montesa of
the DILG declaring the appointment of Maghirang void. The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the case but
ordered Maghirang to replace his sister in law as barangay
secretary. Later, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
granted the MR and ordered the filing of an information for
unlawful appointment against Maghirang.
With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman,
the City Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a
motion for the suspension of Maghirang pursuant to Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019. The judge denied the motion and ruled
that since Maghirang was reelected as barangay chairman,
the offenses committed during the previous term are not
causes for removal.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended
that the judge liable for ignorance of the law and that he be
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The OCA said that it is well settled in Section 13 of RA 3019
that the court suspends any public officer against whom a
valid information was filed against him.
Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law
Held: Yes
Ratio: All things considered, while concededly, respondent
Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying
complainant’s Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman
Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to indicate
that he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may,
it would also do well to note that good faith and lack of
malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from
liability.
113 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court
Administrator are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact
that despite his claim that he has been “continuously
keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development
(sic) in law” ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in
1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that
as early as 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez this Court explicitly
ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only
the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by
him during his previous term of office, thus:
The ruling, therefore, that -- “when the people have elected
a man to his office it must be assumed that they did this
with knowledge of his life and character and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had
been guilty of any” -- refers only to an action for removal
from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a
crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than
mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public
officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only
to a person or group of persons but to the State as a whole.
This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code, which enumerates the grounds for extinction of
criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one
of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned.
Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may
grant the pardon of a criminal offense.
There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The
basis of the investigation which has been commenced here,
and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation
the object of which is to cause the indictment and
punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen;
whereas in the cases cited, the subject of the investigation
was an administrative charge against the officers therein
involved and its object was merely to cause his suspension
or removal from public office. While the criminal cases
involves the character of the mayor as a private citizen and
the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to
the case, an administrative case involves only his actuations
as a public officer as (they) affect the populace of the
municipality where he serves.
Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor,
et al.,[20) this Court likewise categorically declared that
criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official
during his previous term of office were not extinguished by
his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and
Lizares v. Hechanova referred only to administrative
liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective
official.
Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term is separate
from other terms and that the reelection to office operates
as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is
misplaced. The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear
that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative
liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to
criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco v. Sanchez the
Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new
term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability
incurred by him in a previous term.
Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against
the State and the body politic. The small segment of the
national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the
municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a crime
against the public justice of the State and the entire body
politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer
prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-
Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of
conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code declares that such
penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation
of the public offices and employments which the offender
may have held, even if conferred by popular election."
It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault
or misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his
reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply
only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As
succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate
Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to
hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability
would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal
culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was
lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and
caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his
constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official
by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated
against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of
justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the
very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and
uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon
which our government is based, which is one of laws and not
of men."
While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of
this Court is a commendable virtue of judges -- and, of
course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisions
is a different matter, for it is in that area where one’s
competence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus,
it has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and
authoritative doctrines.[23) He should strive for excellence,
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be
the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. Needless
to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the
desired level of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple
issue.
Pablico v. Villapando (2002)
Facts: Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez
(members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente,
Palawan) filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan an administrative complaint against Mayor
Alejandro A. Villapando for abuse of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution. Villapando allegedly entered
into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape (defeated
mayoralty candidate) which amounted to an appointment to
a government position within the prohibited one year period
under the Constitution. Villapando claimed that he did not
appoint Tiape, but he merely hired him and a consultant
does not constitute an appointment to a government office
or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent
guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President
affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Villapando filed a certiorari and prohibition before the CA
seeking to annul the decision of the Office of the President.
The CA declared void the decision of the OP and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Issue: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the
President, on appeal, can validly impose the penalty of
dismissal from service on erring elective local officials
Held: No
Ratio: The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides:
114 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective
local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from
office on any of the following grounds:
An elective local official may be removed from office
on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the provision that the
penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective
local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in
Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al we held that "[t]he Office
of the President is without any power to remove elected
officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper
courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the
aforequoted Section 60."
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, however, adds
that "(b) An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this
Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local
Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court
or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other." The
disciplining authority referred to pertains to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office
of the President. As held in Salalima, this grant to the
"disciplining authority" of the power to remove elective local
officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule
or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of
law, such as the LGC. Implementing rules should conform,
not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation
which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the
statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991,
expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX
of the implementing rules.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring
elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with
the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to
remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for
being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public
official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of
their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be
put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove. As explained by the Court in
Lacson v. Roque:
"the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an
elective mayor is not without its own justification, and was,
we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils
resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or remove
must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to
the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an
unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove."
Removal only by courts
Sangguaning Barangay of Don Mariano v. Punong
Barangay Martines (2008)
Facts: Severino Martinez was administratively charged
with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner
through the filing of a verified complaint before the
Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining authority over
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA
7160. The complaint was later amended for Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner alleged that Martinez
committed the following acts:
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay
Treasurer the income of their solid waste management
project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived
from composting.
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the
sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like
hauling sand and gravel for private persons without
monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from
this source appears in the year end report even if payments
were collected x x x.
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline,
lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck
instead of using the money or income of said truck from the
garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste
Management Project. x x x.
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-
Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by
the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not
attend said seminar because on the dates when he was
supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x
x x.
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during
sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to
discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.
For failure to file an Answer, Martinez was declared in default
and was placed under preventive suspension for 60 days.
Thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision
which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from
office. The decision was conveyed to the mayor of
Bayombong, Nueva Ecija. The mayor, however, issued a
Memo wherein he stated that the Sangguniang Bayan has no
power to order Martinez’ removal from office. However, the
decision remains valid until reversed. Martinez then filed a
special civil action for certiorari before the RTC. The court
declared the decision void and maintained that the proper
courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an
elective official from office.
Issue: WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, an
elective local official, from office.
Held: No
Ratio: Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred
upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials
from office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the
Local Government Code,[16] the legislative intent to confine
to the courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the
appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the
removal of elective local officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically
ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the
last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated
Article 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since
the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its
authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the
power to remove elective officials, a power which the law
itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that
under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the
power to remove Martinez.
Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving
elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and
decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
115 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of
removal from office. It further claims that the courts are
merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a
penalty of removal is warranted.
The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner
would run counter to the rationale for making the removal of
elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico
v. Villapando, the court declared that:The law on suspension
or removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in whom such
power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it
with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an
ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through
the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will
must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of
the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to
remove an elective local official from office is intended as a
check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with
the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive
may be removed from office, and only relegating to the
courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would
still not free the resolution of the case from the
capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority.
Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear
intent of the law.
Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts
to nothing more than an implementing arm of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would
be an unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of
powers, thus placing the courts under the orders of the
legislative bodies of local governments. The courts would be
stripped of their power of review, and their discretion in
imposing the extreme penalty of removal from office is thus
left to be exercised by political factions which stand to
benefit from the removal from office of the local elective
official concerned, the very evil which Congress sought to
avoid when it enacted Section 60 of the Local Government
Code.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code
provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative
case against an erring elective barangay official before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot
order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power
under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the
acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed with the
regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it
retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less
than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand,
the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective
barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal
of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve
that the proper charges be filed in court.
Petitioner alleged that an interpretation which gives the
judiciary the power to remove local elective officials violates
the doctrine of separation of powers. This allegation runs
contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as well as
jurisprudence.The doctrine of separation of powers is not
absolute in its application; rather, it should be applied in
accordance with the principle of checks and balances. The
removal from office of elective officials must not be tainted
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting
public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more
impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local
government units are not deprived of the right to discipline
local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from
imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.
Petitioner questions the Decision of the trial court for
allowing the petition filed before it as an exception to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If, indeed,
the Sangguniang Bayan had no power to remove Martinez
from office, then Martinez should have sought recourse from
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This Court upholds the ruling
of the trial court. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, which is based on sound public
policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are
instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official
inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4)
where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised
is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7)
where its application may cause great and irreparable
damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process;
9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong
public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto
proceedings.
As a general rule, no recourse to courts can be had until all
administrative remedies have been exhausted. However,
this rule is not applicable where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are
essentially judicial. In this case, it is apparent that the
Sangguniang Bayan acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order dated 28 July 2005 removing
Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and,
therefore, Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of
an administrative appeal in order to annul the said Order of
the Sangguniang Bayan.[24] Thus, his direct recourse to
regular courts of justice was justified.
Disciplinary actions over Local Appointive Officials
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission (1991)
Facts: The Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City
Vicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint against
the petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon City
Office of the City Attorney, for Gross Misconduct and
Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of TCT
209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for having
pocketed it.
After three months of investigation, Quezon City Mayor
Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.
Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board
which reversed the decision and ruled that Mendez is guilty
as charged and therefore dismissed from service. The CSC
affirmed on appeal.
Issue: WON the exoneration made by the mayor is
unappealable
Held: Yes
Ratio: The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
assailing the reversal of the city mayor's decision by the
116 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
MSPB and the CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an
aggrieved party or "party adversely affected by the decision"
allowed by law to file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner
claimed that his exoneration by the city mayor is
unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D.
807.
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provision of law.
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The
Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges. The phrase "party
adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for
the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed
the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party
because he is not the respondent in the administrative case
below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the
city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to
enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like
suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary
equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be
availed of only in a case where the respondent is found
guilty of the charges filed against him. But when the
respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case,
there is no occasion for appeal.
Macalingag and Carlos v. Chang (1992)
Facts: Lorinda Carlos signed a formal administrative
charge approved by Victor Macalincag accusing Robert
Chang of dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. They are for: (a) disbursing
the amount of P30,000 to Ms. Marisa Chan during the local
elections, (b) disbursing certain funds allegedly as financial
assistance to bereaved families, (c) disbursing funds for
merienda of the employees, (d) incurring overdrafts, (e)
transferring certain amounts from the treasurer’s safe to the
realty tax division’s safe, and (f) remitting to the Bureau of
Treasury the national collection.
Macalincag issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against
Chang. Chang filed a petition for prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC against Macalinlag and
Carlos. The judge sustained the power of the Secretary of
Finance to issue the Order of Preventive Suspension. Upon
MR, the court set aside its decision and ordered the
petitioners to cease and desist from enforcing the order of
preventive suspension.
Issue: WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to
issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against the acting
municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Chang contends that a government officer is not
suspended until someone has assumed the post and the
officer subject of the suspension order has ceased
performing his official function; that the implementation of
the questioned suspension order was overtaken by the
issuance of EO 392 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and that the power to discipline is vested solely on
the person who has the power to appoint.
It is very apparent from the records that Chang was
administratively charged on October 6, 1989 for dishonesty,
neglect of duty and acts Prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It was signed by Carlos, Executive Director, Bureau
of Local Government and approved by Macalincag,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Undersecretary of Finance, then acting Secretary.
Simultaneous with the charge, Chang was preventively
suspended which caused him to file a complaint for
Prohibition with preliminary injunction in the lower court. The
lower court pointed out that in order that a preventive
suspension will be implemented, there are two steps
involved, viz: 1) service of a copy of said order on the
respondent and 2) designation of his replacement. The trial
court ruled that until an acting municipal treasurer is
appointed to replace the respondent, the order of preventive
suspension dated October 6, 1989 is incomplete and cannot
be said to have taken effect. This ruling of the trial court is
untenable.
Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or
the Civil Service Law. It will be noted that under the law,
designation of the replacement is not a requirement to give
effect to the preventive suspension. On the contrary, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, provides in Section 156, Article 5,
Chapter 3, Title II thereof for the automatic assumption of
the assistant municipal treasurer or next in rank officer in
case of suspension of the municipal treasurer.
Accordingly, there appears to be no question that: the Order
of Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang became
effective upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when
he filed a complaint in the trial court preventing the
implementation of such Order of Suspension. Otherwise
stated, the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace
Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's
suspension. A contrary view would render nugatory the very
purpose of preventive suspension.
Among others, Chang argued that EO 392 gave rise to the
creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA) and
vested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines the
power to appoint municipal treasurers in Metro Manila. As
the power to suspend and remove a municipal official is an
incident of the power to appoint, he maintained that it is the
President who may suspend or remove him. Earlier, prior to
EO 392, the power to appoint the aforesaid public officials
was vested in the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors of the
Municipalities concerned, under PD 477 and later transferred
to the Commissioner of Finance under PD 921, but under
both decrees, the power of appointment was made subject
to Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of
Finance. Verily, the intention of the aforesaid legislations to
follow the Civil Service Laws, Rules and Regulations is
unmistakable. Correspondingly, the power to discipline is
specifically vested under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and
chartered cities who have original jurisdiction to investigate
and decide on matters involving disciplinary action. Stated
differently, they are the proper disciplining authority referred
to in Sec. 41 of the same law.
The Office of the Municipal Treasurer is unquestionably under
the Department of Finance as provided for in Sec. 3, P.D. No.
477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper
disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension
order. More specifically acting Secretary of Finance,
Macalincag, acted within his jurisdiction in issuing the order.
By and large, even assuming that the power to appoint,
includes the power to discipline as argued by Chang, acting
Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego
of the President and therefore, it is within his authority, as an
alter ego, to preventively suspend Chang.
Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan (2002)
Facts: Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City
Treasurer’s Office, Dagupan City. He was ordered suspended
by City Treasurer Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding
of his salary because of the Formal Charge filed against him.
However, Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did
not honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted
117 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
as the complainant and that there was no complaint against
him from the Office of the City Mayor.
Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed
that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his
performance for several semesters, which is the reason why
he was formally charged. Garcia was preventively
suspended for ninety days since the charge is a major
offense. An investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed to
appear and testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena.
So, Pajaro proceeded with an ex parte investigation. The
Bureau of Local Government Finance favorably approved the
suspension. This was affirmed by the Regional Director. “
Affirming the RTC Decision, the CA held that private
respondent was vested with legal power and authority to
institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and
employees.
The appellate court further held that the requisites of
administrative due process had been fully observed by
Pajaro while investigating petitioner. But despite being
informed of the charges against him and being given the
opportunity to be heard in a formal investigation, petitioner
chose not to answer those charges.
Issue: WON the City Treasurer has disciplinary powers over
the petitioner
Ratio: At the outset, it should be pointed out that under
the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive
officers and employees of local government units are
covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations
and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto,
unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and
the adjudication of administrative complaints against
appointive local officials and employees, as well as their
suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the
Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on
the civil service -- is the primary law governing appointive
officials and employees in the government. They may be
removed or dismissed summarily “(1) [w]hen the charge is
serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the
respondent is a recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the
respondent is notoriously undesirable.” Technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due process
in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with
that in the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47
of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the
other hand, the power to commence administrative
proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is
granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a
department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head
of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the
regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio,
disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85,
which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27,
1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the
regional director, and head of a local treasury or an
assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action
against officers or employees subordinate to them.
In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining
authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The term “agency” refers to any of the various units
of the government including a department, a bureau, an
office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the
Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer
is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate
petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against
him.
Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may
discipline him is not persuasive. Section 455 (b-1-x) of the
1991 Local Government Code states that the city mayor
“may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial
proceedings against any official or employee of the city.”
This rule is not incongruent with the provisions of the 1987
Administrative Code, which authorizes the heads of agencies
to discipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old Local
Government Code does not vest in city mayors the sole
power to discipline and to institute criminal or administrative
actions against any officers or employees under their
jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under the present
Local Government Code expressly rescinding the authority of
the Department of Finance to exercise disciplinary authority
over its employees. By the same token, there is nothing that
prohibits the city treasurer from filing a complaint against
petitioner.
As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate. In the present case, Pajaro was
authorized to issue the assailed Preventive Suspension Order
against petitioner, because the latter was charged with gross
neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties and
functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the
issuance of such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the
1987 Administrative Code. Clearly, the city treasurer acted
within the scope of his power when he commenced the
investigation and issued the assailed Order.
Issue: WON Garcia was denied due process
Held: No
Ratio: In an administrative proceeding, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side.
Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely
by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and
perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably --
through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the
opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action
or a ruling.
In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in the
1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First,
petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal
charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval
of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 1990
letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance
regional director, who approved the Order in the First
Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated
July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify
during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he
admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was
conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance
affirmed Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1, 1991
Decision,.
We need only to reiterate that parties who choose not to
avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges
against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.
Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite
due notice, was at his own peril. He therefore cannot validly
claim that his right to due process was violated.
As to petitioner’s claim for damages, the extant rule is that a
public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of
118 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice or gross negligence. There was no such showing in
the present case.
RECALL
Rivera v. COMELEC (2007), supra.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above,
Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive
terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998
election was declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte in its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by this
Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full
term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him.
Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also
apply to respondent Morales who is similarly situated.
Here, Morales invoked not only Lonzanida v. COMELEC, but
also Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections which is likewise
inapplicable. In Borja, the Court held that Capco’s
assumption of the office of mayor upon the death of the
incumbent may not be regarded as a “term” under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code). He held the position
from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992, a period of less
than three years. Moreover, he was not elected to that
position.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court ruled that
assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the
remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of
R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code). As the Court
observed, there was a “break” in the service of private
respondent Ramon T. Talanga as mayor. He was a “private
citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall
elections.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as
mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire
period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him
(respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v.
Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term. Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit.
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has
been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break
since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007,
he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution
specifically included an exception to the people’s
freedom to choose those who will govern them in
order to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the
position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive
term as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be
possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen
consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
This is the very situation in the instant case. Morales
maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001)
only as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official serves in the same
position for three consecutive terms. Whether as
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
“caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the powers
and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him
“to stay on indefinitely”. Morales should be promptly ousted
from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate
of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be
cancelled. In the light of the foregoing, Morales can not be
considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being
a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE
COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.
Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from continuing
to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant petition for quo
warranto has become moot.
Evardone v. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar,
having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. He assumed office immediately after
proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E.
Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of
Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar,
Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution
approving the the recommendation of Election Registrar
Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall
against Evardone. Evardone filed a petition for prohibition
with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the
Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of
the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the
COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and
BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in
favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was,
during the period material to this case, no local government
code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of
recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends
that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and
that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does
not refer only to a local government code which is in
futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines
which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of
the present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory
law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express
provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed
or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10
October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided
in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and
therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is
still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We
therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the the
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall
and set the date for the signing of said petition.
Issue: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered
nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held
pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
119 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone
knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21
February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt;
yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining the
outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it was only on
or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the
Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition
for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for
prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a
TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall
took place just the same on the scheduled date through no
fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was
undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat
and its Election Registrar in good faith and without
knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As
attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the
6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about
34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs.
Executive Secretary there is no turning back the clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on
the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and
elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated
upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public
interests and that the representatives of the people holding
public offices are simply agents or servants of the people
with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to
follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices.
Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in
the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss
of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of
their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office
previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The
constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall
Evardone has already been ascertained and must be
afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held
last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of
said municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of
the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The
Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local
election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as
provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of
May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately
seven (7) months before the regular local election will be
violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local
Government Code
Garcia v. COMELEC (1993)
Facts: Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the
province of Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of
Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los
Reyes, and the mayor of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila
Payumo, were chosen as Presiding Officer and Secretary of
the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of
Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque, was recognized and he
moved that a resolution be passed for the recall of the
petitioner on the ground of "loss of confidence." The motion
was "unanimously seconded."
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to deny due
course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the
requirements under the LGC. The comelec dismissed the
petition and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
ground that section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through
the initiative of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide whether
or not to initiate proceedings, and (2) it violated the right of
elected local public officials belonging to the political
minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the
proceedings followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I
suffered from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was
the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-
five (65) members of the assembly.
Issue: WON all the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly were notified of its meeting
Held: Yes
Ratio: The failure to give notice to all members of the
assembly, especially to the members known to be political
allies of Garcia was admitted by both counsels of the
respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to
agree with the resolution of recall were notified as a matter
of political strategy and security. They justified these
selective notices on the ground that the law does not
specifically mandate the giving of notice. We reject this
submission of the respondents. The due process clause of
the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is
inviolable and should always be considered as part and
parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice
to all the members of the assembly is also imperative for
these members represent the different sectors of the
electorate of Bataan. To the extent that they are not notified
of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the
sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The
resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the
members of the assembly but the majority will can be
genuinely determined only after all the members of the
assembly have been given a fair opportunity to express the
will of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement
of notice is indispensable in determining the collective
wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly.
Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to
recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of
Bataan.
Issue: WON the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory
recall assembly to initiate the process of recall is
unconstitutional
Held: No
Ratio: A reading of the legislative history of these recall
provisions will reveal that the idea of empowering a
preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office
of local elective officials, originated from the House of
Representatives and not the Senate. The legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of
initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b)
to cut down on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the
undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by
direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the
City of Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to
recall the city mayor failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo
Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct
action of the people was too cumbersome, too expensive
and almost impossible to implement. Consequently, our
legislators added in the a second mode of initiating the recall
of local officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. They
brushed aside the argument that this second mode may
cause instability in the local government units due to its
imagined ease.
120 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the
Constitution that will sustain this submission. To be sure,
there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely
suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The
mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is
for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress
was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power
given was to select which among the means and methods of
initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the
judgment of the electorate. Congress was not
straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating
recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is that
the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise
to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by
the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but
even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
Petitioners also positive thesis that in passing Resolution 1,
the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate
the process of recall but had de facto recalled Garcia from
office, a power reserved to the people alone. Again, the
contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners
have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of
recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that
initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a
misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by
the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for
the people to act through their elected representatives.
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our
Constitution is delegated by the people to their
representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional
convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The
initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no
rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised
by the elected representatives of the people. More far out is
petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall
itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of
recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but
is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a
PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC
for validation will not recall its subject official. Likewise, a
PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the
election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever.
The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official
concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he
can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office.
Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the
official concerned remains in office but his right to continue
in office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of
the Local Government Code which states that "the recall of
an elective local official shall be effective only upon the
election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during
the election on recall."
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Issue: WON petitioners were denied equal protection of
the laws
Held: No
Ratio: Petitioners' argument does not really assail the law
but its possible abuse by the members of the PRAC while
exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More
specifically, the fear is expressed that the members of the
PRAC may inject political color in their decision as they may
initiate recall proceedings only against their political
opponents especially those belonging to the minority. A
careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show
that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally
elected officials belonging to the political minority. First to be
considered is the politically neutral composition of the
preparatory recall assembly, all mayors, vice-mayors and
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component
cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly
at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to
political parties. No significance is given to the political
affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall
assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected
officials in the province concerned. Considering their
number, the greater probability is that no one political party
can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides
that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official
is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC
are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties
but as representatives of the people. By necessary
implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere
differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence
of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and
nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as
crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local
officials belonging to the minority.
The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be
dominated by a political party and that it may use its power
to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political
persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is
not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To
be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can
be no escape from the reality that all powers are susceptible
of abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however,
infirm per se the grant of power to an individual or entity. To
deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee
is to render government powerless and no people need an
impotent government. There is no democratic government
that can operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its
officials, especially those elected by the people themselves.
On the contrary, all our laws assume that officials, whether
appointed or elected, will act in good faith and will perform
the duties of their office. Such presumption follows the
solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to
faithfully execute all our laws.
There is only one ground for the recall of local government
officials: loss of confidence. This means that the people may
petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may resolve to
recall any local elective officials without specifying any
particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need
for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption
against the local elective officials who are the subject of any
recall petition.
Petitioners also contend that the resolution of the members
of the preparatory recall assembly subverted the will of the
electorate of the province of Bataan who elected Garcia with
a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds
from the erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is
the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the
resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of
Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The
121 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate
of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is
premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the
electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of
Bataan may or may not recall petitioner Garcia in an
appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects Garcia, then
the proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall
assembly is rejected. On the other hand, if the electorate
does not re-elect Garcia, then he has lost the confidence of
the people which he once enjoyed. The judgment will write
finis to the political controversy. For more than judgments of
courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is
final for "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them."
In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the
sovereignty of the people, particularly their direct right to
initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall
elections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be a
return to the previous system of recall elections which
Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of
initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall
assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to
remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people
of their sovereign power to check the performance of their
elected officials. The power to determine this mode was
specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the
Constitution.
Quaison, Concurring: The intent is clear that the 1987
Constitution leaves it to Congress to provide the recall
mechanism without any pre-ordained restrictions. The broad
powers of Congress in pescribing the procedure for recall
include the determination as to the number of electors
needed to initiate the recall, the method of voting of the
electors, the time and place of the voting and whether the
process includes the election of the successor of the recalled
official. In the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
Congress adopted an alternative procedure for initiating the
recall and made it as a mere stage of the recall process.
Congress also deigned it wise to give the electorate a
chance to participate in the exercise twice: first, in the
initiation of the recall; and secondly, in the election of the
person to occupy the office subject of the recall. This is in
contrast with the first recall statute in the Philippines, the
Festin Law (Com. Act No. 560) where the participation of the
electorate were denied the opportunity to vote for the
retention of the official subject of the recall.
In a sense, the members of the PRA can be considered as
constituting a segment of the electorate because they are all
registered voters of the province. If they constitute less than
one per cent of the voters in the province, that miniscule
number goes to the policy, not the validity of the law and the
remedy to correct such a flaw is left with t he legislature, not
with the judiciary.
Vitug, Concurring: It may not be amiss, however, to
caution against any idea of omnipotence in wielding the
"power of recall" conferred to the "Preparatory Recall
Assembly." Clearly implicit in any grant of power, like any
other right, is an assumption of a correlative duty to exercise
it responsibly. When it, therefore, becomes all too evident
that there has been an abuse of that authority, appropriate
judicial recourse to, and corrective relief by, this Court will
not be denied.
Davide Jr, Dissenting: In both B.P. Blg. 337 and the Local
Government Code of 1991, our Legislature fixed it at 25% of
the total number of registered voters in the local
government unit concerned during the election in which the
local official sought to be recalled was elected. It follows
then that said power cannot be shared with any other group
of persons or officials. The reason why the initiation phase
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
can and must be done only by the electorate is not difficult
to understand. If it can also be done by another body, such
as the PRA in this case, the exclusiveness or indivisibility of
the power is necessarily impaired or negated. In such a case,
the electorate is by passed and the resulting recall petition
or resolution can by no means be an authentic, free, and
voluntary act of the electorate, which characteristics are
indicia of the exercise of a power. The power to initiate,
being a component of the power or recall, necessarily
includes the power not to initiate. The power to initiate
becomes meaningless if another body is authorized to do it
for the electorate. Worse, since the second component of the
power of recall, i.e., the recall election, does not come into
play without the recall petition, it follows that where the
petition is not done through the initiative of the electorate
because the latter chooses not to exercise its power to recall
or finds no reason therefor, that election becomes, as to the
electorate would in effect be compelled to participate in a
political exercise it neither called for nor decided to have.
Hence, the fullness of the power of recall precludes the
delegation of the corresponding authority to initiate it to any
entity other than the electorate, especially where the
delegation unduly infringes upon and impairs such power as
in this case.
I might add that since Congress decided to retain the 25%
requirement for the traditional method of initiating recall
which is the method in full accord and perfect harmony with
the true essence of recall the provision for an alternative
method, i.e., recall resolution by a mere majority of the PRA,
is subtly designed to negate, if not altogether defeat, the
power of the electorate and to substitute the will of a very
small group for the will of the electorate.
Paras v. COMELEC (1997)
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay
of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
The Coelec scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. At
least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
above the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
petition for injunction. After conducting a summary hearing,
the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain
why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was
without COMELEC approval.
The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, hence
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction.
Issue: WON the recall election to be held on January 13,
1996 is barred by the SK election to be held on May 1996.
Ratio: Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point.
Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is
now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was
set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May
1996, and every three years thereafter.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall election once during his term of office.
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may
be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year
of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
122 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision
of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal
of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of
his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808
to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local
election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no
recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the LGC.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a
statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the
Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal
working of the local government unit necessitating additional
expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official
concerned. The electorate could choose the official's
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer
tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall
election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible
because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the
Code considering that the next regular election involving the
barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away,
the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
Davide, Concurring: I wish to add another reason as to
why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular local
election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The term "regular local election"
must be confined to the regular election of elective local
officials, as distinguished from the regular election of
national officials. The elective national officials are the
President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The
elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-
Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities
and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of
provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and
members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective
regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed
recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
which provides:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer
to an election participated in by those who possess the right
of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who
are registered voters. One of the requirements for the
exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of
age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration
prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging
from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991).
Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote
in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular
election (whether national or local).
Malonzo v. COMELEC (1997)
Facts: Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor, winning over
former Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his
term, 1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members and SK chairmen, constituting a majority of the
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of
Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for
the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No.
01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and
calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
The Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in order.
Mayor Malonzo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
TRO assailing the Comelec’s resolution. The Petition, in the
main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution and
proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the
service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the
issuance of the questioned Resolution.
Issue: WON notices were properly sent to the members of
the PRA
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Commission regards the sending of notice one
thing, and the completion of service thereof another, for
indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied,
if there was not only service, but also completion of service
thereof. Thus, we were obliged to inquire more closely into
the records and we found. Personal services were
acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the addressee
himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse,
nearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion in the
member 's residence or office. Service by registered mail
was evinced by the return card duly signed by the addressee
or by persons acting for him. There were instances when
notices were served but were refused, this fact noted in the
acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses.
The circumstances being thus, we hold that there was
complete service of the notices as contemplated in Section
8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga
Barangay who sent the notices is of no moment. We had
earlier determined that as member of the PRA, he can legally
exercise the prerogatives attached to his membership in the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the other
members of its scheduled convening. It is evident from the
foregoing and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the
requirements of notice had been fully complied with.
Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent
to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error the Court should
not disturb the same.
Issue: WON the proceedings held by the PRA are valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall
proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng
mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that
"respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not
123 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The
barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay
captains as provided under Section 492 LGC. It also provides
that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the
absence of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga
Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the
personalities representing the barangays in the Liga are the
very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the
majority of whom met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of
the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after
deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the
existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang
Barangay members convened and voted as members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan, and not as
members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall
proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this
ground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings
held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As the
COMELEC pertinently observes: The Minutes of the session of
the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a session
held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the members of
the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on establish.
Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated.
Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was
that of petitioner's recall. The members were given the
opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the matter.
More importantly, their sentiments were expressed through
their votes signified by their signatures and thumbmarks
affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by Petitioner
to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing
thereon represented a cause other than that of adopting the
resolution.
The charges of graft and corruption, violence and
irregularities, before and during the session of the
preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and
cannot override the substantiated findings of the respondent
COMELEC.
Claudio v. COMELEC (2000)
Facts: Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay
City in the May 11, 1998. On May 19, 1999, several
barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the
purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula was
designated chair. The members of the PRA adopted
Resolution No. 01, S-1999, initiating Claudio’s recall. The
petition for recall was filed on the Office of the City Mayor.
The comelec also posted the petition on the bulletin boards
of certain public places. Oppositions to the petition were
filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L.
Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the
petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution
were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting;
(2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the
parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe
the proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place
within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case,
filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the
annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as
mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall
proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the
recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the
members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually
double entries, were not duly accredited members of the
barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had
withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction.
The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the
opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who attended
the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to
constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the
total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In
either case, since only a majority is required to constitute
the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of
the recall resolution. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the
Local Government Code Includes the Convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall
Resolution
Held: Yes
Ratio: We can agree that recall is a process which begins
with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the
gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered
voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the
verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the
date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on
the scheduled date.[5) However, as used in paragraph (b) of
§ 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official
or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in
support of this conclusion.
First, § 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is
in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand,
§69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on
the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
proceedings[6) but the power to elect an official into office,
the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the
entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in
paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the
convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall
filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the
number of times such processes may be resorted to. These
are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a
recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the
power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is
this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be
taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks
to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one
year from the date of assumption of office of an elective
local official.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b)
refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the
limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on
the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place
within one year from the date of assumption of office of the
official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place
within one year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable
basis for judging the performance of an "The only logical
reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to
wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to
prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a
newly elected official before having had sufficient time to
evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The
one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition
for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that case
expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed
against any officer or until he has actually held office for at
least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition
is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of
the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating
the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this
124 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year
period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be
held even before the end of the first year in office of a local
official.
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as
including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of
discussing the performance in office of elective local officials
would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech
and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be
asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and
formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold,
therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and
opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most
cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a
recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the
expression of confidence in the incumbent.
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the
recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to
initiate recall -
Because §74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which,
according to §69, is a power which shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit. Since the
voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is
clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited
within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is
to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective
local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the
election; and Because to construe the limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would
unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly
guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000,
more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor
of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that
date.
Issue: WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same
Paragraph (b) of §74 of the LGC includes the Election Period
for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such Election
Ratio: The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n) o recall
shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended
this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period
is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have
expressly said so.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the
period during which a recall election may be held. Actually,
because no recall election may be held until one year after
the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period
is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about
the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of
only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the
second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign
period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize
the right of recall which is designed to make local
government units" more responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and
campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless
otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period
commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election
and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow
petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would
emasculate even more a vital right of the people.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, §74 imposes
limitations on the holding of recall elections. First, paragraph
(a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once
during the term of office of an elective local official. Second,
paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within
one year from the date the official assumed office. And third,
paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within
one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As
succinctly stated in Paras v. COMELEC, "[p) aragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject to
recall election, that is, during the second year of office."
Issue: WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a
Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified
Held: Yes
Ratio: Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the
annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the
holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of
the signatures of the members of the PRA was not obtained
because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution.
According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on
pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance
and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is
shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top
of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being
raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before
the COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears at
the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by
mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines
drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the
attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd
to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the
recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting
twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages
94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of
which the pages in question are part. The other point raised
by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC
was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who
notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay
City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this
issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot,
therefore, be raised now.
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
Practice of Profession by Mayors, Governors and other
elective officials
Javellana v. DILG and Santos 212 SCRA 475
Facts: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City
Council or of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against
Javellana.Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing
authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department:
that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal
and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public
ridicule: that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several
criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of
the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38
125 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case
against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum
Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because
the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to
regulate the practice of law. The motion to dismiss was
denied.
A few months later, the LGC was enacted which provides:
"SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.
"(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
also members of the Bar shall not:
"(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case
wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
"(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office:
"(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and
"(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except
when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.”
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying
that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and
Section 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and null
and
Issue: WON the Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of
RA 7160 are unconstitutional
Held: No
Ratio: In the first place, complaints against public officers
and employees relating or incidental to the performance of
their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for
by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a
complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their
real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman.
Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, would
actually be a judgment against the City Government. By
serving as counsel for the complaining employees and
assisting them to prosecute their claims against City
Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum
Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to
prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid
conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public
duties and the private practice of their profession, in those
instances where the law allows it.
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides
that sanggunian members "may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply
particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions,
the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
affect, the area of public service.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
LOCAL BOARDS AND COUNCILS
Osea v. Malaya (2002)
Facts: Petitioner filed Protest Case with the Civil Service
Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-
in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur, by DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, upon
the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of
Camarines Sur. However, President Ramos appointed
respondent to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Respondent’s appointment
was made without prior consultation with the Provincial
School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that
respondent’s appointment be recalled and set aside for
being null and void.
The CSC dismissed the protest complaint and held that
Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991
contemplates a situation where the DECS issues the
appointments, whereas respondent’s appointment was made
by no less than the President, in the exercise of his
appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent
as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of
petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City
were in the nature of reassignments, in which case
consultation with the local school board was unnecessary.
Issue: WON Petitioner is entitled to the position of as
Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent
of Camarines Sur
Ratio: Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991
applies to appointments made by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports. This is because at the time of
the enactment of the Local Government Code, schools
division superintendents were appointed by the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports to specific division or
location. In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued
Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing the
positions of schools division superintendent and assistant
schools division superintendent within the career executive
service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to
career executive service positions was transferred from the
DECSto the President. The appointment may not be specific
as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees
to their particular stations was vested in the DECS Secretary,
pursuant to the exigencies of the service, as provided in
DECS Order No. 75, Series of 1996.
In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President
Ramos in favor of respondent to the Schools Division
Superintendent position on September 3, 1996 did not
specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a
Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and
designated respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and
petitioner to the Division of Iriga City.
We agree with the Civil Service Commission and the Court of
Appeals that, under the circumstances, the designation of
respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines
Sur was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook
of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she
previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-
Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly,
therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 of prior consultation with the local
school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointments
made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Such is the plain meaning of the said law. The “plain
meaning rule” or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
126 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An
appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
On the other hand, a reassignment is a movement of an
employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official.
Petitioner asserts a vested right to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, citing her
endorsement by the Provincial School Board. Her
qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential
ingredient, i.e., her appointment thereto. While she was
recommended by Secretary Gloria to President Ramos for
appointment to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was
not acted upon by the President. Petitioner’s designation as
Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent,
was expressly made subject to further advice from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Thus, her
designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to
recommend her to the President for appointment in a
permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position
only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned
to other positions without violating her right to security of
tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position
of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Barangay conciliation and mediation
Morata v. Go (1983)
Facts On August 5, 1982, Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed a
complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa
Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages
amounting to P49,400.00. On the basis of the allegation in
the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of
Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as
grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior
availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation
process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties.
The judge denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the
provision of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable
by the inferior courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the
law.
Issue: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure
to comply with PD 1508
Held: Yes
Ratio: Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:
SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in
Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the
Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
However, the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support pendente lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
Statute of Limitations
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The
Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister
may in the interest of justice determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and
6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably
all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in
the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no
distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil
disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level,
in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon
by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority
over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority,
Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should neither
add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary
precept in statutory construction that "where the law does
not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling
the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected
members of the barangay, the animosity generated by
protracted court litigations between members of the same
political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the
conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise
designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court
in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the
process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus,
to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases
exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight
of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-
defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action
for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from
bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the
jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the
mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed,
should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only
in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where
the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the
lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and
self-defeating legislation.
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon
the Lupon "the authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious
intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and
comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about
the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These
objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if the
127 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its
coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts,
then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the
following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is
situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically,
jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest
therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always
been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial
court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections
11, 12, and 14, of the law speak of the city and/or municipal
courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the
settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold
that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of
the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the
authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of
the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by
respondent judge, deal with the nullification or execution of
the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the
barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and
municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve
petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the
original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said
sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation
process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said
inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by
Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
regarding the implementation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. It is significant that the above-quoted
circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases
falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been
addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts,
but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance,
circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and
courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial
courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by
president Ferdinand E. Marcos in a Letter of Implementation,
dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which
reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of
cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all
government offices involved in the investigation, trial and
adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate
implementation be made by all government officials and
offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes
at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
Uy v. Contreras (1994)
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the decision of herein respondent
judge which denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss cases
filed for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss was
based on the failure of herein private respondents to comply
with the requirement on prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The court found the motion to be without
merit whereas the barangay conciliation proceedings
between the parties had started but nothing has been
achieved by the barangay. The trial court also stated that
the accused and her witnesses had already filed their
counter-affidavits and documents which implied waiver on
the part of the accused to claim her right to a reconciliation
proceedings before the barangay. Further, the court held
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
that the complainants may go directly to the court since
their complaint was about to prescribe or be barred by
statute of limitations.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when he denied the motion to dismiss for failure of the
private respondents to comply with the mandatory
requirement on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Court granted the petition. The filing of the
cases herein assailed was premature and the motion to
dismiss should have been granted. The trial court’s
contention that the action is about to prescribe was also
unmeritorious since upon the filing of the complaint to the
Lupon Tagapamayapa, the prescriptive period shall be
automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty
days. Furthermore, having brought the dispute before the
Lupon, the private respondents are estopped from
disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves
had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the
lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled
mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right
away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do
so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and
the respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The
petitioner further invoked the Section 18. None knew of the
repeal of the decree by the Local Government Code of 1991.
Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the
decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the
weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did
refer their grievances to what might be a wrong forum under
the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that
on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner
before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati,
in compliance with the requirement of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code." Yet,
in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is
condemnable for it disregards the virtue of candor, they
assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases
before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner and
respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the
same city or municipality; (b) the law does not apply when
the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law
applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has substantially
complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have
exerted enough diligence to inquire from the private
respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary
before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total
unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991, more
specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial
notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take
judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines." We have ruled
that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
21
He should have applied the revised katarungang
pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of
1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have reached
us and taken valuable attention and time which could have
been devoted to more important cases.
128 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the
first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the
mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight
physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati
at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11
May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a),
Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent
Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss
the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking
refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly,
Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991)
which states that the parties may go directly to court where
the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier
stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code,
the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the
private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which
they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the
authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the
complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the
barangay conciliation system. Granting arguendo that the
petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offense
for which she may be liable would only be slight physical
injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, considering that per the medical certificates the
injuries sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in
nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no
showing that the said injuries incapacitated them for labor or
would require medical attendance for such period. The
penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties are light
under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would
prescribe in two months pursuant to Article 90.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly
inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor
would have expired two months thereafter. Nevertheless, its
running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents'
complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days,
or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be
reached within the said period of suspension and,
accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private
respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to file
their separate criminal complaints for such offense.
Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the
respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph
(b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the Judge that
the petitioner "had already waived the right to a
reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of
Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the accused and the
complainant are residents of different barangays." The
petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings
before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it
and attended the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993
and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit.
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private
respondent that the parties could not agree on a
compromise and that they had to request the barangay
captain to issue a certification to file action. The request is
dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months after
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the
court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
contention in the said court that, in any event, there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to
the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents,
after failing to appear at the initial confrontation and long
after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand
the issuance of a certification to file action.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234. Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to
emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang
pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the
barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress
therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive
and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by
the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies
provided by that law, government prosecutors should
exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it,
and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the
appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.
Wingarts v. Mejia (1995)
Facts: The administrative complaints filed against Judge
Mejia were an offshoot of three criminal cases decided by
the judge and involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo Munar.
Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in criminal
cases for malicious mischief and grave threats. The first two
criminal cases were initiated by Col. Munar as the private
complainant therein. Thereafter, the Wingarts made a
counter-charge against Col. Munar resulting in the third
criminal case for usurpation of authority docketed in the
same court as Criminal Case No. 2696 with Col. Munar as the
accused.
The judge is charged with malicious delay in the
administration of justice. The case allegedly dragged for one
year and four months in respondent's sala and was
ultimately dismissed in a decision dated June 8, 1994 after
an ocular inspection of the burned premises was conducted
by the court personnel. As for the second complaint, the
judge was charged with incompetence and gross ignorance
of the law for taking cognizance of the case for grave threats
despite the lack of barangay conciliation. The third complaint
charges the judge with rendering an unjust decision.
The judge explained that he took cognizance of the grave
threats case for he believed that there had been substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law since a certification of the barangay
captain regarding a confrontation of the parties, the fact that
no amicable settlement was reached by them, and that he
was endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly
submitted to respondent judge. With regard to the
complaint for malicious delay, the judge contended that
"(t)he proceedings were continuous until the complainant
was acquitted of the crime charged against him. The case
was decided one (1) month and three (3) days after it was
submitted for decision. As to the third complaint, he claimed
that the decision as a result of his honest findings and
conclusion based on the evidence and the law in the hearing
of the case.
The OCA ruled that the first charge is meritorious for failure
to remand the case to the lupon and instead, taking
cognizance of the case. In the second charge, the delay does
not appear to be malicious nor deliberate. Also, the OCA
ruled that it does not appear that the judge was motivated
by an evil or corrupt motive in rendering the decision.
Issue: WON the judge is liable for incompetence and
ignorance of the law
Held: Yes
Ratio: Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith,
bias or partiality on his part, respondent judge should have
129 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
exercised the requisite prudence, especially under the
environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal case
where personal liberty was involved. He should have
carefully examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided
the improvident issuance of the warrant of arrest without a
circumspect review of the case which, after all, did not
exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated legal
questions. The present controversy could have been avoided
had he kept faith with the injunction that a member of the
bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments because the learning process
in law never ceases.
In the present case, assuming that he did not act with.
malice or bad faith and that he subsequently issued an order
to recall the warrant or prevent the arrest of complainant,
such considerations can mitigate but will not altogether
exculpate him from the charge of incompetence and
ignorance of the law, which accordingly warrants the
imposition of an appropriate penalty on him. If judges
wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there
will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but
even oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due
process.
Moreover, judges are directed to desist from improvidently
receiving and desultorily acting on complaints, petitions,
actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa. We have repeatedly ruled that
the proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the
filing of any action or proceeding in court or other
government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed
without compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed
on motion of any interested party on the ground that it fails
to state a cause of action.
As to the charge of malicious delay in the administration of
justice, we agree with the observation of the Office of the
Court Administrator that while there was some delay in
hearing the case, the same does not appear to be malicious
nor deliberate. Respondent judge should not be unfairly
subjected to liabilities, for contretemps which were brought
about by the parties and their lawyers. Complainants could
not have been unaware that the delay of the hearing was
due to postponements sought and obtained by the parties
and their respective counsel. Litigants should not blame a
judge for the delay which was not of his own making.
However, the Court finds this as an appropriate occasion to
once again remind the members of the judiciary to adopt
measures to prevent unnecessary delays in the disposition of
their cases. A judge should administer justice not only
impartially but also without delay. As expressly mandated by
the Code of Judicial Conduct, he shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
In connection with his decision in Criminal Case No. 2696,
after a careful analysis of the assailed decision, we find no
showing that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption in rendering the same.
"An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust
judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for
a mere error. It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when
required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts
in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability. If
in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same
was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously
and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred,
envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. As
interpreted by Spanish Courts, the term "knowingly" means
sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an
injustice. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or
application of the law does not constitute the crime.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
In a recent administrative case decided by this Court, it was
reiterated that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is unjust
and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to
do an injustice. The complainants in the present case have
dismally failed to convince us that respondent judge knew
that his challenged judgment is unjust, even assuming it to
be so.
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately
penalized for his regrettably erroneous action in connection
with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly
stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of
the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he
serves, and he must accordingly act at all times with great
constancy and utmost probity. 20 Any kind of failure in the
discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be
countenanced in order to maintain the faith of the public in
the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most
of them resort for redress.
Corpuz v. CA (1997)
Facts: Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against
Juanito Alvarado with the MTC for recovery of possession of
the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz'
children allegedly needed for their own use. Alvarado and
Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo
Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the
tenants. Due to economic difficulties, Alvarado and the
other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting
Barredo the right to sell his house to any person who can
afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold his
house to Corpuz for P37,500. As a result of the sale, a
tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and
Alvarado.
In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado
demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying
because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use.
Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded,
prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.
In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1)
the alleged "Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and
Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was not referred
to the Lupong Tagapayapa. The MTC ordered Alvarado to
vacate the room. The RTC reversed ruling that the sale
between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a pending
case before the NGA. Also, the Affidavit of Waiver was a
forgery. The CA affirmed.
Issue: WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the
MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the
resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale
of said property
Held: No
Ratio: The MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment
cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved
in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical
or material possession over the real property, that is,
possession de facto.
Refugia v. CA: “The inferior court may look into the evidence
of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said
evidence would indicate or determine the nature of
possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of
ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is the
true and lawful owner of the subject property, because the
resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on
ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for
unlawful detainer. With this as a premise and taking into
consideration the amendment introduced by BP 129, it may
130 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally
vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or
ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."
Consequently, since the petition involves the issue of
possession intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the
controversy pending in the NHA), the doctrinal
pronouncement in Refugia is applicable. Parenthetically
speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the
annulment of sale, title or document do not abate any
ejectment action respecting the same property.
The underlying reason for the above rulings is for the
defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is
summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before
the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing
the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot
deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit
merely for the purpose of determining who has a better
possessory right among the parties.
It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We
have ruled that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case
shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.
Issue: WON the ejectment suit was not referred to the
Lupon Tagapayapa as required by PD 1508
Held: No
Ratio: We are not persuaded. This defense was only
stated in a single general short sentence in Alvarado's
answer. We have held in Dui v. Court of Appeals that failure
of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no
compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's
answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to
support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general
averment.
In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court had
already acquired over the subject matter and the parties
therein.
Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo (2002)
Facts: In a letter-complaint, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of
the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo
B. Bellosillo of the MTC of QC, with ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. In an
ejectment suit, the judge referred the case back to the
barangay conciliation despite the fact that it was alleged in
the verified complaint that the case was already referred to
the barangay and a copy of the Certification to File Motion
was attached to the verified coplaint. Atty Salomon filed a
compliance with respondent’s court attaching therewith a
copy of his complaint filed before the barangay and the
minutes of the proceedings held thereat.
After the filing of said compliance, no action was taken by
the court despite the fact that the case falls under the Rule
on Summary Procedure and the judge has still to come up
with a determination as to whether summons should be
issued or not. He then inquired personally with the court
about the status of the case and he was told that no action
could be taken unless the Order of April 2, 1996 had been
complied with. Dismayed by the Court’s insistence of
referring the case to the barangay though it had already
gone through all the requisite proceedings thereat, he
decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
complaint. Said withdrawal however was denied by
respondent on the basis of the action already taken thereon
as contained in the questioned Order. He then filed a Notice
of Dismissal but the same was still unacted upon by
respondent.
It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filed
that respondent ordered that summons be served on
defendants. When defendants failed to file an Answer, he
(complainant) filed a Motion to Render Judgment in
accordance with the provisions of Sec.5 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. However, instead of rendering
judgment, respondent merely required defendants to
comment on the motion to render judgment. After
defendants filed their comment, respondent still did not act
on the said motion.
The judge, however, said that since there was a failure of
settlement of mediation proceedings before the Barangay
Chairman, it is necessary for the Pangkat to be constituted
anew so that parties may have a second opportunity to
amicably settle their dispute.
The OCA found respondent either ignorant or negligent in
referring the case back to the barangay despite the presence
of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File
Action. It also faulted him for disregarding the Rules on
Summary Procedure by (1) calling for a preliminary
conference, (2) directing the defendants to submit their
Comment to complainant’s Motion to Render Judgment, and
(3) failing to render judgment within the reglementary
period.
Issue: WON the judge was grossly ignorant of the law
when it ordered the parties to submit to another barangay
conciliation
Held: No
Ratio: The records reveal that such Certification was
improperly and prematurely issued. In what appears to be a
pre-printed standard form thereof, the “x” before the second
enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal
confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo took place. Respondent’s position that the
Pangkat was not constituted, and that no face to face
conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is
substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant.
Evidently, complainant failed to complete the barangay
conciliation proceedings.
We also note that the Complaint before the barangay was
dated February 16, 1996. Records show that the hearing
was scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for
February 29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File Action
was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the
first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman.
Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort
required by law to conciliate between the parties and to
settle the case before it. Hence, respondent judge was not
incorrect in remanding the case to it for completion of the
mandated proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking to
promote the objectives of barangay conciliation and for
taking to heart the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No.
14-93. His referral of the case back to the barangay cannot
be equated with gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it
constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.
Thereafter, complainant filed a Motion praying that the
proceedings already held before the barangay be considered
as substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
Acting on the Motion, the judge issued the summons and
opted to continue with the court proceedings without
insisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangay
proceedings. He did so after noting that complainant was
apparently not making any move to complete the barangay
proceedings after the case had been remanded to the
131 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
barangay, and that the case fell under the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, however,
provides that such cases may be revived only after the
requirement for conciliation has been complied with.
Nevertheless, the judge’s error is judicial in nature and
cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. At any
rate, because he chose to continue with the proceedings of
the case, and because respondents failed to answer the
ejectment Complaint on time, he should have rendered
judgment within thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
period to file an answer.
Complainant filed a Motion to Render Judgment dated March
25, 1997. Refusing to heed the Motion, respondent instead
called a preliminary conference and directed the defendants
to submit their Comment. The OCA correctly arrived at the
following findings:
“x x x (T) he Judge’s resolution (to) the complainant’s Motion
to Render Judgement casts serious doubt on his
understanding of the law. The express language of the law
states that when an Answer has not been filed within the
reglementary period, the judge, motu proprio, or on motion,
‘shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint’ (Section 6, Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure). This provision cannot, by any stretch
of the imagination, be construed to mean anything other
than what the words themselves communicate: that the
rendition of judgment is mandatory, and that the judgment
should be based only on what is contained within the four
walls of the complaint.
“By calling for a preliminary conference and directing the
defendants to submit their Comment to the complainant’s
Motion, the Judge went beyond the bounds set by the law x
x x. Moreover, when he finally resolved the motion – after
the defendants had submitted their Comment – he merely
ordered that the case be ‘deemed submitted for decision.’
Needless to say, ‘submission for decision’ is a far cry from
‘rendition of judgment,’ the character of immediacy implicit
in the latter does not exist in the former. And in this case,
supposedly to be resolved under the Summary Rule,
immediacy is the defining characteristic. x x x.”
Respondent rendered judgment on the case only on January
7, 1998, almost a year from the time the case had been
deemed submitted for resolution. Unacceptable is his
explanation that he waited for the defendants to avail
themselves of their right to appeal the Order deeming the
case submitted for resolution. He has no duty to wait,
because the law mandates him to act and decide the case
promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges
are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to
do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.
Mendova v. Judge Afable (2002)
Facts: Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that on
February 18, 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay
Chairman of Poblacion San Julian, Eastern Samar a
complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert Palada.
Barangay Chairman Ronie Quintua, in his Certification
confirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia Cabago
also certified in an undated “Minutes In Settling Disputes”
that the case was set for hearing on March 16, 22 and 29,
1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Mendova then filed with the MTC a complaint for slight
physical injuries against Palada.
The judge dismissed the complaint on grounds of
prescription as the complaint was filed on April 20, 1998 was
filed with this Court on May 4, 1998. However, the
alleged offense took place on February 15, 1998.
From the date of the commission of the alleged
offense, more than two months have elapsed.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Mendova filed with the OCA an administrative complaint
against the judge. He alleged that in dismissing the case, the
judge showed his ignorance of the law when he did not apply
the provisions of Section 410(c) of Ra. 7160 (60 days
interruption of running of prescription).
In its Evaluation and Recommendation, the OCA, through
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, found
respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be
fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a commission of similar
acts will be dealt with more severely, thus:
Issue: WON the judge is liable administratively for
dismissing Criminal Case No. 2198-98 on the ground of
prescription.
Held: Yes
Ratio: It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed,
that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision
issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such
as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For,
obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s
challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to
proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the
error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be
imposed against the erring judge.
What we said in Flores vs. Abesamis is illuminating:
“As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by
a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be
regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of
a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion
for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case
may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against
Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion
of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are
pre-requisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned, whether
of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after
the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened,
or closed.
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors,
they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of
civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts
they may do and dispositions they may make in the
132 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
performance of their duties and functions; and it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently
of statute, that judges are not generally liable for
acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in
good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a
judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration
by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding
of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and x x x also evidence of malice
or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on
the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or
order’ or under the stringent circumstances set out in
Article 32 of the Civil Code.”
In the present case, we noticed from the records before us
that the complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent judge’s decision dismissing
the criminal case. No reason was advanced by complainant
why he failed to do so. Thus, following our settled
pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative
complaint is premature.
According to complainant, Robert Palada committed the
crime of slight physical injuries on February 15, 1998. On
February 18, 1998, complainant filed his complaint with the
Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion, San Julian,
Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c)
of The Local Government Code of 1991, quoted earlier, such
filing interrupted the prescriptive period and started to run
again upon receipt by the complainant of the
Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat
Secretary. Here, records fail to show when complainant
received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The
undated certification he submitted merely states that the
case was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16,
22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable
settlement. When he filed on May 4, 1998 Criminal Case No.
2198-98 for slight physical injuries with respondent's court,
until the dismissal of the case on November 3, 1998, he still
failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay
Certification to File Action. Clearly, he cannot now fault
respondent judge for dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not
be considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be
an error of judgment.
Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad
faith or malice on the part of respondent judge when he
dismissed the criminal case.
Sangguniang Kabataan
Monteclaros v. COMELEC (2002)
Facts: The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is a youth
organization originally established by Presidential Decree
684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB). The KB was composed
of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old,
without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized
to provide its members with the opportunity to express their
views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK
and limited SK membership to those youths “at least 15 but
not more than 21 years of age.” The SK remains as a youth
organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs
“to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural,
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of
the youth.” The SK in every barangay is composed of a
chairperson and 7 members, all elected by the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is
composed of all citizens actually residing in the barangay for
at least 6 months and who meet the membership age
requirement. The first SK elections took place on 4
December 1992. RA 7808 reset the SK elections to the first
Monday of May of 1996 and every three years thereafter. RA
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the
SK elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgate.
Accordingly, the Comelec on 4 December 2001 issued
Resolutions 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK elections on 6
May 2002. On 18 February 2002, Antoniette V.C.
Montesclaros sent a letter to the Comelec, demanding that
the SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002.
Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter
within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will
seek judicial relief. On 20 February 2002, Alfredo L.
Benipayo, then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to
the Speaker of the House and the Senate President about
the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections.
In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that it was
“operationally very difficult” to hold both elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman
expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that
proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and
postpone the SK elections to November 2002. 10 days
lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of
Montesclaros. Subsequently, Montesclaros, et. al. received a
copy of Comelec En Banc Resolution 4763 dated 5 February
2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the
SK elections to November 2002 but holding the Barangay
elections in May 2002 as scheduled. On 6 March 2002, the
Senate and the House of Representatives passed their
respective bills postponing the SK elections. On 11 March
2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee of the Senate
and the House came out with a Report recommending
approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 2050
and House Bill 4456. The Bicameral Committee’s
consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to 15
July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at
least 15 but not more than 18 years of age. On 11 March
2002, Montesclaros filed the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to
prevent the postponement of the SK elections originally
scheduled 6 May 2002, and also to prevent the reduction of
the age requirement for membership in the SK. On 11 March
2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s
consolidated bill and on 13 March 2002, the House of
Representatives approved the same. The President signed
the approved bill into law on 19 March 2002.
Issue: Whether there is actual controversy in the case which
seeks to prevent a postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK
elections, and which seeks to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill
lowering the membership age in the SK.
Held: At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the
following events that have transpired since
Montesclaros filed the petition: (1) The 6 May 2002 SK
elections and 13 May 2002 Barangay elections were not held
as scheduled; (2) Congress enacted RA 9164 which provides
that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be “at
least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the
election.” RA 9164 also provides that there shall be a
synchronized SK and Barangay elections on 15 July 2002. (3)
The Comelec promulgated Resolution 4846, the rules and
regulations for the conduct of the 15 July 2002 synchronized
SK and Barangay elections. The Court’s power of judicial
review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Herein,
there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the
power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
133 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
postponement of the 6 May 2002 SK elections, Montesclaros,
et. al. are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002. RA 9164
has reset the SK elections to 15 July 2002, a date acceptable
to them. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is
therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention. Further, their prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership
age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A
proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no
constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional
because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory
opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial
review cannot be exercised in vacuo. The second paragraph
of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Thus, there can be no
justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a
proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only after a law is enacted, not before. Absent a clear
violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot
exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.
Issue: WON SK membership is a “property right within the
meaning of the Constitution”
Held: No
Ratio: Congress exercises the power to prescribe the
qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot
complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can
contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying
them from SK membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a property right protected
by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law
to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one
has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested
right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo
v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
”Again, for this petition to come under the due process of
law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a
“property.” It is, however, well settled x x x that a
public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is
a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the
government x x x is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of
the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law
and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.”
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office,
should realize from the very start that no one has a
proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK
officer an ex-officio member of a local government
legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a
public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim
to public office. Even the State policy directing “equal
access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow on
petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youth’s
involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those who
belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress
has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join
the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do
not qualify because they are past the age group defined as
the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In
government service, once an employee reaches mandatory
retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling
to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now
past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they
cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
membership.
The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of
discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections.
RA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications
of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also
fixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are not even
assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to
the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
The Municipality
Muñez v. Ariño 241 SCRA 478 (1995)
Doctrine: Municipal Mayors cannot conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest. Section 143 of
the former LGC (BP 447) has been abrogated, rendered
functus officio by the 1987 Consti which took effect Feb. 2,
1987.
Facts: Mayor Irisari of Agusan del Sur summoned
complainant Muñez to his office for a conference regarding a
land dispute with the latter and Tirso Amado. As complainant
failed to attend, the Mayor issued a warrant of arrest against
him. No investigation was later conducted. Muñez filed a
complaint for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial
function. Initially Judge Arino denied the mayor’s motion to
quash on the ground that the power of mayors to issue
warrants of arrest ceased to exist when the 1987 Consti took
effect. For its part, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found the
mayor guilty and suspended him for 8 months without pay.
On appeal, DILG reversed saying the warrant was merely an
“invitation.” Mayor Irisari filed an MR using DILG resolution
and Judge Arino correspondingly, dismissed the case. We
subsequently find out that the Jusge made a serious error
and SC said he “showed poor judgement and gross
ignorance of basic legal principles.”
Held: It cannot be alleged that Mayor Irisari merely
intended to invite or summon Muñez to his office because he
had already done this the day before, under the pretense of
a conference. Thus, the next day a warrant was issued given
that complainant did not show up for the conference despite
the mayor’s summons. The Judge mrely relied on the DILG
opinion which was grossly erroneous. A 5k fine is imposed on
the errant judge.
Greater Balanga v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
(1994)
Facts: GBDC applied with the Office of the Balanga Mayor
for a business permit its property, certain portions of which
as been "unlawfully usurped and invaded" by Balanga, which
had "allowed/tolerated/abetted" the construction of shanties
and market stalls while charging market fees and market
entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area.
134 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Mayor issued a Mayor's Permit granting GBDC the privilege
of a "real estate dealer/privately-owned public market
operator" under the registered trade name of Balanga Public
Market.
However, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a Resolution
annulling the Mayor's permit issued to GBDC and advising
the Mayor to revoke the permit. Mayor revoked the permit
insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.
GBDC filed this petition claiming that it had not violated any
law/ordinance, thus there’s no reason to revoke the Mayor's
permit. The EO and the resolution in question were quasi-
judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power.
Respondent also failed to observe due process in revoking
the permit. Balanga argues that Mayor may issue, deny or
revoke municipal licenses and permits. Resolution and EO
were legitimate exercise of local legislative authority. GBDC
violated Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code
when it failed to disclose the true status of the area involved
in the permit when it did not secure separate permits for its
two businesses.
Held: No. There was no ground for revocation. The
application for Mayor's permit requires the applicant to state
what type of business, profession, occupation and/or calling
privileges is being applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank
in its application form. Leaving an entry blank is not equal to
false statement. There must be proof of willful
misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false
statement. The absence of the material info in the
application form was nonetheless supplied in the face of the
permit signed and issued by Mayor Banzon himself.
Applying for two businesses in one permit is also not a
ground for revocation. Par 2 Section 3A-06(b) does not
expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or
more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be
paid for each business. The powers of municipal
corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris
(strictly in its legal terms) and any doubt or
ambiguity must be construed against the municipality
Granting, however, that separate permits are actually
required, the application form does not contain any entry as
regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to
engage in.
The City
Lim and Garayblas v. CA (2002)
Doctrine: City mayors have authority to issue business
licenses and permits, and collorarily make suspend, revoke
and even refuse the same, but due process must always be
observed in exercising these powers which means that the
mayor must give applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
Policemen under Mayor Lim’s instructions inspected and
investigated Bistro Pigalle’s license as well as the work
permits and health certificates of its staff causing the
stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant
operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for
a business license, as well as the work permit applications of
Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993.Bistro filed before the trial
court a petition against Manila Mayor Lim..
Held:
The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
Section 455 (3) (iv) of the LGC is clear that the power of the
mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even
refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or
revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses.
Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits.
The mayor must observe due process in exercising these
powers, which means that the mayor must give the
applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate
private commercial establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits. However, the
mayor has no power to order a police raid on these
establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating
these commercial establishments
The Province
Rivera v. Malolos (1957)
Facts: Sometime in August 1949 the municipality of
Malolos, called for bids for the supply of road construction
materials to repair the road of the municipality. At the public
bidding, the petitioners bid was the lowest. On the same
day, the acting municipal treasurer informed the petitioner
that the contract had been awarded to him and requested
him to call at his office for the execution of the contract. The
contract was then signed. It was stipulated that for and in
consideration of the sum of P19, 235 the petitioner was to
furnish and deliver to the municipality 2,700 cubic meters of
crushed adobe stone and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. In
compliance with the contract, the petitioner delivered
crushed adobe stone and gravel to the municipality.
On 29 July, 1950 the petitioner wrote to the municipal
treasurer, through the provincial auditor, calling his attention
to the fact that the sum of P19,339.56 due him as payment
for the value of crushed adobe stone and gravel delivered to
the municipality had not yet been paid and that as the fiscal
year 1949-1950 had already expired, he requested that the
sum be included in the appropriations for the incoming fiscal
year 1950-1951 as an outstanding obligation. The municipal
council passed Resolution No. 68 ratifying the public bidding
called by the municipal treasurer for the supply of road
construction materials, and the contract entered into by the
municipality.
Later, the petitioner filed a complaint against the
municipality of Malolos in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan to collect the sum of P19,235 for the value of
crushed adobe stone and gravel delivered by the petitioner
under the contract. The CFI dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner sought the intervention of the Presidential
Complaints and Committee, which forwarded the petitioner's
claim on the ground that as there was no sum of money
appropriated to meet the obligation incurred before the
execution of the contract, as required by section 607 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the said contract is void, as
provided in section 608 of the same Code; and that even if
there was such sum appropriated to meet such obligation,
the alleged deliveries of crushed adobe stone and gravel
could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor of
Bulacan or his representative.
Issue: WON the contract between the municipality and the
petitioner is void
Held: Yes
Ratio: Before a contract may be entered into validly by a
municipality, the law requires that there should be an
appropriation of municipal funds to meet the obligation
validly passed by the municipal council and approved by the
municipal mayor. In answer to the statement of the Solicitor
General that there is no provision of law which authorizes a
municipal mayor to enter into a contract with a private
135 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
contractor for furnishing the municipality with public works
materials, the petitioner cites sections 2165 and 2196 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 2165 provides that
"Municipalities .. are endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective
municipal governments in conformity with law." It shall be
competent for them, in their proper corporate name, .. to
contract and be contracted with, .." The power or authority
conferred upon municipal corporations must be exercised in
conformity with law, and the law provides that such
contracts must be entered into by the district engineer. The
petitioner contends, however, that section 1920 of the
Revised Administrative Code must be read in connection
with sections 1912 and 1913 of the same Code and
concludes that section 1920 does not abrogate the general
rule that a municipal council may designate an officer of the
municipal corporation to execute such a contraction behalf
of the municipality. Section 1912 refers to investigation and
survey by the district engineer for a proposed construction
or repair of public works and submission by him to the mayor
to reports and estimates of the cost of such construction or
repair with his recommendations, and to the preparation of
plans and specifications for such public works and
supervision of the construction or repair of the same. The
provisions of sections 1912 and 1913 of the Revised
Administrative Code do not refer to contracts entered into by
the municipality for the supply of road construction
materials.
If the law requires that before a contract involving the
expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or
authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer
entering into such contracts that funds have been duly
appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract-is available for
expenditure on account thereof; and that purported contract
entered into contrary to the requirements just stated is
wholly void, the petitioner's claim that there is no longer any
question as to the validity of the contract entered into by
and between the petitioner and the municipal mayor of
Malolos is not correct.
Likewise, if the law provides that the provincial auditor or his
representative must check up the deliveries made by a
contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly
entered into, and there was no such check up, the
petitioner's claim that there is no longer an issue as to
whether the road construction materials have been actually
delivered by the petitioner and received by the respondent is
groundless. The Auditor General is not in duty bound to pass
and allow in audit the sum claimed by the petitioner if he or
his authorized representative did not check up the delivery
of the crushed adobe stone and gravel. To say that the
purpose and aim of this checking requirement is to forestall
fraud and collusion is to state what is obvious.
The petitioner enlisted the aid of the Presidential Complaints
and Action Committee to request the Auditor General to pass
in audit and authorize the payment of the petitioner's claim.
The Auditor General had no alternative but to comply with
the provisions of the law and as the contract entered into by
the municipal mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, was not in
accordance with law, the Auditor General was correct in
denying the petitioner's claim.
Section 73, Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor
Vehicle Law, as amended by section 2, Republic Act No. 314,
invoked by the petitioner, merely allocates 10 per cent of the
money collected under its provisions to the road and bridge
funds of the different municipalities in proportion to
population as shown in the latest available census, for the
repair, maintenance and construction of municipal roads.
This alone is not sufficient appropriation and authority to
disburse part of the 10 per cent collected under the Motor
Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim of the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
petitioner. Section 608 of the Revised Administrative Code
affords the petitioner a remedy.
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
Disomancop v. Datumanong (2004)
Facts: Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction are the
constitutionality and validity of Republic Act No. 8999
entitled “An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the
First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur and
Appropriating Funds Therefor,” and Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 119 on
the subject, “Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office.”
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No.
6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled “An Act Providing for An Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” was
enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. The law
called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of
Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del
Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the plebiscite, only four (4) provinces voted
for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). The law contains elaborate provisions on the
powers of the Regional Government and the areas of
jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government.
President Aquino issued E.O. 426, entitled “Placing the
Control and Supervision of the Offices of the DPWH within
the ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government, and
for other purposes.”
Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R.
Vigilar issued D.O. 119 (Creation of Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Officewhich shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH
within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.)
Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and
signed into law R.A. 8999 (establishing engineering district in
lanao del sur).
Congress later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to
Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.”
On 23 July 2001, petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH
Secretary Simeon Datumanong, seeking the revocation of
D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No
action, however, was taken on the petition.[
Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse
of discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy
of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department
Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
with functions that have already been devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of
legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly studied,
and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B.
995) from which the law originated is questionable.
Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the
law, no public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM
was made. The House Committee on Public Works and
Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from
the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law
was skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph
E. Estrada during the pendency of the impeachment
proceedings.
136 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Issue: Preliminaries
Ratio: In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the
executive department on the ground that they contravene
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy.
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot
succeed. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take
cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are
involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal
stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people.
It is not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation
of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District
of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the
powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and
the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been
endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely
that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of
their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material
and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the
enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct
and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the
validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Issue: WON Republic Act No. 8999 was valid
Held: No
Ratio: The challenged law never became operative and
was superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the
Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they
enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions
thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as
R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be
submitted to a plebiscite.
Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the
imperativeness of the plebiscite requirement. In fact, R.A.
9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, was
subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by
E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM
which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)
to the Regional Government. By creating an office with
previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought
to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore
first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it
could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this
requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and
superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be
given effect. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution.
It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing
the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del
Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over
regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
ventures to reestablish the National Government’s
jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur.
R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it
destroys the latter law’s objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be
reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A.
9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in
the regional autonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain
pursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999
contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of
regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054.
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for
autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of
peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These
cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of
the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and
even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society
of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist
approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are
invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being
open for minority representation. As a result, democracy
becomes an irony to the minority group.
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case
of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people who have
been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their
unique cultures and the unresponsiveness of the unitary
system to their aspirations. The Moros’ struggle for self-
determination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in
the Philippines. Even at present, the struggle goes on.
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not
signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that
of the Republic, as it can be installed only “within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit
determined groups, with a common tradition and shared
social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of
life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge of
their own business. This is achieved through the
establishment of a special governance regime for certain
member communities who choose their own authorities from
within the community and exercise the jurisdictional
authority legally accorded to them to decide internal
community affairs.
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the
cultivation of more positive means for national integration. It
would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase
their trust in the government and pave the way for the
unhampered implementation of the development programs
in the region
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization.
Decentralization is a decision by the central government
authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It
involves decision-making by subnational units. It is typically
a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to
delegate certain authority to more local governments.
Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but
unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization
differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that
have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess
any claim of right against the central government.
Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and
devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it
involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of
authority and responsibility from the national office to the
regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.
137 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political
decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities,
and resources for the performance of certain functions from
the central government to local government units. This is a
more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual
transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant
greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of
their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and
to improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
The diminution of Congress’ powers over autonomous
regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. CA wherein this Court
held that “the omission (of “as may be provided by law”)
signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments’ autonomy from Congress and to break
Congress’ ‘control’ over local government affairs.”
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have
powers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers
over certain areas. Worthy of note is that the area of public
works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the
National Government.
E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the
DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government
(ARG). More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054
transferred and devolved the administrative and fiscal
management of public works and funds for public works to
the ARG.
In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in
Mindanao are to be given freedom and independence with
minimum interference from the National Government. This
necessarily includes the freedom to decide on, build,
supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure
projects within the autonomous region. The devolution of the
powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer
of the administrative and fiscal management of public works
and funds to the ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and
unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a
clear consensus, reached at the Constitutional Commission
and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality
of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of
deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of
Muslims and Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and
the National Government takes control again. The hands,
once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied
up.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and
powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously
devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur. E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the
control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within the
ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG.
Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the
control of the Regional Government shall be responsible for
highways, flood control and water resource development
systems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope
of power includes the planning, design, construction and
supervision of public works. According to RA 9054, the reach
of the Regional Government enables it to appropriate,
manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the
region by the central government. The use of the word
“powers” in EO 426 manifests an unmistakable case of
devolution.
It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for
the areas of executive power mentioned therein, all other
such areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous Regional
Government (“ARG”) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. It is noted that programs relative to infrastructure
facilities, health, education, women in development,
agricultural extension and watershed management do not
fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the provision
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these
spheres of executive responsibility have been transferred to
the ARG.
R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered
regional autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure
projects. The Congressional Record shows, on the other
hand, that the “lack of an implementing and monitoring
body within the area” has hindered the speedy
implementation, of infrastructure projects. Apparently, in the
legislature’s estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM
engineering districts failed to measure up to the task. But if
it was indeed the case, the problem could not be solved
through the simple legislative creation of an incongruous
engineering district for the central government in the ARMM.
As it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.A.
8999 was passed in record time on second reading (not more
than 10 minutes), absolutely without the usual sponsorship
speech and debates. The precipitate speed which
characterized the passage of R.A. 8999 is difficult to
comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the
amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore,
could not take effect without first being ratified in a
plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March 2001, or
barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January
2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic
Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in
ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, to the
Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
Issue: WON DPWH Department Order No. 119 was valid
Ratio: D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of
the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued
pursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated the creation of the
constitutionally-mandated autonomous region and which
defined the basic structure of the autonomous government.
E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control and
supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified
four (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4)
provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi.[89) Accordingly, the First Engineering District of
the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the
public works within the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the
same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis
of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back
powers which have been previously devolved under the said
executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of
E.O. 426. The DPWH’s order, like spring water, cannot rise
higher than its source of power—the Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to
E.O. 124—signed and approved by President Aquino in her
residual legislative powers—is of no moment. It is a finely-
imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special
provision or law prevails over a general one.[90) Lex
specialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the
case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[91)
“another basic principle of statutory construction mandates
that general legislation must give way to special legislation
on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to
embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general
statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor
specially should prevail.”
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law
reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while
E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and
138 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute
specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should
therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in
a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an
irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages,
the later enactment prevails because it is the later
legislative will.
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that “all
laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other
issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this
Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.”
With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it
necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus
officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Abbas v. COMELEC (1989)
Facts: The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the
participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission,
Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary
General of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It
provided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern
Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and enumerated
the thirteen provinces comprising the areas of autonomy.
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified which for the first
time provided for regional autonomy. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and
signed into law.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R. A. No. 6734 unconditionally
creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region
which makes the creation of such region dependent upon the
outcome of the plebiscite.
Issue: Whether certain provisions of RA 6734 conflict with
the Tripoli Agreement.
Held: We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the
case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its
binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under
public international or internal Philippine law. In the first
place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the
creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The
standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734
would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution.
Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734
and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the
effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli
Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it
would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as
internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would
be in the same class as the latter. Thus, if at all, R.A. No.
6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a
subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A.
No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the
granting of the reliefs sought.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its
composition needs to be clarified. First, the questioned
provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary
for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to
the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it
clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region
shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the
Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied
in the Constitution and fills in the details. Thus, under the
Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in
the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous
region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.
6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will
therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No.
6734, shall compromise it.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require
approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite
they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section
27, it is provided that "[t) his Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this
with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region,
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in
the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have
simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a
simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in
individual constituent units and not a double majority of the
votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the
individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is
also the sense in which the vote requirement in the
plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have
been understood by the people when they ratified the
Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner
Mama-o, on the other hand, maintain that only those areas
which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included
within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists
that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the
provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao
del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and
Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other
relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not
strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas
which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the
others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself
has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays
down the standards by which Congress shall determine
which areas should constitute the autonomous region.
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by
Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within
the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review
of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of
139 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to
the separation of governmental powers.
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the
Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then
adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in
Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since
the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope
should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-
Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim
areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and
therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same
constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any
determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should
compromise the autonomous region, taking into account
shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics, would
necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As
earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which
areas should be covered by the organic act for the
autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative
prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this
Court.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on
the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on
free exercise of religion. The objection centers on a provision
in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any
conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code (still
be enacted) on the one had, and the national law on the
other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act
should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the
islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which
makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to
any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this
objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict
between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law,
wherein an application of national law might be offensive to
a Muslim's religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may
not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived
potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code
and national law.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President
the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred
by the Constitution upon the President. That the President
may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the
Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution. It must be pointed out that
what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National
Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative
regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the
power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. There is no conflict between the power of the
President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger
of local government units because the requirement of a
plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the
Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to
supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the
powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
regional government by the organic Act. Said provisions
mandate that the transfer of certain national government
offices and their properties to the regional government shall
be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished
within six (6) years from the organization of the regional
government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are
unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that
the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon
approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an
Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of
powers and properties to the regional government would in
effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous
region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the
Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by
constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of
the autonomous region immediately takes effect delay the
creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous
region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the
Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by
constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of
the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The
questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight
Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization
of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the
operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at
effecting a smooth transition period for the regional
government. The constitutional objection on this point thus
cannot be sustained as there is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to declare a
law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition
must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
Pandi v. CA (2004)
Facts: On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as
Regional Director and as Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM,
issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then
DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-
Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai
Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH) Lanao del Sur. In the
same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani,
then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao
del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.
Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued
Office Order No. 07 designating Dr. Amer Saber also as
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
Sani filed a complaint with the RTC challenging the memo of
Macacuao. Saber filed with the CA a petition for quo
warranto claiming that he is the lawfully designated officer in
charge of IPHO-APGH.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the
powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the
Regional Government of the ARMM. Macacua, again, issued
a Memorandum reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-in-
Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, as well as Sani’s
detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato
City.
The CA ruled that that Saber is the lawfully designated
Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA
ruled that Lanao del Sur Governor Mutilan has the power and
authority to appoint the provincial health officer under
Section 478[10] of the Local Government Code of 1991.
140 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the issuance of
Executive Order No. 133, and the Memorandum of
Agreement entered between the DOH of the National
Government and the ARMM pursuant to Executive Order No.
133, did not render moot and academic the issues raised in
the proceedings before it.
Neither did the Court of Appeals give credence to Pandi and
Macacua’s argument that the passage of the ARMM Local
Code puts to rest the issues in the instant case. The Court of
Appeals maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the
ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU Code.
The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 457 (b) and (d) of
the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM Regional
Governor, and not the Provincial Governor, who exercises a
recommendatory prerogative in the appointment of the
provincial health officer.
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that there is nothing in
Section 18,[15] Chapter 5, Title IX, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 which explicitly or even
impliedly vests in Macacua, as DOH-ARMM Secretary, the
power to make such an appointment or designation.
Issue: WON an incumbent provincial health officer of
Lanao del Sur can be assigned to another province and if so,
who can order such assignment.
Second, who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the
provincial health office of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial
Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health.
Third, who is empowered to appoint the provincial health
officer of Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor, the
Regional Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health.
The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the
powers and functions of a Provincial Governor under the
1991 LGU Code are now enjoyed, as a minimum, by a
Provincial Governor in the ARMM. Thus, the Provincial
Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latter’s
salary comes from provincial funds. If the provincial health
officer’s salary comes mainly from regional funds, then the
ARMM Local Code applies, in which case the Regional
Governor is the appointing power but he must appoint only
from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor.
Moreover, the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and
control over the provincial health officer because the ARMM
Local Code has classified him as a provincial government
official. This is now the present state of the law on the
appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM. This
is actually the same as the law after the effectivity of the
ARMM Local Code but prior to the passage of the Organic Act
of 2001. The only difference is that the Regional Assembly
cannot amend the ARMM Local Code to reduce or diminish
this power of the Provincial Governor because this devolved
power, emanating from the 1991 LGU Code, is now part of
the Organic Act of 2001.
Application of the law to the designation of Saber. Lanao del
Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber
as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on
September 15, 1993. On this date the provincial health
officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government
official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial
health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of
Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of
Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial
health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official
authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to
any province within the region. Indisputably, on September
15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to
designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao
del Sur. Consequently, the designation of Saber as such
Officer-in-Charge is void.
The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur became a
provincial government official only after the effectivity of the
ARMM Local Code, which was enacted by the Regional
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Assembly on January 25, 1994 and approved by the Regional
Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code
but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the
Regional Governor appointed the provincial health officer
while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the
provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM.
The Provincial Governor had no power to appoint or even
designate the Officer-in-Charge of the provincial health
office.
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991
LGU Code as Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority to
appoint Saber is misplaced. Section 478 of the 1991 LGU
Code, which provides that “[T]he appointment of a health
officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal
governments,” is not a grant of power to governors and
mayors to appoint local health officers. It is simply a
directive that those empowered to appoint local health
officers are mandated to do so. In short, the appointment of
local health officers, being essential for public services, is a
mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with
the power to appoint them. Moreover, as explained earlier,
the 1991 LGU Code did not amend the Organic Act of 1989.
Application of the law to the appointment and transfer of
Sani
Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then
Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 1988.
He was appointed as “Provincial Health Officer (R-05 5th
Step), Office of the Regional Health Director, Regional Health
Office No. XII, Cotabato City.” Sani was appointed provincial
health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order
No. 119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressly
stated that provincial health officers were to be appointed to
a region. The Secretary of Health, upon recommendation of
the Regional Director, could assign provincial health officers
to any province within the region. Consequently, Sani
cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health
officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to
that office.
Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM
Secretary of Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City on August 9, 1993. As of
that date, the powers and functions of the Department of
Health were not yet transferred to the Regional Government,
and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still
exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in
the ARMM. Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of
Macacua detailing or assigning Sani to the Regional Office in
Cotabato City is void.
However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another
Memorandum reiterating Sani’s detail or assignment to the
Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum
was issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133
which expressly transferred “supervision and control over all
functions and activities of the Regional Department of
Health” to “the Head of the Regional Department of Health.”
In Gen. Renato de Villa vs. City of Bacolod, this Court ruled
that the power of administrative control encompasses the
power to transfer personnel who under the law may be
reassigned to other stations. The second detail or
assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issued
on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as
Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani
is valid.
Application of the law to the designation of Pandi
Macacua, as Regional Director and Regional Secretary of
Health, designated Pandi Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur, on August 9, 1993 and again on
November 6, 1993. The designation dated August 9, 1993 is
void since the Regional Secretary at that time did not yet
exercise supervision and control over the provincial health
offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi on
November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order
141 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
No. 133 had already been issued vesting in the Regional
Secretary of Health supervision and control over all functions
and activities of the Department of Health in the ARMM. The
designation of Pandi, however, while valid is only temporary
in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent
appointment is made.
As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of
November 6, 1993, the official vested by law to exercise
supervision and control over all provincial health offices in
the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive
Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and
functions of the Secretary of Health of the National
Government with respect to provincial health offices within
the ARMM. The official exercising supervision and control
over an office has the administrative authority to designate,
in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the
office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the
authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-
Charge in the provincial health office of Lanao del Sur
pending the appointment of the permanent provincial health
officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the
Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such
a designation.
Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer
became for the first an official of the provincial government
even though he is appointed by the Regional Governor and
draws his salary from regional funds. The ARMM Local Code
vests in the Provincial Governor the power to “exercise
general supervision and control over all programs, projects,
services, and activities of the provincial government.” Upon
the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the power of
supervision and control over the provincial health officer
passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial
Governor. From then on the Provincial Governor began to
exercise the administrative authority to designate an Officer-
in-Charge in the provincial health office pending the
appointment of a permanent provincial health officer.
Bai Sema v. Comelec (2008), supra.
The creation of any of the four local government units -
province, city, municipality or barangay - must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
"only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities
or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local
government units is not one of the express legislative
powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with
the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves
the power to create a legislative district.
Ordillo v. COMELEC (1990)
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite
held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region." The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite
showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a
majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the
provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued
Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the
Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On March 8, 1990,
Congress enacted RA 6861 setting the elections in the CAR
of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the
Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a
Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition. The
petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: WON the province of Ifugao can validly constitute
CAR
Held: No
Ratio: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute
the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
142 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
"Sec 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
RP.”
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into
which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes
are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province
by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It
joins other units because of their common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics. The
Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions
of RA 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the
Region cannot be constituted from only one province. Article
III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera
government consisting of the Regional Government and local
government units. From these sections, it can be gleaned
that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be
faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials,
a set of provincial officials and another set of regional
officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the
legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members
shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned
among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous
Region.
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such
Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the
province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of
having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative
powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one
of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise,
it would have too many government officials for so few
people.
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning
and Development Board composed of the Cordillera
Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or
their representatives, two members of the Cordillera
Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The
Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the
Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The
Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act
No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial
Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220
(4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 Local Government Code). If it
takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such
functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to
perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could
only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional
level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region
being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of
Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements can
not be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one
province Cordillera Autonomous Region was never
contemplated by the law creating it.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total
population of the areas enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b)
of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain
Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the
second smallest number of inhabitants from among the
provinces and city above mentioned. The Cordillera
population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra,
185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-
Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio
City, 183,000; Total population of these five provinces and
one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census.
`There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which
are either violated or which cannot be complied with. Section
16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on
Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6)
members coming from different provinces and cities in the
Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission would
have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have
a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members,
as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and
cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system
of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural
communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires
the development of a common regional language based
upon the various languages and dialects in the region which
regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national
language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule
against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent
would not only violate the letter and intent of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be
impractical and illogical.
`Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, is not applicable
in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of
Justice.The Abbas case established the rule to follow on
which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same
rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in the
Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision
which deals with the issue on whether an autonomous
region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist
despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
constitute it. Stated in another way, the issue in this case is
whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is
not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the
Court answers in the instant case.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990), supra.
Ratio: We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras contemplated by the
Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion
that E.O. No. 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a
new territorial and political subdivision. After carefully
considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did
not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision.
Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be
sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power
to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier,
the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning
and implementation of programs and services in the covered
areas.
The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of
expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The
143 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as
part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established
11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional
centers and required departments and agencies of the
Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field
offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to
implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional
areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with
regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies
in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in
the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law.
CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No.
220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not
only of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic
groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing
about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds
solely for that purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the
provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the
CAR.
Held: No
Ratio: It must be clarified that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast
in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the
1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973
Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee
under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local
Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act
(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march
towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting
gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy.
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority and LGUs
MMDA v. Bel Air Village Assoc. Inc. (2001), supra.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of
several local government units - i.e., twelve (12) cities
and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon,
Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela,
and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San
Juan and Taguig. With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development
authority" referred to as the MMDA.
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and
projects is undertaken by the local government units,
national government agencies, accredited people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this
purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts,
memoranda of agreement and other cooperative
arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the
required services within Metro Manila.
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the
delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is
transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and
projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,
infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and
promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It
also covers the mass transport system and the institution of
a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a
single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations.
Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set
the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate
the implementation of all traffic management programs." In
addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties
for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not
been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in
R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the
various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself
MMDA v. Garlin (2005)
Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the
Dante Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation
receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. The
following statements were printed on the TVR: You are
hereby directed to report to the MMDA Traffic Operations
Center Port Area Manila after 48 hours from date of
apprehension for disposition/appropriate action thereon.
Criminal case shall be filed for failure to redeem license after
30 days. Valid as temporary DRIVER’S license for seven days
from date of apprehension.
Garin sent a letter to MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his license and his preference for his
case to be filed in court. When there was not reply, Garin
filed a complaint for preliminary injunction in the RTC
contending that the absence of an IRR of RA 7924 grants the
144 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
MMDS unbridled power to deprive motorists of their license,
thereby violating the due process clause. Also, there is
undue delegation of legislative authority to the MMDA.
For its part, the MMDA pointed out that the powers granted
to it by Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and executive in
nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the
validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the
doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude
“admixture” of the three powers of government in
administrative agencies. The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of respondent and ordered the MMDA to desist from
confiscating licenses without first giving the driver the
opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its
Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for
the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme.
Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which
can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may
no longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course
in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed
TVRs were given seven days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and
redeem their license or vehicle plates. It would seem,
therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case
to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers’ licenses is
concerned, recent events have overtaken the Court’s need
to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and
academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular
No. 04, Series of 2004.
Issue: WON the state in the exercise of its police power
can validly withhold a motorist’s license
Held: Yes
Ratio: A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a
property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which
may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of
its police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.
State ex. Rel. Sullivan: “Since motor vehicles are
instruments of potential danger, their registration and the
licensing of their operators have been required almost from
their first appearance. The right to operate them in public
places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in
the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to
license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such
license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.”
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Funk: “The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of
the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how
and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the
highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of
general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the
Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of
motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to
the promotion of public safety and is well within the police
power.”
The legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has
the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom
motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
Issue: WON MMDA is vested with police power
Held: No
Ratio: In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc., we categorically stated that Rep.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let
alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature. Police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same. Having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The Legislature,
however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or LGUs. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several
local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No.
7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the
region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of
government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, insofar as Sec.
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court
and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without
need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.
Issue: WON Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to
enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Ratio: Section 5 of RA7924 enumerates the “Functions and
Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.” The
contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall
“install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose
and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving
in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of RA4136 and PD 1605 to the
contrary notwithstanding,” and that “(f)or this purpose, the
Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in
Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may
deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may
be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose.”
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in
this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is
duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and
traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is
a development authority created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-
145 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory
construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that
would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it, and is
supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute.
LIABILITY
Ultra Vires Act
San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro
Facts: Following a public bidding conducted by the
municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its
municipal waters, Resolution 46 was passed awarding the
concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to
Bartolome San Diego. A contract was entered into between
the said San Diego and the municipality, for a period of lease
for 5 years.
The lessee then requested for a five year extension of the
original lease period, this was granted by the municipal
council. After the resolution had been approved by the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the
lessee, contracted for the extension of the period of the
lease. The contract was approved and confirmed on
December 29, 1951 by Resolution 229 of the municipal
council of Naujan whose term was then about to expire.
Pursuant to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety bond
of P52,000 and then reconstructed his fish corrals and
stocked the Naujan Lake with bangus fingerlings.
On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, this
time composed of a new set of members, adopted
Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series
of 1951. On the same date, the new council also passed
Resolution 11, revoking Resolution 229 of the old council
which confirmed the extension of the lease period. The
lessee requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution
3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the contract
executed between him and the municipality on December
23, 1951, and, therefore, contrary to Article III, section 1,
clause 10 of the Constitution. The request, however, was not
granted.
The lessee instituted proceedings to annul the Resolution.
The defendant asserted that the original lease contract,
reducing the lease rentals and renewing the lease are null
and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
The trial court upheld the validity of the lease contract.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking
Resolution 222, series of 1951, of the municipal council of
Naujan is valid
Held: No
Ratio: The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative
Code) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or
the right to conduct a fish-breeding ground is granted to a
private party, the same shall be let to the highest bidder in
the same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, a
market or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality.
The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of
inviting competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud
and corruption in the letting of fishery privileges. There is no
doubt that the original lease contract in this case was
awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the
rental and the extension of the term of the lease appear to
have been granted without previous public bidding.
Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring public
bidding apply to amendments of any contract already
executed in compliance with the law where such
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
essential particular. Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a
vital and essential particular to the contract, we believe that
the extension of the lease period in this case, which was
granted without the essential requisite of public bidding, is
not in accordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 222,
series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby,
extending the original five-year lease to another five years
are null and void as contrary to law and public policy.
We agree with the defendant in that the question Resolution
3 is not an impairment of the obligation of contract, because
the constitutional provision on impairment refers only to
contract legally executed. While, apparently, Resolution 3
tended to abrogate the contract extending the lease, legally
speaking, there was no contract abrogated because, as we
have said, the extension contract is void and inexistent.
The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant
municipality has been estopped from assailing the validity of
the contract into which it entered on December 23, 1951,
seems to have overlooked the general rule that the doctrine
of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal
corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to
make or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed
conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed
mode or manner, although the corporation has accepted the
benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed his
part of the agreement, or has expended large sums in
preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned
for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against
a municipality in such case would be to enable it to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a contract is
violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot
be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has
ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or
government powers.
As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the best
protection of the public and to give the public the best
possible advantages by means of open competition between
the bidders." Thus, contracts requiring public bidding affect
public interest, and to change them without complying with
that requirement would indeed be against public policy.
There is, therefore, nothing to plaintiff-appellee's contention
that the parties in this case being in pari delicto should be
left in the situation where they are found, for "although the
parties are in pari delicto, yet the court may interfere and
grant relief at the suit of one of them, where public policy
requires its intervention, even though the result may be that
a benefit will be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt
with defendant. But here the guilt of the parties is not
considered as equal to the higher right of the public, and the
guilty party to whom the relief is granted is simply the
instrument by which the public is served."
In consonance with the principles enunciated above,
Resolution 59, series of 1947, reducing the rentals by 20% of
the original price, which was also passed without public
bidding, should likewise be held void, since a reduction of
the rental to be paid by the lessee is a substantial
alternation in the contract, making it a distinct and different
lease contract which requires the prescribed formality of
public bidding.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos (1957), supra.
Doctrine: Before a contract can be entered into by an LGU
the following must be present:
1. Funds have been appropriated
2. Amount necessary to cover expenditures is
available.
If both requirements are not present, the contract it is void.
Also, the provincial auditor or his representative must check
deliveries made by a contractor pursuant to a contract
lawfully and validly entered into; and when there is no check
up to show that materials have been actually delivered, the
146 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
Auditor General is not duty bound to pass and allow in audit
the sum claimed by the contractor.
Rivera v. Maclang (1963)
Facts: The municipality of Malolos called for bids for
furnishing and delivering materials to be used in the
maintenance and repair of barrio roads. Appellant won in the
bidding and was asked by the Municipal Treasurer to come to
his office for execution of the corresponding contract. The
contract was signed by appellant and by Carlo P. Maclang in
his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Malolos. Pursuant thereto
appellant subsequently delivered to the municipality gravel
and adobe stones valued at P19,235.00. The municipal
council of Malolos passed a resolution approving the
contract, but in spite of repeated demands by appellant the
price of the materials was not paid.
In 1954 appellant sought the intervention of the Presidential
Complaint and Action Commission, which referred the matter
to the General Auditing Office. That office turned down the
claim for payment, whereupon appellant filed in this Court a
petition for review. The Court sustained the action of the
General Auditing Office and held that the contract in
question was void as far as Malolos was concerned on the
ground that no money had been appropriated to meet the
obligation prior to the execution of the contract, as required
by section 607, RAC. However, in the same decision this
Court indicated that section 608 of the same Code afforded
appellant a remedy. Consequently, he filed the present
action against defendant in his personal capacity pursuant to
the said provision.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the contract
had been declared null and void by this Court, "it cannot
produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can
be made."
Issue: WON the dismissal was proper
Held: No
Ratio: Our ruling in the previous case is that the contract was
null and void visa-vis Malolos, by reason of non-compliance
with the requirement of section 607 RAC, which states that
"except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried in
stock, no contract involving the expenditure by any province,
municipality, chartered city, or municipal district of two
thousand pesos or more shall be entered into or authorized
until the treasurer of the political division concerned shall
have certified to the officer entering into such contract that
funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and
that the amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is
available for expenditure on account thereof."
It should be noted that the present action is against
defendant in his personal capacity on the strength of section
608 of the same code, which provides as follows:
SEC. 608. Void contract Liability of officer. A purported
contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the
next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the
officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been
wholly between private parties.
The position of defendant, as the officer who signed the
contract with appellant in violation of Sec 607, comes
squarely under the provision just quoted. His liability is
personal, as it the transaction had been entered into by him
as a private party. We take it that the intention of the law in
this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into
transactions with private individuals calling for the
expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of caution
so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised
or improvident action by those assuming to represent it.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Liability on Torts (Quasi-Delict)
Palafox et., al v. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)
Facts: Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of Provincial
Gov’t of Ilocos Norte detailed to the Office of District
Enginner.
While driving his truck in compliance with his duties, he ran
over Proceto Palafox killing him. Palafox was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. Heirs bagan
proceedings for damages against provincial gov’t.
Issue: WON Prov’l Gov’t is liable
Held: NO
Ratio: To attach liability to the state, a declaration must be
made that Torralba was a special agent within the scope of
Art 1903 par 5. But this principle applies only to the Insular
Gov’t as distinguished from prov’l or municipal gov’ts.
The heirs of Palafox invoked the doctrine of respondeat
superior, that the master shall answer, as illustrated in
Mendoza case concerning liability of municipal corporations
for negligent acts of its employees. Mendoza held that if the
negligent employee was engaged in the performance of
governmental duties as distinguished from proprietary or
business functions, the government is not liable.
The construction or maintenance of roads in which the driver
worked at the time of the accident is admittedly
governmental activities. Hence, Gov’t is not liable.
Mendoza v. De leon (1916)
Facts: This is an action for damages against the individual
members of the municipal council of the municipality of
Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an
exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the plaintiff under
the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission.
After use of a little more than one year, the plaintiff was
forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted
by the defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry
to another person.
Issue: WON the defendants are liable for damages
Held: Yes
Ratio: Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized
under the Municipal Code have both governmental and
corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the
adoption of regulation against fire and disease, preservation
of the public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons,
establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of
the latter class are the establishment of municipal
waterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the construction
and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets,
stables, bathing establishments, wharves, ferries, and
fisheries. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery,
fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and
slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township
shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer
period not exceeding five years as may have been previously
approved by the provincial board of the province in which
the municipality or township is located.
The two fold character of the powers of a municipality under
our Municipal Code is so apparent and its private or
corporate powers so numerous and important that we find
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the general
principles governing the liability of such entities to applicable
to it. The distinction between governmental powers on the
one hand, and corporate or proprietary or business powers
on the other, as the latter class is variously described in the
reported cases, has been long recognized in the United
States and there is no dissent from the doctrine.
147 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on
Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) section 38 and 39. “As is
indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the
municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents
in the performance of its governmental functions.
Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental
character by being delegated to the municipal governments.
Nor of the municipality which, for convenience the state
allows the municipality to select, change their character. To
preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the
community and so on to administer government, whether it
be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a
local organization. And the state being immune for injuries
suffered by private individuals in the administration of
strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by
the municipality in the performance of the same duties,
unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
In Claussen vs. City of Luverne: “It is elementary that neither
the state nor any of the subdivisions, like a municipality,
through which it operates, is liable for torts committed by
public officers, save in definitely excepted classes of cases.
The exemption is based upon the sovereign character of the
state and its agencies, and upon the absence of obligation,
and not on the ground that no means for remedy have been
provided. "The government," said Mr. Justice Story, "does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve
in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest." This general exemption has been applied to
municipal corporations in so far as the acts complained of
were, in the language of the memorandum of the trial court,
"done in exercising powers for the public at large as a
governing agency." While so acting, the city cannot be held
liable for misfeasance; and ... the rule of respondeat superior
has no application.”
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with
the performance of governmental duties which are in their
nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the
consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that
they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express
purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If they exercise
their honest judgment in the performance of their duties,
their errors cannot be charged against them. So it may be
said that in so far as its governmental functions are
concerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless expressly
made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they
perform their duties honestly and in good faith. The most
common illustration of both phrases of this rule is the action
for false imprisonment so often brought either against a
municipality or a municipal police officer. So, in Field vs. City
of Des Moines, it was held that a municipality, acting under
authority given it by the central government to destroy
houses in the path of a conflagration, was not liable in
damages in the absence of a statute expressly making it so.
From what has already been said, it should be clear that a
municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary or business
functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it
is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far
as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is
concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be
enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts
of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment
in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as
those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for
these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits
in the courts.
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts
and in tort. In a previous chapter we have considered at
length the authority of such corporations to make contracts,
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
the mode of exercising, and the effect of transcending the
power. This leaves but little to add in this place respecting
their liability in actions ex contractu. Upon an authorized
contract that is, upon a contract within the scope of the
charter or legislative powers of the corporation and duly
made by the proper officers or agents they are liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as private
corporations or natural persons. (Dillon)
But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar.
Here is it clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the
highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a
governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when
validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee
which the municipality is bound to respect. The matter is
thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal Corporations:
Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or
legislative authority, containing grants to water and light
companies and other public service corporations of the right
to use the streets for pipes, mains, etc., upon the condition
of the performance of service by the grantee, are, after
acceptance and performance by the grantee, contracts
protected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitution
against the enactment of any State law impairing the
obligation of contracts.
It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of
Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referred to, the
plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the
ferry in question for the period of his lease. Were the
municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a
judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the
contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual
method of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex
delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of
municipalities. But the present action is against the
members of the municipal council personally, and the
question arises: Are they liable? In administering the
patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of
directors of a private corporation. In disposing of the local
public utilities, if the term may be used, such as the fishing
and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable
judgment. It required some considerable amount of business
acumen to compel performance on the part of lessees of
these privileges in accordance with the terms of their leases
and in a manner which will not cause the property to
deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which are not
expressly provided for in contracts and which must be
settled, if possible, in a manner that will preserve the just
claims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable
that on occasion the councilors may have reason to believe
that a particular contract has been rescinded by the other
party or has never been legally entered into, in both of which
cases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the interest
of the municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vs.
Cajuigan, the lessee of a municipal fishery was evicted for
failing to pay his quarterly rents. The municipal authorities
rightly held that the contract was rescinded but forcibly
evicted the lessee instead of resorting to the courts. Hence,
in an action by the municipality against the lessee and his
bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowed
the lessee on his counterclaim for the loss caused by the
forcible eviction. Nevertheless, we do not think the
councilors could have been held personally liable for their
error in resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs was
an error of judgment, and honest mistake on their part as to
the rights of the municipality in the premises. We think the
rule of personal liability should be with municipal councilors
in such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an
ordinary private corporation.
Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of
judgment, it follows naturally that they are not liable for the
mismanagement of the corporate affairs where such
148 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
mismanagement is a mistake of judgment. The wisdom of
this rule is not only approved by common experience but by
law writers and all courts. A rule so rigid as to hold directors
personally liable for honest mistakes in corporate
management would deter all prudent business men from
accepting such positions. The remedy of stockholders in all
such cases is by a change in the directory. ... The rule is that
courts will not interfere even in the doubtful cases. But
directors and managing officers may be liable for
mismanagement to warrant the interposition of a court
either as against the contemplated action of the directors, or
a majority of the stockholders, or to give relief by way of
damages after the action as been taken; a case must be
made out which plainly shows that such action is so far
opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to
lead to clear inference that no one thus acting could have
been influenced by any honest desire to secure such
interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to
subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the
consequences to the corporation, and in a manner
inconsistent with its interests.
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that
there was any justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the
plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. On the contrary,
the defendant councilors attempted to justify their action on
the ground that the ferry which he was operating was not
the one leased to him; this, in spite of the fact that the vice-
president had personally placed him in possession of it more
than a year before, and the fact that he had operated this
ferry for over year, evidently with the knowledge of the
defendants. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of which
the plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he leased
that no reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever
upon the question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescinding
the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the
municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid
reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting
for the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the defendants are liable jointly and severally
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the
rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in
question. In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to
take into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs.
The Moro Province, nor the distinction made by the courts in
the United States between the liability of a municipal
corporation, made such acceptance of a village or city
charter, and the involuntary quasi corporations known as
counties, towns, school districts, and especially the
townships of New England. Upon the question of the amount
of damages sustained, we accept the findings of the lower
court.
Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (1991),
supra.
Ratio: The doctrine of non-suability of the State is
expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti,
to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in
case of money claims involving liability arising from
contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be
passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when the
government enters into business contracts, thereby
descending to the level of the other contracting party, and
also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they
are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
A distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be
sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable
for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability
of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver,
acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. Fontanilla).
According to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipal
corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are
twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance
of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule
131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the
driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks
pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case of
Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District
Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction
or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver
worked at the time of the accident are admittedly
governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and
jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of
the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.
Fernando v. CA and City of Davao (1992)
Facts: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property
of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the
septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico
Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. Bascon was
notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before
such date, bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando
and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
149 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned
that the five victims entered the septic tank without
clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the
market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be
almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones
who did the re-emptying.
The heirs of the deceased filed an action against the City of
Davao. The trial court dismissed the case. The IAC reversed
and ordered the City to pay compensatory and moral
damages. However, upon MR, the IAC reversed and
dismissed the case.
Issue: WON the City of Davao is guilty of negligence
Held: No
Ratio: Negligence has been defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission
causes damage to another, there being negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. As to what would
constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case of
Picart v. Smith provides: The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining
the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct
is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove
under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the
defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. Proof of
such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the
claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of
the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the
product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a
difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the
proximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co, this Court set a guideline for a
judicious assessment of the situation: Difficulty seems to be
apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall
be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there
could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim
not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his
own proper hurt.
Petitioners fault the city of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation
of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They
contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that
there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no
efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit
that the public respondent's gross negligence was the
proximate cause of the fatal incident.
We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that
the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-
empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market
master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public
toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder,
Bascon. The city, therefore, lost no time in taking up
remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an
undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure
to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market
have been using the public toilet for their personal
necessities but have remained unscathed.
Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation
pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the city
government and presented witnesses to attest on this lack.
However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their
witnesses were not expert witnesses. On the other hand,
Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified
and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements
like emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and
septic tank have been complied with. He stated that the
ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building
as it could also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is
usually done in residential buildings. The petitioners
submitted no competent evidence to corroborate their oral
testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada.
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that
warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the
toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already
in place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not
nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil
Code which would necessitate warning signs for the
protection of the public. While the construction of these
public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not
one of those requirements.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is
unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The
accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on
their own and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are
no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this
kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the
job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v.
Phil. Motors Corporation, We held that when a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do. The fatal
accident in this case would not have happened but for the
victims' negligence.
Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market
master to supervise the area where the septic tank is located
is a reflection of the negligence of the public respondent. We
do not think so. The market master knew that work on the
septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered
that the bidding had just been conducted. Although the
winning bidder was already known, the award to him was
still to be made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the
other hand, the accident which befell the victims who are not
in any way connected with the winning bidder happened
150 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
before the award could be given. Considering that the case
was yet no award to commence work on the septic tank, the
duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise
the work could not have started. Also, the victims could not
have been seen working in the area because the septic tank
was hidden by a garbage storage which is more or less ten
(10) meters away from the comfort room itself. The
surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without
clearance from the market master or any of the security
guards goes against their good faith. Even their relatives or
family members did not know of their plan to clean the
septic tank.
Finally, petitioners' insistence on the applicability of Article
24 of the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. We approve
of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one of the victims
was invited to bid for said project, he did not win the bid,
therefore, there is a total absence of contractual relations
between the victims and the City Government of Davao City
that could give rise to any contractual obligation, much less,
any liability on the part of Davao City." The accident was
indeed tragic and We empathize with the petitioners.
However, the herein circumstances lead Us to no other
conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of
the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.
Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from
the public respondent.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA and Jurado (1992), supra.
Ratio: The private respondent anchors his claim for
damages on Article 27 CC (Refusal to Render Service). It has
been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the
"bribery system, where the public official, for some flimsy
excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty until
he gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may also
be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference to the
responsibilities of public service. The provision presupposes
that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his
official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is
justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or
damage the complainant has sustained.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the
Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to
bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be
said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were
motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in
refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to
show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent
for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners
stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the
mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were
not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On
the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was
uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality
without discrimination or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the
scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that it
was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a
judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to
be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellate
court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive
officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it
as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang
Bayan or annulled by the courts.
The private respondent complains that as a result of the
petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his
business all this time and earning substantial profit
therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the
prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and
later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to
"donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate
his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante
that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners'
wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but
still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or
profit.
Torio v. Fontanilla (1978)
Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage
the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21,
22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed
creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive
Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on
entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman.
the council appropriated the amount of P100 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another
for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the construction
of the stage.
During the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Vicente
Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General
Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint to recover
damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the
individual members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Their
defense was that the holding of a town fiesta was an
exercise of governmental functions. The councilors
contended that they were merely acting as agents of the
municipality.
The judge ruled that the defendants exercised due diligence
in the construction of the stage. Also, the collapse of the
stage was due to force majeure. Hence, the complaint was
dismissed. The CA reversed and ordered the defendants to
pay moral and actual damages.
Issue: WON celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in
the excercise of a municipality's governmental or public
function or is it or a private or proprietary character
Held: Governmental
Ratio: Under Philippine laws municipalities are political
bodies corporate and as such are endowed with the faculties
of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through
their respective municipal governments in conformity with
law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia
sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The
powers of a municipality are twofold in character public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate,
private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers
are those exercised by the corporation in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and
they include the legislative, judicial public, and political
Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial private and corporate.
In Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, relying
mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities
of the municipality as governmental, e.g.: regulations
against fire, disease, preservation of public peace,
maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of schools,
post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter
houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries, and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses,
cemeteries and airports among others, are also recognized
as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.
151 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a
governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can
be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing
statute on the matter, 10 nor from its officers, so long as
they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or
that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With respect
to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contract or
ex delicto.
The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of
Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code simply gives authority to the
municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even
if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical
event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit
of the community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure
profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the
town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the
nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which
are for public service.
There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of
a municipality; the circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element,
however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is
that it is governmental in essence, otherwise, the function
becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no
governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
Issue: WON petitioners are liable
Held: Yes
Ratio: It follows that under the doctrine of respondent
superior, the municipality is to be held liable for damages for
the death of Fontanilia if that was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or
agents. On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held
that there was negligence. It appeared that the front portion
of the stage was not supported by any braces. The CA also
found that the stage was not strong enough considering that
only P100 was appropriate for the construction of two stages
and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden
planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material
We likewise observe that although the stage was described
by the Petitioners as being supported by "" posts,
nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5
on each side. Where were the rest?
The "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during
the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan,
and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the
donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela
stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage show
had the right to expect that the Municipality through its
"Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put
up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight
or burden of the performance and take the necessary
measures to insure the personal safety of the participants.
Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade
ability and/or liability under the c that it was Jose Macaraeg
who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through
its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the
sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely
as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of
respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting
within his assigned tasks.
Issue: WON the municipal councilors who enacted the
ordinance were liable
Held: No
Ratio: We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals
erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against the for
this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-
performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does
not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying
out an official duty.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held
that the celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of
Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that
ruling. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality
stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of
directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has
a personality, separate and distinct from its officers,
directors, or persons composing it 26 and the latter are not
as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's
employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith
or gross or wanton negligence on their part.
The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of
his office, is not personally Stable for the torts of his
corporation; he Must be shown to have personally voted for
or otherwise participated in them Officers of a corporation
'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation
merely because of their official relation to it, but because of
some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to
a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To make an
officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the
corporation there must have been upon his part such a
breach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about,
the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the
wrongful act.
Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks
Ambition on the corporate are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of the exhibitor. On these people We absolve
Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective construction
of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted
spectators to go up the platform.
Liability by Express Provision of Law and contracts
City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)
Facts: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of a "loading
and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down
town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to
hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin
or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit
the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing
broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood
flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came
to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of
them brought Teotico to the PGH. In addition to the lacerated
wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on
the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper
lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
152 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
treasurer and chief of police. The trial court dismissed the
complaitn. The CA affirmed, except insofar as the City of
Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages
in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.
Issue: Should RA 409 prevail over Art 2189 of the CC
Held: No
Ratio: RA 409: The city shall not be liable or held for
damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.
Art 2189 CC: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil
Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-
matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic
Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of
the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce
the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death
of, or injury suffered by any person by reason "specifically"
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to
Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of
Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an
allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his
amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the
amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the
streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept
in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm
drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City
and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant
and zealous in the performance of their respective functions
and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City
had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is
under its control and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which
had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set
up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the rendition
of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even
if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control
or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by
Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated
May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs
the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the
giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities
in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely
implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917,
concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway
funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction,
maintenance and improvement of national primary, national
secondary and national aid provincial and city roads shall be
accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and
Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from
such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of
the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in
connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of
fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to
our review.
Abella v. Municipality of Naga (1952)
Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur sentencing the municipality of
Naga, now Naga City, to pay the plaintiff, now appellee,
P300 damages resulting from the closing of a municipal
street.
The complaint alleged two causes of action and the parties
submitted in the court below an agreed statement of facts
on both. As the second cause of action was dismissed and
the plaintiff did not appeal, and as the stipulated facts are
long and somewhat involved in many or most of them have
become irrelevant to the issues formulated in this appeal, it
will suffice to state for the purpose of these issues, that the
defendant municipality by resolution ordered the closing of
that part of a municipal street which ran between the public
market and the plaintiff's property, and used the closed
thoroughfare to expand the market. "As a consequence of
this resolution, and immediately after the passage of the
same, says the agreement permanent, semi-permanent, as
well as temporary constructions were allowed by the
defendant municipality of Naga along the sidewalk of
Plaintiff's property and abutting to said property, facing P.
Prieto Street, and extending out in the middle of the same
street, hence depriving the plaintiff's property of access to
said street, and consequently retarding her reconstructions.
"It was further stipulated "that if all the damages is to be
awarded the plaintiff, the same should not exceed the sum
of Three hundred pesos (P300)."
The appellant is the municipality of or city of Naga and the
burden of its contention is that "it acted and exercised its
police power" "prompted to preserve the peace and good
order of the community and promote the general welfare;"
and this being the case, it believes that it is not liable for
damages.
Held: The appellant misses the point. The municipality or
city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or with
acting without authority, or with invasion of plaintiff's
property rights; the basis of the lower court's decision in
Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code copied in
153 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
appellant's brief, which provides that no municipal road,
street, etc. or any part thereof "shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."
The question then for determination by the court below was
reduced to whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by defendant
municipality's action. That she was economically damaged,
the stipulation of facts admits; and that the indemnity
assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered,
there is no dispute. As a matter of fact, the damages
awarded seem to be nominal judged by the description of
the plaintiff's interests adversely affected by the conversion
of P. Prieto Street into a market.
Satisfying/Executing Judgment Against Municipal
Corporations
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (1927)
Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of
Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase price
of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of
592 sq. m., and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59
sq. m., which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for
widening said street. The CFI Iloilo sentenced the said
municipality to pay the Tantoco the amount so claimed, plus
the interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed
by the Supreme Court.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was
unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a
writ of execution issue against the property of the said
municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto
trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and
Mandurriao. After notice of the sale of said property had
been made, and a few days before the sale, the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the
attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said
attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and
violative of the rights of the municipality. By order of 12
August 1925, the Court declared the attachment levied upon
the aforementioned property of the municipality null and
void, thereby dissolving the said attachment. From this order
Tantoco has appealed by bill of exceptions.
Held/Ratio: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
appealed from with costs against Tantoco.
Municipalities’ capacity to sue and to be sued;
Capacity to acquire property
The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code,
provides that "Municipalities are political bodies corporate,
and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations, to be exercised by and through their respective
municipal government in conformity with law. It shall be
competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue
and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire
and hold real and personal property for municipal purposes,
and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter specified or
otherwise conferred upon them by law." The Administrative
Code does not specify the kind of property that a
municipality may acquire.
Property of provinces and municipalities
Article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of
provinces and (municipalities) into property for public use
and patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the
Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, drives and public
improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the
said towns or provinces, are property for public use. All other
property possessed by the said towns and provinces is
patrimonial and shall be subject to the provision of the Civil
Code except as provided by special laws.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Distinction according to Manresa; of little practical
importance in view of different principles under
American Rule
Commenting upon article 344, Manresa says that "In
accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we
must distinguish, as to the patrimonial property of the towns,
"between that of common benefit and that which is private
property of the town. The first differs from property for public
use in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to
neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and furthermore,
such use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind
of property, for by its very nature it may be enjoyed as
though it were private property. The third group, that is,
private property, is used in the name of the town or province
by the entities representing it and, like any private property,
giving a source of revenue." Such distinction, however, is of
little practical importance in this jurisdiction in view of the
different principles underlying the functions of a municipality
under the American rule.
Property of public domain applies to municipal
property for public use; both not within the commerce
of man
The principle governing property of the public domain of the
State is applicable to property for public use of the
municipalities as said municipal property is similar in
character. The principle is that the property for public use of
the State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not
within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the
public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.
US Law and Jurisprudence: Municipal properties for
public use, but not properties for quasi-private
purposes, exempted from attachment and execution
As expounded by McQuillin in Municipal Corporations (Vol. 3,
par.1160): State statutes often provide that court houses,
jails other buildings owned by municipalities and the lots on
which they stand shall be exempt from attachment and
execution. But independent of express statutory exemption,
as a general proposition, property, real and personal, held by
municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of their
inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is exempt. Public
buildings, school houses, streets, squares, parks, wharves,
engines and engine houses, and the like, are not subject to
execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors carried
in a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for the
exemption is obvious. Municipal corporations are created for
public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their
aggregate or public capacity. That they may properly
discharge such public functions corporate property and
revenues are essential, and to deny them these means the
very purpose of their creation would be materially impeded,
and in some instances practically destroy it. There is
something very repugnant to the moral sense in the idea
that a municipal corporation should contract debts, and that
having no resources but the taxes which are due to it these
should not be subjected by legal process to the satisfaction
of its creditors. This consideration, deduced from the
principles of moral equity has only given way to the more
enlarged contemplation of the great and paramount
interests of public order and the principles of government.
Thus, tt is generally held that property owned by a
municipality, where not used for a public purpose but for
quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a
judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. This
rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal
corporation and the like. But the mere fact that corporate
property held for public uses is being temporarily used for
private purposes does not make it subject to execution.
As stated in Corpus Juris (Vol. 23, p. 355), “the rule is that
property held for public uses, such as public buildings,
streets, squares, parks, promenades, wharves landing
154 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
places, fire engines, hose and hose carriages. engine houses,
public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally
everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject to
levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The
rule also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer.
Likewise it has been held that taxes due to a municipal
corporation or county cannot be seized under execution by a
creditor of such corporation. But where a municipal
corporation or county owns in its proprietary, as
distinguished from its public or governmental capacity,
property not useful or used for a public purpose but for quasi
private purposes, the general rule is that such property may
be seized and sold under execution against the corporation,
precisely as similar property of individuals is seized and sold.
But property held for public purposes is not subject to
execution merely because it is temporarily used for private
purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it
becomes subject to execution. Whether or not property held
as public property is necessary for the public use is a
political, rather than a judicial question. Where property of a
municipal or other public corporation is sought to be
subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered
against such corporation, the question as to whether such
property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage
and purposes for which it is held."
US Law and Jurisprudence: Insurance money derived
from destroyed municipal property exempt from
execution likewise exempted
If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed,
the insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is also
exempt (McQuillin).
US Law and Jurisprudence: Members or inhabitants
not personally liable for debts of the municipality
The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation
proper are not personally liable for the debts of the
municipality, except that in the New England States the
individual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained
(McQuillin).
US Jurisprudence: Wharf a property for public use and
not subject to attachment
In City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd.
(140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf
for unloading sugar and molasses, open to the public, was
property for the public use of the City of New Orleans and
was not subject to attachment for the payment of the debts
of the said city. In Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U S., 149;
25 Law. ed., 430), it was held that a public wharf on the
banks of the Mississippi River was public property and not
subject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of
New Orleans where said wharf was located. It was held that
land was public property as necessary as a public street and
was not subject to execution on account of the debts of the
city. It was further held that the fees collected were also
exempt from execution because they were a part of the
income of the city.
Tufexis v. Olaguera; Special concession of the right to
usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like
any ordinary right
It was held in Tufexis v. Olaguera, where the public market
had been levied upon by virtue of the execution arising from
the debt of the municipality of Guinobatan, that “even
though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of
his debtor's property, yet when among such property there is
included the special right granted by the Government of
usufruct in a building intended for a public service, and when
this privilege is closely related to a service of a public
character, such right of the creditor to the collection of a
debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said special
privilege of usufruct in a public market is not absolute and
may be exercised only through the action of a court of
justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained under
the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor. The special
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
concession of the right to usufruct in a public market cannot
be attached like any ordinary right, because that would be to
permit a person who has contracted with the state or with
the administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a
service of a public character, to be substituted, without the
knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities, by
one who took no part in the contract, thus giving rise to the
possibility of the regular course of a public service being
disturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee, to
the prejudice of the state and the public interests. The
privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy
the usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached
and sold, and a creditor of such person can recover his debt
only out of the income or revenue obtained by the debtor
from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege, in the
same manner that the rights of the creditors of a railroad
company can be exercised and their creditors collected only
out of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has been
made therefrom of the operating expenses of the road. “
Character of property for public use basis why
property of a municipality necessary for
governmental purposes may not be attached
The movable and immovable property of a municipality,
necessary for governmental purposes, may not be attached
and sold for the payment of a judgment against the
municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the
character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that
the property of public use of the municipality be exempt
from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain
property of private individuals in accordance with section
452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Municipal income exempt from levy and execution
Even the municipal income is exempt from levy and
execution. In Municipal Corporations by Dillon (Vol. 1, p.
467), it was stated that "municipal corporations are
instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public
good. They exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a
portion of the sovereign power. The main object of their
creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state,
and to provide for the police and local government of certain
designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are
invested with certain governmental powers and charged with
civil, political, and municipal duties. To enable them
beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these
duties, they are clothed with the authority to raise revenues,
chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes, as by
licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the public
corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to
perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and
adequated supply of revenue, such a corporation is
practically destroyed, and the ends of its erection thwarted.
Based upon considerations of this character, it is the settled
doctrine of the law that not only the public-property but also
the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot
be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for
taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of
officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so
declared by statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of the
public revenues by the creditor is maintained, although the
corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but the
taxes which it is authorized to collect."
Municipality of Makati v. CA (1990)
This is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by
petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondents.
Private respondents now want to get the just compensation
from Makati.
General Rule: In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule
that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute. In the instant case,
155 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
there is already an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant
to PD No. 42.
Remedy where there is no law appropriating funds
yet: Note that, where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the
remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.
Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila (1984)
Facts: On August 12, 1964, V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates
represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract
with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo
Cuneta. The contract entitled "Contract and Agreement" was
for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall at F.B. Harrison
St., Pasay City. Pursuant to the contract, the respondent
proceeded with the construction of the new Pasay City Hall
building as per duly approved plans and specifications. The
respondent accomplished under various stages of
construction the amount of work (including supplies and
materials) equivalent to an estimated value of P1,713,096 of
the total contract price of P4,914,500.80.
The appellants paid only the total amount of P1,100,000 to
the respondent leaving an amount of P613,096 immediately
due from the petitioner to the respondent. Notwithstanding
demands for payment thereof, the petitioner failed to remit
the amount of P613,096.00 to the respondent.
On May 16, 1968, respondent filed an action for specific
performance with damages against herein petitioners-
appellants before the respondent Court.
The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which
was submitted to the Municipal Board of Pasay City for its
consideration. Protracted pre-trial hearings and conferences
were held where the respondent Court suggested and
advised that "under the principle of quantum meruit, the
plaintiff is forthwith entitled to at least that which is due to
him for defendants under the contract and that public
interest must perforce require the continuity of construction
of a public work project.” The Municipal Board of Pasay
enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the
Compromise Agreement and also authorized and empowered
the incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the
appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final
approval of the respondent Court herein. The court approved
the compromise agreement.
On April 10, 1969, the appellants filed an urgent motion
seeking a declaration of legality of the original contract and
agreement dated August 4, 1964 from the Court. On May 10,
1969, the Court issued an order declaring that the original
contract is legal and valid. On July 9, 1969, an application for
and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the
funds of appellant Pasay City Government with the Philippine
National Bank. On July 11, 1969, the appellant filed an
urgent motion to set aside the respondent Court's order of
June 21, 1969 and to quash the writ of execution issued
pursuant thereto upon the following grounds: 1) that the
execution sought was then still premature, the period of 90
days stipulated not having elapsed as yet; 2) that the
obligations of the parties under the Compromise Agreement
were reciprocal and the appellee not having put up a new
performance bond in the sufficient amount equivalent to
20% of the remaining cost of construction as per agreement,
the appellants cannot be obliged to pay the sum due
appellee as yet; 3) that the Sheriff has no power or authority
to levy or garnish on execution the general funds, especially
more so, the trust funds of the defendant Pasay City. On July
19, 1969, the respondent Court issued an order stating that
inasmuch as the defendant has not yet paid the plaintiff as
of this date then "the writ of execution and of garnishment
are declared to be again in full force and effect.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Ratio: The two purposes of a compromise agreement are
enunciated in Article 2028 of the New Civil Code. The first
purpose - "to avoid a litigation" - occurs when there is a
threat of an impending litigation. At this point, no case has
yet reached the courts. The moment a case has been filed in
court then the second purpose - "to put an end to one
already commenced" - applies.
In the herein case, We are concerned with the second
purpose. The latter purpose is given effect in Article 2037 of
the New Civil Code which reads: "Article 2037. A
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise."
A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract
which is the law between the parties themselves. A
judgment on a compromise is a final and executory. It is
immediately executory in the absence of a motion to set the
same aside on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress.
It is obvious that the respondent did not only succeed in
enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff likewise wants to
rescind the said compromise. It is clear from the language of
the law, specifically Article 2041 CC that one of the parties to
a compromise has two options: 1) to enforce the
compromise; or 2) to rescind the same and insist upon his
original demand. The respondent in the case herein before
Us wants to avail of both of these options. This can not be
done. The respondent cannot ask for rescission of the
compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the first
option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of
execution resulting thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay
City funds deposited with the PNB which eventually was
delivered to the respondent.
Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-
appellants moved for its quashal alleging among other
things the exemption of the government from execution.
This move on the part of the petitioner-appellant is at first
glance laudable for "all government funds deposited with the
Philippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of
the government, whether by way of general or special
deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy. But, inasmuch as an ordinance has
already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 of payment to the respondent, then the herein
case is covered by the exception to the general rule stated in
the case of Republic vs. Palacio: "Judgments against a State
in cases where it has consented to be sued, generally
operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in
the absence of express provision; otherwise they cannot be
enforced by processes of the law; and it is for the legislature
to provide for the payment in such manner as sees fit."
Having established that the compromise agreement was
final and immediately executory, and in fact as already
enforced, the respondent court was in error where it still
entertained the supplemental complaint filed by the
respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had
no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a
decision has become final and executory, the court no longer
has the power and jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and
its only power thereof is to order its execution.
What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the
compromise agreement are the words "in proportion." If the
parties really intended the legal rate of 20% performance
bond to refer to the whole unfinished work, then the
provision should have required the plaintiff contractor to
submit and file a new performance bond to cover the
remaining value/cost of the unfinished work of the
construction. Using the words in proportion then significantly
changed the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean a
156 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon)
performance bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work to
be done.
And, We note that in the Contract and Agreement, the
respondent-appellee was allowed to file a performance bond
of P222,250.00 which is but 5% of the total bid of
P4,914,500.80. A security bond was likewise filed with an
amount of P97,290.00. The sum total of bond then filed was
P320,540.00 which is just 6.5% of the total bid. It is rather
curious why all of a sudden the petitioners-appellants are
insisting on a 20% performance bond of the entire unfinished
work when they were quite content with a bond just 5% of
the entire work. For Us to allow the petitioners-appellants to
adamantly stick to the 20% performance bond would be
tantamount to allowing them to evade their obligation in the
compromise agreement. This cannot be allowed. The bond of
a contractor for a public work should not be extended
beyond the reasonable intent as gathered from the purpose
and language of the instrument construed in connection with
the proposals, plans and specifications, and contract.
The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up the
profit of the contractor, who is faced with the fluctuation of
prices of materials due to inflation and devaluation. Right
now, many contractors cannot proceed with the
implementation of their contracts because of the
extraordinary rise in cost of materials and labor. No
contractor would be willing to bid for public works contracts
under the oppressive interpretation by petitioners-
appellants.
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois
(1955)
Facts: Teodoro Manaois having obtained a judgment
against the municipality of Paoay, Judge De Guzman of said
province issued a writ of execution against the municipality.
In compliance with said writ the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos
Norte levied upon and attached the following properties:
The amount of One thousand seven hundred twelve pesos
and one centavo (P1,712.01) in the Municipal Treasury of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte, representing the rental paid by Mr.
Demetrio Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the defendant
municipality;
About forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons
by the Municipality.
The municipality asked for the dissolution of the attachment
since they are properties for public use. It is therefore
necessary to ascertain the nature and status back a few
years, specifically, to the year 1937.
Issue: WON the properties can be levied
Held: No (but the revenues can be levied upon)
Ratio: There can be no question that properties for public
use held by municipal corporation are not subject to levy and
execution. The authorities are unanimous on this point. This
Court in the case of Viuda de Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of
Iloilo after citing Manresa, the works of McQuillin and Dillon
on Municipal Corporations, and Corpus Juris, held that
properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the
streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets,
together with the land on which they stand are exempt from
execution. Even public revenues of municipal corporations
destined for the expenses of the municipality are also
exempt from the execution. The reason behind this
exemption extended to properties for public use, and public
municipal revenues is that they are held in trust for the
people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the
purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and
that to subject said properties and public funds to execution
would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances
destroy said purpose.
S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.
Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
municipality in its proprietary capacity is treated by great
weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may
be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The
same rule applies to municipal funds derived from
patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that
shares of stocks held by municipal corporations are subject
to execution. If this is true, with more reason should income
or revenue coming from these shares of stock, in the form of
interest or dividends, be subject to execution?
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte, which had been parceled out or divided into lots and
later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an
annual rental are clearly not subject to execution. In the first
place, they do not belong to the municipality. They may well
be regarded as property of State. What the municipality of
Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or
the right to use said municipal waters, granted to it by
section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code
Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay
over its municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce a
judgment against the town? We are not prepared to answer
this question in the affirmative because there are powerful
reasons against its propriety and legality. In the first place, it
is not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right
of the town. It is based merely on a grant, more or less
temporary, made by the Legislature. Take the right of fishery
over the sea or marine waters bordering a certain
municipality. These marine waters are ordinarily for public
use, open to navigation and fishing by the people. The
Legislature thru section 2321 of the Administrative Code, as
already stated, saw fit to grant the usufruct of said marine
waters for fishery purpose, to the towns bordering said
waters. Said towns have no visited right over said marine
waters. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as
a matter of public policy, may at any time, repeal or modify
said section 2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and
open these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature
may grant the usufruct or right of fishery to the provinces
concerned so that said provinces may operate or administer
them by leasing them to private parties.
All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is
not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or
absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow
it to be taken away from it as its property through execution.
Another reason against subjecting this usufruct or right of
fishery over municipal waters, to execution, is that, if this
were to be allowed and this right sold on execution, the
buyer would immediately step into the shoes of the
judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably buys
only the right of the municipality. He does not buy the fishery
itself nor the municipal waters because that belongs to the
State. All that the buyer might do would be to let out or rent
to private individuals the fishery rights over the lots into
which the municipal waters had been parceled out or
divided, and that is, after public bidding. This, he must do
because that is the only right granted to the municipality by
the Legislature, a right to be exercised in the manner
provided by law, namely, to rent said fishery lots after public
bidding. Then, we shall have a situation rather anomalous to
be sure, of a private individual conducting public bidding,
renting to the highest bidders fishery lots over municipal
waters which are property of the State, and appropriating
the results to his own private use. The impropriety, if not
illegality, of such a contingency is readily apparent. But that
is not all. The situation imagined implies the deprivation of
the municipal corporation of a source of a substantial
income, expressly provide by law. Because of all this, we
hold that the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its
municipal waters, particularly, the forty odd fishery lots
included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not subject to
execution.
157 | L o c a l Government (Guanzon) S . Y. 08-09: 2nd Sem.

But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the

renting of these fishery lots is certainly subject to execution.
It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish this kind
of revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses
and market fees are provided for and imposed by the law,
they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose
of financing the governmental activities and functions of
municipal corporations. In fact, the real estate taxes
collected by a municipality do not all go to it. A portion
thereof goes to the province, in the proportion provided for
by law. For the same reason, municipal markets are
established not only to provide a place where the people
may sell and buy commodities but also to provide public
revenues for the municipality. To many towns, market fees
constitute the bulk of their assets and incomes. These
revenues are fixed and definite, so much so that the annual
appropriations for the expenses of the municipalities are
based on these revenues. Not so with the income derived
form fisheries. In the first place, the usufruct over municipal
waters was granted by the Legislature merely to help or
bolster up the economy of municipal government. There are
many towns in the Philippines, specially in the interior, which
do not have municipal waters for fishery purpose and yet
without much source of revenue, they can function, which
goes to prove that this kind of revenue is not indispensable
for the performance of governmental functions. In the
second place, the amount of this income is far from definite
or fixed. It depends upon the amounts which prospective
bidders or lessees are willing to pay. If fishing on these
marine water, lakes and rivers in the municipality is good,
the bids would be high and the income would be substantial.
If the fish in these waters is depleted or, if for some reasons
or another, fishing is not profitable, then the income would
be greatly reduced. In other words, to many municipalities
engaged in this business of letting out municipal waters for
fishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline, so that even for
fishing purposes, it is sort of sideline, so that even without it
the municipality may still continue functioning and perform
its essential duties as such municipal corporations.
We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal
waters for fishing purposes as a business for the reasons
that the law itself allowed said municipalities to engage in it
for profit. And it is but just that a town so engaged should
pay and liquidate obligations contracted in connection with
said fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.
In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about
forty in the municipality of Paoay, mentioned at the
beginning of this decision are not subject to execution. For
this reason, the levy and attachment made by the Provincial
Sheriff of Ilocos Norte of theses fishery lots is void and the
order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan insofar as it
failed to dissolve the attachment made on these lots is
reversed. However, the amount of P1,712.01 in the
municipal treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by
Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by the municipality of
Paoay is a proper subject of levy, and the attachment made
thereon by the Sheriff is valid. We may add that other
amounts coming or due from lessees of the forty odd fishery
lots leased by the municipality to different persons may also
be attached or garnished to satisfy the judgement against
the municipality of Paoay.