UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK *************************************************** UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vs.

ROBERT LAWRENCE, Defendant. *************************************************** Transcript of an Excerpt of a Re-Sentencing Proceeding held on January 14, 2014, before the HONORABLE DAVID N. HURD, at the United States Federal Courthouse, 10 Broad Street, Utica, New York, stenographically recorded by Nancy L. Freddoso, Registered Professional Reporter. A P P E A R A N C E S Government: UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ROOM 900, HANLEY FEDERAL BLDG. 100 SOUTH CLINTON STREET SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13261-7198 BY: GRANT C. JAQUITH, AUSA JOHN DUNCAN, AUSA FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 4 CLINTON SQUARE SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13202 BY: LISA A. PEEBLES, FPD 92-CR-35

Defendant:

NANCY L. FREDDOSO, R.P.R. Official United States Court Reporter 10 Broad Street, Room 316 Utica, New York 13501 (315) 793-8114

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 THE COURT: First of all, I have to consider the applicable sentencing guidelines as well as the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), which are included, but I believe I should also advise everyone here what the Supreme Court has said in the Miller case, which of course I am required to follow. In the Miller case, the Supreme Court stated: "Mandatory life without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments." It further stated: "Youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole." "We insist that a sentencer have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities of youth." The Supreme Court further stated: "By removing youth from the balance, by subjecting a juvenile to the same life without parole sentence applicable to an adult, these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender." This court goes on to further state: "Children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, they are less deserving of the

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 most severe punishment." "Three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility leading to recklessness, impulsiveness, and needless risk-taking." "Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers. They have limited control over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings." "And third, a child's character is not as well formed as an adult's. His traits are less fixed, and his actions less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity." The Court states and instructs to us lower judges: "To recap: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features. Among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences." "It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him, and from which he cannot usually extricate himself, no matter how brutal or dysfunctional." "It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetence associated with youth." "And finally, mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it." "The decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." "Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make the judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Again, this court stated and directed me that: "The Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders." So I have taken into consideration all of the factors that have been directed to me by the Supreme Court in this case. I am very sorry for the family of Police Officer Wallie Howard, Junior, that they have to go through

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 this again and again and again. First, I note the awful nature and the tragic consequences of the crime. This offense involved a shooting death of a law enforcement officer during a botched drug robbery. The defendant's use of a firearm during that planned robbery resulted in the death of Officer Howard, obviously an outstanding police officer, as evidenced by the number of police officers that are here in this courtroom, a family member beloved by his sister and mother, and also beloved by the Syracuse Police Department as evidenced by the words of the Chief just a few moments ago. This crime and tragedy not only took Officer Howard's life, but obviously brought loss and sorrow to his family, law enforcement, and to the community. In addition, Defendant Lawrence's decisions and actions have profound effects, not only in relation to the death of Officer Howard, but the decision to use the gun he carried also led to four co-defendants receiving life sentences without the possibility of parole, sentences which were justly warranted, but became required under the law because of what the defendant did. In addition to these five lives, there is no way of knowing how many lives were altered or ruined as a result of the defendant's action. The government points out, and I agree, that the defendant has lied at trial, and he lied in the subsequent

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 affidavit. And quite frankly, at this late date, his remorse, or lack thereof, will play little role in my final decision. I have considered several mitigating factors, which I must do, most of which have not been addressed by the government. The defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offense. His age and disadvantaged life created a situation where the older co-defendants, especially Defendant Davidson, exhibited great influence and control over him. The defendant did not play a role in the planning of the robbery. He was only to receive three hundred dollars for his role in a robbery that the co-defendants believed might entail the robbery of over forty thousand dollars. The defendant did not take any part in obtaining the weapon he used, rather he was given the gun and instructed on what to do during the planned robbery by Defendant Davidson. While it was a reasonably foreseeable that someone would be killed or injured in the robbery given the nature of the events and the presence of the firearms, the murder of Officer Howard was not planned in advance. The defendant did not know Agent Howard, Officer Howard was a police officer. Instead, the defendant believed he was a drug dealer. That was the entire purpose of

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 the police operation. All of the defendants believed that Officer Howard was a drug dealer when, in fact, he was an undercover agent. While it is unclear exactly what transpired inside the vehicle, the evidence shows something caused Officer Howard to fire his weapon first, and the defendant, believing he was protecting an associate from another criminal drug dealer, then fired. He never intended to kill a police officer. He intended to shoot, as instructed by Defendant Davidson, another drug dealer. Finally, I note nothing in record before me indicates the defendant has engaged in violence while in prison. He has completed various education and training courses. He received good reports about his work assignments, and he assisted his mother by occasionally sending her money he earned in prison. He was earning about fifty cents an hour. And at one time, he sent her over twelve thousand dollars. His disciplinary history, while showing he engaged in minor misconduct numerous times earlier in his incarceration, also shows he only had one minor offense in the past ten years. This record of his activities and conduct was all during a time when the defendant believed he would be incarcerated for life, which very well still may be the case. Finally, I am mindful of the sentences of the

Re-Sentencing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 four co-defendants, who are each serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, and this will not change. The defendant may or may not ever be released from prison. He will only be eligible to apply for parole release from the state as of October 28, 2020. The chances of him ever actually being released from prison are rather uncertain. The sentence I will impose which, after considering all of these factors which I am required to do under the Miller case, will provide a fair, reasonable, and just sentence. The defendant will not be released today. He will not be released in the next five years. He will not be released at all perhaps. But the sentence I will sentence him to will give him the opportunity to go before the parole board in state court when he completes his thirty-year sentence at that time. I believe this is the very type of case that the Supreme Court had in mind when it ruled that automatic life without parole for someone below eighteen years of age was unconstitutional. Mr. Lawrence, stand up to be sentenced.

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 S/NANCY L. FREDDOSO, RPR 14 Federal Official Court Reporter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 I, NANCY L. FREDDOSO, RPR, Federal Official Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically-reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.