Epicureanism about Death and Immortality Author(s): John Martin Fischer Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol.

10, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 355-381 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115869 . Accessed: 24/02/2011 13:14
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Ethics.

http://www.jstor.org

JOHN MARTIN

FISCHER

EPICUREANISM

ABOUT DEATH AND

IMMORTALITY

(Received and Accepted

10 September 2006)

ABSTRACT.
curean view views that death

In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum's

about can death be and a bad

defenses of Epi

Here I seek to defend the commonsense immortality. an for individual the I also thing against Epicurean;

defend

the claim that immortality might

of my death. I make analysis, The intersection of a Dialectical certain of these

conceivably
connections two

be a good
between can the be

thing. In the
literatures illuminated on by

development free will and reference

literatures

to my

notion,

Stalemate.

KEY WORDS:
harm, immortality,

David
Martha

Suits, death, Dialectical

Nussbaum, Steven

Stalemate,

Epicurus,

Free Will,

Hetherington

I want

to live forever: but just what

want would have of years, our horizon numbers There are sequence But The natural one

is it that I thereby want? Prior to 1874 (or

year all clear: quite for each been I would natural expanded amount have number by wanted an to live omega

my thereabouts) for an unending sequence Georg order null Why vault of as of Cantor. infinity,

seemed

years.

has

since

the to

aleph-null.

together countess greater

only infinities that three cardinals

of teachings the smallest dwarf aleph ten. and there to

as aleph-null our customarily dwarfs allotted surely settle for a piddling if there are limit years aleph-null inaccessible to be surpassed? cardinals over, waiting

score out

... is (conceptually) there are trans-omega longevity possible: a single omega-sequence endure of years, and a person beyond from one omega-sequence to another. worlds ... I want gle be trans-omega of are longevity, years but not at any cost. Wanting a conditional want, the very least, upon

that worlds possible can survive in these

to as

my my having a fair balance over pain. still being of pleasure In claiming that I claim is desirable, that there is some trans-omega longevity only possible even our remote if in which I have from existence own, world, trans-omega quite are the above and it is true, have conditions that such satisfied. Some, argued about me, and upon there

omega-sequence 100. Both wants

is, for me, at

live beyond to is wanting still

a sin live to

conditional,

wits

The Journal of Ethics (2006) 10:355-381

DOI 10.1007/S10892-006-9004-1

? Springer 2006

356
conditions long life... could never leads be

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

satisfied even for ordinary I suspect immortality that those because who a life too

inevitably

to perpetual

boredom.

argue

in this

way either lack imagination or become

too quickly jaded with

the good

things in

[Phillip Bricker, "On Living Forever" Association, March, 1985)]

(presented at The American

Philosophical

1. Introduction that philosophy has its Boethius' seriously thought on work Hellenistic her philosophy, important an of Hellenistic offered Nussbaum has interpretation take In to the "medical according detached is not a neutral, to grapple with problems model."1 On methodology, that otherwise this approach, but a way of would confuse

Epicureans consolations. Martha philosophy philosophy

us. Philosophy, then, is a kind of therapy. Nussbaum both attributes and his followers this view to Epicurus (such as the endorses it. The Hellenistic and also Roman Lucretius) philosopher, to apply their philosophical sought philosophers the nature and mysteries issues as the fear of death, such as anger. and potentially emotions, unruly I shall focus on Nussbaum's Here reconstruction, and defense of Lucretius's I shall also "main offer fear death.2 argument" some reflections that to such therapy of love, sexuality, interpretation, it is irrational she calls

us helping and distress

to the

on what

argument" "banquet should realize that that briefly would reaches to add not to my

we to this argument, According "it has a structure in time life is like a banquet: of Lucretius. and appropriate defense previous be unattractive.4 termination."3 of the thesis that Here I wish immortality

a natural

necessarily

1 Martha Press, The

Nussbaum, Martha

The Nussbaum,

Therapy

1994); of Desire" Philosophy Therapy 811-819. 2 The main is laid out argument a preliminary I make stab 201-202. "Contribution to Symposium

Princeton University (Princeton: of Desire on Nussbaum, to in "Reply Papers Symposium Research 59 (1999), and Phenomenological pp. in Nussbaum, at The pp. of Desire, Therapy in John Martin these matters discussing on Nussbaum's The of Desire" Therapy 203.

Fischer,

and Phenomenological Philosophy 3 4

Nussbaum, The Therapy

Research 59 (1999), pp. 787-792.

p.

of Desire,

John Martin Fischer, "Why Immortality isNot So Bad," International Journal to of Philosophical Studies 2 (1994), pp. 257-270; and Fischer, "Contribution
Symposium on Nussbaunrs The Therapy of Desire."

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY In my device. is a perfectly neutral view, philosophy reassurance freedom from and those who seek by It can

357 be

Even at its best, and perplexity. confusion we were unaware. Of course, it and which of puzzles previously problems of theoretical is always up to us how exactly we use the deliverances on insoluble a to not It ruminate is idea reasoning. excessively good - a be endorsed, sensible view that would dilemmas by presumably, - or to allow them to dampen our spirits. But itmay practical philosophy be that philosophy shows us, what we feared inchoately, that, as Thomas us store "...a end is in for bad all."5 Nagel puts it,

employed can also increase

It anxiety. itmay reveal

2. The Main Nussbaum 1. An when least event

Argument Lucretius' main

and

Previous

Discussion as follows:

presents can

argument

the event

possible the event. person experiences a 2. The time after dies is a time at which that person does person not exist as a subject of possible experience. 3. Hence the condition of being dead is not bad for that person. 4. 5. It is irrational comes, It is irrational Nussbaum will to fear a future event unless that event, when be bad for one.

be good or bad for someone if, at the time only is present, that person exists as a subject of at so that it is at least possible that the experience,

it

to fear death.6

out that Thomas has rejected the first points Nagel on a of the main because of its insistence argument, premise two connection between badness and offers experience. Nagel an The first who involves individual is behind examples. betrayed never comes his back; even though to know about the individual this us let of say, experience any unpleasant (or, consequences betrayal it), can be a bad contends that the betrayal for the Nagel thing a person In the second individual. loses all higher mental example, in an accident (or as a result of a stroke); this is alleged by functioning even if the individual to be a loss for the person, is now7 (after Nagel
5 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

1979), pp. 1-10; reprinted in John Martin Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of Death (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 61-69. The quotation is on p. 69 of
the 6 reprinted Nussbaum, version. The Therapy of Desire, pp. 201-202.

358
the contented. accident) individual who dies not thesis about

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER view, Nagel's in virtue of involving death's badness"). On death unpleasant is bad for the

experiences,

but insofar as it is a deprivation

"deprivation Nussbaum
... does Nagel life's temporal not by the

of the good

things in life (the

disagrees:
not make span a outside completely are actually analyzes to show sufficient in each of them a subject this, since persists, a strong at of the bad who has least claim to be identical event, to whom the bad event is a misfortune. In the betrayal this case, it clear diminishes the to very that of same, event. and In the is a of subject second case, who possible, it is hard if not not with actual, to feel and experi that the plau is no how an event how located exactly cases the life itself. The he

themselves time

during with the

subject

is clearly subject ence in relation continued existence

the damaged force. and

person,

is continuous

very

sibly identical with the former adult, gives the argument that the adult has suffered
a loss at at least all subject of its part on the scene, Where no death is concerned, So it remains continuant. however, unclear there exactly

the life that has ended is diminished by the event.7 an example to be so important to produce is it thought Why exactly in which "the subject does not persist?" I shall return to this question but I would first suggest that a quite natural below, response would be have that, any in such a circumstance, experience unpleasant why it is impossible as a result for of the the individual event which to

purportedly

is bad for him or her. That is, it is plausible to suppose

the subject's going the assumption that death out of existence is an experiential is problematic the blank), This any unpleasant experience. to develop in which it is examples harmful event,

that the reason

is that (on cannot have agent (nonexistent) makes it natural to seek thought

indisputably impossible for the (still existing) individual to have any

as a result of the purportedly experience unpleasant to be harmed.8 does appear and yet the person
7

8
which

Nussbaum,

The

Therapy individual as a result

of Desire,

pp.

205-206.

Various philosophers
(allegedly) unpleasant the

have faulted Nagel

precisely for providing

examples

in

anything Fischer

rather than does not, cannot, merely experience of the event in question: "The S. Silverstein, Harry

Evil of Death,"
(ed.),

The Journal of Philosophy 11 (1980), pp. 401-424

of Death, pp. 95-110; Stuart

; reprinted in John
"How to Be

The Metaphysics

Rosenbaum,

Dead and Not Care: A Defense (1986), pp. 217-225;

134; and Walter Glannon,

of Epicurus," American Philosopohical Quarterly 23 reprinted in Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of Death, pp. 119?
"Temporal and the Asymmetry, of Life, and Death," The American

Philosophical Quarterly
Fischer, "Death, Badness,

31 (1994), pp. 235-244.

Impossibility

I attempt

to reply in John Martin

Journal of

Experience,"

Ethics

1 (1997), pp. 341-353.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY Consider the following

359

two examples. of The first is a modification structure it employs the signature of by Nagel; presented coun in the "Frankfurt-type" found overdetermination preemptive to the Principle of Alternative Here is my Possibilities.9 terexamples case: of the presentation the case Imagine first that the example is as described by Nagel. You are betrayed behind
your find back out by people about this who or you have any thought bad were good experiences and you never friends, actually as a result But of the betrayal.

now suppose that these friends were (very) worried

betrayal. over watch the In order you. His to guard task is this possibility, against ever to prevent you if one of the individuals can the of the prevent information friends, White him

that you might find out about

for White they arrange out from about finding who you betrayed White succeeding: to you. Or getting you prevent is in a position happened.10 can to the

for So, betrayal. to tell you decide whatever should ceeding any to begin in making by

example, about it, White to prevent is required seek out one contact. you or your

should do

from from

could

if you suc from to thwart

attempt

I simply friends

stipulate to inform

that White you of what

that actually happens among your friends and to you same and your family is exactly the inmy version and Nagel's I version, claim that it is plausible that the betrayal harms you. That is, it is everything in Nagel's and if harm version, some to supervenes you" (in "actually happens physico/causal in my version of the sense) and your loved ones, then you are harmed case. But in my version it is not just true that you do not experience as a result of the betrayal you cannot. anything unpleasant The second case owes much to an example by Jeff McMahon.11 Here is the example: plausible you on what that the betrayal harms

Since

9 Fischer, Alternative only if he "Death, Possibilities could Badness, states

and that

an

of Experience." the Impossibility The Principle of individual is morally for an action responsible

counterexample G. Frankfurt,

a purported have done otherwise. first presented Frankfurt Harry a a to this principle for such in Harry (or template counterexample) "Alternate and Moral Possibilities The Journal Responsibility," of

Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 828-839. I have discussed such examples in (among other places) John Martin Fisher, The Metaphysics of Free Will (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1994); John Martin Fischer "Recent Work on Moral Responsibility," Ethics 110 (1999), pp. 93-139; and John Martin Fischer, "Frankfurt-Type
Compatibilism," Themes from 10 Fischer, in S. Buss Harry "Death, Frankfurt Badness, and L. Overton (eds.). Contours of Agency: Essays The MIT 1-26. Press, pp. (Cambridge: 2002), and the Impossibility of Experience," p. 345. on

Jeff McMahan, "Death and the Value of Life," Ethics 99 (1988), pp. 32-61; reprinted in Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of Death, pp. 233-266.

11

360
... your daughter

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

in the Himalayas while is trekking you are at she dies in an accident. I believe that you a bad even to you thing has happened ever die without that you further, finding for that you find of to me you that die out of home are in the United by your find out the attack death, acci just and,

Tragically, death daughter's about it. Suppose, dent in the Himalayas; five minutes after

States.

harmed you about

before out

given cannot

plausible find out

imagine, example, never dies. You daughter the situations about assumptions your about it. Nevertheless, it seems

a heart her

about and you your

have

you daughter, been harmed

(at least, for the five minutes

ter. And ences natural ences as here a

of your continued
that death; you do

life) by the death of your daugh

not have any unpleasant it is, at least on to have any such experi a very experi

it is not merely the case result of your daughter's

in addition, for you

of ''possibility," understanding as a result of her death.12

impossible

Nussbaum presumably,
I do not find

has her

responded comments

to would

the also

latter apply

case

as

follows

(and,

to the former):
convincing: continues like to exist, the Nagel however

Fischer's they

examples

I criticize, after has her

counterexamples all involve

subject

altogether who

briefly, during the time when

shortly bad thing the bad we bad event believe daughter's happened to her

the bad event takes place. Even

and without rests, at surely of the receiving least to some news of

if the mother

dies

death,

it, the idea that a on the thought extent,

that the mother

thing just death ourselves

is there in the world when

to happen to. This, is the cessation of to be bad for and be us course, subject

the daughter dies. There

is not true of one's ow?n (Lucretius profoundly a mental of hand, sleight own loss of the and not the mother we would

is a her for
death; the that we suggests in which

through

imagine right

precisely the mother

parallel, the

persisting then, would same instant. suffered

our watching in which the case case I think

of life). The goods the daughter die at assert that

In this

confidently

has

a bereavement.13

3. Suits 3.1. David entirely Suits Suits does not

and Hetherington

convincing.14

my modification Indeed, he says:

find

of Nagel's

example

12 Fischer, p. 789.

"Contribution

to Symposium

on Nussbaum's

The

Therapy

of Desire"

13 Nussbaum, 14 David
pp.

"Reply

to Papers

in Symposium

on Nussbaum,

The Therapy of Died," American

Desire"

811-812.

Suits, "Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001), pp. 69-84.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY This

seems of that the

361

[the modified
to be a quite are never

version of the Nagel

fanciful-no, in a position and

example of betrayal behind one's back]

to bolster any precaution in a case such First example. harm (for against as betrayal, where the

all, we

a desperate-attempt to know that to be difficult successful

is all White effects can be

is) is guaranteed far-ranging to me job that

to trace...

Second, could in on bad a the the

it make first one

seems his place. hand, whatsoever

if White easier question

is

really

so

clever

as

all the

immeasurably So now the a secret on

simply by preventing is the is this: What on other a account hand,

that, secret

then betrayal between, have

he

difference can

betrayal

effects secret

acterized, Nothing friends trary. What

betrayal as far whatsoever are not

after as

and, you, ... Let's all? you all can tell,

which, on the invent by the

of magic, there never All loyalty believe

no

counter-story:

in your your discover to

experience friends; betrayal about in

unwavering to leads you fact, all

your of your that any

been having life is char friends. of your con you

after

All

attempts

have

is to the your experience come to naught. shall What that of this there secret is a

do with
will

the hypothesis
your therapist who

that there might

say your all is preventing

nevertheless

be some secret betrayal?

very betrayal

Mr. White cunning from reaching you?

speculations relevant effects

In what

sense then could it be said that something happened

answer of course That said and is that could is not is that if there was a secret to call is the way something we have betrayal, a betrayal is to come to know

that was bad for

then lead it was us after to expect ... The the world. that have to the say

the only you? Well, Now all a betrayal. harmful consequences. best that can be not 'victim' that what would takes

if, somehow, not be harmed

I were

absolutely in any way, then

convinced I would

place

a betrayal

at all.15

out that the example is by pointing so. It is a thought-experiment, with all of the attendant risks (and, I believe, benefits). methodological we are never to know life in a position that a in ordinary Granted: to be successful. I am is guaranteed given precaution against harm In reply to Suits, I would begin indeed fanciful, and admittedly not this as empirically plausible proposing conceivable and thus metaphysically possible. of that White has God-like foreknowledge point could is affected never have as but feasible, if you will, Imagine, I do not the future. by Suits' contention sort of the required or

believe that the philosophical we that are) (as we actually certainty.

Further, it is quite beside the point thatWhite "could make his job
the secret betrayal in the easier simply by preventing immeasurably as I presented it This may be true, but in the example first place." 15 Suits, "Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died," pp. 76-77.

362
White different does not prevent but,

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER the secret in the One betrayal. I told, White tell a certainly is a merely "count struc the characteristic could

story the example thus has out above). ture of a "Frankfurt-type If the story I case" (as pointed a to take it into told is coherent, then theorist is intellectually required account to show how its point fits with his own view, even if his own view fits nicely with another story. at In the "counter-story" told by Suits, there is no act of betrayal erfactual intervener;" is fundamentally different from does in fact take place. Simply a case a between difference in which

story,

can tell. This least as far as anyone an act of betrayal my story, in which put: there

is a basic, clear a betrayal does not takes betrayal actually place and one in which circumstances take place, but would have under certain hypothetical In let us say, but for the intervention of White). have, (would ordinary

of betrayal, it would be unhealthy life, given no evidence a to one's seek evidence of (and betrayal therapist would obsessively is that beside the point. be But, again, concerned!). legitimately quite it is simply stipulated that there was a is one in which The example to consider whether this in fact and we are invited betrayal, as a an individual harms who never has any unpleasant experience of the story that in ordinary it is not a suggestion result. Of course, secret life one and Suits should ones! to press his case: is that if, continues obsessively seek evidence of the infidelity of friends loved

The best that can be said [about the example as presented by Fischer]
somehow, I were

not not and could would convinced that the Victim' absolutely to say that what takes place is not a be in any way, then I would have be harmed to call it... not know what trayal at all. I might secret A White-managed betrayal as we have betrayals, trayal. Real ings then of that of guns: are at is no come different to know from them, a merely are like be fir

hypothetical the incautious

they

past all

have bad consequences, occasions if they do not on some particular on the basis so we invoke least very risky. And which, precautions we will minimize such risks. everyone agrees expect Suppose experience, reasonable Is this bad precautions for someone? firing range Who our are We with comes We fire in place. the gun, and are having at paper fun shooting no one concrete else thick walls; no one is we targets; is around.

harmed. are Who in an

enclosed to as

dares

happened and even tions!

complain? a result of

though Incautious

that has and bad forward says something no one has been harmed, even though practice, our precau no one can make out a case for possible harm, given once are in then is but the of guns place, risky, precautions firing target

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

firing White the gun is not then at all incautious. is no betrayal Similarly, betrayals after all.16 are risky, but

363
once

is in place

there

For my question behind

you negatively (say) "characterizing or whatever. The question is whether your back," simply such behavior It is that harms you. you stipulated experience as a result of the behavior now the in question; nothing unpleasant issue is whether, nevertheless, secret that a White-managed you have been harmed. from betrayal as you insofar is no different It may be a merely anything it does not to respect an actual in the which

it does purposes - a "betrayal"

not matter or

what

we

call

the behavior

in

do not experience betrayal a as of in result the behavior either case; but unpleasant follow that there is no difference between the cases with hypothetical the issue of whether is different an actual has case harmed of the I said As you are harmed. from a merely hypothetical has betrayal, something above,

betrayal case of (arguably) case (the "contented

betrayal:

happened other you. Suits does not discuss Nagel's to the state of a who is reduced individual

the parallel by (say) a stroke, but I would make this case: an actual is crucially claim about stroke different from a stroke the merely (even though, by hypothetical -hypothesis, in question does not experience individual in unpleasant anything infant" either Yes, case). are risky; but the story does not purport typically betrayals a to portray to be right even in atypical typical case. A theory needs cases. A "real betrayal" under normal (or a betrayal circumstances) is like the incautious causing unpleasant the sort of precautions then firing the gun is not described by Suits, as with the White-managed there is incautious; "betrayal" example, no cases are risk of causing But the unpleasant experiences. I am to say inclined that the of so-called "friends" harm you by your negative no the very nature I have of the behavior, similar you, by a mere to a inclination there is no say that gun, where firing of can harm chance of hitting the anyone, anyone (except, perhaps, not but that raises different The contention is gun-firer, issues...). that all riskless behavior harms others (or that all riskless behavior importantly different. Whereas characterizations which would be is only contention 16 risky, but for the precautions) that some does. harms others; the of a gun: there is a considerable risk of cases. one in When both has taken experiences firing

Suits, "Why Death

Is Not Bad for the One Who Died," p. 77.

364
3.2. Hetherington

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

offers a fascinating example critique of Nagel's Stephen Hetherington a la the Frankfurt-type even as of the (alleged) modified betrayal, examples.17
By of that being your

Hetherington
some of

says:
your beliefs to you beliefs are are rendered false. false. For More a start, you vitally, some

betrayed, are

personally friends your even

important loyal

rendered ways;

in standard

moreover,

believe you care that this

belief of yours be true. The betrayal makes

harms (as The one you, harm who though you in Fischer's you case) occurs because to believe are wholly unaware could never experience the only falsification what of is true

the belief false, though. And

of any its doing consequence diminishes so, of indeed even

this
if

wishes

your about

belief

the betrayal. as some you to you.

whatever

is important

You

wish
this to

to have
harm realize because come less now to

those
is one that your

true beliefs;
of which

your wish

is not

being

fulfilled.

So,

although were you

if?perhaps never could you You much matter you, harm what

it is a harm nonetheless. If you are unaware, was even be upset. And belief false, you would your are as described in Fischer's circumstances case?you that your about belief as successful is false, its being false still makes a person to be. than you would wish to you?that that matters something with to be some right matters your the world of parts matters about what you. believer that to That on

realize

that much are?by 'out of to you. therefore, is of at you care

step' Insofar your

being with

cognitively mistaken

the world, as it matters mistaken

notably to you about

being

what as

least metaphysical about is harmed.18

significance,

to you harms as a true status

Hetherington
Your realizing a fortiori, own; harmed. What

goes
that you so does

on
are

to elaborate

the relevant

sort of harm:

is that

a further harmed in that way harm inflicts of its being ever to out find that you were its being for you impossible It is the harm of human If the be further harm? absurdity.

lief is important enough

then your life might about well

to you, and if the betrayal

have become somewhat absurd

is sufficiently fundamental,
as a result.

an objective sort of absurdity. in that it is not It is objective, or even it is the of a discrepancy; actual instead, possible, can a one exist between and the existence that of a basic person discrepancy, aware as a whole, the person of it, per and one that can exist without world being even with to be aware sort of absurdity is also her being unable of it. This haps ...I am talking an awareness, either in that cognitive, least some of her has to live. it is a matter cognitive of efforts her a person's failing are informing her mistaken about to be about aware of how the world poorly in which at she

It is essentially

being

that world.

Stephen Hetherington, (2001), pp. 349-362.

18 Hetherington, "Deathly

17

"Deathly Harm," American Philosophical Quarterly 38

Harm," pp. 351-352.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

...To that the extent that is even your tragic, with belief

365

absurdity

to you, in your is also friends' important loyalty or not you are aware no matter whether of this tragic

dimension
sumably, honesty. All

to your life. You

you interact

trust the friends; you show them your feelings; pre

them

assume in what is a context and of respect you the while, that you do not know how untrust however, they know are aware to you. They trust of how misplaced is your worthy they are in relation ... Even are not in them. at you behind if your friends back, your laughing they could in that sense, the world is doing so, at any rate.19 be; and

On Hetherington's terms of creating certain structures set of his

is understood in of the betrayal view, the badness a certain sort of dissonance or discordance', one has a about features of our beliefs lives, one important life around

Hetherington as it renders In contrast, dissonance

these beliefs, and yet they are false. As can "A be harmed insofar person puts it, by something to her."20 false some belief of hers whose truth matters a of course, cannot death be a bad thing by creating between one's death destroys case betrayal the cognizer. (in its various cognitions If what and disturbs the external us about

or discordance

since reality, the Nagel-type a kind

then, discordance, cannot be legitimately the example way, employed the deprivation thesis about death's badness. I find Hetherington's Although analysis helpful,

of absurd

is that it creates versions) since death cannot be bad in this in order I am not to defend sure that

it captures truth about the entire the badness of the betrayal (or to note In it that is any, case, death). (like interesting Hetherington on Nagel's and not on the Suits) only focuses betrayal example, to the mental status of a of an individual who is reduced example contented infant (as a result of a stroke or accident). It seems to me that stroke even individual, the been a bad thing for the or she has not experienced he though (by hypothesis) as a result. Further, cannot do it seems unpleasant (and so) (or accident) has indeed the badness here cannot be analyzed in the way suggested case. in regard to the betrayal to the betrayal case, in the case of the stroke victim not to by be a discordance of the sort pointed The stroke victim and need has no memories of presumably not be radically mistaken about his He not believe does that he has

anything to me that

by Hetherington As opposed there need Hetherington. his previous current

activities, and abilities. situation that are in fact wildly "out of sync" with reality; he need capabilities not be fundamentally mistaken to about the world or his relationship
19 20 Hetherington, Hetherington, "Deathly "Deathly Harm," Harm," pp. p. 355 352. 356.

366
it. I do not believe even

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER that the stroke

victim is absurd; his situation is sad a not not He but absurd. certain has way), tragic (in no or to and there is that trust, suppose tendency misplaced loyalty at him. the world is, as it were, laughing If one agrees that the stroke The two examples, then, are different. or been a bad thing for the individual, or accident has indeed harmed and maybe then one cannot and explain the badness in terms of the sort of to or absurdity discrepancy me is not that the badness discrepancy but more between "direct" internal the discussed so much by Hetherington. a matter of the discordance states and the external event. It seems

taking

that were possessed experience lack of these more complex capacities than some reality, Nussbaum

cognitive away of capacities prior to the unfortunate and

world, to function and It is the in itself, rather awareness and

experiences sort of discrepancy between the individual's that is bad. Or so it seems to me.

"In the second case in a passage states, above, quoted not to that the continued existence of it is hard feel stroke case], [the and who continuous with the damaged is very plausibly person, that the adult has identical with the former adult, gives the argument a loss at is even can be then argue that least part of its force." One might or discrepancy case a kind of discordance But the the former and current capacities of the individual. in this said

suffered there between same

a disparity of death; it creates between prior and to zero. What been reduced the latter having subsequent capacities an existing cannot be said, in the case of death, is that there remains thus the that individual who has been diminished (and remaining are greater but it is essentially than zero, as it were) capacities the removal of this dialectical within context, whether controversial, is consistent with badness: it cannot the subject simply be assumed here and that thus the removal that there must careful of the subject be a nonzero of is not capacity consistent this sort with of remainder. badness, I turn now dialectical

to a more subtlety.

discussion

precisely

4. Death Elsewhere have called I have

and Dialectical to describe Stalemate." an

Stalemates structure that this sort I

sought a "Dialectical

argumentative I have suggested

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY of structure is found in many of the most intractable philosophical

367

puzzles:
Frequently family of in philosophy arguments) for we are engaged C. claim in considering The argument a certain employs argument a principle (or P.

some

Allegedly, P supports C. Now

to support

the proponent

of the argument may be called upon

a set of examples the principle, and he may do so by invoking (or other on these examples Based he argues that considerations). (or other considerations), are to be accepted. the principle and thus also the philosophical claim But the opponent of to establish the as follows. all The the are and P*, see how not not is all

sufficient adduce that P*9 that without nent

P to explain is decisively established to P, does in contrast one cannot invoke

argument the principle them: rather, by not

may P. One

respond could

examples examples

embrace that

it is alleged the

a weaker other

principle,

support

examples (or C. Finally,

considerations). it is very hard to

Further, one

could decisively establish P. One reason it is so difficult is that it at least appears

the question begging of P or the opponent the proponent a particular P which establish would example decisively in a straightforward the oppo fashion either against seems a it also that one cannot of C. Further, invoke

particular example which would decisively

against distinctive?and of P or the proponent particularly contexts with precarious?spot the above

refute P without
of C. These in dialectical

begging
conditions space.

the question
mark out a

I shall

call

roughly

form,

"Dialectical

Stalemates."21

Take, Causal

for

example, Determinism

the Basic and

for the Incompatibility of Argument the sort of free will that involves alternative

The argument, dubbed the "Consequence possibilities.22 Argument" Peter Van from the point that causal by Inwagen, proceeds that all our behavior determinism is the consequence of the implies past and free will the laws of nature that involves to the conclusion access that we lack the sort of to alternative genuine possibilities (if can be given in different causal determinism The argument obtains).23 our it employs that putatively encode forms, but typically principles commonsense views about the fixity of the past and natural laws. a modal Sometimes the argument that allegedly employs principle captures powerless another,
21 22

intuitive ideas about the transfer of powerlessness: over one thing, and powerless over that thing's one is powerless over the other thing.
Will, p. 83. see Fischer, of Dialectical

if one leading

is to

The Metaphysics Fischer, of Free For a more discussion, complete discuss the application of the structure

Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Also see Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will.

23

The Metaphysics Stalemates

on

p.

of Free 84.

Will.

Press, Press,

1983). 1990);

368
A number

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

can be adduced a of examples that seem to support of is the Laws. The of Natural that the there Principle Fixity problem are different commonsense to capture of seeking the intuitive, ways notion the fixity None of the examples of the laws of nature. to the of the kernel of way appears support capturing incompatibilist over the compatibilist That truth in those examples way. is, consider two Fixity the following of the Laws Principles: of (IFL) For any action Y, and agent S, if it is true that if S were
natural law which actually obtains would not obtain, then S cannot

to do Y, some
do Y.

(CFL) For any action Y, event b, agent S and times fl, tl, and ?3, (fl prior to tl prior to or simultaneous with f3), if (1) F s occurring at tl is inconsistent with the laws of
nature, occurring or (2) Fs occurring at f3 is inconsistent at tl would the cause some event with laws of nature, b's occurring at then S cannot at f3 and ?>'s t Ido Fat f2.24

adduced is that none of the examples by incompatib problem or by anyone ilists such as Carl Ginet and Van Inwagen, else (as far as I know), can show decisively to (CFL). that (IFL) is to be preferred over the other. That is, the relevant data do not support one principle The of someone Inwagen's examples cause to than the faster go things producing a or someone to in selective of light, speed breeding engaging produce out without vitamin C. He human who could get along points being to do such things, that no one has it in his power insofar as the laws Consider, for a machine Van example, that would travels faster than the speed of light, and that nothing cannot vitamin C. It is obvious, get along without beings not If that do such however, support (IFL) over (CFL).25 examples one states that causal determinism to out turn be true, and, might entail that human after all, it is JUST involves alternative OBVIOUS that we are free in the sense that possibilities, in the relevant dialectical this would be clearly similar Exactly as well employed question consider as to the in the of nature

context. begging to the notion of the fixity of the past, ations apply sometimes modal (or related principles) principle for argument incompatibilism.26 24
25

Fischer, The Metaphysics

Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free

of Free Will, pp. 61 and 70.

of Free 78-86. the Will, I discuss modality pp. 61-16.

26

For a discussion of the issues related to the Fixity of the Past, see Fischer, The
Will, where Transfer pp. the dialectical stalemates relevant to principle, "The Fischer, relevant is "nonresponsibility," in J. Campbell, M. in John O'Rourke

Metaphysics the modal Martin

of Nonresponsibility,"

and D. Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism

pp. 189-209.

(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004),

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY I said above, a modal principle the Consequence (for Argument determinism and freedom). The modal As of Transfer is sometimes the employed of

369 as part causal of the

principle,

incompatibilism the "Principle

to the "Principle of Powerlessness," is structurally parallel of Closure Known the of Knowledge Under Indeed, Implication." are the same, except for the different of the principles interpretations if someone relevant modality.27 On this principle, that p, and knows knows the Transfer that q. Just as the Principle of implies q, then he knows a sort of free to generate of Powerlessness is employed about causal determinism and skepticism (i.e., incompatibilism access sort of freedom that involves to alternative genuine that p of Closure employed of Knowledge Under to generate epistemolog

will the

so the Principle possibilities), Known is sometimes Implication ical skepticism. The argument would is a laptop computer

I know that there go as follows.28 Evidently, a laptop in front of me. But there being me am a in not front of I entails that brain-in-a-vat computer being to falsely believe stimulated in front of me, and I there is a laptop the Principle know this. Thus, of the Transfer of Knowledge given that I know it follows that I am not a Implication, to falsely believe brain-in-a-vat stimulated that being (for instance) there is a laptop in front of me. I do not, however, in know the this; I cannot out "rule this Thus, lingo, skeptical counterpossibility." modus tollens gives us the conclusion that I do not know that there is Under Known computer about proposition that there is a laptop a laptop in front of me (or, for that matter, any contingent the external in from world).

Now one could simply state that it is JUST OBVIOUS

skeptical counterpossiblity someone brain-in-a-vat. Thus, Transfer of Knowledge Under

that I know

of me, even though I cannot rule out the and thus I do not know that I am not a could Known insist that the Principle of the is invalid. The

are essentially here is painfully clear: problem and thus it is question-begging, in the relevant dialectical contested, niche is being considered (in which epistemol?gica! skepticism to assert it. seriously), simply Consider, ity." This
27 28

Implication the data invoked

also, is the

the "Principle same modal

of Free of such

of

principle
Will. arguments,

the Transfer of Nonresponsibil as above, for except

the

For

The Metaphysics Fischer, a helpful discussion

see Anthony

Brueckner,

"Skepti

cism and Epistemic Closure," Philosophical Topics 13 (1985), pp. 89-118. Also, Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, pp. 23-45.

see

370

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

It states that if you are not responsible of the modality. interpretation to for one thing, and you are not responsible for that thing's leading are not for the An other.29 you another, responsible incompatibilist use this causal determinism about and moral responsibility might in an argument principle causal determinism, Assuming the with laws of nature, together modal am not morally for some entail this fact sort about of incompatibilism. the distant past, and future facts. I

the present I am not fact. Further, responsible am I not for the laws of nature, and thus, morally morally responsible to the present and future for the past fact's leading responsible for the past situations of the universe.30 of Nonresponsibility, the present (and There Now, given the Principle it follows that I am not morally thus for my behavior). of the Transfer responsible

for

are various ways of responding to this sort of argument. I to show the modal of seeking there are promising believe ways to be the Principle of Nonresponsibility of the Transfer principle is A invalid.31 But I do not think the following strategy promising.

compatibilist might simply point out that it is JUST OBVIOUS

am morally do otherwise, responsible even for my if causal concede behavior, even if causal determinism

that I
is a the a it is

true (Perhaps this is because it is JUST OBVIOUS

might compatibilist distant past, nor am Imorally that this the past and the present (given natural law). So this sort of compatibilist

that I am free to
such for between that

determinism Further, obtains). that I am not morally responsible for the connection responsible connection simply insists

instantiates

move

It simply begs the question is dialectically "traif (unkosher). A compatibilist about causal determinism the incompatibilist. against in rejecting the be and moral might entirely justified responsibility but not on this basis. modal transfer principle, In my the 29 work on these subjects, previous of a perennial salient characteristics I suggested that it is one of or classic philosophical

JUST OBVIOUS that the Principle of the Transfer of Nonrespon sibility is invalid. It should' however be (painfully) clear that this

This principle was first formulated and discussed by Peter Van

on Free Will, An Essay pp. 182-188). Inwagen, see David an interesting discussion, Widerker, "Farewell

Inwagen (See
to the Direct

Peter Van 30 For

Argument," 31
Mark

The Journal of Philosophy

Ravizza, "Semicompatibilism

99 (2002), pp. 316-324.

and the Transfer of Nonresponsibility,"

Philosophical Studies 75 (1994), pp. 61-93; and John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
pp. 151-169.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY problem family classic" of that it involves the signature structure of a Dialectical

371

Stalemate.32 I added that the Free Will Problem (which is really a

related in part and problems it is an because is a "true philosophical puzzles) environment rich with Dialectical discussed points by me, out above that cannot about the death examples show is

Stalemates. It should a Dialectical invoked be evident Stalemate. even that the debate Nussbaum as modified

by Nagel, to

decisively

that death is a bad thing for the individual who dies. Even if it is
plausible badness death cannot and stroke of betrayal involve say that the examples are the examples from for the relevant different individuals, in that they involve the persistence of the subject. Thus they in themselves decisively show that death can be a bad thing for

who dies. In framing and considering general principles to it is evident that there will be different harm, relating principles, and that the examples in question will not in themselves decisively to entail that death can be bad for support a principle strong enough - a the individual who dies over a slightly weaker principle principle that does not have this conclusion. As Nussbaum points out, all of the a subject who to exist, however continues "involve examples briefly, the individual the time the event takes place."33 But it is hard to see how one during can get rid of this feature and have an example that would not beg the seem that, given the It would death's badness. case removes event of death, in which in the any question the subject would be essentially contested. Thus we have a classic Dialectic Stalemate. question definition at issue about It Stalemate progress Dialectical relevant is important, need not to keep in mind that a Dialectical however, to make result in our inability any philosophical or to come to any useful conclusions. In a philosophical no can in establish the Stalemate, example itself decisively the conclusion Nussbaum is (without begging question).

to point out that none of the examples correct above can completely in themselves establish that death can be a bad thing for the decisively to highlight individual who dies. But I want what I have written about
I do despair. not

how

to proceed
think of

in this sort of argumentative

that the Dialectical principle Stalemates under should

neighborhood:
issue may in philosophical demand that

however An opponent

consideration

is

32
33 Desire,"

Fischer, The Metaphysics

"Reply p. 811.

of Free Will, p. 84.

in Symposium on Nussbaum, The Therapy of

Nussbaum,

to Papers

372
proponent provide But I would claim ily the case that a weaker examples that this

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

which absolutely is unreasonable. argues be found for one to accept require even be true that It may a certain is the general strongest principle principle that the principle. it is necessar by giving the exam

examples, to accept

if a philosopher can principle

ples support (strictly speaking). The crucial issue becomes whether

the stronger principle, if one accepts as the weaker principle. or

it is plausible
Considerable

philosophical
to accept the a non-ad'hoc Alternatively, or perhaps

ingenuity can be displayed

stronger fashion philosophical one can show principle exactly as well why creativity in some one can

in generating examples which

the weaker should issue only in a principle, accept

invite one
in

in explaining the weaker principle. of the problem;

restructuring that

that is, one might find some other principle P* which can be employed
C, way that C wasn't interesting

to establish
after all.34

In my

work

on of

restructuring are importantly different of freedom and that kinds (or control), some of the Dialectical Stalemates seeing this can help us to sidestep in traditional embedded debates about Free Will. In our discussion of death above. example here That of action alluded opt for the other course to I it is would insist that unreasonable demand is, that would in itself decisively show (in a nonquestion I would to an

Free Will, the traditional

I have debates.

a certain kind of suggested I have contended that there

begging way)
believe

that death can be a bad thing for an individual (I

with me that Nussbaum may well be in agreement actually about her contention is that the in this; merely explicit examples can a not be themselves do show that death bad thing for the individual who dies, and this leaves it open that other considerations may be Recall Stalemate principle, whether makes invoked). that I stated the crucial question in a Dialectical to is the stronger may accept plausible if one accepts the weaker So the issue is key principle. and weaker the difference between the stronger principles above that it be whether at hand. cases not Alternatively, discussed above with I would all involve argue the is

a difference to the issue whereas the that, Nagel-type it does of a subject, persistence crucial that it is this feature in the examples) that present individual inclined.

seem plausible

that

this feature

(perhaps inclines

is harmed, and in the absence to hold that the individual So, my view is that if it is plausible in the betrayal, is harmed also be stroke, and trekking cases, it would

together us to say that the relevant not be so of which we would

others

that are

plausible to maintain

that he is (or can be) harmed by death.

34

Fischer, The Metaphysics

of Free Will, p. 85.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY Recall parallel, that Nussbaum be then, would die at precisely stated the the assert the trekking case), (about case the mother in which same that instant. In this case has the mother "The and

373 right the

daughter not would

I think we

a suffered confidently not correct It it be is that would kosher bereavement."35 dialectically as decisive on to invoke the original of the example evidence version the basis individual. conclude of which And with in virtue not be to conclude I would that death can be a bad thing for an that one cannot agree with Nussbaum that the mother has suffered a bereavement, of her version of the example. But it the original of the version to of the other examples, can that a persisting be subject of the harm and does

confidence

simply would example, generate harmed not between badness,

of consideration

to employ inappropriate suitable versions together with conclusion in which he

the preliminary even in contexts as a result.

is unaware

suffer

if it is plausible that the difference Then, a difference to death and these contexts does not make one could conclude version of the that, even in Nussbaum's

the mother has been harmed. trekking example, Nussbaum holds that the Nagel-type do not in them examples can be a bad selves decisively establish that death thing for the who dies. She does however individual have reservations about the main stem not so much Her worries from the examples, argument.36 but from considerations about our ongoing in life. Although projects I am in agreement with Nussbaum that the examples do not in can a establish that death be themselves bad the for decisively thing individual who dies,

insofar as they point us to that they are helpful a strong plausibility for it. conclusion; argument they help to provide to state why one should think that the the Epicurean They challenge are importantly different from death. More examples specifically, us of should the feature that death deprives why exactly pertinent the subject It is perhaps the difference in question? make to natural that the problem with there being no subject is that this suppose issues in an impossibility but we have seen that the mere of experience; of experience is not what makes it the case that death impossibility cannot be bad, if it were indeed the case that death cannot be bad for the individual is removed?
35 Nussbaum, "Reply Desire" pp. 811-812. 36 Nussbaum, "Reply p. 812. Desire," to Papers to Papers in Symposium in Symposium on Nussbaum, on Nussbaum, The Therapy of

who

dies.

So why

exactly

does

itmatter

that the subject

The

Therapy

of

374

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER 5. Lucretius's "Profound Insight" that we believe suggests in which we of hand, sleight our own loss of the goods

Nussbaum death of

"Lucretius states, profoundly to be bad for us through a mental and watching persisting imagine ourselves life.'07

according explained mentally

this view of Lucretius, also highlights Stephen Rosenbaum to which at least part of our view that death is bad can be - a in terms of a natural, mistake pervasive tendency to project ourselves into the future as somehow "there" and

even after our death. The even "suffering," and perhaps "watching" to exist in covertly mistake consists that one will continue assuming and have a point of view, even after death. In his more subjective
It hardly been

recent

work

on

tendency
needs around

to project

also emphasizes death, Nagel into the future: oneself

to our own existence. the only of my a even cease result Each natural

this

has

that we are accustomed saying for as long as he can remember; than a mere It is true

of condi

us

it seems

tion of things, and to look forward to its end feels like the denial of something
which is more possibility. that that various as I might do or things But more fundamental when why tion and I as the of a subject of of experience-will is the fact possibilities remain unrealized possibilities of my death.

then cease they will as well as of actualities

to be possibilities to exist. That from of the expecta

is

expectation complete death. Unconsciousness doesn't obliterate

unconsciousness includes the here the and

is so different continued now as death possibility does.

experience,

therefore

The sense may ing

internal of

awareness future,

of my and It any of

own

existence

its own

be reached. actually to the existence of of

its possible is stronger than particular only by

continuation

perhaps about

a strength surpassed the world itself.38

thing the sense

it a particularly strong future that any beyond the sense of future attach possibility in the world conceived objectively carries with of possible continuation we have

I believe Lucretius

that we

do

indeed but

have that

the

sort

of

(and Nagel), on balance, I think that sometimes, be helpful. This is because would, our at least, our subtle projection of into the future, even perspective we picture at our own funeral is comforting; ourselves after death, or to the no-doubt of loved-ones, family, (listening eulogies glowing friends),
37 Nussbaum, Desire" "Reply

it is unclear

noted by tendency whether its removal

or, perhaps

less nobly,
to Papers

we

picture

ourselves
on Nussbaum,

enjoying
The

other
of

in Symposium

Therapy

Thomas Nagel, 1986), p. 226.

38

p.

811.

The View from Nowhere

(Oxford: Oxford University

Press,

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY emotions upon observing reactions we are own by others simply to our own deaths. the eulogies them. But

375 Now and it is

strictly perhaps, speaking, the reactions, and not our Lucretius's

picturing of enjoyment

that we tend to assume, that subtly, suggestion perhaps we are (somehow) or be aware of the world, still able to experience even after our deaths. Consider Richard
[Eulogizing me as

these passages Lewis:

myself and at my own

from

an amusing

piece

by

the comedian,

funeral]

would

be

sort

of

a dream

come

true...

My licks

feeling is that since everyone

to what it's me in when why in that ... casket.

in my

life (except God)

I am, I at

puts some kind of spin on

least deserve to get my

and who

and where

I really own at the two

don't

want

to

scare

people

who

show

up

to pay

their

last

respects

for me,

but I feel that I owe it to my soul (before it gets too set in its ways)
cents. At the risk and last good-bye shit and

to put in my

emotional little I don't too

a lot of people I expect of sounding and want cocky, a lot of the more the better, I suffered because crying to hear a little sobbing, it would too do my albeit corpse good

late. a small, funeral. Not because I will be forever

want

private

just even

probably So come on

narcissistic but also because I so rarely leftmy house when

would be nice to see people for a change, if I am dead.

I was living. I think it

down!!!39

David contains

Sedaris's some

Hear also from Me," story, "The Last You'll malevolent the future: into deliciously projections

short

Richard Lewis, The Other Great Depression (New York: [Penguin], 2002), pp. 244-245. Lewis goes on to write:
I have cool former opportunity women, than this gut visitation 'dates that feeling and everyone from hell' As if I made would who are a iive' have still appearance a sense of calm it would about

39

Plume

Books

actresses before,

to showcase.

I've mentioned

be a friendly and it. Everyone except see my as a great and demise if I don't in a good settle down

relationship but instead drop dead while

I'm certain a golden that my memorial to display service some opportunity and for

still adolescently
will mean histrionics nothing (after

dating much
more catching first

younger
vixens of

to these

a glimpse

some industry heavies in the synagogue) with the hopes of turning some heads (not
mine to plan anymore) a seed considered role. After for a future getting future auditions for a potential horror-flick the blue, paying to refer self-pity, go into lip service to things my well-rehearsed powerful, to my death by frivolously come that clearly from limitless quantity of screams feigning then, they would some from monologues part, a few words changing too much life-like or my sickening,

out of apparently Mamet play while here and there masturbation

my

and

neediness,

debilitating habit of believing that I never did enough for the jerky people who knew how to make me feel guilty and worthless if I didn't go to bat for them (p. 245).

376
Dear Friends and Family,

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

this letter I will be dead. Those of you this ser receive By the time you attending a gift from a beautiful vice are sitting the collection, quietly, holding paperweight, over turn the paperweight in life, had been my in your and joy. You which, pride a rose at look the imbedded in the be it of a scor hands, inside, deep glass, object pion, whatever, I certainly know and through the answer your to that tears you ask, but 'What am is death like?' unable to give By this details... time

question

If my instructions were followed the way I wanted them to be (see attached instruction envelope #1), this letter is being read to you from the pulpit of The Simple Shepherd Church of Christ by my best friend, Eileen Mickey (Hi, Eileen), who is wearing the long-sleeved Lisa Montino designer dress I left behind that al
ways out needs please, Most and looked some to on be so good on me. or took I hope lost some weight it you either (Eileen, not going to be able to breathe. the sides or you're remember it Also, to skimp, I know how and your love but you dry-cleaned. family to what listen anyone says about Woolite. Dry-clean!) are I did it. You're why wondering asking probably to do such Trish Moody "What could have driven over

don't

of over

you again,

yourselves a thing?"

You're whispering,
bright full of sunshine, love.

'Why, Lord? Why

doing things Just as smart for and

take Trish Moody?

other people, always as sweet and pretty

Trish was
so up they and come.'

a ray of
perky and

always too. Pretty

You're
worse for dog, well also it....

probably
than Trish The

shaking your heads and thinking there's plenty of people a lot

Moody. boyfriend her beat his There's who, senseless. ...The her after He former Trish beat excuse for a boyfriend, her backed accidentally her with words but was spend a tragic entirely Randy car Sykes, over his

example. practically have been a blessing

with

fists.

in disguise

as Randy

Dog's tended

death to

as it might still, accident but perhaps too much time with

What with

did Randy,

Trish's came

mother to her

her daughter, heartbroken say when in search of love and understanding?

over

her

breakup

'If you're
dictionary.'

looking for sympathy you can find it between

shit and syphilis in the

Perhaps Neither tries That's

my can

mother

can

live with

slogans

such

as

this.

I know

I can't.

I live

surrounded nobody

to pretend Look

that

right. chrome-dome single five-day

who such as Annette by 'friends' desperately Kelper, on top of her head. notices the fact that she's balding feels for sorry Perhaps closely?balding just like a man. Randy Maybe that's why he was seen twice in her company in a

Annette. period...

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

Is everyone on earth as two-faced as Annette Kelper? around the Is everyone as cruel

377
as

Randy
devoted

Sykes? I think not. Most

people. I urge you now

of you, the loved ones I left behind, are simple,

to take a look room. Are Randy Sykes

and Annette sitting in the audience? Are they shifting uncomfortably in the pew, shielding their faces with the 8-by-ll photograph of me I had reproduced to serve
as a memento of this occasion?

Fancy fault stone

little

shitheads! They Release

Look are your

at

I'm dead. them.

to blame. anger! and cast

take a good them, I urge you now The Bible says the

hard to take it's

look those all

at

them.

It's

their and first

that

paperweights to cast the right

stone if someone dead is telling you to do it and I'm telling you now, pretend the
paperweights to pay for are damages stones to them and upon windows. the walls I've guilty. It's money put aside my I was saving savings for my

wedding and there's plenty of it so throwl Hurt them the way them? No one will hold you responsible. Kill them!40 Much of the "fun" described above one would to witness still be around Much humor involve comes

they hurt me? Kill

death.

practices,

(ways obviously I simply wish of our continued assumption world, entirely even after death, and

surrounding the dead as like the living in certain ways treating seen to be inappropriate, in the case of the humor).41 to point out here that our (perhaps clandestine) and capacity presence can be a source of comfort it has the to be aware and consolation.

from illicitly assuming that even after the events in question, as well as many death, funerary

of the

If death is like life in this respect, even if it is unpleasant,

(Note old friend"). mysterious that chronic of

it is not

frightening ring familiarity think of their pain as "an pain sufferers sometimes to project ourselves In any case, removing this tendency a the future into of view) may lead to (as having persisting point enhanced anxiety about death; the tendency tames death, and without can seem more and total annihilation it, the stark nothingness death is completely different it can arouse less tractable, from more life and unruly lacking fears.

frightening. When even in awareness,

6. The Let us turn to Lucretius's

Banquet "Banquet

Argument

banquet, life (in the typical 40

pp.

there

is a definite case).

As in the case of a Argument." or structure to a human pattern temporal The conclusion of the Banquet Argument is (Boston: Little Brown of Death, pp. 29-30. and Company, 1994),

David
18-21.

Sedaris, Barrel Fever

41

Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics

378

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER

like this: that our mortality of our is a necessary condition something we can various sort activities of and value the having meaning "... and find attractive. Nussbaum the removal of writes, comprehend not so much all finitude in general, mortality in particular, would in friendship, love, justice, and to survive the various for example] forms of morally virtuous action, as as we of about the value know death it."42 She eternally bring not have contends that we would the virtues without death. For enable these values [the values example, acting management can bring I have Nussbaum and involves "a certain way of says that courage in the face of death," and moderation "is a reacting excesses sorts in a being for whom of appetite of certain and we find

death...."43 eventually in that death is not the only condition contrast, out, pointed a point or content to the virtues. in an Even that could provide of physical immortal be stretches life, there could and/or long

illness

and so boredom, loneliness, disability, anxiety, depression, a sorts of potential conditions could certainly forth. These give shape to our lives and content to the virtues. We do not need death in order emotional to have strive danger, to avoid has and and suffering. her with this agreement subsequently expressed point, we need to take apart the different I agree with Fischer: life much in connection I wish issues to make a better. more asking exactly how precisely, with the shaping of value."44 a few tentative toward gestures to provide considerable impetus terrible disability, dysfunctionality, to ourselves to

Nussbaum

saying, "So limitations of a human each In of them works section these this

understanding that the view Williams45) immortal which in our this would there would unattractive. involve

of First, note that the proponent as bad Bernard is necessarily (such immortality in insists that there are no conceivable circumstances life would lives we be recognizably became decrepit human and attractive. If or permanently disabled, sort of "shape" to our lives, but that our I am lives would be and envisaging disabilities would

immortal certainly

emerge

give the relevant the concomitant for

Thus, the potential

danger the sort of circumstances long-term and

significant

42 43 44 Nussbaum, Nussbaum, Nussbaum, Desire," 813.

The

The

p. 226. of Desire, pp. 227 of Desire, Therapy to Papers in Symposium "Reply Therapy

and

228. on Nussbaum, The Therapy of

Bernard Williams, Problems Press, 1973), pp. 82-100).

45

p.

of the Self

(Cambridge, Cambridge

University

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

379

and but with This recovery. regeneration suffering, subsequent seems both conceivable attractive. and potentially certainly life would have no shape. How It is often stated that an immortal for could we care about something Consider, essentially amorphous? as a an such You carpet. ordinary object, might example, physical the size of the carpet in your expand simply and that would you thereby indefinitely imagine a very an But the is large carpet?indeed, infinitely large carpet. problem that a carpet is what it is?a virtue of its particular carpet?in borders. As one expands the carpet in one's mind, it inevitably you imagination between the carpet and a statue becomes blurred. is surroundings Similarly, the particular statue it is in part because of its of the contours and one is in danger of having no them indefinitely borders; expand a at but formless blob of marble. all, sculpture huge, are But I believe the analogies here. First, it is not misleading into explodes the noncarpet shapelessness large carpet! indefinitely But, more why not think of infinitely importantly, long life as similar to an indefinitely could be more long electrocardiogram? (What context in this than the representation of one's heartbeat appropriate the physical engine of life?) I do not see why one could not have an indefinitely any given all of the spatial indefinitely tent along along with "shape" boundless long electrocardiogram, temporal period. After dimensions of a given pattern displayed at one not to need all, expand infinity the relevant object; one can have an with evident that entirely conclusions. Perhaps the thought-experiments one can think of an issue in their putative as the distinction think that could

structure with and con long electrocardiogram specific the way, since the vertical dimension need not be extended the horizontal need be conflated one. with It is surely features a mistake of one to think that dimension-the

horizontal dimension. a has a definite and bounded structure: Yes, banquet temporal our and so forth. Also, course, soup, salad, main desert, appetizers, a beginning, lives typically structure with have a certain narrative and end (carved up very roughly). It is of course normally middle, - a a to be virtue to accept the finitude of wisdom great thought sign of our lives and not engage or in what the Greeks called "plenoexia" But the question at inappropriate "overreaching." our ordinary, about normal life's lives, but about considered from a distinctively of possibilities, philosophical point can a banquet not be a kind of "temporal view. Why all-you-can-eat can we not an indefinitely buffet?" Better: why extended imagine issue here is not a certain sort of

380
banquet, activities)? already! And essential watch Perhaps certain finitude. narrative our with This suitable

JOHN MARTIN FISCHER intervals all, for recovery of other (and enjoyment the way tend to look at life "foodies" structure, is finitude?

is, after

lives have sort of

a narrative structure

to this

which soap operas, more put: carefully of the distinctive features our

but why that suppose After all, many people are stories that are seemingly endless. it seems to me that our lives could have of narrative structure value without based to have

on Specifically, even are the lives bounded structure, we value as a result of So, for example, temporally. succeeding as a result rather than merely striving or learning from past mistakes, as The the values encoded in of a windfall (such lottery). winning narratives these are could still exist, even if the stories were infinitely a function not finitude. We mean of relationships, to the notion when we advert that our lives are (or I

lives can be thought apart from whether

human long; different

things

correspond that believe In

Consider, an immortal

structure. and that they have narrative to) "stories," than the chief element is narrative rather finitude.46 value, I what dub the Problem." would finally, "Super-Powers

immortality. of concept I am

one would know that one has life, presumably the this raises interesting about By the way, questions as a in it role discussions. immortality, plays philosophical that the relevant individuals know not

that they are know that they are so; they simply contingently not to death, not just that in fact they will die. But if one invulnerable one could do lots of one is invulnerable to death, one knows knows a to about without death worry skydiving (without things having most in and the exotic parachute), precarious places, rock-climbing to one knows what and so forth. Further, that, no matter happens assuming and immortal, and could riddle you with bullets so, someone one to live. Given these realizations, nevertheless continue you would that one could do just about anything, conclude and, although might seem at first attractive, it would be so fundamentally such a life might one, one will not die: different from our incomprehensible The is again reply be very different would 46 own, to us. finite, limited human lives as to be

the envisaged circumstances that, although not be from our current status, they would

I explore these issues in greater depth in, John Martin Fischer "Free Will, Death, and the Meaning of Life: The Role of Narrative," Philosophical Papers 34 (2006), pp. 379-404.

EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH AND IMMORTALITY

381

As with the to justify the purported conclusion. different sufficiently we are must other than death. that there remember virtues, dangers to death and thus that I So, even if I realize that I am invulnerable would doubt continue be to live, even if I were to fall from a high mountain

cliff or were riddled with bullets, I would still realize that I would no
by such things. Consequent pain, be a constraint against trying such suffering, to suppose and would that one also temper any inclination antics, or superbe different, had "infinite" Life would but, powers. damaged significantly and disability would arguably, Department analogous to our finite human lives.47

of Philosophy

University of California Riverside, CA, 92521, USA e-mail: John.Fischer@ucr.edu

47 Buffalo

I benefited

"Conference

Smith. Barry of Buffalo University philosophy comments. their thoughtful I have

a truncated version of this paper reading on Metaphysics and Medicine," November I also the paper with of discussed members from department also read graduate of versions seminar;

at

the University organized Hershenov's

of by

2004, David I am at

this paper

at Duke The John Hopkins departments University, University, on in St. Louis. I am very grateful comments to thoughtful University I am honovred to be part of this celebration sions. Finally, of the work Nassbaum.

for grateful the philosophy and Washington these occa of Martha