LAND TITLES

Capistrano vs Limcuando GR No. 152413 February 13, 2009 Leonardo De Castro, J.: Facts: Petitioner owns a parcel of land pursuant to a free patent. She then sold such land to Spouses Zuasola and Subida with a right to repurchase. Later, she sold half of the same land to herein respondents in installment basis. When the respondents learned that the interest over the land sold to them was already sold to Spouses Zuasola and Subida, they instituted a criminal action against the petitioner. Petitioner was convicted of estafa. Petitioner then repurchased the land from Spouses Zuasola and Subida; and sold the portion of the disputed land to respondents. A certificate of title was issued in favor of the respondents. Petitioner then filed an action for the annulment of the deed of sale and invoked Sec. 119 of Public Land Act. The RTC sustained the validity of the deed of sale and denied the petitioners right to repurchase the subject land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the sale of the land may be annulled since it is in violation of the Public Land Act. Held: No. Petitioners action for annulment of the subject deed should be dismissed based on Article 1397 of the Civil Code which provides that the person who employed fraud cannot base his action for the annulment of contracts upon such flaw of the contract. Also, it is important to stress that the ultimate objective of the Public Land Act is "to promote public policy, that is, to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order. Our prevailing jurisprudence requires that the motive of the patentee, his widow, or legal heirs in the exercise of their right to repurchase a land acquired through patent or grant must be consistent with the noble intent of the Public Land Act. We held in a number of cases that the right to repurchase of a patentee should fail if his underlying cause is contrary to everything that the Public Land Act stands for.

Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 43346 March 20, 1991 Regalado, J.: Facts: Rosendo Del Rosario was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Adjoining said land is a dried up portion of estero occupied by the defendant since 1945. They claimed that when they learned that the herein petitioner was occupying a portion of their land, they demanded payment thereof, but the latter refused to pay. The petitioner, on the other hand, contended that the disputed property is land of public domain. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner to deliver the land to the private respondent and to pay reasonable rent thereof of P5.00 from the date of filing the complaint until the surrender of the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the dried up portion of the estero should accrue to the benefit of the respondents being the riparian owner Held: No. A careful perusal of the evidence presented by both parties in the case at bar will reveal that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused, not by natural forces, but due to the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to manmade or artificial accretionsnor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners. The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

SALES
Amigo vs. Teves 96 Phil 252 November 29, 1954 Bautista Angelo, J.: Facts: Spouses Macario Amigo and Anacleto Cagalitan executed in favor of their son, Marcelino Amigo, a power of attorney. Marcelino, in his capacity, as attorney-in-fact, sold the land with the right to repurchase in favor of Serafin Tever, herein respondent. It was stipulated that the vendor would remain in possession of the land and would pay rent as lessees. Further, in case on default in rental payments, the lease shall automatically terminate and the right of ownership of vendee shall become absolute. Meanwhile, Spouses Amigo and Cagalitan donated to their sons, Petitioners Justino Amigo and Pastor Amigo, several parcels of land including their right to repurchase the land in litigation. The vendor-lessee failed to pay rentals; as a result, respondent executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership. The petitioners then exercised their right to repurchase but the respondent refused on the ground that ownership was already consolidated unto them. Issue: Whether or not the sale is void because the right to repurchase is not within the power granted to Marcelino Amigo Held: No. A cursory reading thereof would at once reveal that the power granted to the agent is so broad that it practically covers the celebration of any contract and the conclusion of any covenant or stipulation. When the power of attorney says that the agent can enter into any contract concerning the land, or can sell the land under any term or condition and covenant he may think fit, it undoubtedly means that he can act in the same manner and with the same breath and latitude as the principal could concerning the property. Further, while the lease covenant may be onerous or may work hardship on the vendor because of its clause providing for the automatic termination of the period of redemption, however, the same is not contrary to law, morals, or public order, which may serve as basis for its nullification. Rather than obnoxious are oppressive , it is a clause common in a sale with pacto de retro, and as such it received the sanction of our courts.