Australia's engagement vvith Asia T he doctrinal tradition of Realism has dominated the discipline of International Relations and been enormously influential in Australian foreign policy. 1 Realism offers four major propositions about global reality: Independent soveTei,gn states a?'e the most impo'rtant cu.:tors 'in gtobal polUics and must be the basic unit Qf 'reali,stic' analysis; The relationship between these states is best unde?'stood as ungoverned ana:rchy; The behaviour of states engaged in anaTclL'ical cOr/fT:ict can nevertheless be undeTstood i,n m.f'irmaltenns - a,s the utiJUa:rian PUTsu'it of self (s{,Q1e) interest; a:nd Even when sta,te acto?'.'; appear to engage in coopemtive activity and/oT 'when actors other tha:n states engage in 'integrutive behmriour that appea,TS to undermjne the power politics premise, this is a transient and ephemeral phenomenon and the structu:ral determinants of (anarchicat) global existence sl'ill ') p p l y ~ While there are many variations on this theme, there is general agreement that these propositions are central to Realism. Australia's foreign minister Alexander Downer has endorsed Realism as 'the theoretical framework in and through which Australia approaches its engagement with Asia'. According to Downer, 'it is the state, rather than culture or civilisation, which continues to be the primary locus of power and identification. It is the state that is the primary source of political power. Despite the influence of transnational corporations and international capital flows, it is the state that remains the primary economic unit'.3 In order to give effect to this state-centric analysis, successive Australian goverrullents have had to find ways to neutralise public opinion. The challenge of public opinion has been particularly strong with respect to Indonesia and East Timor. Yet this challenge was recognised from the outset. More than a year before the Indonesian invasion of December 1975, William Pritchett, First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence, 38 I O!SSENT SUMMER 200S/2006 warned policymakers that it would not be possible to conceal Indonesian brutalities from the Australian public. Nor would it be possible to conduct a good working relationship with Indonesia in the face of sustained public condemnation. He argued that Australia should 'favour the emergence of the territory (East Tinlor) through self-detennination, as an independent state' despite Indonesian objections. 4 Pritchett's view was rejected; instead, the hard-headed Realism of Richard Woolcott prevailed. Woolcott, who was Australia's ambassador to Jakarta, argued repeatedly that 'we need to make a pragmatic, practical, hard-headed assessment of our real long-term interests'.5 Accordingly, we should 'leave events to take their course; and if and when Indonesia does intervene act in a way which would be designed to mininlise the public impact in Australia'. 6 Furthennore, it nlight be easier to negotiate with Indonesia rather than an independent East Timor on the seabed boundary in the 'rimor Sea. He regarded this as much more realistic: 'I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but this is what national interest and foreign policy is all about'.7 Had the Australian government taken Pritchett's advice, President Suharto would have had firmer grounds on which to resist his military's desire to invade East Timor. Instead, as Indonesia's General Murtopo observed, 'Australian support for the idea of incorporation had helped Indonesia crystallise its own thinking'. 8 As history shows, the Australia- Indonesia relationship was dogged by the challenge of public opinion; a transnational coalition of activists campaigned against East Timor's occupation for 24 years. Although not tmder direct threat themselves, and for the most part not even of Timorese origin, foreign activists took up the cause of East 'rimor. They held rallies, disrupted press conferences, blockaded military bases, sabotaged nlilitary equipment and raised awareness wherever they could. This coalition was leaderless but llighly organised - leaderless because no central corrmlittee directed the rest of the movement; highly organised because its members cooperated witllin a shared framework of understanding and collective action. A continuum of activism developed between campaigners on the outside, armed freedom fighters in the mountains, and clandestine networks in the towns and villages. This movement of non-state actors grew irl strength over the years, ultinlately capitalising on the Sullarto regime's diplomatic vulnerability during the Asian financial crisis. The liberation of East Timor in 1999 represented a Copyright of Full Text rests With the origmal owner and, except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, copying this copyright materialis prohibited without the permiSSion of the owner or .:l.ent or by way of a licence from COPYright Agency Limited. For mformatlOn about such licences, contact the Copyright Agency Limited on (02) 93947600 (ph) or (02) 93947601 (fax) Dr... .. .- __ .......'.., ,4'. IIP" ...... Indonesian military responded by launching a campaign of state- sponsored terror in order to reverse the results of the ballot. The Howard goverml1ent assisted Indonesia by evacuating foreign observers, thus ensuring that there would be no witnesses to the military's ethnic cleansing campaign. However, its efforts were confounded by a tidal wave of public outrage. It was therefore forced to reverse its policy and deploy troops into East TimorJ 1 The territory's emergence as an independent state voided the Timor Gap Treaty. There had been clear indications all along that the East Timorese would not accept it; Mari Alkatiri (today the Prime Minister) said in November 1999, 'We still consider the TinlOr Gap Treaty an illegal treaty This is a point of principle. We are not going to be a successor to an illegal treaty'. 12 Alkatiri emphasised that transitional arrangements to provide certainty to existing operators would continue, but East Tinlor could not be expected to inherit a treaty signed between its fOffiler occupier and that occupier's greatest Western ally. The Australian Labor Party under then-Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Laurie Brereton realised the impOl1:ance of resolving the issue fairly and speedily. At its National Conference on 3 August 2000, Brereton stated: Labor is prepared to SUppOTt tlw negotiation and conclusion of a perrnanent mm-il'ime boundn,ry in tlw Timor Gap based on lines qf eqU'id'istance bef'lJ.Jeen Austmlia and East Tim01: Such (J, settlement would see major gas and pelroleum TesenJes 'within East Timm's 'lTw:ritime boundwies and would be ajust outcorne consisten.t with the Law Qf the Sea. This view appears to have been anathema to the hard-headed policymaking Realists, whose assessment was that a lawful boundary settlement with East Timor would have negative implications for the existing boundary with Indonesia. They may have been thinking of the 1977 statement of Indonesia's then- Foreign Minister Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja that Australia > - , ' - , ' ,b,usir.flll;i am! E.'!.-'>t to the 1995 Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security. Given the degree of public hostility, this agreement had to be negotiated in secret. As Keating acknowledged, 'If there'd been a more public process, there probably wouldn't have been a treaty'. 10 The Howard government adhered to the foreign policy of its predecessors, continuing to extend diplomatic support to the Indonesian occupation. After the resignation of President Suharto, it worked assiduously alongside Indonesia to prevent a ballot on East Tinlor's independence. The situation soon became untenable, and Indonesia was forced to hold a ballot. Australia tried to mininlise international involvement while Indonesia tried to engineer a favourable outcome. Despite these efforts, the ballot reSUlted in a victory for independence. The boundary in the Timor Gap in February 1979. The Hawke Labor government followed the same trajectory, ultimately signing the Tirnor Gap Treaty with Indonesia in December 1989. Australia received a disproportionate share of the resources in return for recognising Indonesia's annexation. Under the prime ministership of Paul Keating, the Australian Defence Force engaged in militaty training with Indonesia's Special Forces. Australian defence cooperation led .. ... '.,..... ,. The 1972 Seabed Agreement between Australia and Indonesia resulted in a boundary much closer to Indonesia, giving AustTalia the lion's share of the resources. Portugal, which then controlled East Timor, refused to conclude a similar agreement with Australia, resulting in the 'TinlOr Gap'. InU11ediately after the December 1975 Indonesian invasion, Ambassador Woolcott advised the press that an independent East Timor 'would probably have held out for a less generous seabed agreement than Indonesia had given'. 9 Malcolm Fraser was Prime Minister as the death toll mounted during the War of Pacification (1975-79). He moved to legitimise the occupation by extencling de facto recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in January 1978, followed by de JUTe recognition with the opening of negotiations on the seabed major crisis in Australia-Indonesia relations. Austnlian diplomacy, often criticised on moral grounds, had failed even by its own standards of pragmatism, practicality and hard-headedness. T hirty years on, a similar challenge from non-state actors has arisen - this time in the form of the Timor Sea Justice Campaign, which is opposing Australia's claims to East Tinlor'S oil resources. The relevant background is as follows. D!SSENT SUMMER 2005/2006 I 39 MCNAUGHTAN'S OPTION: Under the Australian proposal, 20% of the Greater Sunrise field is 'deemed' to belong to East Timor. Australia could make a simple, unilateral technical alteration, such that 90% of Greater Sunrise - instead of 20% - would be 'deemed' to belong to East Timor. had 'taken Indonesia to the cleaners'.13 According to the legal academic Gillian Triggs, 'There is no doubt Indonesia will feel quite aggrieved if we have unequal boundaries in certain areas with Indonesia and we suddenly blow the boundary out and make a more equidistant one in relation to East Timor'.14 Accordingly, in March 2002, just two months before East Timor became independent, Australia withdrew unilaterally from the maritime boundary jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Intem.ational Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Its withdrawal was based on the optional clause of the Statute of the ICJ and Article 298 (1) ofthe United National Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) , and reflected its assessment of the weakness of its own legal position. 15 Defending this decision, Foreign Minister Downer said, 'As I explained to the East Timorese some time ago, we are happy to hear what they have to say but we don't want to start renegotiating all of our boundaries, not just with East Timor, but with Indonesia. It has enormous implications. As I have explained to them, our maritime boundaries with Indonesia cover several thousand kilometres. That is a very, very big issue for us and we are not in the game of renegotiating them'.16 This is a dangerous precedent. Neighbouring states may use similar tactics to Australia's detriment in future. Australia has continued to adopt strong-arm tactics toward the East Timorese govemment. In November 2003, for example, a year after East Timor asked Australia to begin negotiations on a permanent boundary, the first round of talks was held in Darwin. East Timor sent a full team of negotiators with a 40 I D!SSENT SUMMER 2005/2006 mandate to engage in substantive negotiations. By contrast, Australia sent a team of three, but asserted that it did not regard the proceedings as binding. It described them as 'talks about talks'. East Timor requested the convening of discussions on a monthly basis, but the Australian government pleaded that it had only enough resources for two rounds of discussions per year. Incredulous, East Timor offered to fund Australia's expenses, but the offer was not taken up. Great secrecy surrounds the negotiations, so an accurate analysis of their content cannot be made at this time. However, the late Dr Andrew McNaughtan suggested a feasible way forward more than three years ago. 17 There is every indication that his proposal is still appropriate and agreeable to both governments. It involves fuding a middle road between East Timor's legitimate claims and Australia's unreserved of them (see map, previous page). East Timor's legitimate claims: Were East 'l1mor to insist on its full maritime rights, it would be entitled to 100%of the oil and gas on its side of the median line in the Timor Sea. This includes the single most crucial resource, namely the Greater Sunrise field, the bulk of which lies just outside the lateral boundary of the Gap, now renamed the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA). Greater Sunrise contains resources estimated at about two billion barrels of oil equivalent (an energy unit that covers both oil and gas deposits). This outcome would be lawful and ideal from East Timor's perspective, but it would be plagued by considerable diplomatic, political and strategic factors. For one, a small and militarily weak East Timor is located between two huge and militarily powerful neighbors - Indonesia and Australia. East '.rimor would not have the military capacity to defend its resources from its enemies within the Indonesian army, which may yet seek revenge for its 24 years of defiance. Australia also appears to be resolutely committed to opposing and delaying a lawful settlement. Given these factors, the fledgling state would face considerable political and fmancial insecurity. Australia's rejectionism: Australia's preferred scenario would result in only 200!o of the crucial Greater Sunrise field being 'deemed' to lie within the JPDA. East Timor would receive 900!o of this 200!o, meaning that it would get only 18% of the overall revenue from Greater Sunrise. East Timor cannot ratify the Australian proposal because it would surrender for all time its right to the majority (or all) of its most significant resources. McNaughtan's option: Under the Australian proposal, 200!o of the Greater Sunrise field is 'deemed'to belong to East Timor. But this percentage is merely the result of an agreement between the parties, and is just as easily replaceable by another figure. Australia could make a simple, unilateral technical alteration, such that 90% of Greater Sunrise - instead of 20%- would be 'deemed' to belong to East Timor. East Timor would receive 900!o of this 900!o, or 81%of the overall revenue from Greater Sunrise. The Australian government would resolve its concerns about the boundary - particularly the concern about setting a precedent that Indonesia might exploit. East Timor would receive most of the resources it is God6ttheTerrorist-- DAVIO\ANGSAM . _. .. . If anyone sees a terrorist- other than an emotionally unstable person expelled from our closed psychiatric .. hospitals - could ti)ey please let me know? . entitled to, and would also get a powerful security guarantee for these resources - responsibility for maritime security would fall to Australia, whose powerful navy and air force are already well equipped for the task. What is more, East Timor could continue to insist on jobs and training for downstream developments. It remains to be seen whether the Realists take a hard-headed, recalcitrant stand. If they do, unpleasant surprises may yet be in store for them. Dr Clinton Ferna,ndes is u historian und uuthor Qf Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the Independence of East Timor (Scribe, 2004). He is currently a Visit?:ng Fellow ut the Austml'ian Nationa,l University. These are his views. For more information, visit the Timor Sea Justice Campaign's website: www.timorseajustice.org FOOTNOTES 1. International Relations here refers to the academic discipline that deals with the study of global politics. Realism here refers to the range of views contained within the dominant intellectual/policy perSPective in International Relations. 2. J. George 1996, 'Quo Vadis Australia? Framing the Defence and Security Debate Beyond the Cold War'. in Cheeseman G and Bruce R 1996 (edsJ, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers: Australian Defence and Security Thinking after the Cold War, Alien and Unwin, St Leonards. 3. A. Downer 23 May 1996, Address at the launch of the Australia in Asia series, Parliament House, Canberra. 4. W. Way (ed) 2000, Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese rimor 1974-1976, Melbourne University Press, p 84 and p 190. 5. W. Way (ed) 2000, p 309. 6. W. Way (ed) 2000, p 314. 7. W. Way (ed) 2000, p 314. 8. W. Way (ed) 2000, p 136. 9. H. McDonald 15-20 September 1975, Australia supports Indonesia takeover of East rimor, The National Times. 10. 19 December 1995, The Austraiian, p 1. 11. See my Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and the independence of East rimor, Scribe, 2004. 12. K. Polglaze 30 November 1999, Future of rimor Gap Treay thrown into doubt, Sydney Morning Heraid. 13. R. King 2002, The Timor Gap, 19722002, www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsctjtimo r/subs/sub43.pdf, p 5. 14. R. King 2002, pp 32-3. 15. N. Bugalski 2004, Beneath the Sea: Determining a maritime boundary between Australia and East Timor, Alternative Law Journal, voi 29, no 6. 16. D. Greenlees 25 May 2002, Downer: No change to Timor borders, The Australian. 17. A. McNaughtan March 2002, A Middle Road in Timor's Oil and Gas Options, http://www.etan.org/et2002b/mayj05-
1'1 ,'. I", ,", I 've looking for but I haven't seen any. On the weekend my boys and I were in the garden and we looked everywhere for terrorists but we didn't see any. There were a pair of Eastern Rosellas and we're pretty sure they were because we looked them up in the bird book and although they could be confused for juvenUe Crimson Rosellas or perhaps a lorikeet or two, we were pretty sure they were Eastern Rosellas. But no terrorists. I know there must be terrorists in Australia because Prime Minister John Howard says he's seen them. And he's shown them to the State Premiers and Territory Chief Ministers. But I haven't seen them. We looked at Caulfield Park, Canlegie Velodrome, Princess Park and Queen's Park and we didn't see any there, either. And I didn't see any at the MCG for the Grand Final, which is good1;Jecause then the whole stadium would have had t<;> be evacuated and you can imagine how alert and alarmed 90,000 football fans would be if there was.an Auskick bag left near .. a seat while someone went to get a pie or a beer. I've seen some men and women with guns and very surly men and women with badges and notebooks at Flagstaff Station but I don't think terrorists wear uniforrriS inAustralia, do they? I know our police wouldn't shoot a . Braziliarielectrician eight times, because even the police know how: hard itis to get a qualified electrician these days, I saw some people from the Middle East at TullamarineAirport the other.day, including young males, but I don't think they were terrorists because they were with a little old lady in a wheelchair and they were crying a lot. She was being deported. There were some men with guns and others with uniforms but that was as close to terrorists as I could see.. Perhaps the young MUslim men crying over their grandmother's forced deportation might grow up to be terrorists. I did see terrorists when I was a Middle East reporter. They had gunS. Some of the Palestinian ones had black Mercedes sedans with dark glass windows and their drivers and guards had guns. All the Israeli ones had guns. The Irish terrorists had their own CCTV- so if the IRA can use CCTV; I suppose we should, too. The one Welsh terrorist I met blew up an electricity pylon. Come to think of it, I've actually seen quite a few terrOIists. It was my job. ThE:W told me who they were and what they did. But I haven't seen any terrorists in Australia. Perhaps they are the sort of terrorists you can't see; a bit like the tooth fairy and Santa Claus and the Bogeyman. If anyone sees a terrorist - otherthan an emotionally unstable person expelled from our closed .... psychiatric hospitals - could they . please let me know? Drivid Langsamreported on the Israeli-Pulestinian conj1.ict 1985- 1997jor BBC WorldService, .. The Guardian, the 5MB; the New Statesman und ABCRadio. D!SSENT SUMMER 200512006 I 41