New Political Economy, Vol. 9, No.

3, September 2004

REVIEW ESSAY

Grays Elegy for Market Utopianism

ANDREW LINKLATER

The hope that science would increase social power over nature, liberate human beings from ignorance and superstition, and increase freedom is one of the hallmarks of the Enlightenment. The revolution in science and technology encouraged the conviction that suffering resulting from the vulnerability of the body, the operation of natural forces and the functioning of repressive institutions could be diminished if not eradicated.1 Marxs thought and the Marxist tradition were exemplars of this new-found faith in human potentialities. Of course, few on the Left now subscribe to the progressivist or teleological conception of history which suffuses Marxs writings; and no serious thinker today has the faith in technology which informed Lenins belief that freedom can be realised by combining collectivisation and electrication. Horkheimer and Adorno argued that the technological forces which enlarged human power over nature also made totally administered societies possible. The tyranny of Soviet Marxism, the rise of Fascism and the Holocaust destroyed the na ve faith in the progressive nature of modernity. What, if anything, can be salvaged from the Enlightenment project has been debated by social and political theorists ever since. Horkheimer and Adorno saw no escape from pessimism and despair, but each held on to the Enlightenment theme that lending voice to the suffering was a necessary condition of truth; Adorno called for a form of self-reection which worked against the brute predominance of all collectives which threatened to annihilate the different.2 He called in a striking passage for a new categorical imperative which would ensure that Auschwitz, or its like, would not happen again.3 His belief that this struggle would never be completed resonates with more recent critical approaches which do not abandon the project of modernity while scaling down their political aspirations because of the failed utopias of recent times. For Habermas, the contemporary radical mind should be informed by an enlightened suspicion of the Enlightenment; ethical inquiry should focus on the procedures which can be used to establish principles of coexistence; it
Andrew Linklater, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion SY23 3DA, Wales, UK.
ISSN 1356-3467 print; ISSN 1469-9923 online/04/030429-11 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/1356346042000259866

Andrew Linklater should eschew the quest for a rational account of a substantive and universalisable form of life in the wiser post-metaphysical age; and the grand aspiration for emancipation should be replaced by the more modest task of increasing understanding. Others, including several poststructuralist writers, display similar ambivalence towards the Enlightenment. Foucault, it will be recalled, maintained there is no need to be either wholly for or against the Enlightenment. More generally, very few on the Left harbour the illusion that the forms of suffering mentioned earlier can be eradicated forever, and most are acutely aware that all proposed remedies for human misery can generate new forms of domination. Belief in a never-ending assault on the different causes of human suffering is the version of the Enlightenment project which commandsor deserves to commandmost support in radical circles at the current time. Until recently, the second great heir of the Enlightenmentliberalismdid not have the same need to rethink its attitudes to modernity, the reason being that liberals have typically rejected the view that political projects will ever succeed in substituting harmony for conict. Liberals have repeatedly argued that the great plurality of beliefsa condition to be cherished rather than merely toleratedwill always defeat efforts to refashion society. A rational approach to politics must therefore lower its sights to consider the social and political framework that will enable diverse world-views and interests to coexist with the minimum of coercion and interference. Of course, liberals have not been immune from demands to re-examine their fundamental beliefs about the progressive nature of Western modernity. E.H. Carr maintained that the 19th century liberal belief in a natural harmony of interests anchored in free trade reected the standpoint of the comfortable powers which ignored the widening gulf between haves and have-nots in international politics.4 Numerous welfare liberals have echoed this concern in their disagreement with a free market liberalism which does not pause to think seriously about national and global social justice; and they have pointed, like Carr before them, to the biases of a human rights culture which places the entitlement to liberty above the right to subsistence or to an equitable share of global resources. Over several books John Gray has developed a powerful critique of the soulless liberalism which dominates contemporary political lifea perverted form of the liberal ethos which worships the free market as the engine of economic growth, which believes untrammelled capitalism can reduce suffering and enlarge freedom, and which supposes that a rational design for the improvement or perfection of human affairs can be applied across the world as a whole. This critique is all the more interesting because it is made by a major New Right thinker of the 1980s. Gray argues that this liberal world-view suffers the same aw as all forms of secular humanism by virtue of repeating the errors of the Enlightenment which have their origins in Christian monotheism and the Christian doctrine of salvation. Enlightenment thinkers transformed this into a project of universal human emancipation which insisted that the individuals could free themselves from the limits that frame the lives of other animals by using growing scientic knowledge to perfect their societies.5 The neoliberal faith in progress is accused of perpetuating the view that politics can remake social structures and transform human drives. Although Gray does not make this 430

Review Essay exact point, the upshot of his argument is that economic liberalism deserves the searching examination of core beliefs about history and progress which was undertaken by socialist thinkers in response to the theoretical and political failures of the revolutionary Left. Grays assault on free market liberalism raises several questions. How does he characterise this standpoint and what does he regard as its central defects? What is novel about this critique, and what can be found in previous challenges to liberalism? Finally, where does Grays condemnation of market utopianism leave the Enlightenment project, and how does it compare with socialist and other radical critiques of the utopias of the Left? Market utopianism Gray maintains that the United States today is the last great power to base its policy on (the) Enlightenment thesis that it is possible to supplant the historic diversity of human cultures with a single, universal civilisation.6 Market utopianism has been successful in appropriating the American faith that it is a unique country, the model for a universal civilisation which all societies are bound to emulate.7 The USA is alone in supposing that the global expansion of unregulated capitalism can bring about the betterment of the human race. With the collapse of bipolarity, it has been free to globalise its vision of unregulated capitalism at a time when the prestige of free market thinking has rarely been higher. Gray adds that this conception of the progressive globalisation of market relations is inextricably linked with the pervasive inuence of religious beliefs in US society and politics. A peculiar conjunction of economic ideology and religious faith separates the USA from the great majority of Western liberal democracies where the Enlightenment belief that modernity leads inexorably to secularisation has largely been validated and where, additionally, the commitment to a social market which promotes community and cooperation is stronger than in the USA. Curiously, the USA does not t the model of a modern society that has been inherited from the Enlightenment. Yet it is more pervaded by Enlightenment superstitions and illusions than any other late modern culture.8 Gray adds that the USA and most European societies are drifting apart in terms of core aspirations and beliefs, but the more important trend has seen the juggernaut of the free market weaken social markets in Europe with the effect that pervasive individualism has rendered the European social-democratic project obsolete.9 The critique of market utopianism There are at least four dimensions of Grays critique of market utopianism. The rst is that the triumph of the market is responsible for large-scale suffering in the form of economic insecurity, for widening inequalities within liberal societies and across the wider world, and for creating a populous underclass that is denied the rewards of material growth. A second argument is that free markets destroy family relations and erode local communities with consequent increases in the level of crime. Free markets, Gray argues with reference to the dominance of laissez-faire 431

Andrew Linklater ideology in Victorian England, do not develop of their own accord, but require states for their establishment and survival. The tragedy of the exercise of state power in the market utopias is that the forms of solidarity to which human beings usually turn in critical moments have been seriously weakened; the state has drawn back from obligations to protect the vulnerable from economic insecurity and is now powerless to foster new solidarities or to revive old ones. Social tensions have appeared in liberal economies as the have-nots react to the vulnerabilities that result from the states retreat from preserving social markets. Such problems might be augmented by future capitalist economic crises of which the Asian crisis is a sobering foretaste. Insulated from any kind of political accountability, the global market is much too brittle to last for long; it is in the logic of global laissez-faire that nancial crisis will eventually impact in the heartlands of the system.10 Indeed, Gray argues, without offering much support for this thesis, that the contemporary global order is probably more brittle than the liberal international economic order that collapsed in 1914.11 A third argument is that the global operation of market forces knows no barriers in the sense of recognising the impending exhaustion of natural resources and the growing likelihood of violent resource conicts. A fourth argument is that market utopianism is based on the serious error of thinking that a specic political experiment and local cultural form can produce lasting benets for the whole human race. Here Grays argument divides into separate themes. One is that the spread of capitalism has not secured the global triumph of the American free market; many different varieties of capitalism exist, including the anarcho-criminal form that has thrived in post-Soviet Russia and the family-based capitalism that seems suited to Chinese culture and other mutations may develop in future.12 A second and more fundamental point is that the Enlightenment hope for a universal civilisation has been undercut not only by the multiplication of capitalism in the modern world but also by the growing revolt against the West and Western values. More than any other event, the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 has struck at the idea that modernity must take a Western liberalor Americanform. Far from being a throwback to medieval times, Al Qaeda resembles fascism by being a distinctive way of being modern.13 Alternatively, it can be understood as a unique combination of pre-modern, modern and post-modern attitudes in which enmity to the West is linked to the modernist myth defended by revolutionary anarchists in 19th century Europe that a new society could be created through spectacular acts of violence.14 The revolt against the belief in a vision of a universal civilisation places a special burden on the West to work for a more tolerant, multicultural global order. The question which Gray asks is whether the USA with its belief that free markets are the key to freedom everywhere is up to the task of promoting peaceful and productive coexistence among peoples and regimes that will always be different.15 Post-Enlightenment politics Very little in this critique of free market liberalism is particularly new; as noted earlier, similar lines of criticism can be found in Carrs writings and in Marxs critique of capitalism. In Carrs condemnation of free market liberalism, there is 432

Review Essay the same broad critique of the urge to universalise a particular culture, of the tendency to protect sectional interests under the guise of promoting all human needs and of structures that cause profound insecurities and attendant political conicts. We must look beyond this literature for reections on one of the themes which troubles Gray, namely, the failure to deal with the revulsion against Western values. The importance of the revolt against the West was a central theme in Bulls writings and in more recent arguments about the need for justice between diverse cultures in a post-European world society, although Gray does not engage with this literature.16 Major differences exist between Grays standpoint and these arguments that the West has much to do to promote justice between cultures in the modern world. Most of these thinkers are broadly committed to some version of the Enlightenment project since most think that the purpose of critique is to make the case for, and to identify the possibility of, improved political structures. Particularly in his more recent work, Gray breaks the nexus between social critique and transformation by rejecting this political project. This has not always been his conclusion. He argued in False Dawn that a regime of global governance is needed in which world markets are managed so as to promote the cohesion of societies and the integrity of states. Only a framework of global regulationof currencies, capital movements, trade and environmental conservationcan enable the creativity of the world economy to be harnessed in the service of human needs.17 Moreover, a global tax on currency speculation, as proposed by the economist James Tobin, may be an example of the kind of regulation that would render world markets more stable and productive.18 In Endgames, published a year earlier, he defended a communitarian liberal perspective that contended that the liberal value of autonomy can be protected only in the context of a public culture of which market exchange is only a subordinate part.19 In his two more recent books, Gray dispenses with global problem-solving approaches precisely because they are scarred by the Enlightenments belief in expanding human control over the world, in forcing it to become more compliant with human needs and in striving to make it steadily more predictable. Gray breaks with his earlier position in interesting ways, not least by combining his dystopia with non-Western ideas to produce a troubling mix of pessimism and quiescence. There are many reasons for Grays abandonment of a liberalism that is committed to the goal of humane globalisation. One reason is that environmental degradation is uncontrolled and irreversible. The upshot is that resource depletion spurred on by the growing world population will validate Malthuss dark prognostications about escalating violence, but this will be made more dangerous and intractable by being intertwined with religious and ethnic enmities. Moreover, as in the case of other animal species, when humans overshoot the carrying capacity of their environment famine, plague or war will cull their numbers.20 Green political thought and practice aims to reverse environmental decay, but its strategies generally reveal its entrapment within the Enlightenment world-view that envisages greater mastery of external nature and society.21 In any case, it is highly doubtful that the necessary deation of human aspirations 433

Andrew Linklater can take place given the religious quality of the modernist commitment to progress.22 The depth of Grays pessimism is evident in his question of what could be more hopeless than placing the Earth in charge of this exceptionally destructive species.23 Contra the humanist imperative, he argues that human beings have an eternal predatory streak and an unquenchable fondness for killing which science simply magnies.24 A reduction of the worlds population and a large-scale switch to low-impact technologies might ease the strain,25 but mounting global problems will only be solved by the operation of physical forces as Nature extracts its revenge for all the harms which the human species has done to it. The Gaia thesis, with which Gray sympathises, foretells that natural forces will correct the hubris of humanism.26 The foreseeable extinction of the human species is not self-evidently lamentable: Homo sapiens is only one of very many species, and not obviously worth preserving. Later or sooner it will become extinct. When it is gone, the Earth will recover. Long after the human animal has disappeared, many of the species it is bent on destroying will still be around, along with others that have yet to spring up. The Earth will forget mankind. The play of life will go on.27 Gray argues that resource conicts will demonstrate there is no escape from a world of predatory states.28 His most recent book extends this narrative by arguing that the terrorist attacks on the USA have turned liberal states into Hobbesian surveillance states dedicated to the eradication of terrorist organisations that can organise violent attacks on the USA and other societies from secure havens within failed states. A new type of imperial governance is emerging to deal with the consequences of collapsed states and with the decisive feature of globalisation that is the diffusion of the instruments of violence.29 More will be said about Grays interpretation of the Enlightenment in a moment. One recent assessment of that epoch nds more to support than reject in its approach to cruelty, domination and exploitation, and in its hostility to war.30 From this standpoint the Enlightenment cannot be reduced to the triumph of instrumental rationality and it remains the critical starting-point for contemporary struggles for emancipation, for understanding the radically different and for countering excessive power. Gray is too well-versed in Enlightenment thought to reduce it to a single register, but is inexplicably reluctant to ask how its positive side can be used to preserve an emancipatory standpoint that removes the dangers of hubris. Instead of asking what can be salvaged from the Enlightenment, Gray draws insights from the Ancient Greeks who did not lock themselves in the modernist enthusiasm for perpetual striving; he turns to Oriental thinking in which life is not wasted agonising over alternatives, but is devoted to pursuing a way of living in which one never has to choose but can respond effortlessly to situations as they arise.31 Gray also borrows from Schopenhauers renowned pessimism. The point is to abandon the aspiration of remaking the world through politics and to embrace instead the vita contemplativa with its regard for the mysterious notion of groundless facts and for a willing surrender to never-returning moments.32 This is hopelessly vague but the immediately following passage plunges further into vacuousness: Other animals do not need a purpose in life. A contradiction to itself, the human animal cannot do without one. Can we not think of the aim of life as being simply to see?33 434

Review Essay Signicantly, Gray does not inch from making grand claims about the aims of human life, but the culmination of his disillusionment with the free market is an argument for the contemplative life. This immediately raises the question of why Gray has not made the case for a political project which tackles the human problems he has documented. Can we have our Enlightenment back please? There would seem to be little point defending the Enlightenment project if Grays more apocalyptic predictions that the most predatory forms of capitalism may bring a violent or sudden end to the human enterprise are right, but we have not reached this stage yet. Grays argument that market utopianism causes major social dislocation and destroys non-Western cultures calls up images of a less destructive and more tolerant philosophy of public affairs whose foundations can be found in the Enlightenment. Gray recognises that the tolerance, which is needed to ensure that diverse forms of life coexist, is an Enlightenment value that is shared by many religions and philosophies outside the West.34 It is difcult to reconcile this more subtle reading of the Enlightenment with Grays dominant complaint that its main thinkers were committed to a view of human progress in which different cultures are made into a single universal civilisation. Gray might protest that non-Western philosophies often have the advantage over the Enlightenment because they are not wedded to an anthropocentric project, but even here there is need for great care because one of the thinkers who Gray regards as symptomatic of modernist failingsnamely, Bentham35made sentience central to his moral philosophy, as did Frances Hutcheson. As Singer has argued, the result was a philosophy which most certainly did not privilege human over animal pain and suffering.36 What might be made of these philosophical dispositions is the missing question in Grays shift from New Right radicalism to the renunciation of progressivist politics. Silence on this matter is surprising given that Gray recognises that Enlightenment thinking cannot be reduced to the desire to expand logics of control. Hume is regarded as one of the more sagacious Enlightenment thinkers because he saw history as a succession of cycles in which civilisation alternated with barbarism,37 but this scepticism is thought to explain his marginal role in the eyes of those who are most strongly committed to the Enlightenment project. Some readings of the Enlightenment have argued that this bleaker, or at least more sceptical, reading of human affairs and human history is less the exception than the rule. One maintains there was little condence in progress in any eld amongst French writers prior to the close of the 18th century. Indeed, cyclical theories of history prevailed or existed alongside the most progressive grand narratives; writers such as Holbach, and Diderot on occasion, focused on perpetual ux rather than (on) evolution in any particular direction; Montesquieu thought the political project was to postpone predictable decline.38 These thinkers may well have thought they were living in an age more enlightened than the past, but this was often accompanied by a philosophically informed and politically principled scepticism towards the grand narratives of their forebears and contemporaries.39 From this vantage point, the project of 435

Andrew Linklater modernity might amount to little more than an effort to protect the civilising process from permanent and ineliminable destructive urges. If this reading of the Enlightenment is correct, then Grays observations about the Occidental twilight and the need for post-humanism are guilty of neglecting the achievements of the Enlightenment.40 There is a strange parallel between Grays post-liberalism and Horkheimer and Adornos post-Marxism, which reduced the Enlightenment to a project of domination, leaving later thinkers such as Habermas with the task of recovering its ethical protestations against torture, slavery and other examples of domination. Vogel argues that Enlightenment thinkers such as Condorcet and Foster opposed the cruelties of colonialism while Montesquieu stood for the destruction of pathological loyalties and Voltaire vigorously defended toleration. Vogel notes that the moral sentiment of compassion for suffering was essential to the Enlightenments defence of cosmopolitan citizenship and politics.41 The stress then was as much on criticising the causes of human misery than on envisaging and striving to create a world free from conict where the government of men replaces the administration of things. A recurrent theme in Grays writings is that market utopianism causes economic insecurity and unnecessary suffering, but Gray does not regard this as a possible starting point for a global ethicindeed, such a project is ruled out by his unsubstantiated claim that moral philosophy is a branch of ction.42 The obvious question to ask is where Grays plea for a contemplative attitude towards the world leaves the question of human insecurity and suffering. Enlightenment thinking as developed by Kant and Marx answered this question by analysing counter-hegemonic movements that develop a conception of the good society through political action. Grays position seems to be that all counter-hegemonic movements (including Green movements and post-modernism) are just the Enlightenment in a new guise since all are ultimately committed to a politics of expanding human control over society.43 Post-modern thinkers in particular have every reason to be bemused by Grays claim that they hope for a social condition in which all our (conicting) hopes can be satised.44 Gray comes close at many points to a poststructuralist ethic of respecting radical differences. The global order needs to be refashioned, he argues and rightly, to make the world more hospitable to non-Western cultures and values. What results from this argument is support for the pluralist conception of international society which was defended by Vattel in the 18th century and by English School writers such as Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson in more recent times. According to the pluralist approach, state sovereignty is to be defended as part of the disavowal of all political projects that seek to impose any particular set of moral values on the whole world. Gray reects this standpoint in his argument for a world order in which governments are left alone unless they cause harm to outsiders.45 As many writers have argued, the problem with this line of argument is that ethical pluralism is often frustrated, rather than protected, by state sovereignty. Gray is caught up in an internal contradiction here. To take ethical pluralism seriously one must think about how best to make the transition from a sovereign to a post-sovereign world order, but Gray cannot take this path because of his opposition to grand theorising along the lines of the 436

Review Essay Enlightenment. To defend the sovereign states-system is no less an exercise in grand designs and one that comes at a price, by compromising the ideal of cultural diversity and much else besides, including the belief that human arrangements need to be revised to tackle economic insecurity and unnecessary suffering. The problem is not insoluble, but it almost certainly leads back to the Enlightenment and to thinkers such as Kant who were concerned not only with the harm that states do to each other but with the states violence to its own citizens and with the harms that resulted from the expansion of global commercial society. The main choice here is between two grand projects: between the Kantian vision of a world order, which gives all individuals protection against unnecessary suffering, and Grays awed defence of the international statessystem. In short, the political theory of the Enlightenment and the moral sentiment of compassion for suffering which animates so many of its key writings offer a way of imagining an improved world order that addresses the human problems which Gray has documented in his critique of market utopianism. The point is not to abandon the Enlightenment, but to work through its legacy in the way that Habermas did in response to Horkheimer and Adornos pessimism, and as Foucault did in his parallel engagement with Kants philosophy and political thought. Grays disillusionment with market utopianism leads him to abandon grand political projects that have the purpose of alleviating the suffering it causes. So great is the fear of being tarnished by the unintended consequences of grand projects that safety is found in adopting a contemplative standpoint, even though this seems to abandon the suffering to their fate. Hegel called this standpoint the beautiful soul. It is a form of self-consciousness which is withdrawn into the inmost retreats of its being so that the ego is all that is essential, and all that exists. This orientation lacks force to externalise itself, the power to make itself a thing and to endure existence. It lives in dread of staining the radiance of its inner being by action and existence. And to preserve the purity of its heart, it ees from contact with actuality, and steadfastly perseveres in a state of self-willed impotence. It becomes a beautiful soul where its light dims and dies within it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air.46 In the end, all this form of consciousness can do is play with itself. The collapse of faith in a certain liberal grand metanarrative explains Grays ight from contact with actuality. There has been a move from the position of those that want to understand too much and too quickly: they have explanations for everything to the perspective of those who refuse to understand: they offer only cheap mystications. The author of these words adds that the only way forward lies in investigating the space between these two options.47 The middle ground as far as Grays trajectory is concerned can be found in that strand of Enlightenment thinking which believes that a primary function of politics is to protect human beings from pain, humiliation and related forms of suffering. Defending this position is all the more necessary in the case of the intellectual who supported New Right ideology despite the predictable miseries its implementation would cause. The victims of that failed utopia deserve rather more than an invitation to view the world more clearly through a lens cut from 437

Andrew Linklater deated political aspirations. Gray asserts that the social-democratic ideal of reducing poverty and material inequalities, and creating a more just distribution of meaningful opportunities within nation-states and across the whole world, is unworkable because of the successes of economic liberalism, but his writings do not undermine the claim that the social-democratic project is the legacy of the Enlightenment and needs to be supported and strengthened at the present time in response to the insecurities and suffering caused by market utopianism.

Notes
1. The three forms of suffering discussed in Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents (Hogarth Press, 1939), p. 28. 2. Joshua Cohen, Interrupting Auschwitz (Continuum, 2003), p. 38. 3. Ibid., p. xvi. 4. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 19191939 (Macmillan, 1946). 5. John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and other Animals (Granta, 2002), pp. xiii, 4. 6. John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (Granta, 1998). 7. Ibid., p. 104. 8. Ibid., p. 126. 9. Ibid., p. 216; and John Gray, Al-Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern (Faber & Faber, 2003), p. 23. 10. Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 48, 523. 11. Gray, False Dawn, p. 67. 12. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 56. 13. Ibid., p. 20. 14. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 176; and Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 13. 15. Gray, False Dawn, pp. 1056, 132 and 235. 16. Chris Brown, The Modern Requirement? Reections on Normative International Theory in a Post-Western World, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1998), pp, 33948; and Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 17. Gray, False Dawn, p. 199. 18. Ibid., p. 200. 19. John Gray, Endgames: Questions in Late Modern Political Thought (Polity, 1997), pp. 1516. 20. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 60ff. 21. Gray, Endgames, p. 158. 22. Ibid., p. 173. 23. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 17. 24. Ibid., pp. 4 and 92; see also p. 28. 25. Gray, Endgames, p. 164. 26. Ibid., pp. 163, 16970 and 172; see also Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 34. 27. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 151. 28. Ibid., p. 178. 29. Gray, Al-Qaeda, p. 97; and Gray, False Dawn, p. 216. 30. Ursula Vogel, Cosmopolitan loyalties and cosmopolitan citizenship in the Enlightenment, in: Michael Waller & Andrew Linklater (eds), Political Loyalty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2003), pp. 1726. 31. Gray, Straw Dogs, pp. 11415. 32. Ibid., pp. xv and 199. 33. Ibid., p. 199. 34. Gray, False Dawn, p. 207. 35. Ibid., p. 119. 36. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: Towards an End to Mans Inhumanity to Animals (Paladin, 1977), pp. 267. 37. Gray, Endgames, p. 136.

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38. Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment: The Pelican History of European Thought 4 (Penguin, 1968), p. 150. 39. Karen OBrien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 1011. 40. Gray, False Dawn, p. 193; and Gray, Endgames, p. 61. 41. Vogel, Cosmopolitan loyalties. 42. Gray, Straw Dogs, p. 109. 43. Ibid., p. 184. 44. Gray, Endgames, p. 160. 45. Gray, Al-Qaeda, pp. 11314. 46. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. Baillie (George Allen & Unwin, 1949), pp. 6656. 47. Giorgio Agamben, quoted in Cohen, Interrupting Auschwitz, p. 146.

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