Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies Eugenio vs CSC FACTS:

August 2, 1998 Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She was given Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility. She was recommended for the CES Officer rank to the president/ October 1, 1993 the Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 934359. The said resolution consolidated CES with the Civil Service Office thereby making it Office for the Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. This resolution became an impediment to the appointment of Eugenio as Civil Service Officer Rank IV since there will be no office to speak of because of the resolution. The petition was anchored on the fact that CES is an office created by the Legislature and the said resolution is usurpation of legislative functions.

ISSUE: W/N the Civil Service Commission has the power to Abolish and Reorganize the Career Executive Committee? HELD: No.
CSC's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as law created the CESB, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office. In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power Abella vs CSC FACTS:

Petitioner, Abella Jr., a lawyer, is a retired Department Manager of the Legal Services Department of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority. On July 1, 1996, He held civil service eligibility for the said position, having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management under the Civil Service Academy, which was required for the said position. On July 1, 1994, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 21 requiring additional qualifications for CES officials, Section 4 of which States that:

'1. Positions Covered by the Career Executive Service xxx xxx xxx

(b) In addition to the above identified positions and other positions of the same category which had been previously classified and included in the CES, all other third level positions of equivalent category in all branches and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters are embraced within the Career Executive Service provided that they meet the following criteria: '1. the position is a career position; '2. the position is above division chief level '3. the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive or managerial functions. '4. Status of Appointment of Incumbents of Positions Included Under the Coverage of the CES. Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.'
2 years after his retirement, he was by SBMA on a contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, he was issued a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. Said employment was submitted for approval with the CSC. It was disapproved on the ground that it was not appropriate not having met the above requirements under the Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) for permanent appointee.

ISSUE: 1) W/N Abello can be considered civil service eligible on his new position in SBMA by using the qualification he got from the Executive Leadership Management Training program from his position in EPZA? 2) W/N His right to due process was violated because CSC failed to notify him of this new requirement? HELD: 1) No. The challenged Circular protects the rights of incumbents as long as they remain in the positions to which they were previously appointed. They are allowed to retain their positions in a permanent capacity, notwithstanding the lack of CSEE. The government service of petitioner ended when he retired in 1996; thus, his right to remain in a CES position, notwithstanding his lack of eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment years later as department manager III at SBMA in 2001, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position. 2) No. The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice and hearing are necessary. In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. These requirements include prior notice and hearing. On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as an incident of the administrative body's power to issue guidelines for government officials to follow in performing their duties.

Quasi-Judicial Power

United Pepsi Cola vs. Laguesma FACTS:

Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It filed a petition for certification election on behalf of route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. But petition was denied by the med-arbiter and similarly on appeal on the ground that route manager are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible to form union membership under the 1st sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code: o Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Petitioner brought this appeal contending that the 1st sentence of Art 245 contravenes Art. III Sec. 8 of the Constitution which provides: o The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUE: 1) W/N Route Managers are managerial employees? -Yes 2) W/N the above prohibition violates the Constitution? -No HELD: 1) Yes The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organizational resources." A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rankand-file employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the rank-and- file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees. This question was the subject of 2 previous administrative determinations by the Secretary of Labor and Employment that the Secretary used in ruling this case. Petitioner argues that these previous administrative determinations do not have the effect of res judicata citing Nasipit vs NLRC because "labor relations proceedings" are "non-litigious and summary in nature without

regard to legal technicalities." In ruling that res judicata do not apply, the Court made it clear that it was referring to labor relations proceedings of a non-adversary character. However, the court pointed out that this case is an adversarial administrative proceeding where res judicata citing Abad v. NLRC xxx we applied the related doctrine of stare decisis in holding that the prior determination that certain jobs at the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., were project employments was binding in another case involving another group of employees of the same company. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Xxx 2) No. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations. As Justice Davide, Jr., himself a constitutional commissioner, said in his ponencia in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC: By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.