MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Vol. 35. No. 8, August 1989 Printed in U.S.A.

DEFINING MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRESCRIPTIVE THEORIZING*

GERALD F. SMITH Information and Decision Sciences Department, Carlson School of Managemenl, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455
Reflective problem solving activity presumes the existence of a problem definition or representation, often the precursor ofa formal model. Although problem definition has been addressed by theorists from several disciplines, it has not been adequately conceptualized, limiting the potential value of descriptive and prescriptive research. This article places problem definition in the overall problem solving process and delineates the various ways in which problems are commonly defined. It identifies the central dilemma of problem definition and proposes a prescriptive framework responding to that dilemma. (PROBLEM SOLVING; PROBLEM FORMULATION; PROBLEM DEFINITION)

Researchers concerned with understanding and improving managerial problem solving have noted the importance of problem definition, variously termed, and the need for research into this phase ofthe problem solving process (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 1976; Nutt 1984). A modicum of problem definition research has appeared, primarily within three disciplines: policy analysis, strategic management, and management science. Despite important contributions, much remains to be done: the domain has not been adequately conceptualized; various notions of problem definition coexist, untested by empirical studies; and, as a consequence, prescriptive theorizing remains homiletic, offering advice with little conceptual or empirical grounding. Problem solving is thinking done in anticipation of action; one thinks about a problem in order to determine what action to take in pursuit of one's objectives (Duncker 1945). Cognitive science holds that problem solving, like all mental activity, works from a representation, performance being strongly affected by representational adequacy (Pylyshyn 1984; Simon 1978a). Problem definition has to do with the way problematic concerns are represented. Prescriptive problem definition research attempts to improve the way managers and management scientists conceptualize their problems. To be effective, this research must be grounded in an adequate conceptualization of its domain. The present paper is concerned with the definition of real world, managerial problems. Although problems can be defined by organizations through a complex sociopolitical process (Lyles and Mitroff 1985), this paper adopts the individual level of analysis, while recognizing that organizations influence their members' thoughts. It attempts a conceptual reconstruction of the problem definition domain, locating definitional activity in the overall problem solving process, and characterizing the general contents of definitional statements. Many theorists have acknowledged that a given problem can be variously defined. This paper analyzes definitional alternatives, tracing most to divergent conceptualizations of problem definition itself Given an awareness of definitional possibilities, an appreciation of the cognitive constraints on conceptual activity, and sensitivity to variations among problem types, prescriptive theorizing becomes possible. The paper argues that problem definition efforts face an unavoidable conflict between the desire to focus attention and the need to insure that important considerations aren't lost from view. A prescriptive framework is proposed that responds to this conflict. Finally, the paper identifies opportunities for future research.
* Accepted by Vijay Mahajan; received September 23, 1987. The paper has been with the author 3 months for 2 revisions. 963 0025-1909/89/3508/0963801.25
Copyright 1989. The Institute of Managetnent Sciences

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1. Problem Definition and the Probiem Solving Process

To properly define "problem definition," the concept must be situated in a broader account of problem solving. Among management theorists, phase or stage models are the most common depictions of the problem solving process. Lang, Dittrich and White (1978) compare many of these; Cowan's (1986) model of "problem recognition" is especially relevant to current purposes. Phase theories provide high level, functional descriptions of problem solving, identifying activities that seem like logical steppingstones from a problem's origination to its solution. While empirical research has questioned their descriptive adequacy (Witte 1972), phase models remain popular. Given the lack of empirically testable model-reality connections, discipline is needed in the development and application of such models. The present paper is concerned with problem definition, part of the front-end or formulation half of the problem solving process. It analyzes formulation in terms of several identifiable mental states. The early phases of problem solving are demarcated by the occurrence of certain feelings, beliefs, and intentions which constitute the completion of one phase and make possible the initiation of its successor. Within each phase, characteristic mental processes promote the conclusive state-achievement, but the achievement, not the processes, defines the phase. The existence of such states is consistent with our introspections and contemporary cognitive science. And while subsequent stages of problem solving vary greatly with the nature ofthe problem, the initial stages evince a strong logical order and necessity. The proposed model of problem solvingincomplete regarding post-formulation stagesis depicted in Figure 1. This model employs the term "problem solving" in both broad and narrow senses. Broadly construed, problem solving refers to the entire process, action-oriented human thought. More narrowly, it denotes activities taking formulated problems as input and working towards their solution. Problem formulation has been variously defined (Lyles and Mitroff 1980; Schwenk and Thomas 1983); typical definitions including multiple activities. In light of its internal complexity, formulation is more an organizing construct than a research target: studies of problem formulation run the risk of making claims for the whole that are only true ofa part.
DELIMITING EVENT OR MENTAL CONTENT Physical stimuli, evidence PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION "^ ^ Perception CHARACTERISTIC COGNITIVE PROCESS

PHASE OR DESCRIPTIVE CONTENT

Concern, worry^ unease belief that a problem exists FORMULATION PROBLEM DEFINITION Explicit or Implicit representation of the problem PROBLEM SOLVING PROBLEM STRUCTURING Strategy for addressing the problem Instrumental reasoning Conceptualization

DIAGNOSIS

Identification of problem's cau8e(s) Discovery/design of solution alternatives

Causal reasoning

PROBLEM SOLVING

ALTERNATIVE GENERATION

Creativity

FIGURE 1. A Model of Problem Solving.

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Formulation has been decomposed into problem identification, definition, and structuring, each phase demarcated by the occurrence of certain events and characterized by certain cognitive processes. Problem solving begins with the perception of stimuli, interpreted as evidence ofa problem's existence, which arouse concern. The identification phase culminates with one's belief that a problem exists, a belief leading naturally to the definition stage. Here one attempts to specify the problem, to represent it to oneself and others. This is a conceptual process, problems being constructs, largely underdetermined by available information. Once defined, a problem can be structured, readied for solution. The structuring phase has the solver address the problem of deciding how to go about solving the original problem (Smith 1988). It involves instrumental, means-ends, reasoning: identifying major tasks towards solution and likely means of discharging these tasks. The logical sequencing ofthe stagesone can't structure a problem that hasn't been defined, or define a problem that hasn't been identifiedand ofthe larger process formulation precedes solvingdoesn't rule out the possibility of backtracking. Ideas or information generated during problem solving may lead one to change solution strategies, to redefine the problem, or to deny its existence. Notably absent from this analysis of problem formulation is a diagnostic stage, determining the problem's cause. Many theorists consider diagnosis part of problem formulation (Elbing 1970; Schwenk and Thomas 1983), problem definition (Kilmann and Mitroff 1979; Mushkat 1986), or as the main preliminary to problem solving (Mintzberg et al. 1976; Ramakrishna and Brightman 1986). This is inappropriate for two reasons. First, diagnosis is a discretionary activity irrelevant to the solving of many problems. Those arising from a change in one's objectives, i.e. Chen's (1975) goal-changing problems; situations where a cause is not continuing, e.g. a tornado-flattened factory; matters of evaluative judgment, e.g. which house should we buy?; or of alternative generation, e.g. what should we name this new product?: none of these requires causal diagnosis. In contrast, the specified constituents of problem formulation are pertinent to every instance of problem solving. Second, when needed, diagnosis can entail extensive investigatory activity, successful completion of which virtually solves the problem. Kepner and Tregoe's (1981) examples are typical. Formulation is intended as front-end preparation for problem solving, not the primary task. Diagnosis is best conceived as an activity one might perform during problem solving. Having distinguished problem definition from other phases of problem solving, it is useful to note coextensive terms. Since problem definition involves regarding a feeling of dissatisfaction as a problem, it is equivalent to "problem setting," which Majone (1980) defined as "the intellectual process by which a problem situation is translated into a specific problem." Rein and Schon (1977) characterize "problem setting" as a "framing and naming" process in which one selects and organizes important aspects of the situation, identifying particular concerns therein. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) apply the framing construct to the definition of decision problems. Another member of the family is Maier's (1963) notion of "locating" the problem, identifying obstacles that prevent attainment of an objective. Setting, framing, and locating problems will be treated as equivalent to problem definition. 2. Problems and Problem Definition What are problems and how might they be defined? Adapting from Agre (1982), a problem is an undesirable situation that is significant to and may be solvable by some agent, although probably with difficulty. Key elements of this definition are the gap between preferences and reality, the importance of remedying this gap, and the expected difficulty of doing so. Problems are conceptual entities that don't exist in the world, but rather involve a relationship of disharmony between reality and one's preferences. While

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they involve external reality, problems are partially but intrinsically subjective: each person has his own beliefs, preferences, and capabilities. The problem construct was created for attention allocation purposes: by identifying problems, we focus attention in pursuit of our goals. A related construct, "opportunity," draws attention to potential goods, instigating thoughtful "problem solving" activity. Much ofthe existing literature applies to both problems and opportunities, e.g. Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan (1983). The present paper applies the term "problem" in reference to both. Why must problemsnot the concept, but individual instances thereofbe defined? First, since a problem isn't a physical entity, one can't simply point it out to communicate its existence. It must be verbally expressed, hence defined. More importantly, we define individual problems because the concept's definition is inadequate for problem solving. The problem construct encompasses a huge variety of situations, each susceptible to many descriptions. Denoting some circumstance as a problem says relatively little about it vis-a-vis the demands of problem solving. Problem definition is an attempt to more usefully specify such situations. A problem definition is a representation. It depicts a problematic condition, commonly in linguistic terms, but potentially through other representational media. Adopting the cognitivist view that thought is representational (Pylyshyn 1984), it follows that problem solving works from a problem definition, however loosely specified and remote from conscious review. The key issue in definition is how problems should be represented: what elements should be included, which relationships among these elements, and how might these selections vary over problem types. Defining a problem is a less constrained form of mathematical modeling, but subject to the same concerns: one wants to include all and only the important elements, leaving out unnecessary details without losing significant possibilities. It is important to distinguish between definition as a representation and definition as an attribute of problems. Many theorists follow Reitman (1964) in differentiating between well and ill-defined problems. This distinction relates to the nature or characteristics of the problems, and only derivatively to possible representations. Owing to their unclear boundaries and lack of deep structure (Smith 1988), it may be more difficult, if not impossible, to adequately represent ill-defined problems. But such problems are necessarily represented, if only implicitly, and this can be done more or less successfully. For instance, "We have no corporate strategy" might be an acceptable initial definition of a certain ill-defined problem. While it may be difficult to determine the quality ofa definition of an ill-defined problem, the fact that the problem is ill-defined is no grounds for assuming that definitional attempts are futile or equally inadequate. Many theorists regard problem definition as the best defense against Type III Error, solving the wrong problem. The value of an appropriate definition has been demonstrated empirically, Volkema (1983) citing relevant literature. A well-chosen definition seems necessary for problem solving success, though by no means sufficient. Unfortunately it has proven difficult to properly define real world problems. One ofthe difficulties is the lack of criteria differentiating good from bad definitions. As Volkema noted, the syntax and semantics ofa problem statement don't evidence its quality. It has thus far been assumed possible to define problems, and that the effort is meaningful, some definitions being better than others. Both of these assumptions can be challenged. Checkland (1981) argues that unstructured problems can't be defined, since time changes the problem and one's perceptions thereof A more common view is that problem definition is relative, there being no basis for preferring one definition over another. Problems, as conceptual entities, are designed rather than discovered (Yadav and Korukonda 1985; Schon 1979; Graham and Jahani 1977), so that there exists no objective problem with which proposed definitions can be compared (Eden and Sims 1979). The extreme viewthat problems are subjective constructs definable however one pleases

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was rebutted by Agre (1982). Problems involve objective facts, e.g. a brain tumor, as well as individual preferences, no less real for being subjectively determined. That different agents can have different concerns in a situation argues for a multiplicity of problems, but does not undermine the reality of each. Finally, as Schon (1979) and Dery (1984) acknowledge, while definitions can reflect many perspectives, these may not be equally effective in the pursuit of one's ends. There may be no simple way of determining which definitional altemative is best, but pragmatic considerations argue against the assumption that all are intrinsically equal. Another argument, advanced by Weick (1983), holds that while problem definition may be something theorists talk about, it is not something managers do, and certainly not within a structured problem solving process. Along with Schon (1983), Weick argues that managerial thinking is situated in action, interwoven with the many interpersonal activities dominating managerial time, rather than the reflective "sit-down" contemplation familiar to academics. Though insightful, Weick's claims are overdrawn. Much of a manager's time is spent in meetings that are, among other things, group problem solving sessions. Reflective thought is called for on and in anticipation of such occasions. In addition, managers commonly delegate thinking tasks to subordinates, analysts who do spend hours just thinking about a problem. Reflective problem solving does go on in organizations, though rarely in extended sessions involving a solitary manager. A more serious weakness of Weick's position is that it tries to derive "ought" from "is." Even if managers don't overtly define problems as part o f a deliberate problem solving process, that is no argument that they shouldn't. Acknowledging the fragmented nature of managerial work (Mintzberg 1973), it is nonetheless possible that managers don't do a lot of sit-down thinking because they aren't good at it. The continuing market for problem solving books and techniques, e.g. Kepner and Tregoe (1981), indicates that managers want to know how to solve problems. If the current prescriptive state-of-theart hasn't converted them into more reflective problem solvers, that's a reflection on the state-of-the-art, not an argument that the overall endeavor is irrelevant to managerial practice. Weick (1983) also challenges the descriptive validity and prescriptive utility of stage models like Figure 1. He correctly asserts that real world problem situations resist the linear sequencing suggested by such models. The inflow of relevant information is continuous, as a result of which new ideas, alternatives, goals, and even unrecognized problems are constantly coming to light. Consequently, stage models can't predict or prescribe what will/should happen next in the course of problem solving. In fact, few do, being qualified (as is Figure 1) with a recycle proviso that strips the model of any stage-tostage predictive or prescriptive power. The purpose of such models is not to predict/ prescribe next moves, but rather to decompose a poorly understood process into components that can be analyzed and improved. Certain components exhibit a logical ordering, as previously discussed, that is descriptively valid. But elements of order are swamped by the dynamics of actual problem solving. Models must include allowances for backtracking and skipping ahead to be able to describe (not predict) such activity. Prescriptively, value comes less from saying "Do this next," and more from saying "Do this in this way." For instance, people often design solution alternatives without having carefully diagnosed the problem's causes, it being useful to focus attention on the need for diagnosis, and to suggest what diagnostic activities might be performed. Any application of a stage model must be conducted under the assumption that stages are only completed provisionally, solution progress occurring within cycles that often seem not to advance. 3. Definitional Alternatives Each of the classic writers on problem solving recognizes the importance of problem definition, yet each conceptualizes it in a distinct way. Polya (1945), for instance, con-

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cerned with the solution of mathematical problems, posits the need to understand a problem in terms ofthe unknowns, the data, and the conditions for solution. Duncker (1945) and Wertheimer (1945), both Gestalt theorists, regard definition as recognition of basic structures that constitute the problem situation. More concerned with managerial problems, Barnard (1938) proposed that the problem be analyzed in terms of individual and organizational purposes, and facts that are relevant to these purposes. The pragmatist Dewey (1933) specifies definition as a matter of locating the difficulty that has aroused one's concern. He cites cases of premature medical diagnosis in arguing the importance of suspending judgment until a problem's nature has been determined. Thus, many definitions might be proposed for a complex managerial problem. These can be differentiated along four dimensions, each allowing a sizable set of alternatives: (1) Conceptualization of what definition is or involves. Problem definition has been conceptualized as goal setting, cause finding, and perspective taking, among others. (2) Substantive alternatives within a conceptualization. Defining a problem in terms of, say, its causes creates as many definitional alternatives as there are possible causes. (3) Scope or bounds ofthe problem construct. It's not clear how much complexity should be included within the confines ofa defined problem, and a given concern can be specified at various levels of analysis. (4) Linguistic variations on a substantive alternative. The flexibility of natural language allows a particular content to be expressed in many ways. These distinctions will be discussed in the remainder of this section. The most importantdifferent conceptualizations of problem definitionreceives the preponderance of attention, illustrating distinctions among substantive alternatives as well. Figure 2 summarizes the major conceptualizations apparent in the literature. Since problems are existing state-desired state gaps, problem definition can be regarded as the specification of such gaps. One compares what is with what ought to be, it being assumed that both states can be described appropriately. Pounds (1969) exemplifies this

Conceptualization Gap Specification Difficulties and Constraints

Description Comparing existing and desired states. Identifying factors inhibiting goal achievement. Stating the final ends served by a solution. Identifying the particular goal state to be achieved. Specifying how a solution might be achieved. Identify the cause(s) of the problematic state. Stating facts and beliefs pertinent to the problem. Adopting an appropriate point-of-view on the situation.

Example "Sales are $150,000 under budget." "It's tough competing, given our limited experience in this market." "We need to convince management that this is a profitable market." "This year's sales target of $5.2 million must be met." "We have to hire more salespeople." "The real problem is our ineffective V promotional material." "Our product is six years old; our competitors out-spend us on advertising; etc." "Since the market isn't growing, we're in a zero-sum game with our competition.

Ultimate Values and Preferences Goal State Specification Means and Strategies Causal Diagnosis Knowledge Specification

Perspective

FIGURE 2. Alternative Conceptualizations of Problem Definition.

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approach. Rittel and Webber (1973) note the difficulty of knowing what distinguishes an observed condition from a desired condition, suggesting that superficial gap descriptions aren't adequate. A more serious concern was raised by Dery (1984): because goals evolve and emerge during the course of problem solving, "what ought to be" is a highly variable target. A second conceptualization recognizes that the set of problems includes only those existing state-desired state gaps that are difficult to bridge or close. Problem definition involves delineation of the difficulties or constraints making gaps problematic. Maier (1963) argues that problems are located in terms of obstacles preventing attainment of an objective; Nezu and D'Zurilla (1981) propose that problem definition and formulation includes "identification of the factors and circumstances that are making the situation problematic (i.e. obstacles, conflicts, etc.)"; and Nickles( 1981) defines a problem as "all the conditions or constraints on the solution plus the demand that the solution . . . be found." Problem difficulties and constraints are often implicit, natural concomittants of man's limited physical and mental endowments and of reality itself. Sometimes constraints are self-imposed, e.g. the classic nine dots problem (Adams 1986). Problem definition is often conceptualized as specifying the goals or values pursued by problem solving activity. Actually, three distinct conceptualizations are discernible: specification of ultimate values and preferences; delineation ofthe goal state which constitutes the problem's solution; and identification of means or strategies effective towards a desired end. The utility of defining a problem by identifying ultimate endspreferences, needs, and valuesderives from several considerations. First, if various stakeholders are affected, all must be taken into account by an effective solution. Second, problem situations can engage multiple values for a single stakeholder. Third, it's not easy to determine relevant values, even when all stakeholders have been identified. Public policy theorists pointedly argue that people can be mistaken about preferences they've expressed (MacRae and Wilde 1979) and that unanticipated goals often emerge during problem solving (Dery 1984). While it is difficult to make optimal tradeoffs among known objectives, the costs of failure are generally slight. Far more serious are cases in which certain values are entirely omitted from consideration, e.g. one gains the whole world but loses his own soul. Another conceptualization proposes the goal state as problem definition. Simon (1969) suggests that a problem is posed "by giving the state description ofthe solution." Goal state conceptualizations are common among artificial intelligence researchers and others dealing with puzzle-like tasks having identifiable terminal states, e.g. Cannibals and Missionaries, Towers of Hanoi. Klein and Weitzenfeld (1978), arguing that the goal state, not values, must be specified, define a crime problem in terms of the types of crimes being objected to, rather than the values served by a solution. While few theorists endorse defining problems in terms of possible means or strategies for achieving an objective, problems are often specified in this way. Maier (1963) suggests the following "locations" for a company's need to increase its creative talent: how to do a better job of college recruiting; how to attract talent from other companies; how to keep our best talent from leaving. The requirement that definitions include clear action implications (Dery 1984; Rein and Schon 1977; Rittel and Webber 1973) often leads to means definitions, which can seem quite insightful if they happen to promote an effective way of achieving the solution. Unfortunately people can be mistaken in their assumptions about the solution effectiveness of suggested means (MacRae and Wilde 1979), resulting in the pursuit of weak strategies and a failure to recognize the existence of more promising approaches. While this paper has argued that causal diagnosis should be kept out of problem formulation, causal definitions are common in the literature. Considering a high employee turnover condition, Kilmann and Mitroff (1979) suggest such causal definitions as in-

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terpersonal conflict, organizational climate, job or organizational design, and member skill inadequacy. In addition to those at a given level of analysis, more general or underlying causes can be cited in defining a problem. For instance, Lindblom and Cohen (1977) define the "Why Johnny can't read" problem with a set of causes ranging from inadequate family income to "the world is not what it should be." As with means, a problematic condition can have many possible causes, more than one of which may be active. Defining the problem in terms of one throws others out of consideration, misdirecting the problem solving process. Another conceptualization regards problem definition as specification of relevant knowledge, representing the facts and beliefs needed to understand and resolve the situation. Nezu and D'Zurilla (1981) propose that definitions include a "description of all the available facts in clear, specific, concrete terms." Brody (1982) asks that a definition relate the problem's background, including its magnitude, who is involved, time duration, and origins. Less concerhed with observables, Lyles (1981) proposes that problem conceptualizations express the assumptions underlying claims as to the problem's existence and nature. In general, problem definitions might include known facts; those acquired through research; relevant elements of one's experiential knowledge; and more tentative beliefs and assumptions pertinent to the problem situation. But an attempt to ascertain all the relevant facts presumes an ability to determine what is relevant. The facts themselves cannot establish relevance criteria; what is needed is an interpretation, a larger view of the problem that separates significant from trivial facts (Rein and Schon 1977). The final conceptualizationproblem definition as perspective settingaddresses this need. Many terms have been applied to this aspect of problem definition: Eden and Sims (1979) talk about differences in agents' mental frameworks; Herden and Lyles (1981) note the variety of individual worldviews; Brody (1982) suggests the existence of alternative theoretical and personal perspectives on a problem; Dery (1983) says that problems are the products of imposing certain frames of reference on reality; and Rein and Schon (1977) describe a "framing and naming" process through which people make sense out ofa situation. The common thread is the notion of an integrative understanding supported by observable facts, but not entirely determined by such, given that several equally coherent understandings can emerge (Schon 1979). Perspectives might be unique to individuals (Eden and Sims 1979), derived from disciplinary backgrounds (Kilmann and Mitroff 1979), the product of organizational roles and affiliations (Brody 1982), cultural creations (Gusfield 1981) or metaphorical expressions (Schon 1979). Another source of definitional variation derives from the uncertain scope ofthe problem construct. Two issues are relevant: the amount of complexity that can appropriately be included in the confines of a single problem; and the various levels of generality at which problems can be defined. Since they relate goals and preferences to states ofthe world, problems share the complexity of these constituents. As noted earlier, an agent's preferences can be engaged in many ways by a problem situation, and many agents can be thus involved. One inadequacy commonly implicates many others. Instead of a single, stand-alone problem, we face complex situations in which a focal concern is embedded in a variety of other worries, what Ackoff (1979) termed a "mess." While it may not be difficult to define the original problem, narrowly construed, such a definition has little value in the face ofthe situation's complexity. On the other hand, a comprehensive problem definition might be impossible to devise, just as complex messes seem impossible to solve. While it's essential that problems be regarded as potentially complex, it's also necessary that this complexity be bounded. An appropriate, if weakly applicable, criterion is pragmatic: definitions should encompass as much situational complexity as possible, while insuring that one's immediate concerns are adequately understood and effectively addressed. Distinct from the complexity issue is the matter of level of analysisdeciding how

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broadly or tiarrowly a particular objective should be expressed. Problem expansion techniques (Nadler 1981) pose the question most dramatically. They present a hierarchy of goals, each a means towards the next, asking at which level in this hierarchy the problem can most usefully be defined. While this question can't be decided on logical grounds (Rittel and Webber 1973), the case of alternative causal definitions at different levels of generality is resolvable: one should only define a general problem if there is adequate supporting evidence. A machine failure may suggest production management weaknesses, but the larger problem should only be defined if significant additional evidence supports its existence. Linguistic form is the final dimension of variation in problem definitions. Natural language is flexible in allowing content to be expressed in various ways. A problem of deficient sales can be expressed as "lack of sales," "inadequate sales," "the need to increase sales," or "how to increase sales." Some of these alternativesthe first and second seem equivalent in all respects save wording. Others may have subtle and potentially important effects on problem solving activity. A focus on "increasing sales" tacitly accepts the legitimacy of the implied sales goal, whereas a "sales are below target" definition makes the goal salient and subject to review. Certain kinds of problems may call for certain linguistic expressions, empirical research being needed to support theoretical arguments to that effect. 4. A Framework for Prescription A prescriptive theory of problem definition presumes the existence of criteria against which alternative definitions can be evaluated. Of the criteria that have been proposed (Dery 1984; Rein and Schon 1977), only one is ultimately significant: a problem definition should promote effective problem solving. The obvious way for this to happen is if the definition identifies or strongly implicates the problem's solution. But since definition occurs early in the problem solving process, it seems unlikely that definitional activity could point towards the solution. This suggests the fundamental dilemma of problem definition: One can't realize the rewards of aggressive definitions, those suggesting likely solutions, without risking false paths. Strongly directive definitions reduce the salience of solution alternatives that could be correct. This inevitable risk-reward tradeoff legitimizes Bardach's (1981) advice: rather than finding the right problem definition, avoid proposing a wrong one. Psychology of Problem Definition Since individual mental abilities affect the likelihood that a definition leads to solutions or errors, they must be appreciated if a proper balance between solution-seeking and error-avoidance is to be struck. The psychology of problem definition centers on the goals of definers and the strategies they adopt. Volkema (1986) identified various purposes motivating definitional activity in social contexts: the promotion of group processes, group outcomes, or self-interest. While social and political ends may be important, other purposes derive from the simple objective of trying to solve the problem. First, one wants to accurately represent the problem. This goal fosters the generation of replicative definitions, those stating the obvious. Second, not always satisfied with stating the obvious, people want their problem definitions to do more, to be insightful, even to anticipate possible solutions. It seems likely that definitional strategies and products are significantly affected by the desire for directive content. How might one, seeking to express more than the brute facts ofthe case, attempt to define a problem? One possibility is to focus. One can try to narrow attention to the "real" problem, sloughing off seemingly tangential issues. One's definition can concentrate on the most important objective, the most imposing difficulty, the most promising means.

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or the most likely cause. Since alternative objectives, difliculties, means, and causes come readily to mind, the focus strategy provides a definition with the desired sense of directive content. Unfortunately, as Bardach (1981) forcefully protests, the chosen direction is all too often wrong. A less risky way of achieving definitional content is through abstraction. One's definition can express the problem in terms of more fundamental issues and structures than simple replicative statements. The abstraction strategy can work in several ways. Many problems have deep structures underlying their surface details. A representation in terms of deep structure affords insight into the situation (Duncker 1945) and may support the use of mathematical modeling as a solution strategy. Abstracting definitions can also be based on similarities between problems and better known phenomena. Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) account of language holds that humans understand abstract concepts metaphorically, in terms of familiar physical realities. As conceptual entities, problems are liable to metaphorical definition. Schon (1979) describes how the urban housing problem was alternately defined through "blight and renewal" and "natural community" metaphors. Capturing elements of both structure and similarity is the notion of "schema," which Rumelhart (1981) defined as "a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory." Cognitive scientists have used the schema construct to explain how situational stimuli evoke large clusters of memorial knowledge, providing meaningful interpretations and generating useful inferences (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 1986). In the context of problem definition, schemata might correspond to common problem types or categories, the identification of which organizes perceived stimuli and concerns into coherent wholes. Such systems of categories can be based on underlying problem structures or on more superficial similarities. Schema evocation makes the problem familiar, providing a label for it, and supporting a heuristic classification approach to problem solving (Clancey 1985). Chi, Glaser and Rees (1982) found that subjects solving physics problems used certain schemata, e.g. inclined plane problem, in categorizing and addressing tasks, with experts using more substantive categories than novices. Explications of modeling methodology (Rivett 1980; White 1975) suggest that modeling is primarily a matter of determining a problem's type, e.g. queuing, inventory, types being schemata evoked by situational characteristics that in turn elicit relevant modeling knowledge. Managers may do this as well, acquiring an informal set of problem schemata that includes categories for business functional areas and various other types, e.g. implementation or communication problem. The problem schemata available to one and the likelihood of their application may be influenced by disciplinary backgrounds (Kilmann and Mitroff 1979), worldviews (Herden and Lyles 1981), and past experiences (Volkema 1983). Cowan (1986) used the schema concept in his model of problem recognition. Maier (1963) noted that certain problem locations are remote from ordinary experience, so that related schematic definitions are unlikely to arise. Prescriptive Framework This cognitive analysis paves the way for prescriptive theorizing. Preliminary to such, it should be acknowledged that in defining real world problems, one is often defining complex situations that encompass many lower order problems. References to "the problem" in the prescriptions that follow apply equally to the overall situation and its subsidiary difliculties. Relatedly, while common practice implies that real world problems can be defined in single sentences or short paragraphs, the foregoing suggests otherwise. Real world problems are complex; definitions must encompass this complexity; but it can't plausibly be captured in concise, verbal representations. The proposed prescriptive approach responds to the dilemma of problem definition one can't reap the rewards of directive definitions without being exposed to the risks of

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A. REDEFINITION: B.

Recognize the need to redefine the problem. Redefine to reflect new evidence and insights.

i
RECOGNITION: State and legitimate the presenting problem. A. Specify the existing statedesired state gap. A. B. State all evidence indicating existence of the gap Challenge the pcoblem's existence. B. C. C. D.

t
DEVELOPMENT: Elaborate the problem situation. EXPLORATION: Identify possibl directions for analysis. Identify relevant stakeholders, Including the problem owner/solver. Specify pertinent values and objectives. Conceive various perspectives on the problem. Cenecate relevant knowledge and information. A. Bound the problem by selec tng a level of analysis. B. Decompose the problem Into subtasks. Identify relevant difficulties and constraints. Generate possible means solution. E, Propose a comprehensive working definition. E. Suggest possible causes of the problem. C. D.

FIGURE 3. A Prescriptive Framework for Problem Definition.

definitional errorswith a stratification strategy. Certain definitional activities are more subject to error than others, and some kinds of error are more harmful than others. The stratification strategy delays high risk activities until late in the definitional process, after a base representation has been developed, consolidating them in a phase that can be undertaken in full awareness ofthe tentativeness of its outputs. The proposed framework is outlined in Figure 3. Problem definition is split into three primary phases, according to the reliability of related processes. The ordering of the phases is strong, whereas the ordering of activities within each phase is flexible. The first phaserecognitioninvolves activities that are necessarily doable, given that a problem has been identified. It yields a spare but reliable definition ofthe presenting problem and validates that problem's existence. During the development phase, this definition is expanded into a working definition of the larger problem situation through elicitation of relevant knowledge and values. The products of this stage risk being incomplete, but are not likely to be misleading or wrong. The third phaseexplorationencompasses more speculative processes. Its outputs can be erroneous, e.g. focusing on an ineffective means, and for that reason, are intended as areas for further investigation, rather than as definitional content per se. Supporting this three-phase process is a redefinition cycle that allows representations to be revised on the basis of new evidence and insights. The remainder of this section elaborates the contents of each phase, citing appropriate heuristic advice from the literature. Recognition The recognition phase of problem definition attempts to specify the presenting problem and validate its legitimacy. The presenting problem is the issue that arouses initial interest in a more general problem situation. It may turn out to be the most important or even the only problem, or it may be supplanted by related problems of greater significance. The presenting problem should be specified as an existing state-desired state gap. In doing so, one should employ concrete, operational terms, avoiding abstractions. Be clear about the goals and preferences involved, reflecting on the feeling of concern that aroused one's attention. While many theorists (Brody 1982; Klein and Weitzenfeld 1978) call for precise

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problem statements, the precision shouldn't be misplaced. It's more important to recognize which values are at stake than to determine the exact magnitude ofthe problematic gap. Theorists also warn against mistaking problems for symptoms (Yadav and Korukonda 1985), although there's confusion on this point. Problems and symptoms are not mutually exclusive types. A symptom indicates the existence of something else, and one problem can be symptomatic of another. For instance, inadequate product sales is both a problem an undesirable stateand a symptom ofthe underlying conditionsay, poor advertisingthat causes it. Theorists have proposed that problems be expressed in certain linguistic styles. Bardach (1981) suggested phrasings involving the terms "too little" or "too much," whereas Volkema (1983) endorsed statements driven by infinitives, e.g. "To acquire" or "To improve." There's no relevant empirical research, but it seems prudent to avoid expressions that tacitly assume an implied goal; action-oriented infinitives run that risk. After stating the problematic gap, one should specify evidence indicating existence of that gap. Both the existing state and the goal state may be opaque, making it important that assumptions about states be grounded in evidence. Brody (1982) asks that problem statements include an "as evidenced by" clause. Elbing (1970) stressed the need to verify relevant information as fact or opinion, having various degrees of credibility. Some problems are generalizations over multitudes of specific states and events, creating the need to describe the situation at different levels of generality, starting from concrete cases and working up to the final claim. Since goal states often have no physical evidence, it's important to be clear about wants and to avoid a bias towards overt, quantified performance measures (Quade 1980). Evidence specification is particularly important as regards opportunities and potential problems, the identification of which rests heavily on assumptions about trends and likely future states. Relevant claims and projections must be carefully documented with known facts and plausible predictive arguments. Having stated the presenting problem and the evidence supporting its identification, one should vigorously challenge the problem's existence. Assumptional analysis (Mitroff, Emshoff, and Kilmann 1979) can be used to question the assumptions, projections, and interpretations underlying the problematic claim. The problem's assumed goal should be considered as regards substance and level. Does it express what is really desired, at an achievable level, or is it merely a means to a more remote end, perhaps not the most promising means (Elbing 1970; Quade 1980)? The difficulty and importance ofthe problem should be assessed. A trivial or insoluble issue may not warrant further attention. Questioning ofthe problem's existence is essential regarding hand-me-down problems passed along by others (Majone 1980). Attention being the scarcest resource of managers and management scientists (Simon 1978b), one wants to prevent the initiation of definitional activity concerning issues that turn out to be illusory or insignificant. Development Satisfied that the presenting problem is legitimate, one must elaborate the situation in which that problem is embedded, identifying related problems in this way. The activities in this stage are difficult, largely because they require the retrieval of memorial knowledge that isn't well indexed to the presenting problem stimulus. Thefirstactivity is identification of relevant stakeholders. Who owns the problem, is directly concerned with its resolution? What other agents are involved in the situation? The stakeholder analysis literature (Freeman 1984) may be helpful. One can consider the situation in terms of relevant systems (Checkland 1981), identifying agents concerned with inputs, outputs, and transformation processes. Or one might assess the problem's causes and effects, keying on agents implicated in either way (Moore 1976). Stakeholder identification enables identification of the goals and values to be considered in the problem's solution. Even when all stakeholders are known, goal specification isn't easy. Preferences are implicated by the many potential

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effects of a problem and its possible solutions, a deep and comprehensive causal understanding being needed to predict these effects. Majone (1980) cautions against overlooking externalities. If relevant stakeholders aren't accessible, role playing can be used to imaginatively identify their goals and values. Klein and Weitzenfeld (1978) suggest analogical reasoning as helpful, similar problems being analyzed as a way of identifying goals for the case at hand. Perhaps the most extensive prescriptive research of relevance is the decision analysis literature (Humphreys, Svenson and Vari 1983; Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986), which includes techniques for the elicitation of value trees and other objectives structures in complex decision situations. A key element of the development stage is the attempt to generate alternative perspectives on the problem. Stakeholder and value identification support this effort by providing a number of useful partial perspectives, noteworthy points of view having limited scope. Other partial perspectives can be defined around business functional areas and time frames. Schon (1979) argues the importance of metaphorical perspectives but provides little basis for generating them. It's easier to note the existence of different ways of looking at a problem ex poste than it is to identify such perspectives ex ante by the application of principled techniques. Perhaps the most promising prescriptive approach involves the determination of deep problem structures. Gestalt psychologists (Duncker 1945), early operations research, and much work in artificial intelligence (Marr 1977) have attempted to get at the structures that underly problematic conditions. A deep account of problem structure would provide a basis for generating and assessing alternative perspectives. Knowledge generation occurs throughout the problem definition process, but is especially intense during the development stage. The most valuable information source is one's own memory and the natural inferential practices that develop recollected facts into interpretations ofthe situation. It is important to assess the facticity of information so that speculations can be acknowledged as such. Researchers (Brody 1982; Dery 1984) have suggested asking who, what, where-type questions as a way of generating information. Alternatively, one might adopt different points of view on the problem, e.g. marketing, operations, asking, for each, an appropriate set of questions. Based on the foregoing, one should propose a working definition of the problem situation and its major constituent concerns. This definition can be quite extensive. It should present a coherent account acknowledging multiple perspectives. The definition can encompass several levels of generality, assuming it's not clear which level best serves problem solving. Meltsner (1976) advises that one's definition identify crucial variables, relationships, insights, and testable hypotheses, these providing the basis for further scientific study ofthe situation. As Rein and Schon (1977) point out, it's important that this definition be tested for consistency and completeness in its accounting ofthe facts. The facts of the case should make sense under one or more of the proposed perspectival interpretations, and when they don't, there's a need to rethink the proposed definition. Exploration Being more speculative, the outputs of this stage must be held tentatively as possibilities, options to be explored. The tendency to adopt an option as a de facto definition of the "true" problem must be resisted. The first set of possibilities concerns the problem's proper level of analysis. Problems can be defined more or less broadly, at different steps in a goal hierarchy, different points in a causal chain, or different systemic levels. Problem expansion techniques (Nadler 1981) can be used to broaden out from a narrow goal into more encompassing solution objectives. Jones (1982) proposed guidelines for defining systems boundaries in practical applications. Among the considerations she cites is the span of control of relevant decision makers. Some researchers (Nutt 1984) favor constraining definitional scope on this basis; others (Bardach 1981; Majone 1980) deny its

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relevance, arguing that restricting attention to controlled issues commonly leads to suboptimal decisions. Another consideration is the extent of evidential support. While a level of analysis should be chosen, the selection must be revisable, as when evidence suggests that excessively narrow goals are being pursued. Specified at a certain level of analysis, the problem situation should be decomposed into subproblems. Real world problems pose numerous demands, with problem solving addressing these subproblems rather than the overall situation. Most prescriptive literature is narrow in focus, relative to actual problems, decomposition being needed for techniques to be properly targeted. Newell and Simon (1972) identified means-ends analysis, a decompositional strategy, as the problem solving approach most commonly applied by their subjects. Decision analysis exemplifies the use of decomposition, splitting decision problems into predictive and evaluative judgments. A more general decompositional framework was proposed by Smith (1988). Any decomposition will reflect the problem perspective on which it is based (Rein and Schon 1977) and the set of primitive problem types the method assumes. Identification of difficulties and constraints goes hand in hand with decomposition: a problem's major subproblems arise from the unavoidable difficulties it poses. Difficulties must be localized in subproblems before they can be effectively analyzed. One should ask why each subproblem is difficult, what inhibits or constrains its solution. Duncker (1945) advised that situations be analyzed in terms of conflicts and material. Many problems are difficult because of a conflict of values or interests, or due to conflicting functional demands. Other difficulties derive from a lack of material or needed resources. What is needed for subtask completion? Is it a matter of determining certain facts, having certain skills, needing more time, or requiring some other resource? In some cases, difficulties are artificial, deriving from the tacit imposition of unnecessary constraints. It's important to challenge the legitimacy of constraints, to successively relax them as a way of testing their necessity (Jones 1980). Quade (1980) suggests that constraints be restated as goals, allowing partial satisfaction in lieu of strict enforcement. For design problems, those requiring the creation of some plan or artifact, it's useful to note "open constraints" (Reitman 1964), those that become "closed" on the basis ofthe solver's subjective inputs. Difficulties evoke means or strategies for their resolution. How might this subproblem be resolved in light ofthe difficulties it presents? Per Maier (1963), one should seek unusual obstacles to overcome, new approaches to follow; he warns against persisting with unproductive approaches and the danger of being misled by near successes. Creativity techniques can be useful in generating alternative means (Van Gundy 1981). Means can be evoked by consideration ofthe goal (Duncker 1945): what does one normally do to achieve this kind of goal? Having identified alternative means, they should be compared in terms of cost, feasibility, effectiveness, and potential side effects. The final component of the exploration stage is generation of possible causes of the situation and its constituent problems. Preliminary identification of causal candidates can be performed during problem definition, assuming one remains noncommital about their validity. Given the human bias towards simple models of causality (Nisbett and Ross 1980), it's important to look for multiple contributing causes, and for complexity in the conditions that make causes effective. Passive conditions should be noted (Mackie 1974), since they can provide useful ways of blocking a cause. Ramakrishna and Brightman (1986) proposed the fact-net model as a problem diagnosis procedure. Kepner and Tregoe's (1981) problem analysis procedure is a widely applied technique for identifying causes. Watson (1976) and MacRae and Wilde (1979) caution against definitions that cite individuals as causes ofthe problem, presumably because ofthe defensiveness and conflict likely to result. Nonetheless it may be necessary to recognize characteristics of individualslack of knowledge, motivation, or aptitudeas contributing causes (Mager and Pipe 1970) since many performance problems clearly involve individual deficiencies.

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Redefinition This three stage process stratifies definitional activities in an attempt to minimize errors. But definitional mistakes will be made and, more commonly, new information will be acquired suggesting the inadequacy of one's current definition. Thus, while there are good reasons for organizing definitional activities in the prescribed manner, actual definitional practice is invariably cyclical, involving returns to earlier stages as new evidence and insights arise. The prescriptive framework includes a redefinition module in order to encompass this need for flexibility and change. While many theorists have proposed redefinition as a strategy for dealing with definitional errors, it's important to recognize limitations on the strategy's effectiveness. Over-reliance on redefinition seems ill-advised in light of psychological findings concerning man's belief maintenance and revision practices (Nisbett and Ross 1980). Humans are conservative of their beliefs, rely heavily on initial belief anchors, ignore disconfirming evidence, and misinterpret new data to fit current assumptions. Volkema (1983) reasonably concluded that it's difficult to revise an initial formulation. Since errors and oversights can't be avoided, redefinition seems necessary. Its effectiveness may be improved by reducing the solver's commitments to his most error-prone assumptions, the approach adopted herein. Two questions remain: How does one recognize when redefinition is needed? And, assuming such recognition, how should redefinition be carried out? Concerning the first issue, Schon (1979) recommends that restructuring be done when two or more definitional "frames" for the problem are in conflict. MacRae and Wilde (1979) suggest that redefinition be considered when various problem areas involve interrelated values; when possible solutions/policies have significant cross-area impacts; or when reformulation can make the issue more acceptable to important stakeholders. Rein and Schon (1977) propose that a definition be revised if it fails to integrate the requisite range of facts into a consistent framework. Most commonly, definitions should be challenged and revised as new information surfaces. Jones (1980) describes a technique supporting this kind of reevaluation. Intended as a means of making strategy changes while solving complex design problems, "strategy switching" requires the designer to record and consciously assess his spontaneous thoughts during the design process, considering a change in design strategy when an emergent pattern in these thoughts can't be integrated with the current strategy. In a problem definition context, one would be looking for a pattern among new information and insights that didn't fit one's working definition ofthe problem. Assuming the need, redefinitional attempts can be made along various lines. MacRae and Wilde (1979) advise that one redefine a problem by generalizing it, making it more specific, or proposing new alternatives. Meltsner (1976) suggests that one simplify the problem by omitting part ofit. Inadequate solutions can be analyzed in order to identify their progressive and obstructive features, redefining the problem in terms of a more substantive set of goal properties (Klein and Weitzenfeld 1978). Alternative definitions should be debated (Kilmann and Mitroff 1979) so as to surface and assess their underlying assumptions. 5. Implications This paper has analyzed the concept of problem definition as it applies to unstructured, real world problems. After locating definition within the problem formulation and problem solving process, the paper considered the many ways in which a problem might be defined, identifying various conceptualizations of what problem definition involves. Keeping human cognitive limitations in mind, a prescriptive framework was proposed which allows the aggressive pursuit of definitional content while resisting the tendency to restrict at-

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tention to narrow and potentially mistaken problem statements. Heuristics were cited to inform definitional practice within this framework. Future research in this domain is likely to fall into three different streams: descriptive, structural, and prescriptive. Descriptive research will attempt to determine how managers and management scientists define problems. Problem representations must be elicited in both field and laboratory contexts, using problems actually faced by subjects as well as experimenter-assigned tasks. A methodology for analyzing and classifying problem definitions must be developed. Since these are representations rather than processes, process tracing techniques, e.g. Ericsson and Simon (1984), are of limited applicability. The methods linguists and psychologists use to study human comprehension of written text may be more useful (Graesser and Clark 1985; Britton and Black 1985). Assuming a workable analytic methodology, an important set of descriptive research questions can be addressed. For the various conceptualizations of problem definition identified in this paper, how commonly do they appear in practice, under what circumstances, and with what variations? Can other noteworthy notions of problem definition be discerned? What major linguistic variations are evident? Is there an underlying definitional language or set of schemataconflict, inadequacy, complexity, etc.which people use to define problems? Are there notable variations in this language, dialects reflecting differences in industry or disciplinary affiliations? What kinds of perspectives can be noted in individuals' problem definitions, and how can these be encompassed under a theory of perspective taking? Finally, what level of analysis do people commonly adopt in their definitions, and what factors affect this choice? Problem definition can't really be understood, absent an understanding of problems. Are there autonomous problem structures, and how do elicited problem definitions relate to these? A stream of structural research is needed which will identify the ways in which problems might possess structure, and the primitive entities and relationships that a theory of problem structure must include. Such a theory would support the development ofa problem taxonomy, which must be validated by empirical analysis. Given the complexity of real world problems, there's a need for a decomposition procedure which can reduce problems into more basic subproblems that fit into the taxonomy and have analyzable structures. Once this array of machinery has been developed, it will be possible to study how peoples' definitions of problems relate to their underlying structures. Are managers sensitive to the basic natures of problems, or are their definitions superficial, inadequately discriminating? How do our natural schematic classifications of problems align with a theory-based categorization? And what about the relationship between problem structure and perspectives? If a problem can be analyzed as having a single fixed structure, how can it support so many different and seemingly valuable points of view? Significant progress in both the descriptive and structural streams is needed before prescriptive research can be initiated. In addition to descriptive and structural knowledge, the development of prescriptive theory in this domain presumes an ability to assess problem solving performance. However good or bad a definition seems in theory is ultimately over-shadowed by the quality ofthe problem solving it incites. Problem solving performance can sometimes be assessed narrowly in terms of outcomesmaking the right decision for the right reasonsalthough it is often advisable to consider the comprehensiveness and depth ofthe process leading to the outcome. Determining the relative quality of answers can be difficult in realistic cases, researchers having recourse to panels of expert opinion, e.g. Isenberg's (1986) use of business school faculty to evaluate solutions, or to the informed and argument-derived consensus of managers themselves. An ability to assess problem solving performance opens the following questions for research: Do people perform better when required to think about and generate an overt problem definition, or is the flexibility ofa hazy, intuitive "sense of things" more important for effective problem solving? How serious are the performance risks of inadvertently narrow

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causal or means definitions, and for what kinds of problems? How efFective are the various definitional techniques proposed in the literature? What about the many heuristics that have been offeredfor instance, define problems in terms ofthe situation, not the individuals involved: how valid is such advice and under what conditions? The model proposed in the last section (Figure 3) also has research implications, relating both to its components and the overall framework. Within the recognition phase, there's a need to study how problems are manifested. Some researchers (Lyles and Mitroff 1980) suggest that managers become aware of problems through intuition, but, unless we are to believe in extra-sensory perception, there must be some physical evidence which managers might not be able to recall. The key to the development phase is the evocation of memorial knowledge, research being needed to determine how expressed problems could cue relevant stakeholders, goals, perspectives, and other information. This issue is being addressed by many other fields, most fundamentally by psychological studies of human semantic memory (Anderson 1983). The exploration phase poses a similar need to generate appropriate subtasks, constraints, means, and causes. Because these are more abstract or conceptual than raw information, less existing research attempts their evocation. Equally important, researchers must develop techniques that keep problem solvers from anchoring on particular causes, means, or subtasks. The debiasing methods being developed in the probability assessment literature (Fischhdff 1982) could suggest useful strategies. The general claim made by this modelthat problem definition encompasses a range of activities that can be usefully stratifiedis subject to empirical validation. Individuals and groups could be trained to organize their definitional activities as suggested by the model, with their performance at defining and solving problems being compared with untrained counterparts. Additional support would be gained if field studies of organizational problem solving traced failures to activities, e.g. causal diagnosis, that the model designates as error prone. Research on problem definition has implications both for the practice of management and of management science. Regarding the former, it creates the opportunity for valid prescriptions, consistent with human cognitive capabilities, which will help managers avoid serious definitional mistakes. Problem definition is also important for the management scientist. As the discipline attempts to solve unfamiliar, ill-structured problems, problem definition and modeling become indistinguishable elements of a general representational process. An account of problem definition seems necessary if modeling, management science's central methodology, is to become a scientific practice rather than an intuitive art. References
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