CHAPTER 1: STATUTES

A. IN GENERAL LAWS, GENERALLY Law in its jural and generic sense refers to the whole body or system of law, in its jural and concrete sense, it means a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate ower of the state !t includes" statutes, residential decrees, e#ecuti$e orders, other residential issuances, rulings of the Su reme %ourt construing the law, rules and regulations, and ordinances S&A&ES, GENERALLY A statute is an act of the legislature as an organi'ed body, e# ressed in the form, and assed according to the rocedure, re(uired to constitute it as art of the law of the land) !ncludes those assed by the" *hil) %ommission, *hil) Legislature, +atasang *ambansa, %ongress of the *hil) *ri$ate Statutes, a lies only to a s ecific erson,subject *ublic Statutes, affects the ublic at large" -) General law. a lies to the whole state u on all the eo le or all of a class /*eo le $) *alma0 1) S ecial law. relates to articular ersons or things of a class or to a articular community, indi$idual or thing 2) Local law 3 o eration is confined to a s ecific lace or locality e)g) munici al ordinance *ER4ANEN& AN5 &E4*6RARY S&A&7&ES *ermanent. o eration is not limited in duration but continues until re ealed &em orary. duration is for a limited eriod of time fi#ed in the statute itself, ceases u on the ha ening of an e$ent 6&8ER %LASSES 69 S&A&7&ES A lication" ros ecti$e, retroacti$e 6 eration" declaratory, curati$e, substanti$e, remedial, enal 9orms" affirmati$e, negati$e

4ANNER 69 RE9ERR!NG &6 S&A&7&ES *hil) %ommission,*hil) Legislature /-:;-.-:2<0 3 *ublic Act %ommonwealth /-:2=.-:>=0 3 %ommonwealth Acts %ongress of the *hil) /-:>=.-:?1 and -:@? onwards0 3 Re ublic Acts +atasang *ambansa /-:?2.-:@=0 3 +atas *ambansa B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTES LEG!SLA&!AE *6WER, GENERALLY Leg) *ower is the ower to maBe, alter and re eal laws) &he sangguniang barangay, sangguniang bayan, sangguniang anlungsod and sangguniang anlalawigan ha$e also legislati$e owers within their jurisdiction, to enact ordinances) 6rdinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state /*rimicias $) 4unici ality of 7rdaneta0) An admin),e#ec) 6fficer, in the e#ercise of a duly delegated ower, can liBewise issue rules and regulations to im lement a s ecific law, and such rules and regulations ha$e the force and effect of law) %6NGRESSC LEG!SLA&!AE *6WER &he essential feature of the legislati$e function is the determination of the legislati$e olicy and its formulation and romulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct) &he legislati$e ower is lenary) *R6%E57RAL RED7!RE4EN&S, GENERALLY A art from the basic constitutional re(uirements, congress ro$ides in detail, embodied in the Rules of both 8ouses of %ongress, the rocedure by which a bill may be enacted into law) *ASSAGE 69 A +!LL &he Secretary re orts the bill for first reading, which consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by its referral to the a ro riate %ommittee for study and recommendation) 6n second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments ro osed by the committee, unless co ies therof are distributed and such reading is dis ensed with) &hen, the bill will be subject to debates, ertinent

mandatory,

directory,

motions, and amendments) After the amendments, the bill will be $oted on second reading) A bill a ro$ed on the second reading shall be included in the calendar of bills for third reading) 6n third reading, the bill as a ro$ed on second reading will be submitted for final $ote) A**R6*R!A&!6NS AN5 REAEN7E +!LLS Read Article =, sec) 1>, 1< of the constitution) A7&8EN&!%A&!6N 69 +!LLS +efore an a ro$ed bill is sent to the resident, the bill is authenticated by the signing of the S eaBer and the Senate *resident of the rinted co y of the a ro$ed bill) 7N!4*EA%8A+!L!&Y 69 LEG!SLA&!AE E67RNALS &he journal is regarded as conclusi$e with res ect to matters that are re(uired by the constitution to be recorded therein) With res ect to other matters, in the absence of e$idence to the contrary, the Eournals ha$e also been accorded conclusi$e effect) ENR6LLE5 +!LL 7nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the te#t of the act as assed and a ro$ed is deemed im orting absolute $eracity and is binding on the courts) !t is conclusi$e not only of its ro$isions but also of its due enactment) !f there has been any mistaBe in the rinting of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and a ro$ed by the chief e#ecuti$e, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curati$e legislation, not by judicial decree /%asco *hil) %hemical %o), !nc) $) Gimene'0 Where there is discre ancy between the journal and the enrolled bill, the latter as a rule re$ails o$er the former, articularly with res ect to matters not e# ressly re(uired to be entered in the journal) W!&85RAWAL 69 A7&8EN&!%A&!6N, E99E%& 69 &he S eaBer and the Senate *resident may withdraw their signatures from the signed bill where there is serious and substantial discre ancy between the te#t of the bill as deliberated and shown by the journal and that of the enrolled

bill) !t thus, renders the bill without attestation and nullifies its status as an enrolled bill) &he court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not accordingly become a law /Astorga $) Aillegas0) C. PARTS OF STATUTES &!&LE 69 S&A&7&E 6ne subject, one bill thereof is unconstitutional)

ro$ision is mandatory, $iolation

*7R*6SES 69 RED7!RE4EN& !t is to rohibit du licity in legislation, the title of which com letely fails to a rise the legislators or the ublic of the nature, sco e and conse(uences of the law or its ro$isions /!nchong $) 8ernande'0 -) to re$ent hodge odge or log.rolling legislation 1) to re$ent sur rise of fraud u on the legislature 2) to fairly a rise the eo le >) title of the statute may be used as a guide in ascertaining legislati$e intent when the language of the act does not clearly e# ress its ur ose 86W RED7!RE4EN& %6NS&R7E5 &he constitutional re(uirement as to title of a bill should be liberally construed /*eo le $) +uen$iaje0) !t should not be gi$en a technical inter retation) Nor should it be so narrowly construed as to cri le or im ede the ower of legislation /&obias $) Abalos0) Where there is doubt, the (uestion should be resol$ed against the doubt an in fa$or of the constitutionality of the statute) W8EN &8ERE !S %64*L!AN%E W!&8 RED7!RE4EN& -) if the title is com rehensi$e enough to reasonably include the general object which a statute seeBs to effect, without e# ressing each and e$ery end and means necessary of con$enient for accom lishing the object 1) if all arts are related and germane to the subject matter 2) if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, sco e and conse(uences of the law and its o erations)

&he title need not be a catalogue or inde# of the bill /*eo le $) 9errer0) &hese rinci les a ly to titles of amendatory acts) A title which states that it is an act to amend a s ecific statutes is a sufficient com liance with the constitutional re(uirementF it need not states the recise nature of the amendatory act /4anila &rading G Su ly %o, $) Reyes0) Note" Hand for other ur osesI amounts to nothing W8EN RED7!RE4EN& N6& A**L!%A+LE !t does not a ly to laws in force e#isting at the time the -:2< %onstitution tooB effect /*eo le $) Aalensoy0, nor to munici al or city ordinances) E99E%& 69 !NS799!%!EN%Y 69 &!&LE !f the subject is not related in any manner to the title it is null and $oid, but if the subject matter is not sufficiently e# ressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not e# ressed therein is $oid, lea$ing the rest in force, unless the in$alid ro$isions are inse arable from the others) ENA%&!NG %LA7SE &he enacting clause is that art of a statute written immediately after the title thereof which states the authority by which the act is enacted) *REA4+LE A reamble is a refatory statement or e# lanation or a finding of facts, reciting the ur ose, reason or occasion for maBing the law to which it is refi#ed) !t is usually found in residential decrees and e#ecuti$e orders) *7RA!EW 69 S&A&7&E &he ur$iew of body of a statute is that art which tells what the law is all about) A com le# and com rehensi$e iece of legislation usually contains, in this se(uence, a short title, a olicy section, definition section, administrati$e section, sections rescribing standards of conduct, section im osing sanctions for $iolations or its ro$isions, transitory ro$ision, se arability clause, re ealing clause and effecti$ity clause) &he constitutional re(uirement that a bill should ha$e only one subject matter which should be e# ressed in its title is

com lied with where the ro$isions thereof, no matter how di$erse they may be, are allied and germane to the subject, or negati$ely stated, where the ro$isions are not inconsistent with, but in furtherance of, the single subject matter /*eo le $) %arlos0) SE*ARA+!L!&Y %LA7SE A Se arability clause is that art of a statute which states that if any ro$ision of the act is declared in$alid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby) Such a clause is not controlling and the courts, in s ite of it, may in$alidate the whole statute where what is left, after the $oid art, is not com lete and worBable) D. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE, RULES AND ORDINANCES *RES!5EN&!AL !SS7AN%ES &hese are those which the resident issues in the e#ercise of his ordinance ower) &hey ha$e the force and effect of law) -) E#ecuti$e order 3 acts of resident ro$iding for rules of a general or ermanent character in the im lementation or e#ecution of constitutional or statutory owers 1) Administrati$e order 3 acts of resident which relate to articular as ects of go$ernmental o erations in ursuance of his duties as administrati$e head) 2) *roclamations 3 acts resident fi#ing a date or declaring a statute or condition of ublic moment or interest, u on the e#istence of which the o eration of a s ecific law or regulation is made to de end >) 4emorandum orders 3 acts of resident on matters of administrati$e detail or of subordinate or tem orary interest which only concern a articular officer or office of the go$ernment <) 4emorandum circulars 3 acts of resident on matters relating to internal administration which the resident desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the de artments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the go$ernment for information or com liance =) General,S ecific orders 3 acts and commands of resident in his ca acity as commander.in.chief of the A9*

S7*RE4E %67R %!R%7LARSF R7LES AN5 REG7LA&!6NS Read Sec) < /<0, Article A!!! of the constitution !n case of discre ancy or conflict between the basic law and the regulations issued to im lement it, the former re$ails o$er the latter /Wise G %o) $) 4eer0) 9or it is elementary rinci le in statutory construction that a statute is su erior to an administrati$e regulation and the former cannot be re ealed or amended by the latter /%hina +anBing %or ) $) %)A)0) A54!N!S&RA&!AE R7LE AN5 !N&ER*RE&A&!6N 5!S&!NG7!S8E5 When an administrati$e agency romulgates rules and regulation, it maBes a new law with the force and effect of a $alid law and is binding to the courts, while when it renders an o inion or gi$es a statement of olicy, it merely inter rets a ree#isting law, it is merely ad$isory and not binding to the courts) +ARANGAY 6R5!NAN%E &he sangguniang barangay may ass a barangay ordinance by majority $ote of all its members, it is subject to re$iew by the sangguniang bayan or sangguniang anlungsod, as the case may be, which shall taBe action on it within 2; days from submission) !naction is e(ui$alent to a ro$al) 47N!%!*AL 6R5!NAN%E &he sangguniang bayan may bass a bill by a $ote of a majority of the members resent, there being a (uorum, subject to re$iew by the munici al mayor acting on it within -; days) !naction is a ro$al, if $etoed may be assed by two. thirds $ote of all members) %!&Y 6R5!NAN%E &he sangguniang anglungsod assed a bill in the same manner as the sangguniang bayan) +ut if itCs a com onent city, the bill is subject to re$iew by the sangguniang anglungsod, acting on it within 2; days where inaction is e(ui$alent to a ro$al) *R6A!N%!AL 6R5!NAN%E

&he sangguniang anlalawaigan may ass a bill by a majority $ote of the members resent, subject to re$iew by the go$ernor, who shall act within -< days from recei t) !naction is a ro$al, if $etoed, may be re assed by two.thirds $ote of all members E. VALIDITY *RES74*&!6N 69 %6NS&!&7&!6NAL!&Y E$ery statute is resumed $alid) All reasonable doubts should be resol$ed in fa$or of the constitutionality of law) &o doubt is to sustain) &he final authority to declare a law unconstitutional is the S% en banc by the Hconcurrence of a majority of the 4embers who actually tooB art in the deliberations)I &rial courts ha$e jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in a ro riate cases) RED7!S!&ES 96R EJER%!SE 69 E75!%!AL *6WER -) the e#istence of an a ro riate case 1) an interest ersonal and substantial by the arty raising the constitutional (uestion 2) the lea that the function be e#ercised at the earliest o ortunity >) the necessity that the constitutional (uestion be assed u on in order to decide a case) A**R6*R!A&E %ASE 6ne in which it raises a justiciable contro$ersy, the resolution of which the court will ha$e to choose between the constitution and the challenged statute S&AN5!NG &6 S7E Legal Standing is a ersonal and substantial interest in the case such that the arty has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the go$ernmental act that is being challenged) %iti'ens legal standing" o 8e has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of go$ernment o !njury is fairly traceable to the challenged action)

!njury is liBely to be redressed by a fa$orable action &a# ayers legal standing" -) When it is established that ublic funds ha$e been disbursed in alleged contra$ention of the law or the constitution, or in re$enting the illegal e# enditure of money raised by ta#ation 1) 8e will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the (uestioned statute) &he S% may taBe cogni'ance of a suit which does not satisfy the re(uirements of legal standingF the %ourt has ado ted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a etitioner where the etitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the eo leF aramount im ortance to the ublic) o W8EN &6 RA!SE %6NS&!&7&!6NAL!&Y %onstitutionality must be raised at the earliest ossible time) !f the (uestion is not raised in the leadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial, it will not be considered in a eal) E#ce tions" a) the (uestion may raised in a motion for reconsideration or new trial in the lower court, where the statute sought to be in$alidated was not in e#istence when the com laint was filed or during the trial b) the (uestion of $alidity may also be raised in criminal cases at any stage of the roceedings) c) !n ci$il cases where it a ears clearly that a determination of the (uestion is necessary to a decision and incases where it in$ol$ed the jurisdiction of the court below) &ES& 69 %6NS&!&7&!6NAL!&Y A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is $ague) !t is $ague when it lacBs com rehensi$e standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its a lication) &he change of circumstances or conditions may affect the $alidity of some

statues, s ecially those so.called emergency laws designed s ecifically to meet certain contingencies) With res ect to ordinances, the test of $alidity are" 4ust not contra$ene the constitution or any statute 4ust not be unfair or o ressi$e 4ust not be artial or discriminatory 4ust not rohibit but may regulate trade 4ust be general and consistent with ublic olicy 4ust not be unreasonable E99E%&S 69 7N%6NS&!&7&!6NAL!&Y &he general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not a law, confers no rights) Regard should be had to what has been done while the statute was in o eration and resumed to be $alid) 8ence, its o erati$e fact before a declaration of nullity must be recogni'ed) &here are two $iew on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute" Orthodox View) An unconstitutional law confers no right, is not a law, im oses no duties, affords no rotectionF in legal contem lation, it is ino erati$e, as if it had not been assed) Modern View. &he court in assing u on the (uestion of constitutionality does not annul or re eal the statute if it is unconstitutional, it sim ly refuses to recogni'e it and determines the rights of the arties just as if the statute had no e#istence) !t does not re eal, su ersede, re$oBe or annul the statute) &he arties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound) !NAAL!5!&Y 57E &6 %8ANGE 69 %6N5!&!6NS &he general rule as to the effects of unconstitutionality of a statute is not a licable to a statute that is declared in$alid because of the change of circumstances affecting its $alidity) !t becomes in$alid only because the change of conditions maBes its continued o eration $iolati$e of the %onstitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should affect only the arties in$ol$ed in the case, and its effects a lied

ros ecti$ely) A statute of this ty e belongs to the class of emergency laws *AR&!AL !NAAL!5!&Y &he general rule is that where art of a statute is $oid as re ugnant to the %onstitution, while another art is $alid, the $alid ortion, if se arable from the in$alid, may stand and be enforcedF e#ce t when the arts are so mutually de endent and connected) &he resence of se arability clause creates the resum tion that the legislature intended se arability, rather than com lete nullity of the statute) F. EFFECT AND OPERATION W8EN LAWS &AKE E99E%& Art 1 of the %i$il %ode ro$ides that HLaws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise pro ided.! All laws or statutes, including those of local a lication and ri$ate law shall be ublished as a condition for their effecti$ity /&aLada $) &u$era0, otherwise it would $iolate the due rocess clause of the constitution) &he general rule is that where the law is silent as to its effecti$ity, or where it ro$ides that it shall taBe effect immediately or u on its a ro$al, such law shall taBe effect after -< days from its ublication in the 6fficial Ga'ette) &he com letion of ublication, from which date the eriod of ublication will be counted, refers to the date of release of the 6)G) or news a er for circulation and not to its date, unless the two dates coincide) W8EN *RES!5EN&!AL !SS7AN%ES, R7LES AN5 REG7LA&!6NS &AKE E99E%& &he re(uirement of ublication as a condition for the effecti$ity of statues a lies to *residential !ssuances, e#ce t those which are merely inter retati$e or internal in nature not concerning the ublic) Rules and regulations of administrati$e and e#ecuti$e officers are of two ty es" -) Whose ur ose is to im lement or enforce e#isting law ursuant to a $alid delegation or to

fill in the details of a statuteF whether they are enal or non. enalF this re(uires ublication) 1) Which are merely inter retati$e in nature or merely internal in character not concerning the ublic, does not need ublication) !n addition, the -:@? Administrati$e %ode ro$ides that" -) E$ery agency shall file with the 7)*) Law center three co ies of e$ery rule ado ted by it) Rules in force on the date of effecti$ity of this %ode which are not filed within 2 months from that date shall not be the basis of any sanction against any arty or ersons) 1) Each rule shall become effecti$e -< days from the date of filing as abo$e ro$ided unless a different date is fi#ed by law, or s ecified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to ublic health, safety and welfare) *ublication and filing re(uirements are indis ensable to the effecti$ity of rules and regulations, e#ce t when the law authori'ing its issuance dis enses the filing re(uirements) W8EN L6%AL 6R5!NAN%E &AKE E99E%& 1. 7nless otherwise stated, Local ordinance shall taBe effect after -; days from the date a co y thereof is osted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the ro$incial ca itol or city, munici al, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two other cons icuous laces in the local go$ernment unit) 1) the secretary to the sanggunian shall cause the osting of the ordinance within < days after its a ro$al at the entrance of the ro$incial ca itol and the city, munici al or barangay hall in at least 1 cons icuous laces 2) &he gist of all ordinances with enal sanctions shall be ublished in a news a er of general circulation, within the ro$ince where the local legislati$e body concerned belongs, in the absence of such news a ers, ostings shall be made in all munici alities and cities of the ro$ince where the saggunian of origin is situated) >) 9or highly urbani'ed city and inde endent com onent cities, in addition to being osted, be ublished once in a local news a er of gen) circulation within the city, in the

absence of which, it shall be ublished in any news a er of general circulation) S&A&7&ES %6N&!N7E !N 96R%E 7N&!L RE*EALE5 7nless a statute is by its ro$isions for a limited eriod only, it continues in force until changed or re ealed by the legislature) Law once established continues until changed by some com etent legislati$e ower) !t is not changed by change of so$ereignty nor of a change in constitution, until the new so$ereign by legislati$e act creates a change) 4ANNER 69 %64*7&!NG &!4E Where the word HweeBI is used as a measure of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a eriod of se$en consecuti$e days without regard to the day of the weeB from which it begins /*N+ $) %)A0) Where a statute re(uires the doing of an act within a s ecified number of days, such as ten days, from notice, it means -; calendar days and not worBing days) &he e#clude. the 3first and include the last day rule go$erns the com utation of a eriod) !f the last day falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the act can still be done the following day) &he rinci le does not a ly to the com utation of the eriod of rescri tion of a crime, in which the rule is that if the last days in the eriod of rescri tion of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the ne#t worBing day, as the offense has been by then already rescribed)

!nter retation is the art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of word, while construction is the rocess of drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct e# ression or determining the a lication of words to faces in litigation) +ut they are used interchangeably in ractice) R7LES 69 %6NS&R7%&!6N, GENERALLY &he legislature is resumed to Bnow the rules of statutory construction, it enacts a law with the end in $iew that it will, in case of doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled rinci les of inter retation) Where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, courts em loy canons of statutory construction to ascertain and gi$e effect to its true intent and meaning) &he legislature sometimes ado ts rules of statutory construction as art of the ro$isions of a statute) &he legislature also defines, in certain com licated statutes, the word and hrases used therein) E#ce t as they may ha$e been embodied as art of a statute, rules of construction ha$e no binding effect on the courts) Nor are they controlling in the inter retation of laws, they may only be used to clarify, not to defeat, legislati$e intent) E$en those rules of construction which are in the form of statutory ro$isions may be ignored if their em loyment may defeat, rather than effectuate, legislati$e intent) *7R*6SE 6R 6+EE%& 69 %6NS&R7%&!6N All rules of construction of inter retation ha$e for their sole object the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature) &he object of all judicial inter retation of a statute is to determine legislati$e intent, what intention is con$eyed, either e# ressly or im liedly, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for ascertaining whether the articular case or state of facts resented to the court comes within it) LEG!SLA&!AE !N&EN&, GENERALLY %ourts will not follow the letter of the statute when it leads away from the true intent of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general ur ose of the act /&orres $) Limja 0) 8ence, where the statute is susce tible of more than one construction, that construction should be

CHAPTER 2: CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

A. NATURE AND PURPOSE %6NS&R7%&!6N 5E9!NE5 !t is the art or rocess of disco$ering and e# ounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the gi$en case is not e# licitly ro$ided in the law %6NS&R7%&!6N AN5 !N&ER*RE&A&!6N 5!S&!NG7!S8E5

ado ted which will most tend to gi$e effect to the manifest intent of the legislature /7)S) $) &oribio0) LEG!SLA&!AE *7R*6SE !t is the reason why a articular statute was enacted by the legislature) A legislation is an acti$e instrument of the go$ernment which, for ur oses of inter retation, means that law ha$e ends to be achie$ed and statutes should be so construed so as not defeat but to carry out such ends and ur oses /Lite# Em loyees Assn $) Edu$ala0) LEG!SLA&!AE 4EAN!NG !t is what the law, by its language, means) !t may be synonymous to legislati$e intent) !f there is ambiguity in the language, its ur ose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead to what the legislati$e intent is) 4A&&ERS !ND7!RE5 !N&6 !N %6NS&R7!NG A S&A&7&E !t is not enough to ascertain the intention of meaning of the statuteF it is also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning of the statute has been e# ressed in such a way as to gi$e it legal effect and $alidity) &he legal act is made u of two elements 3 an internal and an e#ternal oneF it originates in intention and is erfected by e# ression) 9ailure of the latter may defeat the former) W8ERE LEG!SLA&!AE !N&EN& !S AS%ER&A!NE5 &he rimary source of the intent is the statute itself and has to be disco$ered from the four corners of the law /4anila Lodge No) ?=- $) %) A0) !t has to be e#tracted from the statute as a whole and not from an isolated art of articular ro$ision thereof) Where the words and hrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language em loyed /Aeroy $) Layague0) &he court may also looB to the ur ose of the statute to be subser$ed, the reason or cause which induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to be su ressed, and the olicy which dictated its assage /Yu %ong Eng $) &rinidad0) B. POWER TO CONSTRUE %6NS&R7%&!6N !S A E75!%!AL 97N%&!6N

!t is em hatically the ro$ince and duty of the judicial de artment to say what the law is and it has the final word as to what the law means) &he court does not inter ret the law in a $acuum) !t does not gi$e legal o inion on hy othetical cases or in cases which ha$e become moot or academic LEG!SLA&7RE %ANN6& 6AERR7LE E75!%!AL 5E%!S!6NS &he legislature has no ower to o$errule the inter retation or construction of a statute of the %onstitution by the Su reme court and while it may indicate its construction of a statute in a resolution or declaratory act, it cannot reclude the courts from gi$ing the statute a different inter retation) W8EN E75!%!AL !N&ER*RE&A&!6N 4AY +E SE& AS!5E &he Su reme %ourt may change or o$errule its re$ious construction) %onstitutional amendments may modify or nullify a judicial inter retation of a ro$ision thereof) &he rule that the Su reme %ourt has the final word in the inter retation of a statute merely means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the judicial construction without modifying or re ealing the $ery statute which has been the subject of construction, but when it enacts a re eal, the re$ious judicial construction of the statute is modified or set aside) W8EN %67R& 4AY %6NS&R7E S&A&7&E A condition sine (ua non, before the court may construe or inter ret, is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language) 6nly statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction /5aong $) 4unici al Eudge0) A statute is ambiguous if it is susce tible of more than one inter retation) %67R&S 4AY N6& %6NS&R7E W8ERE S&A&7&E !S %LEAR %onstruction comes only after it has been demonstrated that the a lication is im ossible or inade(uate without it) !t is the $ery last function which the court should e#ercise, for it there is more a lication and less construction, there would be more stability in the law /Li'arraga 8ermanos $) Ya &ico0) !t has been re eatedly declared that where the law s eaBs in clear and categorical language, there is no room for

inter retation and there is only room for a lication /%ebu *ortland %ement %o) $) 4unici ality of Naga0) 9or nothing is better settled than that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to a ly the law as they find it, not as they liBe it to be) 9idelity to such a tasB recludes construction unless a lication is im ossible or inade(uate without it /Resins, !nc) $) Auditor General0) Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taBen to mean e#actly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed /Lu'on Surety %o) $) 5e Garcia0) Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce e#ce tions where none is ro$ided from considerations of con$enience, ublic welfare, or for any laudable ur ose, nor may it engraft into the law (ualifications not contem lated /Ramos $) %)A0, nor construe ro$isions by taBing into account (uestions of e# ediency, good faith, ractical utility and other similar reasons so as to rela# non com liance therewith) Administrati$e agencies tasBed to im lement a stature may not construe it by e# anding its meaning where ro$isions are clear and unambiguous) R7L!NGS 69 S7*RE4E %67R& *AR& 69 LEGAL SYS&E4 Legis interpretato legis im obtinet, the authoritati$e inter retation of the Su reme %ourt of a statute ac(uires the force of law by becoming a art thereof as of the date of its enactment, since the courtCs inter retation merely establishes the contem oratneous legislati$e intent that the statute thus construed intends to effectuate /Seno$ila $) 8ermosisimo0) "tare decisis et non #uieta mo ere, when the Su reme %ourt has once laid down a rinci le of law as a licable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that rinci le and a ly it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same) &his assures certainty and stability in the legal system) As art of the legal system and until re$ersed by the Su reme %ourt itself, rulings of the highest tribunal are binding u on inferior courts) E75!%!AL R7L!NGS 8AAE N6 RE&R6A%&!AE E99E%&

Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looBs forward not bacBward) &he inter retation of a statute by the Su reme %ourt remains to be art of the legal system until the latter o$errules it and the new doctrine o$erruling the old is a lied ros ecti$ely in fa$or of ersons who ha$e relied thereon in good faith) %67R&S 4AY !SS7E G7!5EL!NE !N %6NS&R7!NG S&A&7&E !n construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread on sensiti$e areas of constitutional rights, the court may issue guidelines in a lying the statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law re(uires) &his is not judicial legislation but an act to define what the law is) C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE %67R&S 4AY N6& ENLARGE 6R RES&R!%& S&A&7&ES -) While statutory constructions in$ol$es choice, the court should resist the tem tation to roam at will and rely on its redilection as to what olicy should re$ail) 1) &hey may not, in the guise of inter retation, enlarge the sco e of a statute and include therein situations not ro$ided nor intended by lawmaBers) 2) &hey are not authori'e to insert into the law what they thinB should be in it or to su ly what they thinB the legislature would ha$e su lied if its attention had been called to the omission) >) &hey should not re$ise e$en the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they thinB should be the law <) Nor may they inter ret into the law a re(uirement which the law does not rescribe =) Neither should courts construe statutes which are erfectly $ague, or cannot be clarified either by a sa$ing clause or by construction) %67R&S N6& &6 +E !N9L7EN%E5 +Y D7ES&!6NS 69 W!S564 Since the legislature is rimarily the judge of the necessity, ade(uacy, wisdom, reasonableness and e# ediency of any law, courts may not taBe any of these matters into account in construing or inter reting the law) As long as laws do not $iolate the %onstitution, the courts merely inter ret and

a ly them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary)

CHAPTER 3: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. IN GENERAL GENERALLY Aid to construction are those found in the rinted age of the statute itself, Bnown as intrinsic aids, and those e#traneous facts and circumstances outside the rinted age, called e#trinsic aids) &!&LE &he title may indicate the legislati$e intent to e#tend or restrict the sco e of the law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful im ort will be construed to conform to the legislati$e intent as disclosed in its title) &he rule that the title may ser$e as a guide carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional re(uirement that e$ery bill shall ha$e one subject as e# ressed in the title thereof) W8EN RES6R& &6 &!&LE N6& A7&86R!ME5 When the te#t is clear it is im ro er to resort to its title to maBe it obscure) &he title may be resorted in order to remo$e, but not to create doubt or uncertainty *REA4+LE !t is that art of the stature written immediately after its title which states the ur ose, reason or justification for the enactment of the law and usually e# ressed in the form of HwhereasI clauses) &hough it is not, strictly s eaBing, a art of a statute, it is the Bey to the statute for its sets out the intention of the legislature) !t may restrict what otherwise a ears to be a broad sco e of a law, or re(uire, in the commission of a crime, an element not clearly e# ressed in its te#t) !t may e# ress the legislati$e intent to maBe the law a ly retroacti$ely, in which case the law has to be gi$en retroacti$e effect, so as to carry out such intent /*N+ $) 6ffice of the *resident0) %6N&EJ& 69 W86LE &EJ&

Legislati$e intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration of the whole conte#t of the stature and not from an isolated art of articular ro$ision /Aboiti' Shi ing %or ) $) %ity of %ebu0) &he conte#t may circumscribe the meaning of a statute, it may gi$e to a word or hrase a meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification) !n such a case, the meaning dictated by the conte#t re$ails) E$ery section, ro$ision or clause of the statute must be e# ounded by reference to each other in order to arri$e at the effect contem lated by the legislature) &he intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole te#t of the law and e$ery art of the act is taBen into $iew /%ommissioner of !nternal Re$eneu $) &4J Sales0) *7N%&7A&!6N 4ARKS A semi.colon is used to indicate a se aration in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that e# ressed by a commaF and what follows a semi.colon must ha$e a relation to the same matter which recedes it) &he comma and the semi.colon are both used for the same ur ose 3 to di$ide sentences and arts of sentences, the only difference is that semi.colon maBes the di$ision a little more ronounced) &hey are not used to introduce a new idea) *unctuation marBs are aids of low degree and can ne$er control against the intelligible meaning of written word) &he reason is that unctuation marBs are not art of a statureF nor are they art of the English language /9eliciano $) A(uino0) %a itali'ation of Letters LiBe unctuation marBs, ca itali'ation is an aid of low degree in the construction of statute) E#am le" in a statute which ro$ides that H a will made within the *hili ine !slands by a citi'en or subject of another state or country, which is e#ecuted in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citi'en or subject, and whichNI , in force at a time when the *hili ines was still a territory of the 7S, the fact that the words Hstate and countryI are not ca itali'ed does not mean that the 7nited States is e#cluded form the hrase Hanother state or country)I

10

8eadnotes or e igra hs 8eadnotes, headings, or e igra hs of sections of a statute are con$enient inde# to the contents of its ro$isions) 8owe$er they are not entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn therefrom are of little $alue and they can ne$er control the lain terms of the enacting clause, for they are not art of the law) Secondary aids, such as headnotes or e igra hs, may be consulted to remo$e, but not to create nor to limit or control the lain language of the law) Lingual te#t *hili ine laws are officially romulgated either in English, S anish or 9ili ino, or either in two such languages) &he rule is that, unless otherwise ro$ided, where a statute is officially romulgated in English and S anish, the English te#t shall go$ern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or mistaBe, the S anish may be consulted to e# lain the English te#t) !ntent or s irit of the law &he intent or s irit of the law is the law itself) 9or this reason, legislati$e intent or s irit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light in the a lication and inter retation of a statute) A thing which is within the intent of the lawmaBer is as much within the statute as if within the letterF and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmaBers) *olicy of law &he olicy of the law once ascertained should be gi$en effect by the judiciary) 6ne way of accom lishing this mandate is to gi$e a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will romote ublic olicy) &he construction which would carry into effect the e$ident olicy of the law should be ado ted in fa$or of that inter retation which would defeat it) E#am le" homestead act *ur ose of law or mischief to be su ressed &he court much looB to the object to be accom lished, the e$ils to be remedied, or the ur ose to be subser$ed, and should gi$e the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effectuate its ur ose)

5ictionaries While definition s gi$en by le#icogra hers are not binding, courts ha$e ado ted, in ro er cases, such definitions to su ort their conclusion as to the meaning of the articular words or terms used in a statute, es where no strong reason e#ists why their dictionary meaning should not be ado ted in the construction of the statute) %onse(uences of $arious constructions !n construing a statute, the objecti$e should always be to arri$e at a reasonable and sensible inter retation that is in full accord with the legislati$e intent) As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause injustice or hardshi , result in absurdity, defeat legislati$e intent or s irit, reclude accom lishment of legislati$e ur ose or object, render certain words or hrases a sur lusage, nullify the statute or maBe any of its ro$isions nugatory) *resum tions !nclude" resum tions in fa$or of the constitutionality of a statute, of its com leteness, of its ros ecti$e o eration, of right and justice, of its effecti$e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable o eration as a whole, as well as those against the inconsistency and im lied re eal, unnecessary changes in law, im ossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardshi , incon$enience, and ineffecti$eness) +) Legislati$e 8istory Generally !t is a well settled rule of statutory construction that where a statue is susce tible of se$eral inter retations or where there is ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute)

What constitutes legislati$e history

11

!f the statute is based on, or is a re$ision of, a rior statute, the latterCs ractical a lication and judicial construction, the $arious amendments it underwent, and the contem orary e$ents at the time of its enactment form art of its legislati$e history) !f the statute is borrowed from, or modeled u on, Anglo.American recedents or other foreign sources, its history includes the history of such recedents, and for a ro er construction of the statue sought to be construed, it is oftentimes essential to re$iew such legislati$e history and find authoritati$e guide for its inter retation from such recedents, their ractical a lication , and the decisions of the courts construing and a lying such recedents in the country of origin) *residentCs message to legislature &he residentCs message indicates his thinBing on the ro osed legislation which , when enacted into law, follows his line of thinBing on the matter) E# lanatory Note Where there is ambiguity in a statue or where a statute is susce tible of more than one inter retation, courts may resort to the e# lanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the ur ose or intent of the statute) &he statue may then be so construed as to gi$e effect to the ur ose or intent as disclosed in its e# lanatory note) Legislati$e 5ebates, $iews and deliberations %ourts may resort to the legislati$e deliberations in the legislature on a bill which e$entually was enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its ro$isions) &hus, where there is doubt as to what a ro$ision of a statute means, that meaning which was ut to the ro$ision during the legislati$e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be ado ted) 8owe$er the $iews e# ressed by the legislators during the deliberation of a bill as to the billCs ur ose, meaning, or effect are not controlling in the inter retation of the law) &he o inions e# ressed by legislators in the course of debates concerning the a lication of e#isting laws are not also gi$en decisi$e weight, es ecially where the legislator was not a member of the assembly that enacted said laws)

Re orts of commissions !n the codification of laws, commissions are usually formed to com ile and collate all laws on articular subject and to re are the draft of the ro osed code *rior law from which statute is based !n ascertaining the intention of the lawmaBer, courts are ermitted to looB to rior laws on the same subject and to in$estigate the antecedents of the statute in$ol$ed) %hange in hraseology by amendments &he change in hraseology by amendment of a ro$ision of law indicates a legislati$e intent to change the meaning of the ro$ision from that it originally had) !n construing the amended ro$ision, courts may in$estigate the history of the ro$ision to ascertain legislati$e intent as to the meaning or sco e of the amended law) Amendment by deletion As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or hrases in a statute indicate that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the resum tion is that the legislature would not ha$e made the deletion had the intention been not to effect a change in its meaning) &he amended statute should accordingly be gi$en a construction different from that re$ious to its amendment) E#ce tions to the rule &he rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a change in meaning from that which the statute originally had a lies only when the deleted words or hrases are not sur lusage or when the intention is clear to change the re$ious meaning of the old law) &he rule does not a ly where the intent, as shown by history of the enactment, is clear that the amendment is recisely to lainly e# ress that construction of the act rior to its amendment because its language is not sufficiently e# ressi$e of such construction) Ado ted statute

12

&he general rule is that where local statutes are atterned after or co ied from those of another country, the decisions of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the inter retation of such local statutes) &he reason is that the legislature, in ado ting from another country a statute which has re$iously recei$ed judicial construction in that country, is deemed to ha$e ado ted the statute with such construction and ractical a lication in the country of origin) &he ado ted statutes are thus generally construed in accordance with the construction gi$en similar statutes in the 7S, unless s ecial reasons, local customs, and ractice re(uire otherwise) Limitations to the rule &he general rule that a statute which has been ado ted from that of a foreign country should be construed in accordance with the construction gi$en it in the country of origin is not without limitations) *rinci les of common law While common law as Bnown in Anglo.American juris rudence is not in force in this country, sa$e only insofar as it is founded on sound rinci les a licable to local conditions and is not in conflict with e#isting laws, ne$ertheless many of the rinci les of the common law ha$e been im orted into this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and establishment of institutions similar those of the 7nited States) %ourts may thus ro erly resort to common law rinci les in construing doubtful ro$isions of a statute, articularly where such statute is modeled u on Anglo.American recedents) 8owe$er there is a conflict between a common law rinci le and a statutory ro$ision, the latter re$ails) %onditions at time of enactment !n enacting a statute, the legislature is resumed to ha$e taBen into account the e#isting conditions of things at the time of its enactment) 9or this reason, it is ro er, in the inter retation of a statute to consider the hysical conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtaining which must

of necessity affect its o eration in order to reach an understanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as to the meaning of the statute) 8istory of times &he court may looB to the history of the times, e#amine the state of things e#isting when the statue was enacted, and inter ret it in the light of the conditions obtaining) Generally, it may be said that in determining the meaning, intent and ur ose of a law or constitutional ro$ision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally su osed to bear some direct relationshi , the e$ils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accom lished are ro er subjects of in(uiry) %) %ontem oraneous %onstruction Generally %ontem orary or ractical constructions are the constructions laced u on statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the e#ecuti$e, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as those who, because of their in$ol$ement in the rocess of legislation, are Bnowledgeable of the intent and ur ose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill s onsors) $ontemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege... the contem orary construction is strongest in law) E#ecuti$e construction, generallyF Binds of What is commonly Bnown as contem oraneous construction is the construction laced u on the statute by an e#ecuti$e or administrati$e officer called u on to e#ecute or administer such statute) Accordingly, e#ecuti$e and the administrati$e officers are generally the $ery first officials to inter ret the law, re aratory to its enforcement) &hree ty e of e#ecuti$e inter retations" /-0 construction by an e#ecuti$e or administrati$e officer directly called to im lement the law, e# ressed or im lied, e# ressed such as circular, directi$e, or regulationF /10 by the Secretary of Eustice in his ca acity as the chief legal ad$iser of the go$ernment, in the form of o inions issued u on the re(uest of the e#ecuti$e /20 inter retation

13

handed down in an ad$ersary roceeding in the form of a ruling by an e#ecuti$e officer e#ercising (uasi.judicial ower) Weight accorded to contem oraneous construction Generally s eaBing, where there is doubt as to the ro er inter retation of a statute, the uniform construction laced u on it by the e#ecuti$e or administrati$e officer charged with its enforcement will be ado ted, if necessary to resol$e the doubt) !n the absence of error or abuse of ower or lacB of jurisdiction or gra$e abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the s irit of the legislati$e enactment creating or charging a go$ernmental agency, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts) As a tly said in a case" Hthe rinci le that the contem oraneous construction of a statute by the e#ecuti$e officers of the go$ernment, whose duty it is to e#ecute it, is entitled to great res ect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to su ort it)I Weight accorded to usage and ractice . ac(uiesced in by all the arties concerned and has e#tended o$er a long eriod of time %Optimus interpres rerum usus. the best inter reter of the law is usage %onstruction of rules and regulations An administrati$e agency has the ower to inter ret its own rules and such inter retation becomes art of the rules) Reasons why contem oraneous construction is gi$en much weight %ontem oraneous construction is entitled to great weight" because /-0it comes from the articular branch of go$ernment called u on to im lement the law thus construed) /10 e#ecuti$e officials are resumed to ha$e familiari'ed themsel$es with all the considerations ertinent to the meaning and ur ose of the law, and to ha$e formed an inde endent, conscientious and com etent e# ert o inion thereon) /20 there are fre(uently the drafters of the law they inter ret) !n short,

due to their com etence, e# ertness, e# erience, and informed judgment) And there is a need for certainty and redictability in the law) When contem oraneous construction disregarded !t is neither controlling nor binding u on the court) &he court may disregard the law %%, where there is no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary e#ists, and where the court has re$iously gi$en the statue a different inter retation) !f it is erroneous then should be declared null and $oid) Erroneous contem oraneous construction does not reclude correction nor create rightsF e#ce tions &he error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained) As a rule, an erroneous %% creates no $ested right on the art of those who relied u on, and followed such construction) A $ested right may not arise from a wrong inter retation of a law by an administrati$e or e#ecuti$e officer whose rimary duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law) And the go$ernment is ne$er esto ed by the mistaBe or error on the art of its agents) &he rule is not absolute, but admits e#ce tions in the interest of justice and fair lay) /true in ta# cases0 Legislati$e inter retation &he fact that the inter retation of a statue is rimarily a judicial function does not reclude the legislature form indicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law) !t may thus ro$ide in the statute itself an inter retati$e or declaratory clause rescribing rules of construction or indicating how its ro$isions should be construed) !t may also define the terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a re$ious law or ass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as to gi$en statute) 8owe$er the legislature cannot limit or restrict the ower granted to the courts to inter ret the law) While their inter retation is not controlling, the courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language thereof) !t is entitled of res ectful consideration) Legislati$e a ro$al

14

&he legislature may by action or inaction, a ro$e or ratify such contem oraneous construction) !t may be manifested in many ways" as when it reenacts a statute re$iously gi$en a %%, uses words similar in their im ort to the language of an earlier law which has recei$ed a ractical a lication or amend a rior statute without, in the amending act, ro$iding anything which would restrict, change or nullify the recious %% laced u on the rior law) !t may be also shown by the legislature a ro riating money for the officer designated to erform a tasB ursuant to an inter retation of a statute) Where the legislature has notice or Bnowledge of a construction laced u on a statue by an e#ecuti$e officer charged with its im lementation, without re udiating it, its silence is ac(uiescence e(ui$alent to consent to continue ractice) &here is an im lied a ro$al by its failure to change a longstanding administrati$e construction) &atihabitio mandato ae#uiparatur. legislati$e ratification is e(ui$alent to a mandate Reenactment &he most common act of legislati$e a ro$al of %% of a state is by reenactment) &he rinci le is the reenactment of a statute, re$iously gi$en %%, is a ersuasi$e indication of the ado tion by the legislature of the rior construction) !t must be reenacted and not merely amended and the %% thereof must be in the form of regulation to im lement the law and duly ublished and not merely administrati$e ruling embodied in a letter to a s ecified indi$idual and not ublished) !t is accorded with greater weight and res ect than the %% of the statute before its ratification) &he reason for such is" there is an agreement between two de artments 3 the legislati$e and e#ecuti$eO to the meaning of the law, and it de$ol$es u on the judiciary to gi$e it deferential treatment) Stare decisis &he decision of the S% a lying or inter reting a statute is controlling with res ect to the inter retation of that statute and is of greater weight than that of an e#ecuti$e or administrati$e officer in the construction of other statutes of similar im ort) &he reason" the S%Cs inter retation forms art of the statue itself and of the legal system and comes form that

branch of go$ernment entrusted with the duty to construe or inter ret the law) "tare decisis et non #uieta mo ere. one should follow ast recedents and should not be disturbed what has been settled) &he rule rests on the desirability of ha$ing stability in the law) 'nterest republicae ut sit finis litiumOthe interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation) 9or a ruling of S% be under the doctrine of stare decisis, it must be a direct ruling and not through sub silencio and obiter dictum) &he facts of the recedent and the case to which it is a lied should be the same for stare decisis to be a lied) &he rule of stare decisis is not absolute) &he rinci le does not blind adherence to recedents) !f it is found contrary to law, must be abandoned) &he rinci le should not a ly when there is conflict between the recedent and the law) 8owe$er only the S% itself can change or abandon a recedent enunciated by it, neither by inferior court, nor by legislature unless they re eal or amend the law itself) !f the inferior courts feel that the recedent is against their way of reasoning, they may state their ersonal o inion but still they are bound to follow it)

CHAPTER IV : ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE

A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION Lite !" Me!#i#$ % &"!i#'(e!#i#$ )"e - As a general rule, the intent of legislature to be ascertained and thereafter gi$en effect is the intent e# ressed in the language of the statute) - *lain meaning rule" erba legis - 'ndex animi sermo( s eech is the inde# of intention) - Verba Legis non est recedendum( from the words of a statute there should be no de arture) - What is not clearly ro$ided in the law cannot be e#tended to those matters outside its sco e)

15

Where what is not clearly ro$ided in the law is read into law by construction because it is more logical and wise, it would be to encroach u on legislati$e rerogati$e to define the wisdom of the law, which is judicial legislation) &o de art from the meaning e# ressed by words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to inter ret) Maledicta est expositio#uae corrumpit textum" or it is dangerous construction which is against the te#t)

Dura Lex Sed Lex - )bsoluta sentential expositore non indigent( When the language of the law is clear, no e# lanation of it is re(uired) - When the law is clear, it is not susce tible of inter retation) !t must be a lied regardless who may be affected, e$en if it may be harsh or onerous) - *ura lex sed lex( &he law may be harsh, but it is still the law) - +oc #uidem per#uam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est, or it is e#ceedingly hard but so the law is written) - &he court should a ly the law e$en if it would be harsh or unwise) - &he duty of court in inter reting a statute which is ambiguous is not to dis ute its wisdomF the duty of the court is limited to in(uiring into the legislati$e intent and, once this is determined, to maBing said intent effecti$e) - When the law is clear, a eal to justice and e(uity as justification to construe it differently are una$ailing) E(uity ! described as justice outside legality, which sim ly means that it cannot su lant although it may su lement the law) - )e#uitas nun#uam contra enit legis( E(uity ne$er acts in contra$ention of the law) B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL MEANING St!t)te ()*t +e ,!&!+"e %- i#te & et!ti%#, %t.e /i*e i#%&e !ti0e.

%ourt must use e$ery authori'ed means to ascertain the intent of the statute and gi$e it an intelligible meaning) !f effort is im ossible to sol$e the doubt and dis el the obscurity of a statute, if no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to su ly nor to maBe one) !f statute fails to e# ress a meaning, judicial modesty forbids court from assuming and from su lying a meaning thereto) 'nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis aleat#uam pereat" that inter retation as will gi$e the thing efficacy is to be ado ted) A law should be inter reted with a $iew to u holding rather than destroying it)

W.!t i* /it.i# t.e *&i it i* /it.i# t.e "!/. - &he intent or s irit of the law is the law itself) - As a general rule of statutory construction, the s irit or intention of a statute re$ails o$er the letter thereof, and what is within the s irit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter but not within the s irit of the statute is not within the statute) - &he intent is the $ital art, the essence of the law, and the rimary rule of construction is to ascertain and gi$e effect to that intent) - A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not re ugnant to, the s irit of the law) - &he court may consider the s irit and reason of statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear ur ose of the lawmaBers) Lite !" i(&% t ()*t 1ie"2 t% i#te#t. - &he intention controls the literal inter retation of a articular language of statute) - Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser ire( words ought to be more subser$ient to the intent and not the intent to the words) - !f thereCs two conflicting theories, courts choose which best accords with the s irit or intent of the law)

16

%onscience and e(uity should always be considered in the construction of a statute) &he s irit and intendment of the law must re$ail o$er its letter) A statute may therefore be e#tended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its s irit or intent)

&his may ha en when the ur ose of the statute sought to be achie$ed by it is accom lished, or the mischief sought to be re ressed is re$ented, by an act or e$ent inde endent of the statute itself)

Li(it!ti%# %- )"e - What is within the s irit of a statute e$en if not within the letter is a licable only if there is ambiguity in the language of the law) C%#*t ),ti%# t% !,,%(&"i*. &) &%*e - Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achie$ed and the e$il or mischief to be su ressed, and they should be gi$en such construction as will ad$ance the object, su ress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended) - %ourts should not follow the letter of a statute when to do so would de art from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the ur ose of the act) - As between two statutory inter retations, that which better ser$es the ur ose of the law should re$ail) whyP &he general ur ose is a more im ortant aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down) /8olmes0) - A literal inter retation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results) W.e# e!*%# %- "!/ ,e!*e*, t.e "!/ it*e"- ,e!*e*. - cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex - raton legis est anima" the reason of the law is its soul) - &he reason behind the law is the heart of the law) Reason of the law lays a decisi$e role in its construction) - A statute may render a rior law de$oid of reason) - Where a later law has a ur ose in conflict with that of a rior statute on the same subject, the latter has lost all meaning and function and has ceased to e#ist)

S)&&"1i#$ "e$i*"!ti0e %(i**i%# - Where a literal im ort of the language of a statute shows that words ha$e been omitted that should ha$e been in the statute in order to carry out its intent and s irit, clearly ascertainable from the conte#t, the court may su ly the omission to maBe the statute conform to the ob$ious intent of the legislature or to re$ent the act from being absurd) - Rule is corollary with the rule that what is within the s irit of the law is within the law) C% e,ti#$ C"e i,!" e % * &he court, in order to carry out the ob$ious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistaBes or mis rints which, if uncorrected would render the statute meaningless, em ty or nonsensical or would defeat or im air its intended o eration, so long as the meaning intended is a arent on the face of the whole enactment and no s ecific ro$ision is abrogated) - !t is the duty of the court to arri$e at the legislati$e intent) - &he court is not indulging judicial legislation, it is merely endea$oring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error) -

3)!"i-i,!ti%# %- )"e - What the courts may correct to reflect intention of legislature are those which are clearly clerical errors or ob$ious mistaBes, omissions, mis rints) - &o correct a clear statute would be rewriting the law and do judicial legislation in the disguise of inter retation) C%#*t ),ti%# t% !0%i2 !+*) 2it1 - General terms of a statute should be so limited in their a lication as not to lead to absurdities) !t is resumed that the legislature intended e#ce tions to its language which would a$oid absurd conse(uences)

17

'nterpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut e itetur incon eniens et absurdum( Where there is ambiguity, such inter retation as will a$oid incon$enience and absurdity is to be ado ted) Where literal adherence to the language would result to absurdity, the court has the ower to su ly or omit the words from a statute in order to re$ent an absurd result) %ourts test the law by its result) &here are laws which are generally $alid but may seem arbitrary when a lied in a articular case because of its eculiar circumstance) %ourts are not bound to a ly them in sla$ish obedience to their language) A law should not be inter reted so as not to cause injustice) Where a term is defined in a statute, the court may not construe it to e#clude what is included therein as to restrict its sco e)

&he fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with res ect to a (uestion before the court will not justify the latter from declining to render judgment thereon) -ure naturae ae#uum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et in.uria fieri locupletiorem, which was restated with ninguno non deue enri#uecerse tortizeramente con da/o de otro. %ourts in$oBe these rinci les when the statutes are silent or obscure in order to arri$e at a solution that would res ond to the $ehement / assionate0 urge of conscience) !n balancing conflicting solutions, that one is ercei$ed to ti the scales which the court belie$es will best romote the ublic welfare in its robable o eration as a general rule or rinci le)

C%#*t ),ti%# t% !0%i2 i#4)*ti,e - &he resum tion is that the legislature in enacting a law, did not intent to worB a hardshi or an o ressi$e result, a ossible abuse of authority or act of o ression, arming one erson with a wea on to im ose hardshi on another) - ,a est accipienda interpretatio #uae itio caret" that inter retation is to be ado ted which is free from e$il or injustice) C%#*t ),ti%# t% !0%i2 2!#$e t% &)+"i, i#te e*t - !t is a well established rule of statutory construction that where great incon$enience will result, or great ublic interest will be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a articular construction of a statute, such construction is to be a$oided) - %ourts should resume that such construction was not intended by the legislature) C%#*t ),ti%# i# -!0% %- i$.t !#2 4)*ti,e - Any doubt in the construction of a statute should be resol$ed in fa$or of right and justice)

S) &")*!$e !#2 *)&e -")it1 2i* e$! 2e2 - surplusagium non noceat( sur lusage does not $itiate a statute) - 0tile per inutile non itiatur( the useful is not itiated by the non%useful. - Where a word, hrase or clause in a statute is de$oid of meaning in relation to the conte#t or intent of the statute or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the word, hrase, or clause may be rejected as a sur lusage and entirely ignored) Re2)#2!#t /% 2* (!1 +e e4e,te2 - General rule is that e$ery effort should be made to gi$e some meaning to e$ery art of a statute) &his rule does not im ose u on the courts an im erati$e obligation to gi$e e$ery redundant word or hrase a s ecial significance, contrary to the manifest intention of the legislature) - A ossible inter retation which would defeat the whole ur ose of the law is to be rejected) - When the use of word is merely to reiterate or re eat, it carries out the intention of the legislature)

18

O+*,) e % (i**i#$ /% 2 % -!"*e 2e*, i&ti%# (!1 #%t & e,")2e ,%#*t ),ti%# - %ourt should not and cannot always be bound by the hraseology or literal meaning of a statute) - &hat some words may be missing due to clerical errors or false descri tion does not reclude construction nor $itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear) - 1alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat( 9alse descri tion does not reclude construction nor $itiate the meaning of the statute) E5e(&ti%# - %( i$i2 !&&"i,!ti%# %- "!/ - E$ery rule is not without e#ce tion - 'bi #uid generaliter conceditur2 inest haec exception, si non ali#uid sit contras .us bas#ue, which means that where anything is granted generally, this e#ce tion is im liedF that nothing shall be contrary to law and right) - E(uity and other com elling reasons may justify an e#ce tion to a rule e$en when the rule does not ro$ide any) - !f the a lication of law will re$ent a fair and im artial in(uiry into the actual facts of a case, justice demands that the general rule should yield to occasional e#ce tions) - "ummum .us, summa in.uria" the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice) - Where rigid and strict a lication of law would worB injustice, an e#em tion therefrom to re$ent such result on humanitarian and e(uitable grounds is warranted, although the literal im ort of the law suggests no such e#em tion) L!/ 2%e* #%t e6)i e t.e i(&%**i+"e - The law obliges no one to erform an im ossibility, e# ressed in the ma#im, nemo tenetur ad impossibile. !n other words, there is no obligation to do an im ossible thing) 'mpossibilium nulla obligation est. - Statutes should not be construed as to re(uire com liance with what it rescribes, which is im ossibleF

but in such a way that substantial com liance with what the law re(uires is sufficient) N)(+e !#2 $e#2e %- /% 2* - it is a ma#im of statutory construction that when the conte#t if a statute so indicates in lural include the singular, and $ice $ersa) - A lural word in a statute may thus a ly to a singular erson or thing, just as a singular word may embrace two or more ersons or things) - !t is also a rule of statutory construction that in construing a statute, the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the conte#t in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise) C. IMPLICATIONS D%,t i#e %- #e,e**! 1 i(&"i,!ti%# - What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all. embracing legislation may be inade(uate to ro$ide for future e$ents, thereby creating ga s in the law) 6ne of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the ga is the doctrine of necessary im lication) - 5octrine states that what is im lied in a statute is as much a art thereof as that which is e# ressed) - E$ery statute is understood by im lication to contain all such ro$isions that are needed to effectuate its ur ose) - ,x necessitate legis or from the necessity of the law) - E$ery statutory grant of ower, right or ri$ilege is deemed to include all incidental ower, right or ri$ilege) &his is because in eo #uod plus sit, semper inest et minus. - Hnecessary im licationI" it is one which under the circumstances, is com elled by a reasonable $iew of the statute, and the contrary of which would be im robable and absurd) - HNecessityI" defines what may ro erly and logically be inferred from and read into the statute) - &his doctrine may not be used to justify the inclusion in a statute of what to the court a ears to be wise and

19

just, unless it is at the same time necessarily and logically within its terms) What may be necessarily im lied from a statute should, in any e$ent, be consistent with, and not contrary to, the constitution or to e#isting laws) An im lication which is $iolati$e of the law is unjustified or unwarranted)

Re(e21 !&&"ie2 - %( ! i$.t - Where there is a right, there is a remedy) 0bi .us, ibi remedium - &he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not reclude him from $indicating his right, for such remedy is im lied from such right) - Such right enforces itself by its own inherent otency and uissance, and from which all legislation must taBe their bearings) - HwrongI means de ri$ation or $iolation of a right, and is not e(ui$alent to Herror)I G !#t %- 4) i*2i,ti%# - Settled is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is conferred only by the %onstitution or by the Statute) - Eurisdiction cannot be im lied from the language of a statute, in the absence of a clear legislati$e intent to that effect) W.!t (!1 +e i(&"ie2 - %( $ !#t %- 4) i*2i,ti%# - to em loy all writs, rocesses and other means essential to maBe its jurisdiction effecti$e) - *ower to do all things which are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the sco e of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, e$en though the court may be called to decide matters which would not be within its cogni'ance as original caused of action) - !t can grant reliefs incidental to the main cause of action) G !#t %- &%/e i#,")2e* i#,i2e#t!" &%/e

As a rule, where a general ower is conferred or duty enjoined, e$ery articular ower necessary for the e#ercise of one or the erformance of the other is also conferred) &he incidental owers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the ower granted) !t cannot e#tend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto) *ower conferred by law u on an administrati$e officer to issue rules and regulations to carry out the ur oses of a statute he is called u on to e#ecute includes the authority to delegate to a subordinate officer the erformance of a articular function, absent any e# ress or im lied ro$ision to the contrary)

G !#t %- &%/e e5,")2e* $ e!te &%/e - the rinci le that the grant of ower includes all incidental owers necessary to maBe the e#ercise thereof effecti$e im lies the e#clusion of those which are greater than that conferred) W.!t i* i(&"ie2 *.%)"2 #%t +e !$!i#*t t.e "!/. - The statutory grant of ower does not include such incidental ower which cannot be e#ercised without $iolating the %onstitution, the statute conferring the ower, or other laws on the same subject) A)t.% it1 t% ,.! $e !$!i#*t &)+"i, -)#2* (!1 #%t +e i(&"ie2 - 7nless a statute e# ressly so authori'es, no claim against ublic funds may be allowed) Accordingly, a statute may not be so construed as to authori'e, by im lication, a charge against ublic funds) I""e$!"it1 %- !,t i(&"ie2 - %( & %.i+iti%# - Where a statute rohibits the doing of an act, the act done in $iolation thereof is by im lication null and $oid) - &he rohibited act cannot ser$e as a foundation of a cause of action for relief) - ,x dolo malo non oritur( no man can be allowed to found a claim u on his own wrongdoing or ine(uity

20

3ullus commodum capere potest de in.uria sua propria( no man should be allowed to taBe ad$antage of his own wrong) !t is o ularly Bnown by the ma#im" 'n pari delicto potior est condition defendentis

articular ro$ision alone, must be made to determine the real intent of the law) St!t)t% 1 De-i#iti%# - &he legislati$e definition controls the meaning of a statutory word, irres ecti$e of any other meaning the word or hrase may ha$e in its ordinary or usual sense) - 9or the legislature, in ado ting a s ecific definition is deemed to ha$e restricted the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition) - When the legislature defines a word, it does not usur the courtCs function to inter ret the laws but it merely legislates what should form art of the law itself) - While the definition of terms in a statute must be gi$en all the weight due to them in the construction of the ro$ision in which they are used, the terms or hrases being art and arcel of the whole statute must be gi$en effect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and integrated unit, not as a mass of heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences) 3)!"i-i,!ti%# %- )"e - &he statutory definition of a word or term Has used in this ActI is controlling only in so far as said act is concerned) - &he general rule that the statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words does not a ly where its a lication creates ob$ious incongruities in the language of the statute, destroys one of its major ur oses, or becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis) - 8owe$er, in a subse(uent case, it was held that of a statute remains unchanged, it must be inter reted according to its clear, original mandate until the legislature amends it) W% 2* ,%#*t )e2 i# t.ei % 2i#! 1 *e#*e - !n construing words and hrases, the general rule is that in the absence of legislati$e intent to the contrary, they

E5,e&ti%#* t% t.e )"e - the rinci le of pari delicto recogni'es certain e#ce tions) - !t will not a ly when its enforcement or a lication will $iolate an a$owed fundamental olicy or ublic interest) - Another e#em tion is that when the transaction is not illegal er se but merely rohibited and the rohibition by law is designed for the rotection of one arty, the court may grant relief in fa$or of the latter) W.!t ,!##%t +e 2%#e 2i e,t"1 ,!##%t +e 2%#e i#2i e,t"1 - 4uando ali#uid prohibetur ex directo, prohibeturet per obli#uum - What the law rohibits cannot, in some other way, be legally accom lished) T.e e *.%)"2 +e #% &e#!"t1 -% ,%(&"i!#,e %- "!/. 9or sim le logic, fairness and reason cannot countenance an e#action or a enalty for an act faithfully done in com liance with the law

CHAPTER 7: INTERPRETATION WORDS AND PHRASES

OF

Ge#e !""1 - A word or hrase used in a statute may ha$e an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trade meaning) - Which meaning should be gi$en de ends u on what the legislature intended) As a general rule in inter reting the meaning and sco e of a term used in the law, a careful re$iew of the whole law in$ol$ed, as well as the intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated art or a

21

should be gi$en their lain, ordinary, and common usage meaning) 9or words are resumed to ha$e been em loyed by the lawmaBer in their ordinary and common use and acce tation) &he grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute must be resumed to yield its correct sense) 0bi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus

meanings which are generally acce ted in the community in which they ha$e been in common use) Settled is the rule that in the absence of legislati$e intent to the contrary, trade or commercial terms, when used in a statute are resumed to ha$e been used in their trade or commercial sense)

Ge#e !" W% 2* ,%#*t )e2 $e#e !""1 - Generalia erba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally s oBen shall be generally understood or general words shall be understood in a general sense) - Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in a general sense) - Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted and general meaning, the general must re$ail o$er the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or the conte#t in which it is em loyed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended) - A general word should not be gi$en a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated) Ge#e i, te ( i#,")2e* t.i#$* t.!t ! i*e t.e e!-te rogressi$e inter retation" e#tends by construction the a lication of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general ur ose or sco e that come into e#istence subse(uent to its assage and thus Bee s legislation from becoming e hemeral and transitory unless there is a legislati$e intent to the contrary) - !t is a rule of statutory construction that legislati$e enactments in general and com rehensi$e terms, ros ecti$e in o eration, a ly aliBe to all ersons, subjects and business within their general ur$iew and sco e coming into e#istence subse(uent to their assage) W% 2* /it. ,%((e ,i!" % t !2e (e!#i#$ - Words and *hrases, which are in common use among merchants and traders, ac(uire trade or commercial

W% 2* /it. te,.#i,!" % "e$!" (e!#i#$ - As a general rule, words that ha$e or ha$e been used in, a technical sense or those that ha$e been judicially construed to ha$e a certain meaning should be inter reted according to the sense in which they ha$e been re$iously used, although the sense may $ary from the strict or literal meaning of the words) - &he technical or legal, not the ordinary or general meaning of a word used in a statute should be ado ted in the construction of the statute, in the absence of nay (ualification or intention to the contrary) H%/ i2e#ti,!" te (* i# *!(e *t!t)te ,%#*t )e2 - &he general rule is that a word or hrase re eatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute) - &he same word or substantially the same hrase a earing in different arts of a statute will be accorded a generally acce ted and consistent meaning, unless a different intention a ears or is clearly e# ressed) - &he reason for the rule is that a word used in a statute in a gi$en sense is resumed to be used in the same sense throughout the law) - !t is articularly a licable where in the statute the words a ear so near each other hysically and articularly where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in the statute) Me!#i#$ %- /% 2 6)!"i-ie2 +1 &) &%*e %- *t!t)te - &he meaning of a words or hrase used in a statute may be (ualified by the ur ose which induced the legislature to enact the statute)

22

!n construing a word or hrase, the court should ado t that inter retation that accords best with the manifest ur ose of the statute or romotes or reali'es its object) !t is generally recogni'ed that if a statute is ambiguous and ca able of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the word or hrase used therein may be rejected if the result of ado ting such meaning will be to defeat the ur ose which the legislature had in mind)

W% 2 % &. !*e ,%#*t )e2 i# e"!ti%# t% %t.e & %0i*i%#* - &he general rule is that a word, hrase or ro$ision should not be construed in isolation but must be inter reted in relation to other ro$isions of the law) &his rule is a $ariation of the rule that a statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its ro$isions must be gi$en effect) - A word or ro$ision should not be construed in isolation from, but should be inter reted in relation to, the other ro$isions of a statute or other statutes dealing on the same subject) - &he word or ro$ision should not be gi$en a meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should instead be construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an enacting law) Me!#i#$ %- te ( 2i,t!te2 +1 ,%#te5t - While ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be gi$en its usual and commonly understood meaning, the conte#t in which the word or term is em loyed may dictate a different sense) - &he conte#t in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning) - A word is understood in the conte#t in which it is used) Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam - &he conte#t may liBewise gi$e a broad sense to a word of otherwise ordinarily limited meaning) - &he conte#t may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad signification) W.e e t.e "!/ 2%e* #%t 2i*ti#$)i*.

Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish) 0bi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. &he rule founded on logic, is a corollary of the rinci le that general words and hrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance &he rule re(uires that a general term or hrase should not be reduced into arts and one art distinguished from the other so as to justify its e#clusion from the o eration of the law) A corollary of the rinci le is the rule that where the law does not maBe any e#ce tion, court may not e#ce t something therefrom, unless there is com elling reason a arent in the law to justify it) 0bi lex non distinguit, nec non distinguere debemus, a lies not only in the construction of general words and e# ressions used in a statute but also in the inter retation of a rule laid down therein) &his rinci le assumes that the legislature made no (ualification in the use of a general word or e# ression) &he courts may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or (ualification, for in such a case, the courts merely gi$e effect to the legislati$e intent)

Di*4)#,ti0e !#2 ,%#4)#,ti0e /% 2* - &he word HorI is a disjuncti$e term signifying disassociation and inde endence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated) !t should be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily im lies, as a disjuncti$e word) - &he use of the disjuncti$e word HorI between two hrases connotes that either hrase ser$es as (ualifying hrase) - &he term HorI has sometimes been held to mean HandI, when the s irit or conte#t of the law so warrants) - &he word HorI may also be used as the e(ui$alent of Hthat is to sayI gi$ing that which it receded it the same significance as that which follows it) !t is not always

23

disjuncti$e and is sometimes inter retati$e or e# ository of the receding word) &he word HorI may also mean successi$ely) &he word HandI is a conjunction ertinently defined as meaning Htogether withI, Hjoined withI, Halong or together withI, Hadded to or linBed toI, used to conjoin word with word, hrase with hrase, clause with clause) &he word HandI does not mean HorIF it is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union, Hbinding togetherI, Hrelating the one to the otherI) 8owe$er, HandI may mean HorI as an e#ce tion to the rule) &he e#ce tion is resorted to only when a literal inter retation would er$ert the lain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the conte#t of the statute or from e#ternal factors)

Noscitur a sociis - Where a articular word or hrase is ambiguous in itself or is e(ually susce tible of $arious meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and s ecific by considering the com any of words in which it is found or with which it is associated) - Where the law does not define a word used therein, it will be construed as ha$ing a meaning similar to that of words associated with or accom anied by it) - A word, hrase should be inter reted in relation to, or gi$en the same meaning of, words with which it is associated) - Where most of the words in an enumeration of words in a statute are used in their generic and ordinary sense, the rest of the words should similarly be construed) - Where a word with more than one meaning is associated with words ha$ing s ecific or articular signification, the former should be gi$en a s ecific or articular signification) Ejusdem generic - While general words or e# ressions in a statute are, as a rule, accorded their full, natural, and generic sense, they will not be gi$en such meaning if they are used in association with s ecific words or hrases)

General rule is that where a general word or hrase follows an enumeration of articular and s ecific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or hrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, ersons, things, or cases aBin to, resembling, or of the same Bind or class as those s ecifically mentioned) Where a statute describes things of articular class or Bind accom anied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a Bindred nature with those articularly enumerated, unless there be something in the conte#t of the statute to re el such inference) *ur ose" gi$e effect to both the articular and general words, by treating the articular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not s ecifically named by articular words) &his rinci le is based on the ro osition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not ha$e enumerated the s ecific words) A lication" where s ecific and generic terms of the same nature are em loyed in the same act, the latter following the former)

Li(it!ti%#* %- Ejusdem generic - &o be a licable, the following must concur" o Statute contains an enumeration of articular and s ecific words, followed by a general word or hrase) o &he articular and s ecific words constitute a class or are of the same Bind o Enumeration of the articular and s ecific words is not e#hausti$e or is not merely by e#am les o No indication of legislati$e intent to gi$e the general words or hrases a broader meaning - &he rule of e.usdem generic does not re(uire the rejection of general terms entirely)

24

&he rule is not of uni$ersal a lication, it should be used to carry out, not to defeat, the intent or ur ose of the law) !f that intent clearly a ears from other arts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which will be reached by a lying the rule of e.usdem generic, the rule must gi$e way in fa$or of the legislati$e intent)

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - E# ress mention of one erson, thing or conse(uence im lies the e#clusion of all others) - !t is formulated in a number of ways" o 6ne $ariation of the rules is the rinci le that what is e# ressed uts an end to that which is im lied ,xpressum facit cessare tacitum o General e# ression followed by e#ce tions therefrom im lies that those which do not fall under the e#ce tions come within the sco e of the general e# ression) ,xceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis o E# ression of one or more things of a class im lies the e#clusion of all not e# ressed, e$en though all would ha$e been im lies had none been e# ressed) - &he rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its $ariations are canons of restricti$e inter retation) - +asis" legislature would not ha$e made s ecified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those e# ressly mentioned) &hey are o osite the doctrine of necessary im lication) Ne$!ti0e'%&&%*ite 2%,t i#e - &he rinci le that what is e# ressed uts an end to that which is im lied is also Bnown as negati$e. ositi$e doctrine or argumentum a contrario. A&&"i,!ti%# %- expressio unius )"e

&he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its corollary canons are generally used in the construction of statutes granting owers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and im osing enalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed) Where a statute directs the erformance of certain acts by a articular erson or class or ersons, it im lies that it shall not be done otherwise or be a different erson or class of ersons) !f a statute enumerates the things u on which it is to o erate, e$erything else must necessarily, and by im lication, be e#cluded)

Li(it!ti%#* %- )"e - &he rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law) !t is a mere tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the legislati$e intent) - &he rule, not being infle#ible nor a mechanical or technical tool, must yield to what is clearly a legislati$e intent) - !t is no more than an au#iliary rule of inter retation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be e#clusi$e) - !t should a lied only as a means of disco$ering legislati$e intent and should not be ermitted to defeat the lainly indicated ur ose of the legislature) - !t will not a ly where the enumeration is by way of e#am le or to remo$e doubts only) - !t will not a ly in case a statute a ears u on its face to limit the o eration of its ro$isions to articular ersons or things by enumerating them, but no reason e#ists why other ersons or things not so enumerated should not ha$e been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them) - &he rule may be disregarded of it will result to incongruities or a $iolation of the e(ual rotection clause of the constitution, incon$enience, hardshi and injury to the ublic interest) - Where the legislati$e intent shows that the enumeration is not e#clusi$e, the ma#im does not a ly)

25

D%,t i#e %- casus omissus - &he rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that a erson, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to ha$e been omitted intentionally) - *rinci le roceeds from a reasonable certainty that a articular erson, object or thing has been omitted from a legislati$e enumeration - &he rule does not a ly where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to e#clude the erson, thing, object from the enumeration) !f such legislati$e intent is clearly indicated, the court may su ly the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do $iolence to its language) D%,t i#e %- "!*t !#te,e2e#t - 3ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or hrases to which they are immediately associated) &hey do not (ualify words or hrases which are distantly or remotely located) - !n the absence of legislati$e intent to the contrary, referential and (ualifying words and hrases must be a lied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or receding words or association of words) - &he ma#im e# ressi$e of this rule is proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia, or relati$e words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the conte#t otherwise re(uires) - &he use of comma to se arate an antecedent from the rest e#erts a dominant influence in the a lication of the doctrine of last antecedent) 3)!"i-i,!ti%# %- t.e 2%,t i#e - 5octrine of last antecedent is subject to the e#ce tion that where the intention of the law is to a ly the hrase to all antecedents embraced in the ro$ision, the same should be made e#tensi$e to the whole) - Slight indication of legislati$e intent so to e#tend the relati$e term is sufficient) Nor does the doctrine a ly

where the intention is not to (ualify the antecedent at all) Reddendo singular singulis - &he $ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent is the rule of reddendo singular singulis) &he ma#im means referring each to eachF referring each hrase or e# ression to its a ro riate object, or let each be ut in its ro er lace, that is, the words should be taBen distributi$ely) - &eddendo singular singulis re(uires that the antecedents and conse(uences should be read distributi$ely to the effect that each word is to be a lied to the subject to which it a ears by conte#t most a ro riately related and to which it is most a licable) P %0i*%*, $e#e !""1 - &he office of a ro$iso is either to limit the a lication of the enacting clause, section, or ro$ision of a statute, or to e#ce t something therefrom, or to (ualify or restrain its generality , or to e#clude some ossible ground of misinter retation of it, as e#tending to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its ur$iew) - !ts rimary ur ose is to limit or restrict the general language or o eration of the statute, not to enlarge it) - A ro$iso is commonly found at the end of a section, or ro$ision of a statute and is introduced, as a rule by the word H*ro$idedI - What determines whether a clause is a ro$iso is its substance rather than its form) !f it erforms any of the functions of a ro$iso, then it will be regarded as such, irres ecti$e of what word or hase is used to introduce it) !t is a (uestion of legislati$e intent) P %0i*% (!1 e#"! $e *,%&e %- "!/ - It has been held that He$en though the rimary ur ose of the ro$iso is to limit or restrain the general language of a statute, the legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical correctnessF conse(uently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the

26

court to ascertain the legislati$e intention, through resort to the usual rules of construction a licable to statutes generally and gi$e it effect e$en though the statute is thereby enlarged, or the ro$ision made to assume the force of inde endent enactment and although a ro$iso as such has no e#istence a art from which it is designed to limit or (ualify) A ro$iso may thus enlarge, instead of restrict or limit, what otherwise is a hrase of limited im ort has there been no ro$iso (ualifying it)

P %0i*% !* !22iti%#!" "e$i*"!ti%# - A ro$iso may also assume the role of an additional legislation) - A clear and un(ualified ur ose e# ressed in the o ening statement of a section of a statute com rising se$eral subdi$isions has been construed as controlling and limiting a ro$iso attached to one of the subdi$isions, where the ro$iso, if segregated therefrom, would mean e#actly the re$erse of what it necessarily im lied when read in connection with the limitation) W.!t & %0i*% 6)!"i-ie* - The general rule is that the office of the ro$iso (ualifies or modifies only the hrase immediately receding it or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows) - It should be confined to that which directly recedes it, or to the section to which it has been a ended, unless it clearly a ears that the legislature intended it to ha$e a wider sco e) E5,e&ti%# t% t.e )"e - Where the legislati$e intent is to restrain or (ualify not only the hrase immediately receding it but also earlier ro$isions of the statute or e$en the statute itself as a whole, then the ro$iso will be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out)

Re&)$#!#,e +et/ee# & %0i*% !#2 (!i# & %0i*i%# - A ro$iso should be so construed as to harmoni'e and not to re eal or destroy, the main ro$ision of the statute) - When there is an irreconcilable conflict or re ugnancy between a ro$iso and the main ro$ision of a statute, that which is a located in a later ortion of the statute re$ails, unless there is a legislati$e intent to the contrary or such construction will destroy the whole statute itself) - &he latter ro$ision, whether a ro$iso or not, is gi$en reference because it is the latest e# ression of the intent of the legislation) E5,e&ti%#* $e#e !""1 An e#ce tion consists of that which would otherwise be included in the ro$ision from which it is e#ce ted) An e#ce tion will be construed as such if it remo$es something from the o eration of a ro$ision of law) !t is often said that an e#ce tion confirms the general rule) !t should not be construed to (ualify the words or hrases constituting the general rule) !t is well settled that the e# ress mention of e#ce tions o erates to e#clude other e#ce tions and con$ersely, those which are not within the enumerated e#ce tions are deemed included in the general rule) E#ce tions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed)

E5,e&ti%# !#2 & %0i*% 2i*ti#$)i*.e2 - an e#ce tion differs from a ro$iso) An e#ce tion e#em ts something absolute from the o eration of a statute, by e# ress words in the enacting clause) - A ro$iso defeats its o eration conditionally) - A ro$iso a$oids them by way of defeasance or e#cuse) An e#ce tion is generally a art of the enactment itself, absolutely e#cluding from its o eration some subject or thing that otherwise would fall within its sco e) - +ut when the enactment is modified by engrafting u on it a new ro$ision by way of amendment, ro$iding

27

conditionally for a new case, it is in the nature of a ro$iso) 6ne of the functions of a ro$iso is to e#ce t something from an enacting clause) !n this sense, an e#ce tion and a ro$iso are similar)

e$ery other art and e$ery word and hrase in connection with its conte#t) Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. &he best inter reter of a statute is the statue itself) =);2 *ur ose or conte#t as controlling guide A statute must always be construed as a whole, and the articular meaning to be attached to any word or hrase is usually to be ascertained from the conte#t, the nature of the subject treated and the ur ose or intention of the body which enacted or framed the statute) Statute must recei$e a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling ur ose, to all their ro$isions, force and effect being gi$en not narrowly to isolated and disjoined clauses, but to their s irit, broadly taBing all their ro$isions together in one rational $iew) =);> Gi$ing effect to statute as a whole +ecause a statute is enacted in whole and not in arts or sections, which im lies that one art is as im ortant as the other, the statue should be construed and gi$en effect as a whole) A ro$ision or section which is unclear by itself may be made clear by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute) E$ery art of a statute should be gi$en effect because a statute is enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge odge of conflicting ro$isions) %ourt should ado t a construction that will gi$e effect to e$ery art of a statue, if at all ossible) &his rule is e# ressed in the ma#im ut res magis aleat #uam pereat or the construction is to be sought which gi$es effect to the whole of the statuteOits e$ery word) =);< A arently conflicting ro$isions reconciled &he rule that a statute must be construed and gi$en effect as a whole re(uires that a arently conflicting ro$isions should be reconciled and harmoni'ed, if at all ossible) All the ro$isions, e$en if a arently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and gi$en effect by reconciling time) &he statute must be so construed as to re$ent a conflict between arts of it) 9or it is only by so construing a statute that the statute will be gi$en effect as a whole) =);= S ecial and general ro$isions in same statute

S!0i#$ ,"!)*e - !t is a clause in a ro$ision of law which o erates to e#ce t from the effect of the law what the clause ro$ides or to sa$e something which would otherwise be lost) - !t is used to e#ce t or sa$e something from the effect of a re eal of a statute) - !t should be construed in the light of the intent or ur ose of the legislature /the rinci al consideration being to effectuate such intent or carry out such ur ose0) - !t should be gi$en a strict or liberal construction de ending u on the Bind of inter retation that should, considering its nature, be gi$en to the statute as a whole)

CHAPTER 8: STATUTE CONSTREUD AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

=);- Generally A statute is assed as a while and not in arts or sections and is animated by one general ur ose and intent) %onse(uently, each art or section should be construed in connection with e$ery other art and section so as to roduce a harmonious whole) Whole and e$ery art of statute should be construed together) =);1 !ntent ascertained from statue as whole &he intent or meaning of a statue should be ascertained from the statute taBen as a whole and not from an isolated art or ro$ision thereof) &he legislati$e meaning is to be e#tracted form the statue as a whole) !ts clauses are not to be segrated, but e$ery art of a statute is to be construed with reference to

28

When there is a articular or s ecial ro$ision and a general ro$ision in the same statue and the latter in its most com rehensi$e sense would o$errule the former, the articular or s ecial ro$ision must be o erati$e and the general ro$ision must be taBen to affect only the other arts of the statute to which it may ro erly a ly) &he articular or s ecial ro$ision is construed as an e#ce tion to the general ro$ision) =);? %onstruction as not to render ro$ision nugatory &he whole state should, if ossible, be gi$en effect is that a ro$ision of a statute should be so construed as not to nullify or render nugatory another ro$ision of the same statute) 'nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis aleat #uam pereat, which means that a law should be inter reted with a $iew to u holding rather than destroying it) A construction that would render a ro$ision ino erati$e or ineffecti$e should be a$oided) =);@ Reason for the rule &he construction that re(uires that a arently conflicting ro$isions of a statute be reconciled and harmoni'ed, if at all ossible and that a ro$ision should be so construed as not to nullify another, is based on the resum tion that the legislature has enacted a statute whose ro$isions are in harmony and consistent with each other and that conflicting intentions in the same statue are ne$er su osed or regarded) =);: Dualification of rule 6ne art of a statute cannot be reconciled or harmoni'ed with another art without nullifying one in fa$or of the other, the court should, in construing the statue, choose one which will best effectuate the legislati$e intent) Rule" where absolute harmony between arts of a statue is demonstrably not ossible, the court must reject that one which is least in accord with the general lan of the whole statue) 8owe$er, if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious ro$isions or sections, the latter ro$ision or section, beign the last e# ression of the legislati$e will, must, in construction, $acate the former to the e#tent of the re ugnancy)

=)-; %onstruction as to gi$e life to law Law must recei$e sensible inter retation to romote the ends for which they are enacted) &hey should be gi$en reasonable and ractical construction as will gi$e life to them, if it can be done without doing $iolence to reason) %on$ersely, a law should not be construed as to allow the doing of an act which is rohibited by law, nor so inter reted as to afford an o ortunity to defeat com liance in terms, create an inconsistency, or contra$ene the lain words of the law) 'nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis aleat #uam pereat or that inter retation that will gi$e the thing efficacy is to be ado ted) &he court should start with the assum tion that the legislature did not do a $ain thin gin the enactment of the statute) !t is to be resumed that the law is com lete by itself) 0t res magis aleat #uam pereat, that the courts should, if reasonably ossible to do so without $iolence to the s irit and language of an act, so inter ret a statute as to gi$e it efficient o eration and effect as a whole) =)-- %onstruction to a$oid sur lusage &he rule that a statue should be gi$en effect as a whole re(uires that the state be so construed as to maBe no art of ro$ision thereof sur lusage) A legal ro$ision must not be so construed as to be a useless sur lusage, and accordingly, meaningless in the sens of adding nothing to the law or ha$ing no effect whatsoe$er therein) Nor should a word be so construed as to render other words or hrases associated with it ser$es no ur ose) 9or the legislature, in enacting a law, is resumed to ha$e used the word or hrase for a ur ose) !n short, the legislature, in enacting a statute, is su osed not to insert a ro$ision which is unnecessary and a sur lusage) =)-2 Statute and its amendments construed together All arts of a statute are to be harmoni'ed and reconciled so that effect may be gi$en to each and e$ery art thereof a lies to the construction of a statute and its amendments) Amendments should be gi$en effect) !t is to be resumed that the changes ha$e some ur ose, which should be ascertained and gi$en effect)

29

B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES =)-> Statute construed in harmony with the %onstitution As the %onstitution is the fundamental law to which all laws are subser$ient, a statute should not be inter reted inde endently of the %onstitution) &he statute should be construed in harmony with and not in $iolation of the fundamental law) !t is resumed that the legislature in enacting a law, ha$e adhered to the constitutional limitations) A statute should be construed whene$er ossible in a manner that will a$oid conflict with the %onstitution) !t should not be construed in such a way as will gi$e rise to a constitutional doubt) Nor should it be inter reted in such a manner as will render its a lication $iolati$e of a constitutional inhibition) !t should be inter reted in consonance, rather than re ugnant to, any constitutional command or rescri tion) Where a statute is reasonable susce tible of two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that construction in fa$or of its constitutionality shall be ado ted and the construction that will render it in$alid rejected) E$ery intendment of law should lean towards its $alidity and the court should fa$or that construction which gi$es it the greater chance of sur$i$ing the test of constitutionality) !f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words or ro$isions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susce tible of two or more constructions, that inter retation will be ado ted which will a$oid the effect of unconstitutionality, e$en though it may be necessary, for this ur ose, to disregard the more usual or a arent im ort of the language em loyed) 8owe$er, the court cannot, in order to bring a statute within the fundamental law, amend it by construction) =)-< Statutes in ari materia Statutes are in ari material when they relate to the same erson or thing, or ha$e the same ur ose or object, or co$er the same s ecific or articular subject matter) &he later statute may s ecifically refer to the rior statutes) &he fact that no reference is made to the rior law does not mean that the two laws are not in ari materia) !t is sufficient, in order that

they may be considered in ari materia, that the two or more statute relate to the same s ecific subject matter) &wo laws are not in ari materia if they refer to different s ecific matters, although they both fall under the same broad subject) =)-= 8ow statutes in ari materia construed A statute should be construed as to harmoni'e with other laws on the same subject matter as to form a com lete, coherent and intelligible system) 'nterpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or e$ery statute must be so construed and harmoni'ed with other statutes as to form a uniform system of juris rudence) Statutes in ari materia should be construed together to attain the ur ose of an e# ress national olicy) 9or the assum tion is that whene$er the legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the re$ious statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any e# ress re eal or amendment, the new statute is deemed enacted in accord with the legislati$e olicy embodied in the rior statutes and they should be construed together) *ro$isons in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be a lied in a roceeding under the other act when not inconsistent with its ur ose) *rior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be com ared with the new ro$isions, and if ossible by reasonable construction, both are to be construed that effect is gi$en to e$ery ro$ision of such) Statutes in ari materia, although in a arent conflict, are so far as reasonably ossible construed to be in harmony with each other) 'nterpretare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus, which means that the best method of inter retation is that which maBes laws consistent with other laws) When two or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at different times and under dissimilar circumstances or conditions, their inter retation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions eculiar to each, in order that the statutes may be harmoni'ed or better understood) Rule based on" distingue tempora et concordabis .ura, or distinguish times and you will harmoni'e laws) A statute will not, howe$er, be construed as re ealing rior act on the same subject in the absence of words to that

30

effect, unless there is an irreconcilable re ugnancy between them or unless the new law is e$idently intended to su ersede all rior acts on the matter and to com rise itself the sole and com lete system of legislation on the subject) =)-? Reasons why laws on same subject are reconciled !n enacting a statute, the legislature is resumed to ha$e been aware of, and ha$e taBen into account, rior laws on the subject of legislation) !t cannot be said that they intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject, or to lea$e in force ro$isions of a rior law which may thwart and o$erthrow the will of the legislature) =)-@ Where harmoni'ation is im ossible !f two or more laws on the same subject cannot ossibly be reconciled or harmoni'ed, one has to gi$e way in fa$or of the other) &here cannot be two conflicting laws on the same subject) &he earlier one must yield to the later one, it being the later e# ression of the legislati$e will) =)-: !llustration of the rule =)1; General and s ecial statutes A general statute is a statute which a lies to all of the eo le of the state or to all of a articular class of ersons in the state with e(ual force) !t is one which embraces of a class of subject or laces and does not omit any subject or lace naturally belonging to such class) A s ecial statute is one which relates to articular ersons or things of a class or to a articular ortion or section of the state only) A general law and s ecial law on the same subject are statutes in ari material and should, accordingly be read together and harmoni'ed, if ossible, with a $iew to gi$ing effect to both) Rule" where there are two acts, one of which is s ecial and articular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the s ecial act, the s ecial must re$ail since it e$inces the legislati$e intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must be taBen as intended to constitute an e#ce tion to the general act) &he circumstance that the s ecial law is assed before or after the general act does not change the rinci le) Where

the s ecial law is later, it will be regarded as an e#ce tion to or (ualification of, the rior general actF and where the general act is later, the s ecial statute will be construed as remaining an e#ce tion to its terms, unless re ealed e# ressly or by necessary im lication) Where two statutes are of e(ual theoretical a lication to a articular case, the one designed therefore s ecially should re$ail) =)1- Reason for the rule Reason" /s ecial as e#ce tion to the general0 the legislature in assing a law of s ecial character has its attention directed to the s ecial facts and circumstance which the s ecial facts and circumstances which the s ecial act is intended to meet) =)11 Dualifications of the rule &he rule is not absolute) 6ne e#ce tion is that where the legislature clearly intended the later general enactment to co$er the whole subject and to re eal all rior laws inconsistent therewith, the general law re$ails o$er a s ecial law on the subject) !n such case, there is a re eal of the s ecial law) Another e#ce tion" where the s ecial law merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a s ecific and s ecial rule, in which case the general law re$ails o$er the s ecial law) &he rule does not a ly where the situation is re$ersed, that is, the general law treats the subject in articular and the s ecial law refers to it in general) !n this situation, the general law re$ails o$er the s ecial law in the e$ent of re ugnancy or conflict between the two laws) =)12 Reference statutes A reference statute is a statute which refers to other statutes and maBes them a licable to the subject of legislation) !t is incor oration in a statute of another statute by reference) !t is used to a$oid encumbering the statute booBs of unnecessary re etition, and they ha$e been recogni'ed as an a ro$ed method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions)

31

&he ado tion by reference of a statute that was re$iously re ealed re$i$es the statute) &he ado tion taBes the ado ted statute as it e#ists at the tie of ado tion and does not include the subse(uent changes or modification of the statute so taBen, unless it does so e# ressly) A reference statute should be so construed as to harmoni'e with, and to gi$e effect to, the ado ted statute) =)1> Su lemental statutes A su lemental act is one intended to su ly deficiencies in an e#isting statute and to add, to com lete, or e#tend the statute without changing or modifying its original te#t) &he original statute and the su lemental act should be read and construed together to maBe an intelligible whole) =)1< Reenacted statutes A statute which reenacts a re$ious statute or the ro$isions thereof is Bnown as reenacted statute) A reenactment is one in which the ro$isions of an earlier statute are re roduced in the same or substantially the same words) &he reenactment may also be made by reference) &hus, where a statute ro$ides that all laws not inconsistent with the ro$isions thereof are deemed incor orated and made integral arts thereof by reference, such re$ious laws on the same subject matter are deemed enacted) &he reenactment is a legislati$e e# ression of intention to ado t the construction as well as the language of the rior act) Rule" when a statute or a ro$ision thereof has been construed by the court of last resort and the same is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as ado ting such construction, and the construction which the ado ted statute re$iously recei$ed) &he rule is that two statute with a arallel sco e, ur ose and terminology should, each in its own field, ha$e a liBe inter retation, unless in articular instances there is something eculiar in the (uestion under the consideration, or dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, re(uiring a different conclusion) =)1= Ado tion of contem oraneous construction

&he reenactment of a statute which has recei$ed a ractical or contem oraneous construction by those charged with the duty of e#ecuting it is a ersuasi$e indication of the ado tion by the legislature of the rior ractical or e#ecuti$e construction, the legislature being resumed to Bnow the e#istence of such construction when it made the reenactment) =)1? Dualification of the rule the rule that when a judicial or contem oraneous construction has been gi$en to a statute, the reenactment of the statute is generally held to be in effect a legislati$e ado tion of the construction, a lies only when the statute is ca able of the construction gi$en to it and when the construction has become a settled rule of conduct) =)1@ Ado ted statutes An ado ted statute is statute atterned after, or co ied from a statute of a foreign country) !n construing it, the court should taBe into consideration the construction of the law by the courts of the country from which it is taBen, as well as the law itself and the ractices under it, for the legislature is resumed to ha$e ado ted such construction and ractices with the ado tion of the law) &he resum tion does not, howe$er, a ly to construction gi$en the statute subse(uent to its ado tion, although it had ersuasi$e effect on the inter retation of the ado ted statute)

C.!&te 9: STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

A) !N GENERAL ?)-) Generally" Whether a statute is to be gi$en a strict or liberal construction will be de end u on the nature of the statute, the ur ose to be subser$ed and the mischief to be remedied, and a strict or liberal inter retation will be gi$en a statute that will best accom lish the end desired and effectuate legislati$e intent)

32

?)1) Strict construction, generally Strict construction is that construction according to the letter of a statute, which recogni'es nothing that is not e# ressed, taBes the language used in its e#act meaning, and admits no e(uitable consideration) !t does not mean gi$ing a statute its narrowest meaning of which it is susce tible) Nor does it mean that words shall be so restricted as not to ha$e their full meaning) Sco e of statute shall not be e#tended or enlarged by im lication, intendment, or e(uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of its terms) ?)2) Liberal construction, defined) Liberal constructions means such e(uitable construction as will enlarge of a statute to accom lish its intended ur ose, carry out its intent, or romote justice) !t does not mean enlargement of a ro$ision which is clear, unambiguous and free from doubt, for a statute which is lain and clear is not subject to construction) Liberal construction is that construction which e# ands the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are clearly within the s irit or reason thereof or within the e$il which the statute was designed to remedy, or which gi$e the statute its generally acce ted meaning to the end that the most com rehensi$e a lication thereof maybe accorded, without being inconsistent with its language or doing $iolence to any of its terms) Liberal construction means that the words should recei$e a fair and reasonable inter retation, so as to attain the intent, s irit and ur ose of the law) ?)>) Liberal construction a lied, generally) &he literal meaning of the words used may be rejected if the result of ado ting said meaning would be to defeat ur ose of the law) Liberal inter retation so as to sa$e the statute from obliteration, ut res magis aleat #uam pereat) %onstruction by this nature and the act of the court in engrafting u on a law something which its belie$es ought to ha$e been embraced therein) &he former is liberal construction and is a legitimate e#ercise of judicial ower) &he latter is judicial

legislation forbidden by the tri artite di$ision of owers among the three de artments of go$ernment, the e#ecuti$e, the legislati$e and the judicial) A statute may not be liberally construed to read into it something which its clear and lain language rejects) ?)<) %onstruction to romote social justice) H!t /social justice mandate0 is meant for the three de artments" the legislati$e, e#ecuti$e, and judicial, because the latter two are no less than the agencies of the state than the first) Enhance social justice) ?)=) %onstruction taBing into consideration general welfare or growth of ci$ili'ation) Some authorities ad$ocate a construction which seeBs an e# ansi$e a lication of statutes to attain the general welfare) salus populi est suprema lex) Statute enacted for the ublic good are to be construed liberally) "tatuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur) An authority on the subject e# ounds on this ty e of construction" H&here is for me in all cases a rinci le of statutory construction not to be found on the booBs, but which for the *hili ine !slands is all.im ortant) !n the resolution of all (uestions, ! begin with these (ueries" what is for the best interest of the 9ili ino eo leP H&he statute in general has two, articulate organs for lawmaBing ur oses 3 the legislature and the tribunal) 9irst organ maBes new law, the second attests and confirms old law) Statutes must be inter reted in the light of the growth of ci$ili'ation and $arying conditions) ?)?) *enal statutes, generally) *enal statutes refer to those laws by which unishments are im osed for $iolation or transgression of their ro$isions) Acts of the legislature which rohibit certain acts and establish enalties for their $iolationF or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and ro$ide for their unishment) *enal or criminal laws are those which im ose unishment for an offense committed against the state, and which the chief e#ecuti$e has the ower to ardon) A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa$or of the state of une# lained wealth ac(uired by a ublic official while in office is criminal in nature)

33

?)@) *enal statutes strictly construed) *enal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in fa$or of the accused cannot be enlarged or e#tended by intendment, im lication, or any e(uitable consideration) &he language of a enal statutes cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the general ur ose for which the statute was enacted) Resol$ed in fa$or of the erson accused of $iolating the statute) No erson should be brought within the terms of a statute who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be ronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute) &he rule that enal statutes are strictly construed does not mean that e$ery enal law must be so narrowly construed as to defeat the law itselfF it merely means that they are not to be construed so strictly as to nullify or destroy the ob$ious ur ose of the legislature) +e construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time reser$e the ob$ious intention of the legislature) !t will endea$or to effect substantial justice) %areful scrutiny safeguard the rights of the accused) &wo reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which o erates in fa$or of a arty accused under its ro$ision is to be referred) &he rinci le is that acts in and of themsel$es innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and une(ui$ocal e# ression of the legislati$e intent to maBe them such) ?):) Reason why enal statutes are strictly construed) Law is tender in fa$or of the rights of an indi$idualF the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which manBind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited) &he ur ose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty erson to esca e unishment through a technicality but to ro$ide a recise definition of forbidden acts)

criminal without regard to the intent of the doer, unless there is a clear legislati$e intent to the contraryF e$il intent must combine with an act) )ctus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, the act itself does not maBe a man guilty unless his intention were so) )ctus me in ito factus non est meus actus, an act done by me against my will is not my act) Mala in se, criminal intent, a art from the act itself, is re(uired but in those which are mala prohibita the only in(uiry is, has the law been $iolated) ?)-1 Limitation of the rule) &he rule that enal statutes are gi$en a strict construction is not the only factor in the inter retation of the criminal lawsF merely ser$es as an additional factor to be considered as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of enal laws) A strict construction should not be ermitted to defeat the intent, olicy, and ur ose of the statute) &he court should consider the s irit and reason of a statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear ur ose of the law, for strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction as to de ri$e it of the meaning intended) %a able of two inter retations, one which will o erate to e#em t an accused from liability for $iolation thereof and another which will gi$e effect to the manifest intent of the statute and romote its object, the latter the inter retation should be ado tedF they are not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the ob$ious ur ose of the legislature) ?)-2 Statutes in derogation of rights) *eo le in re ublican state enjoy certain rights, which are either inherent or guaranteed by the constitution or rotected by lawF rights are not absolute, and the state, in the e#ercise of its olice ower, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting their enjoyment) As these statutes are in derogation of common or general rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their sco e or ur ose)F two reasonably ossible constructions, one which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of the eo le and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction

7.10. Acts mala in se and mala prohibita)

General rule is that a enal statute will not be construed to maBe the commission of certain rohibited acts

34

must be ado ted so as to allow full enjoyment of such fundamental right) ?)-> Statutes authori'ing e# ro riations) &he ower of eminent domain is essentially legislati$e in nature) &he legislature may not, howe$er, by itself, e#ercise such ower by enacting a law directly e# ro riating a articular land and fi#ing the amount of just com ensation thereof) !t may delegate the ower, by law, subject to hearing as to just com ensation to the resident, local go$ernment units, or a ublic utility com any)F strictly construed against the e# ro riating authority and liberally in fa$or of ro erty ownersF He#ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether by the state or by its authori'ed agents, is necessarily in derogation of ri$ate rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construedF right to freehold inhabitants) ?)-< Statutes granting ri$ileges) Statutes granting ad$antages to ri$ate ersons or entities ha$e in many instance created s ecial ri$ileges or mono olies for the rantees and ha$e thus been $iewed with sus icion and strictly construedF ublic ad$antage is gained by the grant, it narrowly a ears to be secondary significance com ared with the ad$antage gained by the grantee) Strict construction re(uires that those who in$oBe a s ecial ri$ilege granted by the statute must com ly strictly with its ro$isions) 5ri ilegia recipient largam interpretationem oluntati consonam concedentis, or ri$ileges are to be inter reted in accordance with the will of him who grants them) ?)-= Legislati$e grants to local go$ernment units) Legislati$e grants in fa$or of local go$ernment units are grants of a ublic nature, and hence, should be strictly construed against the grantee)F there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of ublic money or ro erty which results in an unfair ad$antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in fa$or of the ublic) ?)-? Statutory grounds for remo$al of officials)

Statutes relating to sus ension or remo$al of ublic officials are strictly construed) F remo$al is to be confined within the limits rescribed for itF the causes, manner and conditions fi#ed must be ursued with strictnessF where the cause of remo$al is s ecified, the s ecification amounts to a rohibition to remo$e for a different cause, which is a ara hrase of the ma#im expressio unius est exclusion alterius) F remedy of remo$al is drastic one and enal in nature)F where a statute ro$ides that a ublic official may be remo$ed for Hneglect of duty, o ression, corru tion or other forms of maladministration in office,I the hrase Qin officeI should be construed to (ualify the enumerated grounds, in that the grounds must be such as affect the officerCs erformance of his duties as an officer and not such as affect only his character as a ri$ate erson) ?)-@ Naturali'ation laws) Laws on naturali'ation are strictly construed against an a licant for citi'enshi and rigidly followed and enforced) F right of an alien to become a citi'en by naturali'ation is a statutory rather that a natural one, and it does not become $ested until he files a etition and establishes by com etent and satisfactory e$idence that he has all the (ualifications and none of the dis(ualifications s ecified by law) ?)-: Statutes im osing ta#es and custom duties) &he ower to ta# is an incident of so$ereignty and is unlimited in its range, acBnowledging in its $ery nature no limits, so that security against its abuse the is to be found only in the res onsibility of the legislature which im oses the ta# of the constituency who are to ay it) F H ower to ta# in$ol$es the ower to destroy)I F ta# statutes must be construed strictly against the go$ernment and liberally in fa$or of the ta# ayer) F the statute is to be construed strictly against the subjection to ta# liability, and it will not be construed as im osing a ta# unless it does so clearly, e# ressly and unambiguously ) a ta# cannot be im osed without clear and e# ress words for that ur ose) &a# or customs laws may not be e#tended by im lication beyond the clear im ort of their language, nor their o eration enlarged so as to embrace matters not s ecifically ro$ided) F

35

Reason 3 ta#ation is a destructi$e ower which interferes with the ersonal and ro erty rights of the eo le and taBes from them a ortion of their ro erty for the su ort of the go$ernment)F burdens are not to be im osed, nor resumed to be im osed, beyond what the statutes e# ressly and clearly im ort) ?)1; Statutes granting ta# e#em tions) &a#es are what the eo le ay for ci$ili'ed society) F lifeblood of the nation) &he law frowns against e#em tions from ta#ation) Laws granting ta# e#em tions are thus construed strictissmi .uris against the ta# ayer and liberally in fa$or of the ta#ing authority) &a#ation is the rule and e#em tion is thee#ce tion) &he burden of roof rests u on the arty claiming e#em tion to ro$e that it is in fact co$ered by the e#em tion so claimed) Statutes granting ta# e#em tions are construed strictissimi .uris against the ta# ayer and liberally in fa$or of the ta#ing authority) +asis 3 to minimi'e the different treatment and foster im artiality, fairness and e(uality of treatment among ta# ayers) 9or e#em tions from ta#ation are not fa$ored in law, nor are they resumed) &hey must be e# ressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language and not left to mere im lications) He#em tions are ne$er resumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to e#em tion and an alleged grant of e#em tion will be strictly construed and cannot be made out by inference or im lications but must be beyond reasonable doubt) !n other words, since ta#ation is the rule and e#em tion the intention to maBe an e#em tion ought to be e# ressed in clear and unambiguous terms) ?)1Dualification of rule) Not absolute) Where the ro$ision of the law is clear and unambiguous , so that there is no occasion for the court seeBing the legislati$e intent, the law must be taBen as it is, de$oid of judicial addition or subtraction) Law ro$ides no (ualification for the granting of ta# e#em tion, the court is not at liberty to su ly one))F does not a ly in the case of ta# e#em tions in fa$or of the go$ernment itself or its agencies) ?)11 Statutes concerning the so$ereign)

Restricti$e statutes which im ose burdens on the ublic treasury or which diminish rights and interest are strictly construed) 9or this reason, such statutes , no matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the so$ereign, unless the so$ereign is s ecifically mentioned) ?)12 Statutes authori'ing suits against the go$ernment) HState may not be sued without its consent)I 3 reaffirms uni$ersal rule that the so$ereign is e#em t from suit, in the absence of its consent to be sued usually in the form of a statute to that effect, not because of any formal conce tion or absolute theory but on the logical and ractical ground that there can be no legal right de ends) 3ullum tempus occurrit regi) A statute whereby the state gi$es its consent to be sued is strictly construed, and the wai$er of immunity from suit, being in derogation of so$ereignty, will not be lightly inferred) ?)1> Statutes rescribing formalities of will) Statutes rescribing the formalities to be obser$ed in the e#ecution of wills are strictly construed, F a will must be e#ecuted in accordance with the statutory re(uirements, otherwise it is entirely $oid) F a ly the intent of the legislators and not that of the testator, and the latterCs intention is fre(uently defeated by the non.obser$ance of what the statute re(uires) ?)1< E#ce tions and ro$isos) As a rule, e#ce tions should be strictly but reasonably construedF they e#tend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resol$ed in fa$or of the general ro$ision rather than the e#ce tion) &he court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by im lication, and it is a rule that an e# ress e#ce tion e#cludes all others, although it is always ro er in determining the a licability of this rule to in(uire whether, in the articular case, it accords with reason and justice) Similarly, a statute, rule or situation which allows e#ce tions to the re(uirement of warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly construed) A reference is an e#ce tion to the general rule and it is what its name im lies)

36

A ro$iso should be inter reted consistently with the legislati$e intent) &he reason is that the legislati$e ur ose set forth in the general enactment e# resses the legislati$e olicy and only those e# ressly e#em ted by the ro$iso should be freed from the o eration of the statute) %) S&A&7&ES L!+ERALLY %6NS&R7E5 ?)1= General social legislation !m lement the social justice and rotection.to. labor ro$isions of the %onstitution are Bnown as general welfare legislations) &hese statutes are construed liberally) General welfare legislations, the courts will be guided by more than just an in(uiry into the letter of the law as against its s irit and will ultimately resol$e any doubt in fa$or of the ersons whom the law intended to benefit) Labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws and social security laws) 8owe$er, while general welfare legislations are construed liberally in fa$or of those intended to be benefited, this rinci le holds true only when there is doubt or ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and free doubt) WorBingmanCs welfare should be the rimordial and aramount consideration) Article > of the New Labor %ode which states that Qall doubts in the im lementation and inter retation of the ro$isions of the Labor %ode including its im lementing rules and regulations shall be resol$ed in fa$or of labor) +ased on the remise that the statute is ambiguous) ?)1? General welfare clause) &he general welfare clause on the ower of local go$ernment has two branches) 6ne branch attaches itself to the main trunB of munici al authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the owers and duties conferred u on local legislati$e bodies by law) &he second branch is much more inde endent of the s ecific functions enumerated by law) !t authori'es such ordinances as shall seem necessary and ro er to ro$ide for the health and safety, romote the ros erity, im ro$e the morals, eace, good order, comfort, and

con$enience of the local go$ernment unit and the inhabitants thereof, and for the rotection of the ro erty therein) &he general welfare clause should be construed liberally in fa$or of the local go$ernment units) ?)1@ Grant of ower to local go$ernments) Limited self.go$ernment to full autonomy) &he old rule is that munici al cor orations, being mere creatures of the law, ha$e only such owers as are e# ressly granted to them and those which are necessarily im lied or incidental to the e#ercise thereof and that grants of ower to them are to be construed strictly and any doubt should be resol$ed in fa$or of the national go$ernment and against the olitical subdi$ision concerned) &he rule of construction change with the enactment of Re ublic Act No)11=>, otherwise Bnown as the Local Autonomy Act) Section -1 of said Act ro$ides in art that the Qim lied ower of a ro$ince, a city or a munici ality shall be liberally construed in its fa$or) Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the e#istence of the ower should be inter reted in fa$or of the local go$ernment and it shall be resumed to e#ist) &his liberal construction is fortified by the %onstitution) -:?2 %onstitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local go$ernment units) Local Go$ernment %ode 3 Qany ower of a barangay, munici ality, city or ro$ince shall be liberally construed in its fa$or) Shall be resol$ed in fa$or of de$olution of owers and of the lower local go$ernment unit) &a# ordinance or re$enue measure shall be construed strictly against the local go$ernment unit enacting it, and liberally in fa$or of the ta# ayer) Any ta# e#em tion construed strictly against the erson claiming itF Liberally inter reted to gi$e more owers to local go$ernment units in accelerating economic de$elo met and u grading the (uality of life for the eo le in the communityF go$erned by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were $estedF resolution of contro$ersies may be had to the customs and traditions in the lace where the contro$ersies taBe lace) ?)1: Statutes granting ta#ing ower)

37

+efore the -:?2 %onstitution, the rule is that a local go$ernment unit, unliBe the so$ereign state is clothed with no inherent ower of ta#ation) And the ta#ing ower when granted is to be construed strictissimi .uris) Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting that ower must be resol$ed against the local go$ernment unit) !nferences, im lications, and deductions ha$e no lace in the inter retation of the ta#ing ower of a munici al cor oration) +ased on the conce t that local go$ernment, unliBe the so$ereign state, are allocated with no inherent ower to ta#) &he New %onstitution has changed such conce t) &he %onstitution ro$ides that HEach local go$ernment unit shall ha$e the ower to create its own sources of re$enue and to le$y ta#es, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the congress may ro$ide, consistent with the basic olicy of local autonomy) Statutes rescribing limitations of the ta#ing ower of local go$ernment units must be strictly construed against the national go$ernment and liberally in fa$or of the local go$ernment units) ?)2; Statutes rescribing rescri ti$e eriod to collect ta#es) Statutes rescribing the eriod of limitation of action for the collection of ta#es is beneficial both to the go$ernment because ta# officers would be obliged to act rom tly in the maBing of assessment, and to citi'ens because after the la se of the eiod of rescri tion, citi'ens would ha$e a feeling of security against unscru ulous ta# agents who will always find an e#cuse to ins ect the booBs of ta# ayers, not to determine the latterCs real liability, but to taBe ad$antage of e$ery o ortunity to molest eaceful, law.abiding citi'ens) ?)2Statues im osing enalties for non. ayment of ta#) Statues im osing enalties for non. ayment of ta#es within the re(uired eriod are liberally construed in fa$or of the go$ernment and strictly obser$ed and inter reted against the ta# ayer) Strong reasons of ublic olicy su ort this rule) Such laws are intended to hasten ta# ayments or to unish e$asions or neglect of duty in res ect thereto) &hey will not lace u on ta# laws so loose a construction as to ermit e$asions on merely fanciful and

insubstantial distinctions) When ro er, a ta# statute should be construed to a$oid the ossibilities of ta# e$asions) ?)21 Election Laws) Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achie$e their ur ose 3 to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their re resentati$es 3 for the a lication of election laws in$ol$es ublic interest and im oses u on the %ommission on Elections and the courts the im erati$e duty to ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected by the eo le) Elections laws may be di$ided into three arts for ur oses of a lying the rules of statutory construction) &he first art refers to the ro$isions for the conduct of elections which elections officials are re(uired to follow) &he second art co$ers those ro$isions which candidates for office are re(uired to erform) &he third art embraces those rocedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dis ute, the actual winner in the elections) Hrules and regulations for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the elections they are held to be directory only, if that is ossible, es ecially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent $oters will be de ri$ed of their $otes, without any fault on their art) Generally, Hthe ro$isions of a statute as to the manner of conducting the details of an elections are not mandatory, but directory merely, and irregularities in conducting an elections and counting the $otes, not roceeding from any wrongful intent and which de ri$es no legal $oter of his $otes, will not $itiate an election or justify the rejection of the entire $otes of a recinct) &he ro$isions of the election law which candidates for the office are re(uired to com ly are generally regarded as mandatory) Dualifications of candidates, re(uiring the filing of certificates of candidacy, defining election offenses, and limiting the eriod within which to file election contests, are mandatory and failure to com ly with such ro$isions are fatal) &he ro$isions of the election law designed to determine the will of the electorate are liberally construed) &echnical and rocedural barriers should not be allowed to

38

stand if they constitute an obstacle in the choice of their electi$e officials) Election law intended to safeguard the will of the eo le in their choice of their re resentati$es should be construed liberally to achie$e such ur ose) Election rotest, which should be liberally construed to the end that the o ular will e# ressed in the election of ublic officers will not, by reason of urely technical objections, be defeated) Rigid a lication of the law that will reclude the court from ascertaining the o ular will should be rejected in fa$or of a liberal construction thereof that will subser$e such end, where a rigid and strict a lication and enforcement of ro$isions of the election law will safeguard o ular will and re$ent transgression of suffrage and the mandate of the majority, the ro$isions will be gi$en strict construction) Election contest, es ecially a reciation of ballots, must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of ublic officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities) ?)22 Amnesty roclamations) Amnesty roclamations should be liberally construes so as to carry out their ur ose, which is to encourage the return to the field of the law of those who ha$e $eered from the law) Amnesty and ardon are synonymous, and for this reason, the grant of ardon should liBewise be construed liberally in fa$or of those ardoned and strictly against the state, for where two words are synonymous, the rules for inter reting one will a ly to the other) ?)2> Statues rescribing rescri tions of crimes) A stature of limitation or rescri tion of offenses is in the nature of amnesty granted by the state, declaring that after a certain time, obli$ion shall be cast o$er the offense) 8ence, statutes of limitations are liberally of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the $ery e#istence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out roofs and innocence, has assigned to it fi#ed and ositi$e eriods in which it destroys roofs of guilt)

?)2<

Ado tion statues) Ado tion statutes are construed liberally in fa$or of the child to be ado ted with the liberal conce t that ado tion statutes, being humane, and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be a aramount consideration and are designed to ro$ide homes, arental care and education for the unfortunate, needy or or haned children and gi$e them the rotection of a society and family in the erson of the ado ter) ?)2= Aeteran and ension laws Aeteran and ension laws are enacted to com ensate a class of men who suffered in the ser$ice for the hardshi s they endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty) &hey are e# ression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered ser$ice tot eh country by e#tending to them regular monetary benefit) 9or these reasons, such statutes are construed liberally to the end that their noble ur ose is best accom lished) 8owe$er, while $eteran and ension laws are to be construed liberally, they should be so construed as to re$ent a erson from recei$ing double ension or com ensation, unless the law ro$ides otherwise) Retirement or ension laws are also liberally construed) +eing remedial in character, a statute creating ension or establishing retirement lan should be liberally construed and administered in fa$or of the ersons intended to benefited thereby) ?)2? Rules of %ourt) &he Rules of %ourt, being rocedural, are to be construed liberally with the end in $iew of reali'ing their ur ose 3 the ro er and just determination of a litigation) A liberal construction of the Rules of %ourt re(uires the courts, in the e#ercise of their functions, to act reasonably and not ca riciously, and enjoins them to a ly the rules in order to romote their object and to assist the arties in obtaining a just, s eedy and ine# ensi$e determination of their cases, means conduci$e to the reali'ation of the administration of law and justice) La ses in the literal obser$ance of a rule of rocedure will be o$erlooBed when they do not in$ol$e ublic

39

olicy, when they arose from an honest mistaBe or unforeseen accident, when they ha$e not rejudiced the ad$erse arty and ha$e not de ri$ed the court of its authority) %oncei$ed in the best traditions of ractical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of %ourt u on.s litting technicalities that do not s(uare with their liberal tendency and with the ends of justice) &he literal stricture of the rule ha$e been rela#ed in fa$or of liberal construction in the following cases" -) where a rigid a lication will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice 1) where the interest of substantial justice will be ser$ed 2) where the resolution of the emotion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court and >) where the injustice to the ad$erse arty is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not com lying with the rescribed rocedure) ?)2@ 6ther statues) %urati$e statutes are enacted to cure defects in a rior law or to $alidate legal roceedings which would otherwise be $oid for want of conformity with certain legal re(uirements) &hey are intended to su ly defects, abridge su erfluities and curb certain e$ils) &heir ur ose is to gi$e $alidity to acts done that would ha$e been in$alid under e#isting laws ha$e been com lied with) %urati$e statutes, by their $ery nature, are retroacti$e) Redem tion laws, being remedial in nature are to be construed liberally to carry our their ur ose, which is to enable the debtor to ha$e his ro erty a lied to ay as many debtorCs liabilities as ossible) E#ecution are inter reted liberally in order to gi$e effect to their beneficent and humane ur oseF and to this end, any reasonable doubt be construed in fa$or of the e#em tion from e#ecution) Laws on Attachment are also liberally construed in order to romote their rojects and assist the arties in obtaning s eedy justice) An instrument of credit, warehouse recei ts lay a $ery im ortant role in modern commerce, and accordingly, warehouse recei t laws are gi$en liberal construction in fa$or of bona fide holders of such recei ts) &he ur ose of the robation being to gi$e first. hand offenders a second chance to maintain his lace in society

through the rocess of reformation, it should be liberally construed to achie$e its objecti$e) &hus, the robation law may liberally construed by e#tending the benefits thereof to any one not s ecifically dis(ualified)

CHAPTER :: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

A. IN GENERAL Statutes may be classified either as mandatory or directory)

M!#2!t% 1 !#2 2i e,t% 1 *t!t)te*, $e#e !""1 - 4andatory statute is a statute which commands either ositi$ely that something be done, or erformed in a articular way, or negati$ely that something be not done, lea$ing the erson concerned no choice on the matter e#ce t to obey) - Act e#ecuted against the ro$isions of mandatory or rohibitory laws shall be $oid, e#ce t when the law itself authori'es their $alidity) - Where a statute is mandatory, the court has no ower to distinguish between material and immaterial breach thereof or omission to com ly with what it re(uires) - A directory statute is a statute which is ermissi$e or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its ur ose can be accom lished in a manner other than that rescribed and substantially the same result obtained) - &he non erformance of what it /directory statute0 rescribes, though constituting in some instances an irregularity or subjecting the official concerned to disci linary or administrati$e sanction, will not $itiate the roceedings therein taBen) W.e# *t!t)te i* (!#2!t% 1 % 2i e,t% 1 - &he rimary object is to ascertain legislati$e intent) - Legislati$e intent does not de end u on the form of the statute)

40

%onsideration must be gi$en to the entire statute, its object, ur ose, legislati$e history and the conse(uences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes) &he language of the statute, howe$er mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whene$er the legislati$e ur ose can best be carried out by such construction, but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly ado ted and ne$er where it would in fact maBe a new law instead of that assed by the legislature) Whether a statute is mandatory or directory de ends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing re(uired, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction)

Te*t t% 2ete (i#e #!t) e %- *t!t)te - &he test generally em loyed to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory is to ascertain the conse(uences that will follow in case what the statute re(uires is not done or what it forbids is erformed) - Whether a statutory re(uirement is mandatory or directory de ends on its effects) - !f no substantial rights de end on it and no injury can result from ignoring itF and the ur ose of the legislature can be accom lished in a manner other than that rescribed and substantially the same results obtained, then the statute will generally be regarded as directoryF but if not, it will be mandatory) - A statute will not be construed as mandatory and re(uiring a ublic officer to act within a certain time limit e$en if it is couched in words of ositi$e command if it will cause hardshi or injustice on the art of the ublic who is not at fault) Nor will a statute be inter reted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd, im ossible or mischie$ous conse(uences) L!#$)!$e )*e2

Statutes using words of command, such as HshallI, HmustI, HoughtI, or HshouldI, or rohibition, such as HcannotI, Hshall notI or Hought notI, are generally regarded as mandatory) - &he use of words of command or of rohibition indicates the legislati$e intent to maBe the law mandatory) - !t has been held that the intention of the legislature as to the mandatory or directory nature of articular statutory ro$ision is determined rimarily from the language thereof) U*e %- ;*.!""< % ;()*t< - As a general rule, the use of the word HshallI in a statute im lies that the statute is mandatory) - !t means Hought toI, HmustI, and when used in a statute or regulation, e# resses what is mandatory) - &he term HshallI is a word of command, and one which has or which must be gi$en a com ulsory meaning and it is generally im erati$e or mandatory) - !f a different inter retation is sought, it must rest u on something in the character of the legislation or in the conte#t which will justify a different meaning) - !t connotes com ulsion or mandatoriness) - &his rule is not absolute) &he im ort of the word de ends u on a consideration of the entire ro$ision, its nature, object and the conse(uences that would follow from construing it one way or the other) - &he word HmustI in a statute, liBe HshallI is not always im erati$e) !t may be consistent with discretion) !f the language of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object re$eals that the legislature intended to use the word HmustI to be directory, it should be gi$en that meaning) - 6ne test used to determine whether the word HshallI in mandatory or discretionary is whether non.com liance with what is re(uired will result in the nullity of the act) !f it results in the nullity of the act, the word is used as a command) U*e %- ;(!1< - &he word HmayI is an au#iliary $erb showing, among others o ortunity or ossibility) 7nder ordinary

41

circumstances, the hrase Hmay beI im lies the ossible e#istence of something) Generally s eaBing, the use of the word HmayI in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature) &he word HmayI is generally ermissi$e only and o erates to confer discretion) &he word HmayI as used in adjecti$e laws, such as remedial statutes which are construed liberally, is only ermissi$e and not mandatory)

*rohibiti$e or negati$e words can rarely, if e$er, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command, Hthou shall notI, and that is to com letely refrain from doing the forbidden act)

W.e# ;*.!""< i* ,%#*t )e2 !* ;(!1< !#2 0i,e 0e *! - 5e ending u on a consideration of the entire ro$ision, its nature, its object, and the conse(uences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the con$ertibility of said terms either as mandatory or directory is a standard recourse in statutory construction) - !t is well.settled that the word HmayI should be read as HshallI where such construction is necessary to gi$e effect to the a arent intention of the legislature) - &he word HmayI will, as a rule, be construed as HshallI where a statute ro$ides for the doing of some act which is re(uired by justice or ublic duty, or where it $ests a ublic body or officer with ower and authority to taBe such action which concerns the ublic interest or rights of indi$iduals) - &he word HshallI may be construed as HmayI when so re(uired by the conte#t or intention of the legislature) !t shall be construed merely as ermissi$e when no ublic benefit or ri$ate right re(uires that it be gi$en an im erati$e meaning) U*e %- #e$!ti0e, & %.i+it% 1 % e5,")*i0e te (* - A negati$e statute is mandatory) A negati$e statute is one e# ressed in negati$e words or in the form of an affirmati$e ro osition (ualified by the word HonlyI, said word ha$ing the force of an e#clusionary negation) - &he use of the legislature of negati$e, rohibitory or e#clusi$e terms or words in a statute is indicati$e of the legislati$e intent to maBe the statute mandatory)

B. MANDATORY STATUTES St!t)te* ,%#-e i#$ &%/e - Statutes which confer u on a ublic body or officer ower to erform acts which concern the ubic interests or rights of indi$iduals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the language used is ermissi$e only since such statutes are construed as im osing rather than conferring ri$ileges) St!t)te* $ !#ti#$ +e#e-it* - Statutes which re(uire certain ste s to be taBen or certain conditions to be met before ersons concerned can a$ail of the benefits conferred by law are, with res ect to such re(uirements, considered mandatory) - &he rule is based on the ma#im igilantibus et non dormientibus .ura sub eniunt or the laws aid the $igilant, not those who slumber on their rights) - 5otior est in tempoe, potior est in .ure. he who is first in time is referred in right) St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ 4) i*2i,ti%#!" e6)i e(e#t* - &he general rule is that statutory re(uirements by which courts or tribunals ac(uire jurisdiction to hear and decide articular actions must be strictly com lied with before the courts or tribunals can ha$e authority to roceed) - 8ence, statutes rescribing the $arious ste s and methods to be taBen for ac(uisition by the courts or tribunals o$er certain matters are considered mandatory) St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ ti(e t% t!=e !,ti%# % t% !&&e!" - Statutes or rules rescribing the time for litigants to taBe certain actions or to a eal from an ad$erse decision is generally mandatory)

42

Such statutes or rules ha$e been held as absolutely indis ensable to the re$ention of needless delays and to the orderly and s eedy discharge of business and are a necessary incident to the ro er, efficient, and orderly discharge of judicial functions) Such statutes or rules re(uire strict, not substantial, com liance) Accordingly, they are not wai$able, nor can they be the subject of agreements or sti ulations by litigants)

St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ & %,e2) !" e6)i e(e#t* - !n statutes relating to rocedure, e$ery act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the roceedings, or is rescribed for the rotection or benefit of the arty affected, is mandatory) A statute which re(uires a court to e#ercise its jurisdiction in a articular manner, follow a articular rocedure, or subject to certain limitations, is mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is $oid as in e#cess of jurisdiction) - &he statute rescribing such re(uirements is regarded as mandatory, e$en though the language used therein is ermissi$e in nature) E"e,ti%# "!/* %# ,%#2),t %- e"e,ti%# - &he ro$isions of election laws go$erning the conduct of elections and rescribing the ste s election officials are re(uired to do in connection therewith are mandatory before the electionsF howe$er, when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only, if that is ossible, es ecially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent $oters will be de ri$ed of their $otes without any fault on their art) - 7nless of a character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the $otes, or to the ascertainment of the result, or unless the ro$ision affects an essential element of the election, or unless it is e# ressly declared by the statute that the articular act is essential to the $alidity of an election, or that its omission shall render it $oid) E"e,ti%# "!/* %# 6)!"i-i,!ti%# !#2 2i*6)!"i-i,!ti%#

&he rule that election laws are mandatory before but not after the elections a lies only to those ro$isions which are rocedural in nature affecting the conduct of the election as well as to those which direct or re(uire election officials to do or erform certain acts, the ur ose of such construction being to reser$e the sanctity of the ballot and carry out the will of the electorate) &he rule does not a ly to ro$isions of the election laws rescribing the time limit to file certificates of candidacy and the (ualifications and dis(ualifications to electi$e office) &hese ro$isions are considered mandatory e$en after elections)

St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ 6)!"i-i,!ti%#* -% %--i,e - Eligibility to a ublic office is of a continuing nature and must e#ist at the commencement of the term and during the occu ancy of the office) Statutes rescribing the eligibility or (ualifications of ersons to a ublic office are, as a rule, regarded as mandatory) St!t)te* e"!ti#$ t% !**e**(e#t %- t!5e* ' !t is a general rule that the ro$isions of a statute relating to the assessment of ta#es, which are intended for the security of the citi'ens, or to insure the e(uality of ta#ation, or for certainty as to the nature and amount of each otherCs ta#, are mandatoryF but those designed merely for the information or direction of officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of roceedings are merely directory) St!t)te* ,%#,e #i#$ &)+"i, !),ti%# *!"e - Statutes authori'ing ublic auction sale of ro erties and rescribing the rocedure to be followed are in derogation of ro erty rights and due rocess, and are construed, with res ect to the rescribed rocedure, to be mandatory) - &he rescribed ste s must be followed strictlyF otherwise, the sale at ublic auction shall be $oid) C. DIRECTORY STATUTES

43

St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ $)i2!#,e -% %--i,e * - &here are statutory re(uisitions intended for guidance of officers in the conduct of business de$ol$ed u on them which do not limit their ower or render its e#ercise in disregard of the re(uisitions ineffectual) - *ro$isions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accom anied by negati$e words im orting that the acts re(uired shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated) St!t)te* & e*, i+i#$ (!##e %- 4)2i,i!" !,ti%# - Statutes rescribing the re(uirements as to the manner of judicial action that judges should follow in the discharge of their functions are, as a rule, merely directory) - !t should not be assumes in the absence of s ecific language to the contrary that the legislature intended that the right of arties should be seriously affected by the failure of a court or some officer to com ly strictly with the statutory re(uirements of official action) - *rocedure is secondary in im ortance to substanti$e right, and the non obser$ance of such rocedure should ne$er be ermitted to affect substanti$e right, unless the intention of the legislature is clearly e# ressed) - !t is uni$ersally held that statutes of this nature are merely directory and noncom liance therewith is not necessary to the $alidity of the roceedings) St!t)te* e6)i i#$ e#2iti%# %- 2e,i*i%# /it.i# & e*, i+e2 &e i%2 - &he constitution ro$ides that the ma#imum eriod within which a case or matter shall be decided or resol$ed from the date of its submission, shall be 1> months for the Su reme %ourt, and unless reduced by the Su reme %ourt, -1 months for lower collegiate courts and 2 months for all other lower courts) - Each %onstitutional %ommission shall decide any case brought before it within si#ty days from the date of its submission for resolution) - A judgment romulgated after the e# iration of the said eriod is not null and $oid, although the officer who

failed to com ly with the lay may be dealt with administrati$ely in conse(uence of his delay.unless the intention to the contrary is manifest) Where a statute s ecifies the time at or within which an act is to be done by a ublic officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the time, and not mandatory, unless the time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the language of the statute contains negati$e words, or shows that the designation of the time was intended as a limitation of ower, authority or right) &he better rule is that where a construction of a time ro$ision as mandatory will cause great injury to ersons not at fault or result in a miscarriage of justice, such conse(uence should be a$oided by construing the statute as directory, for reasons of fairness, justice and fair lay re(uire such construction) !t has been held that a statute re(uiring rendition of judgment within a s ecified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that non.com liance with them does not in$alidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result, it would ha$e clearly indicated) 8owe$er, while the eriod fi#ed by law to resol$e a case is merely directory, it cannot be disregarded or ignored com letely with absolute immunity) !t cannot be assumed that the law has included a ro$ision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter)

C%#*tit)ti%#!" ti(e & %0i*i%# 2i e,t% 1 - 5oes the %onstitution alter the general rule and render time ro$ision to decide mandatoryP !s a decision rendered beyond the eriod rescribed in the %onstitution. 1> months for the Su reme %ourt, -1 months for the lower collegiate courts and 2 months for other lower courts. null and $oidP - &8E Su reme %ourt ga$e negati$e answers /4arcelino $) %ru'0

44

CHAPTER >:PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES

A) !N GENERAL :);-) *R6S*E%&!AE AN5 RE&R6A%&!AE S&A&7&ES, 5E9!NE5 A ros ecti$e statute is one which o erates u on facts or transactions that occur after the stature taBes effect, one that looBs and a lies to the future A retroacti$e law creates a new obligation, im oses a new duty or attaches a new disability in res ect to a transaction already astF is one which taBes away or im airs $ested rights ac(uired under e#isting laws :);-) LAWS 6*ERA&E *R6S*E%&!AELY, !N GENERALS Statutes are to be construes as ha$ing only ros ecti$e o eration, unless the intension of the legislature to gi$e them retroacti$e effect is e# ressly declared or is necessarily im lied from the language used Embodied in art) > of the ci$il code" laws shall ha$e no retroacti$e effect unless the contrary is ro$ided, the reason for this is that a rule is established to guide actions with no binding effect until it is enacted) &he rinci le of ros ecti$ity a lies to statutes, administrati$e rulings and circulars and judicial decisions :);2) *RES74*&!6N AGA!NS& RE&R6A%&!A!&Y - &he resum tion is that all laws o erate ros ecti$ely, unless the contrary a ears or is clearly, lainly and une(ui$ocally e# ressed or necessarily im lied) 5oubt will be resol$ed against the retroacti$e effect - &he resum tion a lies whether the statures is in the form of an original enactment, an amendment of a re eal - *resum tion is stronger with reference to substanti$e laws affecting ending actions :);>) W6R5 6R *8RASES !N5!%A&!NG *R6S*E%&!A!&Y - Where by its terms a statute is to a ly QhereafterI or HthereafterI, or is to taBe effect immediately or at a fi#ed future date, or where a statute contains, in the enacting clause, the hrase Hfrom and after the assing

of this actI or em loys such words as Hshall ha$e been madeI or Hfrom and afterI a designated date, the statute is ros ecti$e in o eration only :);<) RE&R6A%&!AE S&A&7&ES, GENERALLY - &he constitution does not rohibit the enactment of retroacti$e statutes which do not im air the obligations of contract, de ri$e ersons of ro erty without due rocess of law, or di$est rights that ha$e become $ested, or which are not in the nature of e# ost facto laws - Some statutes are by their nature retroacti$e" remedial,curati$e statutes, as well as statutes that create new rights - A retroacti$e statute $iolating the constitution shall not be a lied +) S&A&7&ES G!AEN *R6S*E%&!AE E99E%& :);=) *ENAL S&A&7&ES, GENERALLY - Gen) rule" *enal laws or those which define offenses and rescribe enalties for their $iolation o erate ros ecti$ely - Art) 1- R*%" No felony shall be unishable by any enalty not rescribed by law rior to its commission :);= EJ *6S& 9A%&6 LAW - &he constitution ro$ides that no e# ost facto law shall be enacted - An e# ost facto law is any of the ff" -) law which maBes criminal an act done before the assage of the law and which was innocent when done, and unishes such act 1) a law which aggra$ates a crime, or maBes greater than it was, when committed 2) which changes the unishment and inflicts a greater unishment than that anne#ed to the crime when committed >) which alters the legal rules of e$idence and authori'e con$iction u on less or different testimony than the law re(uired at the time of the commission of the offense

45

<) which assumes to regulate ci$il rights and remedies only but in effect im oses a enalty or de ri$ation of a right for something which when done was lawful =) which de ri$es a erson accused of a crime of some lawful rotection to which he has become entitled, such as rotection of a former con$iction or ac(uittal, or a roclamation of amnesty !f the law sought to be a lied retroacti$ely taBe from an accused any right regarded at the time as $ital fro the rotection of life and liberty then it is an e# ost factolaw &he rohibition on e# ost facto law a lies only to criminal, enal matter and does not a ly to ci$il roceedings which regulate ci$il and olitical rights :);= +!LL 69 A&&A!N5ER - A bill of attainder is a legislati$e act which inflicts unishment without judicial trial - &he singling out of a definite minority, the im osition of a burden on it, a legislati$e intent and the retroacti$e a lication to ast conduct suffice to stigmati'e a statute as a bill of attainder - !f a statute is a bill of attainder, it is also an e# ost facto law) +ut if it is an e# ost facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not, are ersuasi$e that it is not a bill of attainder :);:) W8EN *ENAL LAWS ARE A**L!E5 RE&R6A%&!AELY - Art 11 R*%" *enal laws shall ha$e a retroacti$e effect in so far as they fa$or the erson guilty who is not a habitual criminal /e#ce tion to the gen) rule0 - Where there is already a final judgment, the remedy of the accused is to file a etition for habeas cor us alleging that his continued im risonment is illegal ursuant to said statute - &he gen) rule that an amendatory statue rendering an illegal act rior to its enactment no longer illegal is gi$en retroacti$e effect does not a ly if the amendatory statute e# ressly ro$ides that it shall not a ly retroacti$ely but only ros ecti$ely

:)-;) S&A&7&ES S7+S&AN&!AE !N NA&7RE - a substanti$e law creates rights, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or ro erty or the owers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of ublic affairs) - Substanti$e right is one which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system rior to the disturbance of normal relations - A lied to criminal law, substanti$e law is that which declares what acts are crimes and rescribes the unishment for committing them) - Substanti$e law o erates ros ecti$ely - Whether a rule is rocedural or substanti$e, the test is whether the rule really regulates rocedure) !f it taBes away a $ested right, it is not rocedural) !f it creates right such as the right to a eal, it is substanti$e, but if it o erates as a means of im lementing an e#isting right it is merely rocedural - *rocedural rules are retroacti$e and are a licable to actions ending and undermined at the times of the assage of the rocedural law :)--) E99E%&S 6N *EN5!NG A%&!6NS - Statute which affects substanti$e rights may not be gi$en retroacti$e effect so as to go$ern ending roceedings in the absence of a clear legislati$e intent to the contrary :)-1) D7AL!9!%A&!6N 69 R7LE - A substanti$e law will be a licable to ending actions if such is the clear intent of the law or if the statute by the $ery nature of its ur ose as a measure to romote social justice or in the e#ercise of olice ower is intended to a ly to ending actions) &his is howe$er subject to the limitation concerning constitutional restrictions against im airment of $ested rights :)-2) S&A&7&ES A99E%&!NG AES&E5 R!G8&S - Aested right may be said to mean some right or interest in ro erty that has become fi#ed or established and is no longer o en to contro$ersy) !t must be absolute,

46

com lete, and unconditional, inde endent of a contingency and a mere e# ectancy of future benefit) A statute may not be construed and a lied retroacti$ely if it im airs substanti$e right that has become $ested, as disturbing e#isting right embodied in a judgment or creating new obligations with res ect to ast transactions as by establishing a substanti$e right to fundamental cause of action where none e#isted before and maBing such right retroacti$e, or by arbitrarily recreating a new right or liability already e#tinguished by o eration of law

contract, or unsettle matters that had been legally done under the old law %) S&A&7&ES G!AEN RE&R6A%&!AE E99E%& :)-?) *R6%E57RAL LAWS - Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of rocedure, which do not create new or taBe away $ested rights, but only o erated in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already e#isting, do not come within the legal conce tion of the general rule against retroacti$e o eration, furthermore, it a lies to all actions, whether they ha$e already accrued of are ending) - &he fact that rocedural statutes may somehow affect the litigantsF rights may not reclude their retroacti$e a lication to ending actions) &he retroacti$e a lication of rocedural laws is not $iolati$e of any right of a erson who may feel that he is ad$ersely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable, for as a general rule, no $ested right may attach to, nor arise from rocedural laws) - A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a (uasi.judicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is a licable to claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it tooB effect, for it does not create a new nor taBe away $ested rights) No litigant can ac(uire a $ested tight to be heard by one articular court) - An administrati$e rule which is inter retati$e of a re. e#isting statute and not declarati$e of certain rights with obligation thereunder is gi$en retroacti$e effect as of the date of the effecti$ity of the statute) :)-@) EJ%E*&!6NS &6 &8E R7LE - &he rule does not a ly where the statute itself e# ressly or by necessary im lication ro$ides that ending actions are e#ce ted from its o eration or where to a ly it to ending actions would im air $ested rights - 7nder a ro riate circumstances, courts may deny the retroacti$e a lication or rocedural laws in the e$ent

:)->) S&A&7&ES A99E%&!NG 6+L!GA&!6NS 69 %6N&RA%& - Laws e#isting at the time of the e#ecution of contracts are the ones a licable to such transactions and not later statutes, unless the latter ro$ide that they shall ha$e retroacti$e effect if to do so will im air the obligation of contracts, for the constitution rohibits the enactment of a law im airing such) - !f a contract is legal at its ince tion, it cannot be rendered illegal by a subse(uent legislation :)-<) !LL7S&RA&!6N 69 R7LE - *eo le $) Meta) *ursuant to the then e#isting law a lawyer is authori'ed to charge not more then <R of the amount in$ol$ed as attorneyCs fees in the rosecution of a $eteranCs claim) A lawyer entered into a contract with a client with such sti ulation) +efore the claim was collected, a statute was enacted rohibiting the collection of such fees for such ser$ices rendered) &he court ruled that the statute rohibiting the collection of attorneyCs fees cannot be a lied retroacti$ely so as to ad$ersely affect the contract for rofessional ser$ices and the fees themsel$es) :)-=) RE*EAL!NG AN5 A4EN5A&6RY A%&S - Statutes which re eal earlier laws o erate ros ecti$ely, unless the legislati$e intent to gi$e them retroacti$e effect clearly a ears) 8owe$er, although a re ealing statute is intended to be retroacti$e, it will not be so construed if it will im air $ested rights or obligations of

47

that to do so would not be feasible or would worB injustice) Nor may they be a lied it to do so would in$ol$e intricate roblems of due rocess or im air the inde endence of courts) :)-:) %7RA&!AE S&A&7&ES - %urati$e statutes are intended to su ly defects, abridge su erfluities in e#isting laws and curb certain e$ils) &hey are intended to enable ersons to carry into effect that which they ha$e designed and intended, but has faied of e# ected legal conse(uence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action) &hey maBe $alid that which, before the enactment of the statute was in$alid, as such they are gi$en retroacti$e a lication) :)1;) L!4!&A&!6NS 69 R7LE - A remedial or curati$e statute enacted as a olice ower measure may be gi$en retroacti$e effect e$en though they im air $ested right or obligations of contract, if the legislati$e intent is to gi$e them retroacti$e o eration :)1-) *6L!%E *6WER LEG!SLA&!6NS - Any right ac(uired under a statute of under a contract is subject to the condition that it may be im aired by the state in the legitimate e#ercise of its olice ower, since the reser$ation of the essential attributes of so$ereign ower, one of which is olice ower is deemed read into e$ery statute or contract as a ostulate of legal order :)11) S&A&7&E RELA&!NG &6 *RES%R!*&!6N - Such statutes are both ros ecti$e in the sense that it a lies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it tooB effect and retroacti$e in the sense that it a lies to cause that accrued before its assage) 8owe$er, it will not be gi$en a retroacti$e o eration to causes of action that accrued rior to its enactment if to do will remo$e a bar of limitation which has become com lete or to disturb e#isting claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon)

A statute of limitation rescribing a longer eriod to file an action than that s ecified under the ole law may not be so construed as ha$ing a retroacti$e effect, e$en if it so ro$ides, as to re$i$e a cause that already rescribed under the old law, for that will im air the $ested right of the erson against whom the cause is asserted) A statue which shortens the eriod of rescri tion and re(uires that cuses which accrued rior to its effecti$ity be rosecuted or filed not later than a s ecific date may not be construed to a ly to e#isting causes which, ursuant to the old law under which they accrued, will not rescribe until a much longer eriod than that s ecified in the later enactment because the right to bring an action is foundef on the law which has become $ested before the assage of the new statute of limitation)

:)12) A**AREN&LY %6N9L!%&!NG 5E%!S!6NS 6N *RES%R!*&!6NS - +illones $) %ourt of !ndustrial Relations and %orales $) Em loyeeCs %om ensation %ommission) &he roblem in both cases is how to safeguard the right to bring the action whose rescri ti$e eriod to institute it has been shortened by law) &o sol$e the roblem the court in the %orales case construed the statute of limitation as ina licable to the action that accrued before the new law tooB effectF the court in +illones case ga$e the claimants whose rights ha$e been affected, one year from the date the law tooB effect within which to sue on their claims) &he %orales case a ears to be redicated on firmer grounds) :)1>) *RES%R!*&!6N !N %R!4!NAL AN5 %!A!L %ASES - !n a ci$il suit, the statute is enacted by the legislature as an im artial arbiter between two contending arties) !n the construction of such stature, there is no intendment to be made in fa$or of either arty) Neither grants the right to the other, there is therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary resum tions construction are to be made

48

&he rule is otherwise in statutes of limitation concerning criminal cases) 8ere the state is the grantor, surrendering by an act of grace its right to rosecute or declare that the offense is no longer the subject of rosecution after the rescri ti$e eriod) Such statutes are not only liberally construed but are a lied retroacti$ely in fa$or of the accused

5) E) 9)

:)1<) S&A&7&ES RELA&!NG &6 A**EALS - A statute relating to a eals is remedial or rocedural and a lies to ending action in which no judgment has yet been romulgated at the time the statute tooB effect) !t may not be gi$en retroacti$e effect if it im airs $ested rights) - A stature shortening the eriod for taBing a eals is to be gi$en ros ecti$e effect and may not be a lied to ending roceeding in which judgment has already been rendered at the time of its enactment)

C.!&te 1?: A(e#2(e#t, Re0i*i%#, C%2i-i,!ti%# !#2 Re&e!"

I. A(e#2(e#t A) *ower to amend Legislature has the ower to amend, subject to constitutional re(uirement, any e#isting law Su reme court, in the e#ercise of its rule.maBing ower or of its ower to inter ret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law +) 8ow amendment effected +y addition, deletion, or alteration of a statute which sur$i$es in its amended form) +y enacting amendatory act modifying or altering some ro$isions of the statue either e# ressly or im liedly E# ress amendment" done by ro$iding amendatory act that s ecific sections or ro$isions of a statute are amendedF indicated as " H to read as follows) %) Amendment by im lication &here is im lied amendment where a art of a rior statute embracing the same subject as the later act may not be

G)

8)

!)

E)

enforced without nullifying the ertinent ro$ision of the latter in which e$ent, rior act is deemed amended to the e#tent of the re ugnancy) When amendment taBes effect After -< days following the ublication in the 6fficial Ga'ette or news a er of general circulation 8ow construed A statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole meaning, it should be read as if the statue has been originally enacted in its amended form) *ortions not amended will continue to be in force with the same meaning they ha$e before amendment) 4eaning of law changed by amendment General rule" an amended act would be gi$en a construction different from that of the law rior to its amendment for it is resumed that legislatures would not ha$e amended the statue if it did not intend to change its meaning) Amendment o erates ros ecti$ely General rule" amendatory act o erates ros ecti$ely unless the contrary is ro$ided or the legislati$e intent to gi$e it a retroacti$e effect is necessarily im lied from the language used and no $ested rights is im aired) 8owe$er, amendments relating to rocedures should be gi$en retroacti$e effect) Effect of amendment in $ested rights Rule" after the statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued rior to the amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the rior act) Effect of amendment on jurisdiction Rule" a subse(uent statute amending a rior act with the effect of di$esting the court of jurisdiction may not be construed to o erate to oust jurisdiction that has already attached under the rior law) Effect of nullity of rior or amendatory act An in$alid or unconstitutional law does not in legal contem lation e#ist) Where a statute amended in in$alid, nothing in effect has been amended) &he amended act shall be considered the original or inde endent act)

49

 II. K) L)

When the amended act is declared unconstitutional, the original statute remains unaffected and in force) Re0i*i%# !#2 C%2i-i,!ti%# Generally" restating the e#isting laws into one statute in order to sim lify com licated ro$isions) %onstruction to harmoni'e different ro$isions &he different ro$isions of a re$ised statute or code should be read and construed together) Where there is irreconcilable conflict" that which is best in accord with the general lan or, in the absence of circumstances u on which to base a choice, that which is later in hysical osition, being the latest e# ression of legislati$e will, will re$ail) What is omitted is deemed re ealed When both intent and sco e clearly e$ince the idea of a re eal, then all arts and ro$isions of the rior act that are omitted from the re$ised act are deemed re ealed) %hange in hraseology Rule" Neither an alteration in hraseology nor omission or addition of words in the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts) %ontinuation of e#isting law Rule" the rearrangement of section or arts of a statute, or the lacing of ortions of what formerly was a single section in se arate section, does not o erate to change the o eration, effect and meaning of the statute, unless changes are of such nature as to manifest the cleat intent to change the former laws) R)

2)

S)

4) N) 6)

&)

7)

A)

III. Re&e!"* *) *ower to re eal Legislature has lenary ower to re eal, Su reme court, while it has the ower to romulgate rule of rocedure, it cannot in the e#ercise of such ower alter, change or re eal substanti$e laws) D) Re eal" total or artial, e# ress or im lied -) &otal" rendered re$oBed com letely 1) *artial" Lea$es the unaffected ortion of the statue in force

W)

E# ress" there is a declaration in a statute /re ealing clause0 >) !m lied" all other re eals Re eal by im lication &wo well.settled categories" -) Where the ro$isions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilable, the later act re eals the earlier one 1) Later act co$ers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as substitute) !rreconcilable inconsistency Rule" re ugnancy must be clear and con$incing or the later law nullifies the reason or ur ose of the earlier to call for a re eal) 4ere difference in terms will not create re ugnance) Leges posteriors priores contraries abrogant" A later law re eals an earlier law on the same subject which is re ugnant thereto) !m lied re eal by re$ision or codification Rule" Where a statute is re$ised or a series of legislati$e acts on the same subject are re$ised and consolidated into one, co$ering the entire field of subject matter, all arts and ro$isions of the former act or acts that are omitted from the re$ised act are deemed re ealed) Re eal by reenactment Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in substitution of the re$ious laws on the matter, the latter disa ears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed re ealed) 6ther forms of im lied re eal -) When two laws is e# ressed in the form of a uni$ersal negati$e" a negati$e statute re eals all conflicting ro$isions unless the contrary intention is disclosed) 1) Where the legislature enacts something in general terms and afterwards asses another on the same subject, although in affirmati$e language, introduces s ecial condition or restrictions) Re ealing clause All laws or art thereof, which are inconsistent with this act, are hereby re ealed or modified accordingly)

50

Nature of this clause" not an e# ress re eal rather, it is a clause which redicates the intended re eal u on the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on e#isting and rior acts of the same subject matter E# ro rio $igore Rule" the failure to add a s ecific re ealing clause articularly mentioning the statute to be re ealed indicated the intent was not to re eal any e#isting law on the matter unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and re ugnancy e#ist in the terms of the new and old laws) J) Re eal by im lication not fa$ored Rule" Re eals by im lication not fa$ored *resum tion is against inconsistency and against im lied re eals for it is resumed that legislatures Bnow e#isting laws on the subject and not to ha$e enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes) Y. Leges posteriores priores contraries abrogant 3 later statue re eals rior ones which are re ugnant thereto) As between two laws, on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilable inconsistent, that which is assed later re$ails) M) General law Rule" General law on a subject does not o erate to re eal a rior s ecial law on the same subject unless clearly a ears that the legislature has intended the later general act to modify the earlier s ecial law) Generalia specialibus non derogant " a general law does not nullify a s ecific or s ecial law) Reason" the legislature should maBe ro$isions for all circumstance of the articular case) AA) When s ecial or general law re eals the other Rule" Where a later s ecial law on a articular subject is re ugnant to or inconsistent with a rior general law on the same subject, a artial re eal of the latter is im lied to the e#tent of the re ugnancy or e#ce tion granted u on the general law) Legislati$e intent to re eal must be shown in the act itself, the e# lanatory not to the bill before its assage into a law, the discussion on the floor of the legislature and the history of the two legislations)

Rule" General law cannot be construed to ha$e re ealed a s ecial law by mere im lication) Rule" !f intention to re eal the s ecial law is clear, the s ecial law will be considered as an e#ce tion to the general law will not a ly) S ecial law is re ealed by im lication) ++) Effects of re eals -) Statute is rendered ino erati$e 1) 5oes not undo the conse(uences of the o eration of the statute while in force 2) 5oes not render illegal what under the re ealed act is legal >) 5oes not laBe legal what under the former law is illegal %%) 6n jurisdiction Eurisdiction to try and decide actions is determined by the law in force at the time the action is filed) General rule" where the court or tribunal has already ac(uired and is e#ercising jurisdiction o$er a contro$ersy, its jurisdiction to roceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation re ealing the statue which originally conferred jurisdiction unless the re ealing statute ro$ides otherwise e# ressly or by necessary im lication) 55) 6n jurisdiction to try criminal cases Eurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted) EE) 6n actions ending or otherwise &he general rule is that the re eal of a statue defeats all actions and roceedings including those which are still ending) 99) 6n $ested rights Re eal of a statute does not destroy or im air rights that accrued and became $ested under the statute before its re eal) GG) 6n contracts When a contract is entered into by the arties on the basis of the law when obtaining, the re eal or amendment of said law does not affect the terms of the contract not im air the right of the arties thereunder) 88) Effect of re eal of ta# law

51

Re eals does not reclude the collection of ta#es assessed under the old law before its re eals unless the re ealing statute ro$ides otherwise !!) Re eal and enactment Simultaneous re eal and reenactment of a statue does not affect the rights and liabilities which ha$e accrued under the original statute since the reenactment neutrali'es the re eal and continues the law in force without interru tion) EE) Effect of re eal of enal laws Re eal without (ualification of enal law de ri$ed the court of the jurisdiction to unish ersons charged with a $iolation of the old law rior to its re eal) Where re eal is absolute, crime no longer e#ists) E#ce tion" -) &he re ealing act reenacts the statute and enali'es the same act re$iously enali'ed under the re ealed law, the act committed before the reenactment continues to be a crime) 1) Where the re ealing act contains a sa$ing clause ro$iding that ending actions shall not be affected, the latter will continue to be rosecuted in accordance with the old law) !A) 5istinction as to effect of re eal and e# iration of law !n absolute re eal, the crime is obliterated !n e# iration of enal law by its own force does not ha$e that effect KK) Effect of re eal of munici al charter Su erceding of the old charter by a new one has the effect of abolishing the offices under the old charter) LL) Re eal or nullity of re ealing law Law first re ealed shall not be re$i$ed unless e# ressly ro$ided Where a re ealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will ha$e no effect of re ealing the former statute)

!t is an instrument of a ermanent nature, intended not merely to meet e#isting conditions, but to go$ern the future) !t does not deal in details but enumerates general rinci les and general directions which are intended to a ly to all new facts which may come into being and which may be brought within those general rinci les or direction /Lo e' A) 5e los Reyes0) A su reme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all ri$ate rights must be determined and all ublic authority administered /4anila *rince 8otel $) GS!S0) *R!4ARY *7R*6SE 69 %6NS&!&7&!6NAL %6NS&R7%&!6N &he rimary tasB of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent or ur ose of the framers of the constitution as e# ressed in the language of the fundamental law, Sembodied in the ro$isions themsel$esT, and thereafter to assure its reali'ation /E)4) &uason G %o), !nc) $) Land &enure Administration0) &he ur ose of the *hil) %onstitution is to rotect and enhance the eo leCs interest, as a nation collecti$ely and as erson indi$idually) &he inter retation of the %onstitution should be done with a $iew to reali'ing this fundamental objecti$e) %6NS&!&7&!6N %6NS&R7E5 AS EN57R!NG 96R AGES !t is something solid, ermanent and substantial) !ts stability rotects the rights, liberty and ro erty of the rich and oor aliBe /7)S) $) Ang &eng 8o0) -) A constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is, a continuing instrument to go$ern not only the resent but also the unfolding e$ents of the indefinite future) 1) A constitution must be construed as a dynamic rocess intended to stand for a great length of time, to be rogressi$e and not static) 2) !ts construction ought not to change with emergencies or conditions >) Nor should it be construed to infle#ibly identify its te#t with the circumstances that ins ired for its ado tion, for that would maBe it inca able of res onding to the need of the future)

CHAPTER 11 :CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

%6NS&!&7&!6N 5E9!NE5

52

<) Word em loyed therein are not to be construed to yield fi#ed and rigid answers but as im ressed with the necessary attributes of fle#ibility and accommodation to enable them to meet ade(uately whate$er roblems the future has in store) =) %ourts should always endea$or to gi$e such inter retation that would maBe the constitutional ro$ision consistent with reason, justice and the ublic interest) 86W LANG7AGE 69 %6NS&!&7&!6N %6NS&R7E5 &he rimary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or ur ose is the language of the constitution itself) !t is an intrinsic aid) !t is a well.established rule that the language of the constitution should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the worlds in the constitutional ro$isions are to be gi$en their ordinary meaning e#ce t where technical terms are em loyed, because the fundamental law is not rimarily a lawyerCs document but essentially that of the eo le, in whose consciousness it should e$er be resent as an im ortant condition for the rule of law to re$ail) Where the constitution does not s ecifically define the terms used therein, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense) Where words used in a constitution ha$e both restricti$e and general meanings, the rule is that the general re$ails o$er the restricted unless the conte#t in which they are em loyed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended) A word or hrase in one art of the constitution is to recei$e the same inter retation when used in e$ery other art, unless it clearly a ears from the conte#t or otherwise that a different meaning should be a lied) Words which ha$e ac(uired a technical meaning before they are used in the constitution must be taBen in that sense when such words as thus used are construed) A!5S &6 %6NS&R7%&!6N, GENERALLY E#traneous Aids" -) history or realities e#isting at the time of the ado tion of the constitution 1) roceedings of the con$ention

2) changes in hraseology >) rior laws and judicial decisions <) contem oraneous constructions =) conse(uences of alternati$e inter retations REAL!&!ES EJ!S&!NG A& &!4E 69 A56*&!6NF 6+EE%& &6 +E A%%64*L!S8E5 8istory many a time holds the Bey that unlocBs the door to understanding) 9or this reason, courts looB to the history of times, e#amine the state of things e#isting when the constitution was framed and ado ted, and inter ret it in the light of these factors /%ommissioner of !nternal Aenue $) Guerrero0) &he e#isting realities that confronted the framers of the constitution can hel unra$el the intent behind a constitutional ro$ision) &he court in construing the constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accom lished by its ado tion, and the e$ils, if any, sought to be re$ented or remedied) A doubtful ro$ision will be e#amined in the light of the history of the times, and the conditions and circumstances under which the constitution was framed) &he object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the constitution to enact the articular ro$ision and the ur ose sought to be accom lished thereof, in order to construe the whole as to maBe the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that ur ose) *R6%EE5!NGS 69 &8E %6NS&!&7&!6N !f the language of the constitutional ro$ision is lain, it is neither necessary nor ermissible to resort to e#trinsic aids) 8owe$er, where the intent of the framers does not decisi$ely a ear in the te#t of the ro$ision as it admits of more than one construction, reliance may be made on e#trinsic aids, such as the records of the deliberations or discussions in the con$ention /*eo le $) 4uLo'0) +ut while a memberCs o inion e# ressed on the floor of the constitutional con$ention is $aluable, it is not necessarily e# ressi$e of the eo leCs intent) &he constitutional wisdom is that the constitution does not deri$e its force from the con$ention which framed it, but from the eo le who ratified it,

53

the intent to be arri$ed at is that of the eo le, it de ends more on how it was understood by the eo le ado ting it than the framersC understanding thereof) !t is, howe$er, not decisi$e for the roceedings of the con$ention are less conclusi$e of the ro er construction of the fundamental law than are legislati$e roceedings of the ro er construction of a statute, since in the latter case, it is the intent of the legislature that courts seeB, while in the former, the courts seeB to arri$e at the intent of the eo le through the re resentati$es) &he ascertainment of the intent is but in Bee ing with the fundamental rinci le of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the eo le ado ting should be gi$en effect) &he rimary tasB in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the reali'ation of the ur ose of the framers and of the eo le in the ado ting of the constitution /Nitafan $) %ommissioner of !nternal Re$enue0) %6N&E4*6RANE67S %6NS&R7%&!6N AN5 WR!&!NGS %ontem oraneous or ractical constructions of s ecific constitutional ro$isions by the legislati$e and e#ecuti$e de artments, es ecially if long continued, may be resorted to resol$e, but not to create ambiguities) &hough not conclusi$e, contem oraneous or ractical constructions are generally conceded as being entitled to great weight) &he ractical construction of a constitution is of little weight unless it has been uniform) As a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contem oraneous construction has any a lication) %ontem oraneous construction is not necessarily binding u on courts, if in its judgment, such construction is erroneous and its further a lication is not made im erati$e by any aramount consideration of ublic olicy, it may be rejected /&aLada $) %uenco0 Writing of delegates to the con$ention on or e# laining the ro$isions of the constitution, ublished shortly thereafter ha$e some ersuasi$e force) *REA!67S LAWS AN5 E75!%!AL R7L!NGS

A constitution shall be held to be re ared and ado ted in reference to e#isting statutory laws, the ro$ision of which in detail it must de end to be set in a ractical o eration) !ts framers are resumed to be aware of re$ailing judicial doctrines or rulings concerning which are the subjects of constitutional ro$isions) %ourts may ro erly taBe such rulings into account in construing the constitutional ro$ision in$ol$ed) &hus, if the framers of the constitution ado ted a rinci le different from what the courts had re$iously enunciated, they did so to o$errule said rinci le) %8ANGES !N *8RASE6L6GY %hanges in hraseology in the new constitution may indicate an intent to modify or change the meaning of the old ro$ision from which it was based, and it should thus be construed to reflect such intent /Aratuc $) %omelec0) 4ere deletion of a hrase from a ro osed ro$ision before its final ado tion is not determinati$e of any conclusion) !t could ha$e been done because the framers considered it su erfluous) 5eletions in the reliminary drafts of the con$ention are, at best, negati$e guides which cannot re$ail o$er the ositi$e ro$isions of the finally ado ted constitution) %6NSED7EN%ES 69 AL&ERNA&!AE %6NS&R7%&!6NS Where a constitutional ro$ision is susce tible of more than one inter retation, that construction which would lead to absurd, im ossible or mischie$ous conse(uences must be rejected) %6NS&!&7&!6N %6NS&R7E5 AS A W86LE !t is a well.established rule that no one ro$ision of the constitution is to be se arated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the ro$isions bearing u on a articular subject are to be brought into $iew and to be so inter reted as to effectuate the great ur oses of the instrument) 6ne section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable constructionF the two can be made to stand together) &he courts must harmoni'e them, if racticable, and must lean in fa$or of a construction which will render e$ery

54

word o erati$e, rather then one which may maBe the words idle and nugatory) 4AN5A&6RY 6R 5!RE%&6RY &he established rule is that constitutional ro$isions are to be construed as mandatory, unless by e# ress ro$ision or by necessary im lication, a different intention is manifested) &he difference between a mandatory and directory ro$ision is often determined on grounds of e# ediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general ublic by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the fundamental law) 9ailure to discharge a mandatory duty, whate$er it may be, would not automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to that effect) *R6S*E%&!AE 6R RE&R6A%&!AE A constitution should o erate ros ecti$ely only, unless the words em loyed show a clear intention that it should ha$e a retroacti$e effect) A**L!%A+!L!&Y 69 R7LES 69 S&A&7&6RY %6NS&R7%&!6N GENERALLY, %6NS&!R7&!6NAL *R6A!S!6NS ARE SEL9. EJE%7&!NG &he general rule is that constitutional ro$isions are self.e#ecuting e#ce t when the ro$isions themsel$es e# ressly re(uire legislations to im lement them or when from their language or tenure, they are merely declarations of olicies and rinci les) A self.e#ecuting ro$ision is one which is com lete by itself and becomes o erati$e without the aid of su lementary or enabling legislation, or which su lies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or rotected) 6mission from a constitution of any e# ress ro$ision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self.e#ecuting)

55