MARY ROSE P.

CAMBEL 4th Year Juris Doctor Special Proceedings Review LSPU-Santa Cruz, Laguna

RULE 73 In re: in the matter of the petition to approve the will of ruperta palaganas with prayer for the appointment of special administrator, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIOPALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS G.R. No. 169144 Facts: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed w i t h the a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his a p p o i n t m e n t a s special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. T h e R T C i s s u e d a n o r d e r : ( a ) a d m i t t i n g t o p r o b a t e R u p e r t a s l a s t w i l l ; ( b ) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines. The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of courtd o e s n o t r e q u i r e p r i o r p r o b a t e a n d a l l o w a n c e o f t h e w i l l i n t h e c o u n t r y o f i t s execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed a b r o a d . Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Issue: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be p r o b a t e d i n t h e Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Held: Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will,or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of thetestator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether thesame be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will mustshow, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed bythe court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind theprocedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before acompetent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only tor eprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate,the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate courtprovided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirsdo not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good asdepriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shallpass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed bythe proper court.

RULE 74

UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302) Facts:

Juan, Patrocinio and Luz the pendency of the administration proceedings of the fathers estate, Luz died w/o any legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were her mother and husband Pablo Utulo commenced the judicial administration of Luzs estate; he asked the court to be the administrator was no occasion for judicial administration; and if there is, she had better right that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan

Issue: Whether there was a need for appointment of administrator Held: There was no need for appointment of administrator a general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave a will or he had left one but failed to name an executor, the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator from the estate of the deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition of the property without instituting the judicial administration; (2) where the property left does not exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator administration or to apply for the appointment of an administrator in court it is costly, superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs own the property from the moment of death of the decedent have standing in the proceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right of representation

ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359) Facts:

Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the only property to be inherited by heirs MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate. ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the land as belonging to him and his wife. Issue: W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMAC in a separate civil action? Held: The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased persons with the least loss of time. Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate; properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court should proceed to the distribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit). Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens.

RULE 75 FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428) Facts: 1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported will of Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez, et. al. (oppositors) filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices of consent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale. 2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on estoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will be passed upon. Oppositors insisted that estoppel and revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim until opportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was unrevoked by deeds of sale. 3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune appeal, that it was appealable independently of issue of revocation, affirmed CFI. Issues:

1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack of appeal? 2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final? 3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds of sale? Held: 1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final. Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and unenforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable, and it is so recognized by express provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings) 2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel cannot be raised in probate proceedings: The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownersh ip and right of dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently meritorious. 3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any change from original intent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that subsequent alienations made in favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no consideration whatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property to legatee, testatrix Benedicta merely intended to comply in advance with her testament, rather than a departure therefrom. RULE 76 MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215) Facts: Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of will of deceased wife Ines Basa. Without any opposition and upon testimony of witness Gabino (attesting witness), admitted to probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because of ex parte. Second filing of the motion to open the proceeding, again denied. SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL, intervenor Basa de Leon filed with Justice of Peace of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint against Mercado for falsification or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainant withdrew complaint.

THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado for same offense in Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was dismissed after investigation, at the instance of complainant due to his poor health. NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person. This time filed by fiscal of Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of Mexico. Case dismissed after investigation because will was already probated. Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga for reinvestigation. CFI Granted. FOURTH TIME, Mercado was arrested. Mercado filed a demurrer on ground of probate. Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction. CA issued injunction. Issues: 1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a bar to prosecuti on of forgery.

2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy trial.

Held: Several foreign decisions were cited. It can go either way. Others saying that can be impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code of Civil Procedure said that in an action or special proceeding, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration or condition or relation of the person provided that only be a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator conclusive as to its DUE EXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont. Conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world (in rem), reason why publication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that judgment or order of a court when declared by this Code of Civil Procedure are conclusive. State v. Mc Glynn (U.S. case). Although in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside the probate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A SUBTLE DISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and declaring probated will to be forgery. You would still disturb the decree. No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court chose the most consistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is discovered after probate and prosecution before the prescription. Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adversely affected by probate application for relief within reasonable time but no case exceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.

RULE 77 LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90 Phil. 459) Facts: Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in New York leaving a will which was duly probate in the Surrogates Court of New York country on August 3. The estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estate and personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the Philippines) but since Mercedes is not of sound judgments and discretion in handling of money (she is a minor at the time she became devisee), she will only be given a sum ofmoney sufficient for her current needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity from Manufacturers Life Insurance where a monthly payment of $57.60 will be given to Mercedes during her lifetime. On September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butlers will for probate in the CFI of Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator (Ghezzi) filed a motion for the citation of the manager of Manufacturers Life Insurance, Manila Branch to render a complete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed this petition for probate so that she can get hold at once of the entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the motion. Issues: Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer the properties of Butler. Held: No. The general rule is that the administration extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted. Hence, the funds in question (annuity) are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country, Canada is the situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butler s estate and is beyond the control of the court because it has passed completely in the hands of the company by virtue of the contract of annuity.

RULE 78 GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212) Facts:

Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an action against Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. The amount represents the amount due by the estate of Antonio Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to the minors Munoz. The lower court found from the evidence that the estate of Antonio Munoz owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46. Issue: Whether Teran is liable. Held: No Teran is not liable. Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez and guardian of the minors Munoz only for the period September 17, 1901 to March 17, 1902. However, from March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by Maria Munoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz.Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible to said minors for the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio Sanchez from the time of her acceptance of said appointment on March 18, 1902 up to the time of her removal on October 6, 1906 based on the ground that she was not a resident of the Philippines. If during this time she allowed other persons tohandle the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fall upon her. However, she may have a right of action against such persons for any loss occasioned by their negligence or corruption. Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiff arose during the time while the said defendant was administering their interest therein, only the sum of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower court as his liability) Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711) Facts:

Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator of the estate of Geronima Uy. He maintains that he should be appointed as administrator instead of Jose Garcia. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as administrator. Held: No, the lower court did not commit an error. It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability as administrator rest, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant had adverse interests in the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

RULE 79 DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants and appellees. Facts:

The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the existence of debts of the decedent.

Issue: The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures either for the payment or the security of its creditors. Is his contention correct?

Held: No. There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians". The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled. The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinary partition, the regular estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors' claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period of extinctive prescription. An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the very estate proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an action for partition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings cannot be avoided. Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition cannot be converted into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.

RULE 80 JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008)

Facts: this case) for Carlos Abrilles estate. was his 19% share in the co-ownership known as Juna Subdivision.

ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from PNB, which sums were not listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased. He alleged that these sums were deposited in the name of thedeceased but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for, the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The court granted the petition. -owners of the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the subdivision. Only after this was he issued letters of administration. tor, Tan filed a petition with the respondent court, alleging that the deceased was the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and that he had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval by the court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, and appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots. The court granted the petition. withdrawals from PNB and 2. Approving the power of attorney. Issue 1: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the decedent? Held: Yes. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule 80 for powers and duties) In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, the heirs of the deceased.

and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claiming the same. sed; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is invalid and improper. Issue 2: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by approving the power of attorney executed by Tan appointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots? Held: Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract or transaction. quires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice.

a trustee

herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust property -contracts may be permissible but should not be made to apply to administrators of a deceased estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.

In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan to be an agent or attorney-in-fact for two principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other. e respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

RULE 81 ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407) Facts: respondents in this case), filed a petition for the administration of Pablos estate in a special intestate proceeding in Bulacan. ecial administratrix petition for the probate of Pablos alleged will and for her appointment as executrix of his estate. intestate proceedings were dismissed upon agreement of the parties.

of Natividad as special administratrix. However, since she qualified, the widow was appointed to the position.

witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator. The case is now pending on appeal.

Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix

as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria

as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas? Held: YES.

certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator.

the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

especially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, onlyafter the dowry and paraphernalia of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach.

every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator, which cannot be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. y in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the

estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).

RULE 82 GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112) Facts: 1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her four children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices. 2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who was receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as co-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. 3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their opposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of GONZALES. 4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate. 5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied. Issue: Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. Held: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated. 1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or

mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from removalwithout just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal. 3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in OLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year. 4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties (sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. 5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, or on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886) Facts: - Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental. - The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced - the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the estate's two-fourths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00. - Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person. - The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action."

- Dela Cruz the administrator appealed Issue: Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided upon by the Probate Court? Held: No. It must be decided in a separate action. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental over the subject matter herein is beyond debate. However, acting as a probate court, said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim for rentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute of limitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat the administrator's case and should be threshed out in a full trial on the merits. Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person."6 The line drawn in the Escay case gives us a correct perspective in the present. The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view by the more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters affecting property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced" RULE 83 HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75) Facts: - One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included in the estate a tract of land worth P60,000 - Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for about P70,000, which was allowed

- Later on the respondent administrator discovers that Ankrom had executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure that company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had made itself contingently liable; Two days after this mortgage had been executed Ankrom appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. - In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. - The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land considering that without it the estate would be insolvent, but later on reversed - Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by Ankrom of the equity of redemption of the latter in the tract of land above mentioned was affected in fraud of creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to retain the possession of this tract of land and thereby place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, the burden of instituting any action that may be necessary to maintain the rights of the transferee under said assignment. Issue: w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is the remedy of the creditors? Held: Yes. - The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above described is clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator hasnot commenced such action, commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the

judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable. - The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors. RULE 84 PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122) Facts: PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt; filed an administrators bond with LUZON SURETY as his suretysubsequently dismissed and replaced by Philippine Trust Co. Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an amount with the PNB as part of the inventory of the estate of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for having disbursed funds of the estate without authority. Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the administrators bond should not be confiscated. Issue: W/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the administrators bond? Held: Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the same probate proceeding. A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount and executing or forfeiting the administrators bond; execution or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the principal, as Picard failed to faithfully execute the orders and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full force and effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator, privy to the proceedings against his principal. RULE 85

LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729) Facts: Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will. He then filed a motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging that the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00 which was already paid. Lower court granted the motion. Issue: Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees. Held: No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but such compensation is in the nature of executors or administrators commissions, and never as attorneys fees. Where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not from the estate of Carmelita Farlin. RULE 86 MANUEL BARREDO vs COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. L-17863 Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough. On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus inter est and attorneys fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of FaustoBarredo over the leasehold rights of Mc D nough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period. Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed. Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time. The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958) However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.) The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause. MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196) Facts: Balla and driven by Domingo Casin swerved to the left lane and collided head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) owned by Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from the opposite direction. The bus swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on with another passenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Felicidad Balla

and Domingo Casin died on the spot. Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Prades also died.

of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla for damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in a reckless and imprudent manner which was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the incident which resulted to the death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of deceased Felicidad Balla should be held liable for damages, since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to drive recklessly and not observing the required diligence in the selection and supervision of her employee, despite her presence in the passenger bus. icidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother. They said what was proper was to sue the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means that the creditor should institute the proper intestate proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose his claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Important note: there were no intestate proceedings to settle Felicidad's estate.

motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint, amending the title of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in the original complaint. The court issued an order denying the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's children then filed a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of the MTD. Held: SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order. Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by death are: (1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent; (2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent; and (3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]). It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Actions for damages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter.

The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an executor or administrator. The rule provides:

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate proceedings exist for the reason that her children had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of her estate, claiming that Felicidad Balla left no properties.

RULE 87 WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924) Facts: -Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI against defendant, Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus costs and P1500 for attorneys fees. The basis for the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No. 452of the CFI of Negros Occidental. -The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim against the estate of P6,485.02; that administratrix violated theconditions of her bond (i.e. failed to file inventory, failed to pay approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and just account of her administration); and that defendant, as surety failed to pay plaintiff notwithstanding the latters demand. -CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff P6000, P900attys fees + costs. Issue: [1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability of defendant under the bond in question. [2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the deceased administratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

Held: [1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty. -Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture or enforcement of an administrators bond, the sam e matter may be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the Court of First Instance. -Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned. [2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule 87 providing that where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the state to recover contribution from the other debtor. -Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it appears that even as the present complaint was filed, there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate. Where there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased administrator, the creditor may enforce his bond against the surety which bound itself jointly and severally in the case where the bond was filed.

RULE 88 AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959) Facts: Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Hermogenes Llemos averring that Hermogenes served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that the same would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00 a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manilaaccompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mental anguish and undue embarrassment. Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The plaintiffs amended their compliant to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss

which was granted by the court on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint? Held: NO Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied" which according to Leung Ben vs. O'Brien includes all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class.

RULE 89 PAREDES v. MOYA

Facts: Petitioner Severino Paredes sued his employer, August Kuntze, for collection of separation and overtime pay in the CFI-Manila. Paredes prevailed, and Kuntze appealed to the CA. Kuntze died pending appeal and was substituted by the administratrix of his estate. The CA dismissed the appeal for the administratrixs failure to file the printed record on appeal, and the record of the case was remanded. Paredes filed a motion for execution, so the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of August Kuntze. Paredes was the highest bidder at the auction sale conducted by the Sheriff. In spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by the Administratrix still pending resolution, Paredes sold the property to co-petitioner Victorio Ignacio.

Respondent Court (Judge Moya) set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Issue: W/N the CFI correctly set aside the Writ of Execution and the She riffs Sale and Public Auction.

Held: YES. In the case of a money claim where the defendant dies while appeal is pending, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceased defendant should be substituted by his legal representative executor or administrator of the estate. If the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must go to the probate court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The CFI that originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and levy on the properties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in the probate court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending (see Section 21, Rule 3) If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in the case at bar, the action survives. The appeal should proceed with the deceased defendant being substituted by his legal representative. This would prevent a useless repetition of presenting anew before the probate court the evidence already presented in the CFI on the validity of the claim. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrested by his death. It was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, to have the money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze. The proper remedy of Paredes should have been to file his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze because all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice to the creditors.

The respondent court correctly nullified the order of execution pursuant to the judgment, which became final and executory, and the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction sale. The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), although the validity of the money claim covered by a judgment against the decedent which has already become final and executory can no longer be litigated in the court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the properties of the deceased are still pending, unlike the other money claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or administrator. The writ of execution was not the proper procedure for the payment of debts and expenses of the administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the administratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on hand, to order the sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of the administration. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof. To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec. 29, 1949, thus: . . . a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person

shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4;). And this is not the instant case. The same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against the deceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by the administrator. The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid. In this jurisdiction, a void judgment or order is in legal effect no judgment or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless, it neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing from it are void.

RULE 90 DE JESUS VS. DAZA Facts: Justina S. Vda de Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest, and participation of the said Sixto and Natalia in the testate estate of Gavino de Jesus, particularly, the two parcels of land. These parcels of land were assigned to Sixto and Natalia as their shares in the same testate estate based on the project of partition duly approved by the probate court. The sale was also approved by the probate court. After learning of the aforesaid sale, petitioners instituted an action in the CFI of Batangas for legal redemption against respondent Vda. de Manglapus. While the latter case is pending appeal, Vda. de Manglapus in the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus asked the CFI of Batangas to order the provincial sheriff of said province to take immediate possession of the parcels of land in controversy, which was in the possession of the petitioners, and to deliver them to her afterwards. The petition was granted and delivery was subsequently made by the sheriff.

Issue: W/N the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent Vda. de Manglapus within the same estate proceeding and not in an independent ordinary action. Held: YES (this case is based on the old rules of court). From the admitted fact that the probate court had already approved the project of partition without any reservation as to payment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowances to the widow, or inheritance tax, it would appear that the estate was ready for distribution, pursuant to Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1). Neither party has made any representation to the contrary in this case. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the Court of First Instance of Batangas by commencing a civil case carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of said petitioners that the sale to respondent Vda. de Manglapus of the shares of Sixto and Natalia was valid. The sale was duly approved by the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1), confers upon such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any other person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding.

This case is also assigned under Rule 90 Section 1-3. There is no discussion relevant to Rule 89 section 8-9.

RULE 91 (Section 1) THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., VS. COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. Facts: This is an appeal from the order of the Court which denied the petition for escheat filed by the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter. This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat. Issue: W/N COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. may be parties to the case? Yes. W/N the land is proper subject of escheat? No. Held: The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon the provisions of section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text of which reads: SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. If, at the time appointed for the that purpose, the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property

in the Islands, leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceased in these Islands, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated by section 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance with the said section. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced by petition and not by complaint. In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessary party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; and the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract legality entered with the former. According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to the escheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus, among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of the King of Spain and passed from then on to the Crown of Spain. If the hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition.

RULE 92 GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112) Facts: 1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of her four children GONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.

2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband who was receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES as co-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. 3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file their opposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed the removal of GONZALES. 4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled. It was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the two children as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES to manage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate. 5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied. Issue: Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALES should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court Held: Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated. 1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal. 3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified in OLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges brought against GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact that conflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that the former had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.

4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties (sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from Land Bank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. 5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish to reinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.

RULE 93 UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His son Teodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold, filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardian to administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapaci ty. A few days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell real estate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernesto incapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugal properties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed by Teodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties to her daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with the approval of the court in a summary proceeding. Held: Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedy

is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spouse who desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither was he required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 94 PAVIA vs. DE LA ROSA Facts: The deceased Pablo Linart e Iturralde named as executor Francisco Granada eI turralde. In said will Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir. Owing to the death of the testator, Jose de la Rosa was substituted as executor and took possession of the property of the estate. Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf and as guardian of Carmen, executed a power of attorney I behalf of Jose de la Rosa. Jose de la Rosa accepted the power of attorney and proceeded to administer the estate in a careless manner resulting in loss and damage to Carmen. Later Jose de la Rosa died leaving as his only heirs Babiana and Salud de la Rosa. Babiana and Salud received and accepted from the estate of Jose the inheritance without benefit of inventory and received and divided among themselves, as such heirs, all of the estate. Babiana and Salud were then sued by Carmen through Rafaela to recover the losses sustained by Carmen due to Joses mismanagement of the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the suit against Babiana and Salud was proper?

Held: No. In accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act No. 190, it is understood that testate or intestate succession is always accepted with the benefit of inventory, and the heirs, even after taking possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of the deceased with their own property,

but solely with that property coming from the testate or intestate succession of the deceased. The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the appraisal of the properties of the estate and deciding as to the claims against such estate. The extrajudicial division of an estate among heirs of legal age without the intervention of the courts will take effect only in accordance with the terms and conditions provided in sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to the provisions contained in Part II of this code the only entity that can lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession of a deceased person is the executor or administrator appointed by the court, charged to care for, maintain, and administer the estate of the deceased. The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court. From the above it appears evident that whatever may be the right of action on the part of Rafaela Pavia and the minor, Carmen Linart, the latter represented by the former as guardian, as to the obligations assumed by Jose, now deceased, it must be prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of said deceased Jose, whose executor or administrator is at this time the only representative of the estate or intestate succession of said deceased.

RULE 95 UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His son Teodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold, filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardian

to administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapacity. A few days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell real estate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernesto incapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugal properties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed by Teodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties to her daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with the approval of the court in a summary proceeding. Held: Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spouse who desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither was he required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 96 NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUSFELIANO and ANUNCIANO FELIANO G.R. No. 162421 Facts: Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio,

Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson, herein petitioner.Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and theirmother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr.Corrompido. Subsequently,Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold thesaid land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of N e l s o n a n d R i t o , b e i n g m i n o r a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s a l e , w i l l b e h e l d i n t r u s t b y t h e vendee and will paid upon them reaching the age of 21.

In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the S p o u s e s F e l i a n o representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intentionto redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received hisshare; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to alienate the same. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable. Issue: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) i n b e h a l f o f t h e minors were binding upon them. Held: W ith regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was v a l i d . U n d e r Section 1, Rule 96 A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only. x xx Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judiciala u t h o r i t y . T h u s , w h e n S a t u r n i n a , a s l e g a l g u a r d i a n o f p e t i t i o n e

r R i t o , s o l d t h e latters pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to doso. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable. However, w h e n h e r e c e i v e d t h e p r o c e e d s o f t h e s a l e , h e e f f e c t i v e l y r a t i f i e d i t . T h i s a c t o f ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

RULE 97 FRANCISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Feliciano Francisco was the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro. Pelagio, a first cousin of Estefania petitioned the court for the removal of Feliciano as the guardian and his appointment instead. Pelagio claimed that Feliciano failed to submit an inventory of the estate and render an accounting. The court ordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian due to his old age and required him to nominate a replacement. The court thereafter granted the execution pending appeal of its decision and appointed Pelagio as the new guardian despite the fact that he was five years older than the previous guardian. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering the removal of Feliciano as guardian due to his advanced age. Held: The lower court correctly ordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian. A guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of the ward. In the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the physical condition, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers

and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary. Feliciano, at the age of 72 cannot fulfil the responsibilities of a guardian anymore, as evidenced by his delay in accounting and inventory of the wards property. To sustain petitioner as guardian would be detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling criterion in determining a persons fitness or qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.

RULE 98 OCCEA v. MARQUEZ Facts: Petitioners, Atty. Jesus Occea and Atty. Samuel Occea, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the settlement of William Ogan's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial distribution made to the heirs in the total amount of P 450,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, asking the court to approve payment to them of P 30,000.00, as part payment of their fees for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs moved to defer consideration of the motion until after the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. Later, five of the seven instituted heirs filed with the court a Manifestation stating that they had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's fees and recommending approval of petitioners' motion. Respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P 20,000.00. Petitioners moved to reconsider that order. Respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P 20,000.00.

Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse in fixing the entire attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P 20,000.00. In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is already a final order on the motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occea is the husband of executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, hence, Samuel Occea's pecuniary interest now goes against the pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) there are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise agreement and in the executrix's accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the estate; and (e) it is the duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to avoid "that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division," in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. Issue: W/N Judge Marquez acted with grave abuse when he fixed the attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate.

Held: YES. The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is wisely and economically administered and not dissipated. This rule, however, does not authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services. Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.

In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. The court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to.

RULE 99 SANTOS V. ARANZANSO, 116 SCRA 1 Facts: This is a petition to challenge the legality of the decree of adoption in favor of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on the grounds that the application for adoption was not signed by both adopting parents and by natural parents; and the judgment was procured through and by means of fraud.

Issue: 1) Whether the validity if the adoption could be assailed collaterally in intestate proceedings? 2) Whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the petition? Held: 1) No. The validity of the adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in an intestate proceedings. 2) No. Exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption and annulment of adoption cases lies with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) and not the Court of First Instance. RULE 100 REYES VS. SOTERO, GR NO. 167405 Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and

heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latters husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac. Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain badges of fraud. The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt. Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities. Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered the judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santo s spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

RULE 101 CHIN AH FOO AND YEE SHEE VS. CONCEPCION AND LEE VOO Facts: A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health. Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code. Issue: WON a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health. Held: No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other. The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.

RULE 102 TIJING VS. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR NO. 125901

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child. The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor. Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

IN RE: AZUCENA L. GARCIA, 339 SCRA 292, GR 141443, AUGUST 30, 2000 Facts: Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document. In the case at bar, petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the judgment rendered. Petitioner contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus. The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ. Issue: WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Held:

No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order release of the detainee. It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order. RULE 103 REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ, GR NO. 117209, FEBRUARY 9, 1996_DIGESTED Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Held: No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted. The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

RULE 104 PONCE VS ENCARNACION (1953) Facts:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the respondent court granting Potenciano Gapol authority, pursuant to section 26, Act No. 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, to call a meeting of the stockholders of the Dagunoy Enterprises, Inc. and to preside at such meeting by giving proper notice to the stockholders, as required by law or by laws of the corporation, until after the majority of the stockholders present and qualified to vote shall have chosen one of them to act as presiding officer of the meeting; another order denying a motion of the petitioners to have the previous order set aside; and a third order denying a motion to the same effect as the one previously filed. Daguhoy Enterprises, Inc., was duly registered at a meeting duly called, the voluntary dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of Potenciano Gapol as receiver were agreed upon. The respondent Potenciano Gapol, who is the largest stockholder, charged his mind and filed a complaint to compel the petitioners to render an accounting of the funds and assets of the corporation, to reimburse it, jointly and severally because the contended that Domingo Ponce, the president of the company, used the company funds for his own benefit. The petitioner filed an action with the TC and prayed for an order directing him to a call a meeting of the stockholders of the corporation and to preside at such meeting in accordance with section 26 of the Corporation law. TC granted their petition. Issue: WON under the corporation code, the TC can validly call for a stockholders meeting? / Are the officers deprived of due process in the action of the TC? Held: Yes. On the showing of good cause therefor, the court may authorize a stockholder to call a meeting and to preside threat until the majority stockholders representing a majority stockholders representing a majority of the stock present and permitted to be voted shall have chosen one among them to preside it. And this showing of good cause therefor exists when the court is apprised of the fact that the bylaws of the corporation require the calling of a general meeting of the stockholders to elect the board of directors but call for such meeting has not been done. With persistency petitioners claim that they have been deprived of their right without due process of law. They had no right to continue as directors of the corporation unless reflected by the stockholders in a meeting called for that purpose every even year. They had no right to a hold-over brought about by the failure to perform the duty incumbent upon one of them. If they felt that they were sure to be reelected, why did they fail, neglect, or refuse to call the meeting to elect the members of the board? Or, why did they not seek their reelection at the meeting called to elect the directors pursuant to the order of the respondent court.

RULE 105

CARIDAD CRUZ VDA. DE SY-QUIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PEDRO REYNALDO SY-QUIA Facts: This case is about the necessity of taking the testimony of Doctor Ernesto Medina Cue on the serological tests which he took in 1961 regarding the blood types of Jose Sy-Quia, Pedro Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres. The Court of Appeals in its decision of March 31, 1982 ordered that Doctor Cue should testify before the trial court in Pasig, Rizal. His testimony should be admitted in lieu of his deposition. Pedro M. Sy-Quia died in living a holographic will, wherein he divided equally one-half of his net estate among his widow and five children. His widow Caridad Cruz filed Special Proceeding for the probate of his will. The will was probated in May 10, 1968. More than three years later, Jose Pedro Reynaldo Sy-Quia filed a motion in the probate proceeding wherein he alleged that he was an acknowledged natural child of the testator. He prayed in his motion that being the testator's voluntarily acknowledged natural child, his pretention nullified Pedro M. Sy-Quia's will and, therefore, his estate should be settled under the rules of intestacy. The widow opposed the motion on the ground that Jose was asking for compulsory recognition which could not be entertained under article 285 of the Civil Code. This incident was duly heard by the trial court. Jose Sy-Quia presented Leopoldo Sy-Quia, Pedro's brother, who testified that Jose was Pedro's acknowledged natural child. He also offered in evidence his school records at De la Salle College containing the signatures of P.M. Sy-Quia, particularly Exhibit Y dated July 1, 1954, which was an authorization addressed to Brother Jerome signed by Pedro M. Sy-Quia. On the other hand, Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia filed a motion for the taking of the deposition of Doctor Cue, Clinical Laboratory, Pasay City. The motion was granted by the lower court. The deposition was taken over the opposition of Jose Sy-Quia's counsel. He objected to its presentation in court as evidence since Doctor Cue could have testified in court. Doctor Cue's deposition purportedly proved that taking into account the blood groups and types of Jose Sy-Quia, Pedro M. Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres, which, as already noted, he examined in 1961, Jose could not have been the son of Pedro and Remedios.

The lower court found that there is no indubitable writing showing that Jose was an acknowledged natural child of Pedro M. Sy-Quia, that his action for compulsory recognition should have been brought during Pedro's lifetime and that the result of the blood tests explains why Pedro omitted Jose in his will. Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its aforementioned 1982 decision held that Jose's theory was that he was already a voluntarily acknowledged natural child under article 278 of the Civil Code. However, the Appellate Court ruled that the deposition of Doctor Cue was inadmissible evidence. It remanded the case to the trial court and directed it to subpoena Doctor Cue to testify on the subject of his deposition and to be crossexamined by Jose Sy-Quia's counsel. Mrs. Sy-Quia appealed to this Court. Issue: WON Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Held: Article 2260 of that Code provides that "the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws" or before August 30, 1950. Hence, article 278 may be given retroactive effect (p. 169, Report of Code Commission; 7 Padilla, Civil Code, 1975, p. 709). Voluntary recognition "in any authentic writing" under article 278 means any genuine or indubitable writing sufficient for compulsory recognition under article 135 of the Spanish Civil Code (De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866; 1 Tolentino, Civil Code, 1974, p. 585, 586). The status of a person as a voluntarily acknowledged natural child "could be established by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as to time" (Larena vs. Hubio 43 Phil. 1017, 1019). "An action based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father" (Javelona vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, 400; Guaria vs. Guaria-Casas 109 Phil. 1111). Hence, Jose's motion in the testate proceeding to claim his alleged hereditary share is proper. The Appellate Court's decision is set aside. It is directed to receive the testimony of Doctor Cue within thirty days from notice of the finality of this resolution and thereafter to render a new decision as may be warranted under the facts and the law of the case.

RULE 106 DE MESA V. ACERO G.R. No. 185064, [January 16, 2012] Facts: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purchased a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property. The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property. The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudios name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Aceros Torrens title th at was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTCs decision. Issue: Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case. Held: YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. Ratio: For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows: for purposes

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution; Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,

are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home. Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.

RULE 107 REPUBLIC V. GRANADA G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012] Facts: Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her wellfounded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45. Issues: 1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal. 2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death based on evidence that respondent had presented. Held: Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. Ratio:

1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this

Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.) Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. RULE 108 BRAZA V CIVIL REGISTRAR G.R. No. 181174 | December 4, 2009 Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristinas husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patricks birth certificate reflects Patrick as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January 13, 1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her copetitioners (her three legitimate children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille an Pablo as bigamous. TC dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order

Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: WON the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. (WON substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108) Held: NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Ratio: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-1110-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. Petition Denied.

RULE 109

DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO (67 Phil 652) Facts: RAMON del Rosario (husband) died in 1895 and FLORENCIA Arcega (wife) in 1933. RAMON died intestate and FLORENCIA administered the conjugal properties. FLORENCIA acquired other properties using the fruits of the conjugal ones. After RAMON died, his intestate was not commenced and the conjugal properties were not liquidated until FLORENCIA died, after which the latter's testamentary proceedings were initiated and are now in progress. The heirs of both spouses brought this action to recover their share not only in the conjugal properties left by RAMON but also in those acquired by FLORENCIA with the products of said properties. A demurrer (by other heirs) was interposed to the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause of action; that there is a defect of party plaintiffs and party defendants, and that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The (probate) court sustained this demurrer and dismissed the case. From this resolution an appeal was taken. Issue: Whether granting the demurrer was proper. Ruling: Yes. The appealed judgment is affirmed. Whatever law might be applicable the intestate of RAMON del Rosario not having been commenced upon his death in 1895 until his widow FLORENCIA Arcega also died in 1933, and the testamentary proceedings of FLORENCIA Arcega having been subsequently initiated, wherein, among other things, the liquidation of her conjugal properties with the deceased RAMON del Rosario should be made the pendency of these testamentary proceedings of the deceased wife excludes any other proceeding aimed at the same purpose (Zaide vs. Concepcion and Quintana, 32 Phil., 403). At any rate, the plaintiffs have a right to intervene in these proceedings as parties interested in the liquidation and partition of the conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.