How to answer an unlawful detainer filing

In reference to unlawful detailers, everyone is going into court trying to prove something, I would suggest that that is probably not the right move there are several questions that need to be addressed first 1. "I will pay whatever it is that they say that I owe without question if they can give me an accounting of the monies they lent me, so that I can compare it with my books. For I do not have any record of receiving any funds from the (so-and-so) bank" 2. Excuse me your honor but this is a matter that involves revenue, and I think there may be some jurisdictional issues that we need to address. 3. I have made several attempts to pay this obligation, I have asked for a statement of account that is certified from the bank and they have yet to provide. I must submit to the court that this particular bank does not have clean hands in this matter. I use the word submit in the last item, we do not want to use words like submit, plead, pleadings, documents, motions or the like in reference to anything we place in the court it is a presentment (look up the legal definition for the word presentment and you might get a better understanding) 4. "Apparently the bank is foreclosing on the deed of trust, but as I look at the deed of trust their name doesn't appear, I need verified proof that they are indeed the holder in due course before we can proceed in this matter"

5. "I don't mean any disrespect to the court order sanctity of the judicial system for which it represents, but I am of the belief that I do indeed have rights here, the right to cross-examine and the right to have evidence presented for any alleged claims against me. So I must demand that the plaintiffs prove their standing, prove that I actually had a contractual agreement with them, and that they prove that they acted in good faith. 6." Because 31 USC 5118 makes it clear that no one can demand payment in dollars, and I attempted to pay by way of money order which plaintiffs has accepted and indeed monetized, I need the dplaintiffs and this court to state for the record what is considered currency in the United States of America, and how may I obtain access to such currency so as to obsolve myself of this obligation" 7. Because of the recent cases involving bank fraud by all of the major banks, and the lawsuits being filed by the Atty. Gen.'s of the majority of the states within the United States of America, I will be needing for the plaintiffs to provide me the following: a). That they are authorized to practice law within the state of (such in such) b). That they are licensed, and in good standing with the bar of the state of (such and such) c). That they have a power of attorney agreement on file and in the record of this matter showing that they are duly authorized to represent the plaintiffs. And if they do not have such a record then I asked at this matter be dismissed with prejudice and that sanctions be brought against the said attorney for violating court procedures.

d). That the plaintiffs provide a complete accounting of this matter certified under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States of America, to include all activities of this account and the lyrics obligation, as I'm us deny any connection with the accounting provided thus far. 8. "I am not here to argue with the court, and I will not present an argument before this court. The Constitution for the state of (such and such) permits and allows for a party who has a claim against them to challenge the evidence, to have access to discovery, and to compel witnesses. While I present to this body that the information that I just presented may be construed as such a challenge. It is not my wish or my Will to offend the sanctity of the court, however I must insist that my rights be recognized and acknowledged by this body. I also must submit to this body that is one of the people for the state of (such and such) this court has an obligation to protect my rights as secured by the Constitution for the state of (such and such) and I am now making it clear that I require this court to protect my secured rights as recognized in the Constitution of the state of (such and such) Some people say that this will never work! That the courts won't pay attention to this when you demand that this matter be on the record, that it audio record the proceedings, you have already prepared yourself for an appeal. In your appeal was based on them not granting you each of the things that you demanded.

In your original response in answer to the court you will have to bring to their attention that you are not a collective entity, you must tell the court that you are appearing in special appearance you must also indicate to the court that you are there in your proper person we found this to be very helpful, we asked the court is it a legislative court or a judicial court? In Williams vs. United States 1933 the Supreme Court explained the difference between a legislative court in a judicial court. You must ask the court every time you go and are the legislative or judicial? (They will not answer you on this question, they will ask a question or be vague in their answer) when they failed to answer your question then you simply say I perceive that base by the wording of the Constitution for the state of (such and such) that this is a legislative court, and as such it has no judicial power and or authority over the people of the state of (such and such) of which I am a member! And that being the case, it is incumbent upon me to advise this court that it must state for the record from where it derives its authority and/or power. And if the courts response does not purport to confer judicial power, then I demand that these proceedings cease and desist immediately! The case for the collective entity is Braswell vs United States, and the FCC versus AT&T case (May 2011) in case anyone needed reference. Ladies and gentlemen we cannot promise that these arguments will work for you, would we can assure you is that we have gone into court

and we have literally argued the fact that the court is a Corporation, we got the CF goals name of the Corporation and presented to the court, they have yet to respond in reference to our mentioning that a Corporation has no lawful authority to try anyone, arrest anyone, and/or sanction anyone. We have also mentioned that the police departments are corporations, and that they are private and separate from the state. (You might want to check out Rod class website, as he had a North Carolina case brought before the administrative hearing officer's by which this very fact was brought to light in 2011). Remember we are believing that if anyone is in federal court that the corporate office would be the circuit appeals court for that particular area, we haven't had the opportunity to find out who the CFO for the Court of Appeals for the circuit of what ever circuit United States exists, but we will be looking for that information soon. I hope that the above information proves to be a benefit for some, I know that some people are saying "how come you have so much success when everybody else doesn't?" The answer is simple I don't know! I know that I am pretty creative with the way I word documents, that I don't leave them any wiggle room and that if they answer a question (and my questions are always obvious I know that many of you have not heard much for me lately, but my hope is to change that beginning in June, so a week and a half more and I'll be able to contribute the research that I've been doing lately..... So from 4:30 to 5:35 in the a.m. understand that my contribution is not

minor, I'm grateful that I was able to produce this without distraction from phone calls, e-mails, and the like. And asked that all of you have a very good day...

[3:09:51 PM] Sky Pilot: Quoting in pertinent part from Anderson vs. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1987): " The first issue we address is whether the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been altered by operation of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the Code] 1-207 (in Colorado 4-1-207, 2 C.R.S. (1973)), where a negotiable instrument is tendered as full payment to settle a disputed claim.

At common law an accord is a contract under which an obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty, the performance of which discharges the original duty. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 281 (1981). The enforceability of the accord is governed by the rules applicable to the enforceability of contracts in general. Caldwell v. Armstrong, 642 P.2d 47 (Colo.App.1982). In the case of a check offered as "payment in full" for a disputed amount, generally a creditor cannot avoid the consequences of accepting the accord, i.e., cashing the check, by declaring that he does not assent to the condition attached by the debtor. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 281 comment d (1981).

This court long ago stated that:

In order to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is necessary that the money should be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and it must be such that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand therefrom that if he takes it, he takes it subject to such conditions.

Pitts v. National Indep. Fisheries Co., 71 Colo. 316, 318, 206 P. 571 (1922) (quoted as the general rule in Colorado in Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151

Page 420 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 391 (1962); Pospicil v. Hammers, 148 Colo. 207, 365 P.2d 228 (1961); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hollenbeck, 124 Colo. 130, 235 P.2d 792 (1951); Reither, 680 P.2d at 1344).

In Reither, the court of appeals found that an accord and satisfaction occurred when Reither, a construction company, cashed two checks offered as full payment in a dispute between Reither and the defendant, an electric distribution utility. Reither had crossed out the conditions of full payment from the checks, wrote that the checks were only partial payments of the claim, and then cashed them. The

court of appeals held that the restrictive endorsement placed on the checks by Reither over the original restrictive language was ineffective. The court held that section 4-1-207 did not alter the result. Reither, 680 P.2d at 1344. We agree with this reasoning.

Section 4-1-207 provides:

A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without prejudice", "under protest", or the like are sufficient.

4-1-207, 2 C.R.S. (1973).

The effect of this section upon the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been addressed by many courts and commentators. It is now clear that the majority view holds that section 1-207 of the Code does not alter the common law of accord and satisfaction as applied to "full payment" or "conditioned" checks. See, e.g., Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1983); Pillow v. Thermogas Co., 6 Ark.App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982); Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal.App.3d 54, 184 Cal.Rptr. 436 (1982); Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So.2d 312 (Fla.App.1981); Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484

A.2d 1008 (Me.1984); Cass Constr. Co. v. Brennar, 222 Neb. 69, 382 N.W.2d 313 (1986); Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., Inc., 175 N.J.Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980); Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C.App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980); Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or.App. 364, 664 P.2d 419 (1983); Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985); Department of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash.App. 671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980); Flambeau Prod. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 116 Wis.2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 655 (1984); Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo.1979); but see Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985); 3 Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D.1976).

The majority view is supported by commentators. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 281 comment d, notes that U.C.C. 1-207 "need not be read as changing this well-established rule" of accord and satisfaction under which a creditor cannot accept an accord while reserving rights under the original agreement. Another commentator states that the sound view of U.C.C. 1-207 is that it does not authorize a creditor to accept a payment with a reservation that rejects the terms on which the payment was tendered. 1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 1-207:3 (3d ed. 1981); 6 Anderson 3-408:54--408:57 (3d ed. 1984). See also 6 Corbin, Contracts 1279 (2d ed. 1984 Supp.) (the common law doctrine is not affected).

We are persuaded by the majority view of section 1-207. The Official Comment for U.C.C. 1-207 states:

Page 421

This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute....

Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code does not displace principles of common law unless the Code specifically provides for that result and the comments to section 1-207 do not indicate a change in the common law. Accord Brown, 261 S.E.2d at 268-69; Department of Fisheries, 610 P.2d at 395-96. There is no clearly expressed legislative direction to alter the common law, therefore, we find that section 1207 is not applicable to a "full payment" check, and the cashing of a check bearing restrictive language results in an accord and satisfaction. Accord Flambeau Prod., 341 N.W.2d at 664.

We affirm the holding in Reither which finds that the common law of accord and satisfaction is not altered by section 4-1-207."