Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SECR~T
\ speci~l~c~~s,:~:ues: None
\Prepar~~y:t>!et~~Snell, 1110/04
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of Intelligence Operations Specialist withinthe.Radical Fundamentalist Unit of the
\ International Terrorism Section. After ih~ 199~''1~ast Africa embassy bombings,
I ~as assigned to the newly-created UBL ..unit, where he became the Program
Manager for the Kenbom and Tanbom cases, ..assisting on the renditions the defendants in
those cases, In 1999, he worked ohthe Manila.Air case. He spent time in Saudi Arabia
in May 200~~. ""'\. \\., .-.-.::--
...'.
j
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9/11 Classified Information
•
IThe
Bureau also searched MAQ's
cubicle and office computer at the University of Arizona, where he was working as a
"~Cf<~i
9/11 Personal Privacy
• \,pfti~ie)n his.cubicle, frequently sleeping there despite his claims to his wife that he was
actually working. -,He would waituntil late at night to leave, presumably so he could
retri~ve his carwithout paying the $2.6(rpar.k.i~g fee at the garage.
During histime in the Tucson area, MAQ was active in the Saudi Student Club,
which used to consist,of] 5-25 students but is no longer in existence, He appeared to
function as a facilitator.or "go-to guy" for Saudi students, helping them with
miscelJaneous problemssuch as transportation, living accommodations, and visa issues.'
He had a connection at the-Saudi Embassy and seemed intent on extending his stay in the
US indefinitely. He also was. very interested in gaining control of the Islamic Center of
Tucson. especially after the Imam (Omar Shaheen) deprted. although he denied to
I ~ver hoping to become'Jhe ICT Imam·himself.l
I
9/11 Classified Information
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~_~~~oesn't see MAQ as ~h.-,AI-Qaeda operative, but thinks he may have
worked as a facilitator, MAQ definitely was sympathetic to the AI Qaeda cause, as
evidenced by ph'Qt6~ of slain Afghani women and children he would send to his
"brothers" over t~\ l\ternet. \ .
During his ti~'~ in southern Arizona, MAQ, maintained contact with his student
advisor, Ali Badi, at lpl~m University in Riyadh. Badi functioned as MAQ's contact and
helped him apply for a~~,gain extensions of his course..of study in the US. It was MAQ's
practice to go home to Saudi Arabia each summer, unti't Iwas
prevented from retuming\~\ the US.
I ~as read...
i~e FD-302 of the October 2003 interview of MAQ in Riyadh
and considers the interviewto have been consistent with his own interviews of MAO,
perhaps "too consist~nt."/
9/11 Classified Information
noted
reason.
ttl
With respect to the Noeernber 19, 1999 America West flight incid.~~tJ
:AO afd Hamdan Al-Shalawi seemed to want to a directflight for some
.h~.?rizedthat, ~i's}httrained A~ o'p.erative,..~J..Sha~awiplausibly would
I
have been t e one to ask.¥AQ to sc'qu~the accessibility of-the cockpit, WIthout MAQ
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ever even knowing the purpose.of the..·~:~ercise. .
-'--. "\:-,
······:\9·/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
SECREI 2
~(;;l Personal Pri vacy .: /"0/11 Law Enforcement Pri vacy
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sEe"~~T"",,./7 \:\.: .
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Recalling MAJi.f
deme~.during t~e proffer sessionsl" ~bserved that
he appeared to become-much more cautious when speaking aboiit Soubra and Ghassan
Al-Sharby, whom MAQ claimed to have met at the dinner hosted by Al-Shalawi.
at all. . ."'>
• seCKEl 3 .