You are on page 1of 3

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy M Fi20LlO 1i-511

SECR~T

"-\\~---\"'Mt:MORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

• \ \\,\::u:E\~.~t: Interview of FBI Special Ageilti..... ......


\T:rpeQrevent: Interview

'\ D;t.~~Ja~(1~Y7, 2004

\ speci~l~c~~s,:~:ues: None

\Prepar~~y:t>!et~~Snell, 1110/04

~,eam Numb~r: 1"\\:':::


L~~ation: Fa[~»hoeniX,\ ""<:,
Particlpants - N'Z,J\\cominis~'ID~::~B I Assistant General Counsel Sean 0 'Neill

partf\iPants - CO~.~1.~.sion: b.~.~tet:.~~.~~ll,


Raj De

····\SpecialAgend '.... '.... Ibe,~a~


his career with the FBI as analyst at
headquarters, where he wasposted be.tweeli'.J,997 and 2002. Specifically, he held the title


of Intelligence Operations Specialist withinthe.Radical Fundamentalist Unit of the
\ International Terrorism Section. After ih~ 199~''1~ast Africa embassy bombings,
I ~as assigned to the newly-created UBL ..unit, where he became the Program
Manager for the Kenbom and Tanbom cases, ..assisting on the renditions the defendants in
those cases, In 1999, he worked ohthe Manila.Air case. He spent time in Saudi Arabia
in May 200~~. ""'\. \\., .-.-.::--
...'.

After\~ecoming a special agen'~'1 I~a~


ass'i'g~~d"to the Tucson RA in
August-September 2002 and was made co-case agentof the ~uhammed AI-Qudhaieen
case. Initially assigned to handle the criminal side of tliat case'J "', t;ubsequently
became the sole, case agent after the case was made a 3151 "'~analed the proffer
ofMAQ over a three-week period in the summer of2003, when MAQ,,~a§ being geld on
.a material witness warrant issued out of the Eastern District of Virginia. 'j j who
had interviewed l\1AQ once before during a period of heightened alert, found him very
difficult to interrogate, due to MAQ's tendency not to admit particular facts (such as
knowing certain individuals or visiting certain websites) until confronted with proof on
such issues. Indeed) ~escribed the process as "pulling teeth" and recalled that
MAQ's own attorney had to Intercede and admonish MAQ that things would only get
worse if he did not become more cooperative. MAQ was in custody until August 24,
2003, when he arrived back in Riyadh.

j
~~~--~~~----------~~~~--~~
9/11 Classified Information


IThe
Bureau also searched MAQ's
cubicle and office computer at the University of Arizona, where he was working as a

"~Cf<~i
9/11 Personal Privacy

:\~:,,',:·::··Tea<;hi~gASSis~ntWhile completing his ::::::te in linguistics. MA Q spent a great deal

• \,pfti~ie)n his.cubicle, frequently sleeping there despite his claims to his wife that he was
actually working. -,He would waituntil late at night to leave, presumably so he could
retri~ve his carwithout paying the $2.6(rpar.k.i~g fee at the garage.

\'MAQ admitted taki~g·a.f;ou A'~'onceJo see the construction of the


King Fahd Mosque with his friend' After claiming.not to recognize photos
of Fahad Al- Thumairy an' MAQ admittedspeaking with them
\\ only after being confronte WIt t elf names. He a so eventually admitted ·that·D
I . Icame ..t~ Tucson to speak.

During histime in the Tucson area, MAQ was active in the Saudi Student Club,
which used to consist,of] 5-25 students but is no longer in existence, He appeared to
function as a facilitator.or "go-to guy" for Saudi students, helping them with
miscelJaneous problemssuch as transportation, living accommodations, and visa issues.'
He had a connection at the-Saudi Embassy and seemed intent on extending his stay in the
US indefinitely. He also was. very interested in gaining control of the Islamic Center of
Tucson. especially after the Imam (Omar Shaheen) deprted. although he denied to
I ~ver hoping to become'Jhe ICT Imam·himself.l

I
9/11 Classified Information


~_~~~oesn't see MAQ as ~h.-,AI-Qaeda operative, but thinks he may have
worked as a facilitator, MAQ definitely was sympathetic to the AI Qaeda cause, as
evidenced by ph'Qt6~ of slain Afghani women and children he would send to his
"brothers" over t~\ l\ternet. \ .

During his ti~'~ in southern Arizona, MAQ, maintained contact with his student
advisor, Ali Badi, at lpl~m University in Riyadh. Badi functioned as MAQ's contact and
helped him apply for a~~,gain extensions of his course..of study in the US. It was MAQ's
practice to go home to Saudi Arabia each summer, unti't Iwas
prevented from retuming\~\ the US.

I ~as read...
i~e FD-302 of the October 2003 interview of MAQ in Riyadh
and considers the interviewto have been consistent with his own interviews of MAO,
perhaps "too consist~nt."/
9/11 Classified Information

noted
reason.
ttl
With respect to the Noeernber 19, 1999 America West flight incid.~~tJ
:AO afd Hamdan Al-Shalawi seemed to want to a directflight for some
.h~.?rizedthat, ~i's}httrained A~ o'p.erative,..~J..Sha~awiplausibly would
I

have been t e one to ask.¥AQ to sc'qu~the accessibility of-the cockpit, WIthout MAQ


ever even knowing the purpose.of the..·~:~ercise. .
-'--. "\:-,
······:\9·/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
SECREI 2
~(;;l Personal Pri vacy .: /"0/11 Law Enforcement Pri vacy

\.\:><. .
":'. ''.~'''...'::
sEe"~~T"",,./7 \:\.: .

\. >:>:-<:'.:.' Discussing the seplo.00(;nc4i~nt in~OI~jngMAQ's return of his


e\::\ \':~""'\
·ce.t~~honeto a Costeo store, . 'ecalled.that MAQ claimed the phone was broken
\\ \. '::~ndtpat he returned it so he cou get a refund, or alternatively (and inconsistently) that
\.:..... \ti:e:.wailt"¢4 to exchange it. (The Costeo employee mairitained'that the phone was fine.)
\\" rVf.AQ denied trying to damage the phone h~mself and :nsisteci ...that he sim I wanted to
\..::\.. retrieve eerlai·n:.n~mbers from its memo . .:'. \. :" ..

\:\ . ··~;~h:'.!'es~~i:~~·MAQ'Sperio<jiitrijl$ to Tempe,r----,p!ted that it washard


\ """to nail down ju~.t how man' ·.such tri s/occurred. The F~ 'to ascertain t~'at MAQ
\.\ attended a p·artY·:thrown b'. in or around.the summer of200t:attended
\. \.by Al-Shalawi ..~nd ... an ,':one oste by Al-Shalawi in Sept~ber-odober
\'"\fOOO, at which ~yed"Abdullah ~,d'Z~karia: Soubra also were present.'1 thinks
\.the latter party may have been a-send-off fof Al-Shalawi. \

\\. One OfMAQ'S.-.Pri~Cip~ractivities·~~·ln~erestconsisted of his att~dance at the


p~~-prayer meetings held 09 ~rida evenin 's by! ~t his apa.,inent, particularly
aft.e. '.peI)ie· se of the ICT. These meetings, which were
att~nded by 12-25 individ~als, occurre unpg a power struggle between Pakistani and
Gulf Arab factions that werevying for control of the lCT. MAQ took over the meetings
afte1 left, b~,r't?ey eventually cea~ed being held. \ //


Recalling MAJi.f
deme~.during t~e proffer sessionsl" ~bserved that
he appeared to become-much more cautious when speaking aboiit Soubra and Ghassan
Al-Sharby, whom MAQ claimed to have met at the dinner hosted by Al-Shalawi.

,....._......I.....,t- .........i~~ects that th7 traini.~i?f!Y'A Q and ~1'~Shalawii~


a.-__ I~~y
...... ha~:e some operational slgmfir,ance for ~j:-Qaeda. // 11------ ..
... ~~.not
a.- __ ....
_ heard MAQ talk alxi~fl ... ..' ~r Hani Hanj our

at all. . ."'>

9/11 Law Enfoicement Sensitive

• seCKEl 3 .

You might also like