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CASE DIGESTS IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS LAW (Atty.

Lapid)

Submitted by: Dea A!e A. Pama"a

#. E$pi"itu %$. &e'(a" (#))*) +a!t$: Three similar complaints were filed with the DILG, Office of the Provincial Governor, and Office of the President, accusing Mayor Melgar of physically assaulting and arresting complainant without any reason !angguniang Panlalawigan, after evaluation, passed a resolution recommending the Provincial Governor to preventively suspend him pending the administrative case so Mayor Melgar was suspended "y Governor #spiritu Melgar filed petition with $T% which en&oined the Governor from implementing the order of suspension ,e'd: $T% has no &urisdiction to en&oin the governor from preventively suspending the mayor %learly, under !ec'( of the )old* LG%, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authori+ed "y law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of ,au&an at anytime after the issues had "een &oined and any of the following grounds were shown to e-ist: ).* /hen there is reasona"le ground to "elieve that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of0 )1* /hen the evidence of culpa"ility is strong0 )(* /hen the gravity of the offense so warrants0 or )2* /hen the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence The rationale of preventive suspension is so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possi"le witnesses )Lacson vs $o3ue, 41 Phil 25'* 6lso, Melgar failed to e-haust administrative remedies !ince respondent mayor "elieved that his preventive suspension was un&ustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the !ecretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts 7owever, once the '89day preventive suspension has "een served, the official is deemed reinstated in office without pre&udice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him *. Bu ye %$. E$!a"ea' (#))-) +a!t$: Petitioners Municipal Mayor, :ice Mayor and %ouncilors 3uestions the resolution suspending them from office for 48 days pending their trial for violation of !ec()(* of the 6nti9 Graft and %orrupt Practices 6ct .

,e'd: !uspension of petitioners was proper !ec.( of $6(8.4 une3uivocally provides that the accused pu"lic official ;shall "e suspended from office< while the criminal prosecution is pending in court =nder Gonzaga case, such suspension is mandatory It is not violative of the %onstitution as it is not a penalty It is mandatory as soon as the validity of the information is determined There is no merit in the contention that their admission of the acts constituting the offense charged against them eliminates apprehension that they might tamper with the records It is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them The prosecution must "e given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non intervention and non9 interference for 48 days from petitioner>s camp The fear that the government will "e paraly+ed "y their suspension is remote There are ? councilors left who can meet as the !angguniang @ayan The President or his alter ego, the !ecretary of Interior and Local Government will Anow how to deal with the pro"lem of filling up the temporarily vacant positions in accordance with the provisions of the LG% -. Ga"!ia %$. CO&ELEC (#))-) +a!t$: On Buly.44(, some mayors, vice9mayors and mem"ers of the !angguniang @ayan of .1 municipalities of @ataan province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory $ecall 6ssem"ly )P$6* in the @agac town pla+a to initiate the recall election of Governor Garcia )elected governor of @ataan in May, .441 elections* for ;loss of confidence< %OM#L#% scheduled recall elections Governor Garcia asserts the unconstitutionality of !ecC8, LG% ,e'd: !ecC8 of LG% is constitutional The presumption of validity rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, "y which the law is passed, and the %hief #-ecutive, "y whom the law is approved Garcia does not point to any constitutional provision that will sustain their contention D for surely, there is nothing in there that will remotely suggest that the people have the ;sole and e-clusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding < The %onstitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall elections It did not prohi"it the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections The mandate given "y !ec( of 6rt E of the %onstitution is for %ongress to ;enact a LG% which shall provide for a more responsive and accounta"le local government structure through a system of decentrali+ation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum ---< %ongress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates Power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the &udgment of the electorate, and it was not straight &acAeted to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections The %onstitution re3uires only that the mechanisms chosen )one or many* "e effective %ongress deemed it wise to enact the alternative mode to supplement the former mode "y direct action, and the %ourt cannot supplant this &udgment "y %ongress in respect of the principle of separation of powers %hoice may "e erroneous "ut the remedy against a "ad law is to seeA its amendment or repeal "y the legislative Initiation "y the P$6% is also initiation "y the people, al"eit done indirectly through their representatives this act "y the people through their elected representatives is not constitutionally impermissi"le as seen in the tasA of drafting the %onstitution which is delegated to their representatives )either "y constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assem"ly* 1

Initiation of recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot "e entrusted to and e-ercised "y the elected representatives of the people P$6 resolution of recall is not the recall itself The P$6 resolution merely starts the process D only a part of the process, and not the whole This is self9evident "ecause a P$6 resolution of recall that is not su"mitted to the %OM#L#% for validation will not recall its su"&ect officials LiAewise, a P$6 resolution of recall that is re&ected "y the people in the election called for the purpose "ears no effect whatsoever The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear "efore the tri"unal of the people so he can &ustify why he should "e allowed to continue in office @efore the people render their sovereign &udgment, the official concerned remains in office "ut his right to continue in office is su"&ect to 3uestion This is clear in !ecC1, LG% which e-plicitly states that ;the recall of an elective local official shall "e effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest num"er of votes cast during the election on recall < The fear e-pressed is that the mem"ers of P$6% may in&ect political color in their decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those "elonging to the minority %areful reading of the law will show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials "elonging to the political minority The politically neutral composition of the P$6 under !ecC8)"* where all mayors, vice9mayors, sanggunian mem"ers of municipality and component cities are made mem"ers of the P$6 at the provincial level9its mem"ership is not apportioned to political parties D no significance is given to the political affiliation of its mem"ers P$6 at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned9 considering their num"er, the greater pro"a"ility is that no one political party can control its ma&ority !ec '4, LG% provides that the only ground to recall is loss of confidence of the people The mem"ers of P$6% are there not in representation of their political parties "ut as representatives of the peoples @y necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot "e premised on mere differences in political party affiliation The %onstitution even encourages multi9party system to nurture the democratic system Fear that a P$6 may "e dominated "y a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political persuasions is not a ground to striAe down the law as unconstitutional Moreover, law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process "y a P$6 will not "e corrupted "y e-traneous influences Its diverse and distinct composition guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate province shall "e heard Following are re3uired for the validity of resolution: ).* ,otice to all mem"ers is a condition sine 3ua non to the validity of its proceedings0 )1* Law also re3uires a 3ualified ma&ority of all the P$6 mem"ers to convene in session and in a pu"lic place0 )(* 6lso, the recall resolution "y ma&ority must "e adopted during its session called for the purpose Furthermore, it cannot "e claimed that the P$6 mem"ers voted along narrow political lines ,either %OM#L#% nor !% made a &udicial in3uiry as to the reason that led the mem"ers of the said recall assem"ly to cast a vote against Garcia Pimentel in his "ooA stressed that the su"stantive content of a vote of lacA of confidence is "eyond any in3uiry D a political 3uestion )as held in Evardone vs COMELEC*The proposal will still "e passed upon "y the sovereign electorate of @ataan D yet to "e e-pressed It is premature to conclude that the will has "een su"verted If electorate re9elects him, the proposal to recall is re&ected If they do not, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once en&oyed

GC. !'u$i. : The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a P$6 is an innovative attempt "y %ongress to remove impediments to the effective e-ercise "y the people of their sovereign power to checA the performance of their elected officials The power to determine this mode was specifically given to %ongress and is not proscri"ed "y the %onstitution H GSC Re$.'uti. : The re3uirement of notice is mandatory for it is indispensa"le in determining the collective wisdom of the mem"ers of P$6 Its non9o"servance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall Garcia as Governor of @ataan The due process clause of the %onstitution re3uiring notice as an element of fairness is inviola"le and should always "e considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence ,eed for notice to all mem"ers of P$6 is also imperative for these mem"ers represent the different sectors of the electorate $esolution to recall should articulate the ma&ority will of the mem"ers of the assem"ly "ut the ma&ority will can "e genuinely determined only after all the mem"ers have "een given a fair opportunity to e-press the will of their constituents In accord with the !% $esolution, ,otice of !ession was again sent to the mem"ers of P$6% H /. Pa"a$ %$. CO&ELEC (#))0) +a!t$: Petition for recall of Paras as Punong @arangay )elected last .442 regular "arangay elections* was filed "y the registered voters of the "arangay %OM#L#% approved the petition and scheduled the petition signing on Octo"er.2, .445 and set the recall election on ,ov.(, .445 6t least 14 (8I of registered voters signed the petition )a"ove the re3uired 15I* Paras opposed so recall election was deferred "y %OM#L#% to Dec.', .445 %OM#L#% rescheduled recall election on Ban.(, .44' ,e'd: There can still "e a recall election even with the four )2* months that separate the recall election from the upcoming !J elections #vident intent of !ecC2 of LG% is to su"&ect an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office Paragraph )"* construed together with paragraph )a* merely designates the period when such elective official may "e su"&ect of a recall election, that is, during the 1nd year of his term of office Thus, su"scri"ing to Paras> interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the !J election will unduly circumscri"e the novel provision of the LG% on recall, a mode of removal of pu"lic officers "y initiation of the people "efore the end of his term If the !J election were to "e deemed within the purview of the phrase ;regular local election< )to "e held every (years from May.44'*, then no recall election can "e conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LG% It is a "asic precept of statutory construction that a statute should "e interpreted in harmony with the %onstitution Interpretation of !ecC2)"*, LG% should not "e in conflict with the constitutional mandate of !ec(, 6rt E to ;enact a LG% which shall provide for a more responsive and accounta"le local government structure instituted through a system of decentrali+ation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum ---< $ecall election is potentially disruptive of the normal worAing of the LG= necessitating additional e-penses, hence the prohi"ition against the conduct of recall election .year immediately preceding the regular local election The proscription is due to the pro-imity of the ne-t regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned #lectorate could choose the official>s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election Therefore, it would "e more in Aeeping with the intent of the recall provision of the %ode to construe regular local election as one referring to 2

an election where the office held "y the local elective official sought to "e recalled will "e contested and "e filled "y the electorate 7owever, recall is no longer possi"le in the case at "ar "ecause of the limitation under !ecC2)"* D the ne-t regular election involving the "arangay office concerned is "arely Cmonths away )scheduled on May.44C* GDa%ide C. !u""i ( Opi i. : !J election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under !ecC2, LG% The term ;regular local election< must "e confined to the regular election of local elective officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials )President, :P, !enators and %ongressmen* The officials enumerated under footnote are the only local elective officials deemed recogni+ed "y !ec1 par )1* of 6rt IE9% of %onstitution )%OM#L#%>s power and e-clusive original &urisdiction over all contests relating to elections, returns, and 3ualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate &urisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided "y $T%s of general &urisdiction, or involving elective "arangay officials decided "y trial courts of limited &urisdiction* 6 regular election )local or national* can only refer to an election participated in "y those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise dis3ualified "y law, and who are registered voters One of the re3uirements for e-ercise of suffrage under !ec., 6rt : of the %onstitution is that the person must "e at least .?years of age, and one re3uisite "efore he can vote is that he "e a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescri"ed in the Omni"us #lection %ode )!ec..(9..?* =nder the law, !J includes the youth with ages ranging from .591. )!ec212, LG%* 6ccordingly, they include many who are not 3ualified to vote in a regular election D those from ages .5 to less than .? In no manner then may !J elections "e considered a regular election !J is nothing more than a youth organi+ation 6lthough fully recogni+ed in LG% and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained the status of local elective officials 1. +'."e$ %$. D"i'. (#))-) +a!t$: Mayor Gordon of Olongapo %ity was appointed %hairmanK%#O of the !@M6 pursuant to $6C1CC ;@ases %onversion L Development 6ct of .441< which provides that9 The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the !u"ic 6uthority with a compensation to "e determined "y the @oard su"&ect to the approval of the !ecretary of @udget, who shall "e the e- officio chairman of the @oard and who shall serve as the chief e-ecutive officer of the !u"ic 6uthority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this 6ct, the mayor of the %ity of Olongapo shall "e appointed as the chairman and chief e-ecutive officer of the !u"ic 6uthority Petitioners filed an original petition "efore the !%, challenging the constitutionality of the proviso a"ove ,e'd: The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts The proscription is an affirmation that a pu"lic office is a full9time &o" 6 pu"lic officer should "e precluded from dissipating his effortsM among too many positions of responsi"ility, which may result in inefficiency !ection 42 of LG% which permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed "y law or "y the primary functions of his office is untena"le ,o legislative act can prevail over the %onstitution This view ignores the clear9cut difference in the wording "etween the two paragraphs of !ection C 6rt IE9@, wKc distinction was purposely sought "y the drafters of the %onstitution 5

7olding of multiple offices "y an appointive official is permitted when allowed "y law or "y the primary functions of his position is more stringent It does not provide any e-ception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts e-cept as particularly recogni+ed in the %onstitution itself, such as: President, as head of the #conomic and Planning 6gency2 :ice9President, who may "e appointed as %a"inet mem"er2 %ongressman, who may "e designated e- officio mem"er of the Budicial L @ar %ouncil The e-emption allowed to appointive officials can>t "e e-tended to elective officials The contention that !@M6 posts are merely e- officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo %ity, hence, an e-cepted circumstance citing Civil Liberties v Exec Secretary where the %ourt held that the prohi"ition in !ection .( 6rt :II of the %onstitution doesn>t apply to additional duties L functions re3uired "y the primary functions of the official concerned, who are to perform them in an e- officio capacityM is also untena"le %ongress did not contemplate maAing the !@M6 posts as e- officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo %ity wKo need of appointment The phrase ;shall "e appointed< shows the intent to maAe the posts appointive In the !enate deli"erations, !en !aguisag suggested that they maAe the post e- officio so as not to contravene !ection C paragrap . of 6rt IE9@ of the %onstitution, "ut %ongress decided to have the controversy resolved "y the courts instead That the proviso is ,OT a legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the PresidentMThe power of appointment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint /hen %ongress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate, even on the prete-t of prescri"ing 3ualifications of the officer )as in this case, where the 3ualifications prescri"ed can only "e met "y one individual* !uch enactment eliminates the discretion of the appointing power Gand encroaches upon his power of appointmentH GS.'uti. : !ince the ineligi"ility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incum"ency, Gordon may resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally9attached dis3ualification H GC. !'u$i. : Gordon>s appointment pursuant to an unconstitutional legislative act is null L void 7e however remains Mayor of Olongapo %ity 7is acts as !@M6 %hairK%#O are not necessarily null and void 7e may "e considered a de facto officer, whose acts will hold valid in so far as they involve the interests of the pu"lic and third persons 6lso, all emoluments received "y Gordon pursuant to his appointment may "e retained "y him H 0. Sa'a'ima %$. Gui (. a (#))0) +a!t$: Petitioners, mem"ers of the !angguniang Panlalawigan of 6l"ay, seeA to annul and set aside 6dministrative Order .5(, signed "y the President and "y pu"lic respondent #-ecutive !ecretary Teofisto Guingona, approving the finding of fact and recommendations of the 6d 7oc %ommittee and holding petitioners administratively lia"le The order meted out on each petitioner penalties of suspension of different durations, to "e served successively "ut not to go "eyond their respective une-pired terms in accordance with !ection '' )"* of LG% Petitioners argued that the order is an oppressive and capricious e-ercise of e-ecutive power ,e'd: !ection '' )"* of LG% provides that the penalty of suspension shall not e-ceed the une-pired term of the respondent or a period of si- )'* months for every 6dministrative Offense, nor shall said penalty "e a "ar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meet the 3ualifications for the office 6n administrative offense means every act or conduct or '

omission which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action In the case at "ar, there is no grave a"use of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof e-ceeded the si- months and the une-pired portion of the petitionersN term of office The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not e-ceed si- months and there was an e-press provision that the successive service of suspension should not e-ceed the une-pired portion of the petitionersN term The suspension does not amount to petitionersN removal from office 7owever, the petitioners cannot "e administratively lia"le This is so "ecause pu"lic officials cannot "e su"&ect to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term The %ourt should never remove a pu"lic officer for acts done prior to his present term of office To do otherwise would "e to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers /hen the people have elected a man to office, it must "e assumed that they did this with Anowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had "een guilty of any The %ourt cannot practically overrule the will of the people The lia"ilities of the petitioners who signed $esolution .14 authori+ing petitioner !alalima to enter into the retainer contract in 3uestion who were reelected in the .441 elections are condoned This is, however, without pre&udice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases 3. &a'i a. %$. Reye$ (#))0) +a!t$: Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor $ed for a"use of authority and denial of due process with the !angguniang Panlalawigan of Marindu3ue On 6ugust .1, .442, mem"ers of the !anggunian, "y a vote of 5 to (, found $ed guilty, vote signed only "y presiding chairman On !eptem"er 5, the !anggunian, voting C to 1, ac3uitted $ed of the charges against him This vote was em"odied in a Decision which was signed "y all the mem"ers Malinao argued that the First !anggunian Decision had already "ecome final and e-ecutory for failure of $ed to appeal The issue is whether or not the second Decision is valid ,e'd: Oes, the second decision of ac3uittal is valid In any case, this issue is already moot and academic as a result of the e-piration of $ed>s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and further proceedings are "arred "y his reelection G!ec '')"* LG%H $eelection a"ates any administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official G=nder !ec '' )"* of the LG%, the penalty of suspension cannot e-ceed the une-pired term of the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against said official is a"ated if in the meantime he is re9elected "ecause such re9election is a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term In order to render a decision in an administrative case involving elected local officials, the decision of the !anggunian must "e in writing, stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision H 4. Ga"!ia %$. &.5i!a (#)))) +a!t$: Garcia, as %e"u %ity mayor, signed a contract with F # Puellig for supply of asphalt to the city %ontract covers the period .44?9188. which was to commence on !eptem"er.44? when the first delivery should have "een made "y Puellig March.444, news reports came out regarding alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt "y %e"u %ity, through the contract signed "y C

Garcia D which prompted Office of Om"udsman ):isayas* to conduct an in3uiry Preventive suspension order was issued "y the Office of the Om"udsman Garcia assails validity of the order ,e'd: There can "e no 3uestion as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Om"udsman Mo&ica to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official liAe Garcia D to prevent that official from using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses or to tamper with records that might "e vital to the prosecution of the case against him 7owever, the said office cannot hold him administratively lia"le for acts committed prior to his present term of office It has repeatedly held in a num"er of cases that a reelected local official may not "e held administratively accounta"le for misconduct committed during his prior term of office The rationale is that when the electorate put him "acA into office, it is presumed that it did so with full Anowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct If, armed with such Anowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds That the people voted for an official with Anowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the e-tent of this Anowledge !uch an undertaAing is impossi"le $ulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, recAoned from the date of the official>s reelection, e-cept that it must "e prior to said date G!alalima case applies D that sound policy dictates it To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to e-acer"ating endless partisan contests "etween the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have "een committed during his previous term In the case at "ar, Garcia cannot anymore "e held administrative lia"le for an act done during his previous term )his signing of contract with Puellig* H ). 6a%e''a a %$. DILG +a!t$: This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a pu"lic official to engage in the practice of his profession while employed in the Government 6ttorney #rwin @ Bavellana was an elected %ity %ouncilor of @ago %ity, ,egros Occidental %ity #ngineer #rnesto % Divinagracia filed 6dministrative %ase ,o %9.8948 against Bavellana for: ).* violation of Department of Local Government )DLG* Memorandum %ircular ,o ?89(? dated Bune .8, .4?8 in relation to DLG Memorandum %ircular ,o C295? and of !ection C, paragraph ", ,o 1 of $epu"lic 6ct ,o 'C.(, otherwise Anown as the Q%ode of %onduct and #thical !tandards for Pu"lic Officials and #mployees,Q and )1* for oppression, misconduct and a"use of authority DivinagraciaNs complaint alleged that Bavellana, an incum"ent mem"er of the %ity %ouncil or !anggunian Panglungsod of @ago %ity, and a lawyer "y profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the $egional Director, Department of Local Government, as re3uired "y DLG Memorandum %ircular ,o ?89(? in relation to DLG Memorandum %ircular ,o C295? of the same department On the other hand, Bavellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG Memorandum %irculars ,os ?89(? and 489?. are unconstitutional "ecause the !upreme %ourt has the sole and e-clusive authority to regulate the practice of law ?

,e'd: PetitionerNs contention that !ection 48 of the Local Government %ode of .44. and DLG Memorandum %ircular ,o 489?. violate 6rticle :III, !ection 5 of the %onstitution is completely off tangent ,either the statute nor the circular trenches upon the !upreme %ourtNs power and authority to prescri"e rules on the practice of law The Local Government %ode and DLG Memorandum %ircular ,o 489?. simply prescri"e rules of conduct for pu"lic officials to avoid conflicts of interest "etween the discharge of their pu"lic duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it !ection 48 of the Local Government %ode does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation !ection 48 e-plicitly provides that sanggunian mem"ers Qmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools e-pect during session hours Q If there are some prohi"itions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is "ecause of all the professions, the practice of law is more liAely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of pu"lic service #7. Rabu!. %$. 8i''e(a$ +a!t$: The Qdominant and ine-trica"le issueQ at "ar, as correctly perceived "y the appellate court is the constitutionality of $epu"lic 6ct (.18 where"y %ongress converted the lot in 3uestion together with another lot in !an 6ndres, Malate Qwhich are reserved as communal propertyQ into Qdisposa"le or aliena"le lands of the !tate to "e placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure 6dministrationQ for su"division into small lots not e-ceeding .18 s3uare meters per lot for sale on installment "asis to the tenants or "ona fide occupants thereof and e-pressly prohi"ited e&ectment and demolition of petitionersN homes under section 1 of the 6ct as 3uoted in the appellate courtNs certification resolution ,e'd: If the 6ct is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due process of law and without &ust compensation as contended "y respondents city officials, then the trial courtNs refusal to en&oin e&ectment and demolition of petitionersN houses may "e upheld Otherwise, petitionersN right under the 6ct to continue possession and occupation of the premises and to the lifting and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must "e enforced and the trial courtNs &udgment must "e set aside $espondents city officialsN contention that the 6ct must "e stricAen down as unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in 3uestion and providing for their sale in su"divided small lots to "ona fide occupants or tenants without payment of &ust compensation is untena"le and without "asis, since the lots in 3uestion are manifestly owned "y the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore pu"lic property over which %ongress had a"solute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned "y it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not "e deprived without due process and without &ust compensation 7ere, $epu"lic 6ct (.18 e-pressly declared that the properties were Qreserved as communal propertyQ and ordered their conversion into Qdisposa"le and aliena"le lands of the !tateQ for sale in small lots to the "ona fide occupants thereof It is esta"lished doctrine that the act of classifying !tate property calls for the e-ercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not "e interfered with "y the courts !ince the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of $epu"lic 6ct (.18 must fail as the %ity was not deprived there"y of anything it owns "y ac3uisition with 4

its private or corporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the %onstitution, the provisions of said 6ct must "e enforced and petitioners are entitled to the in&unction as prayed for implementing the 6ctNs prohi"ition against their e&ectment and demolition of their houses The %ourt holds that the 6cts in 3uestion were intended to implement the social &ustice policy of the %onstitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not Qintended to e-propriate the property involved "ut merely to confirm its character as communal land of the !tate and to maAe it availa"le for disposition "y the ,ational Government: The su"division of the land and conveyane of the resulting su"division lots to the occupants "y %ongressional authori+ation does not operate as an e-ercise of the power of eminent domain without &ust compensation in violation of !ection ., su"section )1*, 6rticle III of the %onstitution, "ut simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property Q ##. T."i. %$. +. ta i''a (#)34) +a!t$: The Municipal %ouncil of Malasi3ui managed the cele"ration of the town fiesta of the municipality They ordered a stage to "e constructed foa a +ar+uela 6s the stage was not strong enough, it collapsed during the +ar+uela and the deceased was pinned to death The Municipality argued that that since it was performing a governmental function in managing the cele"ration of the fiesta, it is not lia"le for damages ,e'd: The cele"ration a town fiesta is an undertaAing in the e-ercise of a municipalityNs government proprietary character thus the municipality is lia"le The powers of a municipality are twofold in character R pu"lic, governmental, or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other Governmental powers are those e-ercised "y the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the pu"lic welfare and they include the legislative, &udicial, pu"lic, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are e-ercised for the special "enefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate In the %6@, !ection 11?1 of the %hapter on Municipal Law of the $evised 6dministrative %ode simply gives authority to the municipality to cele"rate a yearly fiesta "ut it does not impose upon it a duty to o"serve one 7olding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special "enefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the pu"lic performed in pursuance of a policy of the state The mere fact that the cele"ration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain "ut merely to provide entertainment to the town inha"itants is not a conclusive test For instance, the maintenance of parAs is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is private undertaAing as distinguished from the maintenance of pu"lic schools, &ails, and the liAe which are for pu"lic service #asily, no governmental or pu"lic policy of the state is involved in the cele"ration of a town fiesta !ince the in&ury was caused respect to the municipality>s proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can "e held lia"le to third persons e- contractu or e- delicto if found negligent, which the %6 found and held that there was negligence The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the su"committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the Q+ar+uelaQ stage Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality =nder the doctrine of respondent .8

superior mentioned petitioner is responsi"le or lia"le for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasAs Q when it is sought to render a municipal corporation lia"le for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal in3uiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove them, can hold them responsi"le for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the e-ercise of corporate powers, and are for the peculiar "enefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may &ustly "e regarded as its agents or servants, and the ma-im of respondent superior applies Q )Dillon on Municipal %orporations, 5th #d , :ol I:, p 1?C4* #*. Ga"!ia %$. CO&ELEC (#))-) +a!t$: On Buly,.44( some mayors, vice9mayors and mem"ers of the !angguniang @ayan of .1 municipalities of @ataan province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory $ecall 6ssem"ly )P$6* in the @agac town pla+a to initiate the recall election of Governor Garcia,elected governor of @ataan in May, .441 elections, for ;loss of confidence< %OM#L#% scheduled recall elections Governor Garcia asserts the unconstitutionality of !ection C8 of the Local Government %ode The issue is whether or not !ection C8 of the Local Government %ode is unconstitutionalS ,e'd: !ection C8 of LG% is constitutional The presumption of validity rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, "y which the law is passed, and the %hief #-ecutive, "y whom the law is approved Garcia et al, do not point to any constitutional provision that will sustain their contention D for surely, there is nothing in there that will remotely suggest that the people have the ;sole and e-clusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding < The %onstitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall elections It did not prohi"it the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections Mandate given "y !ec( of 6rtE of the %onstitution is for %ongress to ;enact a LG% which shall provide for a more responsive and accounta"le local government structure through a system of decentrali+ation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum < The %ongress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections are effective to carry out the &udgment of the electorate, and it was not straight&acAeted to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections The %onstitution re3uires only that the mechanisms chosen "e effective The choice may "e erroneous "ut the remedy against a "ad law is to seeA its amendment or repeal "y the legislative The re3uirement of notice is mandatory for it is indispensa"le in determining the collective wisdom of the mem"ers of P$6 Its non9o"servance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall Garcia as Governor of @ataan The due process clause of the %onstitution re3uiring notice as an element of fairness is inviola"le and should always "e considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence $esolution to recall should articulate the ma&ority will of the mem"ers of the assem"ly "ut the ma&ority will can "e genuinely determined only after all the mem"ers have "een given a fair opportunity to e-press the will of their constituents Initiation "y the P$6% is also initiation "y the people, al"eit done indirectly through their representatives, this act "y the people through their elected representatives is not constitutionally impermissi"le as seen in the tasA of drafting the %onstitution which is delegated to their ..

representatives )either "y constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assem"ly* Initiation of recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot "e entrusted to and e-ercised "y the elected representatives of the people P$6 resolution of recall is not the recall itself The P$6 resolution merely starts the process D only a part of the process, and not the whole This is self9evident "ecause a P$6 resolution of recall that is not su"mitted to the %OM#L#% for validation will not recall its su"&ect officials #-. Pa"a$ %$. CO&ELEC (#))0) +a!t$: Petition for recall of Paras as Punong @arangay )elected last .442 regular "arangay elections* was filed "y the registered voters of the "arangay %OM#L#% approved the petition and scheduled the petition signing on Octo"er.2, .445 and set the recall election on ,ov.(, .445 6t least 14 (8I of registered voters signed the petition )a"ove the re3uired 15I* Paras opposed so recall election was deferred "y %OM#L#% to Dec.', .445 %OM#L#% rescheduled recall election on Ban.(, .44' ,e'd: There can still "e a recall election even with the 2months that separate the recall election from the upcoming !J elections #vident intent of !ecC2 of LG%4 is to su"&ect an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office Paragraph )"* construed together with paragraph )a* merely designates the period when such elective official may "e su"&ect of a recall election, that is, during the 1nd year of his term of office Thus, su"scri"ing to Paras> interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the !J election will unduly circumscri"e the novel provision of the LG% on recall, a mode of removal of pu"lic officers "y initiation of the people "efore the end of his term If the !J election were to "e deemed within the purview of the phrase ;regular local election< )to "e held every (years from May.44'*, then no recall election can "e conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the LG% It is a "asic precept of stat con that a statute should "e interpreted in harmony with the %onstitution Interpretation of !ecC2)"*, LG% should not "e in conflict with %onsti mandate of !ec(, 6rtE to ;enact a LG% which shall provide for a more responsive and accounta"le local gov structure instituted through a system of decentrali+ation with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum< $ecall election is potentially disruptive of the normal worAing of the LG= necessitating additional e-penses, hence the prohi"ition against the conduct of recall election .year immediately preceding the regular local election The proscription is due to the pro-imity of the ne-t regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned #lectorate could choose the official>s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election Therefore, it would "e more in Aeeping with the intent of the recall provision of the %ode to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held "y the local elective official sought to "e recalled will "e contested and "e filled "y the electorate 7owever, recall is no longer possi"le in %6@ "ecause of the limitation under !ecC2)"* D the ne-t regular election involving the "arangay office concerned is "arely Cmonths away )scheduled on May.44C*

.1

#/. 8i.'a %$. A'u a III (#))3) +a!t$: %esar G :iola, filed petition for prohi"ition challenging the validity of 6rt III, TT.91 of the $evised Implementing $ules and Guidelines for the General #lections of the Liga ng mga @arangay Officers in so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the ,ational Liga ng mga @arangay and its chapters The issue is whether or not !ection .91 of the Implementing $ules are validS ,e'd: The creation of the additional positions is authori+ed "y T24( of LG% which in fact re3uires R and not merely authori+es R the "oard of directors to Qcreate such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapterQ and "elies petitionerNs claim that T24( limits the officers of a chapter to the president, :P, 5 mem"ers of the "oard of directors, secretary, and treasurer 6lso, the creation of these positions was actually made in the constitution and "y9laws of the Liga ng mga @arangay adopted "y the .st @arangay ,ational 6ssem"ly %ongress can delegate the power to create positions such as these !ection24( em"odies a fairly intelligi"le standard ;deemed necessary for the management of the chapters,Q There is no undue delegation of power "y %ongress !% decisions have upheld the validity of reorgani+ation statutes authori+ing the President of the Philippines to create, a"olish or merge offices in the e-ecutive department #1. 8i!t."ia %$. C.me'e! (#))/) +a!t$: The "asic 3uestion is how the ranAing of !P mem"ers should "e computed for the purpose of succession Petitioner argue that the ranAing of the !P mem"ers should not only "e "ased on the num"er of votes o"tained in relation to the total num"er of registered voters, "ut also on the num"er of voters in the district who actually voted therein )which will result in petitioner :ictoria ranAing first* ,e'd: !ec 22 of Local Gpvernment %ode last paragraph provides: QFor purposes of succession as provided in this %hapter, ranAing in the sanggunian shall "e determined on the "asis of the proportion of votes o"tained "y each winning candidates to the total num"er of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election Q The law is clear that the ranAing in the !P shall "e determined on the "asis of the proportion of the votes o"tained "y each winning candidate to the total num"er of registered voters of each district It does not mention anything a"out factoring the num"ers of voters who actually voted #0. C"u9 %$. Pa"a$ +a!t$: The municipal corporation of @ocaue, @ulacan prohi"its the e-ercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clu"s, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clu"s employing hostesses It is contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with a nullity, the municipality "eing devoid of power to prohi"it a lawful "usiness, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and e3ual protection of the laws were violated as the license previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without &udicial hearing The issue is whether or not a municipal corporation can prohi"it the e-ercise of .(

a lawful trade, the operation of night clu"s, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clu"s employing hostessesS ,e'd: It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohi"it the operation of night clu"s They may "e regulated "ut not prevented from carrying on their "usiness 6ll that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clu"s 6 refusal to grant licenses, "ecause no "usinesses could legally open, would "e su"&ect to &udicial correction That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued e-istence of night clu"s su"&ect to appropriate regulations In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their esta"lishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their "usiness #3. &a$i:ip %$. City .; Pa$i( +a!t$: The %ity of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to e-propriate a .,588 s3uare meter portion of her property to "e used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of "arangay %aniogan This was pursuant to Ordinance ,o 21 enacted "y the then !angguniang @ayan of Pasig $espondent wrote another letter to petitioner, "ut this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the municipal government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community is constitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the are of her lot is neither sufficient nor suita"le to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community $espondent reiterated that the purpose of the e-propriated of petitioner>s property is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents ,e'd: The power of eminent domain is su"&ect only to %onstitutional limitations Local government have no inherent power of eminent domain and may e-ercise it only when e-pressly authori+ed "y statute The right to taAe private property for pu"lic purposes necesaarily originates from the necessity and the taAing must "e limited to such necessity 6pplying this standard, the !upreme %ourt hold that respondent %ity of Pasig has failed to esta"lish that there is a genuine necessity to e-propriate petitioner>s property The necessity has not "een shown, especially considering that there e-ists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the $ainforest parA, availa"le to all residents of Pasig %ity, including those of %aniogan #4. O ( %$. A'e("e +a!t$: Private respondent and Petitioner were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of !an :icente, %amarines ,orte Ong was then the incum"ent mayor 6legre filed with the %OM#L#% Provincial Office a Petition to Dis3ualify Ong The petition was predicated on the three9consecutive term9rule, Ong having, according to 6legre, ran in the May .445, May .44?, and May 188. mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for ( consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections Ong alleged that he could not "e considered as having served as mayor from .44? to 188. "ecause he was not duly elected to the post0 he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner .2

,e'd: For the three9term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or re3uisites must concur, to wit: .* that the official concerned has "een elected for three ( consecutive terms in the same local government post, and0 1* that he has fully served ( consecutive terms !uch assumption of office constitutes, for Ong, service for the full term, and should "e counted as a full term served in contemplation of the (9term limit prescri"ed "y the constitutional and statutory provisions, "arring local elective officials from "eing elected and serving for more than ( consecutive term for the same position @eing a presumptive winner did not maAe him less than a duly duly elected mayor 7is proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the .44? mayoralty election coupled "y his assumption of office and his continuous e-ercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally "e taAen as service for a full term in contemplation of the (9term rule #). O"ti(a$ < C.. %$. +eati Ba : < Tu$t C.. (#)3)) +a!t$: /hen Ortigas and %o sold two lots in highways 7ills, Mandaluyong, $i+al, the original "uyers agreed to the stipulations that the lots shall "e used e-lclusively for residential purposes !u"se3uently, however, on Fe"ruary 2, .4'8, the municipal council of Mandaluyong passed $esolution ,o 1C declaring the area whwre the lots were located as a commercial and industrial +one Two years later, the defendant "anA ac3uired the lots and in .4'( commenced the construction of a commercial "uilding Ortigas and %o filed action to en&oin construction The issue is which shall prevail D the restrictive covenant in the purchase agreement or the municipal ordinanceS ,e'd: $esolution no 1C was a legitimate e-ercise of police power ;the most essential, insistent, and illimita"le of powers< and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attri"ute of government The %ourt reiterated the PLDT ruling that police power ;is elastic and must "e responsive to various social conditions0 it is not confined with narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions0 it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life < It tooA notice of the commercial and industrial development along # delos !antos 6venue and found the resolution a valid e-ercise of police power On the non9impairment of contracts issue, the %ourt found the resolution a ;legitimate response to a felt pu"lic need The non9impairment clause may not "ar the municipality>s e-ercise of police power The %ourt also reiterated the Phil96m Life vs 6uditor General ruling that not only are e-isting laws read into contracts in order to fi- o"ligations as "etween the parties, "ut the reservation of essential attri"utes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order *7. Lumbua %$. R. =ui''. +a!t$: Petitioner is the registered owner of a lot located in Tondo, Manila !he leased it to respondent $on3uillo for a period of ( years $espondent violated the agreement and despite repeated ver"al and written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises Petitioner referred the matter to the @arangay %hairman>s office "ut the parties failed to arrive at a settlement The petitioner filed a case for =nlawful Detainer in the MeT% of Manila, said court rendered its decision against respondent =pon appeal $T% rendered its .5

decision setting aside MeT%>s decision $T% directed the parties to go "aacA to the Lupon %hairman or Punong @arangay for further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amica"le settlement, the entire records of the case will "e remanded to MeT% of Manila $espondent sought relief from the %ourt of 6ppeals through a petition for review The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the "arangar level had not "een complied with, the court should dismiss the case and not &ust remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may go through the prere3uisite proceedings The issue is whether or not the %ourt of appeals gravely erred in dismissing the complaint for the alleged failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation proceedings in the "arangay levelS ,e'd: The primordial o"&ective of the Jatarungang Pam"arangay $ules is to reduce the num"er of court litigations and prevents the deterioration of the 3uality of &ustice which has "een "rought a"out "y the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts To attain this o"&ective, !ection 2.1)a* of $epu"lic 6ct C.'8 re3uires the parties to undergo a conciliation process "efore the Lupon %hairman as the precondition to filing a complaint in court 7ere the Lupon %hairman and !ecretary signed the certificate to file action stating that no settlement was reached "y the parties /hile admittedly no PangAat was constitutes, it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the @arangay %hairman for possi"le settlement The efforts of the @arangay %hairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached 6lthough no PangAat was formed, in our mind, the was su"stantial compliance with the law It is noteworthy that under the afore3uoted provision, the confrontation "efore the Lupon %hairman or the PangAat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court This is true notwithstanding the mandate of !ection 2.8" should "e construed together with !ection 2.1, as well as the circumstances o"taining in and peculiar to the case On this score, it is significant that the @arangay %hariman or Punong @arangay is herself the %haiman of the Lupon under the Local Government %ode *#. Pa"ay . %$. 6.%e''a .$ +a!t$: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline station in %alisiao, Pangasinan In .4?4,some residents of %alisiao petitioned the !angguniang @ayan of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another location =pon the advice of the Municipal #ngineer, the sangguniang @ayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of the said gasoline filling station The issue is whether or not the closure or transfer of her gasoline station "y the municipality was a valid e-ercise of its police powersS ,e'd: The Municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure or transfer of petitioner>s gasoline station 6 local government is considered to have properly e-ercised its police powers only when the following re3uisites are met0 .8 the interest of the pu"lic generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re3uire the interference of the !tate and 18 the means employed are reasona"ly necessary for the attainment of the o"&ect sought to "e accomplished and not unduly oppressive

.'

**. Atie 9a %$. CA +a!t$: MK: 6%# was a mortgaged to Far #ast @anA and Trust %ompany "ut was released therefrom on !eptem"er 1C, .442 when petitioner sold it to privae resppndent #ulugio It was the latter who settled the loan with F#@T% !ometime later, petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that he had sold the vessel to private respondent, sought to transfer its homeport from from Manila to @atangas province The records do not show how he was a"le to do it "ut petitioner succeeded in registering the vessel in his name with the Fifth %oast Guard District in @atangas %ity Petitioner went to @atangas Maritime $egional Office and asAed for the issuance "y M6$I,6 of the vessel>s Philippine %oast Guard certificate 7e claimed that the certificates issued in Manila had "een lost /hen petitioner>s misrepresentation regarding the loss of the certificate was discovered a case was filed against him M6$I,6 issued an order directing him to show cause why he should "e su"&ected to punitive action Petitioner was found guilty of misrepresentation and was imposed an administrative fine ,e'd: The findings of M6$I,6 are to "e accorded great weight since M6$I,6 is the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical e-pertise The e-ercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can "e discharged "y it, "eing the government agency concerned M6$I,6 held petitioner lia"le under Memorandum %ircular ,o 5896 Memorandun %ircular .84, which deals specifically with misrepresentations relating to vessel registration, licensing and documentation, did not alter or modify that finding of culpa"ility "ut only provided for a lower fine, that is, from P15,888 to p.8,888 !ince, Memorandum %ircular ,o .84 was more favoura"le to petitioner, M6$I,6 applied it retroactively to him

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