Abstract Semantical Systems

Roberto Lins de Carvalho

PUC-RJ / LNCC
Rio de Janeiro - RJ
June 1, 2005

Abstract
In this work we introduce a new approach to the study of Semantical
Systems. Traditionally the study of these systems have covered only those
semantical systems whose languages are formal and whose models are rela-
tional structures. Here, both languages and models are classes, moreover
there is no dependency on foundational considerations. The concepts of
theory, worlds, semantical consequence, negation and complete-
ness are presented from a strictly semantical point of view. Some of the
results obtained subsume similar results found in the Theory of Models.
Understanding something means to own a system of criteria to evaluate per-
ceived facts. An evaluation system works as a ¯lter through which concepts
may be generated. Di®erent individuals possess di®erent ¯lters and so per-
ception of reality is something of a subjective nature. Not only do sensorial
observations form an individual's knowledge, but concepts may be apprehended
by other kinds of perception and deductive processes performed by the human
mind. Knowledge is, therefore, the mental appropriation of sensorial and
extra-sensorial perceptions that can be deepened by the exercise of thought and
experimentation. Concepts, in their turn, will in°uence the evaluation process
changing the cultural ¯lter and so our perception of reality.
We can say that for a ¯xed instant of an individual's development an evalua-
tion system is acting for the immediately following perceptions and such percep-
tions change the system itself re-elaborating the evaluation criteria. The steady
existence and functioning of this evaluation system enables the knowledge ac-
quisition process to continue, generating con¯gurations or models of reality.
The impossibility of directly communicating di®erent models by the corre-
sponding sensation causes the necessity for the creation of codes or systems of
meaning. The systems of meaning also result from social acculturation and
their most obvious manifestation is the usage of various forms of language -
spoken, gestual, written, etc. Such languages emerge from social conventions
which associate objects to particular signs.

1
 We can say that a signal S stands for an object O as if it indicates the
object itself. This relation is indirect, because its interpretation is mediated
by the concept C that we have of the object. The properties of the objects, the
relations among them and the transformations to which they may be subjected
are also coded by signals.
Ogden and Richards proposed the Meaning Triangle as a representation
of the relations between the objects and their corresponding conceptions in our
minds and the associated signals (symbols).

The triangle expresses that a ref-

erenced object
O (Referent)
impresses our senses producing an
image in our mind
C (Concept)
that can be represented by a sig-
nal
S (Symbol)
that allow us to establish refer-
ences, under a certain conven-
tion.

1 Semantical Systems
Knowledge about a given world, actual or arti¯cial, is formed by the continuous
process of perception and evaluation. This knowleldge can be understood as a
class of all the conceivable con¯gurations of the considered world. Each of these
con¯gurations is called a model. These models can be fuzzy or fragmented, as
our compreehension is limited. The class of models, also fuzzy and fragmented
since we cannot perceive all of its elements, is what we usually call system of
beliefs of an individual regarding a given world. The class of models, because
of its conceptual nature, is situated at vertex C of the meaning triangle.
Regarding a given state of a®airs we may perceive and even conceive dif-
ferent con¯gurations. Each of them has a valuation with respect to a possible
world. This valuation comes from a set of values and a process of evaluation.
By evaluation we mean a judgement given to a con¯guration (perceived, com-
municated or conceived) related to the world. We may think that the new or
recent con¯guration is compared to each of the con¯gurations that are already
considered as models or real world con¯gurations. The set of abstract values
can be quite extensive and imprecise, varying with the nature of knowledge or
the state of a®airs considered. Therefore we may have a de¯nite set of values,
such as: ff air; unf airg or fdef f icient; insuf f icient; regular; good; excellentg,
which however not very precise, are well determinate. The most usual ones
ftrue; f alseg are taken for granted, despite the extreme di±culties of their un-
derstanding. Nevertheless other sets may be fuzzy or even indeterminate.

2
 We may note that even for de¯nite sets like those mentioned we may still
question the meaning of each element. The degree of indetermination as well as
the complexity of the elements are directly related to the extent to which reality
is understood. Those values are situated at vertex C of the triangle.

After establishing a set of values,

we can proceed to the de¯nition
of the judgement criteria, i.e., the
forms of relating a given con¯g-
uration to a value. The evalua-
tion process, that so far we as-
sume to be carried out by hu-
man agents, is located at ver-
tex C. Although eventually, and
more frequently, such process is
an abstraction, similar to a partial
function, it can also have a sym-
bolic representation whose conno-
tation, instead of being descrip-
tive intentional, is operational or
algorithmic.

Knowledge is coded, classi¯ed, structured, transmitted, learned, and im-

proved by its use. Systems of meaning are built - naturally or arti¯cially - and,
in the process, evaluation systems become more elaborated and complex but it
is mainly by the use of language that they can be studied and better understood.
In the following, unless otherwise stated, when we use the word language we
mean the symbolic portion of the systems of meaning. Languages1 are composed
of: atoms - that can be sonorous or visual signs individually identi¯able, words
- which are temporal or spacial sequences of atoms and sentences - which are
certain temporal or spacial sequences of words.
Thus a language is situated at vertex S of the triangle and frequently it is
learned by a gradual process that never ends. Therefore languages are generally
fragmented and imcomplete.
Although a language has a symbolic nature it can be fuzzy with no clear
boundary, but still coherent for the social group that uses it. The coherence
we expect is obtained by communicative interaction among the elements of the
social group, and each signi¯cant unit is a code, sometimes ambiguous, that is
interpreted generating con¯gurations in the same way as the direct perception
of reality. It is then, something symbolic that by interpretation enables us to
apprehend new con¯gurations or models.
1 In this work we will not consider Formal Languages as an isolated object, i.e. we postpone

their study to further development, when the meaning associated to them will, in most cases,
be relative to their arithmetical interpretation.

3
The interpretation process is car-
ried out in the same way as the
direct perception of reality, nev-
ertheless the generated con¯gura-
tions are acknowledged as possi-
ble relative to the models we pre-
viously acquired by the process
of acculturation. The use of lan-
guages creates, sometimes, a lack
of contact with reality.

In the process of interpretation, the linguistic units, that is, symbols, words
and sentences are interpreted as objects (real or imaginary, concrete or abstract)
as well as relations or activities among these objects.
Evaluation systems together with languages are called Semantical Systems,
and are made up of 4 components:

L- A language

M- A class of models
V- A set of abstract values

'- An evaluation function

We must note that by using the word function for the evaluation process
we are making a simpli¯cation. We are suposing that the interpretation of a
sentence generates only one con¯guration and that the underlying evaluation
process produces a de¯nite abstract value. The function ' might not be com-
putable, i.e. there may not be an algorithmic way to produce a value for it.

2 Propositional Semantical Systems

p
Example 2.1 The propositional semantical system ' `n
S has the following com-
ponents:
. Language Lpn de¯ned by the grammar: G = fSA ¡! p1 j p2 j ¢ ¢ ¢ j pn ;
S ¡! SA ; S ¡! ( S ^ S ) ; S ¡! ( S _ S ) ; S ¡! ( S ) S ) ; S ¡! ( S ,
S ) ; S ¡! : S g

4
 p
. Models Mpn = } ( f p1 ; p2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; pn g ). In the case of the propositional system
'S`2 Mpn = f ; ; f p1 g ; f p2 g ; f p1 ; p2 g g, which, together with inclusion, form a
lattice.

Models here are considered as sets and

not as individuals or elements of a set.

We are interested in the subclasses of

models Mp 2 . If we consider only the
sets which represent the models above
we do not have a lattice anymore but a
partial order:

Considering all the subclasses we have 24 = 16 subsets of M p2 , that also

form a lattice regarding inclusion.

In the ¯gure:
M0 =;
M1 = f;g
M2 = f f p1 g g
M3 = f f p2 g g
M4 = f f p1 g; f p2 g g

the remaining ones are obtained by the union of the above, for instance M 5 =
M 0 [ M 1 = f ; ; f p1 g g
. Abstract Values V = f 0 ; 1 g
. Evaluation Function 'pn = de¯ned by:

'pn ( pi ; M ) = 1 if and only if pi 2 M

'pn ( : ® ; M ) = 1 ¡ 'pn ( ® ; M )
'pn ( (® ^ ¯ ) ; M ) = 'pn ( ® ; M ) : 'pn ( ¯ ; M )
'pn ( (® _ ¯ ) ; M ) = max f 'pn ( ® ; M ) ; 'pn ( ¯ ; M ) g
'pn ( (® ) ¯ ) ; M ) = max f1 ¡ 'pn ( ® ; M ) ; 'pn ( ¯ ; M ) g
'pn ( (® , ¯ ) ; M ) = 1 if and only if 'pn ( ® ; M ) = 'pn ( ¯ ; M )

Propositional semantical systems are usually presented in the Propositional

Calculus without explicitly mentioning the models or state of a®airs. The eval-
uation function is shown through the use of truth tables that are de¯ned for

5
the logical connectives. There are various kinds of knowledge that can be rep-
resented by the propositional semantical systems and actually all the digital
electronics depends greatly upon or at least results from the discipline known as
Boolean Algebra, which is but another syntatical representation of the propo-
sitional semantical systems. The propositional semantical systems have ¯nite
sets of models and therefore there are computable evaluation functions 'pn for
them.

3 First Order Semantical Systems

The ¯rst order language is generated from an alphabet, constituted by the
following sets:
V - Variables f x1 ; x2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xn ; ¢ ¢ ¢ g
C - Constants f a1 ; a2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; an ; ¢ ¢ ¢ g
F - Functions f f1 ; f2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; fn ; ¢ ¢ ¢ g
P - Predicates f P1 ; P2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Pn ; ¢ ¢ ¢ g

From this alphabet terms and formulas are constructed by induction:

T1 - Variables and constants are terms.
T2 - If t1 ; t2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn are terms and f a function then
f ( t1 ; t2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn ) is a term.
T3 - The only terms are those expressions which follows from T1 and
T2 above.

Atomic formulas are de¯ned by

A1 - If t1 ; t2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn are terms and P a predicate then
P ( t1 ; t2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn ) is an atomic formula.
A2 - The only atomic formulas are those expressions which follow from
A1 above.

Formulas are de¯ned by

F1 - Atomic formulas are formulas.
F2 - If ® and ¯ are formulas then

. :®, ( ® _ ¯ ), ( ® ^ ¯ ), ( ® ! ¯ ) and ( ® $ ¯ ) are formulas.

F3 If x is a variable and ® is a formula then 8 x ® and 9 x ® are formulas.

F4 - The only formulas are those expressions which follow from F1 ; F2 and F3
above.

The models are certain mathematical structures like E = < D ; R ; © >, where:
D - Is a set, called the domain of the structure.
R - Is a set of relations on D.
© - Is a set of functions de¯ned on D

6
For a particular ¯rst order language, its interpretation with respect to an ade-
quate structure, is a function I which assigns:
- to all constants a 2 C an element aI 2 D,
- to the functions f 2 F a function f I : Dn ¡! D, and
- to the predicates P 2 P a relation P I µ Dn

An interpreted structure E by I is denoted by E I or simply by I. The valuation

function ' is de¯ned considering not only the sentences of the language, but all
formulas, by the introduction of a valuation of variables s : V ¡! D, which
is extended to all terms of the language by:
s^( a ) = aI , for every a 2 C
s^( x ) = s( x ), for every x 2 V
s^( f ( t1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn ) ) = f I ( s^( t1 ) ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; s^( tn ) )

We will use s instead of s^ in order to simplify notation. We also de¯ne modi¯-

cations on s given by:
n
d if y = x
sdx ( y ) =
s( y ) otherwise
With this we can de¯ne the s-valuation function 's
- 's ( P ( t1 ; t2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; tn ) ; I ) = 1 , < s( t1 ) ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; s( tn ) > 2 P I
- 's ( : ® ; I ) = 1 ¡ 's ( ® ; I ) = 1
- 's ( (® ^ ¯ ) ; I ) = 's ( ® ; I ) : 's ( ¯ ; I )
- 's ( (® _ ¯ ) ; I ) = max f 's ( ® ; I ) ; 's ( ¯ ; I ) g
- 's ( (® ) ¯ ) ; I ) = max f1 ¡ 's ( ® ; I ) ; 's ( ¯ ; I ) g
- 's ( (® , ¯ ) ; I )Q= 1 if and only if 's ( ® ; I ) = 's ( ¯ ; I )
- 's ( 8 x ® ; I ) = d2D
'sd ( ® ; I )
` x
- 's ( 9 x ® ; I ) = d2D
'sd ( ® ; I )
x

If ® is a sentence, i.e. there is no occurrence of variables outside the scope of a

quanti¯er 8 ; 9 we can drop s as subscripts of '.
The domains D are sets of arbitrary cardinality, and the evaluation func-
tions are partially computable. Both systems, propositional and the ¯rst order
language systems, are two-valued systems, i.e. V = f 0 ; 1 g, and despite the
fact that in the latter ' is not computable, they are considered total functions,
i.e. for all < ® ; M > 2 L £ M the value '( ® ; M ) is de¯ned. This, of course
is not the most general situation, but in this work we will consider semantical
systems in which ' is total with respect to a certain subclass of L £ M systems
in which ' is total and two-valued. This subclass '¡1 ( V ) µ L £ M is a rela-
tion that holds between certain elements of the language L and certain models
L ¡1
of M. The set of sentences of L is denoted by T1; M = D ( ' ( V ) ) µ L and
M ¡1
the set of proper models of M is denoted by W1; L = R(' (V )) µ M

7
4 Planes of Meaning
Douglas Ho®stadter, in [Ho®], introduced the concept of Implicosphere as re-
lated to the concept of creativity. Implicosphere can be imagined as a kind
of a fuzzy collection of impressions one has about an object, concept or state,
concrete or abstract. They are like clouds of impressions. This cloud becomes
thicker and more complex as we gain familiarity with such entities. The Im-
plicosphere of a concept includes its conections with other Implicospheres, and
those conections are overlaps between implicospheres.
This is a very important idea because sentences do have meanings. Even
though a sentence can be considered as an assemble of units (words), some of
them carrying no semantical values - without independent meaning- , they might
carry implications which depend more on the context in which they occur. We
could say that sentences, even atoms or just symbols, can generate an in¯nity
of inferences. Implicospheres are, in a way, theories.

By methodological reasons we will

project such implicospheres in an
imaginary plane conceptual plane,
and the corresponding theories in an-
other plane, symbolic plane.
There is yet another plane, which
we will call the real plane, where
the objects, concepts or states actu-
ally happen. These three planes are
connected, directly or indirectly, in a
fashion similar to the meaning trian-
gle.

These theories are formed through interactions inside a social group and they
are conceptual entities which are developed in a very dynamical process. The in-
terplay between the real plane and the conceptual plane is the main trade of the
Natural and Social Sciences. Mathematicians, Logicians and Philosophers deal
mostly with the interplay between the conceptual and symbolic planes. These
planes are not as determined as shown in the presented pictures. As a matter of
fact, knowledge is structured, and concepts varyes in their level of abstraction.
There is a whole in¯nity of planes, and primitive concepts belong to lower levels
of abstraction, following from them the derived concepts. The separation we
did, in our presentation, in conceptual and symbolic planes is methodological,
and the di®erence resides only in the degree of development of the semantical
system. If we consider the primitive concepts of a theoretical discipline in a
certain level, then derived concepts are in higher conceptual planes which are
in some sense more symbolic, because they need of symbolic mechanisms such
as de¯nitions or derivation to be understood besides the understanding of the
more basic or primitives.

8
 We will only analyse the interplay between the conceptual plane (CP) and
the symbolic plane (SP). We can say that a certain state of a®airs is observed
and acquires meaning through a cultural ¯lter of concepts which are, in general,
already represented in a semantical system. Then we assume that in a semantical
system

< L; M; V ; ' >

the class M of models is situated on the conceptual plane CP and the language
on the symbolic plane SP. So, if we consider a subclass N of M, it corresponds
to the understanding of a certain state of a®airs in M, that is represented in
the language L by a subclass T of sentences or meaningful expressions of L.
M
The correspondence between the subclasses N of W1; L and the subclasses
L
T of the language T1; M have been examined for some semantical systems.
These studies were dependent on the state of organization or syntatical struc-
ture of the language L, and on restriction imposed on the class of models M.
In the case of the ¯rst order semantical systems it is usual to de¯ne functions
L M M L
M od : T1; M ¡! W1;L and T h : W1;L ¡! T1;M , which are de¯ned
considering the whole class of relational structures and the whole ¯rst order lan-
guage. Besides, the second function T h is sintatically de¯ned from the function
Cn. The relation between these functions, after GÄodel's completeness theorem,
is given by

Cn( S ) = T h( M od( S ) )
In this work we de¯ne functions Mod, Th without any dependence on syntatical
L M
considerations, moreover we relativize both to subclasses of T1; M and W1;L .
In order to understand, abstractly, i.e. outside syntatical considerations, the
goals and contributions of this work as a general framework to the discussion
of mathematical and computational systems we refer the reader to Tarski's work
[Tar1]. There Tarski presents four axioms related to two primitives notions: a
set S of sentences and logical consequence Cn as an operator de¯ned on S.
The ¯rst axiom is about the cardinality of the set S of sentences:

A1 : The set S is at most enumerable.

This axiom is intuitively reasonable, given that the set of sentences must
ful¯ll certain requirements of communication. We could be more rigorous by
saying:
0
A1 : The set S is recursively enumerable.

which means that concerning the Deductive Sciences, the languages are formally,
ideally, de¯ned through formal grammars.
Even stronger, would be:

9
 00
A1 : The set S is recursive.

which implies the existence of recognition algorithms for the languages of Sci-
ences.
The second axiom refers to the operational character of the function Cn:

A2 : If A µ S then A µ Cn( A) µ S

The third axiom states that once the consequences of a set of sentences are
obtained no further knowledge can be gathered by re-applying the operator Cn:

A3 : If A µ S then Cn( Cn ( A ) ) = Cn( A)

The last axiom states that all consequences obtained from a set of sentences A
must also be obtainable from ¯nite subsets of A:
S
A4 : If A µ S then Cn( A ) = X 2 F in( A ) Cn( X )

Despite the series of important results derived by Tarski, from the four axioms
above, their meaning has been overlooked, at least with respect to their gener-
ality, in further research. Here we started with the notion of semantical systems
[Carn1] and we shall prove A2 and A3 with the aid of very simple mathematical
tools. By starting with simpler assumptions than the above axioms we shall
attempt to clarify the results obtained by Tarski, as well as some others which
make up the necessary theoretical basis for better evaluating some of the recent
achievements in the ¯eld of Applied Logic.

5 Basic Functions
This section introduces four functions which represent the relationship between
L and M. These functions transpose some concepts which are traditionally
treated in Model Theory to the wider context of a two-valued semantical system.
The ¯rst two functions represent projections from the symbolic plane to the
conceptual plane, i.e. from language to models or interpretations:

TL WM WM
(a) ¢ ¢ ¢ Mod : 2 1;M £ 2 1;L ¡! 2 1;L
TL WM WM
(b) ¢ ¢ ¢ Cont : 2 1;M £ 2 1;L ¡! 2 1;L

10
² The function Cont applied to
a set S of sentences in L and
to a subfamily N of models in
W M returns a subfamily of mod-
1;L
els in N.
² The function Mod applied to a
set S of sentences in L and to a sub-
family N of models in M returns a
subfamily of models in N.

The application of Mod results in the representation of the particular state

of a®airs described by S regarding the world N.
The application of Cont results in the representation of the state of af-
fairs which happens outside the world N, that is, which is contradicted by
S. In the ¯gure we represented the case in which ' is a total function, i.e.
Mod ( S ; N ) and Cont(S;N) are complementary. The intuitive meaning of
L
this situation is that all models can be referred by the language T1; M , so if
' is a total function no model is left outside linguistic consideration. So the
L
language T1; M has enough expressive power.
The e®ects of the application of these two functions are interpretative: given
a set of sentences of the language L of a semantical system 'S`, we generate con-
¯gurations or models according to our understanding of the evaluation function
'. It must be clear that we have not classi¯ed ' rom the point of view of its
computability or even with respect to its domain, as being a total or parcial
function. Mod and Cont can represent the abstract activity of a mathemati-
cian interpreting a collection of sentences, for instance equations, positively by
Mod and negatively by Cont.
The following functions are also projections, but now from the conceptual
plane to the symbolic plane. They represent formalizations.
M L L
W1; L T1; M T1; M
(c) ¢ ¢ ¢ Th : 2 £2 ¡! 2
WM TL TL
(d) ¢ ¢ ¢ Absd : 2 1;L £ 2 1;M ¡! 2 1;M

11
² The function Th applied to a set
N of models in W M and to a sub-
1;L
set of K, a dialect K, returns a set
of sentences in K.
² The function Absd applied to a
set N of models in W M and to a
1;L
subset of T L , a dialect Kreturns
1;M
a set of sentences in K.

The application of Th results in a description in K of the state of a®airs W

in N. The application of Absd results in a description of sentences in K that
do not occur in the state of a®airs W in N. In the following we consider only
bivalued semantical systems 'S` = < L; M; f 0 ; 1 g ; ' >

De¯nition 5.1 Let 'S` be a bivalued semantical system, then

i Mod ( ® ; N ) = f M 2 N j '( ® ; M ) = 1 g
ii Cont(®;N) = f M 2 N j '( ® ; M ) = 0 g
iii Th(M;K) = f ® 2 K j '( ® ; M ) = 1 g
iv Absd ( M ; K ) = f ® 2 K j '( ® ; M ) = 0 g 2

Note: In ( i ) ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ( iv ) we used ® instead of f ® g and M instead of f M g as

usual in the literature.
p
Example 5.1 For the propositional semantical system 'S`2 :
M = f; ; f p1 g ; f p2 g ; f p1 ; p2 gg; Mod( p1 ; M) = ff p1 g f p1 ; p2 gg
Cont( p1 ;M) = f; ; f p2 gg, f p2 ; ( p2 _ p1 ) g ½ Th(f p2 g;Lp
2)
and f : p2 ; ( : p2 _ p1 ) g ½ Absd ( f p2 g ; Lp
2 ) 2

'S` be a bivalued semantical system,

M
De¯nition 5.2 Let N µ W1; L and
L 2
K µ T1; M , then
T
(I) ¢ ¢ ¢ Mod ( S ; N ) =
S ® 2 S Mod ( ® ; N )
(II) ¢ ¢ ¢ Cont(S;N) =T ® 2 S Cont(®;N)
(III) ¢ ¢ ¢ Th(N;K) = M 2S N Th(M;K)
( IV ) ¢ ¢ ¢ Absd ( N ; K ) = M 2 N Absd ( M ; K ) 2
2
T
SThe intuitive justi¯cation for the use of in de¯nitions ( I ) and ( III ) and for the use
of in de¯nitions ( II ) and ( IV ) is that the meaning associated with a class of sentences
is the common meaning, the intersection of classes which represent the meaning of each in-
dividual sentence, this is in agreement with the traditional, classical or otherwise, usage of
comprehension £ extension, the same intuitive or at least conventional justi¯cation is given
for classes of models.

12
We assume here that if f Xi g is a family of subclasses of a class X then:
T
( a1 ) ¢ ¢ ¢ x 2 Si 2 A Xi i® for all i 2 A ; x 2 Xi
( a2 ) ¢ ¢ ¢ x
S 2 i 2 A Xi i® for some i 2 A ; x 2 Xi
( a3 ) ¢ ¢ ¢ Ti 2 ; Xi = ;
( a4 ) ¢ ¢ ¢ Ti 2 ; Xi = X T T
( a5 ) ¢ ¢ ¢ i 2 A [ B Xi = i 2 A Xi \ i 2 B Xi
L M
Lemma 5.1 If S µ K µ T1; M and N µ W1;L , then:
(a1 ) Mod(S; N) \ Cont(S;N) = ;
(a2 ) Mod(S; N) [ Cont(S;N) = N
(a3 ) Mod(S; N) = N ¡ Cont(S;N)
(b1 ) Th(N;K) \ Absd ( N ; K ) = ;
(b2 ) Th(N;K) [ Absd ( N ; K ) = K
(b3 ) Th(N;K) = K ¡ Absd ( N ; K ) 2

(a1 ) and (b1 ) are independent from ' being a total function. There are im-
portant connections between this lemma and the notions, to be developed, of
consistency and completeness. In the case of the semantical system of ¯rst order
languages, ' is assumed to be a total function, despite the fact that the class of
models is constituted of structures over very abstract domains.
The following lemmas show the anti-monotonicity of Mod and Th and the
monotonicity of Cont and Absd relative to the class S of sentences.
L M
Lemma 5.2 Let S1 ; S2 µ K µ T1; M and N µ W1;L . If S1 µ S2 then
Mod ( S2 ; N ) µ Mod ( S1 ; N ).

Proof: Immediate from de¯nition (I), page 13. 2

The anti-monotonicity of Mod is in-

tuitively justi¯ed by the fact that the
extension of a description, i.e. the
collection of objects corresponding to
a description decreases with the in-
creasing of the same description by
the introduction of more details

M L
Lemma 5.3 Let N1 ; N2 µ N µ W1; L and K µ T1;M . If N1 µ N2 then
Th(N2 ;K) µ Th(N1 ;K). 2

13
If we increase the amount of concep-
tual objects, i.e. models, we can say
less (smaller number of sentences)
about their common properties.

The monotonicity of Cont and Absd are shown by:

L M
Lemma 5.4 Let S1 ; S2 µ T1; M and N1 ,N2 µ W1;L . If 1 µ S2 then
Cont(S1 ;N) µ Cont(S2 ;N), and if N1 µ N2 then Absd ( N1 ; K ) µ Absd ( N2 ; K )
2

Monotonicity of the functions with respect to the second parameter comes from:
L M
Lemma 5.5 Let S µ K µ T1; M and W µ N µ W1;L , then:
L
. Th(W;K) = Th(W;T1;M) \ K
L
. Absd ( W ; K ) = Absd ( W ; T1; M) \ K
M
. Mod(S; N) = Mod(S; W1; L) \ N
M
. Cont(S;N) = Mod(S; W1; L) \ N 2

6 Preliminary results
In all that follows we will consider only semantical systems in which the evalu-
ation function is not a constant function, the reason for this is given by:

Lemma 6.1 Let S ' ` = < L ; M ; f 0 ; 1 g ; ' > be a bivalued semantical sys-
tem, and ' a constant function, then:
L M
(a) . If for all < ® ; M > 2 T1; M £ W1;L ' ( ® ; M ) = 0 then:
M
(a.1) For all N µ W1; L Mod(®; N) = ;
L
(a.2) For all S µ T1; M Mod(S; N) = ;
L
(a.3) For all K µ T1;M Th(M ;K) = ;
M L
(a.4) For all N µ W1; L and all K µ T1;M Th(N;K) = ;

14
 L M
(b) . If for all < ® ; M > 2 T1;M £ W1;L ' ( ® ; M ) = 1 then:
L
(b.1) For all ® 2 T1;M Mod(®; N) = N
L
(b.2) For all S µ T1; M Mod(S; N) = N
L
(b.3) For all K µ T1; M Th(M ;K) = K
M L
(b.4) For all N µ W1;L µ T1;M and all K Th(N;K) = K
Proof: Imediate. 2
So semantical systems for which ' is a constant function are not to be
considered as proper semantical systems, they are pseudo- semantical systems.
M L
Lemma 6.2 Let N1 ,N2 ,W µ N µ W1; L and S1 ; S2 ; S µ T1;M , then:
(a) Mod(S1 [ S2 ; N) = Mod(S1 ; N) \ Mod(S2 ; N)
(b) Mod(S; N1 [ N2 ) = Mod(S; N1 ) [ Mod(S; N2 )
(c) Th(N1 [ N2 ;K) = Th(N1 ;K) \ Th(N2 ;K)
(d) Th(W;K1 [ K2 ) = Th(W;K1 ) [ Th(W;K2 )

Proof: (a),(b),(c) and (d) are imediate consequences of (a1 ), page 13, and lemma
7.5. 2
M L M
Lemma 6.3 If N µ W1; L S ; T µ T1;M , and N1 , N2 µ W1;L then:
(i) Mod ( S [ T ; N ) = ; , Mod ( S ; N ) µ Cont(T ;N)
(ii) Th(N1 [ N2 ;K) = ; , Th(N1 ;K) µ Absd ( N2 ; K )
Proof: from lemma 8.2 (a) and hypothesis (i) Mod ( S [ T ; N ) = ; ,
Mod ( S ; N ) \ Mod(T ; N) = ; , Mod ( S ; N ) µ Cont(T ;N). The proof of (ii)
is the dual of (i). 2
Note: The last step in the proof of (i) depends on the complementarity of
Mod and Cont and so on the admission that ' is a total function. Also, the
above result is apparently strange in face of hypothesis (ii) which seems to be
unreasonable. It indicates a state of a®airs where not even true sentences are
possible. Nevertheless we could admit that the language L of the semantical
system is inadequate for expressing valid sentences for all states of a®airs.
M L
Lemma 6.4 Let W µ N µ W1; L and K µ T1;M , then ® 2 Th(W;K) ,
W µ Mod(®; N)
T
Proof: ® 2 Th(W;K) , ® 2 M 2 W Th(M ;K) , for all M 2 W; ® 2
Th(M ;K) , for all M 2 W '( M ; ® ) = 1 , for all M 2 W; M 2
Mod(®; N) , W µ Mod(®; N) 2
In the same way we can prove:

15
 L M
Lemma 6.5 Let S µ K µ T1;M and M 2 N µ W1;L , then M 2 Mod(S; N)
, S µ Th(M ;K). 2
M L
Lemma 6.6 Let W µ N µ W1; L and ® 2K µ T1;M , then ® 2 Absd ( W ; K )
, W \ Cont(®;N) 6 = ;
S
Proof: ® 2 Absd ( W ; K ) , ® 2 M 2 W Absd ( M ; K )
, exists M 2 W such that ® 2 Absd ( M ; K ) , exists M 2 W
such that '( M ; ® ) = 0 , exists M 2 W; and M 2 Cont(®;N) , W \
Cont(®;N) 6 = ; 2
Similarly we can prove:
L M
Lemma 6.7 Let S µ K µ T1; M and N µ W1;L then M 2 Cont(S;N) if and
only if S \ Absd ( M ; K ) 6
= ; 2

7 Semantical Consequence
The concept of consequence is usually associated to the concepts of cause and
e®ect. To account for the occurence of an event A there exists a sequence of
events B1 ; B2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Bn ; ¢ ¢ ¢, ending with A such that for each Bi there exists
a sequence B1 ; B2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Bi¡1 that accounts for it. In this way, the events
Bi are like links of a chain, or generally, like nodes of a tree or of a directed
graph. At an arbitrary point of an explanation this graph could be seen as a
hierarchical structure, that is, a subgraph without loops. This intuitive notion of
an explanation could be a model of what is known as the Hypothetical-Deductive
method.
The causality between consecutive nodes is generally not as simple as a con-
ditional expression such as If < premiss > then < conclusion >, but relies
upon a wider context to which the concepts (model level) and the symbols (lan-
guage level) representing the regarded situation belong. Thus the notion of con-
sequence must depend on representational features, such as the language avail-
able for the description of the events, and on abstractional features such as the
models that convey only certain aspects of the overall state of a®airs. Consider-
ing our notion of two-valued semantical system S ' ` = < L ; M ; f 0 ; 1 g ; ' >,
to de¯ne consequence we must be concerned with the dialect K of L, actually
used to describe a certain state of a®airs3 N as part of the overall state of a®airs
M of 'S`.
In the previous section we have seen that Mod(S; N) is a subclass of
N which satis¯es the class S of sentences of a dialect K of L, which means
that Mod(S; N) is the class of all situations where the events represented by
3 In Mathematical Logic the context does not a®ect the notion of consequence. Instead, the

language must have considerable expressive power (¯rst order languages and its extensions)
and a su±ciently comprehensive class of models (relational structure).

16
S occur. Intuitively, a sentence ¯ of K is a consequence of S if whenever all
sentences of S occur then ¯ occurs.

De¯nition 7.1 CnS(S;N,K) = Th(Mod(S; N);K) 2

The projection of S on the con-

ceptual plane generates Mod(S; N),
which is the class of all interpreta-
tions of the classe S of sentences with
respect to N.
The representation or formalization
of these interpretations obtained by
the projection of Mod(S; N), back
on the symbolic plane, contains more
sentences than in the original class
S. This is the meaning of the conse-
quences of S with respect to N

The following result is more operational and intuitive:

Corollary 7.1 ® 2 CnS(S;N,K) , Mod(S; N) µ Mod ( ® ; N )

Proof: From the de¯nition 9.1 ® 2 CnS(S;N,K) , ® 2 Th(Mod(S; N);K), so

from lemma 8.4 ® 2 CnS(S;N,K) , Mod(S; N) µ Mod(®; N) 2
p
Exemplo 7.1 In 'S`3 p2 2 CnS(fp1 ; (p1 _ p2 )g;ffp1 ; p2 g; fp2 ; p3 gg,Lpn ), however
2 CnS(fp1 ; (p1 _ p2 )g;Mp3 ,Lpn )
p2 6 2

We shall later discuss the variation of CnS regarding the language K and N .

17
Lemma 7.1 S µ CnS(S;N,K)
proof: By the corollary 7.1 we have only to show that for all ®, if ® 2 S then
Mod(S; N) µ Mod(®; N), and this is a direct consequence of de¯nition 5.2. 2
The dual concept of CnS is obtained by:
De¯nition 7.2 CnM(W;K,N) = Mod(Th(W;K); N) 2
Corollary 7.2 M 2 CnM(W;K,N) , Th(W;K) µ Th(M ;K)
proof: Similar to corollary 7.1. 2

The projection of W on the sym-

bolic plane generates Th(W;K),
which is the formalization of the
classe W of models with respect to
lingK.
The representation or interpretation
of these sentences obtained by the
projection of Th(W;K), back on
the conceptual plane, contains more
models than in the original class W.
This is the meaning of the conse-
quences of W with respect to K

Lemma 7.2 W µ CnM(W;K,N)

proof: Similar to lemma 7.1. 2

8 Behavior of CnS and CnM.

In this section we shall study the behavior of the functions CnS and CnM as
we vary their arguments.
Lemma 8.1 S µ T ) CnS(S;N,K) µ CnS(T;N,K)
Proof: Follows directly from lemmas 7.2 and 7.3. 2
Lemma 8.2 If N 1 µ N 2 then CnS(S;N 2 ,K) µ CnS(S;N 1 ,K)
proof: It follows immediately from lemma 7.1 2
An intuitive interpretation for lemma 8.2 is that the smaller our speci¯c
knowledge of a general state of a®airs (world), the smaller the class of conse-
quences we can derive. The class S is a formalization obtained by generalization
or inductive inference from a number of particular pieces of knowledge of a world
of which we have only an imprecise de¯nition. If we want consequences which
are undoubtably acceptable whichever the world N concerning S. To make
M
sure we do so we must employ CnS regarding the wider world W1; L , as shown
in the following lemma, whose proof is immediate.

18
 M
T
Lemma 8.3 CnS(S;W1; L ,K) = W
M
µ W1; L
CnS(S;W,K) 2

The dual results are:

Lemma 8.4 If K 1 µ K 2 then CnS(S;N,K 1 ) µ CnS(S;K,K 2 )

proof: Immediate. 2

Lemma 8.5 If W 1 µ W 2 then CnM(W 1 ;K,N) µ CnM(W 2 ;K,N)

proof: Dual to lemma 8.1. 2

Lemma 8.6 If K 1 µ K 2 then CnM(W;K 2 ,N) µ CnM(W;K 1 ,N)

proof: Similar to lemma 8.2 2

Lemma 8.7 If N 1 µ N 2 then CnM(W;K,N 1 ) µ CnM(W;K,N 2 )

proof: Immediate. 2

Lemma 8.8 CnS(S [ T ;N,K) = CnS(CnS(S;N,K) [ CnS(T ;N,K);N,K)

proof: From lemma 7.1 S [ T µ S [ CnS(T ;N,K) and S [ T µ CnS(S;N,K) [

CnS(T ;N,K), by the monotonicity of CnS (lemma 8.1):
(1) ¢ ¢ ¢ CnS(S [ T ;N,K) µ CnS(CnS(S;N,K) [ CnS(T ;N,K);N,K).
Again, from lemma 8.1 CnS(S;N,K) µ CnS(S [ T ;N,K) and CnS(T ;N,K) µ
CnS(S [ T ;N,K), and so:
(2) ¢ ¢ ¢ CnS(S;N,K) [ CnS(T ;N,K) µ CnS(S [ T ;N,K)
From (1) and (2) CnS(CnS(S;N,K) [ CnS(T ;N,K);N,K) = CnS(S [ T ;N,K). 2

Lemma 8.9 CnM(W1 [ W2 ;K,N) = CnM(CnM(W1 ; K; N)[CnM(W2 ; K; N); K; N).

proof: Dual of the one before. 2

9 Closure Properties
The results to be presented in this section are corollaries of the previous de¯-
nitions and results. Nevertheless, they are essential for the reader to acquire a
geometrical view of the relationships between languages and models

Lemma 9.1 Mod ( S ; N ) = Mod(Th(Mod(S; N);K); N)

proof: From lemma 7.1 S µ Th(Mod(S; N);K), so from lemma 7.2:

(1) Mod(Th(Mod(S; N);K); N) µ Mod ( S ; N ),
so by lemma 8.2: (2) Mod ( S ; N ) µ Mod(Th(Mod(S; N);K); N), therefore from
(1) and (2) Mod ( S ; N ) = Mod(Th(Mod(S; N );K); N). 2

19
Lemma 9.2 Th(W;K) = Th(Mod(Th(W;K); N);K)

proof: Dual to lemma 8.1. 2

The expressions Th(W;K) = Th(Mod(Th(W;K); N);K) and Mod ( S ; N ) =
Mod(Th(Mod(S; N);K); N) could be re-written generating the expressions:

(A) Mod ( S ; N ) = Mod(CnS(S;N,K); N)

(B) Mod ( S ; N ) = CnM(Mod ( S ; N );K,N)
(C) Th(W;K) = Th( CnM(W;K,N);K)
(D) Th(W;K) = CnS(Th(W;K);N,K)

(A) says that CnS(S;N,K) is the largest class of sentences K that contain
S and preserves its models, this suggests the following:

De¯nition 9.1 T is a theory in K and N i® T = CnS(T;N,K) 2

L M L
Lemma 9.3 T1; M is a theory in W1;L and T1;M .
L L M L
proof: From lemma 7.1 T1;M = CnS(T1;M ;W1;L ,T1;M ) 2

Lemma 9.4 T is a theory in N and K if and only if there exists W T such

that T = Th(W T ;K).

proof: It su±ces to take W T = Mod(T; N). 2

(C) suggests the following de¯nition:

De¯nition 9.2 W is a world in K and N i® W = CnM(W;K,N) 2

CnM(W;K,N) is the largest class of models that contain W and preservs its
theory. This, again suggests the following:
M L M
Lemma 9.5 W1; L is a in T1;M and W1;L .
proof: trivial. 2

Corollary 9.1 W is a world in K and N if and only if there exists T W ,

T W µ K such that W = Mod(T W ; N)

proof: It su±ces to take T W = Th(W;K). 2

M L M
Corollary 9.2 W0; L = Mod(T1;M ; W1;L ) is the smallest world
M
T M
proof: follows immediately from W0; L = T µT L Mod(T; W1; L) 2
1;M

M
Corollary 9.3 T0;LM = Th(W1; L
L ;T1;M ) is the smallest theory

20
 T
proof: follows immediately from T0;LM = M
W µ W1;
L
Th(W;T1; M) 2
L
L M
Corollary 9.4 T1;M is the largest theory and W1;L is the largest world.
L M L M L M
proof: T1; M = Th(W0;L ;T1;M ) and W1;L = Mod(T0;M ; W1;L ). 2

The picture shows the relations be-

tween the classes:
- TL and W M , given by
0;M 1;L

TL = Th(W M ;T L )
0;M 1;L 1;M
and between the classes:
- W M and T L , given by
0;L 1;M

W M = Mod(T L ; WM )
0;L 1;M 1;L

Despite the facts that, neither every set of sentences S is a theory, nor ev-
ery class of models W is a world, there exists as many theories as there are
M L
subclasses of W1; L and as many worlds as subsets of T1;M . Thus, if in
a semantical system 'S` the cardinality of T1; L
M is º there will be 2
º

M ´
worlds, and if the cardinality of W1;L is ´ there will be 2 theories.

10 True and False sentences

In the last section we de¯ned two very importante classes, T0;LM and W0; M
L.
L
- T0;M is the smallest theory and its sentences ® are true sentences in the
M
sense that for all models M 2 W1 ; '( ® ; M ) = 1
M
- W0;L is the smallest world and its models M are universal models, in
L
the sense that for all ® 2 T1; M ; '( ® ; M ) = 1. Two other classes are also
important:
T
- F0L = L
M Absd ( M ; T1;M ), called the class of false sen-
M 2 W1
tences. T
- N0M = ® 2 T L Cont(®;W1 M
) called the class of empty models. 2
1;M
In this section we will examine the relationship between these classes. For this
purpose we present a few results.

L
Lemma 10.1 For all ° 2 T1; L M
M ; ° 2 F0 i® Mod(°; W1 ) = ;.

21
 T
proof: ° 2 F0L i® ° 2 M
M 2 W1
L
Absd ( M ; T1; M
M ) i® for all M 2 W1 M 2
L M M
Absd ( M ; T1; M ) i® for all M 2 W1 '( ° ; M ) = 0 i® for all M 2 W1 M 2
M M M M
Cont(°;W1 ) i® Cont(°;W1 ) = W1 i® Mod(°; W1 ) = ; 2

Lemma 10.2 F0L 6

= ; if f M
W0; L = ;

Proof ( ¡! ) : F0L 6 = ; then there is ° 2 F0L , by the last lemma

M M M M
Mod(°; W1 )= ; , as W0;L µ Mod(°; W1 ), thus W0; L = ;.
M M
T M L
( á ) W0;L = ; , as W0;L =
®2T
L Mod(®; W1 ) there is ° 2 T1; M
1;M

such that Mod(°; W1 M

) = ; , so by from lemma 10.1 ° 2 F0L and so F0L 6 = ; 2
The last result shows that the existence of contradictions or falses sentences in a
semantical system depends on the non existence of universal models. The next
two lemmas shows the dual situation.
M
Lemma 10.3 For all M 2 W1 ; M 2 N0M i® L
Th(M ;T1;M) = ; .
proof: Dual to lemma 12.1. 2

Lemma 10.4 N0M 6

= ; if f T0;LM = ;

proof: Dual to lemma 12.2. 2

There are empty models if and only if there are no true sentences. Relations
between T0;LM and W0; M
L are more di±cult to envisage at this stage of our
development. In the follwoing sections we shall use the notation:

- W0; N M N M
L = W0;L \ N, W 1 K = W1 \ N
K L
- T0;KN = T0;LM \ K, T 1 M = T1;M \K

11 Negation
In this section we will present several forms of negation. The relevance of
this study is that through abstract de¯nitions we can distinguish each form of
negation from the others. By doing so, we might be able to discuss certain
mathematical concepts regardless of syntatical considerations.

De¯nition 11.1 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) = f ¯ 2 K j Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N) g

S
NegC ( S ; N ; K ) = ®2S
NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) 2

22
As for the propositional semantical systems the above class (a set in this case)
of sentences coincides with the class of sentences logically equivalent to the
p
negation of ®. For instance, in the propositional semantical system 'S`n we have
Mod(®; M p p p p p
n ) = Cont(: ®;M n ), and so NegC ( ® ; M n ; L n ) = f ¯ 2 L n j : ® ´
¯ g. Note that our de¯nition of negation (NegC) is relative to a certain state
of a®airs N, and to a particular dialect K. Therefore, by modifying either
N or K we change the value of NegC, that is, di®erent classes of sentences
are obtained. Our de¯nition satis¯es the following criteria [Ebb] for classical
negation:
For all ¿ and all ' 2 L[ ¿ ] there is a sentence à 2 L[ ¿ ] such that
M od¿L ( Ã ) = Str[¿ ] ¡ M od¿L ( ' )

In [Ebb], the emphasis is syntatical, so the relativization is on notational con-

siderations, ¿ is the vocabulary and L is a possible extension for the ¯rst order
language.
p
Example 11.1 In 'S`2 we have Mod(p1 ; ffp1 g ; fp2 gg) = f f p1 g g =
Cont(p2 ;ffp1 g ; fp2 g g), an so p2 2 NegC(p1 ; f f p1 g ; f p2 g g ; L p 2 ). Note that : p1 2
NegC ( p1 ; f f p1 g ; f p2 g g ; L p
2 ), then in a sense : p1 is equivalent to p2 , i.e. they have the
same models, i.e., Mod(: p1 ; f f p1 g ; f p2 g g) = f p2 g = Mod(p2 ; f f p1 g ; f p2 g g g)

At ¯rst the relativization of negation seems strange, but we can consider the
sentence p1 ¢ `John is married to Ann' as being the negation of the sentence
p2 ¢ `John is married to Mary' in a world in which Ann and Mary are di®erent
women and monogomy is a certain fact, only one of the two sentences is true.
An important property of the classical negation is that if ¯ is the negation of
® then the class containing both ¯ and ® has no models:

Lemma 11.1 If ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) then Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = ;

Proof: We know that: (1) ¢ Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = Mod(®; N) \ Mod(¯; N), also

¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) , (2) ¢ Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N), then from (1) and (2) :
Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = Cont(¯;N) \ Mod(¯; N) = ; 2
p
Example 11.2 In 'S`2 we have: Mod(fp1 ; p2 g; f f p1 g ; f p2 g g) = ; 2

If we allow all possible state of a®airs to be considered, for instance in the

case of marriage we allow poligamy, the sentences p1 and p2 above will not be
contradictory.
M
Lemma 11.2 NegC ( ® ; W1 ; K ) µ NegC ( ® ; N ; K )
M M M
Proof: ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; W1 ; K ) , (1) ¢ Mod(®; W1 ) = Cont(¯;W1 ). As
M M
Mod(®; N) = Mod(®; W1 ) \ N and Cont(¯;N) = Cont(¯;W1 ) \ N , then from
(1), Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N), thus ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) 2

23
 Note that if we consider families of models N 1 and N 2 , then: If N 1 µ N 2 then
Mod(®; N 1 ) µ Mod(®; N 2 ) and If N 1 µ N 2 then Cont(®;N 2 ) µ Mod(®; N 1 ) then
we cannot derive uniform variation of NegC either increasing or decreasing.
On the other hand the variation regarding dialects is more predictable as the
following lemma shows.
L
Lemma 11.3 If K 1 ; K 2 µ T1; M then NegC(®; N; K 1 ) µ NegC( ® ; N ; K 2 )
Proof: It follows immediately from the de¯nition of NegC. 2
We can thus conclude that NegC increases monotonically with the dialect
L
K of T1; M . The next result shows that in the semantical systems where
M L
W0; L6
= ; no sentence of the language T1; M admits the classical negation.
L M M L
Lemma 11.4 If ® 2 T1; M and W0;L 6= ; then NegC(®; W1 ; T1; M) = ;
M
T M
Proof: We know that W0; L = SµT L Mod(S; W1 ) then (1) ¢ ¢ ¢ for all S µ
1;M
M
L
T1; M
M
Mod(S; W1 = ;, if we assume that NegC ( ® ; W1
) 6 ; TL 1;M
) 6
= ;,
L M L
then there is a ¯ 2 T1; M such that ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; W1 ; T1; M ), so by
M
lemma 11.1, Mod(f® ; ¯g; W1 )= ; , which contradicts (1). 2
L M M
Corollary 11.1 If ® 2 T1; M and W0;L 6
= ; then NegC(® ; W1 ; K) = ;

Proof: It follows from the previous lemmas. 2

Another property of the classical negation is that if a sentence ¯ is a negation
of ® then ® is a negation of ¯ . To express it we have the following lemma:

Lemma 11.5 ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) , ® 2 NegC ( ¯ ; N ; K )

Proof: ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) , Mod(¯; N) = Cont(®;N) ,

® 2 NegC ( ¯ ; N ; K ) 2
At this point of our discussions we must make a conceptual division, regarding
two extreme types of semantical systems:
L M
Symmetrical Those in which for all ® 2 T1; M , for all N µ W1 and for all
L
K µ T1; M NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) 6
= ;
L M
Positive Those in which for all ® 2 T1; M , for all N µ W1 and for all
L
K µ T1; M NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) = ;

There are reasons related to the concepts of completeness and consistency for
considering these extreme types of semantical systems: such systems have typ-
ical metamathematical behavior. From lemma 11.1 we can see that semantical
M
systems in which W0; L6 = ; are positive semantical systems.

24
The relation between classical negation, false sentences and true sentences in
symmetrical semantical systems is given by:

Lemma 11.6 Let 'S` beLa symmetricalL semantical

M
system.
L
Then
F0 = NegC( T0;M ; W1 ; T1;M )

Proof: From de¯nition 11.1 ° 2 NegC( T0;LM ; W1 M L

; T1; M ) if and only if
S
° 2 NegC( T0;M ; W1 ; T1;M ) if and only if there is ® 2 T0;LM
L M L
® 2 T0;LM
M M
such that Mod(®; W1 ) = Cont(°;W1 ), as for all ® 2 T0;LM Mod(®; W1 M M
) = W1 ,
L M L M M
° 2 NegC( T0;M ; W1 ; T1;M ) if and only if Cont(°;W1 ) = W1 , therefore
° 2 NegC( T0;LM ; W1 M L
; T1; M
M ) if and only if Mod(°; W1 ) = ; , then by
lemma 12.1 ° 2 NegC( T0;LM ; W1 M L L
; T1;M ) if and only if ° 2 F0 , therefore
F0L = NegC( T0;LM ; W1 M L
; T1;M ). 2
Similarly, we can prove:

Lemma 11.7 Let 'S`Lbe a symmetricalL semantical

M L
system. Then
T0;M = NegC( F 0 ; W1 ; T1;M ) 2

12 Other kinds of negation

In classical negation, as seen in the previous section, ¯ is a negation of ® if
and only if Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N), this is a very restrictive condition. The
intuitive meaning of it is that the class of situations where ® holds is exactly
the class of situations where ¯ does not hold. So, the class of situations where
® does not hold is the class of situations where ¯ does hold. If we allow the
class of situations where ® does not hold, i.e. Cont(®;N) to be a subclass
of the class of situations where ¯ does hold, we are to accept that there are,
eventually, common models for both ® and ¯.

De¯nition 12.1 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) = f ¯ 2 K j Cont(®;N) µ Mod(¯; N) g

S
NegD ( S ; N ; K ) = ®2S
NegD ( ® ; N ; K )
2

Is NegD, really a kind of negation? The following lemma is a partial positive

answer:

Lemma 12.1 If ¯ 2 CnS(®;N,K) then NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegD ( ¯ ; N ; K )

Proof: ¯ 2 CnS(®;N,K) if and only if (1) ¢ ¢ ¢ Cont(¯;N) µ Cont(®;N), and so by

def ... ° 2 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) if and only if Cont(®;N) µ Mod(°; N), then from
(1) Cont(¯;N) µ Mod(°; N), so by def ... ° 2 NegD ( ¯ ; N ; K ) 2
another property of negation is given by:

25
Lemma 12.2 If ¯ 2 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) then ® 2 NegD ( ¯ ; N ; K )
Proof: ¯ 2 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) if and only if Cont(®;N) µ Mod(¯; N) if and only
if Cont(¯;N) µ Mod(®; N) if and only if ® 2 NegD ( ¯ ; N ; K ). 2
The following lemma shows that NegD is the theory of the class of models M
that falsi¯es ®, i.e. '( ® ; M ) = 0.
Lemma 12.3 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) = Th(Cont(®;N);K)
Proof: ¯ 2 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) if and only if Cont(®;N) µ Mod(¯; N) if and only if
¯ 2 Th(Cont(®;N);K) (according to lemma 8.4). 2
The next lemma shows that the only sentences commom to CnS(®;N,K) and
NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) are the ones in T0;LN .

Lemma 12.4 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) \ CnS(®;N,K) = T0;KN

Proof: NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) \ CnS(®;N,K) = Th(Cont(®;N);K) \

Th(Mod(®; N);K) = Th(Cont(®;N) [ Mod(®; N);K) = Th(N;K) = T0;KN 2

Lemma 12.5 If ° 2 NegC(®; N; K) then NegD(®; N; K) = Th(Mod(°; N);K)

Proof: From lemma 11.3 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) = Th(Cont(®;N);K), from ° 2
NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) we have Cont(®;N) = Mod(°; N) so by substitution we have
the proof. So NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) is the class of consequences of the (classical)
negations of ®. 2
From lemma 12.4 T0;KN µ NegD ( ® ; N ; K ), this is quite strange, for true sen-
tences are denials of a description ®. So we introduce a modi¯cation in the
de¯nition of NegD:

NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) = Th(Cont(®;N);K) ¡ T0;KN

The intuitive meaning of NegD can be seen if we consider the sentences

p ¢ ¢ ¢ John is a man and q ¢ ¢ ¢ John is imortal

then q is a negation (NegD) of p, as q is a consequence of : p.

26
 N
Lemma 12.6 If W0; K 6
= ; then for all ® 2 K NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) = ;

Proof: From corollary 11.1 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) = ; then NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) ¡

T0;KN = CnS(NegC ( ® ; N ; K );N,K) ¡ T0;KN = CnS( ; ;N,K) ¡ T0;KN =
T0;KN ¡ T0;KN = ; 2
The next negation is easier to accept as such, as we shall see.

De¯nition 12.2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) = f ¯ 2 K j Mod(®; N) µ Cont(¯;N) g

[
NegE ( S ; N ; K ) = NegE ( ® ; N ; K )
®2S
2

The following is one very clear property of negation:

Lemma 12.7 If ¯ 2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) then Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = ;

Proof: We know that (1) ¢ Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = Mod(®; N) \ Mod(¯; N), as ¯ 2

NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) if and only if (2) ¢ Mod(®; N) µ Cont(¯;N) then from (1) and
(2) Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) µ Cont(¯;N) \ Mod(¯; N) = ; , thus Mod(f ® ; ¯ g; N) = ; 2
The next lemma shows that in any positive semantical system NegE is empty:
M
Lemma 12.8 If W0; = ; then NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) = ;
L 6

Proof: Similar to the proof of corollary 11.1. 2

Lemma 12.9 If ¯ 2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) then ® 2 NegE ( ¯ ; N ; K )

Proof: ¯ 2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) , Mod(®; N) µ Cont(¯;N) , Mod(¯; N) µ

Cont(®;N) , ® 2 NegE ( ¯ ; N ; K ). 2

Lemma 12.10 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegE ( ® ; N ; K )

Proof: ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) , Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N) then Mod(®; N) µ

Cont(¯;N) , ¯ 2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) 2

Lemma 12.11 NegC ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegD ( ® ; N ; K )

Proof: Similar to the proof of lemma 11.11 2

Lemma 12.12 NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) \ NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) = NegC ( ® ; N ; K )

Proof: Immediate. 2

De¯nition 12.3 NegED ( ® ; N ; K ) = NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) [ NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) 2

27
Lemma 12.13 (1) ¢ ¢ ¢ NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegED ( ® ; N ; K )
(2) ¢ ¢ ¢ NegD ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegED ( ® ; N ; K )

Proof: Immediate. 2
The last kind of negation we will consider is very important. It is the semantical
counterpart of Post's negation by non demonstrability.

De¯nition 12.4 NegF ( ® ; N ; K ) = Absd ( Mod(®; N) ; K )

NegF ( S ; N ; K ) = Absd ( Mod(S; N) ; K ) 2
K
Lemma 12.14 NegF ( ® ; N ; K ) = T1; N ¡ CnS(®;N,K)

Proof: Obvious. 2

Lemma 12.15 If Mod(®; N) 6

= ; then NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) µ NegF ( ® ; N ; K )

Proof: ¯ 2 NegE ( ® ; N ; K ) , Mod(®; N) µ Cont(¯;N) , Mod(®; N) \

Cont(¯;N) = Mod(®; N), then if Mod(®; N)6= ; then Mod(®; N)\Cont(¯;N) 6 =
; , and thus from lemma 8.6 ¯ 2 Absd ( Mod(®; N) ; K ) = NegF ( ® ; N ; K: 2

The ¯gure shows that the de¯ned types of

negation form a lattice regarding inclusion

28
13 Complete Theories
Intuitively a theory T is complete when it fully describes a certain state of
a®airs ( Mod(T; N)). This means that its sentences are su±cient to determine
both the situations which satis¯es it - its models - and the complementary
situations - its empirical content. Therefore if a sentence ® does not belong to
T then if T is a complete theory the models which satisfy ®, Mod(®; N), do
not satisfy T , and so these models are among those which do not satisfy T , i.e.
Mod(®; N) µ Cont(T;N), or equivalentely Mod(T; N) µ Cont(®;N). Formally we
have the following (tentative) de¯nition:

De¯nition 13.1 Let T be a theory in N and K . We say that T is complete1

in K and N , if and only if for all ® 2 K if ® 6
2T then Mod(T; N) µ Cont(®;N).
2

In the case of the ¯rst order semantical system the de¯nition above coincides
with the usual one:
T is complete if f f or every ®; ® 2 T or : ® 2 T

Lemma 13.1 T is a complete1 theory in K and N if and only if for every

®6
2 T Mod(T; N) \ Mod(®; N) = ;

Proof: It is an immediate consequence of de¯nition 11.1. 2

The situation presented cor-

responds to the case when
W M = ; , i.e. there are no
0;L
universal models. If there are
universal models (W M 6 = ;)
0;L
then this models are in T and
Mod(®; W M ).
1;L

29
 M
If W0; L = ; the two de¯nitions
coincide.

Lemma 13.2 T is complete1 in N and K if and only if T is complete2 and

N
W0; K = ;.
Proof: Immediate. 2
We will generally adopt de¯nition 15.2 as it is more comprehensive, but we
can alternatively use de¯nition 15.1 when the semantical system is symmetrical.
K
Corollary 13.1 T1; N is a complete theory in K and N .
Proof: It follows immediately from both de¯nitions. 2
The next corollary shows that our de¯nition subsumes Tarski's de¯nition of
completeness.

Corollary 13.2 T is a complete theory in K and N if and only if for every

K K
® 2 T1; N if ® 2
6T then CnS(T [ f ® g;N,K) = T1; N.
Proof: For all ® 2 K; CnS(T [ f ® g;N,K) = Th(Mod(T [ f ® g; N);K) =
Th(Mod(T ; N) \ Mod(®; N);K), if ® 6 2 T then by de¯nition 11.2 Mod(T ; N) \
N N K
Mod(®; N) = W0; K , so CnS(T [ f ® g;N,K) = Th(W0; K ;K) = T1;N . 2
M L
Lemma 13.3 Let N µ W1; L and T1 and T2 theories in K µ T1 . Then if:
T1 is complete in K and N , and
T1 µ T2 , and
Mod(T2 ; N) 6= ;
K
then T1 = T2 or T2 = T1; N.
Proof: Let us suppose that T1 6 = T2 then there exists ® 2 T2 such that ® 62 T1 ,
N
then as T1 is complete in K and N: (4) ¢ Mod(T1 ; N) \ Mod(®; N) = W0; K . From
hypothesis 2, (5) ¢ Mod(T2 ; N) µ Mod(T1 ; N), and as T2 is a theory and ® 2 T2
(6) ¢ Mod(T2 ; N) µ Mod(®; N), so, from (5) and (6), Mod(T2 ; N) µ Mod(T1 ; N) \
N N K
Mod(®; N) = W0; K , thus Mod(T2 ; N) = W0;K , therefore T2 = T1;N . 2
The previous lemma shows that if a theory is complete then no other proper
theory contains it.

30
De¯nition 13.2 W is an elementary class in N relative to K ( EC N
K
) i® for
all M 2 W, T h(M; K) = T h(W; K). 2
N
Lemma 13.4 If W0; N
then W0; N
K 6
=; K is EC K .
N K K
Proof: For any M 2 W0; K T1;N µ Th(M ;K) = T1;N . 2
The models of an elementary class regarding a dialect K are undistiguishable
by this dialect. We say that they are equivalent, or more precisely:
M
De¯nition 13.3 Let M1 ; M2 2 W1; L , we say that M1 is equivalent to M2 in
K, ( M1 ´K M2 ) , we say that M1 is equivalent to M2 in K, ( M1 ´K M2 ) if and
only if Th(M1 ;K) = Th(M2 ;K). 2

Lemma 13.5 Let 'S` be a semantical system, N µ W1;

M L
L and K µ T1;M . ´K
is an equivalence relation in N.

Proof: Trivial. 2
The following is a very useful little result:

Lemma 13.6 Let S ' ` be a semantical system, NNµ W1;L and K µ T1;M . Then
M L

N
for every W µ W1;K Th(W;K) = Th(W ¡ W0;K ;K)

'S` is
N
Proof: If symmetrical, as W0; K is empty there is nothing to prove.
µ ¶
T T
In any case Th(W;K) = M 2W
Th(M;K) =
M 2W ¡W
N Th(M;K) \
T 0;K
N
N Th(M;K) = Th(W ¡ W0; K ;K) 2
M 2W
0;K
The next result tells us that a complete theory T has a nice property with
respect to its models Mod(T; N), which is, we can identify for such theories,
N
besides W0; K , other elementary classes relative to K.
M L
Theorem 13.1 Let N µ W1; L and T 2 K µ T1 . T is complete in K and N
N
if and only if Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; N
K is EC K .

Proof: ( ( ) : Let us assume that Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; N N

K is EC K . So, by de¯nition,
N N
for every M 2 Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K : (1) ¢ Th(M ;K) = Th(Mod(T; N) ¡ W0;K ;K)
and from lemma 13.6 (2)¢ Th(M ;K) = Th(Mod(T; N);K) = T . Suppose that ®6 2
N
T then from (2) for every M 2 Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K we have that ® 2
6 Th(M ;K) ,
N
i.e. M 2 Cont(®;N) and so Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K µ Cont(®;N) $ Mod(T; N) \
N
Mod(®; K) = W0; K , from this we conclude that T is complete in K and N .

( ) ): Now let us assume that T is complete in K and N , then we have to prove

N N
that Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K is EC K . Therefore we need to show that for every M 2

31
 N N
Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K Th(M ;K) = Th(Mod(T; N) ¡ W0;K ;K), but then from
N
lemma 13.6 we have to show that for every M 2 Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K Th(M ;K) =
T . As T µ Th(M ;K), it remains to be shown that Th(M ;K) µ T . Suppose that
N
for some N 2 Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; K Th(M ;K) 6 µ T , then there is ® 2 K such that
(4) ¢ ® 2 Th(M ;K) and (5) ¢ ® 6 2 T . From (5) and from the fact that T is a
N
complete theory in K and N we have that Mod(T; N) \ Mod(®; N) = W0; K.
N
As M 2 Mod(T; N) ¡ W0;K , we have that M 6 2 Mod(®; N), i.e. ® 6 2 Th(M ;K),
which contradicts (1) above. 2
Theorem 15.1 is very important, because it shows that for complete theories T
in a language K , all the properties expressed in K , of a particular model of T
are properties of all models in Mod(T; N). This is the meaning of Mod(T; K) ¡
N N
W0; K being EC K .
The results presented so far are valid for any semantical system S ' `. In the next
section we will study the case of symmetrical semantical systems.

13.1 Symmetrical Semantical Systems

We saw that for complete theories T Mod(T; N) ¡ W0; N N
K is EC K , since for
N
symmetrical semantical systems W0; K is empty, we have:

Corollary 13.3 Let 'S` be a symmetrical semantical system. If T is complete

in K and N then Mod(T; N) is an elementary class relative to K in N .

Proof:Immediate after theorem 13.1. 2

The next result shows that the usual (¯rst order) de¯nition of completeness is
subsumed by our de¯nition 13.2.

Lemma 13.7 Let S ' ` be a symmetrical semantical system. T is complete in N

and K if and only if for all ® 2 K , if ® 6
2 T then NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) µ T

Proof: ( ) ) Let us suppose that T is complete in N and K .

Then (1) ¢ ¢ ¢ if ® 62T then Mod(T; N) µ Cont(®;N). As S ' ` is symmetrical
= ; , so let ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) then Mod(®; N) = Cont(¯;N),
NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) 6
or equivalentely (2) ¢ ¢ ¢ Mod(¯; N) = Cont(®;N). From (1) and (2) Mod(T; N) µ
Mod(¯; N), as T is a theory, ¯ 2 T and so NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) µ T .
( ( ) Let us suppose now that if ® 6 2 T then NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) µ T .
If M 2 Mod(T; N) then for all ¯ 2 T , M 2Mod(¯; N). This holds in partic-
ular for ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) . Thus M 2Mod(¯; N), therefore as Mod(¯; N)
= Cont(®;N), M 2Cont(®;N), then Mod(T; N) µ Cont(®;N), and therefore T is
complete. 2
The next two theorems are generalizations of two important results of ¯rst order
Model Theory. We will see that they are also very important in our framework.

32
Theorem 13.2 Let S ' ` be a symmetrical semantical system, M 2 N µ W1;L ,
M

then Th(M ;K) is a complete theory in N and K .

Proof: Let ® 62 Th(M ;K) , then '( ® ; M ) = 0, so (1) ¢ M 2 Cont(®;N). As 'S` is
a symmetrical semantical system, by lemma 13.7 it is su±cient to prove that
NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) µ Th(M ;K). Let ¯ 2 NegC ( ® ; K ; N ) ,then (2) ¢ Mod(¯; N) =
Cont(®;N), from (1) and (2) we have M 2 Mod(¯; N), and thus ¯ 2 Th(M ;K).2
N
Theorem 13.3 Let S ' ` be a symmetrical semantical system. If W µ N is EC K
then Th(W;K) is a complete theory in N and K .
Proof: As W is elementary in K , for all M 2 W Th(W;K) = Th(M ;K), thus by
lemma 13.2 Th(W;K) is complete in N and K . 2
The relation ´K gave us some understanting about the models of a seman-
tical system. There is another relation which will give us deeper results about
M
models and topological properties of W1; L , the subjacency relation.
L M
De¯nition 13.4 Let K µ T1; M M1 ; M2 2 W1;L , we say that M1 is subjacent
to M2 (M1 vK M2 ) in K if and only if Th(M1 ;K) µ Th(M2 ;K). 2

13.2 The relation v

The subjacency relation, v, has several advantages over the notion of equiva-
lence of models. The ¯rst of which is given by:

'S` be a semantical system,

M
Lemma 13.8 Let M1 ; M2 2 N µ W1; L.
M1 ´K M2 $ M1 vK M 2 and M2 vK M 1
Proof: Immediate. 2
Example 13.1 If in the propositional semantical systems we consider only the
dialects L+
n
;p
that do not contain negation the notion of subjacency coincides
p+
with the µ, therefore in the system 'S`3 ,
f p1 g v f p1 ; p2 g
As a matter of fact we have that: < Mp 3 ; v > is a lattice, as shown below:

Lattice < Mp
3 ; v>

33
 We can see in the lattice < Mp p
3 ; v > that for each model M 2 M3 the class of models
of the theory of M are all the models above M, including M itself.
So,
(1) ¢ ¢ ¢ Mod(Th(f p1 g;Lp;+ p
3 ); M3 ) = f f p1 g ; f p1 ; p2 g; f p1 ; p3 g ; f p1 ; p2 ; p3 g g
p p;+
(2) ¢ ¢ ¢ Mod(Th(f p2 g;M3 ); L3 ) = f f p2 g ; f p1 ; p2 g; f p2 ; p3 g ; f p1 ; p2 ; p3 g g
Moreover Mod(p2 ; Mp p;+
3 ) = Mod(Th(f p2 g;L3 ); M3 )
p
p;+ p;+
As p2 62 Th(f p1 g;L3 ), we can see that Th(f p1 g;L3 ) is not complete, for
Mod(Th(f p1 g;Lp;+ p p
3 ); M3 ) \ Mod(p2 ; M3 ) = f f p1 ; p2 g ; f p1 ; p2 ; p3 g g
So, the question is: which models in Mp3 have complete theories relative to the language
p;+
Lp;+
3 ? A partial answer to this question for the semantical system 'S`3 is that the
only complete theories are those of the models

f p1 ; p2 g ; f p1 ; p3 g ; f p2 ; p3 g
because above these models there is only the model f p1 ; p2 ; p3 g which is the only
M
one in W0; L for the considered semantical system.
The models in Mp3 are ¯nite. So, one would expect their theories to be complete
because as such they can be completly described by enumerating all of its elements.
p;+
It is surprising that only few of them are complete. The semantical system
p
' `3
S was
obtained from ' `3
S by restriction of the language and consequently of the evaluation
p;+
function
power.
'p3 . The system 'S`3 is very poor as a declarative system as it lacks expressive
p;+
Let us suppose we want to describe the model f p1 g in 'S`3 . A strong, natural
and intuitive candidate would be the sentence p1 of Lp;+
3 ,
but then as we just saw this
sentence has other models besides f p1 g which we intended to describe (completly).
What seemed intuitive and natural is a mistake generated by reasoning in the
language of proposicional semantical systems and strongly restricting its language.

Looking at the piece of the lat-

tice containing the models of p1
we can see that f p1 g is the min-
imum (relative to µ) of them.

p;+
The sentence p1 ^ p2 ^ p3 , in
3 'S`
, describes completely the top model of the
lattice because this is the only model for that sentence.
p;+
One way to strengthen the expressive power of the semantical system
3
is '`
S
modifying its evaluation function so that it may capture this notion about minimum
model. There are some di±culties in this project because this notion is quite elusive

34
as it depends on a complete description of the universe of discourse. For instance, in
p;+
the present case, we know completely all the models of 'S`3
and the order relation µ,
as presented in the last page. Intentional considerations, such as of minimum model
is out the scope of this work.
N
It is very useful to postulate a representative of the world W0; K , even when it is empty.

Postulate 1 - We represent by >N , or simply by >, any model in W0;

N 4
K . 2
K

' `, Th(>K ;K) = T1;N .

S
Lemma 13.9 For any semantical system N K

Proof: Immediate. 2
The need to postulate a bottom model is partially justi¯ed by the existence of empty
N
models in propositional semantical systems. The world W1; K is usually not a class
of equivalence, so we can not take one of its models as representative of it.
Postulate 2 - ?N , or simply ? is a model which corresponds to W1; N
K , in the sense
K
K N
that Th(?;K) = T0;N Th(W1;K ;K). 2
p
It is important to observe that if we consider the whole language of ' `2 then
S
Th(f p1 g;Lp2 ) 6
µ Th(f p1 ; p2 g;Lp2 )

Thus such models are not comparable regarding the notion of subjacency.
N
The following result shows that < W1; K ; v > is a °at lattice:

Lemma 13.10 Let 'S` be a symmetrical semantical system. Then:

N
(1) for all M 2 W1; K ? v M v >
N
(2) for all M ; N 2 W1; K ¡ f?; >g M 6
v N
N K K
Proof: (1) For all M 2 W1; K we have T0;N µ Th(M ;K) µ T1;N . (2) follows from
the fact that in a symmetrical semantical system Th(M ;K) is complete in K and N,
and lemma 15.3. 2

Lattice < M ; v > for symmet-

rical systems

4 In the case that W N is empty (symmetrical systems), > is the model for contradictions
0;K
and is used analagously to F in Classical Logic.

35
 p+
In the above lattice as well as in the one we presented for the positive system
3 '`
S
we can see that the models that possess complete theories with respect to v are the
biggest models immediately below >. The reason for this is lemma 15.3 that is valid
p+
for any semantical systems. The example '`
S
3
serves only as a motivation for the
analysis of the topology of the positive semantical systems relative to v.
p p+
Note: Notice that the evaluation function of
3 '`
S
is the same of 'S`
3
but the topology
with respect to v changed. What remained the same in the two topologies is that
above all the models sits >, corresponding to the whole language as theory. Also, the
level immediately below the top contains complete theories, both in the symmetrical
p+
case and in the analysed case of 'S`
3
. As for the general case, it is a matter to be
analysed in the study of positive semantical systems.

14 Conclusions
Applications of the results of this work are already under way and we have been
working in two direction:

Positive Semantical Systems The positive semantical systems are our

bridge to the study of the formal systems. Smullyan's Theory of For-
mal Systems have been studied within our general framework and we
have improved our understanding of GÄ odel's Incompleteness Theo-
rem. A report on this subject is being prepared.
Intensional Semantical Systems From the simple fact that all de¯ni-
M L
tions are relative to subclasses of W1; L and subclasses of T1;M ,
a natural thing is to investigate what happens when one considers
worlds and theories instead of general classes of models or sentences.

15 Acknowledgements
I am in debt with several people who dedicated some of their precious time to listening
to my intuitions, sometimes quite mistaken, in the last three years. Among these
people are: Maur¶³cio Kritz, Nizam Omar, and my graduate students at IME who
took my courses on Knowledge Representation during the Academic years of 1988 and
1989, specially Claudia Garcia who also helped me with the English version. Thanks
to them all.

16 References
Carn1 Carnap, R. { Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its Applications { Dover
Publications { 1958
Carn2 Carnap, R. Introduction to Semantics { Havard University Press { 1975

36
Carv1 CARVALHO, R. L. at all - Engenharia do Conhecimento, 2a. EBAI, Tandil-
Argentina, 1987.
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