Operations of Encircled Forces

Historical Study Operations of Encircled Forces German Experiences in Russia
Department of the Army Pamphlet 20 2!" #ashin$ton% D& '()2
Operations of Encircled Forces
PREFA&E
This pamphlet was prepared by a committee of former German officers under the supervision of the Historical Division, EUCOM !mon" the contributors were former corps commanders and "eneral staff officers at corps, army, and army "roup level, who had e#tensive e#perience on the $ussian front durin" the period %&'%(') The main author, for instance, saw action before *enin"rad, near +orone,h, and later at -talin"rad Toward the end of the war he served successively as chief of staff of !rmy Groups .orth and Centre, durin" their withdrawal from $ussia /n addition to discussin" the tactical and lo"istical problems peculiar to operations of encircled forces, the authors ta0e issue with Hitler1s conviction that si"nificant advanta"es can be "ained by leavin" isolated forces behind the advancin" enemy lines /t was this notion, e#pressed in numerous specific orders that made the desperate stand of encircled German troops a fre2uent occurrence durin" the $ussian campai"n The problems of air support for encircled "round troops are described in a separate appendi#, which deals with tactical air support, air reconnaissance, supply by air, and the employment of antiaircraft units 3ased on the e#periences of the German !ir 4orce in $ussia and presented by a former *uftwaffe officer, the views e#pressed are necessarily coloured by the or"ani,ational peculiarities of the *uftwaffe and its relations to the German !rmy The reader is reminded that publications in the GE$M!. $E5O$T -E$/E- were written by Germans from the German point of view and are presented without interpretation by !merican personnel Minor chan"es in form and in chapter headin"s have been made to secure "reater clarity However, passa"es, which reflect the authors1 pre6udices and defects, whatever they may be, have not been chan"ed and find the same e#pression in the followin" translation as they do in the ori"inal German This pamphlet supersedes M- T(%7, 8Operations of Encircled 4orces,8 which was "iven a limited distribution by the Office of the Chief of Military History, -pecial -taff, U - !rmy
&HAP*ER + +,*ROD-&*+O,
5oc0ets are formed as the result of operations in which the attac0er entirely surrounds a lar"e number of the opposin" forces -uch encirclement is usually followed by a battle of annihilation, the classic "oal of all types of "round combat The principles involved in carryin" out penetrations and envelopments, and in closin" the rin" around an enemy force are well established in tactical doctrine /n the followin" study, however, the problem is approached e#clusively from the defender1s point of view German poc0ets in $ussia9often the result of peremptory orders to hold out in the face of certain encirclement9are used as e#amples to illustrate the tactical principles applied by the encircled units and the measures ta0en in each instance to permit a brea0out in the direction of the German lines The e#periences of :orld :ar // demonstrate that under conditions of modern, mobile warfare such poc0ets are more easily created than in military operations of the past Their tactical si"nificance has chan"ed considerably The encirclement of military forces by the enemy no lon"er si"nals the end of their usefulness 5oc0ets have become fre2uent occurrences in modern combat and must be countered by appropriate tactical measures desi"ned to tie down lar"e numbers of the enemy and, eventually, to rescue the encircled troops Generally, encirclements are effected by an opponent with considerable superiority in men and materiel :ithout these prere2uisites, only superior plannin" can lead to the entrapment of substantial military forces -uch cases are e#tremely rare The manoeuvre of deliberately allowin" one1s forces to be encircled by the enemy so as to tie up his troops in sufficient numbers to even the odds, rarely achieves the desired result -hould the total opposin" forces be appro#imately e2ual, such a manoeuvre can be of value, but only if the number of enemy troops en"a"ed in maintainin" the encirclement is lar"e enou"h to affect the outcome of other operations Even in this case, however, the deliberate creation of a poc0et is a costly enterprise, which will hardly 6ustify the probable loss of the entire encircled force -uccess or failure of the encircled troops in fi"htin" their way bac0 to the German lines depended almost entirely on the tactical situation in and around the poc0et :hereas a discussion of strate"ic decisions is normally outside the scope of tactical studies, the situations described in the followin" chapters are the direct result of decisions by hi"her head2uarters and can only be understood a"ainst the bac0"round of these decisions /n addition to minor German poc0ets in $ussia, the battles of encirclement near Cher0assy and ;amenets(5odols0iy <Chs ' and )= have been selected as typical e#amples of lar"e(scale poc0et en"a"ements and brea0out attempts /n Chapter ', furthermore, the report on developments inside the poc0et is contrasted with impressions "ained of the same operation by an officer at a hi"her head2uarters outside the rin" of encirclement E#cerpts from the diary of a German poc0et commander show the increasin" psycholo"ical pressure e#erted by the enemy on encircled troops, especially the attempt at persuasion by the so(called Committee for a 4ree Germany, which was or"ani,ed by the $ussians and composed of captured German officers
&HAP*ER 2 *HE PO&.E* OF ./+,01REA.O-* OF A PA,2ER D+3+S+O,

:hen the German offensive a"ainst Moscow came to a halt on > December %&'%, the %st 5an,er Division was located at a point fifteen miles north of the $ussian capital /t was immediately ordered bac0 to ;lin <Map %= with the mission of 0eepin" that town open for the withdrawal of other German armoured forces Deep snow obstructed every movement, and the hi"hway runnin" throu"h ;lin was the only route over which the withdrawal of mechani,ed and motori,ed columns could be effected The division reached ;lin, after fi"htin" the elements as well as the enemy, and succeeded in holdin" that important 6unction a"ainst persistent $ussian attac0s until the retro"rade movements of other German units throu"h the town were completed !t that point, however, as the division was ready to brea0 contact and withdraw in the direction of .e0rasino, it found itself completely surrounded by stron" enemy forces The division was ordered by hi"her head2uarters to abandon its vehicles if necessary, and to brea0 throu"h to .e0rasino where it would be able to lin0 up with other German forces Durin" the days of heavy fi"htin" that preceded the entry of the division into ;lin, the road to .e0rasino had been cut by the enemy on several occasions /n these en"a"ements other German units lost numerous vehicles by enemy action and collisions :rec0s had piled up all alon" the road and left no more than a narrow lane between them 3y reconnaissance in force, the encircled division discovered that enemy resistance was wea0est southeast of ;lin, and that a brea0out in this direction would be most li0ely to succeed The terrain, however, was such that practically all vehicles would have to be left behind There were from ?@@ to %,@@@ wounded in ;lin who could not be evacuated without transportation 4urthermore, despite considerable loss of e2uipment, the encircled force was still well provided with vehicles and not inclined to "ive them up, if that could possibly be avoided !fter short deliberation it was a"reed that the division, in order to retain its mobility, would have to brea0 out alon" the road to .e0rasino, althou"h that road itself was held by enemy forces in considerable stren"th Chiefly responsible for this decision was the lar"e number of casualties that were to be evacuated at any cost /n preparin" for the brea0out, the division made use of its e#periences durin" a previous encirclement at ;alinin There, after e#ecutin" a feint in a different direction, which diverted some of the hostile forces, the division had succeeded in ma0in" a surprise brea0out, losin" no e2uipment and sufferin" few casualties The "reat fle#ibility of the artillery had been of decisive importance -hiftin" their fire rapidly from one tar"et to the other, all pieces were able to support the diversionary attac0 as well as the actual brea0out E2ually important had been the possibility of throwin" all the tan0s that survived the diversionary manoeuvre into the main effort !fter a careful survey of the situation around ;lin, a plan was adopted !ll available tan0s, one company of armoured infantry and one rifle battalion were to conduct a diversionary brea0(throu"h north of ;lin, and then to proceed in a westerly direction toward the town of Golyadi Turnin" sharply south after reachin" Golyadi, these forces were to initiate an attac0 in the direction of the main road The artillery was to remain in position around the railroad station of ;lin The main brea0out toward .e0rasino was to ta0e place as soon as the $ussians reacted to the threat near Golyadi and be"an to divert their forces from the main road The Germans calculated that the turnin" movement at Golyadi would force the enemy to shift his front toward the north in order to avoid envelopment from that direction /nitially, the entire German artillery and all available antiaircraft weapons were to support the forces carryin" out the feint :hile all remained 2uiet in the area desi"nated for the main effort, the German units were assembled in proper order inside the encircled city H Hour for the diversionary manoeuvre9 actually an attac0 with limited ob6ective9was set for dawn The time of the main brea0(throu"h depended on the development of the situation
The intended deception of the enemy was accomplished with full success ! well(or"ani,ed German tas0 force fell upon the $ussians at Golyadi and cau"ht them by surprise !t the appearance of German tan0s the $ussians immediately shifted their reserves to meet the diversionary attac0, which they assumed to be the main German brea0out The attac0in" German troops, incidentally, had not been informed that their effort at Golyadi was no more than a feint /t was felt that they would not fi"ht with 2uite the same ,eal if they 0new that they were merely tryin" to deceive the enemy Only the division artillery commander was entrusted with the full details of the plan, includin" the code word for shiftin" fire to his new tar"ets on either side of the ;lin( .e0rasino road The German tas0 force too0 Golyadi and pivoted south !s e#pected, the enemy be"an to pull out from the area of the main road and to move north across the railroad line, determined to counter the threat of envelopment This was the appropriate time9about noon of the same day9to launch the main brea0out alon" the road to .e0rasino Upon prearran"ed si"nal, artillery and antiaircraft weapons shifted their fire Only one artillery battalion continued to fire on the old tar"et so as to cover the withdrawal of the diversionary force from Golyadi -imultaneously, on the road leadin" out of ;lin toward the west, the main attac0 "ot under way The division1s armoured infantry battalion drove the first "ap into the lines of an enemy ta0en completely by surprise Dismounted armoured infantry and motorcycle troops followed and widened the penetration -ome of the tan0s initially en"a"ed in the diversionary manoeuvre had made their way bac0 to ;lin and were now committed on both sides of the road Under their protection, the wounded on truc0s and sleds and accompanied by armoured personnel carriers were moved out of the town 3y now the artillery was coverin" the flan0s of the brea0(throu"h column /n the eastern part of the city combat en"ineers held off the enemy while the evacuation too0 its course :ith the rate of pro"ress determined by the movement of numerous vehicles, and by the need for "radual displacement of the artillery which was in turn covered by tan0s and armoured cars operatin" north and south of the road, the entire force fou"ht its way throu"h to .e0rasino, where it was received by other German units Undoubtedly the division owed much of its success to the proper employment of its combat elements, but it was primarily the maintenance of strict traffic control that permitted the evacuation of an unusually lar"e number of vehicles and thus determined the outcome of the entire operation !ll vehicles that bro0e down were immediately pushed off the road to 0eep the column movin" without interruption ! lar"e number of officers and non(commissioned officers with minor combat in6uries had been added to the military police to assist in the strict enforcement of traffic discipline The division staff, at first located at the western ed"e of ;lin and later with the main body of the division, directed the initial brea0(throu"h and the subse2uent movements of individual elements with the use of radio and messen"ers, but without telephone communications -ubstantially intact, the division emer"ed from the poc0et of ;lin, ta0in" alon" its casualties and nearly all of its e2uipment Twenty(four hours later, on a different sector of the front, it was a"ain in action a"ainst the enemy
&HAP*ER ! E,&+R&/E4E,* OPERA*+O, A* 3E/+.+5E /-.+0FA+/-RE OF A RES&-E
3y mid(.ovember %&'7 the northernmost corps sector of !rmy Group Centre e#tended seventy miles, from the town of +eli,h north to the army "roup boundary /nade2uately covered by */A Corps, the line contained two lar"e "aps, each about ten miles wide and partly swampy but not entirely impassable There, only reconnaissance and combat patrols provided a minimum of security Despite persistent re2uests by the army "roup commander, no reinforcements arrived to stren"then the precarious German defences on that sector *ate in .ovember the $ussians attac0ed north and south of +eli0iye *u0i <Map 7= and succeeded in encirclin" the city, which was held by a stron" re"imental combat team of the ?Bd Division ! few miles farther south two additional German combat teams suffered the same fate Thus three separate German poc0ets completely cut off from the main force were created in the same "eneral area 3y that time all available reserves of !rmy Group Centre had been thrown into the fierce battle at $,hev and could not be e#tricated for the relief of the encircled units in the +eli0iye *u0i area The army "roup commander therefore re2uested authority from !rmy Hi"h Command to order brea0outs of the encircled forces toward the west /f carried out at once, these could have been accomplished without "reat difficulty or e#cessive casualties, but it would have meant pullin" the German line bac0 about ten to fifteen miles The new defence positions, as proposed by army "roup, would still assure the undisturbed operation of the .evel(.ovoso0olni0i(.asva railroad, and the resultin" $ussian salient was then to be reduced, as soon as possible, by a German flan0 attac0 from the south Hitler, who in December %&'% had assumed direct control of all military operations in $ussia, flatly re6ected this proposal /nstead, he ordered that the poc0ets be held at all costs, that other German forces, by attac0in" from the west, re(establish contact with the encircled units, and that the front be pushed even farther to the east He referred to a recent German success in a similar situation at ;holm by the same officer who now commanded the ?Bd Division in the area of +eli0iye *u0i !rmy "roup tried in vain to call Hitler1s attention to the lac0 of reserves and the e#treme hardships imposed by winter weather and difficult terrain !ll such representations were impatiently brushed aside The two German combat teams surrounded in the area south of +eli0iye *u0i meanwhile conducted a fi"htin" withdrawal toward the west :ith the assistance of other German forces, they bro0e out of encirclement and succeeded in establishin" a new front !t +eli0iye *u0i the Germans had previously constructed a perimeter of hasty field fortifications around the town !dvance positions, located several hundred yards from the ed"e of the city, proved of considerable value durin" the initial sta"es of the sie"e The encircled "arrison consisted of a stron" infantry re"iment of the ?Bd Division, two artillery battalions, one observation battalion, one en"ineer company, two construction battalions, and stron" service and supply units The poc0et commander, a lieutenant colonel, had assumed command of his re"iment only a few days earlier, and accordin"ly did not 0now his troops The enemy had so disposed his forces that at the be"innin" of December only two $ussian bri"ades were deployed in a wide arc west of +eli0iye *u0i !s late as two wee0s after the poc0et was closed, a brea0out in that direction would still have been possible, but despite the personal intervention of the army "roup commander, Hitler did not chan"e his mind The poc0et was to be held, and should only be relieved by a push from the west :ith no reinforcements in si"ht, the troops re2uired for this relief thrust could only be ta0en from other sectors of !rmy Group Centre, all of which had been severely drained in an attempt at stren"thenin" .inth !rmy at $,hev The direction for the attac0 was to be from southwest to
northeast with the so(called citadel9a part of +eli0iye *u0i west of the *ovat $iver9desi"nated as the primary ob6ective <Map B= /t was obvious that */A Corps, already responsible for an e#cessively wide sector of the front, could not be e#pected to ta0e on the additional tas0 of conductin" this attac0 The situation not only called for the use of fresh combat units but also for the establishment of a new tactical head2uarters to direct the proposed relief operation Unable to pull out a corps head2uarters from any other sector, army "roup had to resort to an improvisation ! provisional corps head2uarters, Corps :oehler, was formed under the command of the army "roup chief of staff assisted by the army "roup trainin" officer, the chief artillery officer, and another youn" staff officer -ubordinate to */A Corps, which remained responsible for supply and administration, the newly formed command "roup was ready to ta0e char"e of the front sector opposite +eli0iye *u0i by mid(December /ts command post, established on %) December at *ovno, was no less improvised than the staff by which it was occupied ! one(room peasant hut had to serve as livin" and wor0in" 2uarters for si# officers, three cler0s, three drivers, and two orderlies The terrain desi"nated for the attac0 was desolate, rollin" country, virtually without forests Here -talin1s scorched earth policy had been fully effective in the $ussian retreat of %&'% -ubse2uent partisan operations completed the wor0 of destruction Most of the formerly inhabited places had vanished and heavy layers of snow now blan0eted even their last traces .o roads or reco"ni,able terrain features bro0e the monotony Orientation was e#tremely difficult and at ni"ht a matter of pure chance The entire area "ave the impression of a landscape on the moon The German units initially available for the attac0 were a division from East 5russia, the ?Bd Division minus elements inside +eli0iye *u0i, the mountain re"iment that had escaped encirclement south of the city, and two construction battalions They had been wea0ened by considerable losses in men and materiel and were sufferin" from the effects of heavy frosts alternatin" with sudden thaws !lthou"h their morale appeared unbro0en, their combat value was definitely limited 4ortunately, their new commander, because of his e#perience as army "roup chief of staff, had no difficulty in findin" out at what depots in the army "roup area ammunition and e2uipment could still be obtained :ith railroads and transport planes doin" their part, it too0 only a few days for the troops to be resupplied and re(e2uipped with new winter clothin" This brou"ht about a rapid decline in the number of cold weather casualties $einforced by a motori,ed division, a battalion of li"ht infantry, two batteries of %@)(mm "uns, and a roc0et pro6ector bri"ade, the improvised corps continued its preparations for the attac0 They had to be cut short, however, since Hitler advanced the attac0 date by several days despite all ob6ections by army "roup The attac0 was launched shortly before Christmas but, after ma0in" "ood pro"ress at first, bo""ed down at the halfway mar0 3y now it had become clear that additional forces of considerable stren"th would have to be brou"ht up in order to achieve success The reinforcements finally made available consisted of two divisions and one tan0 battalion !t least one of these divisions, however, proved wholly inade2uate for the type of operation in which it was to participate Ori"inally used as an occupation unit in :estern Europe, it had recently been transferred east and employed as a security force on a 2uiet sector of the $ussian front Two of its re"imental commanders were considerably over(a"e and incapable of leadin" their units in combat The third re"imental commander, who was still in "ood physical condition, actually had to command each of the three re"iments in turn as they were successively committed in the attac0 !rmy "roup had re2uested the approval of the !ir 4orce for the employment of a parachute division, which was, then in a 2uiet position southeast of +eli,h CEd D /n the German system of or"ani,ation, parachute units were part of the *uftwaffe E Gorin" refused, insistin" that the division remain intact in its present position Undoubtedly this refusal was one of the chief reasons why the liberation of +eli0iye *u0i failed The second German relief thrust was launched early in Fanuary %&'B *eadin" elements advanced to less than five miles from the northwestern outs0irts of the belea"uered city <Map B= !t that sta"e, however, enemy pressure a"ainst the lon" flan0s of the penetration forced the Germans to assume the defensive
/nside the poc0et, the citadel on the left ban0 of the *ovat $iver had meanwhile become the refu"e for some )@@ wounded from all parts of the city On ) Fanuary the $ussians attac0ed from the north and succeeded in cuttin" throu"h the town and severin" the citadel from the main part of +eli0iye *u0i Thus two separate poc0ets came into e#istence, each one precariously defended after the loss of all positions beyond the ed"e of the town, and particularly threatened by enemy attempts at infiltratin" from bloc0 to bloc0 *iberatin" the main German force encircled in the eastern part of +eli0iye *u0i had become even more difficult /n any event, the immediate ob6ective was to cut throu"h the rin" of encirclement that surrounded the smaller poc0et west of the river ! "eneral advance of the corps front, however, as demanded by Hitler, was by now definitely out of the 2uestion !fter len"thy ne"otiations the !ir 4orce finally released one battalion of its parachute division for commitment at +eli0iye *u0i /t was too little and too late, but a last attempt had to be made to open a rescue corridor to the citadel /n order to bolster the fi"htin" stren"th of the encircled "arrison, a reinforced company of li"ht infantry ridin" on truc0s and tan0 destroyers was to ram its way throu"h the enemy into the surrounded citadel On %@ Fanuary, in a darin" dayli"ht attac0, this force too0 the $ussians by surprise and succeeded in 6oinin" the German defenders inside the poc0et Durin" the ni"ht of %'(%) Fanuary, the parachute battalion was to advance in a surprise attac0 to the southwest side of the citadel There, by @%@@, the fresh troops recently arrived in the poc0et were to attempt a brea0out, ta0in" with them all wounded who were still able to march !lthou"h initially led by a re"imental commander familiar with the area, the parachute battalion lost its way in the featureless terrain and failed to reach its ob6ective The citadel force bro0e out nevertheless, and in the early mornin" hours, reduced by casualties to about %)@ men, appeared at the corps1 advance command post on the .ovoso0olni0i(+eli0iye *u0i railroad line 3y now, irreplaceable losses in the ran0s of the German relief force made it impossible to repeat the rescue attempt !lso, no more radio si"nals were comin" from the eastern part of +eli0iye *u0i9a clear indication that in si# wee0s of relentless fi"htin", despite the most determined resistance, the German force in the eastern poc0et had been wiped out to the last man The poc0et commander1s final radio messa"e, received on %' Fanuary, was, 8:ith last stren"th and ammunition still holdin" two bun0ers in centre of city Enemy outside my command post 8 The stru""le for +eli0iye *u0i was over :hile it had the erect of tyin" down a "reatly superior and constantly "rowin" enemy force for si# wee0s, it also resulted in the annihilation of the German "arrison, e#orbitant casualties amon" the relief forces, and a loss of terrain alon" the entire corps sector <Map B= The important .evel(.ovoso0olni0i(.asva railroad line still remained in German hands, free from enemy interference However, the plan proposed by army "roup would have assured the same result without necessitatin" the futile stru""le for +eli0iye *u0i !t the end of this ill(fated operation German casualties amounted to %G,@@@ officers and men, ),@@@ of whom perished in the belea"uered city, while %7,@@@ were lost in rescue attempts from outside Even if the relief thrust had eventually succeeded, the cost was far too hi"h The e#periences "ained at +eli0iye *u0i mi"ht be summari,ed as followsD % :herever a poc0et comes into e#istence, it is usually the result of the attac0er1s numerical superiority over the encircled force The deliberate adoption of a poc0et(type defence can only be 6ustified when early relief is assuredH otherwise it will lead to the loss of the entire poc0et force, and thus to a further decrease in the over(all fi"htin" stren"th of the forces in the field 7 The enemy1s effective military stren"th, his combat troops, is his principle means of wa"in" war /t must be destroyed To fi"ht constantly for terrain features, industrial installations, or simply for propa"andistic purposes is to violate the basic principles of warfare B /t was Hitler who ori"inally pronouncedD 8/ must hold all poc0ets to the last in order to tie up superior enemy forces as lon" as possible 8 This may be correct in e#ceptional cases, but can never be elevated to the level of a "eneral principle
' /f an encircled force must be liberated by a relief thrust from the outside, only the best troops should be used in that operation The more rapidly such a mission is completed, the fewer will be the casualties, and the "reater the success The maintenance for any len"th of time of a lon", narrow salient obviously pointin" at the poc0et will involve murderous casualties /n the end such tactics are almost certain to fail because of the pressure e#erted by the enemy on both flan0s of the salient ) -peed is an absolute re2uirement, but should not be "ained at the cost of hasty and inade2uate preparations The selection and assembly of the relief forces involves careful deliberation and considerable effort /n the situation described, the supreme commander, on whose specific order the date for the attac0 had been moved up, was far away from the fi"htin" front, and the effect of this intervention proved disastrous There was nothin" to 6ustify such lac0 of confidence in the 6ud"ment of the local commander or in the recommendations of army "roup > Constant communication with the encircled forces was maintained via radio, which functioned smoothly and met all re2uirements On several occasions the artillery fire of the relief force was actually directed by observers inside the poc0et -huttle fli"hts by liaison aircraft were possible only in the be"innin", and then only at ni"ht G Havin" the li"ht infantry unit brea0 out of the citadel at ni"ht proved to be a wise decision Direction toward the forward elements of the rescue force was maintained with the aid of prismatic compasses !dvancin" in several sin"le files, the men succeeded in inchin" their way forward throu"h the hollows and silently overpowerin" the $ussian sentries ? -upply of the German poc0et was at first affected from reserve stoc0s available at +eli0iye *u0i -oon, however, airdrops became necessary, mar0in" the first occurrence of a situation that was later so characteristic of all German poc0ets in $ussia9the pli"ht of encircled forces, inade2uately supplied with ammunition, rations, and e2uipment, who were e#pected to do their utmost in a hopeless situation /f Hitler himself had ever been an eyewitness to such developments, Gorin"1s arro"ant promises of ade2uate air supply for German poc0ets mi"ht have been discounted once and for all The *uftwaffe units concerned were not in any way to blame The missions assi"ned to them proved impossible of fulfilment, but they did their duty a"ain and a"ain in a superior manner, at +eli0iye *u0i, as well as at -talin"rad, and in all subse2uent cases where German "round troops found themselves in hopeless encirclement
&HAP*ER " *HE PO&.E* #ES* OF &HER.ASS50*HE +,S+DE 3+E#

Section +6 E3E,*S /EAD+,G *O *HE FOR4A*+O, OF *HE PO&.E* 3y the end of December %&'B9with ;iev <$eference Map= reta0en by the enemy and a $ussian bul"e e#tendin" as far west as Ihitomir9 the German forces in the Dnepr bend were ordered to hold their positions at all costs A*// Corps <Map '=, on the ri"ht flan0 of 4irst 5an,er !rmy, had been under persistent enemy attac0 since 7> December when some of the $ussian forces recently en"a"ed in the battle for ;iev were shifted south and renewed their pressure a"ainst the corps sector To the ri"ht, Ei"hth !rmy1s A/ Corps, the )th -- 5an,er Division Wiking as its left flan0, was li0ewise en"a"ed in heavy defensive fi"htin" alon" its entire front 3oth corps had the specific mission of continuin" to hold their front lines a"ainst superior $ussian forces in order to assure a favourable base for a pro6ected German counteroffensive To the left of A*// Corps, +// Corps had been operatin" a"ainst the flan0 of the $ussian bul"e -ince about 7@ December the corps had been attac0in" in a westerly direction, but without achievin" any si"nificant results The situation of A*// and A/ Corps, their most advanced elements fi"htin" alon" the Dnepr and their lon" e#terior flan0s inade2uately secured, was certain to invite attempts by the enemy to encircle and annihilate both corps !s early as mid(December the commander of A*// Corps had re2uested authority to fall bac0 behind the $oss $iver This would have meant that, instead of havin" to defend a fronta"e of seventy(five miles with two divisions, the corps would have been able to occupy a shortened defensive position behind a natural obstacle However, that re2uest was turned down .evertheless, A*// Corps had ta0en a few precautionary measures durin" December Two rear positions had been prepared north of the $oss $iver, east of 3o"uslav, which were to prove very useful later on in the withdrawal of the corps toward the south !lso, all food stoc0s of the former German civil administration in the corps area had been evacuated south of the $oss $iver, a move that turned out to be of decisive importance as these provisions soon became the sole source of supply for the German poc0et forces Map ' THE 5OC;ET :E-T O4 CHE$;!--J Day after day, from the end of December %&'B until 7' Fanuary %&'', $ussian infantry, often supported by tan0s, attac0ed the positions of A*// Corps 4rom mid(Fanuary on the enemy1s main effort was clearly directed a"ainst the left flan0 of the corps On 7) Fanuary -oviet forces launched a lar"e(scale attac0 a"ainst the ad6acent +// Corps whose ri"ht flan0 division fell bac0 toward the southeast and south, so that by the end of the same day the roads leadin" to the flan0 and rear of A*// Corps were open to the enemy Over these roads the pursuin" $ussians pressed forward via Medvin toward 3o"uslav and -teblev -imultaneously, A/ Corps had suffered enemy penetrations on the ri"ht boundary and at the centre of its sector To escape the dan"er of envelopment and 0eep its front intact, the corps withdrew its ri"ht win" and centre toward the west and northwest where it was eventually to form the eastern front of the German poc0et 3efore 7' Fanuary most enemy attac0s a"ainst A*// Corps were bloc0ed or repelled These en"a"ements, both in terms of battle casualties and lowered physical resistance of individuals, drained the fi"htin" stren"th of the German forces Their commanders were under constant pressure, tryin" to seal off the daily penetrations by virtually uncoverin" other sectors, which were not under heavy attac0, and by usin" all available truc0s, horses, and horse(drawn carts to shift their units to the threatened points /nitially, each of the two divisions on line with a troop stren"th of si# battalions had to defend a fronta"e of B) to '@ miles, with wea0 artillery support and without tan0s E#cept for the $oss $iver sector, the area in which they were committed was almost completely flat and offered few terrain features favourin" the defence
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4rom mid(December %&'B until its brea0out from the poc0et on %> 4ebruary %&'', A*// Corps was actually never in a position to offer effective resistance to a far superior enemy who attac0ed with numerous tan0sH if it could not dod"e enemy attac0s by timely withdrawal, it was constantly threatened by $ussian penetrations of its lines !uthority for any withdrawal, however, could only be "ranted by !dolf Hitler in person, and no such decision could be obtained in less than twenty( four hours One can easily visuali,e the difficulties, mountin" from day to day, which the corps had to face under these circumstances The $ussian attac0s on 7) Fanuary and the followin" days had produced a deep penetration separatin" A*// and +// Corps :ith its left flan0 and rear threatened by the enemy, A*// Corps was forced to establish a new front alon" the "eneral line 3o"uslav(-teblev 4or a short time it appeared that +// Corps would be able to close the "ap and restore the situation, but after a few days, as the $ussians succeeded in widenin" their penetration, it became evident that +// Corps was rapidly withdrawin" toward the southwest !t this sta"e the German forces east of the $ussian salient were ordered for the first time to ma0e preparations for fi"htin" their way out of the encirclement that was now ta0in" shape ! brea0out toward the west was clearly out of the 2uestion, thus southeast or due south were the only possible directions Durin" the first few days of 4ebruary, however, another $ussian penetration turned the ri"ht flan0 of A/ Corps and made its position untenable :ith its centre withdrawin" west and its ri"ht win" northwest the entire corps was rapidly movin" away from its nei"hbourin" units ad6acent to the southeast /n that area, too, a continuous German front had ceased to e#ist, and a brea0out in that direction was no lon"er possible Moreover, since 7? Fanuary the sole supply roads leadin" to A*//H and A/ Corps <via -hpola and Iveni"orod0a= had been cut -upply by air was re2uested and furnished 3y > 4ebruary, A*// and A/ Corps were completely encircled /n shiftin" its main effort toward the south, A*// Corps had been forced to wea0en its northern and western fronts, which were now slowly "ivin" "round This development, to"ether with the withdrawal movements of A/ Corps on the ri"ht, led to a "radual shrin0in" of the poc0et, which in turn resulted in "reater concentration9 an important prere2uisite for the eventual brea0out from encirclement !t the same time, it had become evident that the surrounded German units could escape annihilation only if they succeeded in brea0in" throu"h the enemy lines on the southern front of the poc0et /n wee0s of defensive fi"htin", however, they had suffered e#cessive casualties, and the forces that would have to be used for such an operation were obviously incapable of "ettin" throu"h the $ussian encirclement on their ownH it was clear that the brea0out attempt would have to be supported by a relief thrust from the outside !ccordin"ly, the encircled units were informed that /// 5an,er Corps, located about twenty(five miles southwest of the poc0et, would launch an attac0 toward Morentsy in order to establish a forward rescue position -imultaneously, another pan,er corps at about the same distance due south of the poc0et was to thrust north in the direction of Olshana On > 4ebruary, in a radio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmy, D Day for the brea0out and rescue operation was set for %@ 4ebruary 3ecause of the sudden start of the muddy season, however, the date had to be postponed for nearly a wee0 /n order to establish unity of command inside the poc0et, the two encircled corps were placed under the control of General -temmermann, the commander of A/ Corps, and desi"nated 4orce -temmermann Meanwhile, repeated $ussian attac0s9from the southeast a"ainst ;orsun and -henderov0a, and from the west a"ainst -teblev9had threatened to split up the German poc0et !lthou"h all of these enemy thrusts were repelled, they further reduced the forces available for the brea0out and had a detrimental effect on the morale of the encircled troops On %' 4ebruary elements of A*// Corps succeeded in ta0in" ;hil0i and ;omarov0a <Map )=, two to three miles west of -henderov0a, and thus reached a favourable 6ump(off line for the final brea0(throu"h /t was hi"h time indeedD The "radual restrictin" of the poc0et had resulted in a dan"erous massin" of troops The entire German(held area was now within ran"e of the -oviet artilleryH volume and intensity of enemy fire seemed to be merely a 2uestion of how much
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ammunition the $ussians were willin" to e#pend /t was feared that at any moment German casualties mi"ht amount to an unbearable level The $ussians themselves, however, were hampered by snowstorms and poor road conditions and could not use their artillery to full advanta"e Thus the German troops inside the poc0et were able to rally for their last effort The brea0out be"an, as ordered, on %> 4ebruary at 7B@@ Fumpin" off from the line ;hil0i( ;omarov0a, three divisional columns struc0 in a southwesterly directionH their mission was to reach the forward rescue position established by the leadin" elements of /// 5an,er Corps at *isyan0a and O0tyabr, and to 6oin forces with 4irst 5an,er !rmy Section ++6 *HE -,+*S +,S+DE *HE GER4A, PO&.E* The composition of the two German corps encircled in the poc0et west of Cher0assy was as followsD A/ Corps consisted of three infantry divisions, the )Gth, G7d, and B?&th Divisions, each without tan0s, assault "uns, or ade2uate antitan0 weapons Of these only the G7d Division was capable of a""ressive combat The two other divisions, with the e#ception of one "ood re"iment of the )Gth, were unfit for use in the attac0 The )th -- 5an,er Division Wiking was part of A/ Corps until the end of Fanuary Corps troops comprised one assault "un bri"ade of two battalions totallin" si# batteries, and one battalion of li"ht GHK artillery A*// Corps included Tas0 4orce 3, the ??th /nfantry Division, and, from the end of Fanuary, the -- 5an,er Division Wiking Tas0 4orce 3 was a cover name "iven to the %%7th /nfantry Division to hide its identity !lthou"h the unit carried a corps standard, it was an ordinary infantry division consistin" of three re"iments, the normal complement of artillery, a stron" antitan0 battalion, but no tan0s or assault "uns .ow at about four(fifths of its authori,ed stren"th, Tas0 4orce 3 had the combat value of one "ood infantry division The ??th Division had been badly mauled durin" the precedin" en"a"ements /t consisted of two re"iments totallin" five battalions and its artillery was seriously depleted /n terms of personnel, weapons, and e2uipment the )th -- 5an,er Division Wiking was by far the stron"est division of A*// Corps /t was fully e2uipped as an armoured division and consisted of two armoured infantry re"iments, one tan0 re"iment with a total of &@ tan0s, the 3el"ian volunteer bri"ade Wallonien or"ani,ed in three battalions, and one replacement re"iment of about 7,@@@ men !ccurate stren"th reports from that division could not be obtainedH its effective stren"th before the brea0out was estimated at about %7,@@@ men Section +++6 D+AR5 OF *HE &O44A,DER OF 7/++ &ORPS The tactical situation between 7? Fanuary and %> 4ebruary, as described above, was modified by a number of developments inside the poc0et ! record of these events is found in e#cerpts from the diary 0ept by the commander of A*// Corps up to the time of the brea0outD 7? Fanuary Communications to the rear alon" the road -hpola(Iveni"orod0a have been cut :e are encircled 4irst 5an,er !rmy to restore communication routes Our defensive mission remains unchan"ed Telephone re2uest to Ei"hth !rmyD 8Mission re2uires maintainin" northeast front a"ainst stron" enemy pressure $ussian advance a"ainst -teblev necessitates main effort on southern sector $e2uest authority for immediate withdrawal of northern and eastern fronts This will permit offensive action toward southwest and prevent further encirclement and separation from A/ Corps 8 7& Fanuary $adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmyD 85repare withdrawal in direction $ossava up to Mironov0a( 3o"uslav 3e ready to move by %7@@ on 7& Fanuary upon prearran"ed si"nal 8!uthority for further withdrawal li0ely within twenty(four hours $eport new situation 8 $e2uested additional ammunition for artillery and small arms 4ood supplies in the poc0et are ade2uate A/ Corps under attac0 by stron" $ussian tan0 forces -everal of its re"iments reduced
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to %@@ men !ir supply be"innin" to arrive Evacuation of casualties too slow More than 7,@@@ wounded have to be removed B% Fanuary Messa"e from Ei"hth !rmyD A*+/// 5an,er Corps will attac0 on % 4ebruary toward *o,ovat0a Cthree miles northwest of -hpolaE to relieve enemy pressure a"ainst A/ Corps % 4ebruary Daily losses B@@ men 4i"hter protection inade2uate !mmunition and fuel runnin" low 7 4ebruary !ir supply improvin" $adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmyD 8:ithdrawal of north front approved 5repare for main effort on eastern flan0 of south front +ormann C"eneral commandin" A*+/// 5an,er CorpsE is continuin" the relief attac0 from the south 3reith C"eneral commandin" /// 5an,er CorpsE will attac0 B 4ebruary from southwest 8 B 4ebruary !ir supply continues to improve Unfortunately several transport aircraft with wounded aboard were shot down on the return fli"ht Have re2uested that air evacuations be made at ni"ht only unless ade2uate fi"hter protection can be provided Messa"e from !rmyD 8To stren"then southern sector, occupy proposed line without further delayin" action at intermediate positions 8 ' 4ebruary Made a determined effort to ta0e 3o"uslav Commander of Tas0 4orce 3 seriously wounded .ow all the division commanders are artillerymen, includin" the present -- bi" shot The north front is totterin" $ussian tan0s today captured a medium battery of Tas0 4orce 3 that was firin" from every barrel without bein" able to score a sin"le hit Evidently we have too few e#perienced "unners 3y ni"htfall our line is restored Daily ammunition e#penditure of the corps 7@@ tons Casualties still B@@ per day This cannot "o on much lon"er Have re2uested 7,@@@ replacements, also %7@ tons additional ammunition per day ) 4ebruary $adio messa"e from Ei"hth !rmyD 85repare brea0out for %@ 4ebruary 4urther instructions follow 8 G 4ebruary $adio messa"e to Ei"hth !rmyD 8$oads deeply mired :ill re2uire more time for brea0out preparations 8 Messa"e from Ei"hth !rmyD 8!t time of brea0out the followin" units will attac0 from the outsideD A*+/// 5an,er Corps toward Olshana, /// 5an,er Corps toward Morentsy 5oc0et force will effect initial brea0(throu"h and, coverin" its flan0s and rear, concentrate its entire stren"th in attac0 across the line -henderov0a(;vit0i toward Morentsy, to lin0 up with armoured wed"e of relief forces $e"roupin" must be completed in time to permit brea0out on %@ 4ebruary 4inal decision will depend on pro"ress of armoured spearheads -ituation does not permit further delay 8 -temmermann C"eneral commandin" A/ CorpsE assumes command of both corps in the poc0et $eport to !rmy that because of road conditions attac0 impossible before %7 4ebruary Had a loo0 at the %%@th Grenadier $e"iment and Tas0 4orce 3 Morale of troops very "ood $ations plentiful Enou"h su"ar, sausa"e, ci"arettes, and bread to last for another ten days !rmy Group Commander radios that everythin" is bein" done to help us ? 4ebruary $adio messa"e to Ei"hth !rmyD 8!rtillery, heavy weapons, and horse(drawn vehicles of G7d, B?&th, and Wiking Divisions, as well as hundreds of motor vehicles of Wiking carryin" many wounded, are stuc0 in the mud at Gorodishche :ithdrawal from line held today, to effect re"roupin", would involve intolerable losses of men, weapons, and e2uipment *ine must be held at least twenty(four hours lon"er 8
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Today / saw many casualties, includin" four officersH ordered more careful evacuation of wounded, and destruction of all classified documents we can possibly "et rid of & 4ebruary Generals Ihu0ov, ;onev, and +atutin have sent an emissary, a $ussian lieutenant colonel, who arrived with driver, interpreter, and bu"ler at the position of Tas0 4orce 3 to present surrender terms for -temmermann and myself He is treated to champa"ne and ci"arettes, receives no reply Ultimatum remains unanswered 4orces for brea0out dwindle from day to day /n2uiry from !rmy Hi"h Command about *eon De"relle, commander of 3ri"ade Wallonien He is a youn" man, 3el"ianH / saw him a few days a"o amon" his men They are li0eable fellows, but apparently too soft for this business !pproach of relief forces delayed by necessary re"roupin" .evertheless !rmy now insists we brea0 out on %7 4ebruary Much as we would li0e to, we cannot do it by then /n this mud the infantry cannot possibly cover more than a thousand yards per hour %@ 4ebruary My old division commander of %&'@, General von -eydlit, CEd D Captured at -talin"rad by the $ussians Thereafter leader of the .ational Committee 84ree Germany8 composed of German officers in $ussian hands E today sent me a lon" letter delivered by aircraftD He thin0s / should act li0e Jorc0 durin" the campai"n of %?%7 and "o over to the $ussians with my entire command / did not answer !rmy in2uires whether brea0out in direction Morentsy still feasible, or whether the operation should rather be directed via D,hur,hentsy(5ochapintsy toward *isyan0a $eply to !rmyD 8*isyan0a preferable if 3reith C/// 5an,er CorpsE can reach it -ituation on east front critical -everal enemy penetrations 4or the past forty(ei"ht hours A/ Corps unable to establish new defence line Troops badly depleted and battle(weary A*// Corps front intact :e are attac0in" south of -teblev -erious dan"er if east front cannot be brou"ht to a halt A*// Corps will brea0 throu"h in direction *isyan0a The troops are well in hand Early advance of 3reith toward *isyan0a decisive 8 $eply from !rmyD 8Than0s for comprehensive information /n full accord concernin" new direction of brea0out 3reith will attac0 %% 4ebruary in direction of *isyan0a :ill do all we can Good luc0 8 -eydlit, today sent me fifty German prisoners with letters to their commandersH in addition they are supposed to persuade their comrades to "o over to the enemy / cannot understand -eydlit, !lthou"h the events at -talin"rad must have chan"ed him completely, / am unable to see how he can now wor0 as a sort of G(7 for Ihu0ov %7 4ebruary 3reith has reached *isyan0a +ormann is advancin" in direction of Iveni"orod0a Our infantry has ta0en the northern part of ;hil0i CMap )E The re"imental commander leadin" the attac0 was 0illed in action -o "oes one after another A/ Corps has ta0en ;omarov0a The $ussians, accordin" to intercepted si"nals, are about to attac0 our left flan0 $adio messa"e to !rmyD 8!bsolutely necessary that 3reith advance to 5etrovs0oye as 2uic0ly as possible, in order to effect lin0(up -peed is essential 4orward elements of A*// Corps now at ;hil0i 8 $eply from !rmyD 8+ormann southeast of Iveni"orod0a 3reith will attac0 %B 4ebruary with stron" armoured wed"e in direction D,hur,hentsy 8 :as at ;hil0i this afternoon Thin"s loo0 bad Our men are e#hausted .othin" "ets done unless officers are constantly behind them !m now 0eepin" my horses inside the hutH they are in better shape than / My orderly is burnin" my papers and "ivin" away my e#tra uniforms %B 4ebruary !nother messa"e from General von -eydlit,, this time addressed to the commander of the %&?th Division .ot badD they thin0 we are stron"er than we really are The letter was attached as
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usual to a blac0, red, and white pennant CGerman coloursE and dropped from a plane These people never fail to find my head2uarters 3rea0out further delayed because of heavy enemy attac0s a"ainst A/ Corps1 east front $adio messa"e to !rmyD 8Concentration for brea0out prevented by heavy $ussian flan0 attac0s and final moppin" up at -henderov0a :ill shorten east front, involvin" evacuation of ;orsun, durin" ni"ht of %B(%' 4ebruary 4orces thereby released will not be available for brea0out before %) 4ebruary /ntend to continue attac0 throu"hout %' 4ebruary 3rea0throu"h of 3reith1s armoured force toward 5etrovs0oye indispensable to success 8 $eply from !rmyD 83reith under orders to thrust toward 5etrovs0oye His forward elements now on line *isyan0a(;hichintsy 8 Have re2uested stron" fi"hter protection for %' 4ebruary $ussian strafin" attac0s are "ettin" increasin"ly serious in view of the "rowin" con"estion in the poc0et / am most afraid that !rmy cannot comply with this oft(repeated re2uest %' 4ebruary 3reith will have to arrive soon *ast ni"ht the *uftwaffe dropped ammunition over the $ussian lines instead of ours .ow they are tryin" to put the blame on us, claimin" the drop point was inade2uately li"hted -temmermann has 6ust issued orders for the brea0out The dateD %> 4ebruary $adio messa"e to !rmyD 8.orth front will be withdrawn durin" the ni"ht of %'(%) 4ebruary to the south ban0 of $oss $iver Main attac0 ordered for %> 4ebruary 4urther advance of tan0 force for direct support absolutely necessary 8 :e are destroyin" all e#cess motor vehicles and e2uipment / have prohibited burnin" %) 4ebruary Our poc0et is now so small that / can practically loo0 over the entire front from my command post, when it is not snowin" Enemy aircraft are hard at wor0H luc0y for us it is snowin" most of the time / was once more at ;hil0i to reconnoitre the terrain selected for the brea0out Then issued final order -ince this mornin" there is trouble at the -- Division The :alloons and the Germania $e"iment are "ettin" fid"ety They must hold only until tomorrow ni"ht 4inal instructions from -temmermannD :e are to 6ump off on %> 4ebruary at 7B@@, with Tas0 4orce 3 G7d Division, and -- 5an,er Division Wiking from ;hil0i(;omarov0a across the line D,hur,hentsy(Hill 7B& to *isyan0aH )Gth and ??th Divisions will cover the flan0s and the rear :ith me, at my command post, are the three division commanders with whom / am supposed to perform the miracle tomorrow One of them is doin" this for the first time, the two others are old hands / left no doubt in their minds that, in my opinion, this is "oin" to be one "iant snafu, and that they should not "et rattled, no matter what happens Jou need a "uardian an"el to brin" you throu"h this 0ind of thin" Have "iven my second mount to my G(B His Panje horse will be used by the G(7 %> 4ebruary !mple supply of ammunition dropped in aerial delivery containers as late as last ni"ht /n this respect we are now well off9 if we can ta0e it alon" !fter consultin" -temmermann / decided to hand over to the $ussians some 7,@@@ wounded to"ether with medical personnel and one doctor from each division This is a bitter decision, but to ta0e them alon" would mean their certain death -aw -temmermann once more to say "ood(bye My orderly ta0es my diaryH he is a crafty fellow and will "et it throu"h somehow Section +36 1REA.O-* ORDER OF 7/++ &ORPS
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On the evenin" of %) 4ebruary, at his command post at -henderov0a, the commander of A*// Corps had issued verbal and written instructions to his division commanders The brea0out order for A*// Corps read, in part, as followsD 4or days the enemy has been attac0in" continuously alon" our entire defence perimeter, with tan0s and infantry, in an attempt to split up the poc0et and destroy our forces !t 7B@@, on %> 4ebruary, Tas0 4orce 3 G7d Division, and )th -- 5an,er Division Wiking will attac0 in a south(westerly direction from the line ;hil0i(;omarov0a, brea0 the enemy1s resistance by a bayonet assault, and throw him bac0 in continuous attac0 toward the southwest, in order to reach *isyan0a and there to 6oin forces with elements of /// 5an,er Corps Compass number 77 CEd D The ma"netic compass carried by the German soldier had B7 consecutively numbered "radations .umber 77 e2uals an a,imuth of about 7B>L E indicates the "eneral direction of the attac0 This direction is to be made 0nown to each individual soldier The password isD 84reedom8 C4reiheitE 4or the attac0 and brea0out each division will be or"ani,ed in five successive waves, as followsD 4irst waveD one infantry re"iment reinforced by one battery of li"ht artillery <at least ei"ht horses per "un, plus spare teams= and one en"ineer company -econd waveD antitan0 and assault "un units Third waveD remainder of infantry <minus one battalion=, en"ineers, and li"ht artillery 4ourth waveD all our wounded that are fit to be transported, accompanied by one infantry battalion 4ifth waveD supply and service units The rear "uard, under the direct command of General -temmermann, will be formed by the )Gth and ??th Divisions, which will protect the rear and the flan0s of the forces launchin" the brea0out attac0 3y 7B@@ on %> 4ebruary, the rear "uard divisions will withdraw from their present locations to a previously determined defence lineH further withdrawals will be ordered by General -temmermann, dependin" on the pro"ress of the brea0out The entire medium artillery and certain specifically desi"nated units of li"ht artillery will support the attac0 They will open fire at 7B@@ on %> 4ebruary, ma0in" effective use of their ma#imum ran"e -ubse2uently, all artillery pieces are to be destroyed in accordance with special instructions The radios of each division will be carried alon" on pac0 horses To receive si"nal communications from corps, each division will, if possible, 0eep one set open at all times, but in any event every hour on the hour The corps radio will be open for messa"es from the divisions at all times The corps command post will be, until 7@@@, %> 4ebruary, at -henderov0aH after 7@@@, at ;hil0i 4rom the start of the attac0 the corps commander will be with the leadin" re"iment of the G7d Division The order was e#plained orally to the division commanders, and all details of the operation were carefully "one over, especially the difficult relief of the -- Division near ;omarov0a by the )Gth Division, whose GO was present durin" the briefin" conference Section 36 *HE 1REA.O-* Despite persistent enemy attac0s a"ainst the poc0et perimeter, constant $ussian shellin" of ;omarov0a, ;hil0i, and -henderov0a, churned up roads, and numerous traffic bottlenec0s, the German forces inside the poc0et were able, by 7@@@ on %> 4ebruary, to report their readiness for the brea0out Determination was the prevailin" mood !pparently the lar"e ma6ority of the troops was not influenced by $ussian propa"anda, nor by the hundreds of leaflets dropped from $ussian planes on behalf of the 4ree Germany Committee <General von -eydlit,=9they wanted to fi"ht their way throu"h -hortly after 7@@@, the commander of A*// Corps appeared at the command post of the %@)th Grenadier $e"iment, which was to spearhead the attac0 of G7d Division He was on horsebac0, accompanied by members of his staff, several aides, and radio operators with their e2uipment The events that followed are illustrated by a personal account of the corps commander, written from memory at a later date, and presented here in his own wordsD
16
3y 7B@@ the re"iment9two battalions abreast9started movin" ahead, silently and with bayonets fi#ed One(half hour later the force bro0e throu"h the first and soon thereafter the second $ussian defence line The enemy was completely cau"ht by surprise 5risoners were ta0en alon" .ot until the followin" day did it become evident that the $ussians, under the protection of heavy snowfall, had pulled out most of their troops from the south front of the poc0et in order to use them in an attac0, on %G 4ebruary, from the area west of -teblev The advance toward the southwest continued .o reports from either Tas0 4orce 3 on the ri"ht or the )th -- 5an,er Division on the left That they were ma0in" some pro"ress could only be inferred from the noise of vehicles due north and south of us, and from the sounds of firin" that indicated the location of their leadin" elements Over road less, bro0en terrain traversed by numerous "ullies, our march proceeded slowly There were fre2uent halts Here and there, men and horses suddenly disappeared, havin" stumbled into holes filled with deep snow +ehicles had to be du" out laboriously The slopes were steeper than could be presumed from loo0in" at the map Gradually the firin" decreased until it bro0e off entirely by @7@@ !bout two hours later the leadin" elements of G7d Division were appro#imately abreast of D,hur,hentsy -till no reports from Wiking and Tas0 4orce 3 / could not "ive them my position by radio because by now my head2uarters si"nal unit was missin" and could not be located -hortly after @'@@ enemy tan0s ahead opened fire They were 6oined by $ussian artillery and mortars operatin" from the direction of D,hur,hentsy, at first without noticeable effect The firin" increased slowly but steadily, and was soon comin" from the south as well :e be"an to suffer casualties The advance, however, continued 3y about @>@@ the leadin" units reached a lar"e hollow southeast of D,hur,hentsy Enemy fire, "ettin" constantly heavier, was now comin" from three directions Elements of Wiking could be heard on the left, farther bac0 .o messa"e, and not a trace of Tas0 4orce 3 Day was dawnin" The difficult ascent out of the hollow be"an The climb was steep and led up an icy slope Tan0s, "uns, heavy horse(drawn vehicles, and truc0s of all 0inds slipped, turned over, and had to be blown up Only a few tan0s and artillery pieces were able to ma0e the "rade The units lapsed rapidly into disorder 5arts of the Wiking Division appeared on the left 3etween @G@@ and %@@@ the G7d Division made several attempts to mount a co(ordinated attac0 toward southwest /t did not succeed The few "uns and most of the tan0s that were still firin" were soon destroyed by the enemy !rmoured cars and motor vehicles suffered the same fate E#cept for a few tan0s that had mana"ed to 0eep up, there were now only soldiers on foot and on horsebac0, and here and there a few horse(drawn vehicles, mostly carryin" wounded /n the protection of a ravine / was able to collect a small force of about battalion si,e, mainly stra""lers from Tas0 4orce 3 and the Wiking Division :ith them / moved on toward the line Hill 7B&(5ochapintsy, which was visible from time to time despite the heavy snowfall, and from where the enemy was firin" with "reat intensity $ussian "round support planes appeared, opened fire, and disappeared a"ain They were ineffective, and did not repeat their attac0, probably because of the difficult weather conditions There was no lon"er any effective controlH there were no re"iments, no battalions .ow and then small units appeared alon"side us / learned that the commandin" "eneral of the G7d Division was amon" the missin" My corps staff still 0ept up with me, but the aides who had been sent on various missions did not find their way bac0 On the steep slope northwest of 5ochapintsy, defiladed from enemy fire, / found the G(B of the G7d Division He reported that infantry units of his division had penetrated the enemy line alon" the rid"e south of Hill 7B& .evertheless, enemy fire was still comin" from there, maintained principally by about ten $ussian tan0s 3ehind and alon"side me thousands of men were stru""lin" southwest The entire area was littered with dead horses, and with vehicles and "uns that had either been 0noc0ed out by the enemy or simply abandoned by their crews / could not distin"uish the woundedH their banda"es did not show, as we were all wearin" white camoufla"e clothin" Despite the "eneral confusion and complete lac0 of control one could still reco"ni,e the determination in the minds of the troops to brea0 throu"h toward the southwest, in the direction of /// 5an,er Corps
17
Durin" a lull in the firin" / readied my battalion for the attac0 across the line Hill 7B&9 5ochapintsy that unfortunately could not be bypassed My staff and / were still on horsebac0 !fter leavin" the draw that sheltered us a"ainst the enemy, we "alloped ahead of the infantry and throu"h the "aps between our few remainin" tan0s, The enemy tan0 commanders, observin" from their turrets, 2uic0ly reco"ni,ed our intention, turned their weapons in our direction, and opened fire !bout one(half of our small mounted "roup was able to "et throu"h The chief of staff and the G(B were thrown, but later found their way bac0 to us The "reater part of the infantry battalion was still followin" behind me :hile ridin" throu"h the enemy sector, / noticed a few German soldiers surrenderin", but the main body was pushin" southwest without letup -oviet tan0s were now firin" at us from the rear and 2uite a few men were still bein" hit 4rom the eastern ed"e of the forest south of Hill 7B& came intensive enemy fire / led my battalion in an attac0 in that direction and threw the $ussians bac0 into the woods $ather than pursue them into the depth of the forest, we continued advancin" southwest, still harassed by fire from $ussian tan0s Gradually, between %B@@ and %)@@, lar"e, disor"ani,ed masses of troops piled up alon" the Gniloy Ti0ich $iver, east of *isyan0a Units from all three divisions participatin" in the brea0out were hopelessly intermin"led ! few medium tan0s had been able to "et throu"h to the river ban0, hut there were no heavy weapons and artillery pieces left The river, below and above *isyan0a, was B@ to )@ feet wide, had a rapid current, and reached a depth of about %@ feet in most places The ban0s were steep and roc0y, with occasional shrubs and trees -everal tan0s attempted to drive across, but the river was too deep and they failed to reach the opposite ban0 Heavy fire from $ussian tan0s located southeast of O0tyabr set the con"ested masses into forward motion Many thousands flun" themselves into the river, swam across, reached the opposite shore, and stru""led on in the direction of *isyan0a Hundreds of men and horses drowned in the icy torrent !n attempt by a small "roup of officers to create an emer"ency crossin" for casualties succeeded only after several hours Toward %>@@ the enemy fire ceased / crossed the Gniloy Ti0ich swimmin" alon"side my horse, traversed the snowy slope southeast of *isyan0a, which was covered with movin" men, and finally reached the town There / found the commander of the %st 5an,er Division, the forward element of /// 5an,er Corps / learned that no more than one company of armoured infantry and three companies of tan0s of %st 5an,er Division were now at *isyan0a, while one armoured infantry battalion consistin" of two wea0 companies was established at O0tyabr, the villa"e immediately north of *isyan0a ! reinforced re"iment of Tas0 4orce 3 had made its way into *isyan0a, and / received the report that the commander of Tas0 4orce 3 had been 0illed in action .e#t, the chief of staff of A/ Corps appearedH he had lost contact with General -temmermann in the mornin" of %G 4ebruary, while marchin" on foot from ;hil0i to D,hur,hentsy He reported that the rear "uard of the poc0et force was in the process of withdrawal and that some of its units would soon appear / assumed command of what was left of 4orce -temmermann 3y now the situation was the followin"D The G7d and Wiking Divisions were completely intermin"led .o lon"er did they have any tan0s, artillery, vehicles, or rations Many soldiers were entirely without weapons, 2uite a few even without foot"ear .either division could be considered in any way able to fi"ht One re"iment of Tas0 4orce 3 was intact and still had some artillery support However, this re"iment also had no vehicles and no rations left !ll wounded, estimated at about 7,@@@, were bein" "radually sheltered in the houses of *isyan0a, and later were evacuated by air 4or lac0 of vehicles and fuel, /// 5an,er Corps was unable to reinforce its units in the area of *isyan0a and O0tyabr The corps commander, with whom / conferred by telephone, informed me that he had been forced to assume the defensive a"ainst heavy $ussian attac0s from the northwest in the area immediately west of *isyan0a He had no e#tra supplies of any 0ind, and his forward elements were unable to provide rations for the troops emer"in" from the poc0et Thus / had to order the poc0et force in its miserable condition to move on westward, while / re2uested supply, evacuation of casualties by air, and the brin"in" up of vehicles and weapons from the rear The march toward the main rescue area continued throu"hout the ni"ht, despite fre2uent bottlenec0s, and was not completed until noon of %? 4ebruary $enewed $ussian flan0 attac0s
18
from the north endan"ered the roads to the rear and necessitated further withdrawal southwest and south durin" the followin" day /n the afternoon of 7@ 4ebruary, havin" clarified the 2uestion of food supply for the poc0et force and dealt with a number of other problems, / was instructed to proceed to head2uarters of !rmy Hi"h Command in East 5russia 4rom that moment on / had no further connection with A*// Corps or 4orce -temmermann Of the B),@@@ men launchin" the brea0out from the poc0et about B@,@@@ successfully fou"ht their way out ),@@@ were 0illed or captured The force lost all of its heavy weapons, artillery, tan0s, vehicles, horses, e2uipment, and supplies
19
&HAP*ER ) *HE PO&.E* #ES* OF &HER.ASS50*HE O-*S+DE 3+E# 8

Section +6 *HE E,&+R&/E4E,* The second $ussian winter offensive of %&'B('' was launched early in Fanuary %&'' a"ainst the German Ei"hth !rmy sector in the Dnepr bend The 4irst and -econd U0rainian 4ronts9the latter consistin" of four armies, includin" one tan0 army9attempted to cut off German forces deployed from a point southeast of ;iev to the Dnepr estuary The -oviet offensive fell short of accomplishin" its purpose, but in twelve days of fi"htin" the $ussians drove a deep wed"e southwestward across the Dnepr and captured the town of ;irovo"rad Two lar"e German salients remained, one to the northwest, the other to the southeast of the ;irovo"rad area Despite heavy tan0 losses, the $ussians could be e#pected to reor"ani,e their armoured forces in the shortest possible time and continue their heavy attac0s desi"ned to push !rmy Group -outh farther bac0 in the direction of the $omanian border /t was evident that the enemy would bend every effort to destroy the German bul"e northwest of ;irovo"rad, held by elements of Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5an,er !rmy The commander of Ei"hth !rmy sent ur"ent messa"es to army "roupH he e#pressed "rave doubts about continuin" to hold the curvin" line of positions northwest of ;irovo"rad, which committed an e#cessive number of men 5ointin" out the $ussian superiority in stren"th, he recommended withdrawal of the interior flan0s of Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5an,er !rmy by retirement to successive positions, first behind the Olshan0a($oss $iver line, and eventually to the line -hpola(Iveni"orod0a(Gorniy Ti0ich $iver 5ermission for such a withdrawal, however, was denied on the "rounds that the salient had to be held as a base for future operations in the direction of ;iev The e#pected attac0 was launched by the -econd U0rainian 4ront, on 7' Fanuary, a"ainst the ri"ht flan0, and by the 4irst U0rainian 4ront, on 7' Fanuary, a"ainst the left flan0 and the rear of the German salient 3y 7? Fanuary the armoured spearheads of both $ussian army "roups met in the area of Iveni"orod0a and thereby accomplished the encirclement of A/ and A*// Corps Havin" erected the ori"inal lin0(up with elements of two tan0 armies, the $ussians rapidly committed stron" infantry units from four additional armies which attac0ed toward the west, southwest, and south in order to widen the rin" of encirclement and provide effective cover a"ainst German counterattac0s from the outside Section ++6 P/A,S FOR *HE 1REA.O-* /n this situation the German !rmy Hi"h Command directed !rmy Group -outh to assemble the stron"est available armoured units alon" the boundary between Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5an,er !rmy These forces were to e#ecute conver"in" counterattac0s, encircle and annihilate the enemy units that had bro0en throu"h, re(establish contact with the poc0et force, and re"ain a favourable 6ump(off base for the pro6ected counteroffensive !ctually, the assembly of the German attac0 force presented the "reatest of difficulties Two of the pan,er divisions of Ei"hth !rmy desi"nated to ta0e part in the operation were still in the midst of heavy fi"htin" in the area of ;apitanov0a They had to be replaced by infantry units with fronta"es e#tended to the utmost Two additional pan,er divisions, recently en"a"ed southeast of ;irovo"rad, were on the march toward the left flan0 of Ei"hth !rmy Of these four armoured units, only one was at full stren"th, while the others, after wee0s of uninterrupted fi"htin", were actually no more than tan0(supported combat teams
M
This description of the encirclement west of Cher0assy was prepared by a German staff officer at army "roup level on the basis of his personal recollections and is presented as a supplement to the precedin" narrative
20
The relief attac0 from the ri"ht flan0 of 4irst 5an,er !rmy was to be carried out by the four armoured divisions of /// 5an,er Corps They were still en"a"ed in defensive operations on the left flan0 of the army sector, and could only be brou"ht up after they had completed their previous missions The two corps inside the poc0et were to attac0 at the appropriate time in the direction of the Ei"hth !rmy and 4irst 5an,er !rmy units approachin" from the south and west /t was clear that any build(up on the southern front of the poc0et could only be accomplished at the e#pense of other sectors -till, !rmy Hi"h Command insisted on holdin" the entire poc0et area, and not until the situation of the encircled forces became far more critical was permission obtained for successive withdrawals on the northern sector Even then, the poc0et had to be 0ept sufficiently lar"e to afford a certain freedom of movement !lso, despite the effort on the southern sector, ade2uate forces had to remain available to seal off enemy penetrations elsewhere The plan for a two(pron"ed drive by /// 5an,er Corps of 4irst 5an,er !rmy from the southwest and A*+// 5an,er Corps of Ei"hth !rmy from the south, to coincide with an attac0 launched by the poc0et force, was adopted on % 4ebruary The units concerned were ordered to complete their assembly for the proposed operation durin" the followin" two days Then A*+// 5an,er Corps was to 6ump off from the area of -hpola, thrustin" into the rear of the $ussian forces that were threatenin" the southern front of A/ Corps -imultaneously, /// 5an,er Corps was to launch a surprise attac0 in the "eneral direction of Medvin, where enemy units were operatin" a"ainst the southwest front of the poc0et defended by A*// Corps !fter destroyin" these $ussian units, /// 5an,er Corps was to pivot due east to effect close co(operation with the attac0in" elements of A*+// Corps comin" from the south Durin" a commanders1 conference on B 4ebruary, the Ei"hth !rmy commander voiced serious doubts whether, in view of the limited forces available and the muddy roads, this ambitious plan was practicable He recommended instead that the attac0 by /// 5an,er Corps be led in a more easterly direction, which would assure early co(operation with the advancin" elements of A*+// 5an,er Corps This recommendation was turned down Meanwhile, the enemy had committed stron" infantry and armoured units in an attac0 toward .ovomir"orod, temporarily tyin" down two of the pan,er divisions that were to ta0e part in the relief operation from the south The muddy season was rapidly ta0in" effect and as the roads deteriorated all movements became e#tremely difficult -imilar conditions prevailed in the area of /// 5an,er Corps En"a"ed in continuous fi"htin" on its left flan0, this corps also suffered considerable delay in the assembly of its units for the pro6ected relief thrust and could not be e#pected to launch its attac0 until ' 4ebruary The forces inside the poc0et, in an attempt to 0eep the enemy from separatin" A/ and A*// Corps, had shifted their main effort to the south front of the perimeter Despite heavy losses in defensive en"a"ements they could not afford to "ive "round in that sector, as their only remainin" airfield, at ;orsun, had to be 0ept out of ran"e of the $ussian artillery !t the hi"h rate of casualties, however, a continued stand alon" the entire perimeter of positions was obviously out of the 2uestion To conserve its stren"th and reduce the threat of $ussian penetrations, the poc0et force eventually obtained permission to e#ecute limited withdrawals on the northern and eastern sectors while bolsterin" its defences to the south The full impact of the muddy season soon made itself felt on all fronts and, in addition to causin" losses of motor vehicles and other e2uipment, be"an to endan"er German air supply operations The re2uirements of the encircled force called for supplies to be flown in at the rate of %)@ tons daily Despite the most determined efforts of the *uftwaffe units, this 2uota was never reached Enemy antiaircraft fire from at least three fla0 divisions in the $ussian(held strip of terrain and interception by enemy fi"hter planes had seriously reduced the number of available transport aircraft To prevent further losses, stron" German fi"hter forces had to be committed in protection of the vital air supply line instead of supportin" preparations on other sectors for the impendin" relief operation
21
:ith the start of the muddy season, the lac0 of paved runways further a""ravated the situation One airfield after another became unusable, and even the ;orsun field, the only one inside the poc0et, had to be partially closed !irdroppin" supplies, because of a shorta"e of aerial delivery containers, met only a small part of the actual re2uirements Eventually, because of the road conditions, the two corps approachin" from the outside also became dependent in part upon airborne supply, which forced a wide scatterin" of the air effort Time was obviously wor0in" a"ainst the Germans !s their difficulties continued to increase, it became clear that each day of delay further reduced their chances for success Section +++6 *HE RE/+EF OPERA*+O, The assembly of an attac0 force on the western flan0 of A*+// 5an,er Corps <Ei"hth !rmy= bo""ed down in a series of heavy local counterattac0s south of *ebedin and -hpola ! small German force "ained a temporary brid"ehead at /,0rennoye and inflicted serious losses on the enemy /n all these en"a"ements, however, the stren"th of A*+// 5an,er Corps was constantly bein" whittled down until, by B 4ebruary, it had only 7G tan0s and B' assault "uns left !t that point it became clear that Ei"hth !rmy could do no more than to tie down enemy forces by continued holdin" attac0s Thus the ori"inal plan, which provided for two conver"in" relief thrusts had to be abandoned .evertheless, on ' 4ebruary, 4irst 5an,er !rmy attac0ed toward the north in order to ta0e advanta"e of favourable tan0 terrain, achieve surprise, and avoid any further loss of time -uccessful durin" the first day, it was, however, unable to maintain this direction of attac0, as terrain and road conditions "rew worse by the hour Meanwhile, the situation inside the poc0et had become more critical and made it imperative to establish contact with the encircled forces over the shortest possible route Therefore, on > 4ebruary, !rmy Group -outh issued new orders to 4irst 5an,er !rmy !fter re"roupin" its units /// 5an,er Corps was to attac0 due east, its ri"ht flan0 advancin" via *isyan0a toward Morentsy !t the same time the encircled corps were ordered to prepare for an attac0 in the direction of /// 5an,er Corps, the attac0 to be launched as soon as the armoured spearhead of the relief force had approached to within the most favourable distance from the poc0et 5lanned for ? 4ebruary, the attac0 of /// 5an,er Corps, because of unfavourable weather conditions, did not "et under(way until three days later /t was initially successful and, by the end of the first day, led to the establishment of three brid"eheads across the Gniloy Ti0ich $iver Concentrated enemy attac0s, however, prevented any further advance /n the difficult terrain east of the Gniloy Ti0ich, the German armoured units were unable to ma0e any pro"ress, and this attac0 also came to a halt in the mud !rmy "roup now reali,ed that it could no lon"er accomplish a reinforcement of the poc0et The encirclin" rin", therefore, had to be bro0en from the inside The divisions of /// 5an,er Corps were ordered to en"a"e and divert the $ussian forces located in the area of 5ochapintsy(;omarov0a( D,hur,hentsy, and to establish on the hi"h "round northwest of 5ochapintsy a forward rescue position that could be reached by the units brea0in" out of the poc0et 3y %%@), on %) 4ebruary, the brea0out order was transmitted by radio to General -temmermann, the commander of the encircled German forces /t read, in part, 8Capabilities of /// 5an,er Corps reduced by weather and supply difficulties Tas0 4orce -temmermann must accomplish brea0(throu"h on its own to line D,hur,hentsy(Hill 7B& where it will lin0 up with /// 5an,er Corps The brea0out force will be under the command of General *ieb CA*// CorpsE and comprise all units still capable of attac0 8 4urther instructions, radioed on %> 4ebruary, emphasi,ed the importance of surprise and proper co(ordinationD 8Durin" initial phase of operation toni"ht hold your fire so as to achieve complete surprise Maintain centrali,ed fire control over artillery and heavy weapons, so that in the event of stron"er enemy resistance, especially at daybrea0, they can be committed at point of main effort in short order !ir support will be available at dawn to protect your flan0s 8 Section +36 *HE 1REA.O-*
22
Durin" the operation that was to follow, two separate phases could be clearly distin"uished !t first everythin" went accordin" to plan /n the proper se2uence and under perfect control, the troops moved into position at ni"ht, despite the most difficult road and weather conditions !s they were compressed into a narrow area, unit after unit had to be channelled across the only e#istin" brid"e at -henderov0a, which was under heavy enemy fire The bayonet assault started on schedule The complete surprise of the enemy demonstrated that the attac0 had been properly timed :ithout much action, and sufferin" but few casualties, the German brea0out force penetrated the enemy lines and in a relatively short time reached the vicinity of *isyan0a On the opposite front of the poc0et the rear "uards held fast and thus assured the success of the initial brea0out The second phase, the evacuation of the remainin" poc0et force, rapidly deteriorated into a wild sur"e toward the west 4ollowin" closely behind the successful spearhead, alto"ether about B@,@@@ men bro0e throu"h the $ussian lines in front of the poc0et !t daybrea0, however, they ran into an unsuspected enemy front of antitan0 "uns, tan0s, and artillery, located on the line D,hur,hentsy(5ochapintsy Under massed enemy fire, enemy tan0 attac0s, and infantry counterthrusts, the German force was split into numerous small "roups, each attemptin" on its own to "et throu"h to the west wherever there mi"ht be a possibility Their "uns, tan0 destroyers, and heavy weapons, which up to now had been dra""ed alon" laboriously throu"h snowdrifts and over bro0en terrain, had to be left behind and were destroyed after the last round of ammunition had been fired Here too, as the last vehicles were blown up, the wounded ta0en alon" at the insistence of their comrades had to be left to their fate Meanwhile a new complication arose that was to have disastrous conse2uences -ub6ected to heavy enemy fire, counterthrusts, and armoured attac0s, the "reat mass of German troops brea0in" out of the poc0et had deviated from their ori"inal direction of attac0 .o lon"er did they advance accordin" to plan toward the area northwest of 5ochapintsy /nstead of approachin" the forward rescue position established by /// 5an,er Corps, they passed by at a considerable distance farther south Here, their advance to the west was bloc0ed by the course of the Gniloy Ti0ich, the enemy holdin" the near ban0 of the river There were no crossin"s, nor had /// 5an,er Corps established any brid"eheads, since a lin0(up in that area had not been foreseen !lthou"h "reatly e#hausted, the German troops were now forced to overcome the resistance of the $ussian security detachments alon" the river and to swim across, leavin" their last weapons behind They suffered considerable losses as both ban0s of the river were under heavy enemy fire and not until they had placed this last obstacle behind them were they finally received by the forward elements of /// 5an,er Corps The German holdin" forces on the eastern sector of the poc0et maintained contact with the enemy and successfully covered the brea0out of the main body This mission accomplished, they made their way westward accordin" to plan and entered the lines of /// 5an,er Corps durin" the ni"ht of %G(%? 4ebruary Contrary to e#pectations, the brea0out had to be e#ecuted without air support Unfavourable weather conditions durin" the entire operation made it impossible for the air force to play its part in the liberation of the encircled units Section 36 /ESSO,S The developments mainly responsible for the encirclement near Cher0assy and its serious conse2uences mi"ht be summari,ed as followsD % Only the insistence of !rmy Hi"h Command to hold the Dnepr bend northwest of ;irovo"rad led to the isolation of two German corps in that area Despite repeated re2uests, permission for a brea0out was not obtained until too late The enemy had "rown too stron" alon" the entire rin" of encirclement, while the German poc0et forces had been wea0ened to such an e#tent, throu"h losses of personnel and e2uipment and shorta"es of supply, that they were forced to surrender their freedom of action and manoeuvre to the enemy
23
7 The two German corps encircled by the enemy were the flan0 corps of two ad6acent armies /mmediately after their encirclement, A*// Corps, heretofore part of 4irst 5an,er !rmy, was placed under the command of Ei"hth !rmy :hile this assured unity of command inside the poc0et, the same was not true of the relief operation in which forces under the command of two different armies were involved The absence of a unified command on the army level made itself felt particularly as the need arose to co(ordinate the actions of the poc0et force <Ei"hth !rmy= with those of /// 5an,er Corps <4irst 5an,er !rmy= B The mission of /// 5an,er Corps on the day of the brea0out was to divert and tie down those $ussian units that bloc0ed the path of the German troops emer"in" from the poc0et 3ecause of terrain difficulties and shorta"e of fuel, the corps1 forward elements failed to reach and occupy the commandin" "round ori"inally desi"nated as forward rescue area Thus the enemy was able to throw considerable wei"ht a"ainst the German units brea0in" out !lso9as the brea0out continued in an une#pected direction9the e#ercise of command in the relief force was not fle#ible enou"h to ad6ust to the chan"ed situation and improvise a new forward rescue position alon" the Gniloy Ti0ich $iver !s a result, the poc0et force remained virtually unassisted in its efforts at breachin" the $ussian lines and fi"htin" its way out ' The *uftwaffe, as mentioned above, was prevented from ta0in" any part in the operationH an effective means of support that had been counted on was thereby eliminated The two German corps succeeded, to be sure, in crac0in" the enemy rin" and brea0in" out of the poc0etH but they were so seriously wea0ened that they re2uired a lon" period of rest and rehabilitation before they could a"ain be committed on the $ussian front Their absence had an immediate effect upon the defensive effort of !rmy Group -outh, which was tryin" to counter heavy $ussian attac0s aimed at a brea0(throu"h in the Uman area -oon the entire southern sector was split wide open and the German -i#th and Ei"hth !rmies were pushed across the Ju,hny 3u" <U0rainian 3u" $iver= into $omania
24
&HAP*ER 9 E,&+R&/E4E,* OF A PA,2ER AR45 ,EAR .A4E,E*S PODO/S.+5

Section '6 *HE E,&+R&/E4E,* /n mid(4ebruary %&'' the front of the 4irst 5an,er !rmy e#tended across the western U0raine alon" a "eneral line north of +innitsa and -hepetov0a, northeast of Ternopol To the ri"ht, north of Uman, was the Ei"hth !rmyH to the left, the -econd !rmy !fter the two corps encircled west of Cher0assy had made their way out of the poc0et <Ch '=, the front remained 2uiet until the be"innin" of March, while the $ussians were reor"ani,in" and re"roupin" their units Then stron" concentrations of -oviet tan0s indicated that the enemy was "ettin" ready to resume his attempts at forcin" a decision The first lar"e(scale $ussian attac0s, on ' and ) March, were directed primarily a"ainst the -hepetov0a and Uman areas 3ecause of their "reat numerical superiority, the $ussians succeeded in dentin" the overe#tended German lines in many places :hile timely German counterattac0s on the left flan0 eliminated the threat of a brea0throu"h aimed at 5ros0urov, the enemy was rapidly "ainin" "round in the Uman area and succeeded, by mid(March, in pushin" across the U0rainian 3u" $iver Havin" driven a deep wed"e into the German front, the $ussians were in a position to threaten the ri"ht flan0 of 4irst 5an,er !rmy -ince there were no German reserves available to close the "ap, 4irst 5an,er !rmy was forced to withdraw its entire ri"ht win" and establish a new defence line facin" east Under the pressure of continued $ussian attac0s, planned withdrawals were also carried out on the central sector until the ri"ht flan0 of 4irst 5an,er !rmy was finally anchored on the northern ban0 of the Dnestr $iver east of Mo"ilev(5odols0iy On the left boundary of 4irst 5an,er !rmy, west of 5ros0urov, stron" $ussian armoured units soon accomplished another brea0throu"h On 77 March five armoured corps followed by infantry poured south between the Ibruch and -eret $ivers, and two days later crossed the Dnestr in the direction of Chernovtsy -ince the enemy had also pushed across the river farther east, in the area of Jampol and Mo"ilev(5odols0iy, 4irst 5an,er !rmy was now contained in a lar"e semicircle north of the Dnestr Hitler1s e#plicit orders prohibited any further withdrawal and eliminated the possibility of a more fle#ible defence, which mi"ht have established contact with other German forces to the east or the west !s could be e#pected, the two $ussian forces, after crossin" the Dnestr, lin0ed up under the protection of the river line in the rear of 4irst 5an,er !rmy 3y 7) March the encirclement was complete !s in all similar situations, the first threat to ma0e itself felt came when the last supply lines into the German salient were cut Until 7) March 4irst 5an,er !rmy still had one supply route open, which led south across the Dnestr brid"e at ;notin and was protected by a stron" brid"ehead on the southern ban0 of the river Over this route all staffs and units that could be dispensed with were moved to the rear, and every nonessential user of supplies and e2uipment was ta0en out of the poc0et before the rin" was actually closed !s soon as it became evident that no more supplies could be brou"ht up, stoc0 was ta0en inside the poc0et :hile ammunition and rations were sufficient to last for about another two wee0s, fuel reserves were found to be critically low 4irst 5an,er !rmy therefore immediately re2uested supply by air and restricted the use of motor vehicles to a minimum !ll measures ta0en inside the poc0et were made e#tremely difficult by unfavourable weather !t first snowstorms and snowdrifts hampered the air supply operation and obstructed movements on the "round Then, practically over ni"ht, the snow be"an to melt, and the roads 2uic0ly turned into bottomless morasses The supply of motor fuel, which was flown in over a distance of %7) miles from the nearest German airfield, fell far short of re2uirements Time and a"ain vehicles had to be destroyed when they bloc0ed the roads in lon", immobili,ed columns 4inally, only combat vehicles, prime movers, and a few messen"er vehicles were left intact Havin" completed the encirclement the $ussians, as e#pected, decreased the intensity of their attac0s Only on the eastern sector enemy pressure remained stron"H there was no more than moderate activity in the northH and from the west no attac0s were launched a"ainst the defence
25
perimeter of 4irst 5an,er !rmy !pparently the continuous movements of German service units southward across the Dnestr had led the enemy to believe that the 4irst 5an,er !rmy was in full retreat toward the south The $ussians, in an effort that turned out to be a serious mista0e, moved more and more units in the same direction on both sides of the poc0et Their lines of communication "rew lon"er and lon"er, and they be"an to face difficulties of supply similar to those of the encircled German force /n response to enemy pressure from the east and north, 4irst 5an,er !rmy deliberately shortened its front until it ran alon" a much smaller perimeter north of ;amenets(5odols0iy, assurin" a "reater concentration of the defendin" forces and a more efficient use of the limited ammunition supply *ocal enemy penetrations were sealed off more easily and brea0(throu"hs could be prevented alto"ether !t the same time 4irst 5an,er !rmy deceived the enemy into believin" that by day and by ni"ht lar"e(scale evacuations across the river were ta0in" place Even before it was completely cut off, 4irst 5an,er !rmy had re2uested authority to conduct a defence alon" mobile lines :hen this re2uest was turned down and the encirclement became a fact, a brea0out remained the only possible course of action short of helplessly facin" certain annihilation 3ecause of unfavourable weather conditions, the 2uantities of supplies that could be flown in were entirely insufficient to maintain the fi"htin" power of the encircled troops $elief of the poc0et by fresh forces from the outside could not be e#pected /n this situation the enemy sent a terse demand for surrender, threatenin" that otherwise all soldiers of the encircled German army would be shot The reaction of 4irst 5an,er !rmy was to immediately ma0e all necessary preparations to enable its total force of ei"ht divisions to brea0 out Once more, in a systematic cullin" process, the divisions were relieved of all unfit personnel and superfluous e2uipment, while special arran"ements were made with the *uftwaffe to assure that the transport planes brin"in" in supplies were used to evacuate casualties on their return fli"hts Section ++6 *HE 1REA.O-* P/A, The 2uestion of the direction in which the brea0out should be launched played an important part in all considerations :as it more advisable to stri0e toward the west, alon" the Dnestr, or toward the south, across the ;hotin brid"ehead an attac0 in the latter direction would involve the least difficulties, be opposed by the wea0est enemy forces, and perhaps permit the withdrawal of the entire German force into $omania /n this case, however, there would be one less pan,er army fi"htin" the $ussians, at least for some time :est of the poc0et several successive river lines constituted natural obstacles in the path of an advance There, too, the Germans had to e#pect the stron"est concentration of enemy forces alon" the rin" of encirclement 3rea0in" out in several directions at once was another possibility under considerationH this would have forced the enemy to split his stren"th in numerous local countermeasures and mi"ht have enabled some small German "roups to ma0e their way bac0 to the nearest friendly lines with the least fi"htin" The final decision was to brea0 out to the west, in the direction involvin" the "reatest difficulties, yet assurin" a ma#imum of surprise -imultaneously, on the outside, another German force was to attac0 from an area southwest of Ternopol <over %7) miles from the scene= in the direction of 4irst 5an,er !rmy !nother hi"hly important 2uestion was the formation to be adopted for the brea0out Desirable as it mi"ht have been to lead off with a stron" concentration of armour, it was to be feared that these armoured units, intent on ma0in" rapid pro"ress, mi"ht outrun the infantry and thus brea0 up the unity of the command The plan of attac0, therefore, provided for a northern and a southern force, each consistin" of two corps and specifically ordered to form an advance "uard of tan0( supported infantry and combat en"ineers, while the main body and the rear "uard were to be composed of mobile units This meant that the entire pan,er army would be committed in two parallel formations attac0in" abreast, with units in column Control over the operation, of course, could only be e#ercised from inside the poc0etH evacuation of an operations staff via ;hotin to the south, in order to direct the brea0out from the outside, was out of the 2uestion
26
Section +++6 *HE PO&.E* 4O3ES #ES* On 7G March, havin" re"rouped its forces accordin" to plan and completed all preparations for the thrust across the Ibruch $iver, 4irst 5an,er !rmy launched its brea0out toward the west -imultaneously, the rear "uards on the eastern and northern sectors of the poc0et switched to delayin" tactics /n the ,one of the northern attac0 force, the enemy alon" the Ibruch $iver was overrun with surprisin" speed, and three undama"ed brid"es fell into German hands The advance of the southern attac0 force met "reater resistance, and considerable difficulties arose as the enemy launched a counterthrust from the west across the Ibruch and was able to force his way into ;amenets(5odols0iy The loss of this important road hub made it necessary to reroute all German movements in a wide detour around the city, an effort that re2uired painsta0in" reconnaissance and careful traffic re"ulation /t was not lon", however, until the enemy penetration was sealed on, and in this instance the Germans, themselves surrounded, were able in turn to encircle a smaller $ussian force which was not dependent upon air supply and could no lon"er interfere with subse2uent operations !s soon as several stron" brid"eheads had been established across the Ibruch $iver, new spearheads were formed which attac0ed the -eret $iver line Thus the pan,er army maintained the initiative and 0ept movin" by day and ni"ht !pparently the enemy was still uncertain about German intentions /nstead of combinin" all his forces from the eastern and northern sectors in an attempt to pursue and overta0e the Germans pushin" west, he persisted in attac0in" the poc0et from the east and north, in some instances stri0in" at positions already vacated by the German rear "uards His units southwest of the poc0et actually continued to move farther south Meanwhile, 4irst 5an,er !rmy 0ept up its westward advanceH on 7? March the southern force was able to cut the road leadin" to Chort0ov, severin" enemy communication lines in that areaH one day later German spearheads reached the -eret $iver, which they crossed durin" the followin" ni"ht The $ussians then be"an to react They recalled elements of their 4ourth Tan0 !rmy from south of the Dnestr and, by B% March, launched a stron" armoured thrust toward the north from the area of Goroden0a !s a countermeasure, the southern attac0 force of 4irst 5an,er !rmy, deployed mainly between the Ibruch and -eret $ivers, assumed the defensive and was able to brea0 up the $ussian armoured attac0 Thereafter, since their supply lines had meanwhile been cut, these $ussian units no lon"er constituted a menace to the German left flan0 ! more serious threat e#isted in the north where $ussian forces movin" west could have overta0en and bloc0ed the entire ri"ht win" of 4irst 5an,er !rmy However, the enemy did not choose to do so, and the northern attac0 force continued to advance and was able to cross the -eret without ma6or difficulty Section +36 *HE ES&APE The last wee0 in March was mar0ed by heavy snowstorms ! rapid thaw followed early in !pril, with the effect of seriously hamperin" all movements -upply durin" this period continued to be the "reatest problem !s the German force 0ept movin", the planes brin"in" in supplies had to use different airstrips every ni"ht /n the final phase of the operation supplies could only be dropped by air, a procedure that proved wholly inade2uate to satisfy the re2uirements of an entire army Despite the daily moves of the poc0et force, the maintenance of ade2uate si"nal communications was assured at all times, primarily by the use of conventional and microwave radio sets -ince the troops were constantly on the move, launchin" successive attac0s toward the west, they never developed the feelin" of bein" trapped in the slowly ti"htenin" "rip of an encirclin" enemy force Conse2uently, there were no si"ns of disinte"ration or panic, and the number of missin" durin" the entire operation remained unusually low 3y ) !pril the leadin" elements of both the northern and the southern attac0 forces reached the -trypa $iver On the followin" day, near 3uc,ac,, they were able to lin0 up with other German units comin" from the west /n two wee0s of heavy fi"htin", but without sufferin" severe casualties, 4irst 5an,er !rmy had freed itself from enemy encirclement $ear "uard actions continued for a few days and then the Germans succeeded in establishin" a new, continuous defence line runnin" from the Dnestr to the
27
town of 3rody, which prevented any further advance of the enemy Moreover, despite their considerable losses in materiel, elements of 4irst 5an,er !rmy were still able to launch an attac0 southeast across the Dnestr to brea0 up an enemy force, which had appeared in the -tanislav area Enemy e2uipment captured and destroyed durin" the entire brea0out operation amounted to B)G tan0s, '7 assault "uns, and 7?@ artillery pieces Section 36 E3A/-A*+O, /n its encirclement and brea0out, 4irst 5an,er !rmy "ained a number of e#periences that may be applicable to many similar situations :hereas in previous wars the double envelopment and encirclement of a unit was tantamount to its annihilation, this is no lon"er true today The pro"ressive motori,ation of "round forces, combined with the possibility of supply by air, tends to do away with this hitherto characteristic aspect of a poc0et :hile it is true that the decision to brea0 out from encirclement should not be needlessly delayed, it is e2ually important to reali,e that definite plans for the brea0out should not be made too early, at a sta"e when the enemy is still movin" and therefore capable of ma0in" rapid chan"es in his dispositions Once the encirclement is completed, the enemy, since he is now operatin" alon" e#terior lines, encounters difficulties of supply and communication and has lost much of his initial fle#ibility /n an operation of this type surprise is the most important factor, particularly the surprise achieved by choosin" an une#pected direction for the brea0out /n the e#ample described all movement prior to the encirclement of 4irst 5an,er !rmy had been from north to south ! brea0out in the same direction was definitely e#pected by the enemy, and therefore this would have been the least favourable choice The direction selected for the German thrust9practically perpendicular to the enemy1s lines of advance9offered the best chance of successH the element of surprise actually proved of "reater importance than considerations of enemy stren"th, terrain conditions, and the distance to the nearest German lines
28
&HAP*ER : &O,&/-S+O,S
Section +6 *HE S+G,+F+&A,&E OF A PO&.E* /n modern warfare with its blit,0rie" tactics e#ecuted by motori,ed and mechani,ed forces, the encirclement by the enemy of lar"e bodies of troops has become a fre2uent occurrence /t is, therefore, all the more important to be ade2uately prepared for this 0ind of fi"htin" Combat in poc0ets, whether it is of lon" or short duration, has its own fundamental rules :hatever circumstances may determine the len"th of the battle, it will always be advisable to see0 an early decision To ma0e this possible, the commander of an encircled force must, on principle, be "ranted full freedom of action He should be permitted, specifically, to use his own 6ud"ment re"ardin" all measures and decisions incident to a brea0out from the poc0et On many occasions in German e#perience, the futile attempt was made to evaluate a local situation and to conduct the operations of encircled troops by remote control from a far distant hi"her echelon, if not directly from Hitler1s head2uarters /ndecisiveness on the part of the poc0et commander and measures, which invariably came too late, were the conse2uences of such limitations imposed by hi"her head2uarters :henever a commander receives ri"id instructions from a distance at which the capabilities of his encircled forces cannot be properly 6ud"ed9and are usually overestimated9his willin"ness to accept responsibility will rapidly decline The notion that poc0ets must be held at all costs should never be applied as a "eneral principle Hitler1s adherence to this mista0en concept durin" :orld !far // resulted in the loss of so many German soldiers that the lesson learned from their sacrifice ou"ht to be remembered for all time Section ++6 SPE&+A/ OPERA*+,G PRO&ED-RES E#perience has shown that only seasoned troops, in the best fi"htin" condition and under the firm control of their commanders, are able to withstand the mental strain of combat in encirclement and are li0ely to retain the hi"h de"ree of physical fitness needed under such circumstances 3ut even with troops that satisfy these re2uirements it is necessary to apply stern measures in order to prevent any slac0enin" of control, which would inevitably result in lowerin" their morale /t is surprisin" how fast the bonds of discipline will disinte"rate in an encirclement Mobs of unarmed soldiers tryin" to proceed on their own, captured horses loaded down with superfluous e2uipment, and other similarly depressin" si"hts were not uncommon in some of the lar"er German poc0ets in $ussia They had a contaminatin" effect and called for swift and drastic countermeasures The hi"hest standards of discipline, more important in this than in any other situation, must be upheld by the officers and non(commissioned officers of an encircled forceH it is their personal conduct that sets the e#ample 4orce of character, as in all critical situations, ac2uires the "reatest si"nificanceH it sustains the will to fi"ht and may, indeed, determine the outcome of the battle More than ever the place of the commander, under such circumstances, is in the midst of his troopsH their minds will re"ister his every action with the sensitivity of a seismo"raph 5articular attention in all matters of discipline must be paid to rear echelon units and the personnel of rear area installations that may be present in the poc0et -ince these troops are usually the first to become unnerved, they must be held under strict control !nother principle that has proved itself in the German e#perience is the dele"ation of authority <see dia"ram= by the poc0et commander
29
<!= to three subordinate command elements within the poc0etH one <3= to maintain the defensive effortH another <C= to prepare and conduct the brea0outH and a third <D= to be responsible for or"ani,ation, traffic control, and the maintenance of discipline inside the poc0et Communication and co(ordination with other friendly forces, particularly in the case of a relief thrust from the outside, will have to remain amon" the e#clusive functions of the poc0et commander 5resumably, he alone will have the necessary radio facilities at his disposal /t is, of course, an absolute re2uirement, for the dele"ation of authority described above, that all the forces inside the poc0et be under one command -ince envelopment attac0s are usually directed a"ainst tactical wea0 spots, such as army or corps boundaries, uniform command over the forces encircled by the enemy is not always assured at first /t must be established as soon as possibleH otherwise, as demonstrated in Chapter ', considerable difficulties will be encountered in the defence of the poc0et, as well as in the conduct of relief operations from the outside The tactical principles which, in an encirclement, apply to the various combat arms, may be summari,ed as followsD % Infantry /n the initial phase, durin" which the entire perimeter is to be held, everything up front! !n encircled force can ill afford loss of terrain Therefore, stron" reserves must be held close byH the battle position must be a closely 0nit system of stron" points with a well(co(ordinated fire plan for all infantry heavy weaponsH and the outpost area must be 0ept under constant surveillance by reconnaissance and combat patrols, particularly durin" the ni"ht /f this cannot be accomplished because of inade2uate forces, the perimeter should be shortened deliberately to the point where the defences can be or"ani,ed in accordance with the principles outlined above 7 Artillery /n small( and medium(si,ed poc0ets the ordinarily undesirable bunchin" up of artillery units cannot be avoided Here, however, it is of advanta"e in that it permits a rapid shift of fire, thus
30
assurin" direct support for lar"e parts of the front without displacement to new positions !lso, centrali,ed fire direction can be more easily established ! practice that proved particularly effective was the firin" of a few batteries at a time, while the bul0 of the artillery remained silent to avoid counterbattery fire Massed artillery went into action only a"ainst lar"e(scale enemy attac0s B Armour and Antitank Weapons /n the defence of poc0ets, tan0s and assault "uns have a dual mission Contrary to the rules of armoured combat under ordinary circumstances, they are scattered amon" the infantry and ta0e part in the small(scale fi"htin" alon" the perimeter !t the same time, they must be able to revert 2uic0ly to their ori"inal formation whenever they have to be used as mobile reserve a"ainst ma6or enemy attac0s -imilarly, the proper place for antitan0 weapons is with the front(line infantry !n antitan0 defence echeloned in depth, as is preferable in most other situations, must be ruled out for the same reasons that apply to the employment of the infantry The necessity for ti"ht or"ani,ation inside the poc0et has already been emphasi,ed This applies particularly to traffic control, which must be so enforced as to assure order and discipline, and to prevent panic /t may be necessary, for this purpose, to employ not only all available military police but also seasoned combat troops under the command of forceful and e#perienced officers !ll measures that must be ta0en inside a poc0et will vary dependin" upon local circumstancesH no two situations are ali0e Therefore, set rules cannot be prescribed for fi"htin" in poc0ets any more than for other types of military operations .evertheless, the fundamental principles outlined above seem to apply whenever the enemy encircles troops -o lon" as the encirclement has not been completed9or before the enemy rin" has been reinforced9an immediate brea0(throu"h offers the best chance of success 4ew tactical preparations will be necessary, if a command faced with encirclement can e#ploit the opportune moment by brea0in" out as soon as the enemy1s intentions have been reco"ni,ed /n most instances, however, all elements of the surrounded force will be loc0ed in battle for several days, and the opportunity for such immediate action will pass before the situation in the poc0et has become sufficiently clear Then, especially in the case of lar"er poc0ets, a brea0out can be launched only after the most careful preparations, which must include some or all of the followin" considerations and measures Section +++6 *HE 1REA.O-* DE&+S+O, Unless the encircled forces have e#plicit orders to remain in place, or are so wea0 that they must rely on relief from the outside, the decision to brea0 out must be made before the enemy has been able to for"e a firm rin" around the poc0et Only if this is done, and only if preparations are be"un without delay, will all measures become part of one coherent plan, directed toward a sin"le ob6ective -uch situations brin" out the innate a""ressiveness, fle#ibilityH and initiative of a born leader The need for 2uic0 decisions, however, must not be permitted to cause action without plan The proper time and direction for the brea0out, for instance, can only be determined after the followin" 2uestions have been answeredD a :hen9accordin" to the tactical situation9is the earliest suitable moment for launchin" the attac0N b :here is the enemy the wea0estN c :hich is the shortest way bac0 to friendly linesN d :hat direction of attac0 would involve the least terrain difficultiesN e :hat time of day and what weather conditions are most favourable for the attac0N f -hould one or several directions be selected for the brea0outN The answers to these 2uestions will vary accordin" to the situation, as can be seen from the precedin" chapters !ctually, there may be situations in which9contrary to the principles
31
advanced above9the direction for the brea0out should not be fi#ed too early, at least not until the enemy1s intentions can be clearly reco"ni,ed <Ch )= !s a rule, unless the brea0out is to be co(ordinated with the approach of a relief force from the outside, the units fi"htin" their way out should follow the shortest route bac0 to their own lines /n many instances the direction most favourable in terms of terrain and enemy resistance cannot be used if it does not permit a lin0(up with friendly forces in the shortest possible time :ith troops in "ood fi"htin" condition, the attac0 can be launched at ni"htH if they are battle weary, the brea0out must be made in the daytime, so as to obtain better control and co(ordination ! brea0out in several directions offers the least chance of success /t is attempted as a last resort, in order to obtain a "reater dispersal of one1s own forces, which mi"ht enable some small units to fi"ht their way bac0 to their own lines -uch an attempt is more or less an act of desperation9when relief from the outside cannot be e#pected, and the distance to the nearest friendly lines has become so "reat that the e#hausted poc0et force can no lon"er brid"e it Section +36 SPE&+A/ /OG+S*+&A/ PREPARA*+O,S ! successful brea0out is the result of sound plannin" and systematic preparation /t is also one of the most difficult combat manoeuvres that a military force can be called upon to attempt This fact must be ta0en into account in all preparatory measures 5rior to the brea0out, for instance, the troops should be stripped of all unnecessary e2uipment, that is, of all e2uipment they mi"ht not need durin" the fi"htin" of the ne#t few days This must be done without hesitation and without re"ard to their possible future re2uirements, should they have to be committed a"ain after the brea0out The easier the lost e2uipment can be replaced afterwards, the less wei"ht will be "iven to such considerations German commanders in :orld :ar // were never allowed to for"et that every weapon and vehicle was virtually irreplaceable9a typical si"n of a 8poor man1s war 8 To some other nations, however, these limitations do not necessarily apply Until the poc0et force is entirely surrounded by the enemy9but as soon as encirclement appears inevitable9the last open road must be utili,ed for the evacuation of casualties and of all nonessential staff sections, detachments, and service troops /f there is still time, e#cess weapons and e2uipment may be moved out over the same road The commander should not fail, however, to ma0e full use of this last opportunity to "et rid of rear echelon troopsH in an encirclement they are a "reater burden than superfluous e2uipment, which can be destroyed if necessary Technical preparations in the poc0et be"in with what mi"ht be called the 8bi" clean(up 8 !ll weapons that cannot be fully manned or ade2uately supplied with ammunition must be destroyed The same is true of all heavy "uns that mi"ht be a hindrance in view of e#pected terrain difficulties, as for instance all artillery pieces of more than %)@(mm calibre !s a rule, it is better to destroy one "un too many, than to dra" alon" a sin"le weapon that cannot be employed -imilar principles apply to the destruction of motor vehicles E#actly how many are to be destroyed will depend upon the availability of fuel and the re2uirements for the transportation of casualties and indispensable e2uipmentH in any event, the ma6ority of vehicles will have to be destroyed Hardest hit by these radical measures are usually the supply services Here, only a forceful officer in char"e of destruction will be able to carry out his mission successfully Official papers are another victim of the "eneral clean up Their destruction is a tas0 that every soldier will underta0e with fiendish pleasure 4iles, administrative forms, voluminous war diaries, orders, re"ulations, and directives are consi"ned to the flames9the hi"her the classification, the "reater must be the care ta0en to assure that they are completely destroyed Only the most important papers, radio codes, and in some cases personnel files, may be left intact, so lon" as there is hope that they mi"ht be saved Effective traffic re"ulation is a prere2uisite for all tactical moves inside the poc0et /f an ade2uate road net e#ists, separate routes must be desi"nated for the movement of supply units and combat troops, and even for armour and infantry The Germans found it e#pedient to co( ordinate all traffic in a poc0et by preparin" a re"ular timetable that had to be strictly observed
32
However, the problem of traffic re"ulation inside a poc0et is not confined to troop movements The most carefully devised system of traffic control can be upset by streams of fleein" civilians who are li0ely to be stric0en with panic when cau"ht in a poc0et !s a rule, therefore, it is imperative for the security of the encircled force to prohibit and prevent any movement of local inhabitants Only in rare cases will it be possible to ta0e alon" part of the civilian population durin" a brea0out Then, while the roads are 0ept clear, special paths must be assi"ned for the tre0s of civilians 5articularly in lar"e poc0ets, the 2uestion whether able(bodied male inhabitants should be ta0en alon" or left behind deserves careful considerationH it can only be decided on the basis of local circumstances E#tensive preparations will also be necessary if an encircled force is to be supplied by airH these preparations are described in detail in the !ppendi# to this study Section 36 *A&*+&A/ PREPARA*+O,S /n an encirclement a deliberate effort must be made to increase the effective stren"th of the combat element at the e#pense of the service units -electin" the proper personnel to be transferred from rear echelon to combat duty may be a slow process, but it is of the "reatest importance at a time when active fi"hters are needed more than anythin" else /n such situations, the service units9havin" "rown out of proportion to the combat element9are lar"ely superfluous and actually impose a heavy burden on the command !t best, they constitute a manpower reserve, which, after a thorou"h process of selection, will yield additional personnel for combat duty One should not e#pect too much of this reserve9while it is composed of military personnel, it will include few combat soldiers !ssi"nin" an e#cessive number of rear echelon troops to front( line duty will only swell the numerical stren"th of the combat element without, however, increasin" its fi"htin" power to the same de"ree The procedure completely loses its usefulness when the men transferred from service units are no lon"er a reinforcement of, but a burden to, the combat element $ear echelon troops whose services have become superfluous and who can no lon"er be evacuated, should be placed in a sin"le unit and held under firm control Demolitions, which are to prevent rapid pursuit by the enemy or to slow his e#ploitation of recently abandoned terrain, are to be ordered and e#ecuted in timeH condemned artillery ammunition ma0es a "ood e#plosive for this purpose /t is advisable, however, to confine such demolitions to a few important ob6ects E#perience has shown that as a rule the troops have neither the time nor the inclination to carry out e#tensive and time(consumin" missions of destruction On the other hand, the commander must ta0e care to prevent senseless mass demolitions born of a spirit of destructiveness that is characteristic of encircled troops The success of a brea0out will depend primarily upon the use of deception and the maintenance of secrecy The fewer subordinate commanders informed about the actual brea0out plan, the "reater the chances that secrecy can be maintained Especially telephone and radio communications must be carefully "uarded !t the same time, radio offers the best means for deceivin" the enemy This may be done by transmittin" dummy messa"es about one1s own intentions, calls to ima"inary relief units, reports that will confuse the enemy about the actual stren"th of the poc0et force, misleadin" re2uisitions for supplies, and false information about drop ,ones and landin" areas !ll these ruses are certain to reduce the number of casualties durin" the brea0out Tactical feints and deceptive manoeuvres must "o hand in hand with the measures su""ested above 3y movin" into different positions every ni"ht, launchin" attac0s with limited ob6ective from various points of the perimeter, and stubbornly holdin" on to unimportant terrain features, the encircled force must deliberately convey to the enemy a false picture of its situation and of its intentions This purpose can also be served by havin" a si,eable column composed of all available supply units move laterally across the sector from which the brea0out will eventually be launched Effective deception can always be achieved by concentratin" armour at a point other than that of the intended brea0out /f these tan0s proceed to e#ecute a feint attac0, the enemy, believin" that he has located the main effort of the brea0out force, will almost certainly divert the bul0 of his forces to the threatened point The attac0in" tan0s are then shifted rapidly into the direction of the main brea0(throu"h, and success will usually follow <Ch 7= -uch deceptive measures by tan0s,
33
dependin" of course upon the fuel situation, should be used both in the defence of the poc0et perimeter and9as an ace in the hole9immediately before the brea0out is launched The desired result can often be achieved by havin" a sin"le tan0 drive in circles at ni"ht to fei"n the assembly of a lar"e armoured unit .o matter what measures of deception are used, they will only serve their purpose if they enable the brea0out force to ta0e the enemy by surprise /n this respect the preparations for a brea0out do not differ from preparations for any other type of attac0 Here, as in any offensive action, secrecy, deception, and surprise are the basic elements of success The most important tactical preparations for the brea0out9apart from diversionary attac0s9 are concerned with the "radual chan"e of emphasis from the defence of the perimeter to the formation of a stron" brea0out force !s the situation permits, every soldier who can be spared from the purely defensive sectors must be transferred9 possibly after a rest period9to the area selected for the brea0out This will wea0en the defence and, in some places, necessitate a shortenin" of the line, which may involve considerable ris0s Enemy penetrations are li0ely to occur, and such local crises, althou"h they may have little or no effect upon the over(all situation, are usually overestimated by the commanders on the spot These difficulties, of course, are "reatly reduced if the entire poc0et 0eeps movin" in the "eneral direction of the brea0out The necessary shiftin" of forces is then more easily accomplished, and minor losses of terrain on the defensive front are no lon"er re"arded as serious setbac0s The advanta"e of a movin" poc0et in terms of morale is obvious .o claustrophobia will develop because the troops are spared the feelin" that they are ma0in" a last stand in a poc0et from which there is no escape Durin" the defence of a poc0et, local crises are a daily occurrence The poc0et commander and his staff must be ready at any moment to ta0e the necessary countermeasures a"ainst serious emer"encies !ctually, each passin" hour may brin" new surprises and call for new decisions, and it is not always easy to distin"uish between important and unimportant developments The commander must 0eep in mind that his reserves are limited and should not be committed unless a ma6or threat develops at a decisive point /t is a result of the unusual tension prevailin" in a poc0et that purely local emer"ences are often e#a""erated and may lead to ur"ent calls for assistance 4re2uently, such local crises subside before lon", and the situation can be restored without the use of reserves9provided the poc0et commander does not permit himself to be needlessly alarmed !t this point a few words mi"ht be added concernin" the attitude that must be displayed by the poc0et commander and his staff /n the midst of rapidly chan"in" events the command element must be a tower of stren"th The troops observe its every action with 0een eyes /n this respect even the location of the command post is of particular importance :hile it should be centrally located, its pro#imity to the momentary centre of "ravity is even more desirable .ever should the operations of an encircled force be conducted by remote control, from a head2uarters on the outside This proved to be an impossibility, both from a practical point of view and because of its disastrous effect upon the morale of the troops 3y the same to0en, no member of the command "roup must be permitted to leave the poc0et by air $eassurin" information, brief orders issued in clear lan"ua"e, and fre2uent visits by the commander and his staff to critical points alon" the perimeter will have an immediate beneficial influence upon the morale of the poc0et force !t the same time, e#a""erated optimism is definitely out of place The troops want to 0now the truth and will eventually discover it for themselves They are certain to lose confidence if they find out that their commanders have been tamperin" with the facts in an attempt to ma0e the situation loo0 bri"hter than it actually is !s a rule, the truth told without a show of nervousness cannot fail to have a reassurin" effect and mi"ht even stir the troops to "reater effort !rran"ed in their proper se2uence, the tactical measures leadin" up to the brea0out are the followin"D a Emphasis on defenceH all weapons committed in support of the fi"htin" alon" the perimeter b Establishment of clear channels of command c -tabili,ation of the defence d $einforcement of the combat element at the e#pense of the service units
34
e Evacuation of nonessential personnelH destruction of e#cess e2uipment f Gradual chan"e of emphasis from the defence to preparations for the brea0out attac0 " 4ormation of a brea0out force h -hortenin" of the defence perimeterH further stren"thenin" of the sector selected for the brea0out i Deceptive manoeuvres culminatin" in a diversionary attac0 6 3rea0out Section 3+6 S-PP/5 A,D E3A&-A*+O, The supply reserves carried in a poc0et should be no more than what the force will presumably need until the day of the brea0out -i,able stores cannot be 0eptH they must either be "iven away or destroyed, re"ardless of 2uality or 2uantity /n such situations the Germans found it useful to prepare so(called individual supply pac0a"es which were composed of all 0inds of items for certain units and could be distributed in advance to the points where they would be needed later on -urplus rations can be issued to the troops for immediate consumption, but if this is done too "enerously it is li0ely to decrease their fi"htin" power The local population will always "ratefully accept whatever the troops can spare /f a poc0et force is without ade2uate supplies and, particularly, if the re2uired fuel and ammunition can only be brou"ht in by air, the escape from encirclement must be accomplished as 2uic0ly as possible -upply by air cannot satisfy all the re2uirements of an encircled forceH it can only remedy some of the most important deficiencies This fact was demonstrated durin" the operations described in the precedin" chapters and confirmed by the personal e#perience of the author /t is not li0ely to chan"e, even if absolute superiority in the air is assured and an ade2uate number of planes can be assi"ned to the operation One of the most important lo"istical problems is that of evacuatin" casualties :hether or not the wounded are ta0en alon" has a profound effect upon the morale of the encircled troops !ny measure from which they mi"ht derive the sli"htest indication that wounded personnel is to be left behind will immediately reduce their fi"htin" spirit, especially if they are facin" an enemy li0e the $ussians /n such situations the commanders are under the stron"est moral obli"ation to ta0e the wounded alon" and must bend every effort to ma0e this possible German e#perience has shown that minor casualties can endure transportation over considerable distances on horse(drawn vehicles padded with straw, even in very cold weather and durin" snowstorms On such movements the wounded were accompanied by medical officers who administered every possible aid durin" the fre2uent halts The German troops encircled near ;amenets(5odols0ly <Ch )= re"arded their convoy of casualties as their sacred trust and fou"ht all the more stubbornly to protect their wounded comrades Conse2uently, it was possible to evacuate nearly all casualties durin" that operation /n the poc0et near Cher0assy <Ch '= the situation was less favourable There, because of the most severe weather conditions and a confused tactical situation, the wounded had to be left behind in the care of doctors and other medical personnel Every opportunity should be used to evacuate casualties by air They must have priority on transport planes returnin" from a poc0et, and this priority must be assured, if necessary, by force of arms The desperate stru""le for space aboard transport planes in the poc0et of -talin"rad should serve as a warnin" for situations of this 0ind Section 3++6 RE/+EF OPERA*+O,S The difficulties encountered by an encircled force may be considerably reduced if stron" relief forces are available in the vicinity of the poc0et Even inade2uate attempts at relief from the outside are better than none at all The basis for real success, however, is the employment of e#perienced troops in the best fi"htin" condition who are not li0ely to bo" down at the halfway mar0 The need for relief from the outside depends, of course, on the tactical situation and the physical condition of the encircled forceH it is "reatest when the troops inside the poc0et are battle worn and show si"ns of wea0enin"H it may appear less ur"ent in other situations 3ut wherever the
35
enemy surrounds friendly troops, assistance from the outside is desirable and should be provided without delay -uch relief operations must be planned with the same care that is used in preparin" every action of the encircled force This applies to the selection of the route of advance, the choice of the proper moment for the attac0, and the timely allocation of fuel and ammunition ! relief thrust cannot be launched on the spur of the moment, and undue haste will surely result in failure Tactical preparations must follow the same principles as those for any other type of attac0 The necessary stren"th of the relief force must be determined on the basis of the enemy situation and the distance to the ob6ective /n most cases armour and ade2uate artillery support will be indispensable !ll relief forces must be under one command, even if they consist of units that were ori"inally parts of two separate armies <Ch '= 5reparatory measures in the fields of supply and administration will "reatly e#ceed those that mi"ht be ta0en for an ordinary attac0, since the relief force must try to anticipate the needs of the troops brea0in" out of the poc0et !ll 0inds of supplies, especially stimulants, must be held ready in sufficient 2uantitiesH rescue and rehabilitation areas must be preparedH and facilities must be provided that will improve the physical condition and the morale of the poc0et force !mon" these are troop 2uarters <heated shelter in winter=, bathin" facilities, clothin", and arran"ements for mail service These measures play an important part in "ettin" the poc0et force bac0 into shape and ready for renewed commitment 5roper care for the wounded must be assured by assemblin" all available medical personnel and preparin" shelter for the poc0et casualties /nformation as to the number of wounded inside the poc0et must be obtained by radio The decision as to the time and place for launchin" the relief attac0 depends on specific arran"ements with the poc0et force Unless a safe wire communication e#ists, such arran"ements can only be made by radio, in which case "reat care must be ta0en to maintain secrecy The distance to the poc0et may be so "reat as to re2uire the use of special types of radio e2uipment /n such situations the Germans used their so(called Dezimetergeraet, a microwave radio set operatin" on fre2uencies between )@@ and >@@ me"acycles /f at all possible, the relief attac0 must be launched on a broad front ! sin"le thrust confined to a narrow fronta"e has little chance of success and is 6ustified only if insufficient forces are available <Ch 7= The relief force, in this case, will have its lon" flan0s dan"erously e#posed and will hardly be able to reach its ob6ective /f such an emer"ency method must be used, the operation should be carried out at ni"ht The conduct of the relief operation must be mar0ed by a hi"h de"ree of fle#ibility 4re2uently a prearran"ed plan must be discarded or modified because of une#pected enemy action, particularly if such action is directed a"ainst the troops attemptin" to escape from the poc0et The 6oint effort of the two conver"in" elements must be "eared to the needs of the encircled units who are always fi"htin" under less favourable circumstances than the relief force The latter must be able to react with swift and effective countermeasures to unforeseen chan"es in the situation The battle west of Cher0assy <Ch '= clearly demonstrated what difficulties could be encountered in a relief operation There, all efforts were frustrated by a combination of unfortunate circumstances The sudden start of the muddy season had rendered the terrain virtually impassable $elief forces approachin" from the south were whittled down in numerous local en"a"ements before they could be assembled for the main attac0 Complicated channels of command and diver"in" directions of attac0 further added to the confusion Certainly, fle#ibility was lac0in" in the conduct of the relief operation from the west The brea0out, to be sure, did not proceed entirely accordin" to plan, as the ma6ority of the troops emer"in" from the poc0et missed their direction Even then they followed a line of advance only a few miles south from the one that had been a"reed upon 3ecause of this minor chan"e, the relief force proved unable to lin0 up with the poc0et forces at the point where they had actually pierced the rin" of encirclement Section 3+++6 *HE 1REA.O-* Once the poc0et force has be"un its brea0(throu"h in the direction of friendly lines, it must apply the same tactical principles and will be sub6ect to the same contin"encies as in any other
36
type of attac0 ! particular difficulty lies in co(ordinatin" this effort with that of the relief force, for the purpose of accomplishin" a 6unction of the two conver"in" spearheads as soon as possible German e#periences vary as to what would be the most desirable attac0 formation for a brea0out -ince the answer to this 2uestion depends lar"ely on the local situation, no definite rules can be offered /n any event it is advisable to adopt a mi#ed formation composed of motori,ed and nonmotori,ed units supported by tan0s and all weapons suitable for the attac0 !rmoured units must be held with close rein so as to prevent them front outrunnin" the infantry They should only be permitted to advance by bounds, with some of the armour held bac0 This is a necessary precaution to prevent deep thrusts by individual armoured units that can be of no advanta"e to the pro"ress of the main force -pecific orders must be issued both for the timely inte"ration of all remainin" elements to be withdrawn from the defensive sectors and for the conduct of rear "uard action to cover the brea0out attac0 ! ma6or crisis durin" the brea0out will arise as soon as the ori"inal plan, for some reason, can no lon"er be followed and improvisation must ta0e its place !s a rule this will be the result of some unforeseen enemy action :ith troops that are severely overta#ed by heavy fi"htin" in the poc0et such crises may easily lead to panic The call 8every man for himself8 is the si"nal for "eneral disorder mar0ed by useless attempts of individual soldiers to ma0e their way bac0 to friendly lines This can only be prevented by firm leadership and strict control, and by ta0in" advance measures that will anticipate such emer"encies, as for instance by 0eepin" a mobile reserve, composed of armour and antitan0 weapons, that can be employed with a hi"h de"ree of fle#ibility Even a few tan0s committed at the ri"ht moment can serve as a very effective means to overcome a local crisis The capabilities of the troops must be carefully wei"hed and are the basis for the timin" of the entire operation /f the troops are battle weary and if the brea0out is e#pected to involve lon" and heavy fi"htin", the operation must be conducted in several phases to provide rest between periods of movement or combat 4or reasons of security, especially in the case of small poc0ets, all movements should be carried out durin" the ni"ht Control of the troops is "reatly facilitated if the fi"htin" can be confined to the daytime /f a brea0out must be e#ecuted without simultaneous relief from the outside, a new position should be selected in which the liberated poc0et force mi"ht be able to rally and to face the pursuin" enemyH in most instances that will be no more than a line desi"nated on the map where the troops are to be reor"ani,ed after their successful escape from encirclement Section +76 S-44AR5 The lessons learned by the Germans durin" :orld :ar // on the relative value of poc0ets left behind the enemy lines mi"ht be summari,ed as followsD a !s a method of defensive combat desi"ned to tie down substantial enemy forces, the deliberate stand of an encircled force rarely achieves the desired result b The deliberate creation of a poc0et and the insistence on its continued defence can only be 6ustified if the surrounded force consists of e#perienced and well(disciplined troops who are able to cope with the unusual difficulties involved in this 0ind of fi"htin" Otherwise the price will be e#cessive since the encircled troops are usually lost and even those who mana"e to escape are certain to remain unfit for combat for a lon" time c :henever friendly forces are cut off and surrounded by the enemy, steps must be ta0en without delay to assure their liberation The senior commander of the encircled units must be immediately authori,ed to force a brea0out /t is even better to issue a standin" order at the be"innin" of hostilities that would ma0e it mandatory for the commander of an encircled force to brea0 out as soon as possible Only then can there be any hope of savin" the surrounded troops without sufferin" e#cessive losses The German Hi"h Command durin" :orld :ar // "reatly overestimated the defensive value of such poc0ets Orders for a brea0out from encirclement were issued either much too late or not at all This turned out to be a "rave tactical error, which could not fail to have a disastrous effect upon the entire conduct of operations on the $ussian front
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APPE,D+7 A+R S-PPOR* OF E,&+R&/ED FOR&ES

Section +6 GE,ERA/ PR+,&+P/ES The air support available to an encircled force will usually determine the feasibility of a brea0out and the manner in which it must be e#ecuted !s a rule, it will depend on the availability of air cover whether marches and combat actions should ta0e place in the daytime or durin" the hours of dar0ness when so many additional ris0s and difficulties are involved -ince a brea0out on a lar"e scale will necessarily include actions that can only be carried out in the daytime, such as frontal attac0s over difficult terrain or assaults a"ainst well(defended enemy positions, a stron" concentration of air power, at least durin" these phases, is indispensable for the success of the entire operation /n an e#tensive theatre of war, where the air force has to accomplish many diversified missions a"ainst widely separated tar"ets, there is always the dan"er of a dissipation of air stren"th /t will therefore be the responsibility of the top(level air force command to create in time the tactical and technical prere2uisites for temporary mass employment of air power at points of main effort This is accomplished by establishin" and maintainin" ade2uate "round installations in all crucial areas so that the rapid diversion of ad6acent air force units <at least for one day1s operations= will not present serious difficulties How many air force units are re2uired to support an encircled force must be determined on the basis of 0nown enemy stren"th, the si,e and vulnerability of the poc0et, and its distance from the nearest friendly lines How much air support can be provided will depend essentially upon the capacity of the airfields, the supply situation, and the intensity of combat on other sectors The air stren"th actually needed in such situations can hardly be overestimated /t has to ma0e up for the critical deficiencies that always a""ravate the situation in a poc0et <lac0 of artillery ammunition, heavy losses of weapons and tan0s, etc =, and to bolster the morale of the encircled troops durin" their difficult stru""le /n addition, since the immediate vicinity of a poc0et is usually the scene of lar"e enemy concentrations, the supportin" air units will find numerous opportunities to wea0en the forces of the enemy Here, even more than in most other situations, an ade2uate reserve of air stren"th should be available, specifically for the followin" reasonsD a The defence of a poc0et often ta0es an une#pected turn and may re2uire the rapid commitment of additional air support that can only be provided if ample reserves are available for instant use b The possibility of heavy aircraft losses must be ta0en into account, particularly as a result of enemy bombin" attac0s on friendly airfields c The most serious crisis in a brea0out may suddenly arise at a late sta"e of the operation This will automatically increase the need for immediate air protection, and without ade2uate reserves such additional air support will not be available at the decisive moment d Entire air force units may suddenly he "rounded because of unfavourable weather and terrain conditions such as dense fo" or deeply mired airstrips *on"(ran"e weather forecasts coverin" a wide area should be made available to the command of the "round forces -uch data can be of the "reatest importance in selectin" the most favourable time for a brea0out, especially if they include an accurate forecast of bad weather periods durin" which the enemy air force will be unable to operate Even local and temporary weather conditions can have a direct bearin" on tactical decisions /t is conceivable that an encircled force mi"ht ta0e advanta"e of temporary weather disturbances over enemy air bases, which may have the effect of "roundin" the bul0 of the enemy1s local air support, while more favourable weather conditions e#ist behind friendly lines, permittin" one1s own air units to carry out their missions The command over all air force units in an area where "round troops are encircled by the enemy must be in the hands of one air force commander, who should also have tactical control over air formations from ad6acent sectors whenever they are committed in support of the encircled force /n addition, all antiaircraft units in the area must be under his command CEd D /t should be
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remembered that in the German or"ani,ation most antiaircraft units were part of the *uftwaffe E /n the case of an encirclement on a lar"e scale with ade2uate airstrips and supply facilities e#istin" inside the poc0et, it is advisable to appoint a special air force commander for the poc0et area, who should be located in the immediate vicinity of the poc0et command post This air force officer should receive his orders from the air force commander responsible for the entire area Section ++6 PREPARA*OR5 4EAS-RES !ll preparations for air support must be carried out as inconspicuously as possible Great care must be ta0en to conceal the intentions of the poc0et force and, specifically, to avoid offerin" any clues as to the time and place of the impendin" attac0 !ir supply operations should be initiated at the earliest possible moment, to assure that the ammunition and fuel re2uirements of the troops for the days of the brea0out can be ade2uately covered :ith few e#ceptions supply by air is indispensable for the success of a poc0et force attemptin" to brea0 throu"h the enemy rin" of encirclement Jet, under the most favourable circumstances supply by air remains an e#tremely uneconomical measure Therefore, when encirclement appears inevitable, every possible effort should be made in advance to build up an ade2uate supply reserve, at least of heavy and bul0y itemsH even after the encirclement has become a fact, this mi"ht still be done by a stron"ly armed supply convoy forcin" its way into the poc0et /f a force is compelled by specific orders to submit to encirclement by the enemy, it should see0 to ma0e its stand in an area that contains at least one usable airfield Type and condition of the terrain may render it e#tremely difficult to accomplish the construction of new airstrips with the limited manpower available !t least one and if possible two or more airfields for the use of supply planes9preferably with car"o "liders in tow9should be in operation as soon as possible /n this instance the "round troops must provide the necessary manpower for "radin" operations /n some situations it may be imperative to accomplish a widenin" of the poc0et by local attac0s, in order to capture a suitable airfield or to place an e#istin" field beyond the ran"e of enemy artillery 4or ni"ht operations, which as a rule cannot be avoided, each airfield must have a radio beacon, a li"ht beacon, and an ade2uate supply of si"nal flares !ll airfields inside a poc0et must be under the command of forceful officers supported by e#perienced personnel, a si,eable number of technicians, and an ade2uate labour force for the unloadin", stac0in", and rapid distribution of supplies /n poc0ets where suitable airfields do not e#ist from the outset and cannot be constructed, supply by air is limited to the use of car"o "liders !lthou"h the volume of supplies, in this case, will be considerably smaller, the facilities on the "round, e#cept for the len"th of airstrips, will have to be virtually the same as described above Droppin" supplies in aerial delivery containers is an e#tremely wasteful procedure *osses from driftin" or from brea0a"e upon impact ran"e up to >@ percentH they may be as hi"h as &@ percent if the containers are dropped into the rubble of a destroyed town Jet, in the case of very small poc0ets, this may be the only possibility for supplyin" the surrounded force by air /n that event, the droppin" point must be fi#ed by specific arran"ements with the encircled troops since the enemy will ma0e every effort to mislead the approachin" planes and cause them to drop their loads over enemy(held territory Section +++6 A+R RE&O,,A+SSA,&E !ir reconnaissance units must provide the poc0et commander promptly with the essential information on which he is to base his decisions as to time and place of the brea0out and his specific plans for the conduct of the entire operation The missions to be accomplished by air reconnaissance include the followin"D a Gatherin" information about enemy dispositions, so as to determine in what area around the poc0et the enemy is wea0est and where a brea0(throu"h would have the best chance of success b 4urnishin" specific information about enemy units located in the prospective brea0out area, and indicatin" tar"ets for counter battery and air attac0s
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c Detectin" enemy reserves and preparations on the flan0s of the prospective ,one of attac0 and opposite the rear of the poc0et d 5rovidin" aerial photo"raphs and photomaps of the prospective brea0(throu"h area, showin" traffic arteries, brid"es, and ma6or terrain obstacles, and determinin" whether or not the terrain is suitable for armoured combat e -pottin" airstrips <by usin" aerial photo"raphy=, which mi"ht e#ist in the path of the planned attac0 that could be used for supply by air durin" the brea0out Section +36 F+GH*ER A3+A*+O, /f the encircled "round troops are in the possession of ade2uate facilities and supplies, a considerable advanta"e can be "ained by havin" part of the fi"hter force operate from airfields inside the poc0et or at least use these fields as advance airstrips for dayli"ht operations The "reater the distance of the poc0et area from the main air bases, the "reater will be the importance of such measures for the maintenance of the poc0et !s the enemy can be e#pected to commit stron" air units in his ma6or attempt to annihilate the encircled troops9especially if he reco"ni,es their preparations for a brea0out9friendly fi"hter forces eventually have the opportunity of attac0in" enemy air formations that are confined to a small area, and of shootin" down a relatively lar"e number of enemy aircraft Section 36 &/OSE S-PPOR* OF GRO-,D A&*+O,S The employment of fi"hter(bombers <Schlachtflieger= has particular si"nificance in the defence of a poc0et where, as a rule, there is a shorta"e of artillery ammunition and an increased need for concealment and for savin" the stren"th of the encircled troops Close tactical air support is especially needed durin" the re"roupin" of the poc0et force 6ust before the brea0out !t such time, close(support aviation may have to assume the role and perform the missions of the artillery To avoid a dissipation of stren"th, the effort of fi"hter(bombers must be concentrated on a few tar"et areas of ma6or importance !t the same time, "reat care must be ta0en a"ainst revealin" the intentions of the encircled "round troops The stren"th and conduct of fi"hter(bomber units committed immediately before the brea0out, for instance, should be lar"ely the same as on precedin" days The tar"ets selected should not permit any conclusions as to the actual direction of the impendin" attac0 /f it is necessary to neutrali,e certain areas in the path of the brea0out, this must be done either sufficiently in advance or as soon as the attac0 on the "round has be"un /n addition to providin" direct support for the attac0in" brea0out force, fi"hter(bombers are also employed to prevent the enemy from brin"in" up reserves and from re"roupin" his forces for the purpose of bloc0in" the brea0(throu"h attempt !s a rule9chiefly for reasons of supply9close(support aircraft must operate from bases outside the poc0et 3ombs and other appropriate ammunition that may be available at airstrips within the encirclement should be saved for a ma#imum air effort on the day of the brea0out -ince positions alon" the perimeter are usually within close ran"e of the enemy and difficult to identify from the air, the "reatest caution must be used in the briefin" of aircrews operatin" over the area This applies particularly when lon"(ran"e aircraft from ad6acent combat sectors are employed, a procedure, which could otherwise lead to serious losses amon" friendly "round troops -uch aircraft should first be transferred to airfields close to the area of commitment where the crews can be properly briefed and 2uic0ly apprised of local chan"es in the situation Section 3+6 E4P/O54E,* OF A,*+A+R&RAF* -,+*S Conspicuous chan"es in the disposition of antiaircraft units before the brea0out may provide the enemy with definite clues as to the intentions of the encircled force !ntiaircraft "uns and other telltale antiaircraft e2uipment should therefore be left in their positions <or replaced by dummy installations= until the very day of the brea0out !ntiaircraft supply and service elements must be re"rouped at an earlier sta"e, but without attractin" undue attention -imilarly, the antiaircraft protection for the "round troops durin" their assembly before the brea0out must be so arran"ed as to produce the least possible chan"e in the e#istin" pattern of antiaircraft positions !t the same
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time, an ostentatious concentration of antiaircraft units or dummy positions in an area unrelated to the main effort mi"ht conceivably be used as a means to deceive the enemy /f ammunition reserves are available, which must be left behind, or if the brea0out force is without ade2uate artillery support, it may be advisable to employ some antiaircraft units in direct support of the attac0 on the "round These units should be moved durin" the ni"ht before the brea0out to double(purpose positions from which they can participate in the initial phase of the operation by deliverin" direct fire on important "round tar"ets in addition to providin" antiaircraft protection The "eneral re"roupin" of antiaircraft units before the brea0out should ta0e place as late as possible and with a view to protectin" leadin" "round elements, flan0 units, artillery positions, and critical points such as brid"es and defiles !t this sta"e it is usually impossible to avoid strippin" the remainin" "round units and installations of their antiaircraft defences -uccess in carryin" out these measures depends in most cases on the de"ree of mobility retained by the antiaircraft units /n all these preparations it is essential to 0eep in mind that the main ob6ectives in the employment of antiaircraft units are protection a"ainst low(level enemy air raids and a"ainst all air attac0s that cannot be warded off by friendly fi"hter forces 5articularly when the protection offered by fi"hter aviation is inade2uate, the "reatest care must be used in co(ordinatin" the efforts of antiaircraft and fi"hter units 4or the brea0out phase specific plans should be made to re"ulate the forward displacement of antiaircraft units and their priority of movement durin" the advance, provided it is at all possible to anticipate the various moves that mi"ht become necessary Section 3++6 E3A&-A*+O, 15 A+R Detailed arran"ements must be made by the air force to use supply aircraft returnin" from the poc0et for the evacuation of wounded, of surplus personnel and e2uipment, and to assist the "round command in carryin" out other evacuation measures <to include, in some cases, the removal of industrial e2uipment= The !rmy, on the other hand, is responsible for providin" ade2uate medical facilities at the air bases to which the wounded are evacuated -ince casualties must be e#pected to occur at a hi"h rate durin" certain phases of the operation, it will be necessary to ta0e care of lar"e numbers of wounded in the shortest possible time Section 3+++6 A+R S-PPOR* D-R+,G *HE 1REA.O-* /n view of the "reat difficulties normally encountered durin" a brea0out, the "round troops need protection a"ainst persistent attac0 from the air, as well as continuous tactical air support 3oth are indispensable for the success of the entire operation This is particularly true for the most critical phases of the brea0out which occur, first, durin" the initial attac0H second, when the enemy commits his reserves a"ainst the flan0s and rear of the poc0et forceH and, finally, when he attempts to overta0e and bloc0 the troops withdrawin" from the poc0et Durin" these phases the air force commander must concentrate all available air units and e#ert steadily mountin" pressure at the critical points /n the intervals between these main efforts he has the missions of preventin" interruptions in the advance on the "round, and of 0eepin" his flyin" units in the hi"hest possible state of readiness /t is, of course, impossible to devise a standin" operatin" procedure for air support durin" a brea0out, since no two situations are ali0e .evertheless, the followin" basic principles should be 0ept in mind Durin" the initial phase all available air units should be committed in direct support of the leadin" "round elements !ir attac0s on "round tar"ets, be"innin" with a stron" openin" blow and continued in successive waves, must be closely co(ordinated with the fire plan of the artillery The tar"ets of fi"hter(bombers comprise ob6ectives that cannot be observed from the "round <enemy artillery positions, assembly areas, tactical reserves=H also enemy positions offerin" particularly stron" resistance, enemy movements approachin" the combat area, and hostile elements threatenin" the flan0s of the advancin" spearheads -tandby reserves of fi"hter(bombers, circlin" some distance away or, better still, at considerable altitude above the combat area, must be employed to eliminate any revivin" enemy resistance and to reduce newly identified enemy stron" points Their presence in the air will "reatly stren"then the morale of the attac0in" "round troops
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E#perience shows, moreover, that as these planes appear over the battlefield, enemy batteries will cease firin", to avoid bein" identified from the air !t the same time, low(flyin" aircraft will often draw fire from hitherto unidentified enemy positions, which are thereby e#posed, to artillery action !nother practicable measure may be the placin" of small smo0e screens to blind enemy artillery observation To avoid hittin" friendly "round troops, bombers should operate in the depth of the ,one of advance a"ainst enemy artillery positions, assembly areas, and similar ob6ectives They mi"ht also be employed to lay lar"e smo0e screens, specifically to eliminate enemy observation from hi"h "round off the flan0s or from dominatin" terrain ahead of the advancin" troops /mportant ob6ectives in the area of penetration should be reduced before the brea0out by thorou"h bombin" attac0s, so as to li"hten the tas0 of the "round troops durin" the initial phase of the operation This cannot be done, however, if such attac0s are li0ely to reveal the plans of the brea0out force .or does this rule apply to enemy command postsH these must be attac0ed at the most opportune moment, immediately after the brea0out, when the resultin" confusion amon" the enemy of fees the "reatest advanta"e to the attac0in" force The re"roupin" of enemy units, which, accordin" to German e#periences in $ussia, mi"ht ta0e place between si# and ten hours after a brea0out has be"un, must be reco"ni,ed and reported by friendly reconnaissance aviation as 2uic0ly as possible 4rom that time on, the enemy should be 0ept under constant air observation /n brea0out operations of lon" duration the available fi"hter forces are usually unable to provide effective air cover at all times /n that event, their efforts must be concentrated on supportin" those phases of the brea0out, which, in terms of terrain and enemy resistance, are e#pected to involve the "reatest difficulties and the hi"hest de"ree of e#posure to enemy air attac0 3etween these periods of ma#imum air effort9which must be used to full advanta"e by the "round troops9it will often be necessary to restrict the employment of fi"hter aircraft, chiefly because of lo"istical limitations such as insufficient ammunition and fuel supply .evertheless, an ade2uate fi"hter reserve must always be ready for immediate ta0e(off in order to defend the advancin" "round troops a"ainst une#pectedly stron" enemy air attac0s The more obscure the enemy air situation, the "reater must be the stren"th of the fi"hter force held in reserve The air support for a relief force that is advancin" in the direction of a poc0et must, as a rule, be 0ept to a minimum, in order to assi"n the stron"est possible air cover to the troops that are emer"in" from enemy encirclement The forces approachin" from the main front line are usually in a much better position to compensate for this deficiency by increased use of artillery and antiaircraft weapons /n such situations, the supportin" fire from friendly aircraft must be carefully re"ulated to avoid inflictin" casualties amon" the advancin" "round troops, especially 6ust before the lin0(up of the two conver"in" forces Even after the 6unction has been effected, the former poc0et force mi"ht re2uire special air protection, at least while its reor"ani,ation and rehabilitation are bein" accomplished
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Operations of Encircled Forces

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Operations of Encircled Forces

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Historical Study Operations of Encircled Forces German Experiences in Russia

Department of the Army Pamphlet 20 2!" #ashin$ton% D& '()2