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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT WESTERNDISTRICTOFTEXAS AUSTINDIVISION

CHRISTOPHERDANIELMcNOSKY andSVENSTRICKER, Plaintiffs, v. TEXASGOVERNORRICKPERRY,etal Defendants, ________________________________________________________________________ CaseNo.1:13CV0631SS

PLAINTIFFSAMENDEDMOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGEMENT
________________________________________________________________________

ComesnowPlaintiffs,McNoskyandStricker,pursuanttoRule56oftheFederalRules ofCivilProcedure,movesthisCourtforsummaryjudgmentagainstDefendantsTexas GovernorRickPerry,TexasAttorneyGeneralGregAbbott,andTarrantCountyClerkMary LouiseGarcia.MaterialundisputedfactsdemonstratethattheDefendants,intheircapacitiesas TexasStateofficials,deniedaccesstoandparticipationinthestatesanctionedinstitutionof marriage,toPlaintiffsMcNoskyandStrickeronthebasisoftheirbiologicalsex.Judgment shouldthereforebeenteredinfavorofthePlaintiffsMcNoskyandStricker,includingentryofa permanentinjunctiontopreventfutureviolationsofthelaw,andproviderelieftothePlaintiffs. Thismotionissupportedbytheexhibitsattachedhereto.

I.INTRODUCTION

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ThiscivilrightscasechallengesasunconstitutionaltheTexasstatuteandstate constitutionalamendmentthateachprohibittheissuanceofmarriagelicensestosamesex couplesinTexas.Theissuanceofmarriagelicensesexclusivelytooppositesexcouplesand blanketedrejectionofsamesexmarriagelicenseapplicants,violatesrightssecuredtothe PlaintiffsbytheUnitedStatesConstitution.Plaintiffsseekdeclaratoryandinjunctiverelieffor themselvesandhopetosetaprecedentthatwillleadtoreliefforothersamesexcouples.

II.STATEMENTOFFACTS
A. Parties
1. PlaintiffsMcNoskyandStrickerboth: a. Arebiologicallymale. b. ArenotallowedtolegallymarryeachotherinTheStateofTexas. c. ArecitizensoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica. d. AreresidentsoftheStateofTexas. e. MeetorsurpassALLofthegeneralrequirementstolegallyenterintoa statesanctionedmarriagecontract,includingbutnotlimitedto: 1. Plaintiffsareatleast18yearsofage. 2. Plaintiffsarenotpresentlymarried. 3. Plaintiffsarenotpresentlydelinquentinthepaymentofcourtordered childsupport. 4. Plaintiffshavenotbeendivorcedwithinlast30days. 5. Plaintiffsarenotrelatedtooneanotherasanancestorordescendant,by bloodoradoptionabrotherorsister,ofthewholeorhalfbloodorby

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adoptionaparent'sbrotherorsisterofthewholeorhalfbloodorby adoptionasonordaughterofabrotherorsisterofthewholeorhalf bloodorbyadoptionacurrentorformerstepchildorstepparentora sonordaughterofparent'sbrotherorsister,ofthewholeorhalfblood orbyadoption. f. OnJuly1,2013,PlaintiffsChristopherDanielMcNoskyandSvenStricker, jointlyappliedforamarriagelicenseattheVitalRecordsOfficeofTarrant County,locatedinFortWorth,Texas. g. ThePlaintiffsproperlycompletedmarriagelicenseapplicationwasdenied immediatelyuponsubmission,withoutfurtherreview. h. ThePlaintiffsweredeniedonthebasisoftheirsex,andONLYtheirSEX, sincenootherlegalreasonexistsinaccordancewithArticle1,Sec.32ofthe TexasConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2 SubchapterASection2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c). 1 SexualorientationisNOTCITEDasajustificationfor exclusionbyeitherlaw. 2. DefendantRickPerryistheGovernoroftheStateofTexas.Inthatcapacity,his dutiesincludeensuringthatthelawsoftheStatearefaithfullyexecuted.See TexasConst.Art.IV,10. a. ThesedutiesofenforcementincludeArticle1,Sec.32oftheTexas Constitution,andTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2 SubchapterASection2.001(b).

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3. DefendantGregAbbottistheAttorneyGeneraloftheStateofTexas.Inthat capacity,heisbothchieflegalofficerandchieflawenforcementofficialforthe StateofTexas. a. Amonghisdutiesistherequirementthatheadvisestateandlocalofficialson questionsofTexaslaw.SeeTexasConst.Art.IV,22.Thesedutiesof enforcementincludeArticle1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitutionTexas FamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection 2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c). 4. DefendantMaryLouiseGarcia,theTarrantCountyClerk,isresponsiblefor issuingallmarriagelicensesinTarrantCounty. a. Shesuppliesformsandinstructionsforfillingoutforms.Texaslawdemands thatsherequirethateachmarriagelicenseapplication,whenpresentedfor approval,becompletedinaccordancewithTexaslaw,includingArticle1, Sec.32oftheTexasConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1Subtitle AChapter2SubchapterASection2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode 6.204(c). b. DefendantGarciarequirespersonsapplyingforamarriagelicense,beofthe oppositesexinorderforapprovaltobepossible.

B.

LawsBeingConstitutionallyChallenged
1. Article1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitution,readsasfollows: (a)Marriageinthisstateshallconsistonlyoftheunionofonemanandone

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woman.(b)Thisstateorapoliticalsubdivisionofthisstatemaynotcreateor recognizeanylegalstatusidenticalorsimilartomarriage. 2. TexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection 2.001(b),readsasfollows: Alicensemaynotbeissuedforthemarriageofpersonsofthesamesex. 3.TexasFamilyCode6.204(c),whichreadsasfollows: Thestateoranagencyorpoliticalsubdivisionofthestatemaynotgiveeffect toa: (1)publicact,record,orjudicialproceedingthatcreates, recognizes,orvalidatesamarriagebetweenpersonsoftheSAME SEXoracivilunioninthisstateorinanyotherjurisdictionor (2)rightorclaimtoanylegalprotection,benefit,orresponsibility assertedasaresultofamarriagebetweenpersonsoftheSAME SEXoracivilunioninthisstateorinanyotherjurisdiction. 4.Bothprecedinglawsatthecenterofthischallenge,eachaccordingtoitsown language,citesexandONLYSEX,asthesolecriterionforwhichotherwiseeligible individualsaretobedeniedparticipationinthestatesanctionedinstitutionofmarriage.

III.ARGUMENT
A. SummaryJudgmentStandard
Summaryjudgmentisappropriatewherethereisnogenuineissueofmaterialfactand themovingpartyisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.FED.R.CIV.P.56(c).

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Themovingpartyseekingsummaryjudgmenthastheinitialburdenofshowingthatthereisno genuineissueofmaterialfact.(SeeAdickesv.S.H.Kress&Co.,398U.S.144,157,90S. Ct.1598(1970)Zozlowv.MCADistributingCorp.,693F.2d870,883(9thCir.1982)). Oncethemovingpartyhasmetitsburdenbypresentingevidencethatwouldentitlethemoving partytoadirectedverdictattrial,theburdenshiftstotherespondingpartytosetforthspecific factsdemonstratingthatthereisagenuineissueofmaterialfactfortrial.(Andersonv.Liberty Lobby,Inc.,477U.S.242,24951(1986)seealsoCal.Arch.Bldg.Prod.,Inc.,v. FranciscanCeramics,Inc.,818F.2d1466,1468(9thCir.1987)). Amaterialfactisonethataffectstheoutcomeofthelitigationandrequiresatrialto resolvethedifferingversionsofthetruth.(Anderson,477U.S.at248249seealso SECv.SeaboardCorp.,677F.2d1301,1306(9thCir.1982)).Wheretherecordtakenasa wholecouldnotleadarationaltrieroffacttofindforthenonmovingparty,thereisno genuineissuefortrial.(MatsushitaElec.Indus.Co.v.ZenithRadioCorp.,475U.S. 574,586(1986)(quotingFirstNationalBankofArizonav.CitiesServiceCo.,391U.S. 253,289(1968))). AccordingtoFED.R.CIV.P.56(c)(1)(A),includedamongsttheacceptableitemsthat maybeusedtosupportfactualpositionsinclude,affidavitsordeclarations,stipulations (includingthosemadeforpurposesofthemotiononly).Attachedtothisdocument,theCourt willfindPlaintiffsswornaffidavits,eachaffirmingthefactualeventsconcerningthealleged sexbaseddiscriminationperpetratedbyeachDefendant. Here,thereisnogenuineconflictofmaterialfact.Thus,Plaintiffsareentitledto judgmentasamatteroflaw.UndisputedfactualevidenceestablishesthatDefendantsactedina

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discriminatorymannerinconsistentwithU.S.Const.Amend.XIV,againstPlaintiffsbyenforcing Article1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleA Chapter2SubchapterASection2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c),thus denyingPlaintiffsconstitutionallyprotectedrighttolawfulmarriage,causingsubstantialinjuryas describedinElrodv.Burns,427U.S.347,373(1976)ThelossofFirstAmendment Freedoms,evenforminimalperiodsoftime,unquestionablyconstitutesirreparable injury.

B.

Bakerv.NelsonIsNoLongerControllingPrecedent

SinceattemptingtoarticulatethispointmoreeffectivelythanUnitedStatesDistrict JudgeRobertJ.Shelbywouldbeanexerciseinfutility,hisassessmentofBakersrelevance shallbequoted,initsentirety,here: In 1971, two men from Minnesota brought a lawsuit in state court arguing that Minnesota was constitutionally required to allow them to marry. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). The Minnesota Supreme Court found that Minnesotas restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 186-87. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed the case for want of a substantial federal question. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972). Utah [in this case, Texas] argues that the Courts summary dismissal in Baker is binding on this court and that the present lawsuit should therefore be dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question. But the Supreme Court has stated that a summary dismissal is not binding when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). Here, several doctrinal developments in the Courts analysis of both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause as they apply to gay men and lesbians demonstrate that the Courts summary dismissal in Baker has little if any precedential effect today. Not only was Baker decided before the Supreme Court held that sex is a quasi-suspect classification, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688

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(1973) (plurality op.), but also before the Court recognized that the Constitution protects individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996). Moreover, Baker was decided before the Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that it was unconstitutional for a state to demean [the] existence [of gay men and lesbians] or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). As discussed below, the Supreme Courts decision in Lawrence removes a justification that states could formerly cite as a reason to prohibit same-sex marriage. The State points out that, despite the doctrinal developments in these cases and others, a number of courts have found that Baker survives as controlling precedent and therefore precludes consideration of the issues in this lawsuit. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that Baker limit[s] the arguments to ones that do not presume to rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002-03 (D. Nev. 2012) (ruling that Baker barred the plaintiffs equal protection claim). Other courts disagree and have decided substantially similar issues without consideration of Baker. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (ruling that Californias prohibition of same-sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). In any event, all of these cases were decided before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Windsor. As discussed above, the Courts decision in Windsor does not answer the question presented here, but its reasoning is nevertheless highly relevant and is therefore a significant doctrinal development. Importantly, the Windsor Court foresaw that its ruling would precede a number of lawsuits in state and lower federal courts raising the question of a states ability to prohibit same-sex marriage, a fact that was noted by two dissenting justices. The Honorable John Roberts wrote that the Court may in the future have to resolve challenges to state marriage definitions affecting same-sex couples. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). And Justice Scalia even recommended how this court should interpret the Windsor decision when presented with the question that is now before it: I do not mean to suggest disagreement . . . that lower federal courts and state courts can distinguish todays case when the issue before them is state denial of marital status to same-sex couples. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is also notable that while the Court declined to reach the merits in Perry v. Hollingsworth because the petitioners lacked standing to pursue the appeal, the Court did not dismiss the case

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outright for lack of a substantial federal question. See 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Given the Supreme Courts disposition of both Windsor and Perry, the court finds that there is no longer any doubt that the issue currently before the court in this lawsuit presents a substantial question of federal law. As a result, Baker v. Nelson is no longer controlling precedent and the court proceeds to address the merits of the question presented here. (Kitchenv.Herbert,MemorandumDecisionandOrder,p.1216,2013).

C.

SexisaQuasiSuspectClassEntitledtoHeightenedScrutiny
AccordingtoSupremeCourtjurisprudencesetbyCraigv.BorenGlennv. BrumbyJ.E.B.v.AlabamaandMississippiUniversityforWomenv.Hogan,and UnitedStatesv.Virginia,sexisconsideredtobeaquasisuspectclassification,subjectto heightenedjudicialscrutinyunderTheEqualProtectionClauseandTheDueProcessClause ofU.S.Const.Amend.XIV. Tosurviveheightenedscrutiny,DefendantsmustshowthatSection32isnarrowly tailoredtoeffectuateanimportantgovernmentobjective,Zablocki,434U.S.at388,orthat Section32issubstantiallyrelatedtoanimportantgovernmentalobjective,(Clarkv.Jeter, 486U.S.456,461(1988)(applyingintermediatescrutiny).Underthisstandard,theCourtmust findthatstatutoryclassificationreflectsareasonedjudgmentconsistentwiththeidealofequal protectionbyinquiringwhetheritmaybefairlyviewedasfurtheringasubstantialinterestofthe state.(Plyler,457U.S.at21718).Thejustificationmustbegenuine,nothypothesizedor inventedposthocinresponsetolitigation,(UnitedStatesv.Virginia,518U.S.515,533 (1996)).DefendantscannotshowthattheTexassamesexmarriagebansatisfiesheightened scrutiny,especiallywhentheU.SConstitutionprovidesthatconvictedfelonscannotbedenied

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theverysameright(Turner,482U.S.at9496)inwhichPlaintiffsMcNoskyandStrickerare presentlyfightingtoexercise.ThereisABSOLUTELYNOimportantgovernmentobjective servedbydenyingthesamerighttolawabidingsamesexcouples. TheCourtdoesnotneedtodecidewhetherSection32failsheightenedscrutiny becauseSection32cannotevensatisfythemorelenientrationalbasistest.(Romer,517U.S. at631).Tosurvivetherationalbasistest,Section32mustbearatleastsomerational relationshiptoalegitimategovernmentpurpose.Id.(seeCityofCleburne,473U.S.at446) (holdingthatevenwhenthereisalegitimategovernmentpurpose,thediscriminationmustbear atleastsomerationalrelationshiptothatpurpose)(Hellerv.Doe,509U.S.312,321(1993)) (rationalbasistestrequiresthattheprofferedjustificationforalawmustfindsomefootingin therealitiesofthesubjectaddressedbythelegislation).Thus,courtsinsistonknowingthe relationbetweentheclassificationadoptedandtheobjecttobeattained.(Romer,517U.S.at 632).Alawcannotsurviverationalbasisscrutinyunlessitisnarrowenoughinscopeand groundedinasufficientfactualcontextfor[thecourt]toascertainsomerelationbetweenthe classificationandthepurposeitserve[s].Id.at63233.Byrequiringthattheclassification beararationalrelationshiptoanindependentandlegitimatelegislativeend,weensurethat classificationsarenotdrawnforthepurposeofdisadvantagingthegroupburdenedbythelaw. Id.at633.InKitchenv.Herbert,theCourthadastrikinglysimilarconclusionregarding Utahssamesexmarriageban,stating: The law differentiates on the basis of sex and closely resembles the type of law containing discrimination of an unusual character that the Supreme Court struck down in Romer and Windsor. But even without applying heightened scrutiny to Amendment 3, the court finds that the law discriminates on the basis of sexual identity without a rational reason to do so. Because Amendment 3 fails even rational basis review, the court finds

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that Utahs prohibition on same-sex marriage violates the Plaintiffs right to equal protection under the law. (emphasisadded,Kitchenv.Herbert,MemorandumDecisionandOrder,p.50,2013). AtissueinCraigv.Boren,wastheStateofOklahomasstatute,whichprohibitedthe saleofbeertomalepersonswhowereunder21yearsofage,yetallowedthesaletofemale personswhoweremerely18yearsofage.RegardingthisOklahomastatute,theONLY disqualifierforbeingabletopurchasetheconsumableundertheageof21asthepurchasers biologicalsex.InCraig,theCourtheldthat,Oklahoma'sgenderbaseddifferential constitutesaninvidiousdiscriminationagainstmales1820yearsofageinviolationof theEqualProtectionClause.(Craigv.Boren,429U.S.190(1976)). InMississippiUniversityforWomenv.Hogan,thenarrowissueofwhethera statestatutethatexcludesmalesfromenrollinginastatesupportedprofessionalnursingschool violatestheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentIn1884,theMississippi LegislaturecreatedtheMississippiIndustrialInstituteandCollege[p720]fortheEducationof WhiteGirlsoftheStateofMississippi,nowtheoldeststatesupportedallfemalecollegeinthe UnitedStates.1884Miss.Gen.Laws,Ch.30,6.Theschool,knowntodayasMississippi UniversityforWomen(MUW),hasfromitsinceptionlimiteditsenrollmenttowomen.The Courtconcludedthat,theState'spolicyofexcludingmalesfromMUW'sSchoolof NursingviolatestheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment. (MississippiUniversityforWomenv.Hogan,458U.S.718(1982)).

InUnitedStatesv.Virginia,theCourtheldthat,Partieswhoseektodefend genderbasedgovernmentactionmustdemonstrateanexceedinglypersuasivejustificationfor

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thataction.Neitherfederalnorstategovernmentactscompatiblywithequalprotectionwhena laworofficialpolicydeniestowomen,simplybecausetheyarewomen,fullcitizenship statureequalopportunitytoaspire,achieve,participateinandcontributetosocietybasedon theirindividualtalentsandcapacities.Tomeettheburdenofjustification,aStatemustshowat leastthatthe[challenged]classificationservesimportantgovernmentalobjectivesandthatthe discriminatorymeansemployedare substantiallyrelatedtotheachievementofthoseobjectives.(UnitedStatesv.Virginia,518 U.S.515(1996)).Aspreviouslynoted,nosuchjustificationcanbereasonablysaidtoexist,nor aidedbyTexasssamesexmarriageban. InGlennv.Brumby,theAppealsCourtheldthatdiscriminatingagainstsomeoneon thebasisofhisorhergendernonconformityconstitutessexbaseddiscriminationunderthe EqualProtectionClause.TheCourtheldthat,discriminationagainstatransgenderindividual becauseofhergendernonconformityissexdiscrimination,whetheritsdescribedasbeingon thebasisofsexorgender.Also,thatsexdiscriminationincludesdiscrimination againstpersonsbecauseoftheirfailuretocomplywithstereotypicalgendernorms.All persons,whethertransgenderornot,areprotectedfromdiscriminationonthebasisof genderstereotype.Forexample,courtshaveheldthatplaintiffscannotbediscriminated againstforwearingjewelrythatwasconsideredtooeffeminate,carryingaservingtraytoo gracefully,ortakingtooactivearoleinchildrearing.Anindividualcannotbepunishedbecause ofhisorherperceivedgendernonconformity.Becausetheseprotectionsareaffordedto everyone,theycannotbedeniedtoatransgenderindividual.Thenatureofthediscriminationis thesameitmaydifferindegreebutnotinkind,anddiscriminationonthisbasisisaformof

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sexbaseddiscriminationthatissubjecttoheightenedscrutinyundertheEqual ProtectionClause.EversincetheSupremeCourtbegantoapplyheightenedscrutinyto sexbasedclassifications,itsconsistentpurposehasbeentoeliminatediscriminationonthebasis ofgenderstereotypes.(Glennv.Brumbyetal.,724F.Supp.2d1284(N.D.Ga.2010), aff'd,663F.3d1312(11thCir.2011)) Furthermore,Article1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitution,andTexasFamilyCode Title1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection2.001(b),discriminatesolelyonthe basisofbiologicalsex.Thisisclearlyillustratedbyeachlawstext,outlinedagain,here:

Article1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitution,readsasfollows: (a)Marriageinthisstateshallconsistonlyoftheunionofoneman andonewoman.(b)Thisstateorapoliticalsubdivisionofthisstate maynotcreateorrecognizeanylegalstatusidenticalorsimilarto marriage.

TexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection 2.001(b),readsasfollows: Alicensemaynotbeissuedforthemarriageofpersonsofthesame sex.

TexasFamilyCode6.204(c),whichreadsasfollows: Thestateoranagencyorpoliticalsubdivisionofthestatemaynotgiveeffect toa: (1)publicact,record,orjudicialproceedingthatcreates,recognizes,or validatesamarriagebetweenpersonsoftheSAMESEXoracivil

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unioninthisstateorinanyotherjurisdictionor (2)rightorclaimtoanylegalprotection,benefit,orresponsibility assertedasaresultofamarriagebetweenpersonsoftheSAMESEX oracivilunioninthisstateorinanyotherjurisdiction. Allthreeprecedinglawsarecompletelydevoidofanyreferencetosexual orientation. Asintheabovecitedcases,PlaintiffsMcNoskyandStrickerareclearlybeing discriminatedagainstonthebasisoftheirsexduetotheirfailuretoconformtogendernorms, strictlyenforcedbyTexasssamesexmarriageban.Effectively,eachplaintiffisbeinglegally barredfrommarryinganotherwiseeligiblemaleindividualsincetherighttomarryamaleis exclusivelythedomainoffemalepersons,andBECAUSEtheyarefemale.Thebasisofthis discriminationisthesexofthePlaintiffs,andONLYtheirsex. TheCourtneednotspeculateastowhetherornotChrisandSvenwouldbeallowedto lawfullymarryintheStateofTexasifoneofthemhappenedtobefemale,becauseitisan undisputable,cold,hardfactthattheywouldcertainlybeallowed. WithoutdemonstratingthatTexasssamesexmarriagebanserves,important governmentalobjectivesandthatthediscriminatorymeansemployedare substantiallyrelatedtotheachievementofthoseobjectivesTexasssamesex marriagebanclearlyfailsrationalbasisscrutiny,aswellasheightenedscrutiny.Thus,thebanon samesexmarriageisindirectviolationoftheEqualProtectionClauseofU.S.Const.Amend. XIV. Mostrecently,intheU.S.DistrictCourtofUtahsCentralDivisionsKitchenv.

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Herbert(2013),theCourt,rulinginfavorofthePlaintiffs,concurredwiththePlaintiffs rationalethatUtahssamesexmarriagebanDID,infact,discriminateonthebasisofsex, stating The State [Utah] concedes that Amendment 3 involves sex-based classifications because it prohibits a man from marrying another man, but does not prohibit that man from marrying a woman. Nevertheless, the State argues that Amendment 3 does not discriminate on the basis of sex because its prohibition against same-sex marriage applies equally to both men and women. The Supreme Court rejected an analogous argument in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967). In Loving, Virginia argued that its anti-miscegenation laws did not discriminate based on race because the prohibition against mixed-race marriage applied equally to both white and black citizens. Id. at 7-8. The Court found that the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race. Id. at 9. Applying the same logic, the court finds that the fact of equal application to both men and women does not immunize Utahs Amendment 3 from the heightened burden of justification that the Fourteenth Amendment requires of state laws drawn according to sex. But because the court finds that Amendment 3 fails rational basis review, it need not analyze why Utah is also unable to satisfy the more rigorous standard of demonstrating an exceedingly persuasive justification for its prohibition against same-sex marriage. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. (Kitchenv.Herbert,MemorandumDecisionandOrder,p.35,2013) AsinUtah,Texasssamesexmarriagebanalsodiscriminatesagainstindividualsonthe basisoftheirsex,inviolationofU.S.Const.Amend.XIV.

TherehasbeennorulingbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatessincedecidingthe firstofthesecases,whichoverturnsthis38yearoldprecedent.

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D.

MarriageRestrictionsonSameSexCouplesMustComplywithEqual ProtectionandDueProcess
AccordingtotheU.S.Const.Amend.XIV, No State shall make or enforce any law whichshallabridgethe privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protectionofthelaws.

E.

TexasSameSexMarriageBanDoesNotComplyWithEqualProtectionNor DueProcess
TheSupremeCourtpresentlyrecognizesthatmarriageanddomesticrelationsisa mattergenerallylefttothestates.(ExparteBurrus,136U.S.586,59394(1890)(The wholesubjectofthedomesticrelationsofhusbandandwife,parentandchild,belongstothe lawsofthestates,andnottothelawsoftheUnitedStates).Buttherestrictionsimposedon marriagebystatesmustnonethelesscomplywiththeConstitution.(Lovingv.Virginia, 388U.S.1,12(1967)(statutelimitingmarriagetosameracecouplesviolatedequalprotection anddueprocess)(Zablockiv.Redhail,434U.S.374,383(1978)(statuterestrictingfrom marriagepersonsowingchildsupportviolatedequalprotection). InUnitedStatesv.Windsor,133S.Ct.2675(2013)theSupremeCourtagain appliedtheprincipleofequalprotectiontoafederalstatuterestrictingmarriage,theDefenseof MarriageAct(DOMA),whichprohibitedALLfederalgovernmentalinstitutionsfrom formallyrecognizingALLsamesexmarriagelicenses,whetherissuedbyU.S.Stateorforeign

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governments.Thisincludedlawfulmarriagesfromthe12statesandDistrictofColumbia.The Courtheldthatthelawviolatedequalprotectionanddueprocessprinciplesguaranteed bytheFifthandFourteenthAmendments. Basically,underSupremeCourtprecedent,statesarefreetodeterminethecriterion necessarytoobtainmarriagelicenseswithintheirrespectivejurisdictions,butthatcriterion, themselves,mustbesupportedbylegitimatestateinterestsincetheyplacerestrictionsonthe fundamentalrightsofcitizenstomarry. Article1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1Subtitle AChapter2SubchapterASection2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c),as appliedtothesePlaintiffs,violatestheEqualProtectionClauseofU.S.Const.Amend.XIV. becausethestatehasnolegitimateinterestintreatingsamesexcouplesdifferentlythan oppositesexcouples,andanyinterestitdoesarticulatecannotpossiblyoutweighthesevere burdenonsamesexmarriedcouplesbydenyingtheirfundamentalrighttomarrytheindividual oftheirownchoosing. In 1966, attorneys for the State of Virginia made the following arguments to the Supreme Court in support of Virginias law prohibiting interracial marriage: (1) The Virginia statutes here under attack reflects [sic] a policy which has obtained in this Commonwealth for over two centuries and which still obtains in seventeen states; (2) Inasmuch as we have already noted the higher rate of divorce among the intermarried, is it not proper to ask, Shall we then add to the number of children who become the victims of their intermarried parents?; (3) [I]ntermarriage constitutes a threat to society; and (4) [U]nder the Constitution the regulation and control of marital and family relationships are reserved to the States. Brief for Respondents at 47-52, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 1967 WL 113931. These contentions are almost identical to the assertions made by the State of Utah in support of Utahs laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. For the reasons discussed above, the court finds these arguments as unpersuasive as the Supreme Court found them fifty years ago.

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Anti-miscegenation laws in Virginia and elsewhere were designed to, and did, deprive a targeted minority of the full measure of human dignity and liberty by denying them the freedom to marry the partner of their choice. Utahs Amendment 3 achieves the same result. (Kitchenv.Herbert,MemorandumDecisionandOrder,p.5152,2013). JustlikeUtah,theStateofTexassnoncompellingreasonsforimposingsuchhardship onsamesexcouples,isvirtuallyidenticaltothoseoftheStateofVirginiasantimiscegenation lawsofold.Therefore,theStateofTexashaspresentedNOCOMPELLINGREASONfor maintainingitsbanonsamesexmarriage.

F.

MarriagesofOppositeSexCouplesareTreatedDifferently
1. Thedifferenttreatmentofsamesexcouplesfromoppositesexcouplesisnot supportedbyalegitimatestateinterestandimposesirreparableinjuryonsamesex couplesincludingPlaintiffsMcNoskyandStricker. 2. TexasFamilyCodesec.2.004(b)(6)(F)states,togetamarriagelicense, youhavetoswearyourspousetobeisnot"asonordaughterofa parent'sbrotherorsister,ofthewholeorhalfbloodorbyadoption.This statuteimpliesthatcousins,onceremoved(secondcousins),mayindeed,obtaina validmarriagelicenseintheStateofTexas,whilesamesexcouples,including ChrisandSven,areexplicitlydeniedthisrightbyTexaslaw. 3. Morethan1,000federalbenefits,privilegesandresponsibilitiesareimpactedby maritalstatus.SamesexmarriedcouplesincludingChrisandSvenwillbedenied manyofthosefederalbenefitssolelybecausetheyareofthesamesexandlivein

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Texas.Theywillalsobedeniedstateandemployerrelatedbenefits,suchasthe righttoaccesstheirspousesemployerbasedhealthbenefits.

G.

PlaintiffsAreExperiencingIrreparableHarm
Denyingacitizenhisrighttofreespeechconstitutesirreparableharm.(Elrodv.Burns, 427U.S.347,373(1976)(ThelossofFirstAmendmentFreedoms,evenforminimal periodsoftime,unquestionablyconstitutesirreparableinjury).DenyingPlaintiffstheir firstamendmentrightsbyundulydictatingtheirabilitytoassociateinastrictlylegalcontext(I.E. Enterintoalegallybindingmaritalcontractwithanotherindividual),similarlyimposesirreparable harmasdefinedinElrod.Inthiscase,ChrisandSvenareeachbeingdeniedtheirinalienable rightoffreeassociationduetoDefendantsenforcementofArticle1,Sec.32oftheTexas ConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection 2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c).Ascitedpreviously,bothoftheselawscite sex,andONLYsex,asthesolecriterioninwhichindividualsaretobedeniedparticipationin thisstatesanctionedinstitution.Neithersexualorientation,broadly,norhomosexuality, specifically,arementionedorevenimpliedaspotentialdisqualifiersforsuchparticipation.Ifthe basisforexclusionfromparticipationinmarriage,providedbythesetwolaws,wasindeed sexualorientationandnotsexitcouldbeinferredthattwoindividualsofthesamesexwould notbedeniedparticipationintheinstitutionofmarriage,providedthattheybothidentifiedas heterosexual.Thisisnotthecase. Plaintiffssufferirreparableharm,andwillcontinuetosuffer,irreparableharmbecauseof DefendantsenforcementofTexasssamesexmarriageban.Aninjuryisirreparableifmoney damagescannotcompensatefortheharm.(DeerfieldMed.Ctr.,661F.2dat332).While

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Plaintiffsundoubtedlysufferfinancialharmfromtheirinabilitytomarry,seeBadgettDecl. 3268(listingeconomicharmsthatSection32causessamesexcouples),noamountof moneycancompensatethemforthedenialoftheirconstitutionalrights.Thefactthat Section32deniesPlaintiffstheirconstitutionalrighttomarryis,perse,irreparableharm.(Elrod v.Burns,427U.S.347,373(1976))again:(ThelossofFirstAmendmentfreedoms,for evenminimalperiodsoftime,unquestionablyconstitutesirreparableharm.) (Deerfield,661F.2dat338(Wehavealreadydeterminedthattheconstitutionalrightof privacyiseitherthreatenedorinfactbeingimpaired,andthisconclusionmandatesafindingof irreparableharm.)(quotingElrod,427U.S.at373)). Thus,Section32irreparablyharmsPlaintiffs,andthisfactorweighsinfavorofinjunctive reliefsoughtbyPlaintiffs.

H.

TheBalanceofHardshipsandthePublicInterestFavorsTheIssuanceofan Injunction
Inconstitutionalcases,publicinterestisdifficulttoseparatefromthelikelihoodof successonthemeritsbecausethepublicinterestispromotedbytherobustenforcement ofconstitutionalrights.(Am.FreedomDef.Initiativev.SuburbanMobilityforReg. Transp.,698F.3d885,896(6thCir.2012)).Inthiscase,thepublicinterestisclearlyserved byawardingandinjunction.TheStateofTexasisnotharmedbytreatingsamesexcoupleson anequalfootingwiththatofoppositesexcouples.Theharmtosamesexcouplesissevere. Theyaredeniedthefreedomofassociation,freedomofspeech,taxbenefits,publicbenefitsand employerbenefitstiedtotheirstatusaslegallymarriedinTexas. The State of Utah has provided no evidence that opposite-sex marriage will be affected in any way by same-sex marriage. In the absence of such evidence, the States unsupported

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fears and speculations are insufficient to justify the States refusal to dignify the family relationships of its gay and lesbian citizens. Moreover, the Constitution protects the Plaintiffs fundamental rights, which include the right to marry and the right to have that marriage recognized by their government. These rights would be meaningless if the Constitution did not also prevent the government from interfering with the intensely personal choices an individual makes when that person decides to make a solemn commitment to another human being. The Constitution therefore protects the choice of ones partner for all citizens, regardless of their sexual identity. (Kitchenv.Herbert,MemorandumDecisionandOrder,p.52,2013). JustlikeUtah,theStateofTexashaspresentednosuchevidenceillustrativeofits perpetualandindefiniteneedtodenysamesexcouplesthesamedignityandrightsaffordedto oppositesexcouples.Therefore,thereisnocompellingreasonforTexasssamesexmarriage bantoremainvalidintheeyesoftheCourt.ThereisabundantevidencefavoringPlaintiffs requestforinjunctiverelief. Accordingly,theStateofTexashasfailedtomeetitsburdenofjustification,andArticle 1,Sec.32oftheTexasConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2 SubchapterASection2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c),mustbeinvalidated bythisCourtundertheEqualProtectionClauseoftheFourteenthAmendmentasprohibited discriminationbasedsolelyonplaintiffs'biologicalsex.

IV.CONCLUSION
Fortheforegoingreasons,Plaintiffsrespectfullyrequestthatitsmotionforsummary judgmentbegranted,andthatanorderbeenteredenjoiningDefendants,andallrelevant parties,fromfutureenforcementof,orcompliancewithArticle1,Sec.32oftheTexas ConstitutionTexasFamilyCodeTitle1SubtitleAChapter2SubchapterASection

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2.001(b)andTexasFamilyCode6.204(c). Respectfullysubmittedthis12thdayofJanuary,2014. /s/ChristopherDanielMcNosky__ CHRISTOPHERDANIELMCNOSKY ProSe /s/SvenStricker__________________ SVENSTRICKER ProSe

CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
IherebycertifyalldefendantswereservedwithacopyofthisPLAINTIFFS MOTIONFORSUMMARYJUDGEMENTbyemailserviceonJANUARY12,2014,and putativecounselforDefendantshavealsobeenservedbyemailonthatdate.

/s/ChristopherDanielMcNosky_______ CHRISTOPHERDANIELMCNOSKY /s/SvenStricker___________________ SVENSTRICKER

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