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ChristopherDanielMcNosky Colleyville,TX76034 & SvenStricker Bedford,TX76021 Plaintiffs, vs. TexasGovernorRickPerry OfficeoftheGovernor StateInsuranceBuilding 1100SanJacinto Austin,TX78701 & TexasAttorneyGeneralGregAbbott OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral 300W.15thStreet Austin,Texas78701 & TarrantCountyClerkMaryLouiseGarcia OfficeofPublicRecordsandCivilCourts 1895Courthouse 100W.Weatherford FortWorth,TX76196 Defendants, CASENUMBER:A13CV0631
I.STATEMENTOFFACTS
A. ChrisandSvenarenotallowedtolegallymarryinTheStateofTexas.
1. Plaintiffs Chris and Sven havebeendenied therighttoobtainavalidmarriagelicense inTheStateofTexasbythedefendants. 2. Texas law prohibits legal recognition of the marriage of Chris and Sven. Texas Family Code Title 1 Subtitle A Chapter 2 Subchapter A Section 2.001 (b)) states,A licensemaynotbeissuedforthemarriageofpersonsofthesamesex. 3. The Texas constitution also prohibits recognition of the marriage of Chris and Sven. Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution states, (a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. (b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similartomarriage.
B.
MarriagesofOppositesexCouplesareTreatedDifferently.
4. The different treatment of samesex couples from oppositesex couples is not
supported by a legitimate state interest and imposes irreparable injury on samesex couples includingPlaintiffsChrisandSven.
5. Texas Family Code sec. 2.004(b)(6)(F) states, to get a marriage license, you have to swear your spousetobe is not "a son or daughter of a parent's brother or sister, of the whole or half blood or by adoption. This statute implies that cousins, once removed (second cousins) may, in fact, obtain a valid marriage license in The State of Texas, whilesamesexcouples,includingChrisandSven,areexplicitlydeniedthisrightbyTexaslaw. 6. More than 1,000 federal benefits, privileges and responsibilities are impacted by marital status. Samesex married couples including Chris and Sven will be denied many of those federal state benefits solely because they are of the same sexandliveinTexas.Theywill alsobedeniedstateandemployerrelatedbenefits.
II.ARGUMENT
A.
StandardforGrantingPreliminaryRelief.
7. ThestandardforevaluatingarequestforpreliminaryinjunctivereliefunderRule65is
well established inthisCircuit.Though,thereisnorigidand comprehensivetestfordetermining the appropriateness of preliminary injunctive relief, Tate v. Frey, 735 F.2d986,990(6th Cir. 1984)(citationsomitted),thecourtshouldconsiderthefollowingfourfactors: 1. Whetherthepartyseekingtheinjunctionhasshownasubstantial likelihoodofsuccessonthemerits 2. 3. 4. Whetherthepartyseekingtheinjunctionwillsufferirreparableharm absenttheinjunction Whethertheinjunctionwillcauseotherstosuffersubstantialharm Whetherthepublicinterestwouldbeservedbythepreliminaryinjunction.
MemphisPlannedParenthood,Inc.v.Sunquist,175F.3d456,460(6thCir.1999) SouthernMilkSales,Inc.v.Martin,924F.2d98,103n.3(6thCir.1991).SeealsoJane
Doev.Barron,92F.Supp.2d694,695(S.D.Ohio1999)WomensMedicalProfessional Corp.v.Voinovich,911F.Supp.1051(S.D.Ohio1995),affd,130F.3d187(6thCir. 1997),cert.denied,523U.S.1036(1998).Thesefactorsaretobebalancedand[are] notprerequisitesthatmustbesatisfied...theyarenotmeanttoberigidandunbending requirements.McPhersonv.MichiganHighSchoolAthleticAssociation,119F.3d453, 459(6thCir.1997)(enbanc).Afindingofirreparableinjuryisthesinglemost importantprerequisitethattheCourtmustexaminewhenrulinguponamotionfor preliminaryinjunction. 8. Even if the Court is not certain that a plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, a preliminary injunction is still appropriate where the plaintiff shows serious questions going to the merits and irreparable harm which decidedly outweighs any potential harm to the defendant, DeLorean, 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (quoting Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)), or if the merits present a sufficientlyseriousquestiontojustifyfurtherinvestigation,DeLorean,755F.2dat1230. 9.Inthiscasetheplaintiffsmeetthetestforpreliminaryrelief.Theirlikelihoodof successonthemerits,theirirreparableharm,thebalanceofhardshipsandthepublicinterestall stronglyfavortheissuanceofaninjunction.
B.
anypersonwithinitsjurisdictiontheequalprotectionofthelaws.U.S.Const.Amend.XIV. 11. The Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage and domestic relations is a matter generally lefttothestates.ExparteBurrus,136U.S.586,59394(1890)(Thewhole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the lawsof the states, and not to the laws of the United States). But the restrictions imposedonmarriage by states must nonetheless comply with the Constitution. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (statute limiting marriage to samerace couples violated equal protection and due process) Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (statute restricting from marriage personsowingchildsupportviolatedequalprotection). 12.InUnitedStatesv.Windsor,133S.Ct.2675(2013)theSupremeCourtagain appliedtheprincipleofequalprotectiontoastatuterestrictingmarriage.Atissuewasthe federalDefenseofMarriageAct(DOMA)whichdeniedrecognitiontosamesex marriagesforthepurposesoffederallaw.Thisincludedmarriagesfromthe12statesand DistrictofColumbiawheresamesexcouplescouldlegallymarry.TheCourtheldthat thelawwasunconstitutionalbecauseitviolatedequalprotectionanddueprocess principlesguaranteedbytheFifthAmendment.PlaintiffwaslegallymarriedunderNew YorkLawbutbecauseDOMAdeniedfederalrecognitiontosamesexspouses,the plaintiffdidnotqualifyforthemaritalexemptionfromthefederalestatetaxthata heterosexualspousewouldhavebeenentitledto.Id. 13. The Court further held that [t]he States' interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees, stemsfromtheunderstandingthatmarriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits. Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two adult persons ofthesamesexmaynotbepunishedby the State and it can form but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. Id. at 2692(quotingLawrencev.Texas,539U.S.558,(2003)(emphasisadded).
14. In Windsor, the Court cited U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) for the concept that a legislative desire to harm a politically unpopular group of people cannot justify disparate treatment of that group. Id. at 2693. In Moreno, a federal statute prohibiting households containing unrelated persons from qualifying for foodstampswasheld to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under a rational basis analysis. The legislative purposebehindthestatutewastoprohibithippiesfromtaking advantageoffoodstamps.TheCourtheldthattheclassificationhereinissueisnotonly impreciseitiswhollywithoutanyrationalbasis.413U.S.at538. 15. According to Craig v. Boren Glenn v. Brumby J.E.B. v. Alabama and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, and United States v. Virginia, sex is considered to be a quasisuspect classification, subject to intermediate judicial scrutiny under The Equal Protection Clause and The Due Process Clause of The Fourteenth Amendment of TheUnitedStatesConstitution. 16. According to the majority opinions of the preceding cases, federal, state,andlocal governments are barred from engaging in the discriminatory allocation and denial of liberty on thebasisofsex,withoutvalidgovernmentalobjective. 17.InWindsor,theCourtheldthatthepurposeofthefederalDOMAwas toimposeinequality,notforotherreasonslikegovernmentalefficiency.Windsor,133 S.Ct.at2694.TheSupremeCourtinWindsordescribedhowfamilieswithsamesex parentsaretreatedbyDOMA:
Windsor,133S.Ct.at2694. 18.Insum,underSupremeCourtjurisprudence,statesremainfreetodetermine conditionsforvalidmarriagesbutthoserestrictionsthemselvesmustbesupportedby legitimatestateinterestssincetheyimposerestrictionsonimportantlibertyinterestsof citizenswhowishtomarry. 19.Thereisnolegitimatestatepurposeservedbyfailingtorecognizesamesex marriages celebrated in states where they are legal.ThepurposebehindtheTexasprovisionsis to single out an unpopular group and cause them harm. As setoutabovethisisnotalegitimate state purpose. But, if there is some other government purpose someappropriatepurposeit cannot possibly outweigh the severe burden imposed by the Texas provisions on samesex couplesthataredeniedtheirfundamentalrighttomarrytheindividualoftheirownchoosing. 20. Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, andTexasFamilyCodeTitle1 Subtitle A Chapter 2 Subchapter A Section 2.001 (b), as applied to these plaintiffs, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the state has no legitimate interest in treating samesex couplesdifferently than oppositesex couples, and any interest it does articulate cannot possibly outweigh the severeburdenonsamesexmarriedcouples.
C.
PlaintiffsAreExperiencingIrreparableHarm. 21. Denying a citizen his right to free speech constitutes irreparable harm. Elrod v.
Burns,427U.S.347,373(1976)(ThelossofFirstAmendmentFreedoms,evenfor
minimalperiodsoftime,unquestionablyconstitutesirreparableinjury).Denying plaintiffs their first amendment rightsbyundulydictatingtheirabilitytoassociateinastrictlylegal context (IE Enter into a legally binding marriage contract with another individual), with the SOLE criterion for the plaintiffs exclusion by the state being the respective sexes of the plaintiffs, similarly imposes irreparable harm as defined in Elrod. In this case, Chris and Sven are eachbeingdeniedtheirinalienablerightoffreeassociationduetotheenforcementofArticle 1, Sec. 32 of theTexasConstitution,andTexasFamilyCode Title1SubtitleAChapter 2 Subchapter A Section 2.001 (b). As cited previously, both of these laws cite sex, and ONLY sex, as the sole criterion in which individuals are to be denied participation in this statesanctioned institution. Neithersexualorientationnorhomosexualityarementionedoreven implied. If the basis for exclusion from participation in marriage, provided by these two laws, was indeed sexual orientation and not sex it could be inferred that two individuals ofthesame sex would not be denied participation in the institution of marriage, provided that they both identifiedasheterosexual.
D.
III.CONCLUSION
23. This Court should issue a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing Article 1, Sec. 32 of the Texas Constitution, and Texas Family Code Title 1 Subtitle A Chapter 2 Subchapter A Section 2.001 (b) as applied to samesex couples seeking Texas marriage licenses, whos sole disqualifier for such marriage licenses is their respective sex. This includes but is not limited to such officials who issue marriage license for TheStateofTexas,astheneedarisesfortheplaintiffs.
RespectfullySubmitted,
CERTIFICATEOFSERVICE
IherebycertifyalldefendantswereservedwithacopyofthisMotionbyemail serviceonNovember23,2013,andputativecounselfordefendantshavealsobeenservedby emailonthatdate.